Mr. Speaker, I wish to propose the motion standing in my name—

The White Paper which is before the House contains the decisions by the Government on the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into South West Africa Affairs. Under ordinary circumstances this would not call for a special debate. The statement would make quite clear what the Government intended to do and any discussion necessary could take place under the relevant Vote. In this particular instance, however, I made a promise to the Opposition that an opportunity for a debate would be given in connection with this matter. To-day we are keeping that promise. Furthermore, there are matters of general interest which will also, no doubt, make such a debate of some value. The debate will of necessity refer to the White Paper but it will be impossible not to deal with certain aspects of the commission’s report in passing. However, it is quite clear to me, and I believe to others, that it is not the report of the commission of inquiry with which we are dealing to-day but the White Paper which contains the decisions of the Government. I therefore do not intend to traverse the contents of the report. Neither do I intend to repeat in detail what is quite clearly stated in the White Paper itself, as being the Government’s intentions, except to outline broadly the policy which lies behind those decisions, both in respect of the positive decisions and the decision to postpone the taking of a stand now on certain other matters.

Before doing so I wish to state certain principles which underlie the attitude we have adopted. In order to make those principles quite clear I wish to read to the House those statements of principle—

1. (1) The decisions for which the Assembly’s approval is now requested are all that are deemed necessary at this stage. At the same time it must be emphasized from the outset that, whatever is the case at present, the comprehensive scheme of the development of political, economic and social aims and benefits, forms one whole and must, at the appropriate time, be implemented as such. This is not necessary, or even possible, from the word “go” but will be implemented in the best interests of all concerned as soon as is practicable.

This is indicated by the Government’s decision to accept as correct the direction indicated by the report—

One decision builds on the effects of actions taken under other decisions.

All impressions that have been created outside that when a report is received it is necessary for the Government to state its intentions on one occasion on all aspects of such a report are wrong, not only with regard to this particular report but with regard to any report.

1. (3) The recommendations of the commission do not involve a radical change in policy. The separate development of the different population groups of South West Africa has been fundamental in the administration of the Territory since the inception of the mandate. This in turn was a natural and unavoidable consequence of the facts of history and the conditions in the Territory and the relation between the ethnic groups which were there from that very time. Both the Permanent Mandate’s Commission and the Council of the League of Nations accepted this as the policy to be endorsed. Similarly the idea and right of administrating South West Africa as an integral part of the administration of South Africa was acceptable throughout all those years.
2. (4) The White Paper is based on the decision to preserve the status quo, for the time being and for the reasons given, in respect of administration, financial control and Native territories, but no shelving for reinvestigation later is insinuated. There is to be a spacing of decisions for obvious reasons.
3. (5) The decisions now taken and placed before the House for approval are of fundamental economic and social import and can usefully, and in some cases must, precede other forms of development.

The standpoint of the Government is based on those principles, Mr. Speaker.

I shall now proceed to deal with the White Paper itself. The White Paper has been drawn up so that the intentions of the Government may be perfectly clear and so that no misunderstanding can exist or be aroused by misinterpretations. Consequently every point has been stated as straightforwardly and as briefly as seemed adequate. The principle on which the White Paper was based was to state definitely what the Government’s attitude was towards the course of development, the broad lines on which the Government thought development should take place in the interests of all sections of the population and in order to promote prosperity and goodwill amongst those various sections of the population. The Government’s attitude has been stated clearly that it accepts the direction indicated by the report of the commission of inquiry.

There are very many recommendations. They concern certain major projects and major principles but also a multitude of details of administration. These various recommendations are classified in three groups. The first group consists of those recommendations on which immediate decisions seemed necessary and were taken. Some of those decisions deal with large matters; some of them deal with organization for what has to come. I shall refer to them later on. The second group consists of those recommendations which need administrative decisions from time to time as they fit in, decisions to be taken not by the Government or by Parliament itself but by those administering the various Departments of State or the South West Africa Administration. These recommendations could only be indicated by means of a number of examples. Anybody who refers to those examples will be convinced, I am sure, that they are not the type of recommendations which should be dealt with in any other fashion than we are following.

The third group consists of matters of major import, matters on which decisions could have been taken now or can be taken later but which, for diverse reasons, both practical and other, we say with great clarity are not taken now. The reasons are analysed in the White Paper without any attempt to evade any problems which the enunciation of these reasons may bring. I shall also deal with that at a later stage.

Finally, an indication was necessary as to how we would proceed within the following period which could be looked upon as an interim period, an interim period pending certain decisions which must come later.

The first group concerns those developments on which decisions have to be taken now. Amongst them the major one is the great economic and also social development scheme called the Kunene scheme. This is a scheme to provide water and electricity. It is a scheme which will cost a huge sum of money but it is one which can to a very large extent, if not completely, ultimately pay its own way. If this scheme were not to be adopted then the whole basis for the building-up of South West Africa’s economy—and that means the economy of various sections of the population and their territories—would fall away.

May I say in passing that the commission which was appointed was a very experienced one. We have been accused of not having included people from South West Africa itself. There were very good reasons for that. The one reason was that we have been attacked in the past for having left matters to South West Africa to solve itself. We were also accused of making use of South West Africans who were prejudiced in their own favour. So in those circumstances we thought it wise to appoint a commission of impartial persons outside South West Africa, individuals who were undoubted experts in their own particular spheres. I have no doubt that when the results of their deliberations, as outside experts, are taken into consideration carefully, everybody will be satisfied that one of the most important and complete reports was produced in a very short space of time, and that South Africa and everybody in South West Africa has much to be thankful for with regard to the efforts made by this commission. There is no reason whatsoever why they should be attacked as not having been the right type of person to have been appointed.

Their Kunene scheme is very fundamental to the whole economic uplift of the Territory. If this scheme were not adopted, or if it were to be attacked for any outside reason, the only—and I emphasize “the only”—real huge scheme which can change a whole country’s future, would be cast aside. It may be true that the scheme has to be partly developed in an area which is situated near the boundaries between our country and that of neighbours, in an area which is not fully under our own control and about whose future there may be some doubts in the minds of some people. The question one must ask oneself is, however, whether because of fear or doubt or hesitation, the Government should just set aside the one real fundamental possibility of creating that change which will mean the difference between prosperity and comparative poverty in that huge area.

We must also take into consideration the fact that South West Africa is in great parts almost a desert area, and that water is of most fundamental value. Here it is possible to initiate a scheme for providing water to huge areas in the north and at a later stage even further south, and at the same time, to have that linked up with an electricity-producing scheme which can bring cheap power for the development of both Native and White areas and also provide an income to at least certain of those Native areas for which an income must be sought if they are to become at all viable. The income which may accrue from this electricity scheme is believed by the experts to be of the greatest value for any future development of those northern territories. Therefore I state categorically that this is the basis on which developmental ideas must be built, if there are not just to be purely local and smallish schemes for each area on its own account. If anything has to be done which demands vision, it is this scheme. I specifically requested those investigators to make quite sure that there were not alternative possibilities; to make quite sure that there were not alternate schemes supposing this one would prove too large. I have been given the assurance that this is the one and only and fundamental scheme of value for the whole of this huge territory.

Consequently, when approaching this matter from the point of view of South Africa, and realizing the need of South Africa’s aid in finding the capital needed for such a scheme as well as the manpower and the know-how, I maintain that it is wrong for people to attack us by saying: “You are prepared to suggest something so great that it will cost more than anything you suggest for some of your own Bantu areas in South Africa.” Such comparisons may not be made. We must deal with each area, here and there, not on the basis of the funds needed, but on the available possibilities for development. In the case of some areas, both in South West Africa and in South Africa, you can only develop localized schemes, or you may have to spread the available funds over a number of smallish undertakings in different spheres, or may have to spread the expenditure over the years, or have to recognize that the benefit of development has taken place to a far larger extent in the past than one finds when dealing with South West Africa so that present need is smaller.

Therefore in each case one must look at the matter on its own merit. If there is a large scheme by means of which we can do much for South West Africa and its inhabitants, and we have the funds available or can find the capital here or further afield, we must not by such specious arguments, raised for political purposes, avoid doing our duty in such a particular area where a project can be made to function properly. Therefore, we as a Government will not, just because these party political attacks are and will be made upon us, allow ourselves to be deviated from the duty of developing this big scheme which is the scheme on which all prosperity and development in South West Africa can be built.

Apart from this big scheme there are, for the various areas, further water schemes as enunciated in the White Paper and with which I need not deal. Then there is another great need and that is roads for communication purposes and airfields in various parts of South West Africa. These means of communication have also been described fully in the report and the Government has indicated in the White Paper what is intended in this respect. Construction will take time but in order to open up South West Africa, quicker, now that it has developed to its present stage, construction of these roads and airfields is also unavoidable and will be of great value to both South Africa and South West Africa.

I need not refer to the suggestions concerning mining and industry, except just to say this. I have noticed that the idea of establishing a furniture factory in Ovamboland has been derided in some quarters. That must have been done by people who cannot recognize, because they have no experience of the area, the opportunity which is only now opening up in this direction. The economist, Dr. van Eck, who made the investigation into the industrial possibilities in those various areas, has convinced himself, as others have been convinced, that this small beginning may now be undertaken. Just as in the case of certain other suggestions, we are not prepared to be deviated from our course of trying to establish anything which can form the basis of future growth—not by derision or by any other kind of attempt to convince us that we must leave something positive aside for the moment. I do not need to say more about the suggestions in regard to agriculture, education and health services. I think there will be very little difference of opinion on those matters.

Then the White Paper refers to the positive decision to continue with the purchase of land. I shall deal with that in another context in a few moments.

The next decision of a fundamental character was the one to appoint a committee of experts. Mr. Speaker, this deals with a specific problem. That problem is that for all this large-scale planning to be implemented properly a closer link-up between South Africa and South West Africa in both the financial and the administrative sphere is accepted by the report as essential to the greatest extent. But the members of the commission did not go further than that and could not go further than that. They could not, naturally, describe to us every detail of procedure which would be necessary in order to create this closer linkup. Anybody who has had to do with reorganization knows how detailed your information must be before you start. I can refer to the developments in the Transkei as an example. There, throughout the years, this particular Native area had been developed as a more or less separate entity. For many years the Bunga system was in existence. It was a chief commissionership on its own. Afterwards the Bantu Authority system was applied, and there was a Territorial Authority. Therefore a central form of advisory body with an administration operated almost all on its own. Yet, when we had to take the next step, the creation of a Transkeian parliament with a civil service of its own, although the transition seemed to be so easy—from the stage of a community almost self-contained within a certain geographical area—it took very detailed investigation by a committee of experts from Departments concerned to work out every detail of procedure. It took more than a year, almost a year and a half, to work out all the details so that the transition could take place as easily as it did without any hitches. Now if that was the case with the Transkei, apparently so easy to reorganize, how much more involved will the arrangements be in the case of a huge territory, organized differently, such as South West Africa is. Consequently it was thought wise to appoint a committee not only to investigate the procedure and the effects, and what should be done in connection with those effects, with regard to financial control as mainly suggested by the commission of inquiry, but to investigate on exactly the same lines all the details of procedure and the effects, and how to deal with those effects, in the case of administrative reorganization. Therefore this committee, which will consist of civil servants and persons in control in both South Africa and South West Africa, will be appointed as a body to lay down in all detail the procedures which will have to be adopted if and when decisions should be made on those matters to which I am referring—that is those concerning administrative and financial control.

After this, the White Paper deals with another class of decisions, viz., those on which the authorities concerned may take their own decisions. To this I have already referred sufficiently.

Then we come to those matters to be decided upon later. Some of those matters cause no problems, I presume, to either ourselves or members on the other side. There are certain long-term projects, even second and third five-year term plans. Nobody expects us to take decisions on them now.

Next are the recommendations which need further consideration.

But over and above these there are certain fundamental issues which are put aside temporarily and with which I want to deal now. One in particular is the question of the homeland policy. Recommendations in connection with the homeland policy are not being decided on now, for various obvious reasons—reasons which have been set out in the White Paper. Before discussing those reasons let me make it very clear that one accusation which is being made against the report and which has given rise to misunderstanding, sometimes deliberately and sometimes through ignorance, rests on the supposition that we are exporting apartheid, or segregation or separate development from the Republic to South West Africa. The words which were used were that we are “extending apartheid to South West Africa”. When that suggestion is made, people do not take into consideration the real facts. I have already referred to that, right at the outset, but now wish to state in more detail that what the report suggests is not to introduce apartheid to South West Africa but to take into consideration the historical facts of South West Africa. They are that there have always been in South West Africa quite separate ethnic groups, groups which in the course of history often clashed with one another. Therefore one would not be forcing them apart now if you were to continue the development of each group’s territory. One should indeed rather not allow oneself to force together those who never did belong together. There is no question of extending apartheid to South West Africa, there is no forcing apart of groups. What is suggested is to refrain from forcing together, against the whole trend of their history, peoples who are separate. Therefore I wish to emphasize that the basic idea with which we are dealing is not the creation of homelands. It is the pre-seerving of homelands. In some cases these homelands have already almost fallen apart. There it is a question of taking the kernel which still exists and, by an extension of territory and by bringing scattered groups together, with their co-operation (those who belong together), to re-establish the valued former conditions that they have always known about and continually have asked for. I, as a former Minister of Bantu Affairs, can state categorically that I visited each of these various groups and have always been asked for the further proper development of their own ethnic groups and areas. For these reasons reference is made in the White Paper to the Government’s attitude in connection with homelands and to the broad course of development which is underwritten by the Government. This is stated on page 12 of the White Paper as follows—

I wish to emphasize again that when the report states, and the White Paper endorses, this general attitude, it is not based on transferring any policy from South Africa to the adjoining territory. It is just purely and simply a continuation of the existing form of development and policy.

But now it is a fact that before you can continue this development, the circumstances must be such that further progress is feasible. Amongst the desired circumstances is the availability of sufficient land in certain cases and the improvement of existing facilities in other cases. In Ovamboland, for instance, you have the huge southern portion, stretching right across the whole breadth of Ovamboland, which is now practically useless, just for lack of water. This can become a part of the homeland providing a good living and can carry another large population, practically two or three times as much as at present, if only water, and water on a large scale, is provided right throughout the length and breadth of that huge area. Therefore the proper development of a homeland there is dependent upon the expeditious carrying out of the water scheme which has already been partially commenced. In the case of other areas, it is more a matter of the extension of the land by purchases from European farmers. Therefore, in any case, the fulfilment of the recommendations in this report would not have been immediately feasible. It would take time, although it could be taken as the objective. Therefore no decision on these matters need be taken at this stage. There are other reasons too for no decision now to which reference is made in the White Paper.

One additional reason of great importance is the fact that South Africa is at present involved in an international court case, a case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia, which concerns the policy of the Government of South Africa, namely the policy of separate development. It is conceivable, and must probably in fact be expected, in view of both the deliberate misunderstandings and misunderstandings through ignorance, and other less cogent reasons, that, if South Africa were to continue with the ordinary natural development of the existing homelands, it would be interpreted as affecting the rights of the litigants in this particular case. Consequently the Government had to take into consideration the possibility that an interdict could be requested from the International Court to prevent South Africa from dealing with such matters as the homeland development and also the financial control and administrative measures envisaged in the report, until after the case comes to an end. That had to be taken into consideration by the Government when deciding whether it should go ahead with these matters now or not. As is very well known, the Government of South Africa is a stickler for doing what is juridically correct, and we have always taken a strong stand on the sub judice rule. It is well known too that neither the United Nations itself, nor countries such as Liberia and Ethiopia have respected the sub judice rule in the same way as would be expected from us. In spite of that we have adhered faithfully throughout to this rule, and therefore in spite of the fact that we have our reservations on the right of the International Court to investigate these matters, we were prepared to go ahead and put our case at the International Court while retaining those reservations. We would therefore have felt ourselves compelled to respect also any possible appeal to that court for an interdict, should we take decisions on these other matters, if they were involved, or theoretically involved. For those practical reasons and for such reasons as pertain to the court case, it is quite clear that we had to come to these decisions.

The final portion of the White Paper deals with the way in which we can proceed during what I call this interim period. Of course when the case is settled and when the other conditions are such that one can proceed and reports have been received on procedure regarding financial control and administration and we are advised how further developments can take place, then we can go ahead on the lines in accordance with these broad principles which we now indicate as having our support. But until that stage is reached some other arrangements have to be made. Those arrangements are easy, because there is in existence the South West Africa Administration which can undertake, at least in these opening stages, quite conveniently, all the tasks which may be expected of them, or they can appoint as agents to do for them what the Government of South Africa, if it were directly responsible, would either do itself, or also do through persons appointed for those tasks. The finances must be made available. Just as they would have been made available to the relevant authorities under other circumstances, they can in these stages be made available to the Administration of South West Africa, and it can be done in such a way that no burdens need be laid upon either the Administration or the people of South West Africa other than they would carry if we had proceeded according to the methods proposed in the report itself.

There is just one point that I must still stress in connection with the White Paper itself before proceeding to a further matter, and that is the purchase of land in South West Africa during this interim period. In the report the new boundaries proposed for the various homelands are clearly stated as the commission thought they should be. As a result every farmer within those at present still-theoretical boundaries may feel uncertain as to his future. Some of them may not mind and will just continue with their farming operations, awaiting what is going to happen. Others may feel that they would prefer to embark upon new undertakings immediately, either farming operations or something else. It is therefore only fair and just to them to make it possible for those who so wish to sell their farms, and not to feel that they are left in uncertainty. Therefore it is said quite clearly here that all farmers who wish to offer their farms for purchase as if the report had been accepted in those respects as well, can do so and their wishes can be met under the ordinary forms of purchase with which everybody in South Africa is well-acquainted, viz. where farms are purchased in areas adjacent to Native territories. But it is also very clearly stated, in order not to make the position uncertain, or to let people feel that their farms have been purchased under false pretences, that not only would they be selling of their own free will, but it is also made clear that the land which is purchased will become state property and that this state property may be used according to whatever decisions are taken in the future. They may be used in accordance with the suggestions of this report when that stage is reached. They may be retained as state property for other purposes, should that be deemed necessary. In other words, nobody who sells is under any uncertainty as to the fact that in this interim period he is not necessarily selling for the purpose of homeland extension, but he is being given the opportunity of selling because there is a suggestion of homeland extension in regard to which decisions may be taken in the future in accordance with the report which we have before us. Everybody knows why decisions have to be postponed. The White Paper dealt with this.

I now wish to deal with the point that the Opposition has made accusations that the Government is discarding principles or former intentions by drafting this White Paper as it did. Sir, that is purely and simply a party political manoeuvre intended deliberately to embarrass the Government. There is no justification for that accusation. It is nothing else but a part of political tactics and political propaganda to describe the Government and myself as weak and submitting to pressure. In fact, we saw during the past few weeks the way in which the Opposition tried to exploit the present position and the problems confronting us. The party opposite and their Press tried to exploit the position in South West Africa for their own purposes. Instead of taking the responsible view that we are dealing with a great problem which needs a act together if we possibly can, and in respect of which we at least should not try to solution and in respect of which we should undermine ourselves and our State by causing suspicion of either weakness or submission to pressure, the Opposition has tried to exploit the position for its own purposes. I can quote a few forms in which, before any announcement of decisions had been made by the Government, these accusations were levelled: “The Prime Minister must defy the world or lose face;” “The Prime Minister is unable to make up his mind;” “The Government is in an acute dilemma;” “The Government must decide how it can defy the Court;” Why were these general suggestions made beforehand, before any decision was arrived at and announced? Purely and simply either to induce us to be tactless, be undiplomatic, follow a way which might cause difficulties, or otherwise ridicule us if we followed the wise and but take into consideration any obstacles which might be in our way. They sought to try to prevent us from following that road, or if we did follow that road, then to be able to turn around and accuse us of having submitted to pressure. It was a party political manoeuvre, statesmanlike path of seeking our objectives nothing less and nothing more, and a very disgusting one at that. Because it does not only hit at the Government, it hits at South Africa. And the follow-up was quite clear. I have got a number of quotations here to show what happened after we did not follow the line they had perhaps hoped we would follow so that South Africa could get into trouble overseas. Then they said “The Prime Minister backs down”. From what? “The Prime Minister climbs down;” “Plans are shelved,” as if they were completely thrown aside. “A severe setback,” “A major withdrawal”; “The Prime Minister is yielding”; “His attitude is different from his Windhoek attitude”; “Plans are placed in cold storage”. What do all these descriptions mean? They are simply intended to build up a picture of a weak Government, so that people from outside can be induced to try to bring more pressure to bear upon the South African Government. This game of make-believe, which the Opposition and its Press is playing, whilst they know that their statements are untrue, as they know that the path of wisdom is always followed by this Government, can only do South Africa harm. It is not the Government they are harming, because the people of South Africa who support the Government have confidence in the Government and expect the Government to achieve its objective and to take into account the obstacles and to find their way around those obstacles. But the Opposition wanted to create this impression of weakness, and did try that before and after the White Paper in a disreputable manner.

Besides these general suggestions there were also more specific ones, namely,: “Here is a capitulation to international opinion.” And worse still: “The Government submits to United States and United Kingdom pressure”. This false propaganda which must be exposed in all its foolishness unfortunately compels me to deal even with these references to other states. I must refer especially to the two major countries which have become involved. This is so partly through their own fault, I am sorry to say, because of the leakages which took place, and partly because of the form in which these accusations were made in the Opposition Press. Actually, there were three contentions. The first was that there was a strong reaction in South West Africa unfavourable to the report, and therefore there had to be changes made in the plans of the South African Government. I must confess that I have no knowledge whatever of reactions of this kind which could make any impression whatever on the Government’s intention or compel the Government to act otherwise than in the way it thinks best. On the contrary, our experience on the whole—I admit there is opposition, but it is weak opposition, among both the Whites and the non-Whites, but it is there just as there is opposition to Government measures in any country—is that public opinion, in so far as it could influence this Government in its attitude and its decisions, was in favour of what we wish to do. This is proved not only by the decision by the Legislative Assembly but also by the public reactions of people in all walks of life. I defy the Opposition to show where, for example in the business or economic life of South West, among their own supporters, they can find a strong attitude adopted against the report of this Commission. I have had all kinds of indications from many quarters of strong support for it. Therefore to say that anything we are doing now, or that the form in which the White Paper has been drawn up, or the decisions which were taken, were influenced by adverse reaction in South West, is just not true.

Secondly, it was said that we were influenced by the United Party and by the United Party of South West Africa. The words used were that “they forced our hand”. How flattering this seems to them. But what exactly did the United Party do, or could it do, this wilting party without any impressive support, this party without any ideas which can penetrate the minds of people, this party which has no influence whatsoever in conditioning the minds of people towards action—how could it possibly influence the Government? How could their Opposition inspire fear in any form? I know that a lot of boasting has been going on. I read about the meetings of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, where according to some newspapers there were 1,500 people present, and according to others 1,200, while others again say there were only 700, but what did that prove? It did not make the slightest impression upon us. Therefore I can only say that the Opposition flatters itself by contending that it influenced this Government to change its mind and follow the path indicated in the White Paper.

The third point was that South Africa submitted to pressure exerted by the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. Now let me say—and I say this quite deliberately—that this also is not true. It is true that we received communications through diplomatic channels from both the U.S.A. and the U.K. Governments. It would not have been correct of me to mention this, or even to discuss it, under ordinary circumstances, but unfortunately leakages took place of what should have been kept secret as diplomatic interchanges. They took place in London and apparently also in Washington or New York, and perhaps even in Cape Town. I think it is only fair of me to say that I deprecate the fact that such leakages took place. After all, when one country communicates with another and gives an expression of its opinion and gives its advice, it would become valueless if that is done in public. That is not customary; it is not done, and there are very good reasons why it should never be done. I, too, could misuse confidences if I wished to do so. I know of reasons, not reasons which affect South Africa but which affect friendly countries, which I regard as good reasons why such information as to their attitude in this matter should have been given to us. I could even embarrass friendly countries to-day if I were to mention one of those reasons communicated to me, but I will not do so precisely because it would be embarrassing to a friendly country. That is just not done, and in spite of the fact that South Africa has been embarrassed in a similar manner I shall not retaliate. But I do wish to say this, that for communications between friendly countries, and especially if they contain friendly warnings, to be made public is not the way to ensure that attention can be given to future communications, because one will not know whether they are private or will become public. I must make it quite clear also that the impression perhaps created outside that crude or threatening communications were made to us is not correct. The communications made by these countries were courteously presented, giving information on their own assessment as to what could happen in certain circumstances. I do not take it amiss if friendly countries who fear that certain actions may lead to certain consequences inform us to that effect, and also inform us as to what their position will then be and what their attitude must then be. That is only fair between friends, but it is quite wrong when, by letting this leak out, public impression can be created that there were threats made of an unpleasant kind and that we submitted to pressure.

In this connection I must refer to a statement made by Mr. Clarence Randall when he visited South Africa. He is not employed by the U.S. Government as far as I know, but he is an important man in the political life of the U.S.A. I do not know how he became informed as to the U.S. attitude, but it does create suspicion that before he even landed he saw fit to make a Press statement in which he suggested that the United States would not look upon implementation of the report on South West Africa as something which it could support if South Africa acted in certain ways, and then he added that the United States believed in the rule of law. That seemed to me to be a form of public statement which might have been inspired or might not have been—I do not know—but which was intended to create a public atmosphere here in order to exert pressure on the Government. That was not necessary, and I do not think it should be done, especially by a person in that position.

I must add this, that the communications which we received were based on two wrong assumptions. Those wrong assumptions were, firstly, that the Government would not and was not taking into consideration the effect on the pending court case of any decision it might take; that it might just ignore that it was involved in an international court case, and that this might have repercussions if its decisions took a certain form. The assumption that we were not considering those matters, or might not want to consider them, was wrong. It was just taken from the air. As I said, I do not take it amiss if a friendly Government makes such an assumption and then tells us what its reaction will be, supposing that assumption were proved to be correct. But it remains an assumption, and a wrong assumption, because even at that stage we were in direct consultation with our own legal representatives on the implications of the Odendaal Commission’s report, and the result on the international court case of anything South Africa might do. We were fully aware of the fact that we had to take this into careful consideration in planning our course of action.

But there was a second assumption, viz. that not only would we follow a line of action ignoring the court case, but also that, should the matter be taken to court and an interdict be applied for, our action pursuant on an interdict if granted would be such as to lead to intervention by the Security Council. Now, no grounds whatsoever were given at any time or in any way for this assumption that South Africa would allow itself to be involved with the Security Council in respect of such a matter. I wish to say no more about this, except that while these two communications from friendly countries were no doubt well-intentioned, they were based on assumptions which were not correct. Naturally the South African Government in its replies did not expose, before it had taken its final decisions, what its line of action would be, because that was our own business. I think it was most unfortunate that through the disclosure of these diplomatic exchanges wrong impressions might have been gained by the public, and therefore I felt compelled to give this explanation to-day.

Now I wish to deal with another problem. This is whether, if we do not follow this direction, the broad direction indicated in this White Paper, there is any alternative. Is there any other direction? Can another line of action be followed? There are apparently two courses in the minds of the United Party Opposition. The leader of the United Party in South West Africa has a solution of his own. He believes in separate independence for South West, and that South West, in certain circumstances, might need the intervention of UN. Therefore he sees a solution in a direction which can only be looked upon as disastrous, both economically and politically. But the Leader of the Opposition has not associated himself with his leader in South West. He has taken a line of his own, and that he described in his speech at Windhoek. The direction he wishes to take is to build one federation upon the other. He apparently accepts a communal system so that the people of the various ethnic groups are recognized as separate entities with a communal organization of their own. Then these communal organizations must apparently build up into a sort of Black-controlled territory north of the police line, i.e. the Okavango, Ovamboland and the Kaokoveld, and possibly the Caprivi. Apparently he accepts some sort of large state there, a federation of the various areas I have just mentioned, a federation of three or four or five of those ethnic areas—I do not know whether he has got clarity on that as yet—but it must necessarily become a Black state, a Black federation. Then he accepts that south of the line there must also be a race federation. The various communities may have certain degrees of self-government, but all must be linked up in the Legislative Assembly in South West, which must then necessarily become a mixed body, since it will contain representatives from all these communal groups as well as from the Whites. We will then have a Black northern federation and a southern mixed state, and then these two will combine once again to create the Federation of South West Africa. So there must be a northern state and a southern state, a Black northern state and a mixed southern state, and all of that will create one federation, the Federation of South West Africa, of course with a Black and White Parliament. And then the federation joke has to be carried further, because that federation has to become come part of another federation, that of the Republic of South Africa. Those federations will have representation in this Federal Parliament. Therefore we will have a Federal Parliament for the Republic of South Africa, which will ultimately be a Federal Parliament above the other Federal Parliament. In this joint Federal Parliament there will be representatives of the Black states in South Africa and in the Protectorates, and also from that Black northern federation and the mixed federation in South West Africa. I do not want to go very far into this, because I do not think Mr. Speaker will allow me to do so, but what I do wish to say is this. If there is anything which can be disastrous for South West Africa and for the prosperity of the Blacks as well as the Whites, and for the possibility of developing the whole of South West, as well as for White rule in its part of South West, it is this little joke or experiment of the Leader of the Opposition which he wants to carry out as an alternative course for South West Africa. Furthermore, by suggesting a super-federation which must become Black-controlled, and soon, he is endangering further than he has already done the future of the Republic of South Africa. In other words, this is a most disastrous direction both for South West Africa and for South Africa. Consequently there is no other direction than to follow the path of history, than to follow the way in which South West has already developed, as I have described, and that is also the road one finds other countries followed. After all, on what is our alternative direction based? On the pure and simple fact of being prepared to give political independence to all those who are different and seek to retain their separate identity; and, since they cannot become viable for a very long time, to do exactly what is done in Europe where there are also countries which are not viable on their own, namely to have a form of economic co-operation and inter-dependence (while they will control their own political life) and so enjoy prosperity. There is, therefore, a clear difference between the two directions.

In conclusion, I wish to stress three points. It is a pity that certain critics, also critics from overseas, sought to deny the outstanding value of this report. No other country, not even UN, could do more for the well-being of the inhabitants of South West of all races and colours than South Africa can do. It is a false accusation which is also being made overseas that the bulk is being given to the Whites and only illusions to the non-Whites. The truth is that a system is envisaged in which each can have his own political rights, quite on his own, and all can be linked together for economic purposes to ensure prosperity for all. The basis of the solution is the association with an economically strong South Africa. Much of the lack of success elsewhere in Africa is because the new states have no strong arm to lean on. Hand-outs are useless to developing countries. They are not well spent. There is only one way in which development is possible, and that is to develop in cooperation with a country which is developing itself on the correct lines, and whose example you follow. Then the one country’s development gives an impetus to the other. That is the reason why African states developed in the past when they could lean on the strong arms of the great European nations, but they fell to the ground when those arms were loosened because they could not yet stand on their own feet. It is far, far better if an underdeveloped state can lean on an economically strong, geographically adjacent, state. Therefore South Africa has this to offer her neighbour, that she has economic strength and can work in such close co-operation with these other areas that they can also develop from the bottom upwards to increasing economic independence. That will take a long time because it needs psychological adaptation as well as organization. But there is only one way for the African areas and for the White areas which are still under-developed to develop, and that is by working in the closest cooperation with a state like South Africa, and not just receive handouts from outside. Therefore let no one decry the value of South Africa for the development of her neighbours.

Secondly, in concluding, I wish to state that attacks on these plans and on this White Paper play right into the hands of those who wish to sow dissension and who have their eyes and designs on both Africa and Southern Africa. I issue this warning that anyone who tries to prevent the Government of South Africa from doing for South West what it wishes to do for all the peoples there, is playing into the hands of those who have their eyes and designs on Africa and on Southern Africa for the obvious reason of combating the West.

Finally, I wish to say that all the work, the co-operation, the know-how and the organization at our disposal, and which we place at the disposal of the development of South West, are part and parcel of the framework within which the problems of both South West and of South Africa can be truly solved.

Mr. Speaker, listening to the concluding remarks of the hon. the Prime Minister, I was happy to find that there was some measure of common ground between us. I think that common ground was that he believes, and I believe, that the futures of the Republic of South Africa and of South West Africa are inextricably intertwined. I think we also have a second thing in common, and that is that we both believe that there is no other country in the world which can do more for South West than can the Republic of South Africa. And having said that, I am afraid I must differ from the hon. gentleman as to a large part of his argument and many of his specific decisions and recommendations. But before doing so, I want to say also that I believe that the decision taken by the Government to put the political recommendations of the Odendaal Commission into cold storage pending the decision of the case in the International Court was in my view a wise decision. It certainly temporarily averted the danger of any international action in respect of this matter. It seems that this issue will now not be complicated by the somewhat revolutionary proposals of that commission in respect of South West Africa.

Having said that, and having no desire whatever to enter into the controversy as to the point of time at which the hon. the Prime Minister realized that an attempt to implement the proposals of the commission might have international repercussions, I cannot omit to say that it is a pity that this matter was allowed to reach the stage it did before the Government made its views clear. It seems somewhat difficult to understand why the Prime Minister went to Windhoek and made the speech he did if he was conscious of what those international repercussions might be. I will say in fairness to him that he warned that there might be international repercussions from states unfriendly towards us.

I also said that no decision had been taken. I was very clear on that.

I accept that, but why play with fire? You get burnt sometimes if you do things like that. I believe that by allowing this matter to go as far as it did a measure of uncertainty was caused which can do South Africa no good at all. I believe also that the Government having decided to put these political recommendations into cold storage pending the decision of the International Court, it would do even better were it to make up its mind now to reject the political implications of the commission’s report. I believe thereby the uncertainty would come to an end and the threat of an international involvement would disappear altogether.

There are various reasons why I believe it would be wiser to reject those recommendations at this stage. The first is that the Government itself has listed a number of other reasons for delay in carrying out that plan, which seems to me to indicate a measure of uncertainty as to whether it intends to apply them in full in the end. I believe, secondly, that that plan is virtually impossible of fulfilment and I believe, thirdly, that if it were to be carried out it would be a plan which would be very dangerous indeed for South Africa. Sir, if you look at the White Paper, on page 12, paragraph 21, you will find four reasons given, apart from the court case, as to why this policy is not being proceeded with. Sir, they make it clear to me that the recommendation to constitute homelands as set out in that report were indeed premature, and despite the Government’s statement that there should be no unnecessary delay before this plan was put into operation, it is quite clear that they have now found a number of difficulties which would be involved in attempting to apply it, so even under the most favourable circumstances it is going to take a very long time indeed before any homelands come into existence, and of course, the problems affecting the effective demarcation and the fixing of the borders of those territories, are going to take up a great deal of time, particularly when regard is had to the manner in which the indigenous groups are scattered about the various territories, especially in the area within the police zone. Sir, the Government has not found it easy, even under favourable circumstances, to persuade members of the various groups to go to homes which they have marked out for them. We see no vast emigration of Bantu into the Bantu homelands in the Republic at the present time. In South West Africa, despite the modern conveniences which they have offered, they seem to be having the greatest difficulty in getting the Bantu to settle in the Katutura Township outside of Windhoek. Then, of course, the measure of interaction which will be necessary between the State and the responsible authorities of the ethnic group before you can develop homelands, is something that is going to take a very long time indeed, as is already indicated by the troubles with the Hereros and the Rehoboths in South West Africa. Sir, the Government is right in saying that the projects for economic and other development in the developed areas are comparatively small at the moment. I must say that despite all the plans which have been outlined in this White Paper I see very little chance of those proposed homelands ever becoming viable.

Sir, if you look at the plans for industrial development set out at the top of page eight of the White Paper, then you wonder whether that is the only development for which this infra-structure for economic development is being prepared at the present time. It is particularly interesting to note that when this Government gave evidence before the Arden-Clarke Commission it indicated that in its view South West Africa alone could never become economically viable, and if it could never become economically viable alone, how can the homelands which will have to become viable before this homelands plan can ever be put into operation, ever become economically viable? It is quite understandable that in these circumstances the Government has the feeling that it might be necessary, as it says in the report, to make adjustments before the policy is put into operation, adjustments because of developments not foreseeable at this stage. No wonder that reference is made on page 14 of the White Paper to considerations which may have a retarding effect upon political development. One of those adjustments, I would say, is what the position now is going to be of the Commissioner-General who was appointed almost immediately after the report of the Odendaal Commission was brought out. Is his appointment not part and parcel of the development of homelands? And if other policies, if other actions and decisions are being postponed because they are inseparably bound up with the creation of homelands, must there not be some decision as to the future of this gentleman? What must be his position if the whole plan is put into cold storage; where does he stand at the present time? Surely he is an integral portion of their development. Sir, in saying that I believe that it is not possible to carry out this plan, I cannot fail to mention the manner in which the various indigenous groups are divided up in the southern portion. There is no homeland in the sense in which the Government speaks about homelands in the southern portion of South West Africa. There are 17 reserves, and, Sir, if you look into those 17 reserves you will find that Hereros are spread over 13 of them; you will find that the Namas are spread over eight, the Damaras over eight, the Coloureds over three, and that five of them are ethnically mixed areas reserved for non-Whites. Of the 166,000 non-Whites within the police zone, only 25,000, I believe, are in the present reserves. Sir, if that is the position, then it means that there is no homeland in that area of the kind that we have learnt to think about when we hear of what the Government is doing in the Transkei. Sir, we are told that there are 44,000 Damaras, but only 5,000 of them approximately appear to be in the proposed homeland. So one can go on with the Hereros, with their population of 33,000, with apparently only 11,000 in the proposed homeland. And when you go into all the figures you find that in order to establish these homelands 97,000 people out of a population of 166,000 are going to have to be moved. Sir, I do not want to go into details, but when I say that I believe that this is a scheme which cannot be carried out then I think it must be clear what I am talking about, and when I say it is a scheme which is dangerous, as the hon. the Prime Minister has characterized my scheme, then I am entitled to point to the fact that all the dangers which exist in connection with Bantustans here in the Republic of South Africa exist to a greater degree with the plan outlined by the Odendaal Commission for South West Africa.

Sir, the hon. gentleman while postponing his decision has stated that he accepts the general trend of the report; that he is moving in that direction. He sees no other solution, he tells us there is no other solution. Sir, I believe he is engaged upon a solution which must spell danger for South Africa and danger for South West Africa such as we have never been able to envisage. You will require only one of those homelands, which he is going to develop to independence, to form an affiliation with a communist state or some country hostile to South Africa, and then you will have not one Cuba but eight or nine Cuba’s right within the mandated territory of South West Africa.

The hon. gentleman in furtherance of his policies has outlined a number of matters in the White Paper which I should like to deal with before I deal with the development schemes generally. It is quite clear that the recommendations of the commission providing for the expenditure of vast sums of money to create the infra-structure for industrial development in the territory, are going to be embarked upon with the adoption of this White Paper. It is quite clear that that is going to happen. I have said that I do not believe that even that expenditure will result in these homelands becoming viable areas. It is still not clear to me from the report exactly how the proposals are to be financed. I am still uncertain—and I think the overwhelming majority of the members in this House must be uncertain—as to what exactly the commitments of the Republican Government are and the exact commitments of the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa. We have been told that capital sums will be made available; we have been told that interest may be capitalized; we have been told that a committee of experts is going into the matter and that a start is going to be made with these schemes. But what are the commitments of the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa and what are the commitments of the Republican Government under the proposals which are before us to-day. What sources of revenue are going to be taken over from the Legislature of South West Africa and what sources are going to be left under their control? What is going to be the extent of the involvement of the two Governments and the responsibility of each for the vast schemes which have been outlined here? Sir, the hon. gentleman has made mention of the vast importance of the supply of water and indicated that the Kunene scheme is virtually the cornerstone of the entire industrial and agricultural development of the northern part of the territory. He has said that we must not compare the vastness of the scheme with the smallness of some of the schemes in our Bantustans. He has denied that the scheme is too big and he has tried to skate over the fact that this is going to be a scheme in which there will be joint control to an extent between ourselves and our neighbours to the north of us. Well, I would accept at once that obviously the first priority is water for agriculture in these parts, but even the Odendaal Commission points out how backward many of these people are and how necessary it is to retain control of the canals and the pumping system for a long time before they can be handed over to the commission, and one wonders whether in embarking on a scheme of this size we are not running the risk which seemed to have been run with the Hardap dam at Mariental where millions have been spent, and I wonder what benefit the State has had from it so far. You see, Sir, it is all very well to envisage big schemes. When you try to apply them before a territory is ready for them you often waste a lot of money. It is interesting to note that the commission itself indicate that some other matters within the framework of the projects outlined will require further consideration. I can only say that as far as we are concerned we wonder whether there has been sufficient investigation of these schemes, whether there has been sufficient examination of the possibility of alternative sources of electricity supply from the southern parts of the territory moving up in a northerly direction, and we wonder whether it is wise to embark on a vast scheme of this kind in an area dependent upon vast technical plant which we shall have to control in conjunction with our neighbour. I know that the White Paper itself says that only the broad outlines are indicated; that some of the detailed aspects are subject to further consideration and possible adjustment, mostly in the course of administrative action. I wonder what that means, Sir.

You had the same doubts about Sasol.

My hon. friend says that I had the same doubts about Sasol. How right I was! It cost three times as much as we were told originally it would cost.

It is worth ten times as much to-day.

Sir, I seem to have cut a sore point!

We have exposed your policy.

I want to draw attention to the transport schemes which are mentioned in this White Paper. The reason why they are so interesting to me is that the Odendaal Commission itself says in its report that the policy which is being followed in respect of roads by the South West Africa Administration appears to be exceptionally progressive and is aimed not only at supplying immediate needs but also at encouraging further development. Despite that the Odendaal Commission makes recommendation for further roads, and the White Paper provides for the additional expenditure of R32,500,000 over and above what is recommended by the Odendaal Commission. Sir I see the need for transport and communication in a territory of that kind and I have a very shrewd idea of its vastness, but I wonder if this is not being overdone a little. Provision is made here for 16 principal airfields; South Africa has four international and three other large airports and 287 local aerodromes. The commission is recommending, and the White Paper accepts, 16 principal airfields, 31 secondary airfields and 60 private airfields for South West Africa. Is that justified by the population? Is that justified by the standard of development of the people, if regard is had to the situation? Then, Sir, I am very interested to know what the views of the hon. the Minister of Transport are in respect of the abolition of the split tariff. That has been a bone of contention for some 25 years and now suddenly the hon. gentleman is capitulating like a lamb and this is going to be the end of the split tariff. I wonder if this is the bait which is being held out.

Where do you get that in the White Paper?

He has not read it.

You have not read it.

Let me find it for the hon. gentleman—

Then the commission goes on to say—

[Interjections.] There seems to me to be a difference of opinion between the hon. the Prime Minister and the Minister of Transport. The Minister of Transport is indicating to me that the decision has been taken.

No, it has not been taken.

I thought the hon. member was indicating to me that the decision had been taken. Well, how the hon. the Minister came to write what is contained in this White Paper if no decision is taken I do not know …

You have misread.

I have not misread. I have read it correctly. Sir, the hon. the Minister does not know what he has written here. If ever there was a promise to those people that the split tariff is coming to an end, there it stands! If it was not meant to be a promise to those people, then it was a very skilful way of concealing it.

Sir, I go further. We are hearing already of a commission to go into mining taxation. What is the object? I know that the report mentions taxation systems adopted in the United States of America and other parts of the world. Is there not a danger of killing the goose that lays the golden egg? Income from mining taxation in South West Africa is, I believe, between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the total income. Is the Government going to try to get even more?

That is why it must be investigated.

I was hoping the hon. gentleman would say that. I believe that the reason for keeping that taxation low in the past was to encourage capital to South West Africa which might well have gone to mining projects in other parts of the world, and it has encouraged capital to South West Africa. Is there not a danger of that being lost as a result of the uncertainty being created by proposals of this kind?

Is there not a possibility of the investigation being intended to lead to mining on a greater scale?

There are all sorts of possibilities. But quite obviously the idea was to investigate it with a view to higher taxation. I have little doubt about that.

Then let us take this business of industrial development as set out in the White Paper. Here we have this vast infra-structure being created, but we are told that “plans for the greater diversification of the economy through industrial development have to wait for decisions on the financial and administrative arrangements between the Republican Government and that of the territory”. Surely, Sir, industrial development is priority number one. Surely this is one of the matters to which attention should have been given immediately. Surely this is one of the matters which one would have expected to have been dealt with immediately, but all we have here are the proposals set out on page eight and which the Prime Minister has attempted to defend so vigorously.

Then we have plans for health, social development and welfare services, some of them based on population figures as the Commission anticipates they will be in the year 1970. I want to say that we believe that some of those recommendations are good, but by the same token I must say that while we are fully prepared to make use of all local resources and that the Republic should accept responsibility to assist in that development, we cannot bind ourselves to the details of the proposals which have been set out here.

They are all kept within the “administrative” decisions.

I accept that the Government is not bound by them but we are not bound by them either and we are not going to support them.

They are in the second group.

Sir, I was very interested to see the recommendations with regard to agriculture and health services in the territory and the promise of agricultural experts, extension officers, doctors, nurses, medical administrators, and I could not help asking myself where these people are going to come from. You know, Mr. Speaker, and I know what a shortage there is of technically trained people in the agricultural sphere here in the Republic of South Africa.

That is also why they fall within group No. 2.

Oh, I see! This is a bluff. These things have been out down here and the hon. the Prime Minister knows perfectly well that he cannot implement these undertakings.

It depends on availability from time to time.

The hon. gentleman spoke about a game of make-belief in his speech. Now I am beginning to understand what he meant. Here we have these wonderful proposals set out; we have indications here as to the people who are going to be involved and the hon. the Prime Minister knows and I know that they are not available.

Not immediately.

Sir, I enjoy this running commentary; they are making excuses all the time. These people are not available now and the plans which are set out in this White Paper cannot therefore be implemented.

The hon. gentleman dealt with the question of the purchase of land. May I say at once that we appreciate the difficulty which has arisen as the result of the fact which certain farms have been named and the fact that it is possible that many farmers may have committed themselves. Sir, one cannot help wondering, if these farms are going to be purchased who is going to look after them. Are they going to be taken over by the Government and dealt with as Government land? These are not just bare stretches of territory. A large number of these farms, the overwhelming majority of them, are developed farms, and one wonders who is going to be responsible for looking after them and making sure that there is not a great depreciation in value, and one wonders accordingly whether it would not be wiser to undertake to buy farms only in the cases of those owners who can show that they have already compromised themselves as the result of the proposal contained in the Commissions report.

Now, Sir, just one more word on the Committee of Experts. Now that the political recommendations have been put into cold storage, I wonder whether it would not be wise also to put the Committee of Experts into cold storage for the time being. You see, Sir, they have very wide terms of reference, and while that committee is sitting the hon. the Prime Minister will never persuade anybody that he does not mean to implement the administrative provisions, that he does not mean to take over the finances of South West Africa and that he does not mean to clip the wings of the Legislative Assembly. No one can understand otherwise why that Committee has been appointed. One wonders whether another remedy could not be evolved to meet the situation. You see, Sir, the proposals of the Odendaal Commission are now not going to be implemented. We are now in this position that the Legislative Assembly is the body that is operative, with funds supplied both from its own sources and supplied also in some cases apparently from other sources. I do not know what is meant by those “other sources” which are going to be dealt with by the Republic. Perhaps they consist of loans from outside, but there is no indication as to what they are. Additional machinery is being built up in the form of a liaison committee. What do we want a liaison committee for? We have an under-Minister for South West Africa.

He has gone “under.”

We have an Administrator for South West Africa; we have an Executive Committee in South West Africa. What is this liaison committee for? Is it not going to duplicate the functions of these gentlemen? Or is it that the hon. the Prime Minister has no confidence in them? I think we should know more about this liaison committee and about what the objectives are.

Sir, before embarking on any scheme of this kind, even a scheme of the kind outlined in the White Paper, it seems to me that the first thing that should be done is to remove the overlapping, the duplication and the lack of co-ordination which has existed, according to the Commission, in the administration of the territory. Sir, it is all set out in paragraphs 209 and 211 where complaints are made as to this lack of co-ordination and overlapping. I think the first thing one should try to find out is how these unsatisfactory features arise. It seems that what gave rise to them originally was the take-over by the Republic of the administration of Native Affairs. The situation was created where Native Affairs was nominally under one authority while almost every aspect of the day-to-day administration of Native Affairs and the welfare of the Native inhabitants, such as their health, roads, agriculture, marketing, public works, etc., were all dependent on another authority. I think the impossibility of continuing this state of affairs must be underlined when you look at the various projects which the Government is intending to carry out in terms of this White Paper. I believe that the obvious solution might well be to return the administration of Native Affairs to the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa.

It never has been there.

No, it never has been there according to law.

How can you return it then if it has never been there?

Well, let us hand it to the Administration of South West Africa. I know there was a peculiar arrangement. Do not let us get into an argument on that issue. Would it not be a very much simpler solution to have Native Affairs controlled by the Administration of South West Africa, which is something which I am afraid the Government for political reasons would not be prepared to do? The Odendaal Commission suggested another solution and that is to take away everything else from South West Africa virtually, to clip its wings and to hand over the lot to the Republican Government. Is it not just as good an answer to take this one facet and hand that over to the Legislative Assembly and place it in a position to get things properly co-ordinated and organized? No wonder, Sir, when you have far-reaching proposals of this kind, that there have been people who have misinterpreted the intentions of the Government. I wonder whether it would not be wiser to leave the development of Native Affairs in the territory to the people of South West Africa?

Why?

They are in the front-line; they know what the dangers are; they now have an idea of what the Republican Government is prepared to do; they have the interests of those people at heart; racial harmony means even more to them than it does to administrators from outside. Has the hon. member for Middelland (Mr. van der Merwe) so little confidence in his own fellow public representatives in South West Africa, and in members of the Executive Committee, that he does not believe that with their local knowledge, and with their intimate contact with these Bantu peoples and various racial groups, they would not make a good job, given the money and the technical assistance from the Central Parliament? You know, Sir, I believe I almost have a convert in the hon. gentleman. Taking the long view is that not the best answer? Would that not be more in the spirit of the international obligations we have in respect of this territory. Would it not help to expedite and accelerate development in every way? If we could make the money available and put the technical assistance at their disposal, if we could remove the legislative and administrative obstacles which stand in the way of efficient administration, I think we will find that a thoroughly good job of work could be done, possibly less expensively, by the territory itself.

The hon. the Prime Minister has outlined the developments he has in view. He has indicated that what he has set out in this White Paper is intended to establish the basis for development along those lines. He has told us that there are no other solutions. But he has also told us that what he wants to see applied to South West Africa is wrongly called the policy of apartheid. He says it is just a development and a recognition and the maintenance of what already exists there. Well, Sir, if it is not apartheid I would very much like to know from the hon. gentleman how it differs from apartheid and how it differs from his Bantustan policy here in South Africa. Because he said in the course of his speech that he stood for self-determination for these people and ultimate independence. Where does that differ from the policy of apartheid which has already been tried in the Republic and which has already failed to create a better international image for South Africa? Yet, the hon. gentleman says, there is no other direction. We believe there is another direction. For that reason we do not accept the general trend of this report; we cannot accept many of the decisions in the White Paper. We shall not support the White Paper. We believe that there is another trend. And the trend we believe could be applied is based on the belief that people of different colours, of different standards of civilization, can still co-operate for the common good within the framework of one state. I have said many times in this House that our alternative policy is based on four principles. The one is a readiness to share the fruits of our civilization with those non-Europeans who have shown the ability to take a joint responsibility with us for the future development of the Republic. Secondly, I have said that that does not mean that we are prepared to hand over to a primitive Black proletariat. So far away from that are we that we believe in the maintenance and the strengthening of White leadership as the vehicle of Western civilization in the interests of all races here in South Africa. I have stressed in the past the value of consultation and the value of a proper respect for the freedom and dignity of every individual.

Before I set out how I believe, under those principles, an alternative policy could be framed for South West Africa, I think it is perhaps necessary that I should state very clearly what our attitude is towards this territory. I think it is stated best in this way: We recognize that South West Africa has an international character. Secondly, we appreciate that South West Africa is a territory involved in an international dispute with both legal and political aspects. Thirdly, we concede that South Africa, when assuming the position of trustee over the territory, voluntarily undertook to recognize the paramountcy of the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress of the peoples who inhabited it. Fourthly, we accept the findings of the Van Zyl’s Commission’s report on South West Africa of 1936, namely, that the Republic has the right to administer the territory in its discretion subject to compliance with the mandate, even to the extent of treating the territory as a fifth province. I think I have said enough to indicate that we cannot support or follow the “homelands” policy which is the direction in which the hon. the Prime Minister is moving. I think I have pointed out some of the difficulties connected with it. I think I have made it clear that it is going to be virtually impossible to apply it without tremendous pressures to get the various indigenous groups into the various areas set aside for them. I think we have made it clear that we cannot support proposals that will involve the bringing of pressures of that kind upon the human beings concerned.

At the same time I want to say that the policy of reserving certain areas of land for non-Whites to protect them from becoming landless as the result of competition with groups of a more highly civilized state of development than themselves, and as areas in which they can gain experience in forms of government adapted to their needs, is something of which we approve. We feel too that the tribal system should not be destroyed but that it should be allowed to merge gradually into modern concepts of government while the workings of evolutionary processes take place. Having said that, what should the future constitutional relationship be between South West Africa and the Republic? The hon. the Prime Minister says there is no alternative route. He sought to criticize the policy of this side of the House. In reviewing that subject I believe one has to have regard to the fact that historically South West Africa has been in two parts for administrative purposes—the part outside the police zone and the part inside the police zone. The part inside the police zone is known as the Southern Region or the police zone and the Northern Region, i.e., the area beyond the red line. I believe each of those two regions, with the passage of years, has under the South African Government developed its own form of autonomy, not only in relationship with the other portion of the territory but also in relationship with the Republican Government. We feel it is desirable, for historical and practical reasons, that that difference should be recognized and maintained. Therefore, in applying the pattern of development which we have outlined for the territory, we feel the division should be recognized and that the administration of the Northern Region, that is the Kaokoveld, Ovamboland, the Okavango and the Caprivi Zipfel, should be modernized as far as possible. While each group retains control, by means of communal councils, of matters of intimate concern to itself there is nevertheless the possibility of the development of a northern legislative council which will slowly be developed to prepare the territory to form part of a race federation.

A big Bantustan?

I would say a big independent area in which a group of communal councils, because of their common interests, will come together and form one legislative authority which can slowly be developed to form part of a race federation.

As far as the Southern Region is concerned I want to say that we do not believe that the powers of the Legislative Assembly based in Windhoek should be clipped or frittered away. We believe it is more in the spirit of the mandate that they should be developed. We believe that in that area also the various groups should have their communal councils but that there should be one legislative assembly in which White leadership will be maintained but in which there will be representation for the various groups developed far enough to enjoy it. I believe very firmly that the Bushmen, as a backward group, should be maintained as wards of the state. I also believe that while we are responsible for their administration, both these portions of the territory should have a federal relationship with each other and a federal relationship with the Government of the Republic. I believe in that way we could develop a friendly co-operation between the various groups. I believe in that way we could see developing a multiracial state in which there will be harmony and in which the various groups have learnt to work together for the common good.

The hon. the Prime Minister has sought to suggest that this is going to be a dangerous policy for the territory. Let us compare his policy with ours and see which is more dangerous. What is going to be more dangerous in the southern area having a legislative assembly in which you retain White leadership, in which various population groups are represented, or having various independent little Balkanized states, each of which may become Cubas or Zanzibars to threaten the rest of the territory? What is going to be more dangerous to maintain a federal relationship between the northern and southern parts of South West Africa so that you have those people not only in a federal relationship with each other but in a federal relationship with the Parliament of the Republic or have a series of independent Bantustans on your northern boundary, independent Bantustans which may not always be as insulated to some of the influences in Central Africa as well as it is at the present time. I think if that choice were put before you, Sir, there is no doubt as to which one you would say was the more dangerous. _ The policy of the hon. the Prime Minister is infinitely more dangerous than the policy which I have outlined as being the policy of this side of the House.

I think it remains for me to say something about the financial relations between the Republic and the territory of South West Africa. I believe that relationship should be based on certain principles. The first of these is that as the Central Government of the Republic has always been generous in financing and subsidizing the various provinces so it should be generous in subsidizing and financing the development of the territory of South West Africa. Secondly, that even if this were to impose a considerable burden on the taxpayers of the Republic, it is nevertheless a price which we believe must be carried for the implementation of these responsibilities and because of the special relationship between the territory and the Republic. While we expect South West Africa to finance itself in so far as it is able, we are satisfied that its social and economic progress should emphatically not be limited by its own present resources. In other words, Sir, its development should be a joint responsibility of the Republic and the territory of South West Africa.

Lastly, I have this measure of agreement with the Prime Minister in that I believe there should be a close inquiry into the exact relationship which should be instituted in respect of the financial relations between the two territories. We cannot accept the recommendations set out in the White Paper without having a more detailed knowledge of exactly what the situation is going to be in financial spheres. We do not feel that that is adequately expressed in the portion of the White Paper dealing with the interim proposals. I think it must be clear from what I have said that we on this side of the House cannot support the motion of the hon. the Prime Minister. We cannot support it because we believe that motion is designed to form the framework of policies which we cannot support. We believe that many of the decisions taken are perhaps unwise; we believe we have not sufficient information and we believe it is all part and parcel of a scheme, as the hon. the Prime Minister himself has said, which we on this side of the House cannot accept and are not prepared to support.

If there is one thing which we as the representatives of South West Africa have always appreciated, it has been the responsible attitude always adopted by members of the Opposition in respect of matters affecting South West Africa. They kept to the rules of the game and we in South West appreciated it, particularly in view of the international position of South West Africa being so delicate. It is just a pity that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition at this late stage should disappoint me in the good opinion I have always had of him. The Leader of the Opposition in the first place tried to create the impression that the Government was retreating. I must say that the Leader of the Opposition had his speech written out before the hon. the Prime Minister started speaking. Because if he had listened to what the Prime Minister said, and if he had taken it to heart, he would in fact not have made the speech he did. The Leader of the Opposition repeated the very thing that the hon. the Prime Minister tried to state as clearly as possible, viz. that the Government was shying away from the report of the Odendaal Commission as the result of the position into which the Opposition had placed it, or as the result of their criticism. What earthly reason could the Opposition have for making such an allegation? One can come to only one conclusion, Sir, and that is that this allegation was made deliberately in order to create the impression in the outside world that the Government in South Africa is now shying away from it. It is nothing less than inviting the world to exert further pressure on the Government. That is what one should expect, because as soon as the outside world gains the impression that, as the result of this pressure, the Government is retreating, we can expect that pressure to increase.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also did something else which greatly disappointed me. In rejecting this sound report, he has again told the world that these are very nice figures but that there is something behind it which he does not accept. In that way he has tried to make this report suspect. The allegation I am now making was recently proved by him in Windhoek. I notice that the Leader of the Opposition to-day tried to get away as far as possible from the wild allegations he made in Windhoek. That is what he tried to do, and to a large extent he succeeded, but not quite. He made this allegation in Windhoek—

When did I say that?

Here I have a newspaper report of that meeting. I have read the report carefully and if the Leader of the Opposition tells me that this report is not correct I will accept his word, but then I expect him to inform this newspaper that they reported him incorrectly.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition put various questions to the hon. the Prime Minister. He asked the Prime Minister why he had not already said in Windhoek that he had certain reservations in respect of the report of the commission, particularly as regards the portion of it which refers to the international position. But the Prime Minister did say it. I was present and he clearly and repeatedly stated that at that stage the Government had not yet adopted the report and that he first wanted to submit the report to the public of South West Africa in order to get their comment on it.

Then the Leader of the Opposition once again came along with this story, of which I think everybody in this House is tired already, this story of danger, this ghost story that various states are now being created, and what will happen if they affiliate with the communist countries, etc. I thought that we had already disposed of that argument in this House. I want to put this to the Leader of the Opposition. Which is best, a state, say in Ovamboland, which may have affiliations with a communist state—say that happens in 50 or 100 or in 200 years’ time—or the position that the whole of South West Africa should become such a satellite state?

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also stated that this proposal in regard to the so-called split railway tariff is the bait which is being held out. Hon. members opposite are the last persons who should say in regard to railway matters that bait is being held out to the voters. The Leader of the Opposition will remember how, before every election, the United Party in South West said: Now we will build the broad gauge line in South West Africa. They said that just to placate the people in South West. Before the last election in 1960 the hon. member for Hillbrow (Dr. Steenkamp), who is not in the Chamber now, came there and said that he had been sent personally to make that promise to the people of South West. He said that in the Windhoek Show hall, where I was present. So hon. members opposite should be the last people to make that allegation.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also said that the Department of Bantu Affairs must now be placed in the hands of the local Government.

Given back.

Yes, given back. I do not want to discuss that matter now. He ought to know that it has never been in the hands of the South West Africa Administration, and the reason for it has been stated clearly and repeatedly by this Government and by the party of which the hon. the leader is a member. The reason why Bantu Affairs cannot be placed in the hands of the South West Africa Administration is because the Permanent Mandate Commission expected that the mandatory power itself and not the people of South West should govern the Bantu of South West Africa.

The Leader of the Opposition set out his race federation policy very nicely here, as he also did in Windhoek. Now I want to analyse his plan, and the Leader of the Opposition must tell me if I interpret it wrongly. In the first place he wants to divide South West Africa into two-—the one area being north of the red line, i.e. the Ovambos, the Okavangos, the inhabitants of the Kaokoveld and those of the Caprivi Zipfel, etc. For them he wants to establish a separate legislative assembly. Then he wants to retain the existing legislative assembly south of the red line. In other words, he wants to have two legislative assemblies in South West Africa. If one wants to be practical, the one in the South will consist of the Whites who, as regards numbers, will comprise about one-third of it. The 13,000 Coloureds will be represented in it, and also the 11,000 Basters, the 35,000 Hereros, the 44,000 Damaras, the 35,000 Namas and the 10,000 Tswanas. I am giving round figures. Out of a total of more than 220,000, only 73,000 are Whites. On what basis will the Leader of the Opposition grant representation in that legislative assembly? If he does so according to numbers, it will mean that the Whites will comprise only one-third of the total number of members in that legislative assembly. If he does so according to race, what moral claim can he have for giving the Whites more than one-third of the representatives? Or is the Leader of the Opposition now going to admit, as far as the outside world is concerned, that although the Whites constitute a small minority, he nevertheless wants to give them the majority of seats in the legislative assembly, because they are White? On what grounds does he want to give them the majority of seats? He can do so on one ground only, viz. because they are Whites. Does the Leader of the Opposition think for a moment that the Afro-Asian countries or the Bantu will accept that as an argument?

How many do you give to the Coloureds?

In terms of that plan of his, the Leader of the Opposition in the first place recognizes Bantu homelands because he wants to give representation in the legislative assembly to the Ovambos and the Okavangos and the other groups separately. He recognizes them, and that means that he must also recognize their borders. He is opposed to the borders demarcated by the Odendaal Commission, but in any case his Bantu areas will also have to have borders, otherwise how else can they be distinguished? They will definitely have to have borders. He will have to determine, in any case, what is a Damara or what is a Herero, because he wants to give them representation in the legislative assembly on a racial basis. He will have to determine the borders because the Damaras can only vote for a Damara representative and for nobody else. Those are the practical implications of his policy.

He now has a separate legislative assembly for the northern area where there are 239,000 Ovambos, who constitute the majority. He has a legislative assembly for the southern areas, in which the Whites will be represented, but not according to their numbers. If he succeeds in placating the world and giving the Whites, who constitute only one-third, the majority of seats, we will in any case have the position that the Bantu will be in the majority in the northern legislative assembly. Then he wants to give those two different legislative assemblies representation in this Parliament. In other words, he wants to bring the Ovambos, who constitute the majority in the north, into this Parliament. Those are the implications of the proposals of the Leader of the Opposition.

The argument in the whole matter is this: There we now have two different policies, the one of the Odendaal Report which envisages Bantu homelands, and that of the Leader of the Opposition. Which is more acceptable to the Bantu and to all the other interested parties? I have here newspaper cuttings which indicate how the various Bantu groups in South West accepted the report of the Odendaal Commission. I may say that, with certain exceptions, it was generally accepted by them.

Where?

There is one exception, the Hereros, who said that they first wanted to consult their people, and one Damara chief out of the four stated that he first wanted to consult his people. But what assurance has the Leader of the Opposition that any of the Bantu in South West will be prepared to accept his proposals? What assurance has he that the Whites will accept it? What assurance has he that the outside world will accept it? And now the interesting thing in regard to his whole proposal is that the Leader of the Opposition has now gone to try to sell his race federation plan in South West Africa, but he was unable to find a market for it in the Republic itself. In other words, if his policy is to be accepted in South West and is successful, then he will have a race federation there which is not recognized by this Parliament. What will he do with it? Would it not be wiser for the Leader of the Opposition first to find a market for his policy in South Africa, and then to see whether he can persuade South West to accept it?

The Leader of the Opposition also dealt with the economic aspects of the particular Bantu homelands which will be established there, and his argument was that those areas will not be viable, i.e., that they would not be able to exist. Sir, the main difficulty of the Leader of the Opposition is of course that those populations are too small, that they are economically weak and unable to govern themselves. Now I want to ask the Leader of the Opposition how large a population group must be before it can demand independence? Has he laid down a standard or a yardstick? Is there any person in the whole world who has laid down such a yardstick and said that a population of so many people can become independent, but a population of so many cannot? I should like the Leader of the Opposition to reply to this specific question.

But, Sir, in South West we have the fact that centuries ago, when the people there were much less developed then they are today, when their numbers were much smaller, they were independent. They enjoyed their independence in terms of the conditions and circumstances prevailing in the country, in terms of the civilization they enjoyed at that time and with which they were satisfied. But the Leader of the Opposition cannot apply to those undeveloped areas the same yardstick of independence which the Western world or America or France or Germany or any other modern nation lays down in respect of development. No country in the world has had the privilege, as far as economic development is concerned, of skipping the normal evolution of centuries. Independence is a process which comes about gradually through evolution. That is how every country in the world became independent. That is also the way in which the Bantu of South West must obtain their independence. In other words, they must adapt themselves to their numbers and their economic capacity. There is no norm or yardstick in the world which says how big a nation must be or what its economic level must be in order to become independent.

As an example of this, I want to compare the area with that of other states, and here I am thinking particularly of the economic arguments. I want to compare the area of land available per capita. Then we find that in South West Africa the Ovambos will be the worst off, with 23 hectares per capita, and the inhabitants of the Kaokoveld will be best off with 530 hectares. The others fall within those two extremes. But what is the position in other parts of the world? In the Argentine it is only 13, and in Israel there is only one hectare per person, in Japan there is only half a hectare per person, in England one-eighth, in India one-third, and India is a very backward country compared with the modern world. In Ceylon it is only one-quarter, and in Ghana only one half. But in any case, this is still no argument. The argument used by the Opposition was also used by it in respect of the Transkei and in respect of South Africa as such, namely that such a large percentage of the population, namely the Bantu, will have only 13 per cent of the available land and the Whites will have 87 per cent. But that is no argument at all. The Leader of the Opposition cannot accept that argument as a basis; then he will have to tell us the area of land necessary per capita for a nation to exist, and what percentage the Bantu should have. He will have to say what his minimum is. But in the eyes of the outside world no figure laid down by the Leader of the Opposition will be acceptable, because the world has already intimated that it will accept no partition at all, even though the Whites get only one-tenth or one-twentieth or one-hundredth of South West Africa. That was intimated when the Arden Clarke Commission, to which the Leader of the Opposition referred, came to South Africa. Then there was a proposal that partition should take place in South West and that the Bantu should be given a certain portion. That was, however, rejected in toto by the Afro-Asian states, by the Western powers and by everybody else. In other words, one cannot use the area of land per person as an argument, and I will take it amiss if the Leader of the Opposition ever again raises this sort of argument.

There are certain replies which the Leader of the Opposition should give this House. He was in South West Africa in 1950, and various hon. members opposite were there also, like the hon. members for Gardens (Mr. Connan), Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker), Orange Grove (Mr. E. G. Malan) and others. They came there and lost the election for the United National South West Party, and that party then told them: “In heaven’s name, we do not want to see you here again.” And they stayed away for a long time. Now for the first time the Leader of the Opposition has again recently gone to Windhoek to try to sell his policy there. But there are a few questions I want to put to him. He has now expounded his policy in respect of South West Africa, but the United National South West Party has its own policy. I have their policy here. They say they do not want two legislative assemblies; nothing of the kind. They do not want that federation. Their policy is simply that the Ovambos should have one representative in the Legislative Assembly, the Damaras one, and the same for the other groups. That is what they want. Now I should like to know from the Leader of the Opposition how he can bring his policy into line with that of the people in South West? Is he going to hold meetings there and put up candidates in order to try to persuade the voters of South West Africa to adopt his race federation policy? How is he going to sit on the two charis between the policy of the United Party there and the policy of his party here?

He has been sitting on two chairs all his life. He knows no other position.

Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition is already accustomed to it, but in any case this will perhaps be the last time he sits down. We should like to know who the leader is there and how he is going to reconcile the policies of the two parties. There is going to be a by-election in the near future, and to a large extent it will be over the Odendaal Report and this White Paper which was tabled to-day. Then the Leader of the Opposition will have to say: I am now coming here to discuss my own policy. Or else he must say: I am now talking on behalf of the United Party of South West Africa. He will also have to answer many other questions. He will have to tell this House whether he also, like the United National South West Party, maintains the standpoint that UN must continue to exert pressure on South Africa from outside while they exert pressure from the inside to oust the National Party. He will have to state his standpoint in that regard. He will also have to give his views in regard to the standpoint of the United Party there, viz. that they want total independence for South West Africa, such as Ghana has. I have it here in writing. That is what was said by their leader in South West Africa. He will have to answer those questions. He will also have to reply to the accusation levelled against the United Party by the hon. member for Bezuidenhout (Mr. J. D. du P. Basson), namely, that nobody undermined the safety of South West Africa more than the United Party speakers, and that three-quarters of the documents submitted to UN by Scott consisted of what the newspapers and the speakers of the United Party had said.

My time is fast running out and I just want to say that there is one thing which has always hampered the development of South West Africa, namely the uncertainty which has existed in respect of its international status. Now the report of the Odendaal Commission has given the people there new courage; it has again attracted capital and South West is again becoming prosperous. I do not want the Leader of the Opposition to do his best now to try to hamper the progress taking place in South West Africa. This report and the White Paper really revealed a great degree of magnanimity not only on the part of the Government of South Africa but also on the part of the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa. The Government of the Republic has at any rate fulfilled its obligations in respect of the mandate. That is once again proved in this White Paper and in the report. Merely by way of loans to finance capital works in South West Africa, R5,700,000 was made available, and the accumulated interest on it is R2,000,000; there is a cumulative loss on railway operations amounting to R51,000,000; capital investment during the past ten years on the Railways alone amounts to R105,000,000; the losses on Airways up to 1963 amounted to R2,000,000; the shortage on the subsidization of police services exceeds R6,000,000, etc. The Odendaal Report reveals an ambitious plan for South West Africa which cannot be equalled by any other country in the world. I tried to compare it with the position of a former mandated territory which is to-day regarded as the model trusteeship territory, namely New Guinea, over which Australia holds the mandate. New Guinea is regarded as the example of what a mandatory power can do for such a territory. The population of New Guinea is 1,500,000, or three times as great as that of South West Africa. New Guinea has a budget of approximately R28,000,000, which is less than that of South West Africa. In the last year for which figures are available, 1962, Australia spent only R20,000,000 in respect of all matters in the mandated territory. That cannot be compared with the Odendaal Report. Take education as an example. Do hon. members know that in the whole of New Guinea with its large population there are only 26,000 students in State schools, as compared with over 46,000 in South West Africa? And that is quite apart from the development which is envisaged in the Odendaal Report.

I just want to say that this White Paper proves that the Republic of South Africa, which held the mandate over South West Africa, implemented Section 2 of the mandate to the full, and still does so. If there is any doubt in this regard, it is not the fault of the Republic. If the Western countries do not realize that the Government of the Republic spends this money in the interest of the welfare of the population of South West Africa, an achievement which cannot be equalled by UN or by any other country, then one can only say that the main consideration on the part of the Western world or those who make that allegation is not the economic welfare of the people of this mandated territory, but odious political considerations. [Time limit.]

Mr. Speaker, having listened to the hon. member for Middelland (Mr. van der Merwe)—the first of the representatives of South West Africa to speak in this debate—one is not surprised that he is an enthusiastic supporter of the White Paper now under discussion. In fact, his enthusiasm goes so far that he took exception to any of us on this side of the House questioning any of the figures, or any of the arguments for that matter, on the grounds that to do so would be to try to create the wrong impression in the rest of the world. Mr. Speaker, I think it is time that hon. members should cease using that argument in this House. If there is any substance in it, then there should be no Opposition here at all. If we are going to be told that every time we criticize anything the Prime Minister or any of his Cabinet says we are sabotaging South Africa in the eyes of the world, then we have no right to be in this House at all. In fact, there should then be no Opposition here. But that is, perhaps, what the hon. member for Middelland would like to see.

He started off his speech by chiding my hon. Leader by suggesting that he had his speech prepared and that had he first-listened to the speech of the Prime Minister, he would have made a different speech. In that he is quite wrong. My hon. Leader listened very carefully to the speech of the hon. the Prime Minister and having done so he, quite understandably, did not find it necessary to alter one single word of what he intended to say. I too listened very carefully to the Prime Minister. That I always do, because whether one agrees or disagrees with him, no one would ever suggest that when the Prime Minister deals with a subject he does not deal with it fully and to the best of his ability. So I always listen to him carefully. But after having listened to him this afternoon, I cannot say that he shed any more light on the subject we are discussing than did the White Paper. That, of course, may be interpreted as a tribute to the White Paper and in this connection I think it is a well-drafted document. Although its contents are unacceptable to us, it is a well set out document nevertheless and contains within a limited space a good deal of argument.

But after having listened to the Prime Minister and to the hon. member for Middelland, and discarding the pure politics which we expected from that hon. member, it is quite apparent that, irrespective of what the terms of this resolution are, we are being asked to endorse the whole of the White Paper. We are being asked to endorse it in toto and without reservation. By his speech the hon. the Prime Minister opened a major debate and we on this side of the House are grateful to him for carrying out his undertaking to allow this House to have a debate on South West Africa. He himself made it clear, however, that he himself could not discuss just simple decisions, but that he had to discuss the White Paper as a whole and, consequently, he asked the approval of the House of the general conclusions of the White Paper. Now, this document consists of one or two highly significant policy statements or policy decisions. There are a number of decisions, decisions to do this, not to do that and not to take any decisions at all at present. The Prime Minister never expected us to vote blindly on this matter, i.e. without analysing and sorting out these decisions and their implications and without, for example, seeing whether by endorsing the resolution we would be accepting, in principle, the Odendaal Commission’s report as a whole, a report about which we have already made our views known outside this House. About this report the White Paper in paragraph 5, page 4, says that—

The Prime Minister also quoted these words. But the point I want to make is that nowhere “hereinafter” is there any suggestion that any of the 475 recommendations of the report is repugnant to the Government. Nowhere in this White Paper is there any suggestion that any of these recommendations is being rejected in toto. In paragraph 21, where the necessity of a delay with a decision in regard to certain matters is dealt with, it is stated that such a decision has to be delayed—

This is confirmed by the line taken by the Prime Minister in his speech this afternoon. Under the heading “Homelands” the White Paper contains these two statements—

and lower down—

The hon. the Prime Minister stated that this policy had no intention of extending the Republic’s race policy, of having Bantustans and apartheid, to South West Africa. On the contrary. He said they were only preserving what South West Africa already had, and that, therefore, they were preserving, and not creating, homelands. That seems to me to be a most disingenuous remark, to put it at its highest, because as my hon. Leader asked would anyone on that side of the House tell us how the recommendations contained in the White Paper and in the commission’s report for the development of homelands differ from the Government’s policy in regard to the development of Bantustans within the Republic? Now, when the Prime Minister says that he is not creating homelands but only preserving them, I should like to ask him when in the past there has ever been any talk of creating independent Black states in South West Africa? I have never heard of it. In spite of what the hon. the Prime Minister had to say, I maintain that, if words mean anything at all—and sometimes listening to gentlemen on that side of the House one wonders if they do—it means that the Government has decided in principle to extend—and I want to repeat “extend”—in due course its Bantustans apartheid policies to the territory. I say it would appear from these recommendations that the Government has, in principle, agreed to the extension of apartheid and Bantustans to South West Africa. Only no decision has as yet been taken on the timing thereof. The principle thereof has, however, been accepted. The other reasons for not going ahead with the implementation of such a policy, reasons of elementary prudence, are connected with the pending court case in The Hague.

The hon. member for Middelland was wrong in his reference to my Leader’s remarks about the Prime Minister’s speech at Windhoek. My Leader’s comment on the speech of the Prime Minister at Windhoek was that a decision ought to have been taken already. My Leader knew that the Prime Minister said that no decisions had as yet been taken. His standpoint was that a decision should already have been taken. In other words, the decision not to take any action in this respect should have been taken much earlier than it actually was.

The Government is, of course, still reserving its decision in regard to the jurisdiction of the court. It has not yet indicated whether it is going to accept the verdict of the court, or what it will do if that verdict goes against it. However, I am not pursuing this subject. I only mention it because these are questions which undoubtedly will have a great bearing on the future of the relations between the Republic and South West Africa.

The Prime Minister also told us of his proposals to institute an urgent programme of economic and social development for South West Africa over the next five years. According to the White Paper this development is “to commence immediately and should be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible”. According to the figures in the White Paper, it will cost R110,000,000, to which they point out must be added their estimate of a shortfall over the five years of R41,000,000, and to which must be added the not inconsiderable development programme which the South West Administration is already carrying out, which I think one can put at a modest estimate of R50,000,000 over the next five years, so that this economic programme involves the spending of not less than R200,000,000 during the next five years. I think three questions arise from this proposal. First of all, why do we have this colossal programme all of a sudden? Secondly, who is going to pay for it? We know that according to the report the money will be provided, but it does not say who will provide it or who will ultimately have to repay it. As my Leader has pointed out, the taxpayers of South West and of the Republic will be in the dark for some time as to just how this burden will be borne. The third question is: Is it practicable? I think there are many reasons why it is not, but the chief and obvious one is that in addition to what we are already doing in the Republic we have not the technical, skilled manpower resources either in the Republic or in South West to carry out a vast R200,000,000 scheme within five years. I do not believe it is physically possible to do it.

But you are always a pessimist.

I shall be glad if the hon. member can tell me where we will find the necessary men. I do not suppose he has even read the White Paper, and I wonder whether he even listened to the Prime Minister this afternoon. The Kunene scheme itself is a colossal scheme. Will the Prime Minister put his hand on his heart and tell us that he really believes that this programme can be carried out in five years? Because if it is not carried out, cannot he see that he will be accused by people who do not like him of bluffing? Cannot he see that unless he is satisfied that it can be carried out, he can be accused of bluffing? And whom will he be accused of trying to bluff? I cannot help feeling that the Prime Minister would have been much wiser either to limit his proposal to plans and figures which he is absolutely satisfied can be met, so that the goods can be delivered in five years, or to extend it over a longer period. As it is, I think he has aimed too high and he will miss the credit which he hopes the country will get by putting forward this scheme.

Lastly, of course, he proposes to strip the Legislative Assembly of South West of most of its powers, and to a large extent to integrate it together with its administration with the Republic. The actual timing has not been decided on yet, but he has appointed this committee of experts to tell him how to do it. Well, I think it was the Administrator of South West who, in addressing the Legislative Assembly in Windhoek, said that the whole of the plans contained in the Odendaal Report was based on three pillars. One was the development of the homelands and the second was the economic development plan, and the third was the future administrative and financial plan. Those are the three pillars on which this plan is based. One has to point out that the first pillar is not being erected at all at present, and the second one will be much slower than people seem to think, and as for the third one, that will also take years, so that on the whole one wonders what was the urgency and the object of this memorandum at all at this time? It is obviously incomplete. There are so many questions left in the air, and so many decisions which are not taken, and so many details which are not finalized, that various commissions and committees have been appointed to go into these matters further. One wonders what was the necessity for this White Paper at all at present. It is not like the Tomlinson Commission’s Report. There we had a White Paper in which the Government quite clearly set out that they were going to do this and not that, and that they were discarding this and accepting that, so that when one looked at the White Paper one had a fairly clear idea of just what the Government was going to do and how much of the report was being rejected. So that was quite a different matter. I say I wonder what really was the object of publishing this memorandum in such a hurry. We have had no reason given for it, and in the absence of one, one is bound to draw one’s own conclusions as to why it was done at this stage. I think myself that the Prime Minister had a twofold object. I think the first object was to endeavour to improve the image of the Republic abroad, and I think that is a very good object. In the first place the Prime Minister hopes—we all hope—that by publishing this document he would obviate any attempt to apply for an interdict in the International Court, and of course we approve of that also. In the second place, I think he is trying to improve our image by impressing our hostile critics abroad with his declaration of this spectacular and dramatic expenditure on this territory. The second object, I think, is to satisfy his own supporters that he has not budged an inch from his objectives, that he is quite undeterred by the views of the rest of the world, and that he is still the good old granite block. I think the interesting question really is whether any one document can possibly reconcile those two objectives. If it can be done, then the Prime Minister is fully justified in having produced this White Paper, and he can justly feel relieved of some of his present anxieties. But in my opinion it just cannot be done. I believe this document fails in its two-fold purpose. Quite apart from us on this side of the House who, as my leader has made clear, are quite unable to vote for this resolution or to approve of this White Paper as it stands, as far as the world is concerned the Prime Minister may, and we all hope he has, averted the threat of immediate action against us. Time will have been gained, and time is of the essence as far as we are concerned. But he has made it clear in his speech this afternoon and also in the White Paper that he hopes and intends as soon as practicable to apply his race policies to South West Africa, and virtually to incorporate the South West Administration into the Republic, and I am afraid that no display of lavish expenditure will obscure that fact, and that so far from relieving external pressure, to which we are being exposed at present, it will increase it. I think this paper as it stands will make no more impression in regard to improving our image in the world than the Prime Minister’s own supporters are concerned, I am convinced that the day of reckoning with them is coming ever nearer. I think that the threat of immediate action may relieve their anxieties for the moment, as it has ours, but when they realize that this is only putting off the evil day, and when they see the vast sums which they are being called upon to find in an attempt to placate world opinion—it reminds me of the tribute which the English used to pay the Danes many years ago. When they realized what vast sums will have to be found, I believe the Prime Minister’s supporters will change their minds, and I only hope it will not be too late. *

The hon. member for Constantia (Mr. Waterson) put a few questions here, and he also made the remark that an hon. member on this side of the House had probably not read the White Paper, but I think if the hon. member himself had read the White Paper he would have found the answers there to practically all his questions. He asked, for example, who was going to pay for this development. Sir, that is set out in the White Paper. Then he asked why these steps were being taken, and that too is dealt with in the White Paper. But there is one point that I want to deal with just briefly. The Prime Minister was accused of having said that apartheid was not going to be applied in South West because there was already apartheid there. What the Prime Minister in fact said was that the system of separate areas for the various ethnic groups was already in operation there. That system has its origin in the history of South West Africa. Before the White man came there there was continual fighting amongst the various races, who maintained their separate identities—and that is what the Prime Minister pointed out—but under the policy of the United Party they no longer remained separate.

The Leader of the Opposition has said that it will be difficult to implement our policy. We realize the difficulties; we realize that it will be no bed of roses. He says that these home lands are impracticable because they cannot be economically independent particularly the smaller states. But it is not necessary for the smaller states to be economically independent. There are many examples of such states, there is Basutoland, for instance. These states will be able to exist therefore and they will be economically dependent on the neighbouring states. The Leader of the Opposition also expressed certain misgivings about other matters such as the Kunene scheme for generating electricity, and he asked whether electric power could not be supplied from the Orange River. Sir, there were experts on this Commission, and surely one accepts that they took everything into consideration before they decided that this was the best scheme. It is very easy to stand up here and to say that one wonders whether this scheme should not have been tackled along different lines. The Leader of the Opposition says that he wonders whether too much is not being spent on roads. I can only say as an inhabitant of South West Africa that I welcome this development. The Leader of the Opposition concluded his speech by asking which policy was more dangerous, that of the National Party or that of the United Party. He pointed out that these small independent states would be able to enter into treaties with Russia and become Cubas, and he then compared that policy with his race federation policy of having a few representatives of the Blacks in the Central Parliament. But the correct comparison would be to compare the final outcome of the two policies. Under our policy these small independent states will not come into existence to-morrow or the day after to-morrow; it will still take many years, and their policy will also take many years to implement. In terms of their policy it will take much less time for the Black man to gain the upper-hand than it will take for these small states to become independent under our policy, but once we have a predominantly Black Parliament here, what would prevent that Parliament from entering into an agreement with Russia?

However, I want to concentrate in the main on the position of the Whites in South West. During the war the United South West Party sent a deputation to ask General Smuts to incorporate South West as a province of the Union. That request was refused but the deputation was promised that South West would be incorporated after the war. That deputation consisted of the representatives of the White population of South West, except for the German-speaking section which represents about 20 per cent of the population. The position to-day is that the Legislative Assembly has decided by majority of 16 to 20 to give its wholehearted support to the principles contained in this report, and in this case the German-speaking section is included. I can give the House the assurance that I represent a constituency which has more German-speaking voters than any constituency in the whole of South West Africa and the general principles contained in the report are supported practically unanimously by these people. As far as the Bantu are concerned, the position is that there are 329,000 northern Bantu belonging more or less to the Ovambu group; then there are 12,000 Coloureds; there are 44,000 Damaras, and they accept the broad principles contained in the report. When I say “they” I mean the leaders of the various races. Then there are 11,000 Rehoboth Basters and 34,000 Namas, who are undecided. The 35,000 Hereros are against this policy. The 73,000 Whites are in favour of it. The total population is 526,000. In other words, there are 453,000 people, or nearly 90 per cent of the population, who are in favour of the broad principles of this policy.

The position of the Whites in South West is that they have to choose between two roads. They must either accept the principle of remaining under the trusteeship of the United Nations, with everything that that embraces—and to drag a race federation into this will be of no avail—or they have to seek closer links with the Republic. As I have indicated, the Government has the support to-day of the biggest majority that it has ever had in the history of South West. In these circumstances, since the population of South West has so much in common with the population of the Republic, the Government must not flinch back from its policy of bringing about the closest ties between South West and the Republic—ties which are so close that nobody will be able to separate us. Sir, this is really a historic occasion, and realizing the dangers that face us and that South West Africa is indespensible to the future of South Africa, it will be nothing less than a dereliction of duty on our part if we run away from our responsibilities.

As far as the Whites are concerned it is clear that there is only one policy which will ensure the survival of our civilization and that is for the Whites to stand united in one Republic here at the southern tip of Africa. How can 70,000 Whites in South West develop all on their own? We do not have a single policeman or soldier or aircraft of our own. We do not even have a Public Service of our own. It is absolutely impossible for us to maintain ourselves. Our freedom is indivisible from that of the Republic, and although our numbers are small we are a hardy people. We have brought civilization to South West. The White man in South West to-day is the protector of freedom and justice and of all economic development that has taken place there. It is true that the various Afro-Asiatic states and the communist countries are up in arms about this report. Why is that so? It is because those countries see in this report what we see in it and that is that if these recommendations are implemented it will ensure the survival of the White man in South West. I must say that I am pleased that to a certain extent the Opposition supports the proposals with regard to the economic development of the territory. This development will cost more per capita—and that includes the non-Whites —than the amount that is being spent on development in any country of the world.

As far as the United Party’s plans for the future are concerned, their proposal is that the Whites in South West Africa must develop on a federal basis together with the Whites in the Republic. There are enough problems already, both under our policy of homelands for the various Native groups and under the United Party’s policy of race federation, without still adding the problem of a separate race or a separate state for the Whites in South West. Let us at least, in the greater South Africa that we visualize for the future, bring together those people who belong together. Is there any member who would stand up in this House to-day and say that we should divide South Africa into four different federal groups of Whites or into four federal provinces? Not even the Opposition advocates that. Why then do they want to create a separate White race for us in South West? As it is we have enough trouble in the Republic with the few matters such as education and health which are dealt with on a federal basis. To sum up, we can never do enough to unite this comparatively small group of Whites at the southern tip of Africa in this life and death struggle, and this Government is prepared to do all in its power to bring about that unity. I may say that there was a time when the South West voters were not prepared to abandon their rights or to pay higher taxes, but those days are past.

As far as the other races are concerned, the future plan for the self-governing homelands that we visualize-—and this even applies to the plan of the Opposition—embraces certain forms of government for the different races, and if the Opposition supports our plan to put the different race groups into specified areas it will also facilitate the implementation of their own policy. If members of the United Party feel that they will be able to take over the reins of government in the foreseeable future, there will be time enough, even if there are separate homelands, to apply their own policy to those homelands. But I want to warn them that as far as South West is concerned the Ovambos will then be in the majority. I want to give the United Party a further example of the sort of thing that would happen under their proposed race federation. Two years ago there was established in South West an organization known as SWAPO, an anti-White organization consisting of members of various indigenous races, and then about a year ago the National Liberation Front was established there. But there was so much quarrelling amongst the leaders of the different groups that both organizations were dissolved. In practice therefore a mixed Parliament would never work there. But there is another warning that I want to address to the United Party. As you know, Sir, there is an old saying that the pen is mightier than the sword. For my part I submit that the franchise is mightier than any modern implement of war, and if the White man in South Africa gives away that protection which he enjoys to-day it will not only be dangerous but it will be disastrous for our future.

I would like to say at once that there are some matters on which I believe there is no difference between us in this House. I believe that an examination of the facts supports the view which has been expressed in this debate and which I personally hold, that South Africa has in fact done as good a job in carrying out the mandate over South West Africa as has been done by any other mandatory in respect of the various territories which were placed under mandate. Sir, the facts speak for themselves. Looking at the development of the territory over the years, I believe that the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa and South Africa can be proud of the progress which has been made in that territory. There is no doubt that in many fields there has been a tremendous advance. I want to make it clear immediately that the recommendations contained in the report which is under discussion here this afternoon, while the commission as far as I can see gives no credit to South West Africa for it, refer in many instances to matters which have actually been under consideration in South West Africa itself by the Legislative Assembly. When one looks at the Estimates for South West Africa for the year ended 31 March 1964 one finds, for example, that there is a Territorial Development Fund, and one finds that up the end of March 1963 a total sum of R192,000,000 was spent out of that fund. It is clear if one looks at the further annexures that as far as the building of schools and hospitals, etc., are concerned, there are large-scale plans which have already been accepted for the building of old-age homes, a Bantu hospital, Coloured schools and various other buildings throughout the territory. In respect of the year 1963-4 a very considerable expenditure of R5,637,000 has been approved for a comparatively small population. The Administration of South West Africa in its Estimates set an example which I feel might be followed here. Reference is made in their Estimates to developments proposed for the next ensuing year. This shows that the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa has been awake to the necessity for further development and had already adopted plans for giving effect to many recommendations which are contained in the Odendaal Report as apparently new recommendations. Sir, I believe that we can very easily reach agreement in regard to the development side as far as the report of the Odendaal Commission is concerned. It is a question of what is practical, what is best, and what is necessary. My hon. Leader has suggested that possibly the Kunene scheme might be reconsidered and that we might possibly have a smaller scheme in the north. Starting from the south I believe that it would be possible to erect a scheme on the Orange River which would be of immense value to South West Africa and which could certainly cope with the southern portion and which at the same time would be of immense value to the northwestern Cape. But, Sir, those are not the matters which cause difficulties. I submit that the White Paper makes it quite clear that while the Government is for the time being putting certain proposals in respect of the political aspects of the matter temporarily into cold storage and is concentrating on the question of development, in fact the Government is merely postponing this matter. The hon. the Prime Minister himself has made it abundantly clear—I hope I did not misunderstand him—that the issue of this White Paper must in no sense be regarded as a retraction by the Government as far as the implementation later of the political aspects of this report is concerned. I want to make it perfectly clear to hon. members opposite that the problem which is bedevilling this situation as far as the outside world is concerned is not the question, of development. The outside world realizes that development is taking place in South West Africa and that there will be great development in the future. There is already a strong economy in South West Africa which in any case will inevitably lead to great advancement in the years which lie ahead, but the real problem of the territories of South West Africa is one which I feel hon. members opposite have not been looking at quite squarely and that is the question of the political future of South West Africa.

It is the same as in the Republic of South Africa.

I understand the hon. member means that the policy for the future in the case of South West Africa is exactly the same as the policy for South Africa. Sir, that supports my contention. The political proposals in this report are not being shelved in any way; it is still the intention of the Government to proceed with those political proposals although for the time being there will be a concentration on the economic advancement of the territory. Sir, that is all very well. It has become clear—and I am glad it has become clear—that the steps regarding development which have now been taken by the Government must be taken. The real problem arises from the form in which the Government announcement has been made. The problem which is creating international complications, is one which the Government is simply not facing. The political proposals are simply being put into cold storage and there they remain to be trotted out one of these days. If one wishes to examine what the Government’s intentions are in respect of the territory of South West Africa, one cannot avoid an examination of the practicability of the Government’s proposal in respect of the future form of government of the territory. Sir, we have a plan attached to the report of the Odendaal Commission which sets out in graphic form what are in fact the proposals of the Government. It sets out a number of proposals. I do not propose to deal with the northern area. My hon. Leader has already made it perfectly clear that so far as that area is concerned, it is a territory which has always been governed separately. It is a territory in which you have contiguous areas where you have related tribes who get on very well together. The development of that territory is obviously possible because of the fact that there is plenty of water in the immediate vicinity. There are plans and schemes whereby that water could be made available to make that desert-like country, which is potentially a very rich country, an area in which there could be substantial economic development.

Your leader does not think the Kunene scheme is too bright.

No, I have made it perfectly clear myself that I am not talking of the Kunene scheme itself. I made it clear that that scheme should be reconsidered. It is quite clear that it would be a simple matter to have a far less ambitious scheme than that particular scheme, which might itself possibly cause international complications at some future date, but I do not want to go into that.

Who told you that?

Obviously that is the position. It is a scheme which lies between two territories; the river lies between two territories and obviously there is a possibility of complications in the years which lie ahead.

It is too complicated for him.

Sir, I want to come to the point made by the hon. member for Kempton Park (Mr. F. S. Steyn). I have already explained what I said and I will attempt to do so again. What I said was that it would be a comparatively easy matter, not on the lines of a grandiose scheme but on the lines of a reasonable scheme, to put a very considerable area under irrigation in that northern territory and it would undoubtedly, as in the case of most desert land, be fruitful and highly productive. But when one comes further south the same position does not prevail there as in the northern parts. Hon. members on the other side have spoken as if in fact in each of these areas you have a concentration of an overwhelming majority of persons forming part of particular ethnic groups. That, of course, is not in accordance with the facts. The fact of the matter is that while those territories look very nice on the map, coloured in as they are, in each there are at present only a small minority of the members of the ethnic group whose homelands these territories are supposed to be. The hon. member over there says that the policy in respect of South West Africa is exactly the same as the policy for this country, thus we will have a number of territories which will eventually become separate economic units and entirely independent. The same objections that we have to that policy in South Africa apply also to South West Africa. Sir, the question of the Transkei has been raised. As far as the Transkei is concerned, Parliament has passed an Act and there is a Legislative Assembly there to-day. But, of course, the Transkei happens to be one of the relatively few Native areas in this country where there is a comparatively large area of contiguous land offering great potentialities for future development. The Transkei is one of the very few areas where the Government could implement its policy with much less difficulty than it would face in the case of other territories. Take my own province, the Transvaal, for instance, where you have scattered communities and where, even if it were possible to bring about a concentration of people of the same ethnic group, you would have a large number of relatively small states which can never be viable. Sir, that is the pattern which also applies to South West Africa. In the Transvaal you have small scattered communities. That is the position in Northern Transvaal, in Western Transvaal, in the central area of the Transvaal and in Eastern Transvaal, and that is very much the sort of pattern which applies to South West Africa south of the red line. You would have exactly the same difficulties there in future schemes for political development. We know the difficulties which face the Government and the very much greater difficulties which they have not faced up to, if they wish to carry out this policy of theirs in the Transvaal. It is quite clear that they are seeking to meet the position in respect of the Transvaal by establishing border areas where there will be enormous industrial development in the White area and where the adjoining Native territories will be corridor areas which the Bantu will leave to come and work in the adjoining industries. We have that position already at Hammanskraal in the Transvaal. The area just north of Pretoria is being built up as an industrial area and which adjoins the Bantu area. Sir, that is where the comparison breaks down. Obviously there is not the same potential for industrial development in the White areas contiguous to the proposed homelands in South West Africa that there is in a comparatively well-watered area such as the Transvaal with its big population. It is already becoming obvious that as far as the Transvaal is concerned the Government is beginning to have second thoughts; it is beginning to realize that we on this side of the House were perfectly right when we said that you cannot possibly create a large number of little Native states in the Transvaal by means of a concentration of people of the same ethnic group; that you cannot create viable communities there. The only answer that the Government has been able to give us is that they are establishing border areas in which there will be industrial development, thus enabling the adjoining Native territories to become viable to a certain extent. But, of course, they will become viable by working in the territory of the White man. That is the difference, and that is where the comparison breaks down as far as South West Africa is concerned. The fact of the matter is that while this Government have done quite a lot in bringing about a consolidation of Native areas and in acquiring land adjoining Native areas, they have done precious little to get persons not at present resident in those areas to go back to those areas. Very little has been achieved in respect of the industrial development of those areas. I know that in the Transkei very good work has been done while this Government has been in power and by previous Governments in restoring the land. That has been done, but quite clearly you cannot make the areas proposed in South West Africa viable areas on the basis of farming; you cannot do it in the proposed Bantustans in the Transvaal, wherever they may be situated. They simply will not carry a fraction of the population which will have to be moved into them if this grandiose plan is to be practicable and effective. But, Sir, when you come to South West Africa, what do you find? You find that homelands are proposed, in most of which only a small fraction of the particular ethnic group is at present living. Hon. members opposite who have studied this report will agree with me when I say that that is the position in practically every instance. Take the area which is to be the homeland for the Hereros. It is inhabited to-day by a relatively small number of Hereros. The others are spread over a very much larger area. We are told that we must give these people their traditional homelands. As is well known, the town to which the greatest tradition is attached as far as the Hereros are concerned is Okahandja where their kings are buried, but, of course, that is a long way from the proposed Hereroland.

They broke that tradition.

It remains a fact that Okahandja, which is one of the places with which the Hereros have traditional links which they greatly value, is not anywhere near the proposed Hereroland, which they are now to occupy. There is a small Tswanaland adjoining the Bechuanaland Protectorate. I happen to have been to that area and I have seen the type of country there. I say here that it is utterly impossible for that area ever to become a viable territory, even for a relatively small population. It is a farming and a ranching area as hon. members will agree. Then you have the Namaland area in the south and, of course, you have the existing Rehoboth territory. We come to certain reserves which are in the area which is to be Namaland. There are European farms there which can be taken over. I make bold to say that if all the people of these various racial groups were persuaded by some means to go back to the territories which are destined to be their homelands, the potentiality of those areas in practically every case is such that there is no possibility whatsoever of the population becoming reasonably prosperous, let alone that you can create a viable territory which will one day be able to govern itself.

Namaland is the best sheep country.

Yes, Namaland is the best sheep country but it is well known that the best sheep country in South Africa is the dry northern areas on the borders of the Orange. It is wonderful sheep country but a reasonably small area of that part of the world can never support an enormous population. Sir, I challenge any hon. member to get up and to say that all the people whose homeland this is supposed to be, will for ever be able to live on that small area of land together with their descendants. Sir, I want to come back to the hon. member’s point about sheep-farming areas. The north-western area of the Cape, as hon. members know, is one of the areas which has been losing population ever since the year 1868. There has not been a growth of population in that area. Areas of that kind cannot support big populations, and I say that the only way in which you can provide for large concentrations of human beings, apart from certain areas where smallholdings are possible—but even there you cannot carry an unlimited population—is by means of industrial development. Of course if you are fortunate enough to be able to develop mines you can care for your population in that way. Sir, as I see it these various homelands—I am not referring to all of them but this certainly applies to some of them—cannot possibly be viable homelands, and on that ground alone this plan must break down. It is this very type of policy of the Government which has given the outside world the image that it has of South Africa to-day.

One of the most prosperous in the world.

Yes, this is one of the most prosperous and fortunate countries in the world, but I wonder how long that prosperity would continue if the policies which it is proposed to apply to South West Africa were applied to the Republic of South Africa. Sir, the policy of the Government simply does not work out in practice, and that is why we on this side reject this plan. We do not believe that it will help us to receive the support of the outside world in retaining the relationship between South Africa and South West Africa and in putting that relationship on a more permanent basis. I say that an attempt to apply this policy to South West Africa will be regarded as something which is not in accordance with the provisions of our obligations and in accordance with our undertaking that we will do everything to recognize the paramountcy of the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the peoples who inhabit it. I hope that this Government will be prepared to drop this idea and to accept that if we are to succeed—and it is my earnest hope that we will succeed—in persuading the outside world that the future of this territory depends on an acceptable relationship with the Republic of South Africa, we must not risk the possibility of creating difficulties by seeking to apply to South West Africa the policy which is envisaged in the report we have before us. In respect of the material progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa, the development of the territory and the constructive proposals contained in the Report and in the White Paper regarding the supply of electricity, etc., we are obviously at one in our aim if not in detail. As far as the provision of adequate water supplies is concerned, that is obviously something we must do. As far as roads are concerned the existing Administration has already done much but unquestionably much more remains to be done. I think we South Africans can be proud of the fact that we have done a great deal for South West Africa by improving communications, by providing a railway system, by providing air services for South West Africa and by helping to carry it along as a modern state.

What do you oppose in the White Paper?

I have already indicated what I oppose in the White Paper. It is inherent in the White Paper that the Government is not abandoning its plan as far as the political aspects of the report are concerned. It is merely placing these proposals in cold storage.

There is no word about it in the White Paper.

The hon. member is, of course, quite incorrect. I can refer him to the earlier part of the White Paper, and if he reads it carefully he will find that it is inherent in this whole document that the Government has not abandoned those proposals. Apart from that, the hon. member’s own leader made it perfectly clear that he wanted this matter to be debated fully on the merits. Quite obviously I am entitled to refer to one of the major recommendations in the Report—the political proposals. I regard this as the most objectionable recommendation in the report of the Odendaal Commission. Sir, my hope is that the Government will drop this idea. I believe that the Government should make it perfectly clear that it will under no circumstances proceed with any proposal to split up South West Africa on the lines laid down in the report and should recognize that the territory south of the red line was one and that it should be administered as such.—I am not dealing with the area north of the red line; I am dealing with the areas where you have a substantial European population. If the Government was prepared to say that it abandons the political proposals and will concentrate on bringing about a much more rapid development of the territory, along the lines which are under discussion here this afternoon, that would have a profound effect on public opinion and that it may help us eventually to arrive at a settlement entirely satisfactory to South Africa. My plea to the Government therefore is that they should go much further than they do in this White Paper. My plea is that they should utterly reject these unacceptable proposals in respect of the splitting of this territory into a series of homelands. I say that those proposals can never be carried out. I say that it will never be possible to force the persons living outside these proposed homelands to return to them, and I challenge any hon. member opposite who believes that that is practicable to get up in this House and to say so here this afternoon. Sir, those proposals are utterly impracticable. They are proposals which will do this country no good. Let us rather concentrate on the more constructive side of this matter and agree that we will do everything possible to bring about the most rapid economic development and advancement that is possible. I believe that if we do that, then with the tremendous resources South West Africa and South Africa have, we would be able to show that South Africa has carried out her obligations under the mandate and that she is entitled to have the relationship between South West Africa and South Africa clarified and once and for all placed upon a basis that will be satisfactory to the people of South West Africa and the people of this country. [Time limit.]

It is clear to me that hon. members of the Opposition know very little about South West Africa. The hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) who has just sat down asked how the Bantu could exist in these areas. Sir, South West Africa has proved that it is a country with great potentialities and we know that the Bantu will be able to make a living in their areas just as the Whites can in their areas. The one thing that has struck me so far, Mr. Speaker, is that every speaker on that side has so far tried to paint a black picture of South West Africa. They are painting a sombre picture in order to frighten somebody. What was even more striking was that every speaker on that side, from the Leader of the Opposition to the last speaker, talked about the world outside. They are more concerned about what the outside world thinks and what attitude it adopts towards us than about the welfare of our own area, South West Africa. If we were to be less concerned about world opinion we shall make greater progress in our own country. However, I shall deal with that at a later stage.

Mr. Speaker, South West Africa is a very peaceful country; we are good people, patient people and we live in that big country of ours at peace with everybody. There is no trouble there. When we go to bed at night we leave our windows and doors open. We have nothing to worry about. But when you listen to speakers opposite and to the world outside you would swear we lived there in a state of unrest and that we kept a weapon under our pillows. But we in South West Africa realize that with the type of speech we get from the United Party they are making our position difficult. They do not want peace and quiet to prevail in South West Africa; they want unrest and trouble from the outside world. Mr. Speaker, South West Africa is a very big country. It has an area of 318.261 sqaure miles with a White and non-White population of 526,000. The population of South West is also characterized by its various ethnic groups. There are 12 different ethnic groups, groups which can be distinguished from one another by the different languages they speak and their physical appearance. We can also be distinguished from one another because of the areas and settlements in which we live. I do not want to go into that this afternoon; I want to discuss other matters. In the first place I wish to pay tribute to the members of the commission and express my appreciation for the wonderful report they have produced. I think everybody who is in his right mind will agree with me that this is a report we can keep for posterity. It is a report we ought to keep in the library so that posterity can see it. This report with its valuable collection of data and recommendations deserves the sober and serious consideration of everybody who means it well with South West Africa. Having listened to the speeches we had this afternoon I am sorry I cannot say the United Party here and in South West Africa mean it well with South West Africa.

I want to assure the hon. the Prime Minister that we in South West appreciate the fact that he appointed this commission. In the second place we also wish to pay tribute to that which he has produced in the White Paper. Mr. Speaker, as you know, it is a fact that approximately 90 per cent of the population of South West Africa, White and non-White, accept this report in broad principle. That has been proved throughout the country as well as at the meeting the Prime Minister held in South West Africa. The recommendations in respect of the further economic development which is envisaged will make a new country of South West Africa. It is not only the ordinary Southwestern or the Bantu groups who welcome these recommendations but even the businessmen in South West Africa welcome them. I want to read what the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce said. I quote from Commercial Opinion of March 1964—

That is the opinion throughout South West Africa. If the recommendations in regard to its economic development are accepted it can only mean prosperity to that country. Not only to the Whites but to the non-Whites as well. Everybody will benefit.

I just want to say that over the years South West Africa has not remained in one position as far as development is concerned. There has been terrific development in every respect. That development has taken place since 1950 when we came into power there. I think with its limited income and the increasing demands that are made the time has arrived for new developmental works of a far-reaching nature to be tackled, as suggested in this report and as suggested by the Prime Minister in his White Paper. If the development could be accelerated we shall welcome it. Before that development can take place it is necessary to give attention to our roads. Years ago the South West Africa Administration realized that the country was developing fast but that the roads were inadequate and since 1950 large sums of money have been spent on road construction. That greatly assisted the economic development of the country. At the present moment approximately 22½ per cent of the South West African Administration’s total expenditure is spent on the construction of roads. Over recent years the annual expenditure on road building has been approximately R9,000,000 per annum. I may also tell you, Sir that although 30,000 vehicles are registered in that area it means that the expenditure on, road building is approximately R300 per annum per vehicle in comparison with R75.80 per annum per vehicle in South Africa. South West Africa can already boast of 400 miles of tarred roads to-day and the Administration has a road-construction programme for 1,400 miles of tarred road. The intention is to construct these tarred roads over the next 20 years. If the recommendation that the National Transport Commission should undertake the responsibility for the building of our national roads were carried out it would mean that our roads would be constructed much quicker, and that is of great importance to us in South West Africa with our long distances. That will of course also have to be done if you wish to accelerate the economic development.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also referred to the number of airfields that have to be built in terms of the recommendations. I do not find that very strange. Many South West African farmers have private planes today; most doctors in distant places have their private planes; some ministers of religion have their planes. Practically every small town has built itself an airfield. I am unable, therefore, to appreciate the point the hon. the Leader of the Opposition tried to make. I welcome the fact that an attempt is going to be made to build more airfields because it is a big country with long distances.

I just want to say this, for the sake of the record, that at the moment the South West African Administration is building a new aerodrome near Windhoek. That aerodrome will cost about R3,000,000 and is approximately 28 miles outside Windhoek. But that is not all. A few days ago the Administration awarded a tender for an airfield at Grootfontein which it is estimated will cost R1,500,000.

The hon. member for Middelland has already referred to certain loans the South West Administration raised in the early twenties and thirties. He also referred to the loss suffered by the Railways in South West. In this respect the Republic is doing South West a favour because it is rendering these services to promote the development of this area.

As I have said the Whites and a large section of the non-Whites accept the report of the commission. But shortly after the report was published the leader of the United National South West Party addressed meetings and issued statements to the Press. He immediately embarked on a campaign of sowing suspicion against the members of the commission, in the first place, because the commission did not consist of sufficient South-westers. He also attacked the recommendations of the commission. When the Leader of the Opposition in South West realized that he was not getting enough support he turned to the Leader of the Opposition in the Republic. I do not know whether the hon. the Leader of the Opposition wanted to go to South West to make an impression there because he knew he no longer made an impression in the Republic. I can, however, tell him that he did not make an impression in South West either. Nor will he be able to assist the United Party there to get on to its feet again, as little as he can do it here. In any case, it was the first time in 10-12 years that a member of the United Party in the Republic held a meeting in South West. I think it will also be the last. In any case, the Leader of the Opposition only tried to frighten the people in South West. If you read the speech he made there, Sir, you will realize that he had no case to put up, except to try to frighten the people. Every now and then he talked about the dangers which would threaten us if we did this, that or the other. I want to tell him that we in South West Africa are not frightened. Nor will we allow ourselves to be frightened and that is why he will not make any impression with that type of speech.

The actions of the two leaders have shown that they are very poor South Africans. They have also proved that they sided with the enemies of South West Africa and of South Africa. They are inviting our enemies to become their allies against the Government in order to thwart its good intentions towards South Africa and South West Africa. The Opposition has once again proved that this afternoon by rejecting this White Paper. In that way they are siding with UNO and with the Afro-Asiatic states and with the communists and other enemies. The only people who have attacked the report are the United Nations, the Africa states, the United Party and Hosea Kotako with a few Hereros. It is clear from newspaper reports and from speeches by members opposite that they did not listen to the speech made by the hon. the Prime Minister at Windhoek and to-day they pretend to be heroes and to have been the people who have forced the Government not to carry out certain suggestions. But the Government need not and shall certainly not consult the Opposition as to what it should or should not do. After all what is wrong with extending the existing Bantu areas, because it is simply a matter of extending the existing areas and not creating new areas.

I just want to show how inconsistent the Leader of the Opposition in South West Africa is. Shortly after the meeting the hon. the Prime Minister held in Windhoek, Adv. Niehaus had an interview on 20 February 1964 at which he said this—

He is saying the world outside will not accept it. Why does the United Party always regard it as their duty to enlist the aid of the world outside. I want to know what the world outside will think of him. [Interjections.] In the same interview with the Argus he said—

A few months ago Mr. Niehaus said they were in favour of it and that they had already asked that the Bantu reserves be extended, but the hon. member for Bezuidenhout accused us of not giving the poor Bantu enough land. Adv. Niehaus says they accept the basic pattern as laid down, but they are against the principle of apartheid. Then he goes on—

Mr. Niehaus says if his party come into power they will give each ethnic group representatives in the Central Parliament and Legislative Assembly. I take it that they will be Bushmen, Hereros, Damaras and the lot. They will all have representation in his Parliament. That is also the direction indicated here by the Leader of the Opposition, the only difference being that Mr. Niehaus is more honest. He states frankly that he will give those areas representations in his White Parliament.

In conclusion I wish to say the following in order to prove that Mr. Niehaus is beginning to move over to the left, just like the Leader of the Opposition here and a large number of his supporters. However, I am pleased that he is honest enough to tell us what he is going to do. On 22 October 1963, for example, he said the following at Aranos, according to the Suidwes-Afrikaner—

World Opinion cannot be ignored and the sooner we fall in line with world opinion the sooner will there be hope for us. If we move with world opinion, speaker sees us coming out safely at the other end.

We know what world opinion is. That is that the majority must rule, or one man one vote and Mr. Niehaus states very clearly that we must move with world opinion. But I want to read something else in connection with the dangerous policy of a race federation. On 12 November last year Mr. Niehaus said the following at Dordabis, according to the SuidwesAfrikaner—

That is the policy of the United Party there and if they come into power they will carry it out.

I want to conclude by saying that as soon as this plan is carried out so that there can be greater economic development in South West, Sir, you will find, particularly those people opposite who are so pessimistic that they cannot see any future for the White man in this country, that the position is exactly the same as it is in the Republic where we are busy with the big Orange River scheme. It will encourage investors to invest their money and I envisage a bright future for us if the investors have confidence in us because we have a strong Government and a Government which is tackling big projects, but that is what the United Party does not want. They begrudge South West that development. I want to conclude by saying that the inhabitants of South West are grateful to the Government for the decisions it has taken; we welcome them and hope they will soon be carried out.

The hon. member for Namib (Mr. Cloete) said quite a lot of things to which we take very strong exception. He said that we were greatly influenced, and almost mesmerized, by world opinion. I should like to remind the hon. member that his Leader and his party embraced the Bantustan policy because they wanted peace in the face of UN attacks, and the hon. member for Constantia (Mr. Waterson) pointed out tonight how there may very well be truth in the allegation that this vast amount of money, approximately R200,000,000, is being spent also to appease world opinion. I will not react to many of the statements made by the hon. member for Namib, objectionable though they be, because this side has had the testimony of the hon. member for Middelland (Mr. van der Merwe) that what he has said is quite untrue. The hon. member for Middelland said that South West Africa had always appreciated the attitude of the Opposition and how they had played according to the rules up to now, and I would say that up to now means over a very long period of years. It is true that he said that now the Leader of the Opposition had departed from that, but he did not give chapter and verse for that, and I challenge him to bring forward instances in that regard.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 23 and debate adjourned.