I move—

These proposals were made available to hon. members quite some time ago. Subsequently, as a result of arrangements I had made, discussions were held with legal officers of the Defence Force and an amended document was presented to this House. A need exists in the South African Defence Force for the proposed amendments to the First Schedule to the Defence Act, 1957, which were tabled here, as well as in the Other Place, on 6th March in order to effect these essential changes. Military law, of which this First Schedule serves as an important source, is being administered by military courts, i.e. officers of the S.A. Defence Force and in particular of the Permanent Force. In the administration of this law certain problems have been revealed by experience, and it is essential, in order to combat these problems, for the aforementioned amendments to be effected now.

These problems are of a fourfold nature. Certain relevant sections have been phrased in such a way that they are open to more than one interpretation, as a result of which there is confusion and some uncertainty on the part of those concerned in the implementation of those sections in practice. If in addition regard is had to the fact that such persons do not always have legal qualifications and have to deal with the implementation of the First Schedule every day, this becomes a real problem. In the second place, the narrow interpretation of certain penal provisions gives rise to a lack of freedom for the executive authority, as a result of which military discipline is being prejudiced. In the third place, administration is being hampered by incorrect terminology and directives, and some of the sections are defective as a result of in completeness. In the fourth place, the First Schedule is inadequate to meet particular needs, i.e. the intensification of control in order to make the maintenance of discipline more effective and to facilitate the procedure as far as administration is concerned.

In view of the fact that there are several sections in the First Schedule which are affected by the aforementioned shortcomings, it is obvious that many amendments will be of a purely consequential nature, and I shall indicate these.

I want to say a few words about clause 1. In terms of section 2 of the First Schedule, the provisions of the First Schedule are applicable only to persons who are subject to the Military Discipline Code. The First Schedule contains the statutory provisions in terms of which a military court is established, and consequently it can try only persons who are subject to that Code. The terminology “with offences under this Code” may possibly lend itself to an, interpretation that the military court was presumably precluded from trying persons for offences other than those under the Code. Such an argument can be strengthened by a closer inspection of paragraph 5 of subsection (1) of section 1 as well as section 70, where a distinction is drawn between civil offences and offences under the Code. In order to remove any confusion with regard to the jurisdiction of a military court, the amendment in its new form is being proposed.

Then I come to clause 2. In, any prosecution for a contravention of section 26 of the Schedule, it is essential for the State to prove the element of negligence. The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of proving this element in a court has become evident in practice. After the analogy of what is prescribed in subsection (2) of section 24, the State is being released of this onus of proof now, and it is being expected of the accused in such a prosecution to furnish at least a reasonable and a satisfactory explanation to the court of the circumstances which form the basis of the facts which have given rise to that prosecution.

Clause 3: The amendments to section 30 are being effected for the sake of completeness, but they are important and are removing the possibility of a one-sided interpretation of section 30. In its existing form a person could be implicated by these provisions only when he had been required to complete the documents for official purposes. If he had submitted a document out of his own free will, without his having been requested officially for such a document, one in which he had made a false statement or entry, with the intention that it should be dealt with officially, his action would hardly have been punishable by virtue of a one-sided interpretation which can be attached to the relevant provisions of section 30. Now the amendments are removing this shortcoming as well.

Clause 4: This amendment is necessary, in the first place, to avoid unnecessary repetition. A person who is “in diens” can be “diensvry”; a person “aan diens” is not “diensvry”. In addition there is the omission of something which is superfluous as there is no other penalty prescribed in the Code for any contravention of section 33 (and there is no necessity to prescribe any such other penalty) and may cause unnecessary confusion as far as a court is concerned.

As regards clause 5, “prejudice” in section 46 is now being qualified in order to eliminate any argument with regard to what is to be understood under that. Actual prejudice leads to punishment. Conduct which has not given rise to any actual prejudice to good order and military discipline, but may nevertheless have contained the possibility or likelihood of prejudicing good order and military discipline, ought to be punishable. In a given circumstance the conduct of a person may possibly not have any perceptible effect on the persons in his presence, with the result that actual prejudice is completely out of the question, but such conduct may be prejudicial to good order and military discipline in the S.A. Defence Force in general, and therefore it ought not to be overlooked merely on account of the circumstances in which such a person found himself at the time of his conduct.

As regards clauses 6, 7 and 8, they are more or less of a consequential nature.

Clause 9: The further amendments are being effected, in the first place, with regard to the provisions of section 56, and, in the second place, to delete a procedure which is in fact not prescribed.

As regards clause 10, the need for this new provision is to be found in the fact that there is no provision for formal action against officers of the rank of commandant or major for minor offences. The procedure then usually is either to reprimand these officers informally, which is not always desirable and conducive to discipline in given circumstances, or to bring them before the only competent military court, namely a general court martial, which, on account of practical and financial circumstances and circumstances of service, is not always desirable either for minor offences.

The reasons for clause 11 are threefold: In the first place, by extending the punitive jurisdiction of commanding officers, discipline is intensified; in other words, increased punitive jurisdiction serves as a deterrent. Coupled with this there is the provision in rule 28 of the Military Discipline Code with regard to the penalties which may be imposed on an accused when he pleads guilty to any charge brought against him and the trial officer convicts him on that charge without any evidence having been led. In that case it is being envisaged, for various reasons, the most important of which is to alleviate the administrative burden which rests on the trial officer with regard to the procedure at the summary trial, to increase the maximum penalties of fines and detention which may be imposed, with the result that as far as clause 11 is concerned, those penalties in section 62 also have to be increased in order to maintain a proper balance. The third most important consideration is to limit the number of courts martial convened in respect of minor offences merely for the sake of imposing a heavier penalty than that which a trial officer has jurisdiction to impose. The envisaged increased punitive jurisdiction of trial officers should not be regarded as a tremendous power which may have farreaching and indeterminable consequences for an accused. The interests of the accused are still being protected through automatic channels of review, and the very object the amendments contained in clauses 13, 14 and 15 seek to achieve is to benefit accused persons by means of an accelerated procedure of review in order to avoid too much time elapsing.

The proposed subsection (2) of section 63, as embodied in clause 12, is not creating anything new. In this subsection, in which the provisions of the existing subsections (2) and (3) have been embodied, the procedure to be followed in the event of any objection to a trial officer is simply being stated more clearly, as the procedure which is outlined at present is inconsequential, incomplete and difficult to understand.

The amendments contained in clause 13 as well as in clause 14 are being effected purely with a view to benefitting the accused. In terms of the provisions of section 118 of the First Schedule, every sentence commences immediately after the sentence has been announced in open court. Nevertheless, in terms of existing legislation, any revision of such a sentence cannot take place prior to the expiration of a period of three days in order to afford the accused the opportunity of making representations with regard to his trial. If such an accused had been sentenced to detention, for example, that sentence would be put into operation immediately, and regard being had to the aforementioned provisions concerning revision as well as to postal traffic, it could happen that he would have served a considerable portion of that sentence before his case could be reviewed and any irregularity could possibly be detected in the proceedings as a result of which his sentence would be set aside. By expediting the procedure with regard to revision, the period of possible irregular detention of an accused is being limited to a minimum. In this connection I have already referred to clause 14.

The provision in clause 15 is essential as a result of the provision in clause 10 in which a criminal court is empowered to hold summary trials in order to make provision for the channels of revision in respect of the proceedings before that trial officer.

Clauses 16 and 17, too, are of a consequential nature.

I now refer to clause 18. In terms of section 70 a general court martial may try a person for any offence excluding an offence under section 56, i.e. treason, murder, rape and culpable homicide committed within the Republic by any person subject to the Code. In terms of section 71 an ordinary court martial has jurisdiction to try any person subject to the Code, not being an officer, for any offence, other than a capital civil offence or an offence under section 4 or 5. Treason, murder and rape are civil capital offences. As culpable homicide, which is mentioned in section 56 and is excluded in section 70, is not excluded in section 71 as well, this amendment removes this shortcoming.

Clause 19 is of a consequential nature.

Clause 20 is included merely for the sake of completeness.

The reasons for the amendment in clause 21 are important. As far as offences are concerned, the jurisdiction of a general court martial outside the borders of the Republic is unlimited, and that court martial would be competent to try an offender on a charge of murder. For various reasons it may be deemed necessary to adjourn such a court martial for a period longer than 14 days, and in that case the accused would be entitled in terms of existing legislation to be released from custody, which could create an undesirable situation. This would apply even in the case of a deserter, the last person a court would want to have released from custody. In terms of the amendment a discretion is now being vested in the court with regard to the dismissal from custody of an accused. This discretion is not unlimited. In the proviso to the amended subsection (1) of section 87 the interests of the accused are protected in that the person who convened that court martial controls the acts of the court martial.

I now want to refer to clause 22. Except for the particular circumstances in which an offence under section 19 (1) is committed, the basic punishable act contained therein, is the same as that contained in section 19 (2), i.e. disobeying any lawful command of a superior. Because of this affinity between the two subsections, a court has the jurisdiction to convict an offender, charged with an offence under section 19 (1), of an offence under section 19 (2) as an alternative.

In the case of clause 23 we have the position that in the case of an offender who repeatedly commits offences, any sentence of imprisonment which has been suspended will be applicable and will have a very beneficial effect. Other than in the case of detention a sentence of imprisonment is accompanied by either cashiering or discharge with ignominy from the South African Defence Force. Consequently the services of an offender in the South African Defence Force can only be retained if the whole of the sentence of imprisonment is suspended and not only a portion of such a sentence, in which case his services will be terminated summarily on account of the automatic sentence. As regards subsection (2) of section 94, a confirming or reviewing authority is now also being empowered to suspend a portion of the sentence of detention and not only the whole or the unexpired portion thereof. Subsection (3) provided that the authority having power to confirm the findings and sentences of general courts martial, might at any time during the currency of any sentence of imprisonment, order the operation of the unexpired portion of the sentence to be suspended. By the deletion of subsection (3), such power is now being vested, in terms of the provisions of section 117, in the General Officer Commanding, South African Defence Force, only. The amendment to subsection 4 is necessary because of the deletion of subsection (3).

I now come to clause 24. The same consideration which applies in respect of clauses 13 and 14, as far as the accelerated procedure in respect of the revision of the proceedings before a trial officer is concerned, now also applies to the proceedings before courts martial, i.e. the ordinary court martial envisaged in this clause, and the general court martial envisaged in clause 25.

The amendment contained in clause 25 once again is a purely consequential one.

As regards clause 26, in accordance with the amended procedure for accelerating the revision of proceedings, and in order to be able to give effect to that procedure, section 111 is being amended so as to enable the offender to send his representations directly to the reviewing authority, to whom the court in the first place now also has to submit without delay the minutes of the proceedings of the trial.

The insertion of paragraph (b) in clause 27 intensifies control. The finding and sentence of an ordinary court martial are not implemented unless and until they have been confirmed by the officer who convened that court martial, which officer has the power to nullify the conviction and to set aside the sentence. Yet this discretion is not an arbitrary one and ought to be exercised judicially. Therefore it is merely to be able to determine whether these requirements have been met in cases where the finding or any of the findings of the court martial have not been confirmed, that the General Officer Commanding, South African Defence Force, is being given the power in aforementioned paragraph to ask for reasons why the confirming authority has refused to do so.

As regards clause 28, the position is as follows. As not only a civil court, but also a military court has the power to impose a sentence of imprisonment in appropriate cases, the amendment is merely indicative, i.e. only a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a military court may be served in a detention barracks. The person who may order the offender to serve the sentence in a detention barracks, is now being designated, i.e. the Adjutant General.

The sole object of clause 29 is to improve obscure terminology.

Clauses 30, 31, 32 and 33 are consequential of nature.

As regards clause 34, as far as paragraphs (a), (c), (e) and (f) are concerned, the amendments are merely being effected for the sake of completeness, as it may be argued that a distinction, although slight, can nevertheless be drawn between arrest and custody. Taking into consideration the provisions of sections 91 and 93, paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of section 128 is incorrect. Cashiering which can be imposed only in the case of an officer, is not accompanied by a sentence of detention, which sentence is not a competent sentence in the case of an officer. As a sentence of detention can be accompanied only by a sentence of ordinary discharge, the amendments are necessarily consequential. Field punishment is an isolated sentence and is not accompanied by other sentences. Apart from the amendments in paragraph (d) which make provision for various eventualities and effect on improvement in the grammar of the Afrikaans version, there is the insertion of the important proviso to make provision for those cases where the trials have been completed but the offenders intend appealing against their conviction or applying for the revision of the proceedings of their cases. In such a case the Adjutant General will have the power to order that the offender shall not return to his duties during the period concerned. As regards paragraph (e) of this clause, the sequence of words is being changed purely on account of the amendment in paragraph (b). In addition subsection (4) of section 128 is being amended in such a way by paragraph (g) as to allow of the designation of the authorities that will have to determine whether an offender has been charged before the court within a reasonable period.

As regards clause 35, membership of the Citizen Force, Commandos, or the Reserve is not sufficient to cause the members thereof to fall under the provisions of the Military Discipline Code, nor, consequently, under a military court. There is a second prerequisite, i.e. training, duty or service in terms of the Defence Act. As a military court does not have jurisdiction in respect of these members at all times, or, if it does have jurisdiction, is limited with regard to the sentences it may impose, it does happen at times, particularly towards the end of the training period of such a member, that he commits an offence and is then summoned, with the approval of the Adjutant General, to appear before a civil court, very often also for an offence in the case of which the action led to the loss of or damage to Government property. If he were summoned to appear before a civil court for such an offence, the civil court would not have the jurisdiction on the conviction of the accused to order the damage to the State to be recovered from him. These amendments are now making provision for this as well.

Paragraph (a) of clause 36 merely gives the correct version of the particular section to which reference is made. The amendment in paragraph (b) seeks to remove, because of practical considerations, the necessity for a witness to appear in person in a court merely for the sake of giving a piece of formal evidence.

The amendments contained in clause 37 are, in the first place, consequential because of the definition of “institution” contained in section 1 of the First Schedule and, in the second place, they are being effected for the sake of completeness as far as the presence of interpreters and shorthand-writers at boards of inquiry is concerned.

Clause 38 contains consequential amendments in paragraphs (a), (c) and (e). The amendments in paragraphs (b) and (d) of the relevant subsections of section 140 are merely procedural of nature, and are being effected for the sake of completeness in pursuance of the provisions contained in subsection (1) of that section.

I now come to clause 39. The substitution of “during service” for “in time of war” seeks to extend the provision. In paragraph (xxvi) of subsection (1) of section 1 “service” is defined as “service in defence of the Republic or in the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic”. This, from the nature of the case, includes war. Hence this term is preferred.

I now come to clause 40. In order to alleviate the administrative burden which rests on the General Officer Commanding, South African Defence Force, he is being empowered in paragraph (a) to delegate the power of appointing a chief disciplinary officer and assistant disciplinary officers. In paragraph (b) the powers of the chief disciplinary officer and the assistant disciplinary officers are being restricted, in the first place, in that they may only arrest persons subject to the Code, and extended, in the second place, in that they may arrest such persons not only for an offence under the Code but also for any other offence. As section 52 (2) clearly specifies that an officer may only be arrested by another officer, and as assistant disciplinary officers need not necessarily be officers, the further amendments to subsection (2) of section 147 are required for the sake of being consequential.

Apart from making an improvement in subsection (2) of section 151 of the Afrikaans version, the amendment contained in clause 41 now specifies who may remove any person who is not subject to military law from the precincts of a military court on the order of the court and take such a person into custody.

Mr. Speaker, this is an extremely difficult and highly technical amending schedule, and for that reason I arranged, as I said at the outset, for hon. members who are usually interested in defence to discuss these matters in detail with a legal officer so that they need not participate in this debate without being prepared. I am pleased that hon. members made use of this arrangement. These proposals are generally accepted by the people who have to maintain discipline and have to implement the Code, and consequently I hope that this House will pass these proposals so as to enable them to do so on an improved basis.

First of all I should like to express our appreciation towards the Minister for the arrangements he made to enable us to discuss these amendments with the responsible officials. Actions of this kind by a Minister make it very much easier for Parliament to function in a smoother and more effective way. The hon. the Minister is aware, although he did not mention it, that the schedule before us now is a different one to that originally laid before the House on the 5th February. During our discussions numerous points on which we were unhappy were discussed and agreement reached on amendments. Thus, in the schedule now before us clauses 2, 21, 23, 37 and 41 are amended clauses. If we had not had these discussions we would have had to discuss all these matters in this House. But we were able to iron out our differences by discussion and negotiation. We welcome these changes, particularly those designed to expedite review. We accept others which are necessary for the smoother operation of military discipline and the carrying out of the Military Discipline Code. Consequently, it is not my intention to deal in any detail with those clauses upon which we are agreed. But there are, unfortunately, two points, one in particular, on which we could not reach agreement because these contain matters of principle and of policy about which it was not possible for an official to express an opinion or to make concessions. Therefore it is necessary to bring them to the House before the hon. the Minister who is the only person qualified to make such amendments will be able to deal with them.

I would like first, however, to refer briefly to some of the original differences of opinion, because I think it is important that there should be no misunderstanding. I refer to clause 2 which places the onus of proof of responsibility for military property upon a person who is in charge of such stock or money. We were unhappy about this, because we have always been unhappy about placing an onus of guilt upon a person before he has been tried. We have always believed that a person is innocent until he is tried. I mention this because the clause, as it stands, now has the addition of the words “unless a reasonable and satisfactory explanation to the contrary is given”, which we believe removes that problem and which therefore makes this clause acceptable to us. I mention this, because I want to say that in principle we are still opposed to any person being presumed guilty before he has been tried. However, we feel that in this case the mere responsibility for stock or money can be an onus upon the person responsible. The addition of this proviso regarding “a reasonable and satisfactory explanation” makes it acceptable to us, and we believe, acceptable as an amendment of our Military Discipline Code.

It is in clause 5. however, that we strike our real problem. Clause 5 amends the famous section 40—now section 46—which dealt with “an act or omission to the prejudice of good order and military discipline”. I do not think any commanding officer has ever had a bigger favourite in the M.D.C. than this clause. Whenever he did not know with what to charge anyone. then it was the good old “prejudice to good order and military discipline”. I think this is the most popular clause that has ever been used by any commanding officer. Because of our experience in this and because we know how this clause can be used when a specific offence cannot be pinpointed, we looked at it with considerable care. We recognize that it is necessary to have such a broad omnibus clause, because one cannot always pinpoint an offence under any of the other specific sections. However, the amendment now proposed broadens a provision which has been in operation for many, many years; a provision which has stood the test of time, of world wars, of internal troubles and of both peacetime and wartime operations. It is a clause which has over the years been one of the cornerstones of military discipline. It is now suggested that this clause should be expanded from an omission causing prejudice to good order and military discipline to read, “causes actual or potential prejudice to good order and military discipline”. We have difficulty with the word “potential”. As I have said, the clause as it stood, has stood the test of time. Now we will have to determine what is the “potential prejudice”. That term is so wide and gives such power, that we do not believe that we can or that we should support it in this House. Who is the hon. the Minister or this House, but much more so. who is an inexperienced person with the authority to use and apply the Military Discipline Code to decide what is potential prejudice? One may say that because a person has red hair he is creating potential prejudice. because he may have a short temper and that may lead to difficulties. I am perhaps giving a ridiculous example. However, it may be said it is a potential prejudice when, let us say, a short-tempered man who is known as a trouble-maker uses words which in another man would not create trouble. It is then a potential prejudice to good order, because it happens in certain circumstances, or because it is a certain person who is committing a certain act. We do not believe that this can be defined to the satisfactory protection of any person tried under the M.D.C. How does the Minister define it; how does the Department define “potential prejudice”? Anything could be potential prejudice. An act which is perfectly legal could, because of a subsequent event, become an act of potential prejudice to good order. Because of something that happened after the act was committed—because of a change of circumstances—a person could be punished for what was adjudged to be potential prejudice. We wish to move the deletion of that particular extension of this definition. At this stage I therefore move, as an amendment—

That will leave section 46 as it is. We believe that that is wide enough and broad enough to provide all the control that is necessary. I feel that the hon. the Minister has made out no case in this House for the extension of that definition. He has not given us adequate reason other than that it widens the scope. He has not explained to us why this should be necessary, but above all, I believe he has not explained to us how this word “potential” can and will be interpreted in practice in regard to the activities of persons tried under this section.

Sir, we also had and to a certain extent still have some difficulty with clause 11, where again we get the principle of extension, in this case an extension of punishment from 28 to 40 days. There is an increase in fines from £10 to R40—a doubling of the fine. While we recognize that money may have lost its value and that we may have to increase the amount of a fine, there are still 365 days in the year, and we do not feel that time has devalued or depreciated and that we can therefore happily agree to the extension of 28 days to 40 days as the punishment which a commanding officer can apply. Sir, these people are not trained judicial officers. They are not people who have taken courses in military law. They are often and can be junior officers in charge of a detachment. I myself as a second lieutenant have used these powers up to 28 days, and the position is that any junior officer has the power to apply the punishments provided for here. Although we are not moving an amendment at this stage, we would like a greater justification from the hon. the Minister for extending this power to an individual to sentence a man to up to 40 days instead of 28 days. We accept that there is an automatic review but, although the hon. the Minister did not mention this, it is also the intention to increase under the rules the period of sentence after which the conviction will be automatically reviewed. In other words, the automatic review will now only apply to a more severe sentence than was the case formerly. So admittedly the sentences over 28 days will go for automatic review, but it means that in the case of lesser sentences, the evidence will not be recorded, and they will not go for such review. We feel that we would like more explanation in regard to that clause.

In regard to clause 21, the hon. the Minister met us in regard to a proviso which makes it possible for us to accept a provision which originally was unacceptable to us. The position was that where a court martial was adjourned for more than 14 days, the accused was automatically released. The original proposed amendment meant that he could be detained without conditions. The proviso now adds that it shall be reported to the convening officer. That is an improvement and whilst it is perhaps not the final answer, we recognize that there are circumstances which may make this necessary and therefore we are prepared to accept it. Similarly, in respect of clause 41 there was an amendment suggested by us which makes this clause acceptable to us.

So in conclusion I would say that we welcome the improvements and we support the necessary amendments, but we cannot give our unqualified support to the extension of the provision relating to conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline to include undefined, vague and potential offences which neither we nor, we believe, the Defence Force will be able adequately to define and adequately to apply in practice. I therefore move the deletion of that clause.

I want to avail myself of this opportunity, first of all, to thank the hon. the Minister very sincerely for the cooperation he showed by placing one of his legal officers at the disposal of members on this side so that they might discuss their problems with him. I am therefore associating myself with the previous hon. member who expressed his gratitude in this connection. It saved a lot of time and also afforded us an opportunity of having fruitful discussions. As the hon. member has just said, amendments were moved to several of these clauses by the other side of the House as well as by this side of the House. Those amendments were discussed with this officer who had been placed at our disposal, and the document which has now been presented to this House is in this form following on the decision of the hon, the Minister not to have various amendments moved. It is also saving a lot of time in the debate to-day and we thank the Minister for that.

But the hon. member who proceeded me disputed two points. Before I come to that I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the provisions of clause 2. I want to ask him whether, at a later stage in the Other Place, he does not want to consider the introduction of an amendment in respect of the wording of clause 2. This has a bearing particularly on the portion which reads “it shall be presumed, unless a reasonable and satisfactory explanation to the contrary is given by the accused, that he so negligently performed his duties that the said deficiency was caused”. What this clause amounts to is that if the State has proved certain aspects it need not prove anything else; the onus of proof then rests with the accused to prove the contrary. One does not like presumptions very much, but they form part of our administration of justice and of our law of evidence in criminal cases. But here we are faced with the problem, in my opinion, that if both words, “reasonable” and “satisfactory” are used, they may confuse the presiding officer. They may confuse the man who must give a ruling about this clause because in our legal system it is very clear what is required if the words “reasonable explanation” are used on their own, or the words “satisfactory explanation”. Throughout the years a particularly great deal of authority has been built up in our law in connection with the interpretation of these two explanations. The Appeal Court has given us direction in this regard. What it amounts to in brief is, that in the case of an explanation of this nature the position used to be that the courts took the view that an accused could satisfy any onus of rebuttal rest ing upon him in terms of a statute, by proof on a balance of probabilities. In later years this decision was taken further and it was laid down that an accused could acquit himself of any onus of rebuttal, and not merely of a statutory onus of rebuttal, by proof of the balance of probabilities. The following is a matter that I am concerned about that this is why I want to ask the hon. the Minister to give attention to it again. If this new subsection (2) of section 26 of the Schedule were to come before this trial officer, whether a trained or untrained person, he is faced with the problem of two words, i.e. “reasonable” and “satisfactory”. He must ask himself whether these two words are synonymous. He already knows what interpretation is given to a “reasonable explanation” or to a “satisfactory explanation”. However, now both are mentioned and he is faced with the question of interpretation. Are they synonymous? If not, what is meant by them? Is a heavier onus of proof being placed on the accused or not? These words can create all manner of problems, especially for an uninitiated person, and for one who is not trained in law. These can be presiding officers, as are provided for in this new subsection. If the hon. the Minister would therefore consider it, I can say that the omission of either of the two words would be satisfactory and I should be glad if the hon. the Minister could do so in the Other Place. It would still be sound legislating and the implementation of this clause would give satisfactory results in a court of law in the sense in which it would be used here, and not necessarily as we would understand it in civil courts.

As far as the hon. member for Durban (Point’s) objections to these various clauses are concerned, I should like to refer to clause 5. As the hon. member said, section 46 of the Schedule is actually the section which could be used if one were not completely certain what these people bad to be charged with. This section is very popular and is also used a great deal. Certain adjectives are used by the three different services, i.e. the military, police and the prison services, in referring to this section a fact which is well-known. However, this section has also produced problems through the years. Because the article was satisfactory during the First World War, the Second World War and in peacetime, we cannot accept that it will still provide satisfactory results to-day. We live in different circumstances to-day and the Military Discipline Code has also been adapted to make provision for these changed circumstances. I think that everyone agrees that the Defence Force has to operate under very difficult circumstances today. To-day many more of our young men are doing compulsory military service and provision must therefore be made for the Military Discipline Code to make provision for all cases. The present section 46 reads as follows: “Any person who by act or omission causes prejudice to good order and military discipline, …” The interpretation attached to this is that there must be an act or omission which is positive to one side or the other. A mere omission is not always something which can be included under this section and this creates a problem. A mere omission (nalating) is not completely covered by this section.

The term “omission” (versuim) is used here.

I do not want to go into this in detail, but also in the case of an omission (versuim) a mere omission (nalating) is not always an offence. I do not want to detain the House any further with technical explanations. and I leave the matter there. It is necessary for this prejudice to be defined, i.e as it is stated in Clause 5 that it should be actual or potential. I do not think that the word “actual” has created any problems for the hon. member who spoke before me. The definition of the word “potential” perhaps created problems for the hon. member. The words “potential prejudice” are not unknown in our legal system. The most familiar aspect of their use is, for example, in the case of the offence of fraud. Through the years many explanations have been given about what is understood by potential prejudice and in this connection I should like to refer the House to what our courts have said in this connection because I then think we shall be clear in our minds about this. I am now referring to the case of Rex v. Muller about which the Transvaal Supreme Court gave a ruling in 1953. In that case the Judge also referred to the judgment in the Eastern Province Division by the then Mr. Justice Kotze in the case of Rex v. Firling. The law report reads as follows—

I think that this is what the hon. member is concerned about. He himself said that he presented the cases he mentioned in a somewhat far-fetched way. He said that those cases were not cases to be taken into account when potential prejudice was to be determined. In addition, the Judge had the following to say—

In my opinion this is the most important—

In other words, it is that same ordinary, reasonable man, and even the commander who is still young in years, to whom the hon. member referred, whom it is expected should judge as a reasonable, ordinary person whether there was possible prejudice. I think that we may surely accept that even the hon. member for Durban (Point) had those characteristics when he was a second lieutenant, i.e. of being able to give a ruling, as a reasonable person, as to whether or not there was potential prejudice. I should like to credit the hon. member with that; if the hon. member feels that he did not have those characteristics, I am sorry, but I feel that in future we can have the same confidence in our officers. This standpoint, which eliminates concern about the interpretation of a potential prejudice, has also repeatedly been adopted in the Appeal Court. Therefore my standpoint about this matter is that I think that the hon. member is unnecessarily concerned and it is really essential that this section be amended in this way.

The hon. member for Durban (Point) was also concerned about clause 11. This clause amends the jurisdiction which the presiding officer has in certain cases, and the objection was raised that this person could be a junior officer and that the jurisdiction was being increased beyond the limits of necessity in this case. However, there are several safety valves which are applicable in respect of section 62 of the Schedule. In subsection (3) of the same section, provision is made for who the commanding officer should be who may make these rulings. Here already we have the first safety valve. Not any commanding officer or second lieutenant may try the person and sentence him to 40 days’ imprisonment. It is only that second lieutenant or commanding officer defined in subsection (3) who may sentence a person, i.e. “… any officer under the command of a convening authority who has been empowered in writing by such convening authority …” In other words, what it amounts to in ordinary cases is that a commanding officer of a unit, for example, is so empowered by the chief commanding officer. This must be done in writing. If it is not in writing then he has no authority to try a person.

What are you referring to now?

I am now referring particularly to subsection (2) and (3) of section 62 of the Schedule. For the hon. member’s information I should like to quote the subsections concerned. Subsection (2) reads as follows—

A commanding officer may delegate in writing to any officer under his command, all or any of the powers conferred upon him under this section.

In the next subsection the following is provided:

In other words, the powers to try someone are not given to any irresponsible person. Those powers are only given in writing to a responsible officer in terms of the provisions of this Code. If one takes note of the provisions of section 64 (1), one finds that a commanding officer is subject to review from this convening authority. In other words, there are so many safety valves which are applicable to clause 11 that it is really not necessary to object to it because there has now been an increase in the penal provisions. The amount of £10 may perhaps have been a large amount in the past, but it is no longer so to-day. The amount of R40 is perhaps more in accordance with what the amount of £10 was in the twenties and thirties. These provisions are much more realistic than the old provisions. I am therefore referring to the period of 28 days which has been increased to 40 days. We must take note of the other amendments in the Code whereby a person who pleads guilty can be given a heavier sentence; and also that in order to impose a heavier sentence a court martial must be convened. The constitution of a court martial is a technical matter which takes time and in which more than one officer is involved, inter alia, in a presiding capacity, and where they must comply with certain qualifications. The summoning of the court martial is a lengthy process. In order to make provision for such offences and sentences, which may be regarded as less serious, it is surely not necessary to set all this State machinery in motion for the composition of a court martial. Therefore I think that the hon. member on the other side of the House should ask himself whether it is really necessary to object to clause 11. I do not want to comment on any of the other clauses. I want to associate myself with what was said here by the hon. member for Durban (Point), who said that what the hon. the Minister had presented to this House in this instance was really good and major improvements which could only contribute to the easier and less cumbersome operation of the Military Code of Discipline.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Potchefstroom thanked the hon. Minister effusively for the amendments which have been proposed here. He did, however, have some criticism to offer against several of these clauses. On clause 2 the hon. member said that he objected to the use of the term “a reasonable and satisfactory explanation”, because this might be a subject which can cause some confusion. The hon. member for Durban (Point) made the point that as this clause existed before the negotiations with this side of the House and the amendments which were made, it was much more onerous.

I proposed the amendment myself.

If the hon. member proposed the original amendment, I must remind him that the amendment said that there was a presumption that if any stores were missing the person in charge was negligent in the performance of his duty unless the contrary was proved. Now, there is a big difference between having to prove to the contrary and having to give a reasonable and satisfactory explanation to the contrary. We all know in cases where there are deficiencies, especially in Government departments, Railways, the Defence Force and so on, but in private concerns as well, where there are certain rules and regulations laid down, where certain people have responsibilities, that where something is missing, if anyone is ever charged with fraud or theft, all one has to prove is that there is some other means or source of outlet of the store. The person charged is inevitably acquitted. In principle there is nothing wrong with this provision, provided it does not go too far. In principle it provides that there shall be a presumption that the person in charge of the store is responsible for negligence. His negligence, not theft, caused that deficiency, unless the contrary be proved. This is as it was. Now it says that he shall give a reasonable and satisfactory explanation, which is less onerous and, I think, far more equitable in the circumstances. Although he is in charge, he carries the legal responsibility, without being, in fact, responsible for that loss. It might be impossible for him to prove the contrary, but it would be possible for him in terms of the new proposal which is before us to-day, to give a reasonable and satisfactory explanation. I hope the hon. the Minister will keep that provision as he has presented it to us.

So far as clause 5 is concerned, the hon. member for Potchefstroom says that he cannot accept that because the situation has existed during two world wars and operated satisfactorily, it should remain the same now. The circumstances, he said, were quite different now. It is very difficult to appreciate quite what the difference is. The principle involved is that one is going to punish a man for his conduct, in which the mental attitude of that man is a most important element, the mental approach for which he is responsible and for which one is going to punish him. The hon. member dealt with the case of Rex v. Muller, I think it was, which concerned a forgery. The Judge said that the remote risk of prejudice would suffice in that case, in a conviction for fraud or forgery. He went on to quote the learned Judge as saying that it was a “probable, direct or reasonable risk”. It must not be too remote. He further quoted the learned Judge as saying that “it is a difficult matter to decide”. Indeed, this is perhaps the nub of the whole matter. It is a difficult matter to decide for a Judge, despite all his years of learning, training and experience. It is even difficult for him to decide what is potential prejudice. I want to say to the hon. member that he misses the point altogether. We are not dealing here with a criminal in a fraud or forgery case. One has to prove, first of all, that he had the intention to defraud. Then one has to prove in addition that the act concerned caused prejudice. The Judge was here dealing with the fact that it could be potential prejudice. Once one has proved the intention to defraud, you may only prove potential prejudice resulted. One need not prove actual prejudice resulted. Here we are dealing with a criminal, a person who is charged, not only with having the intention to defraud, but also that there was in fact actual or potential prejudice. These are two quite different matters. In this schedule the man is being charged with having done, in fact, something which will by any act or omission cause actual or potential prejudice. This is a matter of fact. We are dealing here with the soldier who has done something, not with a criminal who has a certain intention. We are dealing with a soldier who has done something which, in fact, causes prejudice to good order and military discipline.

The hon. member for Durban (Point) raised the point, in my submission quite rightly, that this introduces an element which is almost impossible for the person accused to bear. He ought to know, as it has been in the past, that it will cause prejudice. As a matter of fact, this is a matter within his knowledge. He ought to know that, whatever he does, it could cause prejudice to good order and military discipline But potential prejudice raises yet another element, puts the matter in another plane. It puts it, without his particular knowledge, within the knowledge of the persons, perhaps, who try him. He does not know necessarily that it could cause potential harm, because there might be aspects of the matter that he is not entitled to know, that his superiors are entitled to and do know. In their judgment it might result in potential prejudice, whereas he did not know that. To put it quite simply, it is a case of whether he might or might not know of certain facts which could cause this act of his to cause potential harm.

I think it has the other difficulty that, if one talks about potential prejudice, one is talking about something which is really a matter of opinion. It might or it might not. It is potential. One cannot say that it will cause prejudice, but one can say that it might cause prejudice. That is not a matter of fact. To put it in non-legal terms, it is a little “airy-fairy”. If it, in fact, causes prejudice, the person should be punished if it can be shown that he did cause prejudice.

I want to say that, if the learned Judge in the case quoted by the hon. member for Potchefstroom, felt that this was a difficult matter to decide, then a fortiori it is going to be even more difficult for those persons who are charged with the administration of these matters in our Defence Force to do the same. I think that, if one is going to have a military discipline code, it should be something that is understood by everyone, by the ordinary people who make up our Defence Force. In other words, I think that it should be a code which, when properly applied, in the ordinary way, is a code of which one can say, not only that justice was done, but justice was seen to be done by the ordinary man in the street and not by the lawyer. I do hope that the hon. the Minister will have regard to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban (Point), and in the interest of clarity and of an appreciation by the ordinary man in our Defence Force, will accept the amendment which the hon. member has moved.

Mr. Speaker, I want to agree with what the hon. member for Potchefstroom said in regard to the points he mentioned. I also want to support him in his request to the hon. the Minister to consider whether the words “reasonable” and “satisfactory” should both be retained in clause 2. As far as the Opposition’s argument in regard to clause 5 is concerned, I want to say that the clause as it stands is clear and understandable to me and that I cannot see the objections mentioned by the two hon. members on the Opposition side in this regard.

Where do you draw the line?

We are dealing here with a Schedule to the Defence Act, a Schedule which is popularly known as the Discipline Code, a Code which has been established, on the one hand, to protect the soldier and the members of the Defence Force against the exploitation which one may possibly foresee in an institution such as the Defence Force, where one has higher and lower ranks. The purpose of the Code, on the one hand, is to protect officers and privates. On the other hand it is there to provide the proper discipline which is necessary in a body such as the Defence Force. In view of this one can very well see that, if a situation were to arise where there was intent to prejudice the Defence Force, but where this prejudice was not applied in such a way that it might be interpreted as being real, one might get a conviction on the ground of potential prejudice. I think the important point here—a point which has been mentioned time and again—is that there is an opportunity for review, and the test is always whether it is reasonable, in this case as well. As far as potential prejudicing is concerned, it is not a matter of the opinion of the presiding trial officer; it is a question of whether he applies his opinion as a reasonable person would apply it. Therefore I can by no means agree with the hon. member for Durban (North) in connection with the technical problems which he mentioned here. This is a trial body with its own particular character and provision has accordingly been made for reviews with their own particular character.

The Minister told us that there was a need for these amendments and I wholeheartedly agree with him. I think this need has been felt for many years already, and therefore we welcome the amendments which he is introducing here, except for the few amendments to which we objected.

Sir, the last three hon. members who took part in this discussion are all lawyers, and once lawyers come along with technical points and the hon. the Minister told us that this law is highly technical—and start discussing the definition of words, then poor laymen such as you and I, and I think the Minister as well, get rather confused after a while. Therefore I am not going to venture into this field; as a layman I just want to ask the hon. the Minister, as far as our objection to clause 2 is concerned, whether he will not consider changing the words “reasonable and satisfactory” to “reasonable or satisfactory”. To me as a layman this seems understandable, and I do not think we can argue about it.

As far as clause 5 and the word “potential” are concerned, I just want to say that I do not like the word “potential” either. When someone committed an offence and he could not be brought to book, in terms of the Code, we always resorted to the old section 46, as it read up to now. I do not think it is difficult for the layman to understand that confusion may arise under the old section 46. I think it is so wide that it is not necessary to insert the word “potential” here. I think that the word may very well be left out and the Act still be implemented just as effectively.

Sir, I should like to say a few words about clause 10, in which powers are granted to chiefs of staff. In terms of this clause chiefs of staff are allowed to try officers of the rank of major and commandant. In the past, when such officers committed an offence, they had of necessity to be reprimanded unofficially, which was unsatisfactory, or brought before a court-martial. Trial by court-martial is a matter which is regarded in a very serious light in the Defence Force, and one must not bring someone before a court-martial lightly. The procedure is complicated; the trial takes a long time; many people are sometimes taken from their normal work for days, and in addition, whether the accused before the court-martial is found guilty or not, a stigma always attaches to him to a certain extent for having appeared before a court-martial. I think this amendment is a step in the right direction. The persons who are going to try these field officers now are their chiefs of staff; they are men with years of experience; they are men who have a thorough knowledge of human nature, and I think they are extremely well qualified to carry out these duties. If such an officer’s chief of staff comes to the decision during the trial that the charge is of such a nature that he cannot try the case, he can always refer the case to a court-martial. I think this is an excellent change and I think that all of us can welcome it very much.

Mr. Speaker, I thank hon. members for the spirit in which this discussion was conducted. I also want to thank them once again for their cooperation in judging the original document which was laid upon the Table. The hon. member for North Rand quite rightly said that here we were concerned with a whole number of legal men and that in this sphere one had better tread warily once they started arguing. I want to say at once that if there is one hon. member who convinced me that clause 5 should not be amended, that hon. member is the hon. member for Durban (North), not because he argued his case badly, but because he showed me what a lawyer could do if this provision were not to remain as it was. I think the hon. member did not do the hon. member for Durban (Point) a good turn by speaking, because the clause as proposed by the hon. member for Durban (Point) will afford an able lawyer, who can argue as eloquently as the hon. member for Durban North has just done, the very opportunity of allowing a man to go free. I shall furnish a few examples in this connection. But, first of all, I want to begin by saying that although this House has to guard against any injustice, I think that what we are dealing with here here is not the Defence Act but the prescribed Military Discipline Code laid down, which is used daily by the people who have to maintain discipline, we should allow ourselves be guided by them to a certain extent. It has been reported to me that objections have been raised, and I have been satisfied by examples which have been placed at my disposal—and I should not like to publish them here—that situations arise when potential prejudice does indeed occur.

It may for example happen that an officer in the absence of his superiors and in company of his inferiors or his equals, speaks of his superiors in a way which may have the effect of prejudicing the authority of the superiors. I say this may happen. It may not prejudice him there, because he may be speaking outside of his official duty and then it is not actual prejudice. It may be potential prejudice. In the second place, there is the question of swearing to which hon. members and all of us are opposed. I am not saying that swearing takes place in the Defence Force, but complaints are being lodged continually. The hon. member for Durban (Point) should not hold it against me, but he is one of the members who come to me from time to time with matters against which he says I should guard. We shall take this up on another opportunity. This is intended precisely for handling situations of that kind. There is the question of giving orders in connection with dress. The manner of dress of a man on parade may not prejudice discipline at that moment, but it may hold potential prejudice. We have had examples of such parades which have been held, and with a lawyer like the hon. member for Durban (North), those provisions give a person all the scope in the world. I do not want to give that kind of lawyer all that scope. For that reason I regret that I am unable to concede to their wishes. I think I have been very accommodating to hon. members of the Opposition by negotiating in a reasonable way with them as well about this matter, but now they want to be like Shylock, and have everything. That is why I do not see my way clear to concede to their wishes.

As far as clause 11 is concerned, I think the hon. member for Potchefstroom gave a very adequate reply by referring to sections 62 and 64 of the Military Discipline Code. I think those sections contain all the guarantees and assurances that this will not take place in an irresponsible way. The people who usually conduct that kind of trial in most cases are men who have training in military law but as the hon. member for Potchefstroom pointed out. immediate revision is possible. Consequently it is not as though one is delivering an accused into the hands of an irresponsible person in such a case, because the officer ordering that investigation is surely not irresponsible. The hon. member should not make us use ridiculous examples. Action will be taken with a sense of responsibility; otherwise we will in fact prejudice discipline. I say that with the guarantees contained in sections 62 and 64 I do not think the objections of hon. members hold water.

As regards the point which the hon. member for Potchefstroom made and to which the hon. member for North Rand also referred as regards the words “reasonable and satisfactory”, this is a matter which I have considered from all angles. I shall only make the promise that I shall consult the law advisers in this regard and if the point which the hon. member for Potchefstroom made, namely that this is not correct in legal terms, is a valid one, I shall try to effect an improvement. The hon. member for North Rand asked whether we should not have “reasonable or satisfactory”. I shall consider both suggestions. I shall also discuss this matter with the hon. members personally once again, and if I can be convinced that a change has to be effected, I shall do so in the Other Place. But I regret that I am unable to make further concessions in regard to clause 5.

Amendment put and negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Original motion put and agreed to.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

I shall not detain the House long on this matter. As you will remember, Sir, we decided to support the Second Reading and also the Committee Stage of this Bill. The Minister now has what he has been seeking for some time. Actually the Minister has wider powers than any previous Minister of Posts and Telegraphs ever had in relation to his own Department, and I trust that these powers will now be used wisely and with immediate effect. There are certain matters to which he can now give his immediate attention. Amongst these will be the alteration of the post structure, and in particular the narrowing of the very wide gap there is at the moment between the few higher posts and the very large number of lower-paid posts in his Department. That is his first task and the second task to which I take it he will give and has already given attention, and will now be able to give even more attention, will be to see that the shortage of technical personnel will be diminished by immediate steps in terms of this new Bill and the new powers we are giving him. I trust that there will soon be good news for the whole of the Post Office staff as the result of this Bill being adopted by the House.

All I have to say in reply to these few words of the hon. member for Orange Grove is that these matters mentioned by him have already been receiving my attention since this decision was taken by the Cabinet in September last year. Some of those considerations have already been included in the Appropriation Bill.

Motion put and agreed to.

Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Mr. Speaker, as you will recall, the Opposition strongly objected to this Bill at its previous stages. The hon. the Minister met our demands in one respect in the Committee Stage by accepting an amendment we had moved. Unfortunately, this is not enough to satisfy us on this side of the House. The two main principles of the Bill about which we are really concerned, remain unchanged. The S.A.B.C. is being granted the power here to erect broadcasting stations and broadcasting plant within or outside South Africa, although this can only be done with the approval of the Minister. Moreover, the S.A.B.C. is being granted wide powers as regards the expropriation of property. Here, too, the Minister has the final say. In other words, the approval of the Minister is linked with the performance of both these functions. I hope the Minister will give us a broad interpretation of the words “with his approval”. I want to suggest to him that he should have the annual report of the S.A.B.C. indicate at what places radio stations have been erected. In the second place, I want to express the hope that he will reply to any questions we might put to him in this connection. We have been told that cases may occur where radio stations are erected outside our borders which may affect our foreign policy, and that it will therefore be undesirable to furnish details. I admit that such cases may occur, in which event we shall not be unreasonable in demanding information which may not be divulged. However, I hope the hon. the Minister will furnish us with as much information as he is in a position to do. The same applies in respect of the powers of expropriation which are now being granted the S.A.B.C. We hope we shall be given full information in that regard when we ask for it.

The other provision in this Bill meets with our approval. In terms of this provision the S.A.B.C. is authorized to grant free radio licences on a larger scale. I hope the Minister will use his influence in this respect as well and will see to it that the S.A.B.C. will be more generous and lenient in this regard. For the rest, we are still of the opinion that the powers which the S.A.B.C. is being given here, are too wide, particularly in the case of a corporation of this nature. For this reason we shall vote against the Third Reading of this Bill as well.

I gladly give the hon. member for Orange Grove the assurance that if he asks reasonable questions I shall reply to them. I have done so in the past. Why should I not do so in future as well? As far as the granting of licences is concerned, I just want to point out to him that it is not a question of a lack of sympathy here. Sometimes it is a question of funds. On a previous occasion I told the hon. member for Durban (Umbilo) that since we are now going to introduce a new system of collecting radio licence fees, the results of this new system may be such that we shall be able to be more generous as regards the granting of licences either free or at a reduced rate.

For the rest, the fears of the hon. member that wide powers are here being granted to the S.A.B.C. are unfounded. As has been said by the hon. member himself, the S.A.B.C. may only exercise those powers with the approval of the Minister concerned. Of course, I have to account for these things, and for this reason it is obvious that I shall act in a responsible way.

Motion put and the House divided:

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Motion accordingly agreed to and Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Agreed to.

(Committee Stage)

Instruction stated to Committee.

New clause 9:

Mr. Chairman, I move—

9. (1) Section 28 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for subsection (3) of the following subsection:

1. “(3) If by any amendment of a scheme any other product is substituted for or added to the product to which the scheme relates and the amendment does not provide for the reconstitution or any consequential modification of the constitution of the board—
   1. (a) the members representing the persons producing such lastmentioned product shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to represent also persons producing such other product; (to) any class of persons or consumers which has in terms of subsection (1) been determined in relation to the last mentioned product referred to in paragraph (a), shall for the said purposes be deemed to have been so determined also in relation to such other product;
   2. (c) any member representing a class of persons or consumers so determined, shall for the said purposes be deemed to represent also the corresponding class of persons or consumers which is in terms of paragraph (b) deemed to have been so determined in relation to such other product.”

I should like to inform the House regarding the necessity of including a further amendment to the Marketing Act in this Bill at this stage. The Eastern Transvaal Co-operative Society recently submitted to us a proposed amended maize and kaffircorn scheme on behalf of the producers of buckwheat in a number of magisterial districts on the Transvaal Highveld. This amended scheme, which we are prepared to accept, provides for the introduction of a single channel marketing scheme for buckwheat. The idea is that the Mealie Board will exercise the necessary control because the extent of the buckwheat industry is such that the establishment of a separate control board for this product is not justified at this stage. The amendment of the existing maize and kaffircorn scheme suggested by the co-operative society concerned, does not affect the constitution of the present Mealie Board. When this aspect was tested against the provisions of the Marketing Act, however, doubt arose as to whether buckwheat could be added to the scheme without changing the constitution of the Mealie Board. The matter was discussed with the Government Law Adviser. He is of the opinion that section 28 (3) of the Act, which implies that a product may toe added to a scheme without the constitution of the control board concerned being affected, can never come into operation under the present provisions of the Act. Consequently the constitution of such a control board has to be amended in such circumstances so that the additional interests may also receive representation on the board. In the case in question if means that an additional member representing only the producers of buckwheat has to be appointed to the Mealie Board, or that the existing representation for maize and kaffircorn producers must at the same time represent the producers of buckwheat as well, and that the existing representation for either maize and kaffircorn consumers or merchants or millers or exporters must at the same time represent buckwheat consumers, buckwheat traders, buckwheat millers or buckwheat exporters, as the case may be. Taking into consideration the fact that buckwheat is being included in the maize and kaffircorn scheme on a limited scale, and the undesirability of making over-hasty changes to the constitution of a control board, the Mealie Board is not in favour of administering a scheme for buckwheat if its present constitution will in any way be affected thereby. Since the buckwheat producers insist that buckwheat be placed under control at the earliest possible stage, the only alternative is to amend the Marketing Act in order to provide specifically that the constitution of a control board may be left unchanged when a new product is added to an existing scheme. However, this provision will only be used in special circumstances in future. Since the consideration of and arrangements for the proclamation of the amended scheme had to be proceeded with in the meantime, this amendment, if agreed to, will have to have retrospective effect.

New clause 9 put and agreed to.

Clause 15:

Mr. Chairman, duly authorized by the hon. member for Albany, I should like to move the amendment standing in his name on the Order Paper—

Mr. Chairman, during the Second Reading debate we already hinted that we wished to move an amendment on the lines of the one appearing here. We are doing so for the simple reason that we consider it unfair that producers of uncontrolled products, the people who are going to pay this levy, will have no say in regard to the determination of such a levy. Producers of uncontrolled products may realize full well that the levy will be in their own interests. This we already conceded at the Second Reading. Although they realize that it will be in their interests, I think those people will still want a say in the determination of that amount and will want to be able to tell the Minister whether they will be satisfied with it or not. Of course, according to our amendment, the hon. the Minister need not necessarily listen to what those producers say to him. I will deal with this later. These producers will realize, nevertheless, that they had an opportunity to inform the hon. the Minister whether they approved of the levy or not. We are not suggesting that the hon. the Minister will necessarily levy an arbitrary amount in an arbitrary way. As the clause reads as present, he may do so. Furthermore, I think that we on this side of the House recognize that, apart from protecting the producer, the hon. the Minister should also protect himself in this regard. When Ministerial action is based on consultation, it will be so much more effective than when we have the hon. the Minister acting on his own as is provided by clause 15. Neither will this amendment of ours limit the actions of the hon. the Minister unnecessarily. It may be necessary to act in a state of emergency resulting from surplus conditions. But the hon. the Minister will still have the power to act, also when he has consulted those people. In other words, we on this side of the House are not prepared to tie his hands altogether; we still want to give him the power to impose a levy on uncontrolled products, but only on condition that he has duly notified the producers thereof. This, briefly, is the object of this amendment, and I trust that the hon. the Minister will accept this amendment. This amendment is based on realism, it is fair and it takes the producer into consideration. Therefore, we on this side of the House hope that the hon. the Minister will accept this amendment.

The object of this amendment is to protect the producer and for that reason we are prepared to accept the amendment as moved.

On behalf of this side of the House I want to thank the hon. the Minister for accepting this amendment.

Amendments put and agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and agreed to.

Schedule:

I move, as an amendment—

Agreed to.

Schedule, as amended, put and agreed to.

Title:

I move, as an amendment—

Agreed to.

Title, as amended, put and agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported with amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I am a little concerned about subsection (b). Subsection (b) gives the definition of the word “progeny”. The question has been raised as to whether this definition is wide enough to cover animal semen and eggs. As I understand it, these are both substances of animal origin. However, it seems doubtful as to whether this definition is wide enough. I wonder whether provision should not be made to make assurance doubly sure, by providing for those items in this definition. I do not propose to move an amendment, for this is a very tricky matter. This matter requires great care on the part of the Minister’s legal advisers, as well as his professional people. It is not a matter for laymen, such as myself; I am only a poor farmer from the platteland, and it is not for me to meddle with the legal phraseology which is necessary to put such a matter right. Both these substances are capable of transmitting disease from parent stock to the second and third generation. In subsection (b) the following definition is given—

I am leaving out “parasite” for the moment.

I think that there may be some doubt in this regard and I want to draw the attention of the hon. the Minister to this matter.

I understand we are not taking the stages of the Bill to-day and there is in any event Another Place where anything which the Minister wishes to put right can be dealt with. I understand that the hon. the Deputy Minister is taking the whole of this Bill in review with the assistance of competent veterinary authorities. It may well he that on reconsideration, this particular clause could he amended. I make this request to the Minister because I want to draw the attention of the people assisting the Minister to this matter. I believe that the Minister might have a difficult time in making a prosecution stick. I am sure he will have the whole Parliament behind him if he feels that it is necessary to make a prosecution stick where he takes action against people who are infringing the provisions of this Bill. If the hon. the Minister could close any gap, I hope he will take the opportunity to have the whole matter reviewed so that it could be put right either here or in the appropriate Other Place.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to assure the hon. member for South Coast that the progeny was precisely the problem we had. We asked the law advisers who drafted the Bill to make sure that there could be no loopholes in this legislation. They said that if we used this wording it would cover the progeny. I am thinking specifically of the smuggling of hen’s eggs. During the Second Reading of this Bill—I was glad to see we had the support of the hon. members on that side of the House —I said we would try to put an end to the smuggling of hen’s eggs and roasting chickens. This smuggling enriches only one section, while the other people who are honest do not make any money. Therefore, we intend putting an end to this offence as well. I can assure the hon. member that if we do not close all the possible loopholes in this Bill in this House, we can, in any case, do so in the Senate. However, we agree with him that we should put an end to this practice.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 5:

Mr. Chairman, clause 5 is one of the clauses of this Bill which sets up involved administrative machinery placing a great responsibility not only on the Department but also on a lot of other people. I want to deal for a moment with the provisions of this clause because I am seeking an assurance from the hon. the Deputy Minister in regard thereto.

I want to draw attention to the fact that in subsection (1) (b) of clause 9 the word “progeny” is again used. This word has been defined and was the subject of my remarks a few minutes ago. It is used throughout the Bill and it is correctly used. Here the Government is attempting to deal with infection which can be transmitted through progeny. It is not only the infected animal itself, nor the parasite but the progeny which is provided for in this Bill. The Good Book tells us that the sins of the fathers shall be visited on the children to the third and fourth generation. In this Bill the hon. the Minister and his Department are trying to do the same thing. They cannot go wrong if they follow that good precept.

In clause 5 it is stated that the Minister “may confiscate it or cause it to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, as he may deem fit”. What may he confiscate or cause to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of? Subsection (1) (b) defines this, namely “any animal, parasite or infectious thing which in the opinion of the Minister is the progeny of any animal, parasite or infectious thing which in his opinion was introduced or came into the Republic in contravention of the provisions of this Act or of a law repealed by this Act”.

The Minister may confiscate it, cause it to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, as he may deem fit. I submit that this is very wide language indeed. I want to ask the Deputy Minister whether in terms of this it means that he can hold it, clear it of disease and then dispose of it as he sees fit after it has been cleansed itself or through its progeny. If the progeny are cleansed can they also be disposed of without limiting the power of the Minister in any way? I ask this because the widest possible language is used in this clause. I want to emphasize that this is most important and I will have to come back to it during the Third Reading. This matter is fundamental. One cannot give powers like this to a Minister unless one is absolutely clear in one’s mind as to what must be done. It has been said that I am wanting a tighter Bill than the hon. the Deputy Minister wants. This may be so, but I want this Bill to be watertight.

I therefore want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister whether this means what it says, namely that the progeny of these infected creatures, whatever it may be, parasites or animals, the Minister may confiscate them and order them to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Can these animals be cured? When it has been cured of all disease and it is safe to be distributed can it be in fact disposed of in a manner such as the hon. the Minister may deem fit? I ask this for the benefit of South Africa and for the benefit of the people who have suffered and who are not culprits in terms of this Act. There are innocent people suffering to-day. Are they going to be left on the sidelines to continue to suffer because they did not participate in an illegal operation in the past, or are the people who acted illegally in the past now to be made to realize that the honest man is in the future going to be put on exactly the same basis with equal opportunities to compete in the markets of South Africa and that they are not going to be prejudiced in any way because they remained honest against the temptation of other people who fell for the temptation and have been acting dishonestly all along. Will the Minister take the powers given to him under this clause to see that these people are given an opportunity of acquiring stock which has been cured by itself or through its progeny of any disease and is available for distribution?

Mr. Chairman, the wording of this clause is correct, namely as the Minister may deem fit. I should like the hon. House to realize that the whole Bill should be viewed in its entirety. Problems are being encountered when steps have to be taken in connection with smuggled goods and when the progeny tests have to be carried out as well. I should like to quote a practical example in this connection. The old Act laid down that the Government should look after the smuggled goods until such time as the court found that such goods were in fact smuggled goods. For example, when one million chickens had been smuggled or had presumably been smuggled into the country, the problem was to find a Department that could feed the chickens and look after them for a period of approximately three months until the court had given its ruling. That is why the Act is now being amended. When one views the Act as a whole, one appreciates that it should be worded the way it reads in this clause. The hon. member for South Coast also wanted to know whether everyone would still share in the cleansed stock or poultry which had been rid of parasites. I cannot tell the hon. member now whether it is possible to say that there are smuggled goods and that those people who have not indulged in smuggling will be able to have a share in the smuggled goods.

Why not?

Because I do not know what the legal implications of this are. I do not know what the position will be if we were to confiscate smuggled goods and give it to people who did not indulge in smuggling. On the other hand, this seems to me as a human being to be the correct procedure to follow. I think people who had no share in the smuggling should also receive some of the smuggled goods. Discussions in this regard will be held to-morrow and attention will be given to this matter. Amendments may possibly be effected in the Other Place. I should not like to commit the hon. the Minister at this stage by saying that everyone will be able to share in smuggled goods which may have been recovered. Practically this seems to be a solution that people who did not make money in the past will then be able to do so. However, I do not want to commit the hon. the Minister by giving a reply at this stage. The hon. member must be fair as this matter is still going to be discussed.

Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to pursue this matter too far, but I want to say that it seems to me that the hon. the Deputy Minister has placed his finger on the sore spot. Illegal transactions, detrimentally affect the agricultural and live-stock industry in South Africa to an extent running into tens of thousands of rand of loss with a possibility of a national disaster overtaking one section of our livestock industry. There are people who are deliberately courting a national disaster for profit. They will now be apprehended in terms of this Bill. I want that there should be no doubt about this and that is why I want the definition in clause 1 to be reviewed. We cannot afford those people who, because they have the money and command the resources, can obtain the services of the finest legal brains to defend them if they are apprehended. We do not want this. We want to know that we have a cast-iron case against them. We are now making the law and we want the law to be able to clap its hands on them without any shadow of doubt when the time comes. This is only the first step. These people have been threatening our livestock industry and are costing the Government and the taxpayers of South Africa, let alone all those who are participating, a lot of money. There are breeders of livestock who have been running this terrible risk of contamination. They have suffered terrific losses, let alone the loss they may suffer in markets. Now the Minister steps in, as provided for in this Bill, and takes these animals in order to cure them through their progeny. This will then be clean stock. Why should the people who have been threatening our security be placed in the privileged position when the stock is free of disease, to claim that the Minister should hand it back to them? They will then be able to exercise the monopoly in South Africa again. The people who have been honest and abided by the law, who have assisted the Government all the way through and who are suffering economically have no gains to set off against possible losses. Indeed, they have been losing their businesses. I want the Minister to say categorically, “We are not going to leave the honest man to suffer hereafter when we have cured these flocks of the disease with which they are infested at the present time”. When that flock is cured it will be cured by the State of South Africa; our Government will take all the necessary steps to see that they are cured, and when through the progeny that disease is wiped out, the infection is ended and there is disease-free stock, then I suggest that the Minister under this clause should have the right to say: “The people who have been honest and have played the game are not going to be placed in a worse position than those who offended and who have been breaking the law, to their own personal advantage, for some years past”. I think that would be most unfair and a very bad example to set. Let us play the game by the honest man and let us also see that the evil-doer, whoever he may be, who has been breaking the law and has been making profits in the past, is placed in no privileged position over the honest man.

We agree with the hon. member who spoke a moment ago and who said that it is important that people who acquire things illegally, should not he allowed to benefit by it, but I do not think it is fail to expect the hon. the Minister to say at this stage what is going to happen with the animals. This is laid down in clause 2, line 33—

To me this is adequate proof that the Minister may, according to circumstances, decide what should be done with such confiscated or infected animals after they have been cleansed of parasites or some infectious disease. I think we should accept that the hon. the Ministai has the power to do this, and I do not think it is fair to ask the Minister at this stage in which way he is going to exercise that power. I think we should leave the matter at that. The Minister has that power, and we accept that he will not allow the people who bring animals into the country illegally, to derive all the benefits. For example, the Minister may put these animals up for sale at a public auction. I do not think he can merely give these animals to somebody, but he has the power to dispose of those confiscated things as he may deem fit. I think we should leave the matter at that.

I am sorry, Sir, I must say to the hon. member for Karas that subsection (3) does not apply. If he reads subsection (3) carefully he will see that it deals with the case of the holder of a permit, under subsection (1) (c) who has infected stock, and now he has to pay. It is only if he refuses to pay that the Minister can step in. If the hon. member will read subsection (3) carefully he will see that it only deals with the prescribed fees payable in respect of the feeding, watering and tending of such animal, parasite or infectious thing or the progeny of such animal, and if he refuses or fails to do so, then the Minister may confiscate such animal, parasite, infectious thing or progeny. I am quite satisfied that we have the crux of the matter in this particular clause.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. member should look at clause 5 which provides—

1. (1) If there is found within the Republic—
   1. (a) any animal, parasite or infectious thing which in the opinion of the Minister was introduced or came into the Republic in contravention of the provisions of this Act, … he may confiscate it or cause it to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, as he may deem fit.

That is what I read out.

The Minister therefore has the power. I agree with the hon. member for Karas that you cannot expect me to give a definite answer now that those confiscated things, after having been cured, will be given to specific farmers. As far as I know they might be put up for sale. I cannot commit the Minister at this stage and say that those farmers who did not smuggle will be given the confiscated stock. We can discuss this matter later on.

Clause put and agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported without amendment.

I move—

With the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act, No. 72 of 1967, certain practical problems arose which threatened to disturb the sound relationship existing between the providers of services, i.e. the doctors and dentists on the one hand and medical schemes on the other hand. The most important of these, according to the Medical Association, are that the tariff of fees for medical treatment as laid down in terms of the Act is unrealistic, and that the prescribed arbitration procedure for the amendment of the tariff is too costly and too cumbersome. As a result of this many doctors exercised their right under the provisions of the Act to give three months’ notice of opting out of the tariff of fees. This action on the part of the doctors to a large extent undermined one of the most important principles on which medical schemes are based, i.e. the provision of medical services to members of schemes and their dependants at reduced rates by way of compensation for guaranteed payment of the accounts concerned. In an attempt to remove the aforementioned as well as certain other points of difference as far as possible, I convened a conference under my chairmanship at which all interested parties were represented. i.e. the Medical Association, the Dental Association, the National Association of Medical Benefit Schemes, the National Association of Medical Aid Schemes, the Central Council for Medical Schemes and the Department of Health. These discussions took place in Pretoria last year, and I just want to tell hon. members that they lasted no less than four days. The conference also considered the advisability of effecting certain amendments of an administrative nature which experience with the implementation of the Act had shown to be necessary.

Before proceeding, I want to express my thanks to all the bodies and persons that participated in the conference for the objective way in which they undertook their task. I cannot speak with enough praise of the approach of everyone that attended that conference and their efforts to make the conference a success, and in any event to bring about better understanding among the interested parties. The good spirit that prevailed there also contributed considerably to the success of the conference. In this connection it was very noticeable that the interests of the patient, for whose benefit the Act had been passed by Parliament in 1967, were always kept prominently in mind by all those present, and for that I am very grateful to them.

With one single exception, in respect of which I shall inform the House later on, this Bill gives effect to the decisions of the conference. The principles of the Bill may be classified under two heads, i.e. firstly, those dealing with the tariff of fees and related matters, and secondly, matters of a general nature.

As regards the question of the tariff of fees, the present position is that where no agreement is reached between the Medical Association and the National Association of Medical Aid Schemes on the amendment of the tariff, if such amendment is deemed necessary by either of those parties, the matter has to be referred for arbitration to two arbiters and one referee for decision. As the implementation of the prescribed procedure in this regard is cumbersome and costly, provision is being made in the Bill to replace it by a simpler but more satisfactory system, according to the opinion of the interested parties.

The proposed amendment concerned envisages the appointment by the Minister of a body known as the Remuneration Commission. The members of this Commission consist of a Judge of the Supreme Court as chairman, a medical practitioner appointed by the Minister from a list of names submitted by the Medical Association for this purpose, or, if dental fees are concerned, a dentist appointed by the Minister from a list of names submitted by the Dental Association for this purpose, and a person appointed by the Minister from a list of names submitted to him by the National Association of Medical Aid Schemes.

Initially, at the discussions in Pretoria, the four parties attending the conference decided unanimously that the Remuneration Commission should consist of four members. The Medical Association has since raised certain objections, and it has become clear to me, also from representations from other quarters, that it would be better and more appropriate to have only three members on the Commission, which is what I am now proposing. I may just indicate that the proposal that there should be four members emanated from me alone at the conference, that there was no lengthy discussion and that I hope that the proposal I am now making here, i.e. that there should be three members, will be acceptable to all parties. However, I shall be prepared to listen to arguments that may be advanced by hon. members, if any hon. member should feel that four members would make out a more balanced commission than a commission consisting of three members as is now being proposed here.

The commission, whose exclusive function will be to examine the tariff of fees every two years and to notify the Minister within three months of amendments to the tariff, if any, will not be a permanent body, but will be appointed by the Minister every two years, or at more frequent intervals, if necessary. The Minister is only obliged to do this at least every two years. Within a month after the submission to the Minister of the decisions of the commission he is obliged to amend the tariff of fees accordingly by way of publication in the Government Gazette.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that this Remuneration Commission, the appointment of which is provided for in clause 12 of the Bill, will provide the solution in order to eliminate the constant dispute about fees and the lengthy processes that had to be followed previously. I want to add that this proposal was made and that this, in my opinion, wise decision which is now being incorporated in the legislation was taken with a view, inter alia, to raising the status of the medical profession in the eyes of the public in general, because by doing so the opportunity is being created for negotiations, as conducted by trade unions in regard to tariffs and remuneration, no longer to take place between doctor and employer, but for the tariff of fees to be determined in this way. I also just want to point out that the intention is that the Remuneration Commission will meet in private and hear submissions by the various parties provided for, or which the Commission may deem advisable to ask to appear before them.

Concomitant amendments or amendments closely connected with this matter or arising from the implementation of the tariff of fees, are the amendments in respect of certain of the definitions for which provision is made in clause 1, and the amendments contained in clauses 6 and 11.

As regards the definitions, the position is briefly as follows: Firstly, the amendment of the definition of “tariff of fees” by the deletion of the reference therein to the preferential tariff. This amendment is necessary as the preferential tariff is no longer applicable as before. Secondly, the insertion of a definition of “Commission”. This has become necessary as a result of the establishment of the Remuneration Commission provided for in clause 12.

Thirdly, the amendment of the definition of “medical aid scheme” by the deletion of the reference therein to the tariff of fees. This amendment is necessary because certain schemes have made provision in their rules for their own tariff of fees, and consequently cannot be classified as medical schemes.

Under the existing section 30 of the Act, which lays down the present procedure for the amendment of the tariff of fees, the establishment of statutory bodies, i.e. the National Association of Medical Aid Schemes and the National Association of Medical Benefit Schemes, was necessary in order to give effect to the system prescribed in respect of the amendment of the tariff. With the establishment of a Remuneration Commission, as is being proposed here, the necessity for the existence of statutory national associations of the aforementioned nature falls away. Consequently provision for the abolition thereof has been made in clause 6. Nevertheless the continuation of such national bodies is highly desirable, but then on a completely voluntary basis in order to co-ordinate and protect the interests of medical schemes, just as the Medical Association, for example, is a voluntary association to co-ordinate and protect the interests of doctors.

The last of the proposed amendments in connection with the tariff of fees is that provided for in clause 11. Experience in connection with the implementation of the Act has shown that these amendments in respect of matters concerning doctors (practising outside the tariff of fees are extremely necessary, for the following reasons. I shall only mention a few. In the first place, as many benefit schemes also offer benefits according to the tariff of fees in respect of specialist services, it is desirable that the section concerned should be made applicable not only to aid schemes, but to all medical schemes. In the second place, for administrative reasons and in order to promote efficiency, it is deemed desirable that notices of doctors and dentists operating outside the tariff of fees should take effect on the first day of the month. This is merely to facilitate the administration thereof. A third reason I want to mention is that where, as at present, it is deemed necessary to give three months notice to practise outside the tariff of fees, it is also deemed logical that three months notice should be given when doctors or dentists want to practise within the tariff again, in order to afford the Central Council for Medical Schemes and the schemes themselves sufficient time to make the necessary adjustments.

The fourth amendment in this connection relates to partnerships. This amendment is necessary only to make it clear that notices under this section are binding for all members of a partnership. In the past it has always been accepted in this way by the Medical Association and by schemes, but as doubt may arise it is better to make it clear. This is also the way it should be, otherwise endless problems will arise, for example where a partner who operates outside the tariff of fees must act for his colleague who operates under the tariff of fees. I do not think it is necessary for me to argue this any further. It virtually goes without saying that all the medical practitioners in any one partnership must adopt either the one or the other course in regard to the tariff of fees.

The last amendment in regard to this matter is to prohibit schemes from circulating the names of medical practitioners and dentists practising outside the tariff of fees to their members, because circulation thereof only affects such medical practitioners detrimentally and serves no useful purpose. I think it is an important matter that we are covering here and one that has caused many problems during the past few months. I may add that the inclusion of this in the Act has met with general approval among the schemes as well.

That, then, disposes of the matters concerning the tariff of fees, and I now come to those provisions of the Bill which are designed to eliminate certain anomalies that have come to light, or to effect certain other amendments of an administrative nature which experience in regard to the implementation of the Act has shown to be advisable.

The first of these amendments is the one provided for in clause 2. It affects those schemes which have been exempted under section 2 of the Act, i.e. the Railway Sick Fund, the medical schemes established by the Departments of Police, Defence and Prisons, respectively, and schemes established under the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1958. The position in the aforementioned connection is that section 38 of the Medical Schemes Act provides that no person may belong to two registered medical schemes and that no scheme may enter a dependent of a member as a member of a scheme. As the aforementioned group of schemes are exempted in terms of section 2 of the Act from the provisions of the Act, including the registration provisions thereof, the said section 38 cannot be implemented in sufficient measure. That is in regard to what I mentioned a moment ago. This unsatisfactory state of affairs is clearly illustrated by the following. Many women who, as dependants of their husbands, enjoy medical cover under the medical schemes of their husbands, but who are also working for the firms concerned, are being obliged by their employers to become members of their schemes, such a family therefore has to pay double membership fees. Another example is the following. The wife of a man who is working for the Railways accepts employment with another firm which has its own scheme, and as the Railway Sick Fund is exempted, the firm obliges the wife to become a member of its own scheme, notwithstanding the fact that she already has comprehensive medical insurance under the Railway Sick Fund as a dependant of her husband. This also causes problems to the doctor. As he is a part-time panel doctor to the Railways, he must treat the wife free of charge as a dependant of the man who is on his panel, or he can treat her as a member of the scheme to which she belongs. This is unnecessary duplication.

As the Act reads at present, a great many problems arose, and the only way in which these can be dealt with effectively, is to regard the said schemes as registered schemes for the purposes of section 38 only. Provision for this is made in clause 2 of the Bill. I just want to say that the proposed amendment has been brought to the notice of the Railway Administration and the other Government Departents concerned, and that no objection was raised to it.

Clause 3 of the Bill contains a similar provision to that in clause 2, but in this case it concerns the schemes exempted from the registration provisions of the Act in terms of section 3 thereof. This amendment is necessary to make it clear that the prohibition on membership of more then one registered scheme also applies to a scheme that is exempted from registration.

The next amendment, i.e. the one contained in clause 4, applies to the constitution of the Central Council for Medical Schemes. The proposal in this regard is to provide for the appointment of nine instead of “not less than seven and not more than nine” ordinary members on the Central Council for Medical Schemes, as well as to make it compulsory for one of the nine members to be a lay member of the Medical Council. In other words, while the membership could previously be seven or at the most nine, it will now be nine, and there is an obligation that one of the nine members must be a lay member of the Medical Council. As regards this amendment it is deemed logical that the membership of the council be determined more precisely and that one of the members be elected from the lay members of the Medical Council, as such a member will from the nature of the case concentrate more specifically on the interests of the members of schemes and their dependants, that is to say, of the patient. In fact, it is precisely in order to see to the interests of the patient that lay members are appointed to the Medical Council.

Under section 11 of the Act a member of a scheme may be assisted out of the Medical Schemes Fund established under that section, only in those cases where the scheme has already rendered him the maximum financial aid to which he is entitled. As the annual maximum aid differs from scheme to scheme, one member may—and this is a possibility—receive greater financial assistance than another. For that reason it is desirable to leave the grants from the Fund to the discretion of the Council, and provision for this is made in clause 5.

Clause 7 relates to the Registrar of Medical Schemes, who is appointed under section 13 of the Act. The present position, in terms of which the Central Council for Medical Schemes has no authority over the registrar, is unsatisfactory for obvious reasons. In order to ensure that the policy of the Central Council is implemented, it is now proposed that the registrar perform his functions and carry out his duties “subject to the control and directions of the council”. I may just say here that while we now in this amended Bill want to give all interested parties an opportunity of seeing how it will work in practice over a period, I should also, as regards myself and the Department, like to see how this matter will function. I mention this because, although the Central Council for Medical Schemes and the registrar are appointed by the Minister and although the Minister and the Department are held responsible for everything they do, I should like in the years ahead to keep an eye over the functioning as matters stand now, and to look at the whole matter with an open mind, and perhaps in a few years’ time come back to this House in this connection.

The object of the insertion in the Act of the new section 16A, as proposed in clause 8, is to rectify a weakness in the Act by requiring the registrar to publish the name and address of a scheme that is registered, and the date on which this took place, in the Government Gazette.

The establishment of a benefit fund by each scheme, as is proposed in clause 9, is embodied in the Bill only to ensure that the moneys paid by members as premiums to the scheme, will be applied exclusively to the benefit of those members who pay such premiums, and not to the benefit of members of another fund. This amendment does not introduce any new idea, but only serves to supplement deficiencies in the present definitions, in view of the fact that certain schemes have found a way of utilizing moneys from one fund to the benefit of other funds with larger or smaller claims. Here too I am aware that certain schemes are experiencing problems with this, but I feel that we must allow this to remain as it is and that we must apply it in practice in this way in the interests of the patients, and if it then gives rise to insurmountable problems, which I do not think will be the case, we can look at it again.

The amendment of section 20 for which provision is made in clause 10 involves no departure from the present practical application of the existing section, except that it also protects the rights of a dependant of a member subsequently who becomes a member in his own right of the scheme of which his father or mother is a member. As the section reads at present a scheme must accept a member unconditionally as a continuing member, even if he was a member of the scheme for only one day. All schemes have a qualifying period before a member can become a continuing member, and the object of the amendment of the section is to enable the council to lay down the conditions according to which a member may claim continued membership, in order to bring about greater uniformity in schemes. The proposed amendment also relates to the automatic membership of a widow of a member of a scheme.

In clause 13 of the Bill provision is made for the deletion of section 31 of the Act, which prescribes the procedure to be followed in regard to the amendment of remuneration payable to a medical practitioner under any agreement entered into with him by any medical benefit scheme in respect of services rendered by him to members of the scheme. As the Act reads at present, a medical practitioner who has entered into an agreement with a scheme regarding his remuneration, cannot refuse to render services to a member of the scheme until such time as any dispute between himself and the scheme in respect of his remuneration has been settled by way of arbitration. Apart from the fact that it is not logical that a medical practitioner should be restricted as regards the exercising of his rights under any agreement he has concluded with a scheme on a voluntary basis, this provision serves no useful purpose. It merely disturbs the relationship between medical practitioners and schemes. The deletion of the provision concerned is therefore deemed to be in the public interest.

A flaw in the Act that should be rectified is the fact that, although provision is made in section 37 for appeals against decisions by the registrar, the latter does not have the right to appear before the Appeal Board to offer evidence in support of the decision which is the subject of appeal. Clause 14 grants the registrar this right. This, therefore, is merely a rectification.

Clause 15 of the Bill amends section 41 of the Act. The position in this connection is that while the present section provides that the Central Council for Medical Schemes may issue regulations in regard to the minimum benefits to which members of registered medical schemes are entitled, provision is now being made for the maximum benefits also to be determined by the Council. In this connection I want to make it very clear, however, that the maximum only applies to the percentage benefit of the service, and not to the extent of the annual benefits. This amendment is to combat both abuse of our medical services and personnel and money-making by certain parties. Where, for example, 100 per cent benefits are granted, it has been found that the claims figure is far higher than in the case of those schemes which only grant 80 per cent benefits, with the result that the cost per member is increased unnecessarily. Doctors are called out to attend to trifling matters and are consulted one after another because it does not cost the member anything and there is no discouragement. Our medical manpower, of which there is already a shortage, cannot be abused in this way.

In the second place there are entrepreneurs who are allowed a certain percentage of membership fees for their administration. Now it goes without saying that the greater the abuse, the higher the membership fees must become, and, consequently, the greater their profits.

Another amendment provided for in clause 15 is the inclusion in section 41 of a provision in terms of which every medical scheme is required to provide their members with written proof of membership of the scheme, containing the prescribed particulars. The object of this amendment is to rectify a flaw in the Act.

Finally, provision is made in clause 16 for the deletion of section 44, which relates to the original determination of the tariff of fees in respect of services rendered by dentists to members of schemes and their dependants. As the determination of this tariff has already been settled, this section is now redundant.

I sincerely trust that this measure will to a large extent solve the problems that arose with the application of the Medical Schemes Act, so that medical and related services may continue to be provided to members of medical schemes at a reasonable cost and on a sound basis.

Mr. Speaker, I was very interested in the points made by the hon. the Minister. I must say that it strikes me that this Bill is, among other things, at least a further attempt on the part of the Minister to improve the relationships between the medical schemes, the contributors to the medical schemes, the doctors and the paramedical services, who are allied to this scheme. It is their hope, I take it, that matters will move at a much more even pace and that there will be more co-operation between these various branches of the services than there has been during the past year.

This type of Bill, if not handled properly, could very easily cause a lot of trouble between the doctors and the medical schemes. The whole basis of the success of the patientdoctor relationship, as we see it in South Africa, depends to a great extent on the functioning of this Bill. It has to function in such a way that those who contribute and those who give service must firstly, feel secure and, secondly, they must work in harmony. Otherwise there is going to be trouble. Up to now hundreds of thousands of people have been helped either by medical aid schemes or by benefit societies. Doctors who serve these schemes have had their difficulties, but I think they are starting to iron them out. I am pleased that the Minister was able to call a conference together where he had unanimity and agreement after the four days’ discussion. Perhaps if this took place two years ago, we would have been able to obviate the present difficulties that we have. The point is that these difficulties have been ironed out.

Now let us see what could happen even now. I know, and the Minister knows, that as far as medical benefit societies are concerned, many doctors have objections to this scheme of prepaid insurance. The benefit societies, as we know, have been in existence in the main and they have given a service over very many years. Some of them came into existence at the turn of the century. It would be a pity if the people who have been receiving a service from these benefit societies should find that, because of the action of a group of doctors, my own colleagues, these benefit societies would have to disappear. It is the wish of the doctors in South Africa in the main to change benefit societies into medical aid schemes. But I would appeal to my colleagues and say to them that where a medical benefit society is in existence, they should be prepared to give a continued service to those benefit societies which are in existence. It is up to them not to cause confusion and disruption in that service. Of course we know that the doctors who serve a benefit society are not being paid as well as they should be. But there are other matters that go hand in hand with the payment they receive on a capitation basis. It is quite well known that many doctors have built up a very good private practice as the result of the treatment they have given to their benefit patients. They have been recommended. That, alone, is something which the doctors must not forget. When it comes to remuneration, negotiation can take place. If doctors are dissatisfied with the capitation fee they are getting at the moment, in terms of this Bill as it is now going to be amended, we find a machine which is well able to deal with the complaints that may come from the side of the doctors.

On the other hand, I feel that the patient must also be protected. If the patient feels that he is not receiving the attention he should receive for the contribution he is making, he should have also some form of redress. I must appeal then to the Minister to make sure that he will give his assurance that he will do his utmost to protect the medical benefit societies which are in existence to-day. It would be a great pity if those large benefit societies, like the South African Railways and Harbours Benefit Society, the Mines Benefit Society and some of the others, were to find themselves in difficulties because of action taken by the doctors. I would appeal to my colleagues as well to give those people who are subscribing to benefit societies their continued good service. It is quite obvious that benefit societies would have gone out voluntarily if they had not received the good service from the doctors. But it is because they are satisfied with the service they are receiving that they wish the benefit societies to continue existing. I, for one, would support that wish.

The medical aid societies are not yet quite as uniform as the benefit societies. Here we get a variety of services which are provided by the medical aid schemes. These services are provided according to the means of the contributors. Those contributors who can afford to contribute at a high level, will naturally get a better service. To me it would seem that the benefit patient, the one who in most cases is forced to belong to a benefit society because of his conditions of employment, should receive the same protection as the medical aid scheme contributor. As I was saying, if we are going to have a successful scheme, we have to have co-operation from every single contributor, every single doctor working on the schemes and every single person who provides a service.

Here I want to remind the House that it is not only the doctors and the contributors who are responsible for the even keel that should be kept in this form of insurance. I want to draw the attention of the Minister to what is happening at nursing homes, where I feel that many people who are admitted as benefit patients, are not receiving a square deal, and that the medical aid societies and the benefit societies are not getting value for money. That is a point which we have to watch. It is difficult, I know, for nursing homes, for instance, to run their affairs on an economic basis on the fees that are paid per head per day for benefit patients. But the turnover is so large in most cases, especially in view of to-day’s methods of treating people and the short stay in nursing homes, that I feel that the nursing homes should play a better part in bringing down the costs of the contribution by the contributor to the benefit societies for the medical schemes as a whole.

The same applies in the provision of medicines. Perhaps the hon. member for Berea during his speech will deal with this matter of the provision of medicines to the contributor to a medical scheme. It is a very important point and we know that some of the schemes have already imposed restrictions. Doctors very often object to these restrictions. Contributors very often object to the levy that is placed on a prescription. Brakes and checks will have to be made; otherwise schemes will find themselves in great difficulties. The cost of running those schemes can only go up. I therefore appeal to contributors of medical schemes to be as frugal as possible and to remember that any doctor can only do a certain number of calls a day. A doctor can only see a certain number of people a day. I would appeal to them to remember that if they want their scheme to act properly, they must allow the doctors time and they must not overburden him with trivialities. It is common knowledge that a man who belongs to a benefit society very often goes to a doctor unnecessarily and causes friction between himself and the doctor. The hon. the Minister mentioned that.

I want to say a word or two about those doctors who have decided to opt out of the scheme. If I may I should like to explain to the House what is happening. There are certain doctors who do not wish to attend patients at the tariff of fees as now laid down by medical schemes. What they wish to do is to attend to the patient as a private patient. They wish to be able to send an account to the patient direct and they wish to be paid direct. Now, if I belong to a medical aid scheme and I have a free choice of doctors and I wanted to go to Dr. A, I would like to know that Dr. A is going to treat me at a rate as laid down by the tariff for medical schemes. The doctor who opts out is not keen that the patient should know that he has opted out. The result may be as follows: I may go to a doctor who has opted out. I am not told that this doctor has opted out and I may be faced with paying a bill which I cannot afford, even though the medical aid scheme would give a certain percentage to me, as laid down by the tariff, to pay for that call. But it goes further than that. This call that I have made to the doctor may entail other procedures. It may entail a visit to an X-ray department. It may entail an operation. It may also entail a stay at a nursing home. I should have the benefit of knowing which doctors will attend to me under a set fee and which doctors will not, which nursing homes will accept me at benefit rates and which nursing homes will not. It is then my privilege to be able to go to the doctor that I want. If I still want to go to the doctor who is going to charge me benefit fees, well and good. But if I go to a doctor who is going to charge me above benefit fees, I should at least know beforehand what he is going to charge me. I should like to urge my colleagues therefore to tell the patient when they come for examination that they will undertake the examination but that the patient must understand that they are outside the tariff of fixed fees. When you tell a patient that you have opted out, it does not mean much. When you say that you will charge a fee outside the tariff of fees, the patient will understand. The patient will then protect himself and say to the doctor: If you send me for an X-ray, please send me to a doctor who is going to do it under the tariff as laid down. And if I have to go to a nursing home, please inform the nursing home that I belong to such and such a medical aid and that I cannot pay more than is laid down. Some people today are being faced with bills they cannot pay. The doctors will be the sufferers.

May I ask the hon. member a question? Do you think notices should be put up in doctors’ reception rooms to indicate that they are not prepared to charge the tariffs prescribed by the medical societies?

I do not think doctors are very keen on doing that sort of thing. There are other ways of doing it. I would say that if you go into the reception room of the doctor, the receptionist should inform the patient that Dr. So-and-so is outside the medical schemes.

Doctors do put up a little notice to-day.

I am agreeable to that. Whatever method is adopted by the doctor, the doctor should inform the patient that he is outside this scheme. I am quite happy, whatever way he does it. The other thing that I should like to see, and there is reference to it here, is that the doctor should be protected as well. If he belongs to a medical scheme and he has patients belonging to such a scheme visiting him for professional reasons, then that patient should carry a card on which his identity and that of his family is reflected. General practitioners will tell you how many times there has been a swindle over this sort of thing. It is very unfortunate. I therefore think that where the patient is protected on one side, the doctor must be protected on the other side. I would also appeal to the medical schemes to see to it that the patient’s account is paid promptly. It is too often found these days that doctors have to wait from three to four months before their accounts are settled. I think this sort of thing causes dissatisfaction. Machinery must be instituted in the medical schemes whereby doctors’ accounts can be paid as quickly as possible.

I should just like to say one word about the commission that is going to deal with tariffs. I know that the hon. the Minister has an open mind on this matter. It is suggested that there should be four members and that the representatives on this commission should either be a doctor or a dentist, depending on whether the tariff affects the doctor or the dentist. The fourth person to which reference has been made would then have to come, not from the doctors, the dentists or the medical schemes, but would have to be a lay person. If he is going to vote, it is obvious that in most cases he is going to protect himself. I have an open mind on this matter and I think I could be convinced if a good argument can be advanced for the appointment of a fourth person. I would be inclined to leave it to the three persons mentioned. I have every hope, especially if there is going to be a fudge sitting as an arbitrator on this commission, that a fair and reasonable alteration in the tariff will be made. Let us say then that we on this side of the House will agree to three persons. The Minister will have two or three years time to review the position. If he finds that it is not workable, there is nothing to stop an amendment being made to provide for another person. For that reason I feel that we should rather have three people at the moment who, we know, will come to a reasonable finding.

Lastly, Sir, I want to bring to the notice of the House the fact that there have been complaints by medical schemes that they have no redress if doctors over-visit or if their charges are not reasonable or if they have any other complaints. I do not know what happened at the conference, and perhaps the Minister can tell us in his reply whether or not the medical schemes made any request for the Medical Council to receive complaints directly from the medical schemes. What happens now is that a complaint has to go via the patient. If a complaint comes to the notice of a medical scheme, the medical scheme cannot take that complaint to the Medical Council. It has to be the individual, who has complained to the medical scheme, who has to make the complaint to the Medical Council. It happens occasionally that complaints could be brought directly by the medical schemes to the notice of the Medical Council. Now that a member of the Medical Council is on the Central Council, will it not be feasible to approach the Medical Council and ask them whether they will not accept complaints directly from the medical schemes? This is a complicated business, but the Minister knows what I am talking about. I hope that the Minister will reply to this point now or in the Committee Stage and tell us whether he feels that this is feasible. With those few words I want to tell the Minister that we are pleased that he has introduced this Bill and we on this side of the House are going to support him.

Mr. Speaker, we on this side of the House are of course very pleased to hear that the Opposition have also promised their support to this measure. Arising out of what the hon. member for Rosettenville has just mentioned in regard to benefit schemes, I want to give him the assurance that we on this side of the House have no intention of abolishing those benefit schemes. You will recall, Sir, that there was a time when the Medical Association was exerting itself to have these benefit schemes converted into ordinary aid schemes. But in due course the association also began to realize that these benefit schemes occupy a very definite place in our medical set-up. That is why I do not believe that it would be advisable on the part of any Government to abolish these benefit schemes. I do not think therefore that there are any real grounds for the hon. members’ concern regarding this matter.

The hon. member also referred to the question of a patient’s taking cognizance of whether a medical practitioner is in fact a member of a medical scheme or not. I personally believe that this ought not to present the patients with too many problems, for the simple reason that we have already reached the stage where most patients visit their medical practitioners after they have arranged for an appointment. When such an appointment is being arranged, it is quite simple for the patient to inquire as to whether the medical practitioner concerned is prepared to treat patients at medical scheme tariffs or not. In cases where such a patient does not arrange an appointment beforehand, if is also easy, when entering the consultating rooms, to ask the receptionist whether the medical practitioner concerned is in fact a member of a medical scheme or not. I do not think that this will present patients with any major problems.

When the 1967 Act was passed by this House, an undertaking was given that the situation in respect of the regulation of these schemes between medical practitioners and the schemes concerned would be placed on a firm basis. At one time the measure was also welcomed by both sides of this House. But, after the passing of that Act, a fierce controversy unfortunately arose. I maintain that it was unfortunate that it arose because there was a great deal of misunderstanding. This controversy caused very serious harm to the image of the medical profession in this country. I do not want to go into the merits of this matter. I am simply mentioning a fact, i.e. that the image of the medical profession has definitely suffered damage. You will recall that the Press contained daily statements by some or other body, followed by counterstatements from opposing bodies, which at the same time created the impression that the medical profession was out to make money, and that its only objection to the legislation was the fact that the tariffs at which it had to render its services to patients who were members of medical schemes would be cheaper than those for private patients. The public involuntarily gained the impression that the matter was concerned with fees only, and nothing else. As I said, I do not want to go into the merits of the case, but I want to ask my colleagues to give very thorough consideration to this aspect now and to restore that image of the medical profession which suffered damage. The medical profession, particularly in South Africa, is based on very high ethical norms. It would be a sad day if those norms were demolished, or if the impression arises among the public that service to the ill is no longer the primary motive of the doctor. We must at all costs avoid, and eradicate completely, that impression which can arise, i.e. that doctors are in the profession to enrich themselves at the expense of the suffering of other people. The majority of medical practitioners in this country are dedicated to the service they render to their patients. They feel they are called upon to do so, and in that spirit, as well, they then render service. If there are those who want to destroy that fine and healthy image of the medical profession, I am asking them to give this matter a great deal of thought and to ask themselves whether they are on the right road. It is my appeal to the medical practitioners of South Africa to prove now, by word and deed, that the impression which has gained ground during the past few years, particularly during the past two years, among the lay public is unfounded. We cannot afford to have the prestige and status of medicine in South Africa suffer harm. For that reason we welcome the fact that a change is being effected by clause 12 in respect of the determination of fees which are made applicable to the medical aid schemes. It will no longer be necessary for the medical practitioners to approach the Government or the House in an organized group through the Medical Association and request that the fees be reconsidered. This is now an automatic process. It now takes place without publicity, and in my opinion, it is a much healthier arrangement, and an attempt to place this extremely important matter on a firm basis.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to refer the Minister to the new section 29 (3) where mention is made of an agreement of partnership. I can understand the purpose of this clause very well. For example, where partners co-operate with one another and are in partnership, they must treat each other’s patients. However, I want to ask the Minister whether he will not consider the advisability of defining “partnership” more closely. These days we find in practice that there are various types of partnerships. In particular there is the concept of group practices which has come into existence. According to such a group practice a group of medical practitioners work together, but they nevertheless d-o not divide their fees equally. One finds various types of group practices where medical practitioners share consulting rooms, and where each nevertheless derives his own income from that practice. I do not know whether it is the hon. the Minister’s intention, in all cases where doctors cooperate, on whatever basis, to regard them as partners. However. I just want to offer it for the consideration of the Minister that he consider this aspect of the matter as well.

In addition I also want to refer to the new section 30 (4) and (5). The hon. the Minister told us and it is stated in this way in the Act that this Remuneration Commission will consist of three persons only, because when a matter affecting doctors is discussed on the Remuneration Commission the dentist who has been appointed to the Remuneration Commission, is not represented at that specific juncture. It now seems to me as if the provision in subsection (4), i.e. that the chairman of the commission shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote, is unwarranted for the simple reason that there will always, at a given moment, be only three persons present. This is perhaps a merely academic question, but I am just bringing it to the attention of the hon. Minister.

We can extend our cordial congratulations to the hon. the Minister on the initiative he has displayed in convening this conference with the association of medical practitioners in Pretoria. The problems, the turmoil and suspicion which existed in regard to the original Act would simply have dragged on and created a situation which would ultimately have become unendurable if the hon. the Minister had not intervened and on this friendly basis, arranged a conference with these people. We want to congratulate him on that. We also want to make an appeal to the medical practitioners to make an actual and positive attempt to make this Act work. This is an honest and well intended attempt to place a situation which has existed for many years on a firm basis. I think I can ask my colleagues to make every possible attempt to cause this Act to function smoothly and successfully.

Mr. Speaker, it is gratifying to hear through the hon. member for Cradock that, as far as his side of the House is concerned, they too recognize the need for the continued functioning of the medical benefit societies. They fulfil a very important need, particularly with the lower income groups. I am pleased to know that no attempt is to be made to do away with them in any form.

Both the hon. member for Rosettenville and I had the privilege of serving on the Commission which dealt with the original Bill. We had the opportunity of listening to the evidence and the difficult task of weighing it up and recommending to this hon. House what we considered would be a satisfactory way of combining the evidence in creating a good Bill. The hon. the Minister has indicated that there have been considerable discussions with the view to clearing up difficulties which arose mainly as a result of questions of tariff and questions of dissatisfaction among the medical men who rendered services. I think it is most gratifying that advantage was taken of consultation to overcome these difficulties. I believe that with the goodwill that has been extended from both sides of the House, there is every possibility that most of the difficulties will be ironed out and that the public will get a medical scheme service to which they are entitled in this country. However, there is one aspect which I would like to refer to the hon. the Minister. If one considers para, (b) of the definition of a medical scheme in the Act—“medical scheme” means a scheme established with the object of making provision for the supply, free of charge, to members thereof and to dependants of such members, of medicines or of medical, surgical, dental or optical requirements. Then it goes on to deal with the question of nursing homes.

I want to make it quite clear that I speak as a public representative and not as a member of the profession which may be called upon to give service. These are my feelings in what I regard to be the interest of the public. I know that I do not enjoy the full support of many of my colleagues who are chemists and druggists and who fee1 that as the situation is at the moment, it is working satisfactorily in that chemists and druggists are not included in the tariff. I want to put it to the hon. the Minister that basically in the interest of the public, it is desirable that consultation and discussion should continue with organized pharmacies with the view ultimately to putting into effect fully this particular clause whereby members of the public will receive medicines and will receive them on a basis which I believe will be more satisfactory to them. I know there have been problems and I fully appreciate the difficulties which precluded the inclusion of the suppliers of medicine when the Act was promulgated.

At that stage the argument was advanced that here we have difficulty in establishing a tariff for the reason that a tariff includes a professional fee together with the supply of a medicinal article. I realize that there are difficulties in that respect, because if the manufacturer finds it necessary to increase the price of the article, obviously it must affect the tariff. This could in many respects involve a continual fluctuation in the tariff laid down. I realize that that is a difficulty. However, I believe it can be overcome; I believe it at this present moment and I think the hon. the Minister will agree with me that in so far as the Government dispensing contract is concerned, it can be overcome. This contract has been an arrangement with Government departments through the Department of Health and through organized pharmacy for many years. As I understand the position to-day, that tariff which operates under the Government dispensing tariff, is a tariff acceptable to the State, calculated on an equitable basis, less a discount. On that basis it automatically takes care of certain price increases which may occur as a result of manufacturing costs fluctuating. I believe that if this tariff can operate on that basis in so far as the Government dispensing contract is concerned, there is every reason to suggest that continued negotiation should be made with a view to extending this particular arrangement so that it will be possible that chemists and druggists will supply medicines on a tariff on a similar basis to the tariff which operates now for medical men and dentists. I feel that it will have to be by negotiation, it will have to be by give and take. I think that in so far as the supplying of medicines to members of the medical schemes is concerned, except with minor exemptions, this should be the prerogative of the chemist and druggist. In other words, as regards the supplying of service to members of medical schemes, medicines should be supplied and dispensed by chemists and druggists. Dispensing doctors should only be allowed to supply those medicines in extreme cases where it would not be convenient for members of the public to avail themselves of pharmaceutical services. I believe that that is one basis on which there could be discussion and I hope agreement.

There is also another matter which I should like to put before the hon. the Minister. Before doing so, I wish to raise a question which the hon. member for Rosettenville asked me to raise. He had referred to the question of medical fees charged by doctors. He indicated that cases were on record where the doctor wished to charge the full fee and then required the patient to pay that full fee and to recoup himself from the scheme the amount which the scheme was prepared to pay in terms of a tariff. The hon. member for Rosettenville thought that this was a situation which was not a very happy one and he hoped that at least consideration would be given to eliminating that practice as far as possible.

I now want to deal with the matter of minimum benefits. The hon. the Minister will be aware that in Government Notice 1977 published on the 9th February, 1968, certain conditions were laid down by the Council for Medical Schemes as to how medicines would be supplied to members of medical schemes.

Obviously there could not be fixed conditions because the various schemes had various financial arrangements and operated under different circumstances. I fully appreciate this position, but every variation of circumstance and every change of condition under which a medical scheme is administered, creates certain administrative difficulties on the part of the person who has to supply the medicine, namely the chemist and the druggist. I just want to mention to the hon. the Minister some of the factors which at present are causing, I believe, a lot of administrative work which could be eliminated once one has been able to obtain a certain amount of uniformity of minimum and maximum conditions. I refer to the question of membership identification; I realize that this amendment Bill will make this position easier by virtue of regulations and I think this is important. Obviously any supplier under this Act needs to be safeguarded in relation to the identification of the various people who get these benefits.

Then there is the question of the levy. The regulations lay down that a medical scheme may stipulate that patients are to pay up to R1 in respect of a prescription. I have no basic objection to this, but the problem arises when medical schemes suggest different amounts as levies. At the moment I have details here of schemes operating in a certain area where the amount of levy varies from 25 cents, and if there is an additional item on the prescription another 15 cents and in some cases an amount of 50 cents is charged. There is therefore this variation. I think the hon. the Minister will agree with me that administratively this creates difficulties. There is also the matter of repeat prescriptions. Here again medical schemes have different systems. This can also be extremely awkward. In some cases chemists and druggists are entitled to repeat a prescription, having been satisfied that it is the wish of the patient, and that it is not necessary at that time to contact the medical practitioner. This is not always the case and as a result there are difficulties.

There is also the question of exclusions. Certain medical schemes, in the light of their experience and by virtue of their financial arrangements, refuse to pay for certain items which may be issued on a doctor’s prescription and could be regarded as medicines. These items are excluded from payment by medical schemes. This too leads to administrative difficulties on the part of the people who have to supply prescriptions. In so far as payments are concerned, there are also difficulties. Sometimes members are called upon to pay direct to the supplier and in other cases accounts are sent to the medical aid society. There is no standard system there either. In certain cases discounts are also allowed, but we have no particular standards. Some are net and some are on a discount basis. All these lead to complications.

My point is that these variations which lead to administrative difficulties must obviously have some effect on the ultimate supply of the medicine and the basis on which the charge should be levied. I feel that if the conditions can be simplified and standardized as much as possible there is a possibility that the public will benefit in the end as a result of a tariff worked out strictly on the basis of the time involved minus the time which is at present involved in the solving of administrative problems. There is only one other matter that I would like to raise with the hon. the Minister and that concerns some form of report. I notice in the Act that there is a Medical Schemes Fund which will be supervised by the Secretary for Health. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether it is the intention to make available information about the financial activities of the Medical Schemes Fund and whether it will be by way of the report of the Auditor General or in what form it will be available, because I believe that this is something which is of particular interest to many professional people. It is desirable that they should have access to information with regard to the over-all financial workings of the Medical Schemes Fund.

I want to extend my wholehearted gratitude to hon. members who participated in the debate for the support they have given this amendment Bill. Sir, this was really a serious attempt, after many days of consultation and hard work by the bodies concerned, to see whether we could not effect an improvement in a situation which had almost got out of hand. The Press and the doctors gave great publicity, not only to what happened, but to any possible conclusions which could have been drawn. None of this did the profession any good; it did not do the relations between patient and doctor any good, and certainly did not do anything to promote the sound and correct fundamental principles of this Act. That is why I am pleased that we are able to discuss this matter in this atmosphere to-day. I want to say at once to hon. members that I do not think that this offers a final solution; I do not think we have heard the last word in this regard, but the fact of the matter is that we are dealing here with something which is based on a principle which is not only acceptable to us all, but which can only be beneficial in regard to the provision of medical services and for the promotion of the welfare of the patient, and since this is the case, it is a good thing that we can discuss the matter here in a spirit of friendship and unanimity. I want to give the hon. member for Rosettenville the assurance that the entire object with this legislation, inter alia, is not only to ensure that the scheme remains in force, but also to allow the number of schemes to increase. The first idea I want to emphasize is that, since a high percentage of our people are covered by medical insurance, it will and ought to be the task of the Central Council and of the various associations to include as many people as possible, who have not yet been covered in this regard, in these schemes. I find it gratifying to note that even the farming community is now putting its own scheme into operation in order to cover the farming community. I think in the Free State membership of a medical scheme is now available through the agricultural union there. I just want to say that I have covered myself and my family for many years in this way, and that I can speak only with the greatest praise of the schemes and feel myself quite at liberty to recommend to any person that he should join some medical scheme or other to make certain that in future, when ill-health occurs and he has to incur major expenditure, he will not be ruined financially. I think the message which should be carried abroad from this House to-day is that every person in South Africa, every individual who does not yet have medical cover, should see to it that he protects himself and his dependants in this way. That is why I am assuring the hon. member that the whole object is to expand schemes, and not to let schemes disappear or diminish.

The hon. member raised the question of tariffs at nursing institutions and hospitals. I may just inform the hon. member that I raised this matter very specifically at the discussions we held in Pretoria and that I also raised the question of the tariff which would be charged by nurses, and that I received no complaints or any problem in regard to the schemes or from a single body in this connection. The reason may be that one is dealing here with a uniform service; in other words, payment is only being made for accommodation; payment is only being made for nursing care and not, as in the case of the medical profession, for a hundred and one different items. That is why I want to say to the hon. member that this matter has not escaped our notice, but that we had enough problems with other matters, and since no complaints were forthcoming in this connection, since there was no problem whatsoever, we left the position as it was, but an eye will of course be kept on the position if it presents problems in future. Nor did the Central Council for Medical Schemes receive, I do not want to say, any complaints in this connection, but in any case no complaints of such a serious nature that they were brought to my attention.

The hon. member also spoke about doctors who had opted out. He said that the public should be protected in the sense that they should at least know, when they are treated by a doctor, whether the determined tariff of fees will be charged or whether they will be charged a different tariff. The hon. member made certain suggestions in this connection, and a question in this regard was also put by the hon. member for Brakpan to the hon. member for Rosettenville. A very great percentage of doctors have opted out. I do not like the word, but I am using it because it is the term my colleagues and other people understand. I understand that at the present moment there are about 3,000 of them who do not accept the tariff of fees. This is a misleading figure because, as hon. members will concede, the vast majority of these 3.000 or more doctors who do not accept the tariff of fees, nevertheless charge the tariff of fees. They have in fact opted out, but they are still charging the prescribed tariff of fees. I also want to point out to hon. members that we do not accept this as adequate protection for the patients, and that is why section 29 of the original Act contains the following provision—

I then come to (b) (ii)—

“Before” is the operative word.

Yes, and “if possible”. In other words, the medical practitioner is, according to the legislation, obliged to indicate to the patient that he is going to charge a higher tariff than the one laid down. I think there is also a cover in this regard in amendments which I have made to the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act, earlier on in the Session. But I just want to point out further that what happens in practice is—and this is what I myself experienced when I recently consulted a doctor—that he had a notice in his consulting rooms on which is indicated whether he participates in the tariff or not. But I shall return to that again later. In addition the hon. member stated that the doctor should also be protected. I want to state here to-day that I think that the relations between medical practitioners and patients in a very high percentage of cases are sound, good, relations. I think in the vast majority of cases in the country and in the cities there are very close ties of friendship and confidence between doctors and patients, and I want to make an appeal to the public and to the schemes not to pay the doctor’s account last. I think that that person who enters the house in time of illness, who must in time of illness be the counsellor and support, is perhaps entitled to be taken into consideration first and not last as far as the settlement of his account is concerned. In this connection I want to make a very serious appeal to the schemes that they should make every possible attempt to ensure the smooth functioning of the settlement of accounts and should not delay them for too long.

Then, too, the hon. member raised the question of identification of members. I should like to refer the hon. member to the amendment Bill, clause 15.

†This clause amends section 41 of the principal Act by the insertion after paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of the following paragraph—

In other words, there will now be a way of identifying a member or a dependant as belonging to a certain scheme and also of making sure whether a dependant is the real dependant of the principal member of the scheme.

*In addition the hon. member spoke about complaints which could possibly be submitted directly to the Medical Council by the Central Council. This is a very delicate matter, as hon. members know, which has given rise to considerable problems, because the medical profession and the dental profession have felt that when it comes to ethical matters, when it comes to the question of their conduct, when it comes to matters where only one professional man can judge the conduct of another, laymen must not be concerned in this matter; and now it is the case to-day that the only body which can act in regard to complaints on matters of ethics is the Medical Council. But the fact of the matter is that the only person who can institute proceedings is a layman, in other words the patient, and it is also the case that the Central Council can form no judgment whatsoever on the conduct of a medical practitioner, but that the Central Council can draw the attention of the Medical Council to it. This is the position to-day, and I think that this is what the hon. member wants. The Central Council can form no judgment, but it can in fact bring a matter to the attention of the Medical Council. I think that with this I have dealt with the few matters raised by the hon. member.

In addition the hon. member for Cradock mentioned a matter which is a very important one, and that is the prestige of the medical practitioner. I want to agree with him that medical practitioners are been shown up unnecessarily in a bad light, that too much publicity is given to the isolated cases where there has perhaps been a misdemeanour, or where the relations between the medical profession and the public have not been placed in a favourable light. But I think you would agree with me that, as I have already said, good relations between patient and doctor are by far and away the rule rather than the exception, and as I have already said, the tariff is being charged even in those cases where doctors have opted out, and that this was merely a method by means of which the profession gave expression to its dissatisfaction with the legislation as it was, and not of charging the public excessively high tariffs.

But now there is something else I want to point out and that is that one may not lose sight of the fact that there are, to a very large extent, still doctors in South Africa today who are doing charitable service for which no fees are ever charged. I think a debate such as this would be incomplete if I did not broach this matter and make it very clear that we have reason to be grateful towards the profession for the charitable service, the free service, which is being rendered day after day and night after night throughout South Africa by doctors. Opposed to that one has the small group of black sheep, and let me state now that as long as I hold this portfolio I, and the Medical Council as well, will leave no stone unturned, where there are doctors who are conducting themselves in a way unfitting to the profession, to eradicate them completely, because they are the small group which sometimes place this wonderful and noble profession in a bad light.

In addition the hon. member mentioned the question of partnership and asked whether it was not advisable to define this more closely. I take it the hon. member has no problem with the fact that we are introducing this into the Act as it stands at present, i.e. that when one member of a partnership does not participate in the tariff of fees, this must apply to the entire partnership. He has no problems with the principle; his problem is whether the word “partnership” will be interpreted correctly if it is not defined more closely. I have been told by the legal advisers that this is not necessary because it is in fact clearly indicated in the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act in rule 8 of the ethical rules. I will in any case reconsider the matter to make certain whether it is covered, since one wants no misunderstanding in regard to precisely what “partnership” means. In addition the hon. member mentioned clause 12 (4) of the Bill where it is stated that the chairman of the commission has a deliberative as well as a casting vote. Now it is the case that a casting vote can only apply when there is an eauality of votes, and this commission consists of two members. But now the hon. member for Cradock will concede that although the commission consists of two members, one may be absent. He may be absent at that very moment when the decision has to be taken. I hope it does not happen but it may just happen that at that moment there are only two persons. I take it that a Judge in his wisdom—and I hope I will be able to arrange with the hon. the Minister of Justice to find a Judge of eminent standing to perform this task—will quite probably not force a vote. But it is merely for practical reasons that it has been written in and in any case it does not do much harm.

In addition the hon. member for Berea held forth on the provision of medicines. I am grateful to him for having made no demands and for requesting that the discussion be continued and that consideration should be given to the question of whether there cannot be an expansion in regard to the provision of medicines under the schemes as well. He also mentioned the question of repeating prescriptions.

I just want to inform the hon. member that this is a very difficult matter, but I think we have already progressed to the point where we virtually have the situation to-day that the provision of medicines under medical schemes is far greater and more comprehensive than it was a few years ago. I am pleased of this progress because the ideal should be that the drugs the patient needs should perhaps be supplied to him in the same way as expert advice is supplied to him. But I am very grateful to him for not requesting that this be made compulsory and that we should write it into the Act, but that we should continually seek to attain it, inter alia, by means of negotiations, as he proposed. In addition he spoke about the regulations in regard to the provision of drugs, and the repeating of prescriptions. I do not want to express an opinion on this, and I shall tell the hon. member why. These are regulations of the Central Council. I cannot prescribe to the Central Council, as the hon. member knows, but what I can in fact say, is that the Central Council—and this I will bring to their specific attention through my Department—ought to take very thorough cognizance of this discussion, and should do whatever is necessary if that is in any way possible.

In addition the hon. member inquired about the funds for medical schemes. As the matter stands, all the activities of the Central Council as well as the administration of the funds for medical schemes will be subjected to thorough audit by the Auditor-Genera]. It will be a function which will be carried out by the Auditor-General, and no one else, and that is why this Parliament will also scrutinize it and will be able to discuss it under the Vote of the Minister of Health.

I think that with this I have covered most of the points. Now in conclusion I want to make a very serious appeal to the medical profession to give this amended legislation a chance over a period of, say. four or five years; but I want to tell you why I am mentioning a period of four or five years. It is because as soon as this legislation is promulgated, the judicial commission, the Remuneration Commission, will be appointed and the fees determined. I think it is reasonable to ask this: Let it work for two years and let it then be revised, which will take a further two years, approaching four years, when the second revision will be made. I do not think that is too much to ask of any man or group of people, since we have had all these discussions, to enter a period of peace and quiet now and to see whether we cannot let this matter work and to get these principles established in South Africa.

In addition I also want to request the associations, the Medical Association and the Dental Association, to give positive guidance to their members, asking them to opt in again, because I think it would be irrefutable proof of the goodwill of the association and of its members if they afforded this legislation an opportunity of proceeding on its normal course and to see whether this cannot bring peace and quiet to South Africa where, some time ago, there was discord and problems were being created. I am making this appeal because the most favourable position must be achieved before the Act is put into effect; for the moment the Act is put into effect it takes, according to the Act itself, three months before any re-acceptance of the tariff of fees by any doctor is valid, whereas if it is done now, before the promulgation of the Act, it is immediately effective, and then we have the situation that the vast majority of our doctors will once again find themselves in the position in which they were before the Act was originally put into effect. In any case it will make no difference to the practical situation since they are to-day still applying that tariff. I am making this appeal because I can give the absolute assurance that there must be no possibility of lay persons prejudicing, or being able to prejudice, the ethical and professional matters pertaining to medical practitioners and dentists in our country.

This was one of the things in regard to which there was doubt and dissatisfaction, and with this amendment these things are being finally eliminated, and it will in no way be possible to read anything like that into this legislation, and I think that is a very important aspect, which will be of value to the profession. Lastly I want to say that I am prepared at any time in the future, when practical problems crop up again, and they will, to conduct discussions with interested parties and bring them together, as we did last year in Pretoria, in the best interests of the patient, to the satisfaction of the profession, and, what is very important, to the enhancement of the prestige and the status of the noble profession of medicine, because if that is the case, it is also in the interests of the patient and of the entire community.

Motion put and agreed to.

Bill read a Second Time.

I move—

Mr. Speaker, the principle of control over arms and ammunition is nothing new in our legislation. The existing legislation in terms of which control is, for instance, being exercised over the possession of, dealings in and the importation of arms and ammunition in the Republic, was in fact placed on the Statute Book as far back as 1937—Act 28 of 1937. Since then circumstances in our country have changed a great deal, and in order to adapt to these changed circumstances this Act was amended from time to time, on several occasions. Therefore I believe that it is unnecessary to decide whether we do need this legislation. The principle has already been accepted.

In the times in which we are living other factors have also arisen, factors which make the strict control of arms and ammunition an even more urgent necessity. What we particularly have in mind here, is the terrorist threat and infiltration across our borders and the changed pattern of crime in which more and more use is being made of firearms in cases such as robbery and the various manslaughter cases.

The need for legislation to exercise stricter control over arms and ammunition, has always been appreciated by the authorities concerned. Consequently one of the measures envisaged in this regard, i.e. the keeping of a central firearms register at the South African Criminal Bureau of the South African Police, was made possible as long ago as 1965 by means of the Arms and Ammunition Amendment Act, Act 46 of 1965.

A start was made with the compilation of this central firearms register, but it was soon found that it was practically impossible to compile from existing records a reasonably reliable register of firearms which would in any way serve the purpose for which it was intended.

The re-licensing of arms was considered to be essential for the accurate compilation of the central firearms register, and in order to make provision for that, to consolidate the existing laws relating to arms and ammunition and where necessary to amend them further, this Bill was drafted and is now being submitted for consideration.

The most sweeping change embodied in this Bill is that the administration of this Act is being relinquished by the Department of Justice and will be taken over by the Department of Police. When the Arms and Ammunition Act was placed on the Statute Book in 1937, the South African Police still formed an integral part of the Department of Justice, and it was simply a matter of course that the latter Department should be charged with the administration of this Act. If the Police had at that time been an independent department, they would quite possibly have been charged with the administration of this Act at that stage already. Since then the Police has developed into a fully-fledged Department. The control over arms and ammunition relates for the most part to the maintenance of law and order, and at present to internal security as well. These are purely police functions and therefore it is only logical that the administration of related legislation should also be in the hands of the Department of Police. In fact, in most Western countries such laws are administered by the police. In the course of discussions between the representatives of the relevant two departments, this aspect was given thorough consideration and it was decided that Police was the obvious Department for the administration of this Act.

This Bill makes provision for licences to possess arms. In the first instance, just as is the case under existing legislation, no person may have any arm in his possession unless he holds a licence to possess such arm. Such licence will be issued by the Commissioner to any white person over the age of 16 years. This minimum age has been raised from 14 to 16 years. This raised minimum age is also being applied in other clauses where the minimum age of the individual constitutes a factor. I should like to refer to clauses 8 (1) and 37 (1). The minimum age in terms of existing legislation is 14 years. However, in practice the police do not recommend applications by such juveniles for licences to possess arms, and magistrates do not approve such applications either.

The following few incidents recently reported to the police once again prove indisputably how dangerous an instrument a firearm is in the hands of children:

1. (1) On 19th December, 1968, a 15-year-old white youth tampered with a shotgun and a 5-year-old Coloured child was shot dead.
2. (2) On 5th January, 1969, an 11-year-old boy fired his father’s shotgun and killed a Bantu.
3. (3) On 10th January, 1969, six white children were playing with a .22 pistol and one of them (a 4-year-old) was shot dead.
4. (4) On 9th January, 1969, a 14-year-old youth was doing target shooting. He hit and killed a 17-year-old Bantu youth.
5. (5) On 1st March, 1969, only the other day, two white youths of 14 and 11 years, respectively, were playing with a .22 rifle and a 14-year-old Bantu youth who was with them, was shot and killed.

Taking these cases into consideration, I am convinced that the minimum age ought to be raised from 14 to 16 years.

In the second instance, as regards licences, the Bill provides, inter alia, that—

1. (a) a licence may only be granted to a person other than a natural or white person with the approval of the Minister (clause 3 (4));
2. (b) whenever the Commissioner refuses an application for a licence, the applicant may appeal to the Minister against such refusal (clause 3 (2));
3. (c) arms which are in private possession at the commencement of this Act must be re-licensed (clause 4).

As I have already said, the necessity for relicensing firearms with a view to the compilation of a central firearms register has to a large extent given rise to this Bill being drafted and introduced. I can assure you, Sir, that it is definitely essential that re-licensing takes place. In many cases existing records of firearm licences previously issued are out of date and damaged. They do not contain all the latest particulars, such as the address or identity number of the licence holder, which are essential for compiling a proper central register of firearms. A final decision has not yet been taken on the procedure to be followed in registering such licences. This aspect is being investigated thoroughly in order that this may be effected with the least possible inconvenience being caused to the public. The owners of arms are being granted a period of 12 months after the commencement of this Act to apply for the re-licensing of arms in their possession. The new licences are being issued free of charge, and in order to encourage persons who may be in possession of firearm for which they do not hold a valid licence to apply for such arms to be re-licensed when re-licensing takes place, indemnity from prosecution for unlawful possession of such arms is being granted to them. Provision is being made for that in clause 4 (7). Consequently it is being anticipated that in this way recent particulars will be obtained in respect of the approximately 1,500,000 arms which are estimated to be in private hands in the country, for the compilation of the central firearms register (clause 42). The object in view with the central firearms register is to provide a comprehensive source of information in respect of all firearms and owners of firearms. Such a source of information is simply indispensable for effective control over firearms. If a firearm were found at the scene of a crime committed in Durban, for instance, it is at present practically impossible to determine on the basis of available records who the owner of that firearm is. That firearm could have been bought by the owner and licensed in Cape Town in 1940. Since then the owner might have moved all over the country and never have lived in Cape Town again, whilst the only record of that firearm, i.e. the licence in his name would still be kept in Cape Town.

Clause 8 has been included to enable the holder of a licence to possess an arm to permit the possession of arms with consent of the licence holder in certain circumstances—(a) by a white person over the age of 16 years with the written consent of the licence holder; (b) by such white person in the immediate vicinity of the licence holder on any land belonging to or lawfully occupied by the licence holder, or for the purpose of protecting any property or premises, or any game on land, belonging to or in the care or custody of the licence holder; (c) by a non-white person over the age of 16 years employed by the licence holder for the purpose of protecting any property or premises, or any game on land, belonging to or in the. care or custody of the licence holder/. This clause does not differ substantially from section 35 of the existing Act. So much for the licensing of arms.

Declaration of persons to be unfit to possess arms

Just as is the case in the existing Act (sections 8 to 18), provision is also being made in the proposed legislation for the declaration of a person to be unfit to possess arms. This is being done in clauses 11 to 17. The Commissioner may in certain prescribed circumstances declare a person to be unfit. There is a right of appeal to the Minister against such declaration of unfitness (clause 14). A judge or magistrate presiding at the trial in any criminal proceedings, is also being granted the right to declare the accused to be an unfit person. The provisions of this Bill, as far as this aspect is concerned, are for the most part in accordance with those of the existing Act, but with one, difference, as already mentioned, i.e. that whereas at present a magistrate declares persons to be unfit, that function is now being assigned to the Commissioner of Police.

Dealers in arms and ammunition

Clauses 18 to 24 relate to dealers in arms and ammunition, and clause 19 provides that the Commissioner may, subject to the directions of the Minister, only issue white persons and “white” companies with licences to deal in arms and ammunition. A right of appeal to the Minister is granted if the Commissioner should refuse to grant a dealer’s licence. These provisions are mainly in accordance with the existing provision.

Importation and exportation of arms and ammunition

Clauses 25 to 27 relate to the importation and exportation of arms and ammunition. These provisions are mainly of an administrative nature and merely prescribe procedure which, it is expected, can be carried out without problems. In broad outline this is also in accordance with the existing provisions of the Act. It will be possible to prescribe further procedures in this regard by regulation.

Manufacture of arms and ammunition

As is the case in existing legislation, the manufacture of arms, is being restricted to a factory registered under the Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act (Act No. 22 of 1941), and that of ammunition to an explosives factory licensed under the Explosives Act (Act No. 26 of 1956) or the corresponding Ordinances of the territory of South-West Africa, and in both cases in accordance with a permit issued by the Minister (clauses 28 to 36).

Miscellaneous provisions

The following are the most important provisions under this heading:

1. (1) Clause 32 places a prohibition on the unauthorized importation, supply or possession of certain classes of firearms or articles, such as cannons, machine guns, grenades and bombs, etc., and is verbally identical with the provisions of the existing section 1.
2. (2) Clause 3 grants the Minister wide powers which he may exercise in the interests of pubic safety and maintaining law and order, and in terms of which he may prohibit or restrict the importation of certain articles. Basically these provisions are in accordance with the existing sections 26 and 27.
3. (3) Clauses 35 and 36 place a prohibition on the unauthorized supply of arms and ammunition and are for the most part in accordance with the present section 23 of the existing Act. Clause 35 (2) has been added to enable, for instance, members of the Defence Force, Prisons and Police to purchase ammunition for official arms for purposes of sport.
4. (4) Clause 37 deals with the possession of firearms by juveniles, and its wording is for the most part identical with the corresponding provision of the existing Arms and Ammunition Act (seotion 29). The age limit here is also 16 years to fit in with the provisions already discussed (see clauses 3 and 8 above). However, in order to enable youths to use a firearm under supervision, I intend to add the following subsection to clause 45—
5. (4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained it shall be permissible for any white person over the age of 21 years who is in lawful possession of an arm, to allow a white person under the age of 16 years to use such arm under his immediate supervision.

This new subsection has already been placed on the Order Paper.

(5) Clause 38: In terms of this clause any person must report to the Police the loss of any firearm which used to be in his possession. These measures have become essential owing to the large number of arms being lost or stolen through irresponsibility and subsequently landing in undesirable hands. This provision has already been embodied in the existing Act—see section 3 of Act 64 of 1965 —but the date of commencement has not been announced as yet.

The obligation to report to a policeman the loss, theft or destruction of an arm within 48 hours, is not an unreasonable one and does not place any major burden on the citizenry. This is essential for the effective control of arms in general and definitely for the keeping of the firearms register.

(6) Clause 41: This clause makes provision for the powers of the Police to search and seize, and is in accordance with the existing provision in section 33.

(7) Clause 42: This clause grants the Commissioner the power to keep a central firearms register, which has already been referred to. A similar provision has already been effected in the existing Act in terms of section 4 of Act 64 of 1965. Clause 42 (2) is necessary for the furnishing of proof.

Other miscellaneous provisions include offences and penalties, presumptions, regulations, savings and the repeal of laws, which are not considered necessary to be discussed any further at this juncture.

This legislation will apply in South-West Africa, including the Eastern Caprivi Strip, and will come into operation on a date to be fixed by the State President by proclamation in the Gazette.

This Bill affects many citizens of the Republic, i.e. all those people who are in lawful possession of firearms or even those who possess firearms for which they have no licences. The Bill has been drafted in such a way as to exercise control in respect of practical circumstances. Consequently it is simple to read and fairly easy to understand. I think any hon. member of the House who takes an interest in this, would not have experienced any difficulty in grasping the implications of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Minister is quite right that the Bill, as it now reads, certainly makes it much clearer for the public exactly where they stand and what their rights are. However, I should like to say to the hon. the Minister that where you bring a Bill which both consolidates and amends, it seems to me that it is always wise to produce a White Paper with it so that members can in fact see what the changes are that are being brought about. A consolidating Bill is one thing; an amending Bill is another. But one that consolidates and amends at the same time without any indication being given as to what the changes are, is not a Bill that, I believe, members can easily find their way around. Although this Bill reads very well, it is very difficult to know quite what changes are made.

The hon. the Minister has given a very good exposition of the provisions of the Bill and what they are intended to meet. However, there is just one thing which I would like to refer to. I think the hon. the Minister mentioned all these various cases of the children playing with guns, who wounded each other, killed each other or killed other people as a reason why the age was being raised from 14 to 16. I think that will not help us at all. That is a case of clear negligence on the part of the parents in allowing their firearms to be in the vicinity of small children. I do not think I can speak too strongly about this sort of matter. One cannot deal too strongly with these matters. There is no doubt that this can be dealt with under the provisions of this Bill. The principle that is involved here, as the hon. the Minister rightly says, is a principle which we have really accepted in the existing legislation.

The idea behind this re-registration is to provide—and this is the only way, as the hon. the Minister points out, it can be provided—a central register for firearms in the Republic. Without such a central register we shall never be able to control firearms properly. Therefore, we are very pleased to see that this has been provided for in the Bill. It is something for which we on this side of the House have pleaded both here and in the Other Place. We agree that when the general re-registration takes place an amnesty period should be given to people so that they cannot be prosecuted if they go to the Police and present the firearm to them whilst they are not in possession of a firearms licence. They can then hand it in and if they are fit and proper persons to possess a firearm they will eventually on payment of their fee receive a licence together with the firearm. Surely, one should also provide if there is going to be any sort of decent register so that the firearms which are found by the Police can be traced, that with this general registration persons who have licences, but who have either lost their firearm or it has been destroyed or stolen should also be obliged to satisfy the Commissioner that they have firearms for which the licences were issued. Otherwise the people will not come forward if they do not have this protection. We feel that it should be provided for that not only should the licence be produced, but also that the person concerned should also satisfy the Commissioner that he is in fact in possession of a firearm. I do not suggest by that that he should necessarily have to take all his weapons if he is a collector and has 30 or 40 of these weapons to the Police Station. He should merely satisfy the Commissioner in whatever way applies to his case.

The other aspect of this Bill, to which we shall give more attention in the Committee Stage, follows directly on the Department of Police taking over the control of arms and ammunition. That is the matter the hon. the Minister referred to in dealing with clause 11. There the Commissioner can now declare persons to be unfit to possess arms. At the moment the Act provides that a magistrate may declare a person to be unfit to possess an arm. The procedure at the moment is that if the magistrate receives an affidavit or any information given under oath that a person has, inter alia, discharged a firearm at a person or threatened to kill someone, or by his negligence had injured other people or grossly negligently has injured someone, then the magistrate must call upon the person concerned to show cause on a certain day why he should not declare him to be a person who is not fit to possess a firearm. In other words, the very basic maxim of our law and our jurisprudence is obeyed, because you do hear the other side. It is a most serious matter to deprive someone of a firearm, because it applies for a minimum of three years. We feel that he should at least have the opportunity of indicating that the information obtained on oath is false or that it is misleading or that it was not he who committed this act or whatever the case may be. He at least should be able to put his case. One of the reasons why a person can be declared unfit to possess a firearm is if he loses that firearm through gross negligence. I know that there is an amendment on the Order Paper which provides that the Commissioner may not use that power without getting approval of the Minister, but if we look at (c) it also provides for a person “who has by means of an arm killed or injured any other person through negligence or wantonly or through negligence endangered the life or limb of any other person”. This is a matter of fact and a matter of law; therefore, it is a matter in which one should hear the other side and in which the person concerned should be entitled to put forward his version of the case. Moreover, the law, at the moment, provides that this should be done by a trained judicial officer. This officer sifts the facts and determines in a conflict of facts what the position really is. We feel that this protection for the individual should remain. We shall move an amendment to this effect in due course. However, members will appreciate that as the clause stands at the moment, it is wide open to abuse, it is open to persons who may carry a grudge to lodge their complaints and there is no obligation on the Commissioner at all to verify those facts or to find out from the persons concerned whether those facts are true. I appreciate that the hon. the Minister may feel that if a statement is made on oath that a person has conducted himself with a firearm in such a way as aforementioned, he should immediately be dispossessed of the firearm in the interest of the public. We agree that if it appears to the Commissioner that this person is a danger to the community or himself, he should be declared unfit to possess a firearm and that he should be dispossessed of it immediately. What we should like to see is that this should then be reported to the magistrate of the district and that the inquiry, which is provided for in the present law, should continue to be held. In other words, the power exists and the situation can be dealt with immediately. A magistrate then investigates the matter, after calling on the person to show cause. Whether he is there or not, he will hold an inquiry.

The magistrate then, in his discretion, should be entitled, after having heard all the facts, to determine whether that order should stand or whether it should be withdrawn. Thereafter, there is still, as it exists in the present law, and if the amendment is accepted, an appeal from that decision to the Minister. I hope that the hon. the Minister will give this his consideration, because we believe that it is a provision which it is necessary to have because it has withstood the test of time and it certainly does not in any way influence the action of the Commissioner in depriving irresponsible persons of arms and ammunition.

As regards this whole question of losing arms through gross negligence, I may say that there are many differences of opinion. I have had a case during the last recess, of someone who went away on holiday and he locked his revolver in a drawer. He consciously applied his mind to the hiding of his firearm; he locked it away in the drawer and went away for a few days. When he came back the revolver was gone. He had forgotten that it was quite easy to take out the drawer just above it, and remove the gun. Now, this was unfortunate because that man actually applied his mind to the problem and thought he was putting it away safely. Now, by virtue of the present Act, the Minister of Justice refused to allow this person to possess a firearm, despite the fact that he has had the firearm for many years and that he needed it for the protection of his family. In my own judgment this is a matter which should go to a judicial officer. I should have said he was not grossly negligent, although he might have been careless, because he actually applied his mind to the subject. I might be considered grossly negligent if I am out for the evening and I put my firearm in a certain place. I shall not mention the place across the floor of this House, but I can assure hon. members that it is the safest place where a firearm can be put. However, the place where I keep my firearm might not be regarded as properly safe.

Will you table that information?

Yes, with pleasure. If I were to go away and lock my firearm in the wardrobe or in a drawer and lock all the drawers it would probably not be regarded as negligent. However, if your house is burgled the first thing they will go for is your wardrobe, because they will look for clothes and they will most probably find the firearm there. In such a case the person would probably not be accused of being negligent as he did lock it up. Now, this brings me to the whole problem of losses of firearms. So many firearms are lost or stolen when people are away from their homes. They might be on holiday, they might be overseas or whatever the case may be and they do not want to take the firearms with them; very often you cannot take them with you, especially if you have one or two shotguns. Therefore, if you go away, you try to put your firearm in a safe place or you try to lock it up. However, there is no safe place in a house.

Even a safe is not safe.

As my hon. friend says even a safe is not safe. I plead that there should be provision made by the State for some sort of repository for firearms. This repository should be a safe place where people can deposit their firearms when they go away. We earnestly make this suggestion because we believe it will help to avoid the theft of arms from people when they are away on holiday. The difficult position at the moment is that if you go to a local police station, they are not prepared to accept the responsibility of storing your firearm during that period. They simply will not do it. Now what is a person to do? He will either take it with him, or if he does not want to have this dangerous weapon with him, he will put it away in some safe place in the house. But apart from the place which I can suggest as I have said, there is no real safe place in a house. We shall suggest in the Committee State that the Minister takes power to provide for repositories for arms in various centres, wherever it it feasible and practicable. If necessary the firearms can be deposited at the repository for a certain fee or on the conditions as he would like to prescribe. If this is done, then there will be a place where the public can leave their firearms with the assurance that they will not be stolen. They will have the assurance that their weapon will not endanger the lives of others if it is stolen, as it is at the moment. I want to say that this could also be enlarged so as to provide that private persons such as gunsmiths who have the storing facilities, might be able to keep firearms. At the moment these people are not entitled to do it because of the definition of the possession of firearms in the present Act. I may say that provision for repositories was made in Kenya during the Mau-Mau crisis and it helped a great deal to prevent the arms from getting into the hands of the wrong people.

Therefore, at this stage we offer no objection to this Bill at the Second Reading, but we shall move these amendments as I have mentioned. These amendments will appear on the Order Paper and we hope the Minister will give them his earnest consideration.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 23 and debate adjourned.