I move as an unopposed motion—

Agreed to.

Can the hon. the Deputy Minister tell us why it is that the new rules, or any amendments to the magistrate’s court rules, should no longer be published in three consecutive issues of the Government Gazette? It would seem to have been an excellent practice, having regard especially to the fact that Gazettes are often hard to get and are quickly sold out, especially when they have a provision such as this in them. I wonder whether he will explain why it is that this provision is now being removed.

It is only as regards magistrates’ courts that it has to be published in three consecutive issues of the Government Gazette, as well as in a notice. It is a waste of money to do that printing, because it costs a good deal to print it in three consecutive issues of the Government Gazette, and in order to save that money, it has been decided to print it in one issue of the Government Gazette only, so as to bring the position into line with the practice in the Public Service in connection with all other matters. A full month is allowed before it takes effect and this affords people sufficient time to adapt themselves to the new amendment. This streamlines the entire position.

Has there been consultation with the Rules Board?

The law societies have all agreed.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 5:

This amendment provides for an increase in the cost of a record when a person has been convicted and is considering an appeal to the Supreme Cout. The cost per folio is increased from 9d., or 7½ cents, to 20 cents, which is much more than double. One appreciates that certain things have increased in cost, including obviously the price per folio of a record, but what I find rather disturbing about this is that so far as I am aware the Lubbe organization does almost all the recordings and transcriptions, in the courts. What I would like to know is whether this applies to those records which are recorded by the Lubbe organization, or whether it only applies to those records which are recorded by the magistrate himself, or does it apply to all transcriptions?

It applies to all transcriptions. I might just point out that this amount of 7½ cents has been provided for ever since 1917 and I think that 20 cents is a reasonable increase under the circumstances. As the hon. member knows, in all pro Deo cases copies of records are provided free to the accused. It is only in the other cases that they will have to pay.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 9:

This clause deals with the proof of previous convictions, as does the previous clause, and it appears that the whole procedure is now being streamlined, but I wonder whether the hon. the Minister will indicate just what the significance of the repeal of these sections is, having regard to the other clauses in this Bill.

A long procedure is now being eliminated because it is becoming unnecessary. When a preparatory examination is held, the prosecutor must, in terms of section 69 of the Criminal Procedure Act, send particulars of previous convictions to the Attorney-General as soon as the examination has been concluded. If the Attorney-General finds that those previous convictions must be proved, he must refer the matter back and then they again have to be proved in the magistrate’s court, and then it goes back again. This has in fact been found to be quite unnecessary, because there are so many cases now where the accused are summarily tried, and the accelerated procedure is working quite well. When the accused is summarily charged in the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General cannot make use of the procedure under section 69, and the prosecutor must, in terms of section 302 of the Act, give the Supreme Court and the accused at least 72 hours’ notice that he intends to prove previous convictions against him. This is then done in the usual way at the trial. The object of section 69 appears to be of a twofold nature. In the first place it provides the Attorney-General with the necessary notification and in the second place, according to the procedure in terms of section 302, it notifies the accused that the State intends to prove the previous convictions against him. Upon investigation it has now appeared that the expenditure and the work in connection with the re-opening of preparatory examinations in terms of section 69 is not justified. According to statistics obtained by the S.A. Criminal Bureau there were only four cases out of approximately 3,248 accused in respect of which this procedure was followed during the period of one year from January, 1966, to January, 1967, in which they denied previous convictions. In other words, they were four cases out of 3,248, which is a clear indication to us that this procedure is in fact obsolete, and the intention is now rather to eliminate it and to follow the same procedure in the Supreme Court as has been followed in the magistrates’ courts.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 10:

I move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

If my amendment is accepted, subsection (2) (b) (ii) will read that “security matter” means any matter relating to the security of the Republic and includes any matter concerning the organization of the Bureau for State Security, etc. When we were discussing the Second Reading, and I criticized the application of this clause, I pointed out that any matter which the Security Police investigated would become a security matter. I gave examples of what the Security Police had already done, such as investigating the smear pamphlets, and the possession by the Sunday Times of Broeder-bond documents, etc. The Deputy Minister then interjected and said I must read this sub-paragraph with subsection (2) (a), and he suggested that it only became a secret matter if it was used for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or the interest of the Republic. I want to point out to him that in reading subsection (2) (a), the prohibition relates to any security matter, and “security matter” is defined. No matter what comes after the words “security matter” in subsection (2) (a), no matter what else is contained in subsection (2) (a), “security matter” is defined, and the definition includes, as the Bill now reads, any matter dealt with by or relating to the Bureau of State Security. “Any matter dealt with” means any matter which they handle. What else can it mean? It means any matter which the Security Police handle, and we have it from the Prime Minister himself that the Security Police will handle any matter, not necessarily dealing with security. They can deal with any crime. Therefore we say that as the Bill now reads it is very wide. We quite agree that there should be some security in regard to the organization of the Security Police, and if my amendment is accepted, it will have this effect that any matter dealing with the organization of the Police, with people in the organization of the Security Police, will become privileged. I do not see why the Minister cannot accept that, if in fact that is what is intended in this Bill. I submit that the Minister misreads subsection (2) (a) if he thinks it is confined only to security matters. I submit it is confined not only to security matters, because of the definition given of “security matter”, which is wider.

The hon. member is quite correct in his premise when he says that it will include more than actual security matters only. Many matters may be investigated, but this is not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is that he has to read paragraph (b), which reads as follows: For the purposes of paragraph (a) “security matter” means this. It is only for the purposes of (2) (a) that that definition of a security matter is applicable and important. All the other things which are not important for the purposes of paragraph (a), have no significance. It is only for the purposes of (a) that that definition has any significance. “For the purposes of paragraph (a)” are the words which give finality in regard to the whole matter, because in (2) (a) an offence is being created. These are the words which are decisive in this regard: “in any manner or for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic”. This is what the State has to prove in accusing any person of that offence. Therefore, even if this bureau were to investigate matters, but were unable to meet the requirements laid down in (a), it would have no effect, because that aspect only has significance when it comes to the implementation of (a). Therefore, the hon. member need not be concerned about the writers of the smear pamphlets and about their being convicted in terms of subsection (2) (a). I must also state that his amendment seeks to confine the whole question of security matters to the people within the bureau only, but these people within the bureau do in fact have to deal with many matters which are outside the bureau. If a person outside the bureau were to obtain information about matters within the bureau, we would, according to his amendment, not be able to take steps against those persons, the very outsiders against whom we want to take steps because they are going to interfere with bureau matters within the organization.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. the Deputy Minister has missed the point altogether. There are three aspects of this definition. Firstly “security matter” means any matter relating to the security of the Republic. The amendment moved by my hon. friend proposes to leave that as it is. Secondly, a “security matter” includes “any matter dealt with by or relating to the Bureau for State Security”. It is this part of the definition which is proposed to be substituted by other words. Thirdly, a “security matter” means any matter “relating to the relationship subsisting between any person and the said bureau”. Now the amendment does not propose to touch that aspect either. This amendment only proposes to deal with the middle part of this definition. Quite obviously, if you have such a bureau, the relationship existing between it and its agents, if I may use that expression, has to be protected. If we know that someone is an agent of B.O.S.S., we should obviously not disclose it, in the same way as the C.I.A. tries to preserve the secrecy of its agents. If this is not done, it obviously will not work. However, the hon. the Deputy Minister must not think that we are concerned about the writers of smear letters. That does not worry us at all. What we are concerned about are the writers of things other than smear letters. Every newspaper man in the country is going to be affected by this provision. We concede that B.O.S.S. has to be enclosed in a secret shroud, but how is one to know what it is dealing with? What B.O.S.S. deals with, no one must know about. What will be the case if one publishes an article, for instance, on a subject being dealt with by B.O.S.S.? If this article has the effect of prejudicing the interests of the State, one will be committing an offence. This provision is incredibly wide. How do you know when you are committing an offence? This is really the point. You do not know because you are not allowed to know what B.O.S.S. is dealing with, nor are you allowed to know whether the subject you are dealing with is something which relates to the bureau. You do not know. Nobody knows. Not even this House is allowed to know. I am not complaining about that aspect of the matter because, as we have indicated already, we agreed to the measure establishing this bureau. However, we did not agree to it in these circumstances. We do not agree that the discussion of a matter already being dealt with by B.O.S.S. should be treated as an offence when one does not know what B.O.S.S. is in fact dealing with. Surely the hon. the Deputy Minister concedes that this is so and that one can commit an offence without knowing it. If anyone writes a leading article in a newspaper criticizing a matter which happens to be under investigation by the bureau, he will be committing an offence without knowing it. If, in fact, the hon. the Minister does not like what is written in that leading article, he can prosecute the writer of the article in terms of this provision, or he can certainly take him in for investigation, on the grounds that he is investigating an offence under the Official Secrets Act. My hon. friend is quite right when he says that the bureau can deal with anything. The hon. the Prime Minister has already indicated what the Security Police have dealt with in the past. Is there any assurance that B.O.S.S. is not going to investigate or concern itself with, or deal with smear letters sent to members of the Nationalist Party, and which are published? We know that the Security Branch has investigated the theft of certain magazines from Durban Station. The magazine involved was a magazine called Veg, oddly enough. They investigate matters relating to the population register. They investigate matters concerning the group areas, kidnapping and all sorts of things. These are matters about which people have strong opinions, and about which they express strong criticism. Especially newspapers do so, as they are the medium through which one expresses publicly one’s disapproval or one’s thought on these subjects. This provision can place a curb on the writer of any leading article in any newspaper, because he will not know what B.O.S.S. is dealing with. The only way in which he can find out what B.O.S.S. is dealing with, is to ask the boss. But the boss is not allowed to tell him. This is the effect of this clause. This is how far it goes. I hope that the hon. the Deputy Minister will accept this amendment. It is a reasonable amendment. As the hon. member for Transkei said, this clause should be limited to only the organization of B.O.S.S. That is fair. I hope that the Deputy Minister has reconsidered the position and that he will accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Deputy Minister has not appreciated the precise point we are trying to make. In dealing with this clause a moment ago, he said that the effect of the amendment being introduced by this clause, will be to include any security matter. This is quite correct. This is the only amendment which is being made. But the definition of a “security matter” must then be looked at in order to appreciate exactly what it includes. The point made by the Deputy Minister was that, before there can be a conviction, there must be proof that the matter involved is a security matter and that the matter was communicated or published for any purpose prejudicial to the State. It would assist me, Sir, if I could see the hon. the Deputy Minister.

We cannot see him.

Sir, we are trying to debate with the hon. the Deputy Minister. Is this the point which was made by the hon. the Deputy Minister? Was the Deputy Minister’s point that, before there can be a conviction, there must be proof that there was a communication or a publication for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the State?

Yes.

I thought that was the hon. the Deputy Minister’s point, but, with respect to him, he was not entirely correct, because of the words used in the new subsection (2) (a). If the Deputy Minister’s argument were to apply, this subsection would have to read, inter alia, as follows—

Such information would then have to be communicated in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, even if it were not communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. This is an entirely different situation, because if it is an offence to communicate such information in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the State, the intention of the person would be quite irrelevant. In the example given by the Deputy Minister, the intention of the person is relevant, because it is a question of intention. The information would then have to be communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the State.

But that is not the only situation under which there can be a conviction. There can be a conviction simply if there is a communication or a publication in a manner prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the State. Sir, when you relate that to the definition of “security matter”, we submit that it becomes clear that an offence can be committed quite inadvertently and quite innocently, because “security matter” includes “any matter dealt with by or relating to the Bureau for State Security”.

I come now to the fact that one does not know what is being dealt with by the Bureau for State Security. Quite rightly, the bureau must keep what it is dealing with secret and we are not against that aspect of the matter. Obviously, if there is to be a Bureau for State Security, its actions and the matters with which it is dealing must be kept secret. If it is made an offence to communicate in a manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State a matter which is being dealt with by the Bureau for State Security, an offence can quite easily be committed innocently and inadvertently, because the person concerned may not know what the bureau is dealing with. This is why we suggest that the words “dealt with by” should be omitted so that the definition of “security matter” will then be limited when it refers to the Bureau for State Security. It will then be limited in such a way that it is reasonable for a person to be aware that a certain matter may affect the Bureau for State Security. We are trying to limit this provision to within reasonable limits. We suggest that because of the introduction of the words “dealt with by” in this definition, it is not reasonable. The amendment moved by the hon. member for Transkei suggests that these words should be substituted by the words “concerning the organization of”. The definition would then read: “security matter” means any matter concerning the organization of the Bureau for State Security.

We think that this will cover every kind of case which the hon. the Deputy Minister is seeking to protect by this amendment. In other words, the hon. the Deputy Minister is seeking to give the bureau adequate protection so that there will not be publication of what it is dealing with or of the persons who are acting as its agents, etc. This is reasonable, but it becomes unreasonable when it is extended and when the wording is so wide that it can result in persons being convicted although they acted quite innocently or inadvertently because they did not know exactly what was being dealt with by the bureau. We think that this amendment is reasonable. If, however, the hon. the Deputy Minister does not like the wording of our amendment, perhaps the problem could be met by simply deleting the words “dealt with by”. The definition will then read, “security matter” means any matter relating to the security of the Republic and includes any matter relating to the Bureau for State Security … or relating to the relationship subsisting between any person and the said bureau”. It seems to me that this would also be satisfactory because in the case of a matter relating to the bureau, there is a greater chance that the persons concerned may know that this is a matter with which the bureau is dealing. We therefore ask the hon. the Deputy Minister to consider these possibilities in the light of the problems which we have put to him.

Mr. Chairman, in pursuance of what was said by the hon. member for Durban (North), I just want to point out that to a large extent the amendment moved by the hon. member for Transkei actually removes the core from the definition of a bureau matter. The hon. member must bear in mind that this Bureau co-ordinates various State information Departments. It also co-ordinates the security branch of both the police and the military authorities. This is information which the Bureau does not have at its disposal and which concerns these two bodies, but is nevertheless dealt with by it. For instance, the Bureau may deal with a security matter which in point of fact belongs under the military branch. Such a matter is beyond its organization, but it may, for instance, have been instructed by the military branch to investigate the matter. In that case the matter investigated would be a military one. The same applies to police matters which may perhaps result in the safety or interests of the State being affected. The police can refer such matters to the Bureau because it is a co-ordinating Department. Consequently we cannot accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Transkei, for in moving his amendment the hon. member narrows down the scope of the provision far too much and forgets that the whole object of this Department is to serve as a co-ordinating Department. I hope that the position is clear to the hon. member for Transkei now.

The matter raised by the hon. member for Musgrave is basically the same as the one raised by the hon. member for Durban (North). The hon. member for Musgrave advanced quite a plausible argument. I want to concede to him that he advanced a sound argument, and I should like to reply to it. He is in fact not so much opposed to the definition in paragraph (ii), but rather to the words “in any manner” in (2) (a). He has based his entire argument on the premise that these words exclude the intention which has to be proved. A person may be quite careless and unaware that he is dealing with such a matter. But, surely, this is not correct, for in the case of an offence in terms of subsection (2) (b) (ii) there has to be mens rea. There has to be intention before it can be proved.

No, that is not the case.

Let us get this matter clear. This is a generally accepted principle, because there can be no offence without there being mens rea. This is the prerequisite for any offence. This is elementary law. No elementary element is being excluded here. Even in the case of a minor offence in terms of a road ordinance, for instance, there has to be a mens rea. This is an elementary matter and we shall not be able to argue about it either. It is true that in the case of any offence guilt has to be proved. However, the hon. member said that because of the wording of the definition, it might happen that a newspaper unwittingly published a certain matter which was being dealt with by the Bureau. But what does the State have to prove in such a case? The State has to prove that the publication thereof was prejudicial to the interests of the State. What person will not know that something which is published is not in the interests of the State? Surely, anybody who publishes anything, would know this. After all, all of us know what is in the interests of the State. Such a publication has to be prejudicial to the interests or the safety of the State, and this has to be proved. Any person who publishes something of this nature, would know whether or not it is prejudicial to the safety of the State. Such a person would also know whether it is prejudicial to the public interest. A newspaper does not simply publish articles blindly, without making sure of those possibilities. No person will publish it without making sure of those possibilities. If a person were to do that, he would be reckless and an element of guilt would definitely be involved in the matter. The words “any manner” will also give an indication of what the element of guilt is. If the “manner” is reckless and intentional, such a person would be guilty. What else? Therefore I do not see in these words the danger hon. members opposite see in them.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Deputy Minister has now certainly justified our fears of what the consequences of this Bill will be. He commenced by saying that this Security Branch will interest themselves in other matters. They will co-ordinate the investigations of different Departments. They may be asked to take up a military matter or to take over a police matter. The problem now is that when any person wishes to communicate any matter he will never know whether the Security Police has investigated the matter or not. As the law reads at present, it is laid down that if someone communicates any matter, namely any military or police matter, which may be prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the Republic, he will commit an offence. A “police matter” is defined as being “any matter relating to the preservation of the internal security of the Republic or the maintenance of law and order by the South Africa Police”. That is all that is covered in this Bill at the moment. If that applies to the Security Police we would have no objection either. This amendment now goes much further. I want to give an example of what might happen.

Let us take the case to which the hon. the Minister has referred as being against the interest of the State, namely when we discussed the death of prisoners in a police van. The hon. the Minister of Police said that the matter should not be raised because it was against the interests of the Republic. The hon. the Minister of Police said that by raising and discussing that matter in this House we were acting in a manner contrary to the interest of the Republic. It was not prejudicial to the safety of the Republic, but against the interests of the Republic. No steps could be taken against anybody who communicated on the police van incident, because it was a matter dealt with by the police and in any event a police matter did not cover a matter of that nature. A police matter as defined in existing law did not cover a matter of that nature. A “security matter” is now defined in this Bill as being “any matter relating to the security of the Republic”, to which we have no objection, “and includes any matter dealt with …”

It may be a military matter.

Not only a military matter, but also a police or even a political matter. They have interfered in and investigated political matters. It goes much further than that. What one would expect is that the Security Police will only deal with security matters. The definition of a security matter should therefore merely read “any matter relating to the security of the Republic and/or the organizations of the Security Police themselves”. That would be reasonable. We cannot see why the hon. the Deputy Minister must include the words “and includes any matter dealt with”. What the hon. the Deputy Minister has said now has added to our consternation as to what will happen. I have given the hon. the Deputy Minister an example of what can happen. I have given him an example about something which happened recently and which could be covered by this amendment, something which was not covered before. I therefore ask the hon. the Deputy Minister to reconsider this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will reply to what was said by the hon. member for Transkei. I hope he will also indicate whether it will be acceptable as an amendment to delete the words “dealt with by or”.

I have already indicated that I cannot accept that amendment. It deals with another department, namely the Military.

The hon. the Deputy Minister does not appear to have grasped our arguments at all. The point is that no one is supposed to know what B.O.S.S. does. No one is to know that, not even the Minister or this House. Let us start on that premise. What they are dealing with is. therefore, unknown to anyone except the people in that organization. If someone publishes something concerning a matter that is being dealt with by the Bureau in a manner which is prejudicial to the interests of the Republic, an offence is committed. Such an offence may be committed unwittingly. Anyone who writes anything, any criticism or anything of that sort, especially criticism in a newspaper on a matter which is being dealt with by this bureau, commits an offence if it is published in a manner which is calculated to be against the interests of the Republic. How can one then say, as the hon. the Deputy Minister says, that no mental element comes into it? Of course, it does come into it and should come into it. But here you commit an offence unwittingly, if we should pass this measure. The rule about mens rea as the hon. the Deputy Minister is aware, is that there is a strong presumption that mens rea is required. If the Statute makes it clear that it is not required, it is not required. This paragraph provides for both purpose and manner so that one can communicate in any manner and for any purpose which may be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic. If one should communicate for a purpose then obviously there is mens rea. The mental attitude of mind to do something for a purpose, is required. In “a manner which is prejudicial” there is not necessarily that mental element. But, as I say, that begs the whole question, because no one knows what B.O.S.S. is dealing with. If someone should in fact publish something of this sort, as is going to happen every day about every controversial matter which this bureau deals with, what is this bureau going to do about it? The field seems to be getting wider and wider the more the hon. the Deputy Minister speaks. Where is the end of the bureau. Are they or are they not going to. The hon. the Deputy Minister cannot say. That is why this is so absurd. This hon. Deputy Minister, who wants us to pass this clause, cannot tell us what B.O.S.S. is going to deal with. He cannot tell anyone. He does not know.

The B.O.S.S. should actually be handling this Bill.

That is so. The B.O.S.S. should be handling this Bill. He is the only one who will be able to tell us whether our fears are founded or whether they are not. Not that that would be sufficient, but we would at least like some such assurance. Even the B.O.S.S. would not be able to say what he is going to deal with. That is the point. If that is so the hon. the Deputy Minister should at least agree to the deletion of the words “dealt with”. He can’t tell us what it is going to deal with. All that this Committee can go on, is its experience of what the security branch has dealt with before. And that includes all matters. Any matter that you can possibly think of it deals with. I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will answer that point at any rate, even if he does not agree with it. The hon. the Deputy Minister should tell us what his feeling is about the “dealing with” part, and that one can communicate something about something they are dealing with without knowing it. We would be glad if the hon. the Deputy Minister could give us the benefit of his thoughts.

The hon. member has now made two points. I wish to reply quite clearly to both points. The first point deals with the words “in any manner” in subsection (2) (a). The part in question reads as follows—

This is the aspect about which hon. members are feeling concerned.

It says “or for any purpose” …

Yes, I am very well aware of the “or”. Now hon. members want to argue about those words. All the arguments the hon. member has now advanced, he might just as well have advanced in regard to the wording of the existing Act, i.e. before this amendment was proposed. There are many things which a newspaper could have published unwittingly in regard to security matters. As the Act reads at present, it could unwittingly have done so in regard to security matters as the Act reads at present. As the Act reads at present, it could also have published such things unwittingly in regard to a police matter. I am now referring to a police matter relating to internal security. It could unwittingly have published certain things in regard to all those aspects. Where does the prosecution aspect come into the picture in those cases? As the section reads at present, i.e. before this amendment was moved, the words “any person … who publishes it or directly or indirectly communicates it to any person in any manner or for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the Republic” are just as valid in respect of all those matters. Therefore I need not elaborate on that matter any further. It is not correct, as hon. members are now saying, that the words “in any manner” exclude mens rea as it were. Practical experience over the past 10, 12 years has proved that this is not the case.

Now we come to the second point which deals with the words “dealt with by”. I have already made this point very clear. This Bureau is going to deal with many matters because it is a co-ordinating Bureau. The Bureau co-ordinates information from all State departments; not only from one department, but from all State departments. For instance, it co-ordinates information obtained from the information bureau. It may obtain information there which it would have to investigate as it might be prejudicial to the interests of safety of the State. It co-ordinates military intelligence. It obtains information in regard to military matters, and if the safety or interests of the State are prejudiced by such information, it will have to investigate those matters as well. It has to deal with them. I cannot omit those words, because to do so would in fact eliminate the whole function of the Bureau as a co-ordinating department. I really cannot take the matter any further.

Hon. members must please refrain from indulging in repetition.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will give more consideration to this. I should like to put this matter to him in a different way in dealing with the points which he has made. Frankly, we are even more worried in view of the hon. the Deputy Minister’s reiteration that the Bureau for State Security is going to have such very wide functions. I think that he as Deputy Minister of Justice ought likewise to be concerned with this provision in relation to a bureau with such wide powers. First of all, the hon. the Deputy Minister said that the position before this proposed amendment was introduced could likewise have resulted in somebody being prosecuted inadvertently because it related to military matters, Police matters and so forth. I should like to point out to the hon. the Deputy Minister that persons publishing information or communicating information relating to a Police or a military matter would know that they have to be particularly careful by the very nature of these two things. They would know that it is a Police matter and they would know that it is a military matter. They would therefore know that in relation to such matters they would have to be particularly careful. Our point is that there is no way for a person to know what is being dealt with by the Bureau for State Security. They can deal with so many things. The hon. the Deputy Minister has reiterated that they will be dealing with all sorts of matters. This is our very point. As the clause stands at the moment, that is without the proposed amendment, persons would know what a military matter is and that they would have to be particularly careful. But they would not know what the bureau was dealing with. An offence is created not only in respect of matters dealt with by the bureau and which are communicated in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the State. If the safety of the State is involved, then in most cases one would know whether or not something which is being published affects the safety of the State. The offence is created if a matter dealt with by the bureau is communicated in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the State. The words “interests of the State” and “the security of the State” are not synonymous. Something can affect the interests of the State while it does not at any stage affect the security of the State. In other words, the phrase “interests of the State” goes very much wider. As the hon. member for Transkei has pointed out, we have had thrown at us from the Government side of the House that by raising various matters that we are prejudicing the interests of the State. We do not agree with that for one moment. But the Government is making that contention. Similarly, it could be contended that some matter which is being raised by a newspaper or by an individual affects the interests of the State and therefore comes within the purview of this amendment because it is being dealt with by the bureau.

That is why we are pointing out to the hon. the Deputy Minister that with the use of the words “dealt with by the Bureau”, read in the context of subsection (2) (a) this proposed amendment goes very far indeed and unreasonably far, in a way which makes it quite impossible for a citizen to know whether he is or is not contravening this section.

Sir, this deals with one aspect. Then I would like to come back to the other point made by the hon. the Deputy Minister and that is in regard to mens rea. The hon. the Deputy Minister has countered the argument I have raised by saying that even if you are dealing with this portion of subsection (2) (a) which makes it an offence to communicate in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the State, mens rea will have to be proved in order to obtain a conviction. Sir, I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will give more careful consideration to this and perhaps obtain the views of the department. Sir, could I just explain this to the Deputy Minister because this is really the crux of it. If the hon. the Deputy Minister is right, then obviously the position is not quite so bad as we contend because if mens rea has to be proved, if a clear intention to prejudice the safety or the interests of the State, has to be proved, in other words, if the hon. the Deputy Minister is right, then our fears are not well grounded. But, with respect to the Deputy Minister, I think he is quite wrong on this aspect, because, as the hon. member for Durban (North) has pointed out, whether or not mens rea is required for a conviction depends on the intention of the legislature as it appears from the section.

I think the hon. the Deputy Minister will concede that it is not for every conviction that mens rea or an intention is required. Some laws specifically exclude it, and in other cases it is excluded by reason of the wording of the legislation. In subsection (2) (a) we have two distinct situations which are different from each other; two types of offences are created, and I submit to the hon. the Deputy Minister that the courts would inevitably have to come to the conclusion that in one case the legislature intended mens rea and that in the other the legislature did not I suggest the position is that in the case of a charge of contravening subsection (2) (a) on the ground of communication for a purpose prejudicial to the State, the courts would have to say that the legislature clearly intended mens rea; that it clearly intended proof of an intention or of a purpose to prejudice. But in the case of a communication “in a manner prejudicial” the courts would inevitably have to say that the legislature has used the two different words, and that in the case of a charge of contravening the section by means of a manner prejudicial to the safety of the State, the legislature intended this to be different from “a purpose prejudicial” and that therefore mens rea would not be required.

I think my hon. friend was right when he said that the crux of the matter was whether mens rea would be found to be necessary or not. I submit on the other hand that mens rea would be necessary. I think my hon. friend will agree with me that the rule with regard to mens rea is that normally mens rea is a requirement of all offences except where the legislature clearly states that it is not or where the wording is such that you inevitably have to come to the conclusion that mens rea is not a requirement. What would be the position here? The position here would be that the accused communicates “to any person in any manner or for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the State.” The words “any purpose prejudicial” are obviously intended to mean that mens rea is necessary. I submit that the courts will take that as an indication that the preceding words “in any manner” also imply that an intention is necessary.

They are two different expressions.

They may be two different expressions but the interpretation normally is that if there is an indication at all of mens rea in an offence it will apply to all the facets of the offence. If the court concludes that the offence was committed “for a purpose prejudicial” then it will also conclude that the words “in a manner” mean “with an intention”. In other words, the manner must be so careless as to amount to mens rea. I think my hon. friends have also missed this particular point.

If they look at this subsection carefully they will find that it says—

It is some information that the person concerned has or of which he has knowledge. It relates to munitions of war or to a military or Police matter; that is quite simple; he knows that this thing has something to do with the Police or military or security matters and that he must not tell anybody about it. Normally the position is also quite easy as far as security is concerned. It must be something which is prejudicial to the interests of the State.

Or the safety of the State.

My hon. friend now says that it may simply be a matter that was dealt with by the Bureau. Is that correct?

Yes.

That is the difficulty. Let us take the example quoted by my hon. friend, namely a pamphlet which, on the face of it, appears to be innocent. The question is whether you can give information about this particular pamphlet; you do not know whether the Security Police have been dealing with it or not. If you do not know it at all, if you are completely innocent, I submit that because “in any manner” indicates mens rea you would be found not guilty. But if somebody had told you beforehand that that pamphlet may have a background of some offence against the State and in spite of that you convey that knowledge in a certain manner to someone else, then mens rea would come in and you would be guilty under this section. I honestly do not think that my hon. friends really have a case to present here.

The hon. member for Prinshof surely cannot argue that the legislature intended two words to be interpreted in the same way when the two words have different contexts. That is the effect of what he says.

I was talking about mens rea.

Yes, I know that. The legislature used the word “purpose” and, as I have indicated, “purpose” would carry with it mens rea, but the legislature also mentioned the word “manner”, and as my hon. friend knows, you must assume that the legislature intended that to have some meaning, and the meaning that it has is something different from “purpose”. Otherwise the legislature would have left it at “purpose” instead of putting in the word “manner”. Sir, quite apart from this question of mens rea, quite apart from what one would prove in court, this clause can have consequences, as a result of Police action, which would deprive people of their right to sue in the civil courts for wrongful arrest and detention, for example. This happens quite frequently: the hon. the Deputy Minister must not look shocked because it does happen. Let me say why I say this. If you are arrested and detained pending investigation on suspicion of having committed some offence, the matter is then investigated and the charge may be dropped and you are released. If your detention was unlawful, you can obviously sue the State.

How can wrongful arrest be brought under this section?

I am about to explain it. It is very easy as a rule to show whether you have been wrongly arrested and unlawfully detained because you have to be arrested on suspicion of having committed some offence, and the facts of the offence are well known to you. Take the case of a person who is detained by the Security Police on suspicion that he has committed an offence under this section. He is arrested: investigations are made and then he is subsequently released; the charge, if one was brought against him, is dropped, or if no charge was brought against him, he is simply released. How does the person who was arrested ever prove that he was unlawfully arrested? How can he ever prove it? Because he has been arrested for publishing in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the State a matter being dealt with by B.O.S.S. He is never going to be able to find out or tell a court that in fact that is what is being dealt with by B.O.S.S.; that this is what he was being interrogated about; he will never know whether in fact there was any foundation for his arrest and for his subsequent detention. How can he ever know? Sir, that is a consequence of this provision and, if I may say so, it is in just those circumstances that you can read this clause with clause 29, so the effect of this provision is felt outside of the Court as well as within it. Within the court, Sir, the matter is very wide but the court would deal with it and deal with the circumstances of it if they find him guilty. But in the operation of the members or agents of B.O.S.S., outside of the courts, as I have indicated with just one example, this can have the most ghastly consequences for someone who is in fact detained pending investigation.

There is one other point which the hon. the Minister dealt with when he last spoke in this debate. He said that he could not agree to the deletion of the words “dealt with by or” in the definition of “security matter” because the Bureau of State Security would be dealing with all sorts of things and would be a type of co-ordinating body. I think the answer to the hon. the Deputy Minister on this point is that if it is a matter relating to the security of the Republic, then this is covered specifically by the first part of the definition of “security matter”, so whether or not it is being dealt with by the Bureau of State Security is irrelevant, because it is specifically covered by this first part of this definition. So it is only other matters dealt with by the Bureau with which we need to be concerned, and those are specifically the ones we are concerned about, because if it is a security matter then one has some chance of knowing what it is about. The person who is about to communicate or publish knows that he must be careful because it is a security matter.

Order! I think the hon. member must present new arguments now.

Then I will not take this any further. I think the hon. the Deputy Minister has seen the point which I make and I would ask him to consider it in that light.

The other aspect which worries me very much is still this question of mens rea. The hon. member for Prinshof has argued that because the word “purpose” implies mens rea the court would automatically infer that in regard to the words “any manner” which appeared before, mens rea was likewise intended. I think as an advocate the hon. member for Prinshof will concede that one of the cardinal principles of interpretation, particularly in regard to mens rea, is that if two words are used with the word “or” in between, in other words, two specific types of situations are made offences, where one word necessarily implies an intention and the other word does not imply an intention, one of the cardinal principles of interpretation is that the court will say that the Legislature intended that in the one case there must be mens rea for a conviction, and in the other there need not be, particularly where the word implying intention comes second and not first in order, as is the case here. Here we have the word “manner”, which does not imply an intention; in fact, it clearly indicates that an intention is not necessary. That comes first and then comes the word which implies an intention. In such a context I think the hon. member for Prinshof will agree with me, on further reflection, that in such instances the courts have invariably held that if two types of convictions are envisaged, one not requiring mens rea and the other requiring it … This is so important in view of the words “dealt with by or” in the definition of “security matter” that there should be no doubt at all, and if the Deputy Minister intends that convictions under this section should require proof of an intention I think this ought to be clearly inserted in the Act.

But there is perhaps a more important aspect to this question of mens rea, and that is section 8 of the principal Act, which places the onus on the accused. Section 8 does away with the normal onus and places it on the accused. So, if there is any doubt on the lines suggested by the Deputy Minister, that doubt is removed by section 8. The Crown does not have to prove mens rea because in terms of section 8 the onus is placed on the accused. Perhaps the Deputy Minister would consider that aspect of it. In view of all these problems, I would like to move, as an alternative amendment to that moved by the hon. member for Transkei, the following amendment—

As regards the last point, namely that the onus is now being transferred in terms of section 8, it is probably so much easier for the accused to prove that he did not have any mens rea. The fact that the onus is being transferred, will by no means eliminate the element and the offence of mens rea. Surely, hon. members are well aware of this. The offence still has to be proved, no matter on whom the onus falls. The onus does not exclude the element of the offence. It is simply a matter of his being able to declare that he is not guilty of such an offence because this was not his intention; it was not his intention; he did not do it with that intention. He then denies any guilt and then the onus falls on the State again to prove that there was, in fact, such an intention. But that this is a requirement of the offence, is as clear as a pikestaff. I do not think I need go into this matter any further. This is simply a repetition of all the arguments we have had up to now.

With respect to the hon. the Deputy Minister, I cannot follow his argument at all.

Order! The hon. member was not in the House when the Committee discussed this.

With respect, I have been listening to most of the argument. I admit that I have been called out on occasions, but I have been here for most of the argument. The Deputy Minister is dealing now with the question of mens rea and earlier, when he was talking, he read from this clause. He read the English copy, and he repeatedly read in line 36 “in a manner”. I think this is the crux of the difficulty which the Deputy Minister sees in our argument. I will admit that when this is read in the manner in which the Deputy Minister read it, as being “in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the State”, a degree of mens rea is required. But I want to put it to the Deputy Minister that there are in fact four offences created in this section. This reads that any person who has a document and who publishes it “in any manner”, alternatively any person who has a document and who “directly or indirectly communicates” it “in any manner”, and any person who has a document and who publishes it “for any purpose prejudicial to the safety of the State” …

Order! That point has repeatedly been made.

On a point of order, the hon. member is making the point that there are four different charges here.

All the points have been made.

And the fourth one is that any person who has a document and who “directly or indirectly communicates” it “for any purpose” prejudicial to the State. Sir, in the four instances I have given I submit that charges 2 and 4 require a degree of mens rea, but that charges 1 and 3 definitely do not, or that in certain circumstances they need not, and that the interpretation of the courts when they look at “who publishes in any manner”, does away with the requirement of mens rea because “in any manner” can be accidental or unwitting, and then there is no mens rea. Then it may be negligence, but that is a different thing altogether. Negligence is not the same as mens rea. I cannot understand the reasoning of the Minister and I ask him to reconsider, particularly from the point of view of reading that clause “in any manner”, not “in a manner”. I want to agree with him that if it reads “in a manner” it denotes a degree of mens rea, or requires a degree of mens rea, but not “in any manner”.

While we are on this point, I wonder whether the Deputy Minister could clarify one point which has been worrying me from the start, and which I expected him to clarify during the debate. What is the intention of the phrase “indirectly communicates”? How does he anticipate that anyone “indirectly communicates”? This is just beyond me.

It was in the old Act. If you do not understand that Act, I am not here to teach you.

Having received the usual courteous reply from the Deputy Minister, I am prepared to sit down now in order to hear what he has to say on the other points.

Question put: That the words “dealt with by or” in line 50, stand part of the clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—90: Botha, H. J.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, S. P.; Carr, D. M.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, P. R.; Delport, W. H.; De Wet, C.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, A. H.; Du Toit. J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling. J. C.; Grobler. M. S. P.; Havemann, W. W. B.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heystek, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Koornhof. P. G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Langley. T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux. F. J.; Le Roux, J. P. C.; Lewis. H. M.; Loots, J. J.; Malan. G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais. P. S.; Marais, W. T.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan. R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison. G. de V.; Mulder. C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pienaar. B.; Pieterse. R. J. J.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, M. J.; Raubenheimer. A. J.; Raubenheimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch. J. A.; Smit, H. H.; Smith, J. D.; Stofberg. L. F.; Swiegers, J. G.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Van Breda, A.; Van der Merwe. C. V.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Merwe. W. L.; Van Rensburg. M. C. G. J.; Van Tonder. J. A.; Van Vuuren. P. Z. J.; Van Zyl. J. J. B.; Venter. M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Viljoen, M.; Viljoen. P. J. van B.; Visse. J. H.; Volker. V. A.; Vorster. L. P. J.; Vosloo. A. H.; Waring, F. W. Wentzel, J. J.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Noes—35: Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Eden, G. S.; Emdin, S.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie. R. G. L.; Jacobs, G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lindsay, J. E.; Malan, E. G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Taylor, C. D.; Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

Question affirmed and amendments proposed by Mr. R. G. L. Hourquebie and Mr. T. G. Hughes dropped.

Clause, as printed, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—89: Botha, H. J.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, S. P.; Carr, D. M.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, P. R.; Delport, W. H.; De Wet, C.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, A. H.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Havemann, W. W. B.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heystek, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J.; Le Roux, J. P. C.; Lewis, H. M.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Marais, W. T.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pienaar, B.; Pieterse, R. J. J.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, M. J.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Raubenheimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J., P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Smit, H. H.; Smith, J. D.; Stofberg, L. F.; Swiegers, J. G.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Van Breda. A.; Van der Merwe. C. V.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Viljoen, M.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Visse, J. H.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, L. P. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Noes—35: Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Eden, G. S.; Emdin. S.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Jacobs. G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lindsay, J. E.; Malan, E. G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Taylor, C. D.; Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

Clause, as printed, accordingly agreed to.

Clause 16:

Mr. Chairman, I want to raise certain matters with the hon. the Minister upon which I hope he will elaborate. They refer to the new paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (5) of section 73 of the Prisons Act, 1959. I do know that the hon. the Minister in introducing this measure did make some general reference to this particular clause. But the reference he made certainly does not justify the wide form in which this clause has apparently been drafted. Paragraph (a) of the new subsection (5) reads as follows:

The first question I want to ask the hon. the Minister in that regard is whether there is any intention of establishing some place of detention in the Caprivi Strip. One might imagine a sort of summer Siberia being established for the detention of certain types of prisoners. I think it is important that we should hear from the hon. the Minister whether it is the intention to utilize any portion of the South-West African Territory or the Caprivi Strip for the detention of prisoners who are at present being detained in South Africa.

Lionel, you should be ashamed of yourself.

It is all very well for the hon. member to say that I should be ashamed of myself, but I am talking on the legislation which is before us. If the hon. the Minister wants to provide legislation for the purposes he indicated at the Second Reading, this clause should not be worded in this way. The clause should then simply be worded so that a prisoner who is serving sentence in the Republic and is required to stand trial in South-West Africa, can be removed to South-West Africa for the purposes of that trial and the period he spends in South-West Africa shall be deemed to be part of his serving of his sentence. That is not what this clause says. The clause says that any person detained in South Africa can be removed and detained for the rest of his detention period in South-West Africa. I ask this because the hon. the Minister’s explanation is not in accordance with the words of the Bill before us. I hope he will clarify the position and give an assurance that this clause is only to be used for the purposes he outlined in his Second Reading speech.

I now refer to a second matter. We should like to get clarity in regard to this matter. In paragraph (b) it is provided that a convicted prisoner who is so removed to South-West Africa or to the Caprivi Strip “… shall be treated and be subject to the same laws and regulations in every respect as if he were undergoing the sentence of a competent court of the said Territory”. There again I think it is necessary that we should place on record the hon. Minister’s view in this regard. The laws and regulations referred to here which are applicable in South-West and those which are applicable to a South African convicted prisoner are identical, as far as I know. I believe that is the position. I should like the hon. the Minister to clarify whether it is so that the laws and regulations applicable to detained prisoners in South-West Africa are identical to the laws and regulations which are applicable within the Republic.

Mr. Chairman, I may declare in the most outspoken terms that it is not the intention at all to create a “Siberia” in any part of South-West Africa or in the Caprivi Zipfel. This new subsection is merely being inserted in the Act in order to make a concession to prisoners. As the Act reads at present, a person who has been convicted in South-West Africa and who must serve his sentence of imprisonment there, can be removed to South Africa. If he is awaiting trial, the period during which he is awaiting trial will count as part of the sentence he is serving. However, there is no similar provision as regards a prisoner who was convicted here and has to stand trial in South-West. The position at present is that if he is taken to South-West Africa, the period during which he is awaiting trial does not come off his sentence. This amendment to the Act is therefore being effected in order to make a concession to the prisoners concerned. The period during which such a prisoner is awaiting trial in South-West Africa will now be included in the serving of his sentence that was imposed upon him in the Republic.

In connection with the second matter he raised, I may just tell the hon. member that the regulations are the same. No differentiation is made.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 18:

Mr. Chairman, this clause is to amend section 63 of the Children’s Act, 1960, which deals with the question of contribution orders. I am referring to Chapter VI of the Children’s Act. This is an aspect which causes a great deal of concern when it comes to the carrying into effect of such contribution orders. If one looks at section 63 one sees that there are three subsections dealing with the effect of such contribution orders. Subsection (3), which is to be deleted, reads as follows:

If one refers to that Act one notices that it deals with the steps which can be taken where there is a failure to comply with the maintenance order made by the court. The Minister now proposes to delete section 63 (3) of the Children’s Act of 1960. I would be grateful if the hon. the Minister could give us an indication of the reasons why this subsection has to be deleted and whether he is satisfied that the position can be met in carrying into effect the contribution order where the person is not carrying out the contribution order which has been ordered against him in terms of a court order.

Mr. Chairman, the position is very clear. Section 63 (3) of the Children’s Act of 1960 provides that a contribution order may be made in terms of that section, and shall be deemed to be an order referred to in section 110 of the General Law Amendment Act, 1935. In terms of section 110 it was an offence to fail to comply with an order made by the Supreme Court. But then the Maintenance Act, Act. No. 23 of 1963, was passed. This Act repealed section 110. The Maintenance Act of 1963 now regulates that matter itself, and therefore makes section 63 (3) of the Children’s Act redundant. That is why it is proposed that it be deleted.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 19:

Mr. Chairman, this clause which deals with the delegation of powers is a clause which will replace section 91 of the Children’s Act, which is a far more restricted section than the clause which is now proposed in terms of the Bill before us. The power to delegate further powers is now being extended, particularly where it refers to “the Minister may delegate to the Secretary or to any other senior officer” certain powers, save the power to make regulations. Section 91 (2) deals also with these powers. If one refers to the principal Act, the delegation of powers is not as wide as is proposed in this Bill. I would therefore be grateful if the hon. the Deputy Minister could give an indication why it is now deemed necessary to extend the scope of the delegation of powers in terms of the clause that is now before the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, section 91 of the Children’s Act has now empowered the Minister to delegate certain powers. This is in fact possible, but there is doubt as to whether he can delegate it to an officer of another department. There are other departments which also deal with matters in connection with other races. Take the case of the Chinese. They fall under the Department of the Interior. In order to be able to exercise these powers, as embodied in the Children’s Act, it is necessary for the Minister, for example, to be able to delegate the powers in respect of those Chinese to the officers of the Department of the Interior.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. the Deputy Minister for the explanation which he gave. But really, I am wondering whether this is altogether a wise step which the hon. the Minister is now taking. Here we have the Children’s Act which is administered by the officials of a particular department. I am sure that this committee is entitled to assume that those officials are fully au fait with that particular Act and with the administration of it. Now the hon. the Deputy Minister is empowering the Minister concerned to delegate the powers and the functions under that Act to officials of another department. This is the import of the matter. These officials may not be fully an fait with the administration of the Children’s Act. Really, is this now a desirable principle to introduce into our legislation that, where you have a department and officials who are geared and fully conversant with the administration of a particular measure, the Minister in charge should be allowed to delegate the powers, administration and the authority conferred upon him and those officials so qualified, to officials of another department who are not so qualified, or who may not be quite so qualified and who may not be able to administer it in the manner in which it was intended? I am wondering about the wisdom of this. I should like to hear from the hon. the Deputy Minister what his views are on this point.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think we will need to dwell on this a long time. The hon. the Minister will not delegate his powers to officers who do not know what their functions in that connection will be. I do not know why the hon. member raised this. It is necessary for these powers to be delegated to other departments as well, such as the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions. It would be necessary for the hon. the Minister to delegate those powers to those Departments as well. I do not know how the hon. member can speak of the incompetence of the officers. Must the hon. the Minister, before delegating powers to them, have each officer write an examination in order to determine whether he is conversant with the powers being delegated to him? I think this is unheard of.

Mr. Chairman, the Deputy Minister started off by implying that he had completely missed the point I made. However, towards the end of his little speech, he showed that he had fully appreciated the point I had made. Sir, he has begged the question. It is not a matter of going to test officials at all. Here we have an Act which is administered by the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions. It is administered for the protection of children, those people who need protection. These officials are specially geared to that. Now the Deputy Minister wants to hand this matter over to officials of the Department of the Interior, who really have no interest in those children, and who really have no interest in the administration of this Act. He wants to hand over to them the power to administer that Act as far as the Chinese are concerned. Of course, the same thing is going to apply in the case of other population groups such as the Indians and the Bantu. Actually, I should leave the Bantu out here, because they have their own Act. However, this will apply to other people as well. I cannot accept that this is a good principle. The hon. the Deputy Minister has not convinced me yet that this is a good principle and that it is a principle which we should accept.

Mr. Chairman, to convice that hon. member is almost impossible, because he is so talkative precisely because he wants to be convinced of being able to be even more talkative. This is in fact what it boils down to. We know him like this. Surely he knows that the Children’s Act applies to all the races of South Africa. The Children’s Act applies to the Bantu, the Indians, the Coloured people, the Whites, therefore to all the various races. For example, the Children’s Act is administered in respect of the Bantu by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. But it is necessary for him to delegate certain powers. If he does not have a Bantu Affairs Commissioner at a certain place, he must delegate the powers to the magistrate of the district concerned. These amendments will also rectify such cases. In this way I could give examples in respect of all the other race groups. I do not know, therefore, why the hon. member is making such an issue of it. It is to be able to administer the Children’s Act more effectively that we want to delegate these powers to the people concerned who deal with them.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 20:

Mr. Chairman, this is the clause which amends that section of the Constitution Act which deals with offices of profit under the Crown, or under the Sash, or whatever it is called these days. Section 55 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be capable of being elected or nominated or of sitting as a member of the Senate or the House of Assembly if he holds any office of profit under the Republic. However, there is a proviso which states that certain persons shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit. In terms of section 55 (d) (vi), “a member of any council, committee, board or similar body established by or under any law who receives no payment in respect of his services on such council, committee, board or body in excess of an allowance at a rate not exceeding R11 for each day on which he renders such services, together with the reimbursement of any travelling expenses incurred by him in the course of such services”, is for example not deemed to hold an office of profit. It is now proposed to extend this proviso even further. Such a person may now also receive “an allowance in respect of entertaining by him in connection with such services”.

Order! I should like to have clarity. What did the hon. member say in regard to offices of profit under the Crown?

I used the word “Crown” by mistake.

And then what did the hon. member say?

Then I said “or under the Sash”.

What did the hon. member mean by “under the Sash”? The hon. member must withdraw those words because they are a reflection on the State President.

No, Sir, I am not reflecting on the State President.

The hon. member referred to an office of profit under the State President. That is what it is.

No, it is not. It is an office of profit under the Republic. That is not the State President, Sir.

The hon. member must withdraw the words “under the Sash”.

All right, if you say so, Sir. I withdraw those words. Clause 20 provides that one may now receive an allowance in respect of entertaining in connection with such services. This is most odd. What sort of bodies are these where one can also receive an entertainment allowance? It is very difficult to understand what is meant here. Another point I should like to make is that there is no qualification as to the size of the entertainment allowance one may receive.

That is for them to decide.

It is no good saying that it is for them to decide. We provide here that one may be reimbursed for travelling expenses. Such expenses can be determined. There is also a sustenance allowance which does not exceed R11 per day. This is necessary when one defines an office of profit. It is specifically provided that the sustenance allowance shall be limited to R11 per day. There is, however, no limit to the entertainment allowance such a person may receive.

That all depends on how big the cocktail party is. [Interjections.]

Yes, that is apparently what it is for.

Does it also depend on who is invited?

We should like to know what the position is. Such a person may, for instance, be given an entertainment allowance of R1,500 per year in anticipation of such entertainment, but the person concerned might not use his allowance. Surely, if he does not give such cocktail parties, it will defeat the whole object of providing that members of Parliament may serve on these bodies provided that they only receive a reasonable amount for sustenance and travelling expenses. Will the hon. the Deputy Minister explain to us what sort of bodies are involved here and why this provision has been included and also why there is no limit to the entertainment allowance?

Mr. Chairman, it happens that certain members of Parliament are also members of certain statutory boards, for example, the Wool Board, the Mealie Board or the Tobacco Board. When they are members of such boards, it is provided that they may receive their sustenance allowance without such an allowance, as remuneration from the State, affecting their membership of Parliament. I think there are two members of Parliament who are chairmen of such boards at the moment. On occasion, in their capacity as chairmen, they have had to do entertaining on behalf of those boards. Take, for example, the case of the hon. member for Ladybrand, of which I have personal knowledge. He visited America in connection with Mealie Board matters. He also visited Japan. It was necessary for him to entertain certain officials of those states. He had to pay for such entertainment out of his own pocket, because if he did not do so, he might have offended against this in that he received remuneration from the State, which might have disqualified him. Surely the size of the entertainment allowance is a matter for the board concerned. As hon. members know, the Controller and Auditor-General audits the accounts of these boards, and their statements are also scrutinized by the Select Committee on Public Accounts. Therefore hon. members need not have any fear that the amounts of these entertainment allowances will be excessive. Therefore the sole object of this amendment is to remove any doubt in this regard.

Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with clause 20 (2), which provides that the provisions of the new subparagraph (vi), which we have just been discussing, shall apply also in relation to the receipt of an entertainment allowance at any time prior to the commencement of this section. In other words it appears …

Order! There is no amendment in subsection (2). Therefore it cannot be discussed. [Interjections.]

On a point of order, Sir, this is a completely new subsection. It is a completely new provision.

May I continue, Sir?

Yes, it is part of a new clause.

Mr. Chairman, may I read clause 20 (2) to you. That part of the clause from line 36 is entirely new and reads as follows—

I do not want him to mention names, but the hon. the Minister did indicate that it appears that these allowances must have been paid and that for this reason we are now asked to enact that this provision shall have retrospective effect. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he is quite satisfied that if there are hon. members who are concerned on account of the fact that they receive these allowances, this provision does effectively put right what may have been a difficulty in the intervening period. One can quite understand without having the wrong motivation at all that an hon. member who is the chairman of one of these boards may have received an entertainment allowance. If this Bill is passed, it will put the position right. I should like to know whether the hon. the Minister is satisfied that the Bill will in fact put right any transgressions which took place in the intervening period?

Mr. Chairman, what the hon. member said is true. According to the information I have from the law advisers, this clause will cover them completely. The sole reason for introducing this amendment is to remove completely any doubt which existed before. This does not mean that this could not have happened in the past. We have now added this provision so as to make this retrospective. The law advisers assure me that this provision, as it is worded at present, is completely effective.

Mr. Chairman, would the hon. the Deputy Minister just explain something. He mentioned the case of the chairman of the Mealie Board. Surely, if there is any entertainment to be done by the chairman of the Mealie Board in his capacity as such, the Mealie Board pays for it. They do not have to give him an allowance to do it do they? The hon. the Deputy Minister gave the example of a cocktail party. Surely, the Mealie Board would merely pay for that cocktail party?

Mr. Chairman, I have just explained the case of such a person being abroad on his own while he is undertaking a trip in the interests of the Mealie Board. Suppose he has to entertain people abroad. It is obvious that the Mealie Board does not do the entertaining. He does the entertaining because he is the one who is undertaking the trip. He personally, as chairman of the Mealie Board, does the entertaining as he represents the Mealie Board. They give him an allowance for that purpose. That is what this clause covers. The distinction which the hon. member wants to draw between the Board and the chairman of the Board is somewhat academic. He says it should not be made specifically to the chairman of the Board but always to the Mealie Board itself.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that the chairman has certain duties and that he has to go around the country and entertain people in his capacity as chairman of the board. Surely however, as my hon. friend said, that is reimbursable expenditure. He entertains on behalf of the board and when he presents his chits they pay him out, or whatever method they follow. This is precisely what he can do and it is not necessary for him to have an entertainment allowance if this is reimbursable expenditure. Surely, that is correct because otherwise there is no limit to the entertainment allowance one can receive. That would circumvent the provisions of this clause which lays down that members of Parliament should not have offices of profit which can be obtained at the behest of the State. This is the whole point of the clause. One understands that they should have an allowance for their normal expenditure, which is defined as being R11 a day plus their travelling expenses, but now they are to receive an unlimited amount by way of an entertainment allowance. One must appreciate that the object of this provision is to make members of Parliament independent of the State in all its various ramifications. It is perhaps a little historical, but this provision was nevertheless in the law of Great Britain from which this provision was taken. It also ensured that the Crown did not buy the members in those days. That was the object of the provision because it was an office of profit under the Crown which controlled the whole matter. That is a very good principle. This is going to destroy that principle, if it is entirely without any limit. I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister sees my point. He gave the example of the chairman of the Mealie Board who can claim from the Mealie Board for whatever his expenses were. In terms of this clause he can claim an unlimited amount and he need not entertain. Is that not an office of profit under the State?

I do not think so.

It is. Let us then take some other example. Let us take some other body because there are lots of examples. There is, for instance, the Rent Board and the Diamond Board. There are so many boards that one can cite, the Banana Board, the Mealie Board, the Chicory Board, the Peanut Board, the Wool Board, the Bantu Affairs Commission, etc. The provisions of the Act could be circumvented by this measure. I should therefore like the hon. the Deputy Minister to give us a better explanation.

Mr. Chairman, in order to make this clear, I move the following amendment—

As the clause now reads there is no limit to the allowance which can be paid for entertainment. There is also no condition laid down that that allowance must be spent on entertainment. A person may be granted an allowance of R3,000 or R4,000 a year which is called an entertainment allowance but it has no limit as far as an amount is concerned or a condition to the effect that it must be spent on entertainment. If this is made a reimbursive allowance, then the provision will state clearly that he will only be getting back what in fact he spent in the interests of his job. In other words, when one of these people spends money on entertainment in the pursuance of the duties of his post, the amount concerned can be reimbursed to him. He cannot, however, be paid a flat allowance without a limit as far as an amount is concerned or a condition as to whether it need be spent at all. I therefore suggest that this be made a reimbursive allowance.

Mr. Chairman, I want to point out at once that I am quite unable to accept this amendment, as it goes completely beyond the amendment which is now being proposed. I must point out to hon. members that such a person receives an allowance of R11 per day in the form of a sustenance allowance. This is not reimbursable. He receives this allowance while he is absent. It is a remuneration which he receives on a daily basis.

But it is limited to R11 per day.

Yes, it is limited to R11 per day. In terms of the amendment proposed by the hon. member, I now have to make provision for the person to pay this himself and for him to be reimbursed at a later stage. That proposal goes completely beyond the provisions of this amendment. In point of fact, hon. members are being somewhat petty now as they want to limit the provision which will have the effect that only the rich will be able to afford being a member of these boards. Take the case of expenditure on entertainment. If this is to be reimbursable then that person will first have to pay the amount out of his own pocket. He does not know what that amount is going to be. He will possibly have to pay R200 or R300 or R400 or R500 out of his own pocket, depending on the entertaining he does, and he simply cannot afford to do so. Consequently he will not be able to do any entertaining, but if he receives that allowance he will be able to do so. Do hon. members opposite want only the rich to serve on these boards, as the hon. member for Durban (North) argued by implication? Surely that is not what they want. Surely these people can be trusted. All of them are distinguished people. I do not believe they will regard these allowances as remuneration; they will spend the allowance for the purpose for which the allowance is paid to them. I think one should at least accept the integrity of these people.

And they are subject to the Auditor-General.

They are subject to the Auditor-General as well as to questioning by the Select Committee on Public Accounts of this House.

I am glad to see that the hon. the Deputy Minister is suddenly becoming more socialist-minded in putting up an appeal that not so many people should be allowed to serve on these boards. One does not normally hear these sentiments put forward by him. I think the real objection here is that the allowance has no limit. I think it is a correct objection; I think it is something of which the hon. the Deputy Minister ought to take cognizance. There should be some limitation not only in the law itself but also in the mind of the person who is going to receive this allowance.

It is voted by the boards in their estimates.

But nobody knows how much of the amount provided for in the estimates is going to go to him personally. There might be three members of the board who fancy that they can have most of it because they consider their position to be more important than that of the chairman or the members of other boards. I think psychologically at least, it should be instilled in the minds of these gentlemen or ladies—I do not know whether there are any ladies serving on boards —that they are not expected to go in for a round of extravagance at the State’s expense, or at the taxpayer’s expense in fact; that they are not expected to throw champagne and caviar parties in order to advance the interests of the Mealie Board or the Chicory Board or even the Diamond Board. In order to have what I hope will at least be a psychological block on the people concerned, I move this further amendment—

In other words, what I want is a reasonable allowance. [Interjection.] What worries me about this is that it is retrospective. I want to know for how long it is going to be retrospective? For how long does it go back? Is there a prescribed limit in law?

1961.

That is seven or eight years; that is a long time. I can imagine all sorts of people who have been trotting around overseas and inside the Republic on behalf of these innumerable boards that we have in South Africa, suddenly saying to themselves: “My goodness, look what this kind Parliament has done; it has allowed me to claim in retrospect an allowance for all the money that I spent on entertainment.” I can see everybody sitting down with computers and compiling tremendous lists which are going to be submitted to the Treasury for reimbursement, and therefore I think that this is a very dangerous thing indeed. I think the least the hon. the Deputy Minister should do is to see to it that when all these astronomical figures are being calculated, a few noughts are knocked off by the insertion of the words which I now propose.

Sir, the reply of the hon. the Deputy Minister surprises me.

Are you going to discuss the Wool Board?

Here the hon. the Deputy Minister wants to give a blank cheque to the officials, chairmen and members of boards by paying them a sustenance allowance in respect of which there will be no accountability on their part. The amendment of the hon. member for Durban (Point) seeks to make expenditure on entertainment reimbursive. The reason advanced by the Deputy Minister, i.e. that the person cannot afford to pay expenditure on entertainment out of his own pocket and to claim a refund at a later stage, is senseless. All the boards have fidelity insurance policies, and they may insure for any amount they wish to insure, R1,000 or R5,000. Now the Deputy Minister asks why a member or the chairman of a board has to pay entertainment expenses out of his own pocket. When the chairman or a member or an official of a board undertakes an overseas trip, the board allows him an amount for entertainment, and on his return, he has to give an account of how he has spent that money. This is the usual method and the only method one can apply. One cannot simply allow a man to spend money and to say afterwards that he has spent that money on entertainment. The hon. member for Houghton moved the insertion of the word “reasonable” but what is a reasonable amount? In one case R500 may be reasonable and in another case R5,000. We know that we have had cases in this House where in our opinion an unreasonable amount has been spent on entertainment. It is the easiest thing in the world to verify entertainment expenses. Any person who wants to be reimbursed for entertainment expenses has to keep a proper account of his expenses. The person concerned may reclaim this amount, or a certain amount may be made available to him before he undertakes his trip. When a person is allowed a certain amount for entertainment, the amount he spends is not subject to auditing. Up to now the hon. the Deputy Minister has not advanced a single convincing argument why he is unable to accept the amendment, and I want to make a serious appeal to him to accept the amendment, because in this provision he is leaving a loophole and he is casting suspicion on innocent people.

The hon. member for East London (City) is, of course, a man who knows a great deal about entertainment allowances on account of his experience as chairman of the Wool Board! I just want to point out that if hon. members who spoke on this matter, had consulted the reports of the Auditor-General on control boards, reports which have been tabled here, they would have discovered that virtually all these control boards made provision for entertainment allowances for their chairmen, not colossal amounts, but nominal amounts, and that it was the general practice of all these control boards to grant their chairmen an allowance for covering unforeseen entertainment expenses and that amounts granted to them for such purposes were mentioned by the Auditor-General in his reports on these control boards. The Select Committee on Public Accounts is in a position to go into the matter and to express serious criticism, if necessary. Therefore this is not unlimited; it is under the supervision of the Select Committee on Public Accounts and the board concerned has to vote this amount in its estimates. Now it is being said here that this should be a reimbursive allowance. Sir, I want to put the following question to hon. members in all fairness. If the chairman of a board meets a number of producers at a certain place to explain certain things to them and he invites them to enjoy a drink with him, should he subsequently run after the barman and ask him to give him a certified receipt for the amount spent by him on cool drinks for those people? Surely it is infra dig to expect of these people to hand in “chits”, as they have been called, in support of a reimbursive allowance. To vote an entertainment allowance for their chairmen is a general practice. Throughout the years this has been the practice followed by all the boards. It has not been found illegal. There has merely been doubt whether specific provision should not be made for that, and this provision is intended to remove any such doubt.

I wish to defend the hon. the Deputy Minister against the attack made on him by the hon. member for Odendaalsrus. The hon. member for Odendaalsrus says it is infra dig, beneath the dignity, of a person to have to apply to be reimbursed. But when I look at page 186 of the Estimates before us, I find under the Justice Vote an item for Deputy Minister, and under this there is a scale of salary and then there are allowances amounting to R3,740, with a footnote indicating that R2,000 is reimbursive and that R1,740 is a tax-free allowance in lieu of an official residence. In other words, the Prime Minister apparently does not trust the hon. the Deputy Minister, because when he gives him an allowance he makes it reimbursive. He places a limit on it, firstly, and then he makes it reimbursive. The hon. member for Odendaalsrus says that is infra dig. I want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister whether he thinks it is infra dig to be paid a R2,000 reimbursive allowance? Is it below his dignity? Does he feel, every time he has to claim this back, that this is some terrible burden placed upon him and that this is really lowering his dignity, or will he get up and repudiate the hon. member for Odendaalsrus and say that he does not regard it as infra dig?

I want to go further and say that if the hon. the Prime Minister does not trust his own Ministers and Deputy Ministers, and makes them account for their allowances, being reimbursive, does he then mean to say that the members of the hundreds of boards in South Africa are then more trustworthy than a Cabinet Minister or a Deputy Minister? Are Ministers and Deputy Ministers then to be trusted less than a member of the Rooibos Tea Board or the Banana Board or the Chicory Board, or any other board? Are those members who are appointed to these hundreds of boards all more honourable men than the Deputy Minister, whom, I take to be an honourable man who can be trusted and who does not regard it as infra dig to claim his allowance of R2,000? The hon. the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs is looking so smug, but he has an allowance of R3,000, and the footnote to it says that it is reimbursive. It is not only the Deputy Minister; it is also the Ministers themselves. That argument is utter nonsense, and to say that a member of a board cannot afford first to pay and then to claim shows a complete lack of knowledge. Does the Minister never get an account sent to him for an entertainment? Does he have to count out R1 notes when he has a party? When he entertains people, does he pull out his bundle of R1 notes to pay for it and then reclaim? Of course he does not. Is there no such thing as an imprest account from which a person who has such an allowance can draw? There are half a dozen ways in which any businessman could run an allowance of this sort, but no businessman would make it an unlimited allowance with no ceiling. And despite what the hon. member for Odendaalsrus said about control by the Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee, in practice, of course, the question of an entertainment allowance for these hundreds of boards is not going to be studied by Parliament. It is not going to come before us. This proposal as it is, is going to make any board free, at its own whim, to give any of its members any allowance it likes.

The other point which the Deputy Minister made was that my proposal means that the R11 per day which was allowed would also have to be reimbursed. That is also incorrect. My amendment refers solely to the new amendment, which is an addition, stating “and an allowance in respect of entertaining”. My amendment substitutes “and a reimbursive allowance”. In other words, it does not affect the R11, and the Minister was completely wrong when he said that. This is absolutely reasonable. We are asking for no more than the limitations placed upon the Deputy Minister himself, and if he refuses this amendment we must seek some other reason than those he has given here, because the reasons given here are not valid reasons; and the only other reason I can think of is that the hon. the Minister is too proud to admit that we have come with a good suggestion. Because I do not believe that he wanted to cast any reflection to the members of the board, and neither do we. All we want is to regularize the situation, and if the Minister refuses the amendment it can only be because of his obstinacy.

I hope the hon. the Minister does refuse the amendment of the hon. member for Durban (Point), because I think that is as unlimited as in fact the existing clause in the Bill is. To allow anyone just to come along and reclaim what he spent, without placing any limit at all on what he spends, is a very dangerous thing indeed. I hope the Minister does not accept that amendment and rather accepts my amendment. It is reasonable. Why I differ from the hon. member for Durban (Point) is because I have a feminine imagination and what I see is a member of the Banana Board, shall we say, going overseas to Paris, to sell our bananas, and he just goes mad. I mean, he is suddenly swept up in a round of entertainment and gaiety and he spends thousands and thousands of francs, and then he comes back. The point is that he is out of the usual verkrampte environment in South Africa and he suddenly finds himself indulging in a Continental splurge, and this can be very expensive to the taxpayer. Under this clause he can reclaim for expenses. It does not even say that it must be reasonable expenses. [Interjections.]

I do not know how many Members of Parliament are chairmen of boards, but I should think there are quite a number of them, and I do not know that these hon. members, when they get out of the House, have the same sort of sober and circumspect attitude outside the House that they display inside the House, and I am worried. Sir, I am a housewife and I have to budget and it is just as well to know how much one is allowed to spend. [Interjections.] Yes, I have to budget, and sometimes I am even in the red! I think it is very bad to give all these members of boards free for all at the expense of the taxpayers, and I do not like the suggestion of the hon. member for Durban (Point) one bit because of this. I also see a sort of competitive spirit springing up between, say, the chairman of the Banana Board and the chairman of the Chicory Board. The one goes overseas and learns when he gets there that his colleague has had an enormous party at the Ritz and he reckons it is infra dig for the Chicory Board if it does not do the same sort of thing, so he has a party at the Savoy, and these parties come out very expensive indeed. I think we should be very careful and very wary indeed of the suggestion of the hon. member for Durban (Point). Instead, the Minister should accept the amendment I have moved.

Business suspended at 12.45 p.m. and resumed at 2.20 p.m.

Afternoon Sitting

Mr. Chairman …

Order! The hon. member has already spoken three times on this clause.

If I may point out, Mr. Chairman, one of the cases was a question to the hon. the Deputy Minister.

Order! I have given my ruling. The hon. member has spoken three times on this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Deputy Minister was about to reply to the remark made by the hon. member for Durban (Point) about allowances made to Deputy Minister, namely reimbursive allowances. We want to know from the hon. the Deputy Minister why he must receive reimbursive allowances and yet the chairman or representatives of other bodies do not have to ask for reimbursive allowances. What is the hon. the Deputy Minister’s objection to having a reimbursive allowance for the members of the different boards, where Deputy Ministers themselves can get reimbursive allowances?

Mr. Chairman, for the same reason the hon. member for Houghton advanced as to why it was not acceptable to her, it is not acceptable to me either. I find myself in the extraordinary position of having had that hon. member defend me this morning, which, under the circumstances, astonishes me.

You should say thank you.

Unfortunately I cannot express my gratitude to the hon. member by accepting her amendment, because I find it equally impractical. What is unreasonable to one man, may be very reasonable to another, and this is not a good criterion. For this reason I cannot accept that hon. member’s amendment.

I do not want to elaborate on this matter any further. If hon. members opposite want to quarrel about this allowance which the chairmen of boards receive, I think they should take up the matter with the Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing. It is at their request that this clause is being inserted so that they may also receive an entertainment allowance. I am of the opinion that this is quite in order.

Then there is the question of reimbursable allowances. I do not know what the hon. member means by that. If by “reimbursable” the hon. member means only the money which they actually spend, he is actually making a mistake, because that is not the meaning of “reimbursable” which the hon. member quoted, i.e. in respect of allowances to Deputy Ministers. It actually means tax free, in other words, a lump sum which is tax free. In this case it is also a lump sum. I want to tell the hon. member at once that it is not the hon. the Prime Minister who is treating us like this, but that it is as a result of the Opposition that we are being treated like this.

May I ask the hon. the Deputy Minister a question? Does the hon. the Deputy Minister not have to prove what his disbursements were?

No. This reimbursable allowance is a lump sum and I do not have to prove that I spent that amount. That is not the intention at all. It only means that it is not taxable. The allowance which members receive is also a reimbursable allowance. It is also a fixed lump sum and members do not have to declare whether they spent it or not. Hon. members opposite know very well that it would be impractical for them to account for all their expenditure in connection with these allowances. For this reason I cannot accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I still find it difficult to agree with the remarks made here by the hon. the Deputy Minister. The hon. member for Odendaalsrus also claimed here that an entertainment allowance is being granted to the chairmen of virtually all the boards. I challenge the hon. member to show me where any of the chairmen of the 22 control boards is receiving more than R500 as an entertainment and representative’s allowance. This only relates to entertainment in South Africa. The intention of the amendment is that if a person must entertain on a large scale at any place, an allowance must be made available to him to meet those entertainment costs. In other words, if such a person goes to Europe and wants to entertain 25 or 50 businessmen, and the members of their families, and the costs amount to between R500 and R600, does the hon. the Deputy Minister want to claim that that person must not submit an invoice of the costs of that entertainment, as befits any businessman? Some of these persons have to go overseas as frequently as six times a year in order to represent their boards, or whatever. They must receive an entertainment allowance which would enable them to entertain on three or four occasions during each visit.

Do hon. members realize that this entertainment allowance can amount to thousands of rands? If such a person is not compensated for what he spends, he must pay for it out of his own pocket. If one wants to keep a complete record of this expenditure, one cannot do otherwise than to have these people declare that, for example, they gave a cocktail party at the Savoy Hotel or Claridges, and that a certain number of guests were present, and then have them submit the account for it. This is surely how the Controller and Auditor-General and this House ask that the taxpayers’ money be accounted for. However, the hon. the Deputy Minister says that a person need not furnish a statement of the expenditure, since the amount is untaxable. I would like to see methods, other than those which the hon. the Deputy Minister has designed, which are more conducive to abuse. The persons who do not want to abuse this eventually also fall under suspicion. The entertainment allowance of a person who must do a lot of travelling, and must travel abroad a great deal, does not amount to hundreds of rands, but probably thousands. Such a person comes under suspicion, whereas this should never happen. For his protection, for the protection of this House and for the services which the Controller and Auditor-General must furnish, it is better for that invoice to be submitted, no matter how this is paid, or with what funds the payment is made. I agree with the hon. the Deputy Minister that a man does not carry sufficient money in travellers’ cheques on his person so that he can simply, on any occasion, settle an account of, for example, up to R500. Even a small reception abroad easily costs this much. I would like to see the man who goes from here to America and entertains 70 people there. I wonder if the hon. the Deputy Minister knows what it would cost him?

May I ask the hon. member a question? When he was chairman of the Wool Board, did the hon. member for East London (City), each time he travelled abroad, submit all the invoices in respect of the entertaining he did there?

Most certainly. Even if I were in a position to have spent thousands of rands there, I was still always subject to the Controller and Auditor-General’s audit. This also applies to the present chairman of the Board, and, as far as I know, it ought to and does apply to the chairmen of all other boards. When they entertain on a large scale, and they must surely do so, it is not expected of them to cover the costs from an entertainment allowance of R500 per year. The hon. the Deputy Minister ought not to place chairmen and board members in the position in which they come under suspicion because they are not called upon to account for the funds which are made available to them.

Mr. Chairman, I raised this matter with the hon. the Deputy Minister with particular reference to the second portion of this clause, namely the retrospective effect of the provision which is now being introduced. I do not think the hon. the Deputy Minister has put the Committee in a position to be able to judge whether or not this retrospective provision should be adopted. He has not told us to what extent members, possibly of this House or of other councils, are involved in having allowances which are now being queried as to whether or not they should be allowances not regarded as profit in the service of the State. Perhaps the hon. the Deputy Minister can be more explicit as to why this retrospective provision is required.

I want to come back to the main aspect of this particular clause, namely that an allowance in respect of entertaining in connection with such services should not be regarded as payment in respect of an office of profit for the purposes of disqualification. I think the discussion which we have had has raised several important points. The first one is that the nomenclature of a “reimbursive allowance” is perhaps a little inaccurate, in so far as the allowances payable to the hon. the Deputy Minister and others are concerned. The hon. the Deputy Minister says this is reimbursive but the disbursement does not in fact have to exist.

It is a reimbursive bill.

It was referred to in the Budget as a reimbursive allowance. I assume that the hon. the Minister with his usual hospitality has expended all that money. I do not question that that is so. What we have asked in the amendments that have been proposed, is that when it comes to persons holding office on the various boards—and we know they are innumerable in number—the allowances should first of all be reasonable. This is the suggestion of the hon. member for Houghton. Secondly, the disbursement should be a reimbursive one. In other words, the profit aspect should be removed and no holder of a position on one of these boards should have a surplus at the end of a financial year in respect of the allowance that was paid for entertainment over the amount that was in fact expended. The hon. the Deputy Minister has shown a reluctance to accept the word “reasonable”. He has also shown a reluctance to accept the word “reimbursive” on its own. I want to suggest to him that it would be a wise thing to do to combine both of these and that the wording of this particular clause should not be “an allowance” but “a reasonable reimbursive allowance”. In other words, one has the two tests. The one is that the amount is reasonable and, secondly, that it is reimbursive. I therefore move the following amendment—

Mr. Chairman, I wish to support the amendment of the hon. member for Green Point, and I wish to appeal to hon. members on the other side of the House who are members of the Select Committee on Public Accounts. I refer to those colleagues of mine who are members of the Select Committee on Public Accounts. I appeal to them to support this amendment because they know from the deliberations that have taken place in this committee—and I must immediately admit that I am a new boy oh that committee but that I have seen one session through— the difficulties that are experienced in the auditing of accounts. They have seen the comments of the Controller and Auditor-General in this respect. I would suggest that it is only reasonable that where money is to be defrayed from public funds and where the Controller and Auditor-General is responsible for certifying that those funds have been properly spent and where the Select Committee has the opportunity to examine those accounts, as reported in the report of the Auditor-General, such an amendment should be inserted to make this allowance reimbursive, and reimbursive only on adequate proof of expenditure. I support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, an hon. member over there spoke about filibustering. I am only rising to ask for an explanation and some further information from the hon. the Deputy Minister. There is no reflection, of course, on the honour of any of these gentlemen or on that of the hon. the Deputy Minister. They are all as Mark Anthony said, “Honourable men”. I want to know more about the retrospective effect of these allowances. Does it mean that money that was expended in 1961 will now be refunded? Is that the meaning of this? If that is the meaning, then surely it should have happened from year to year and should have been approved or reported upon by the Controller and Auditor-General? If this means for the future only, i.e. from the date this Bill becomes law, I can understand it. If it means only that the debt is being charged to 1969 and that we are not concerned with any money that had been spent from 1961 to 1969, then that narrows the application and I can then support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am just getting up out of courtesy towards the hon. member who has just spoken. I think other hon. members are repeating themselves and prolonging this debate unnecessarily. In connection with this aspect of retrospectivity there is a measure of uncertainty. Let us first clarify this. There is a measure of uncertainty about whether the boards are entitled to vote entertainment allowances for their chairmen. Over the years an amount has always been placed on their estimates and they therefore voted an amount for entertainment allowances for their chairmen. Now, there are a few members of Parliament who are chairmen of such boards. However, there is no objection in respect of all the other chairmen for whom this is being done. It so happens that this affects another provision which states that if a person is remunerated by the State he cannot serve as a member of Parliament. Now there is uncertainty about the amount which was voted over the years, and there is also uncertainty about the position of members of this House who have acted as chairmen and received allowances. For that reason it is being made retrospective, so that they can continue with their practice. This is all the clause means and nothing more. All this other talk about “reimbursive” and “reasonable”, etc., is quite unnecessary. I can assure you of this. The Auditor-General examines those accounts very thoroughly and reports on them are submitted to this House.

It is an indemnification for what has already been done.

It is only to place beyond any doubt what has already been done.

Mr. Chairman, after listening to the hon. member for Green Point, I should like with the permission of the House to withdraw my amendments in favour of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Green Point. I think his amendment is a suitable compromise which meets both the amendments by myself and by the hon. member for Houghton. My amendment therefore becomes unnecessary. I would therefore not like to follow it up but to come back to the hon. the Deputy Minister’s latest statement. I wish to draw his attention to the Payment of Members of Parliament Act as published in the Standing Orders of the House of Assembly, on page 299. Here specifically, by an Act of Parliament, provision is made for allowances. Those allowances specifically exclude Ministers and Deputy Ministers in regard to this provision. It deals only with members of the Assembly other than Ministers and Deputy Ministers. Ministers and Deputy Ministers are provided with allowances on the Estimates which appear every year before this House and from which I quoted earlier in this debate. In section 2 (3) of this Act specific provision is made in regard to the allowance of members of Parliament, not as being reimbursive, but in terms of a statute of this House which deems such allowances to have been received by the person concerned from employment in the Public Service. I quote subsection (3) of section 2. It reads:

In other words, not by implication or by interpretation, but by specific statute of this House the allowance received by a member of Parliament is deemed to be an allowance received from employment in the Public Service. Here we are debating a provision of the General Law Amendment Bill which specifically and directly aims at creating the exact opposite situation. Its aim is that a person appointed to a board may be paid an allowance which the hon. Deputy Minister has equated to the allowances of a member of Parliament but which is deemed to be not regarded as employment or remuneration in the public service. Every one of us is specifically regarded by law as receiving remuneration from the State. Membership of this House is in other words an office of profit under the State which is specifically excluded by Statute. Now the hon. the Deputy Minister tries to equate the two positions. They are not synonymous; they are not equal in any sense. Here Parliament in its wisdom has seen fit to deem us to be holding an office of profit. The hon. the Minister wants other persons in the hundreds of boards which this Government controls at its gift, as part of the perks of government …

Nonsense.

The hon. member says it is nonsense, but Ministers have said openly and clearly that they regard the appointment of members to various boards as being confined to members of the Nationalist Party. They have said so, and therefore I say it is a perk of office …

Who said so?

The hon. the Minister of Transport, and the hon. the Minister of Agriculture, and other hon. Ministers have said it. Therefore, I am justified in saying that appointment to these boards is one of the perks of government.

What nonsense!

Of course it is so.

Order! That has nothing to do with this clause.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I am dealing with what is an office of profit under the Republic. I am saying that these offices are at the gift of the Government and by admission of the Government are confined to Government supporters. I am not suggesting …

Order! This clause deals with what is not an office of profit under the State.

But I am suggesting that an unlimited allowance for entertainment makes it an office of profit. I am not trying to equate this with crayfish concessions, diamond concessions or any other privileges. This is a specific issue. I would not suggest that a crayfish concession should be an office of profit. It may be an offer of profit but not an office of profit. Therefore, when we look at this clause, we find that members of boards are being privileged above Members of Parliament. The very sound and reasonable rule which applies to Members of Parliament is being negated. When it comes to the granting of office to members of boards, to friends of the Government, who receive R11 per day, plus the payment of expenses and then in addition, as is now proposed, an unlimited expense account, it is not an office of profit.

That is cheap propaganda.

I am not talking nonsense. I ask the hon. members, who decides what entertainment allowance should be paid to the Chairman of the Chicory Board or the Banana Board, or any of the others? The boards decide.

They are responsible boards.

In other words, the members themselves decide what they shall be paid. According to the Government’s own policy, these are Nationalist Party supporters, and they determine what they shall pay themselves as an allowance. They do not determine what they shall pay themselves as members of the board. That is laid down by Statute. Sitting as a board, they are entitled to decide themselves what additional perks they shall give themselves. As a board they can decide that they are people who because of their status should entertain heavily. They themselves take this decision, nobody else does. They themselves can decide that they are sociable types and therefore they are going to have lots of entertainment.

Nonsense!

The hon. member says it is nonsense, but it is true. May I ask the hon. the Deputy Minister who else will determine what entertainment allowance is to be paid to members of these boards other than the board itself?

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause now.

I am dealing with this clause.

No, the hon. member is not. He is dealing with matters which are beside the point altogether.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, I am dealing with the proposed addition of the words, “and an allowance in respect of entertainment”. I am submitting that these words, while unqualified by the amendment moved by the hon. member for Green Point, enable a board to pay itself an unlimited allowance.

That affects only Members of Parliament.

No, Mr. Chairman, I am dealing with members of a board. I am suggesting …

This amendment covers only Members of Parliament who are members of a board. The others are not covered by this clause at all.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, they are, because their payments precludes them from becoming Members of Parliament or of the Provincial Council or of the Senate. Therefore whether they are members or not, this provision applies to every member on the board.

Order! The hon. member’s time has expired.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment proposed by Mr. W. V. Raw, with leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee is grateful to the hon. the Deputy Minister because I think he has shown us a mistake we have all been making, including the Government, in regard to the meaning of words. The Deputy Minister used the word “reimbursable”. Of course the hon. the Minister is right; the word should be “reimbursable”, because there is no such word in the Oxford Dictionary as the word “reimbursive” although it appears in our Estimates. I am also grateful that the hon. the Deputy Minister apparently attributed a meaning to a word which does not exist in the Oxford Dictionary. The meaning he attributed to the word is that if one is given a reimbursive allowance, one can receive the allowance without having to prove that one has spent that money. Sir, I wish these hon. Whips will talk somewhere else. The hon. Whip is standing in my way and I cannot see the hon. the Deputy Minister.

Mr. Chairman, in terms of Rule 132, are hon. members allowed to stand in the gangways and passages?

If I am speaking to an hon. member, he may stand there.

I submit that we should be allowed to see the hon. member we are addressing. I want to get back to the hon. the Deputy Minister. He said that the reimbursive allowance which appears in the Estimates meant that the allowance was paid irrespective of whether or not it is spent on entertainment. He said that that was quite all right. That is not what we intend giving these representatives on the board. I am glad the hon. the Deputy Minister has drawn our attention to it. We intend that it must be a reimbursable allowance, that is to say that these people must submit a list of their accounts …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, is the hon. member allowed to bring this House under a false impression in regard to certain rules in the Standing Orders? The hon. member for Durban (Point) referred to Rule 132 in the Standing Orders, which does not cover the point he raised at all.

That is not a point of order.

That is an insinuation that the Chairman does not know the rules. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member may continue.

I suggest that before doctors take part in this debate they should learn some law.

They should read the Rule Book too.

You are a sick lawyer.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, is an hon. member entitled to say about another hon. member that he is a sick lawyer?

I cannot help it. The hon. member may continue.

Mr. Chairman, while the Whip was talking with you just now the hon. the Deputy Minister went out and nobody missed him. Now he has come back and we can proceed. I want to come back to the word “reimbursable”. The hon. the Deputy Minister was quite right in saying that “reimbursive” meant that he did not have to submit returns. I can now follow why he was not prepared to accept our amendment, because in fact our amendment was meaningless. Our amendment was meaningless because they have received their allowances, and they did not have to produce any proof for what they had spent it on. [Interjections.] I can talk over the Whip’s head but not through his body.

The hon. member need not see the Minister when he talks. The Minister can hear the hon. member without seeing him.

It is of course much easier when you address a person to see the reaction while you are addressing him.

The hon. member must now come back to the clause. He is talking about everything except the clause.

We appreciate the hon. the Deputy Minister’s difficulty in accepting our amendment, because it would not have had the effect which we want. I therefore move the following amendment—

I do not think any member on the other side of the House can object to proof being required of the expenditure so that money which is spent on entertainment can be reimbursed.

Mr. Chairman …

Order! Did the hon. member not speak three times on this clause?

No. Sir. I am indebted to the hon. the Deputy Minister and the hon. member for Transkei for having put me onto the correct terminology so far as my amendment is concerned. I think we are agreed and I am sure the hon. members opposite are agreed that so far as this allowance is concerned, it should be a reimbursement of expenditure. It should not be an open allowance to the officials whether they be members or chairmen of councils, committees, boards or similar bodies. For that reason I feel that we have now reached the position where I am sure there is an agreement between both sides of the House, between the hon. the Deputy Minister and ourselves, because it does not mean and was never intended to mean that a member of this board should receive an allowance for entertainment which is not to be expended on entertainment. I am sure that that was never intended. The amendment which has now been moved states that it should be a reasonable reimbursable allowance, in other words, to reimburse what has reasonably been spent. I do not for one moment suggest that the flights of fancy of the hon. member for Houghton about Paris entertainments and the selling of bananas is quite what is contemplated. Now that we have reached an agreement of approach to this problem I would with the permission of the House, like to withdraw my amendment in favour of the amendment by the hon. member for Transkei.

Amendment proposed by Mr. L. G. Murray, with leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Chairman, I rise because amongst others I am surprised that the hon. the Deputy Minister has not indicated that he is prepared to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Transkei, now that the hon. member for Green Point has withdrawn his. Is the hon. the Deputy Minister then considering accepting the amendment of the hon. member for Transkei? If not, we on this side of the House must assume that the hon. the Deputy Minister has not been convinced. If that is so, perhaps the hon. the Deputy Minister will tell us after he has consulted with his officials exactly what he means by this amendment? Mr. Chairman, it is a little difficult to get through to the hon. the Deputy Minister. Having consulted with his officials, we now have an interruption from another Government Whip moving between the Chair and the Deputy Minister. Now that the Whip has moved away I am prepared to carry on.

I think it is time the Deputy Minister told us precisely what he has in mind with this new subparagraph (vi) which makes provision for an allowance in respect of entertainment The longer this is going on. the more suspicious it is becoming. If in fact the hon. the Deputy Minister intends this to reimburse officials for entertainment expenses which they reasonably incur, why is he not prepared to accept our amendment?

Read subsection (2).

The hon. the Deputy Minister answers by telling me to read subsection (2). I have read subsection (2). I do hot regard subsection (2) as an answer to our contention. If the Deputy Minister does, perhaps he will explain what is happening here.

I cannot help it if you are so dense.

For the benefit of the House, Sir, the hon. the Deputy Minister said that he cannot help me if I am dense. If he considers that this is a satisfactory explanation for the benefit of his members, who may be impressed by that sort of thing, it is his concern. However, I consider that I have put a reasonable point of view to him. He has told us that he intends this amendment to make provision for the reimbursement of officials who incur expenses in connection with reasonable entertainment they have to provide. If that is so, and the amendment is intended to be limited to that, why does the Deputy Minister not accept our amendment, which is to include the words “a reasonable reimbursable allowance”.

What is “reasonable”?

Sir, in answer to that hon. member, I should like to put this question: Does he want to make provision for an entertainment allowance which is not reasonable? [Interjections.] I want him to answer that question, Sir. If he wants to put questions to me …

Order! The hon. member must stop repeating arguments that have been used over and over again.

I am answering a question which was put to me by the hon. member for Turffontein.

Nevertheless, it remains repetition.

Sir, the second point I hope the Deputy Minister will deal with more satisfactorily … We now have somebody else talking to the hon. the Deputy Minister.

The hon. member must continue with his speech or resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I am talking to the hon. the Deputy Minister.

Do you mind? Go on with your speech!

Seniority is going to the Minister’s head. He is now the senior Minister in the House.

This is the Committee Stage of a Bill. We are entitled to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister to listen.

Yes, we do not want the court jester interfering as well.

Does the hon. the Deputy Minister intend listening?

He is listening with both ears.

Mr. Chairman, the other matter I want to raise, now that the court jester has taken his seat …

Order! The hon. member must withdraw that.

Sir, I withdraw that because that hon. Minister … [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member must withdraw that unconditionally and without any further remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my remarks. If the hon. the Deputy Minister will listen I should like to put a serious matter to him. His attention has been drawn to the fact that subsection (2) of this clause is retrospective to 1961. He has not given a satisfactory explanation to this House as to why that should be the case. Who are the people whose entertainment expenses are intended to be reimbursed retrospectively right back to 1961? That is the first thing this House is entitled to know. Who are the people concerned? The second thing this House is entitled to know before it should be expected to pass this subsection, is how much money is involved. What is the extent of the entertainment expenses which have been incurred retrospectively right back to 1961? This covers a period of eight years. Knowing how some of the Cabinet Ministers here can spend money when they are overseas, the amount of entertainment expenses incurred over a period of eight years by officials, who will now be covered by this amendment, could amount to a very large sum of money indeed. We have had no indication from the hon. the Deputy Minister as to how much money is involved here.

Question put: That the word “an” in line 33, stand part of the Clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—87: Bodenstein, P.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, S. P.; Carr, D. M.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, P. R.; Delport, W. H.; De Wet, C.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, A. H.; Du Toit, J. P.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Frank, S.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Havemann, W. W. B.; Henning, J. N.; Herman, F.; Heystek, J.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, T. N. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J.; Le Roux, J. P. C.; Lewis, H. M.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Marais, W. T.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pelser, P. C.; Pienaar, B.; Pieterse, R. J. J.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, M. J.; Raubenheimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, H.; Smit, H. H.; Smith, J. D.; Stofberg, L. F.; Swiegers, J. G.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Van Breda, A.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van Staden, J. W.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter. M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Visse, J. H.; Volker. V. A.; Vorster, L. P. J.; Wentzel, J. J.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Noes—34: Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Emdin, S.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Jacobs, G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lindsay, J. E.; Malan, E. G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman. H.; Taylor, C. D.; Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

Question affirmed and amendments proposed by Mrs. H: Suzman and Mr. T. G. Hughes dropped.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to (Official Opposition and Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Clause 21:

Sir we have dealt with certain aspects of the Extradition Act in clause 16 which has already been approved by this Committee and which provides in essence that a person who has been convicted of an offence in South Africa and who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may be extradited to a foreign country to face some charge in that country; he would then serve his sentence in the other country, would return to the Republic and would then continue to serve the remainder of the sentence in the Republic. That is what we have agreed to under clause 16 of this particular Bill. Sir, this particular clause deals with the time at which the surrender of a convicted person should take place. Under the Extradition Act section 14, it is provided at present that no order by the Minister under section 11 shall be executed—I refer to subsection (d) of section 14—“in the case of a person charged or convicted of an offence in the Republic until the charge has been disposed of and any sentence which may have been imposed in respect of such offence has been executed”. The problem which arises with this clause is that clause 16 of the Bill, of which the Committee has approved, amends the Prisons Act. In other words, it is purely an administrative power which is given to the Commissioner of Prisons. This amendment now deletes the compulsory aspect, i.e. that no extradition shall take place until the sentence has been served. I think I am correct in saying that. Sir, what is worrying me at the moment is this, and perhaps the Deputy Minister will be good enough to elaborate on this: There are circumstances at the present time under which one can understand that in order to preserve evidence it is desirable that the second trial in a foreign country should take place as soon as possible; in other words, that a person who has been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment in South Africa shall not be held for the full term of imprisonment before being submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign country. But I should like to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister whether this is a reciprocal arrangement with the countries with which we have extradition treaties, because it may well be that we would desire the same opportunity of bringing to justice a fugitive from South Africa, so that he can stand trial while the evidence is still readily available in this country. I raise this with the hon. the Deputy Minister so as to be assured that this is a provision which will be applied and administered in terms of clause 16 of the Bill when there is a reciprocal arrangement with the foreign country.

The hon. member is quite correct in his interpretation. According to our law we could not extradite a person until he had served his sentence here. We could only extradite him after that. But we have concluded extradition treaties with several countries, under which they will surrender persons to us before they have served their sentences there and under which we shall surrender persons to them before they have served their sentences here.

That is very satisfactory.

That is why we are now repealing that section. This is a very satisfactory arrangement because, as the hon. member knows, the danger always exists that evidence and documentary evidence may be lost while the person concerned is serving his long term of imprisonment.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 23:

Sir, I want to object to subparagraph (iv), because it means that anybody who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment under the Suppression of Communism Act or the Terrorist Act shall be disfranchised for life unless the period of imprisonment has been wholly suspended. The hon. the Minister of the Interior was kind enough to clear up the ambiguity which I believe exists in the existing clause of this Bill and a previous clause of the same nature which we have already debated. [Interjection.] No, I was not the only one. It is not clearly put at all; in fact, I would say that the clause is very badly worded altogether because the word “suspension” is tautology; it is not necessary, because if it is wholly suspended, then it is wholly suspended. But in any case, the hon. the Minister has cleared up the ambiguity, and I accept that the hon. member for Durban (Point) was correct when he said that a person whose sentence has been wholly suspended—and this is an important point— does not have to be disfranchised. On the other hand when I gave an example of a minor infringement under the Suppression of Communism Act, like failure to report at a police station, and pointed out that the usual sentence, although not mandatory, is a year’s imprisonment, all of which is suspended except for four days, the hon. member for Durban (Point) thought that such a person also was not to be disfranchised. I was no more wrong than he was.

I did not say that.

Well, that is what my Hansard shows. However, I will accept that I misinterpreted that. I might say that this makes no difference to the principle that I am discussing: it does not make the slightest difference. The point is that a person who has been sentenced for any minor infringement of the Suppression of Communism Act, such as failure to report at a police station, being in possession of any article which links him to a banned organization, or quoting any banned or listed person, is liable to be sent to prison without the option of a fine, and unless the entire sentence is suspended, such a person, when he comes out of gaol, remains disfranchised for life.

This means that persons who have committed the crimes that I have mentioned—they are crimes punishable in terms of the Act in the way that I have set out here—are put on the same basis as a person who has been convicted of murder or of treason, They are placed in a worse position than a person who has been sent to gaol for the crime of robbery, rape or murder with extenuating circumstances, or culpable homicide or any crime of violence. They are put in a worse position than the people in the categories I have mentioned because when these people come out of gaol, having served their sentence, whether a portion of the sentence was remitted or not, they are immediately reinstated on the voters’ roll. Under the Bill it is no longer necessary for a person to wait an additional three years after serving his sentence. That is the position in respect of ordinary criminals, but in the case of people who have fallen foul of the Suppression of Communism Act or the Terrorism Act, even if the court have sentenced them to a few months in gaol or to a week in gaol or a day in gaol, they have served a sentence of imprisonment, and when they come out of gaol they are for ever deprived of the normal right of a citizen, which is the franchise right. I think this is an extreme form of punishment. Sir, it shows an extraordinary attitude in this country when one is prepared, as the discussion in the Select Committee showed, to be much more generous to criminals who have committed really serious crimes than to persons who happen to have fallen foul of the anti-Communist Act or the Terrorism Act.

Is this not serious?

They might have been sentenced to one day’s imprisonment and it need not therefore be serious at all. Sir, I want to point out that the anti-Communist Act is extremely wide and far-reaching. I want to point out that the very people I have mentioned, the people who fail to report at the police station, may be persons who are banned or listed because in the opinion of the Minister they were advancing the aims of Communism. A person may be listed or banned before he has ever appeared before the court. I cannot by any stretch of imagination see why this has to be so. I notice that this House, long ago, was much more lenient towards people who had been convicted of treason. The Eléctoral Laws were amended in order to permit persons who had been convicted of treason before 1950 to exercise the vote. We were prepared to be forgiving in that case.

We are prepared to give ordinary criminals, who have committed crimes of violence, the right to vote, but we are not prepared to restore the vote to persons who have fallen foul of these two particular Acts, the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act, because these carry special connotations in South Africa. Everybody has now seized on these things and is frightened to tackle them because they have a special significance far beyond ordinary crimes of violence, and far beyond even the crime of treason before 1950. I can find no justification for this at all and therefore I move the following amendment—

I want to point out that I am hoping very much here that I will get the support of the official Opposition. They have adopted a very tough line on other clauses of this Bill. They have taken a very strong line on clause 10, and I have no doubt that they will take a very strong line on clause 29, judging from their Second Reading speeches.

They approved of that clause in the Electoral Act.

That may be so, but now they have a chance to redeem themselves and disapprove of it here. I admit I made a mistake in interpreting the suspended sentence although it was not such a serious mistake, because one day in gaol is enough to bring the same penalties. But I think the hon. members should also admit that they have made a mistake in allowing that clause to go through in the Electoral Act as far as white persons are concerned. I do not know how many such white persons there are.

I can think of only one at the moment, and that is Helen Joseph, who I know was never convicted in a court of law and was never even listed as a communist, but in fact she is banned. In terms of that Act she is restricted and therefore that person, having on one occasion failed to report to a police station—she has to report daily—will lose her vote as the result of the earlier clause. I do not know how many Coloured people fall under this restriction and have failed to report and have never appeared in court other than for that one crime of failing to report at a police station. Now the hon. member for Durban (Point) is a fair-minded man. We disagree on many things. He is a “verkrampte” and I am a “verligte”. [Interjection.] Maybe he is a “verkrimpte”, the hon. member for Yeoville is a “verkrampte” and I am a “verligte”.

Do you really think you are “verlig”?

Oh yes, I really think so. Don’t you? If not, the hon. member for Yeoville is evidently left of me. But never mind about that now. The point is that this is a stringent provision and it is most unfair. It penalizes people. It draws into the net of disfranchisement people who by no stretch of the imagination should be punished for life by making them lose their voting rights if they have gone to gaol for one day under this Act and the other one, but particularly under the Suppression of Communism Act, because it excludes the courts altogether. I think the hon. member must admit that he has made a mistake.

I am unable to accept this amendment as it is destructive of the principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Sir, may I point out that this is essentially a Committee Stage Bill, and that there are no principles in this Bill as such?

The Bill was passed at Second Reading.

May I point out that every clause is a principle in itself, because each clause amends a different Act?

I have given my ruling.

I am sorry to do this, but I must challenge your ruling.

It is a basic principle accepted at the Second Reading that people who are gaoled for Communism or under the Terrorism Act shall never vote again.

The Second Reading of what, Sir, may I ask?

Of this Bill.

Sir, this is essentially a Committee Stage Bill. It is a General Law Amendment Bill. It is not a clause which deals with a specific Act which is being amended and therefore contains a specific principle. I would ask you, Sir, to reconsider this.

I have given my ruling.

Sir, I am sorry, but I cannot accept that. May I please ask for Mr. Speaker?

I am not prepared to accept that either.

Clause put and a division demanded.

Fewer than four members (viz. Mrs. H. Suzman) having supported the demand for a division, clause declared agreed to.

Clause 29:

This is the worst clause in the whole Bill. [Interjections.] Did I hear someone say something? I hope that some of the hon. members on that side, especially the lawyers over there, will take part in the debate on this clause. This is the clause which the Deputy Minister and hon. members opposite have said is designed merely to consolidate all the various laws there may be relating to privilege in court. If you look at the rubric you will see that it says “privilege arising out of the interests of the State or public security”. If there ever was a more misleading rubric to any clause of any Bill we have ever had here, I think this is it. All the cases that have been quoted, and all the authorities that have been relied upon, have all dealt with secrets and matters relating to State documents which in the nature of things and under the common law in any event have a privilege. It is provided here that the Prime Minister or his delegate, or any Minister, may issue a certificate which will provide that someone will not be permitted or ordered to give evidence in court. That is in the first instance, in court, but also in other places. It says: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law contained, no person shall be compellable and no person shall be permitted or ordered to give evidence,” and the accent is on the words “no person”.

Just quote one of the provisions of the common law.

What this says makes any provision of the common law or of the statute law irrelevant. Why do you want it quoted? It says notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or the common law. In other words, let us start here ab initio. We have no other laws. We just have this clause. That is what it means. So all the other laws are in fact irrelevant. It says that notwithstanding the provisions of any law or the common law, no person shall be compellable and no person shall be permitted or ordered to give evidence or to furnish any information in any proceedings in any court of law, if a certificate purporting to have been signed by the Prime Minister or any person authorized thereto by him, or purporting to have been signed by any other Minister is produced to the court of law to the effect that the said fact, matter, thing, communication, book or document affects the interests of the State or public security. Subsection (2) says that this shall only apply in respect of matters which affect the interest of the State or public security, two different things. Now how do you determine whether the matter affects the interests of the State? The court will be obliged to rely not upon the evidence or the facts of the matter, but upon the certificate of the Minister that it affects the interests of the State and that it affects public security. This is framed in such a way that it can, and does in fact at the moment, give the Minister the power to produce a certificate in a case involving something which the Minister considers to affect the interests of the State or of public security, and to prevent by this certificate an accused person giving evidence in his own defence. That is what it says. It is no good saying that is not what is intended, or that is not what is meant. That is what this clause says. It gives this power to any Minister and we here, assembled in this place as the people’s representatives—and I address myself particularly to my hon. friends opposite— whose main function is to come here and to protect those people whom we represent against intrusions on their liberties and their rights by the Executive …

There is no intrusion which did not exist previously.

What an incredible statement from a person who acts on behalf of the Minister of Justice of our country! [Interjections.] The Deputy Minister must now tell me where there has ever existed in this country, or in any other country, apart from the tin-pot totalitarian states to the north of us and beyond the Iron Curtain, a provision that a Minister of the State can prevent a person in court from giving evidence when he is accused of an offence in that court.

It is done here as in Great Britain.

Where? Do you want to say it is done here? Where is it done here? If the Deputy Minister would read this clause, he would see that this is possible under this clause. This is what he must get his executive mind to understand. It is not a case of what he is going to do.

It may be a far-fetched possibility.

It is not a farfetched possibility; it is a fact that it is possible. That is the point. I am glad the Minister concedes that it is a possibility.

A far-fetched possibility.

It may be farfetched, but he concedes that it is a possibility, and surely that is enough for us in this House. If it is a possibility, we are not going to give those powers to any Minister, in the interest of the people we represent in this House and in the interest of our own image in this world. I want to say that the Government has done an awful lot to spoil our image. If there is one thing which has helped to keep our image good—and hon. members like the hon. member for Prinshof who have been overseas will bear me out here—and which has rescued us from some of the accusations made against us, it is the system of law that we have and the standards of justice we have and the calibre of the judges we have. It is very significant that the Deputy Minister has now conceded that it is a possibility that an accused person could be prevented from giving evidence on his own behalf in a court, although he says it is a far-fetched possibility.

We do not legislate for hypothetical cases.

We should not legislate for hypothetical cases, but the Minister has conceded that it is a possibility. Let me develop this a little further. This is also a possibility. If you are a plaintiff in a matter which might affect the interests of the State or public security, as for example if you are taken in by the Security Police and questioned and assaulted and you have your leg broken, you would be allowed to bring an action, but you could only found your action on evidence. As plaintiff in that action, you would have to go into court and give evidence of the facts upon which you base your claim. In terms of this clause, if the Minister thought it was a matter affecting the interests of the State or a matter of public security, and presumably he would if the Security Police was involved, it is a possibility that he would issue a certificate preventing that person from giving evidence about the facts on which his claim is based.

Order! I regret that the hon. member’s time has expired.

That is a civil action.

Yes, of course it is a civil action.

Order! I am in the Chair and when I say “order”, I mean it. The hon. member’s time has expired.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

By way of interjections whilst the hon. member for Durban (North) was speaking, the hon. the Deputy Minister made some remarkable statements. He said that proposed amendment does not alter the existing position but this is quite wrong. We explained this to the hon. the Deputy Minister during the Second Reading. The hon. member for Durban (North) has again explained it to the hon. the Deputy Minister and he appears not to want to read the very words which are in clause 29. It cannot be that he does not understand it, because the words are so simple. The only conclusion is, therefore, that he does not want to read them.

If you had studied the law as it exists, then you would have seen that I am right.

I will deal with this interjection of the hon. the Deputy Minister. He says that if I study the law as it is, I will realize that what he says is correct. I want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister this pertinent and simple question and I should like him to give me a clear answer of “yes” or “no”. Is it permissible in terms of the law as it stands to-day for the Prime Minister or a Minister of State to issue a certificate in terms of which an accused person can be prohibited or prevented from giving evidence in his own defence in a criminal case or in his own interests in a civil case. Is that permissible in terms of the law as it is to-day?

Such hypothetical cases do not come before the courts.

But is it possible?

Yes, it is possible.

Very well. The hon. the Deputy Minister has now said that it is possible. That is fine, because he has given me a clear and unequivocal answer to this question. He has said that it is possible. My next question to him is: In terms of what law, either common law or statutory law, is it possible? I am waiting.

Have you never read Duncan’s case?

The hon. the Deputy Minister must not draw red herrings across the track. He must simply tell me what the position is.

Order! I want to draw the hon. member’s attention to Standing Order No. 132. I have called upon the hon. member to make his speech and I am not going to allow any interjections, not even from the hon. the Deputy Minister. The hon. member can state his case and the hon. the Deputy Minister can reply later.

Mr. Chairman, I abide by your ruling. I want, however, to say that the hon. the Deputy Minister has clearly said in answer to my question that it is permissible in terms of the law as it is to-day for an accused person to be prevented by the Prime Minister or a Minister of this Government from giving evidence in his own defence in a criminal case or giving evidence in his own interests in a civil case. He has said that that is possible in terms of the law as it is to-day and I challenge the hon. the Deputy Minister to refer this House to the provision of the law which makes that permissible and possible. I challenge him to do so. I should like to point out to the hon. the Deputy Minister that in terms of the amendment that he is introducing by means of clause 29, this is not only possible or hypothetical, but factual, if the words of this clause are to be given any meaning whatsoever. The significant words are—

has been furnished. We had a long debate with the hon. the Deputy Minister this morning in regard to the difference between what affects the security of the State on the one hand, and what affects the interests of the State on the other hand. We pointed out to the hon. the Deputy Minister that almost anything affects the interests of the State, even though it may have nothing to do with security. This is how far this section goes and in the very words of this section “no person shall be permitted … to give evidence” in these cases, if there is a certificate from the Prime Minister or another Minister of State. We would like to hear from the hon. the Minister, firstly, in terms of what legal provision, either common law or statutory law, this is possible under the law as it exists to-day, and, secondly, how he can say that these words I have read out from clause 29, being the proposed amendment contained in this Bill, merely introduce a hypothetical situation when in fact the words are so clear. This is a clause which we cannot possibly accept. To try to justify this clause, as the hon. the Deputy Minister did in the Second Reading debate, by saying that it goes no further than the existing law, is just not correct. As a Deputy Minister of Justice, he must know that it is not correct. It goes much further than the law as it stands to-day. In fact, all I need do is refer to the hon. the Deputy Minister’s own references from legal text books and cases which show the limits in the law as it exists to-day and the extent to which clause 29 goes. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member issued a challenge to me across the floor of the House to the effect that I had so far been unable to furnish a single item of proof that an accused person could not give evidence to prove his innocence, especially in this particular case. This was the hon. member’s contention. The hon. member is posing as a very learned lawyer and the hon. member made derogatory remarks, in regard to which he is going to be hearing from me a great deal in future. I now want to refer the hon. member to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, Act No. 56 of 1955. If the hon. member knows anything about this Criminal Procedure Act section 228 of this Act, the heading “Privileges of Accused when giving Evidence” must at some time or other have caught his eye. Hon. members should remember that when an accused person goes to the witness-box, he ceases to be an accused person and is merely a witness in that case.

May I ask the hon. Deputy Minister a question?

No, the hon. member can ask his questions presently when it is his turn to speak again. The privileges of an accused person when giving evidence in his own case, are clearly defined in this section. However, I should like to read section 233 of this same Act to the hon. member. It reads as follows—

The hon. member must bear in mind now that, for the purposes of this section, the accused is the witness. I read further—

Here is the word “permitted” to which the hon. member took such great exception. I read further—

Therefore, even when an accused gives evidence in a case which is privileged and in the public interest, he is debarred, under this section, from giving such evidence. As a so-called advocate that hon. member ought to know this. I want to go further. The hon. member said that it never existed in the existing law. I want to show him now that it most definitely did exist. I want to refer the hon. member now to the book called “South African Law of Evidence” by Hoffman. The following is said on page 266, which is also why I said it was a “hypothetical case”—

I shall now tell hon. members why. I want to mention a case Rex versus Schniders of 1944. It is not a South African, but an English case. This case is discussed on page 265 of Hoffman’s book. It says the following there—

That is to say if the court felt itself bound by this section—

Does this satisfy the hon. gentlemen? This is the existing law I have just quoted to hon. members. I suppose hon. members were not aware of this and since they know it now, I hope they will cease these unnecessary objections, because they have no grounds for them. What is the meaning of all this? In the first place, when an accused goes to the witness-box he is, according to our Criminal Procedure Act, not allowed to give evidence as a witness in the same way as any other witness who is privileged. This provision already exists in existing law. According to Hoffman, there is not one single English or South African case, where this has occurred. But if this hypothetical case does in fact occur, it will imply, if the court rules that that evidence cannot be used, in other words, if it upholds the Minister’s certificate, that the accused should be acquitted because the court cannot declare beyond a reasonable doubt that that evidence which was not given, could not have been to his advantage. Is this clear to hon. members now? What is the danger of having such a witness now? And why so many objections from hon. members? If hon. members had taken the trouble to make a study of the legal aspect of this point, we would not have had this quarrel. I want to ask hon. members on the other side to have another look at it.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Deputy Minister has proved our very point for us in his quotation from Hoffman. He is trying to tell us that this clause 29 goes no further than the existing position and he reads out from Hoffman to the effect that in terms of the Common Law as it exists to-day there is no English or South African case in which a certificate of a Minister has been given to prevent an accused from giving evidence in his own defence. He then went on to say that if such a certificate were to be given in terms of the law as it exists to-day, the Common Law, the court would not regard itself as being bound by it. This is the very point. The court, in terms of the law as it exists to-day, could not regard itself as being bound by a certificate from a Minister which prevents an accused person giving evidence in his own defence. This is exactly what we are saying. The Common Law as it exists to-day is quite different. But in terms of clause 29, as the hon. the Deputy Minister proposes to amend it, it is specifically provided, in very clear terms, that no person shall be permitted to give evidence if a certificate is produced in the terms which are set out in the clause. This is the first point I make, in other words, that the hon. the Deputy Minister has proved the very point which I mentioned, namely that the laws that exist to-day are not such that the courts would accept a certificate from a Minister prohibiting an accused from giving evidence in his own defence even in these circumstances.

The second matter that I want to point out is that the section in the Criminal Procedure Act, to which the hon. the Deputy Minister has referred, namely section 228, deals specifically with the privileges of an accused when giving evidence. The section concerned likewise deals with privileges. But this goes a great deal further than that. It enables a Minister of State, including the Prime Minister, or anybody designated by him, to prevent a person from giving evidence in his own defence. I again reiterate that the very quotation which the hon. the Deputy Minister has given us from Hoffman, supports my contention. It states quite clearly that under the law as it exists to-day a court would not regard itself as being bound by such a certificate, if one were to be submitted, whereas clause 29 compels the court to accept such a certificate. It is perfectly clear that this clause goes a great deal further than the law as it exists to-day. Until such time as the hon. the Deputy Minister is able to meet the challenge from this side of the House, we cannot possibly accept the clause in these wide terms.

While I am up I want to deal with other aspects of this clause which are referred to in the amendment which I have already moved but with which I have not dealt specifically. I want to draw the attention of this House to the fact that in terms of clause 29 the certificate which is envisaged may be signed by the Prime Minister or any person authorized thereto by him. The clause also refers to any certificate purporting to have been signed by any other Minister. In a case of this sort, which goes as far as this, in the sense that it deals with any matter which affects the interests of the State, it is our intention that no Minister other than the Prime Minister or the Minister appointed to administer the Bureau for State Security, should have the right to issue such a certificate. We are against this clause for the reasons that we have mentioned. If despite our objections, the Government with its majority insists on going ahead and passing this clause, then we think it ought at least to modify the implications of this clause by limiting the right to issue the certificate to the Prime Minister himself or to the Minister appointed to administer the Bureau for State Security. It is quite unreasonable that such far reaching powers should be given to any person authorized by the Prime Minister or to any other Minister. I know that the hon. the Deputy Minister will tell the House that the Prime Minister in authorizing someone to do this will authorize a responsible person. This is not the point. The point is that it is the Prime Minister himself who ought to bring his mind to bear on whether or not a certificate which has such far reaching effects in terms of clause 29 should or should not be issued. It is only the Prime Minister or the Minister who administers the Bureau for State Security who can have all the facts relating to the interests of the State and the State security at his command. If this Government insists on going ahead with this clause, then at least they should limit the right to issue a certificate to one or other of these two persons. It is quite unreasonable to extend it to any other Minister because other Ministers do not have at their fingertips all the implications of State security and interests of the State which we presume the hon. the Prime Minister and the Minister administering the Bureau for State Security will have. This is the reason why I have moved the deletion of the words “or any person authorized thereto by him” in line 3 and “any other Minister” in line 4 and to substitute “the Minister appointed to administer the Bureau for State Security”. I have also moved the omission of the words “affects the interests of the State”. We debated this at length this morning and I do not wish to go into a long explanation on it. We made our position quite clear, namely that the words “interests of the State” and “security of the State”, are not synonymous by any means. In fact the hon. the Deputy Minister and members on the Government side used the two words to mean entirely different things. One can therefore accept that even they do not regard the two words as synonymous. If the Government insists on passing this clause and giving these Ministers these far reaching powers, at least it ought to be limited to cases which involve public security. It should not under any circumstances be extended to include matters which affect the interests of the State, which can be terribly wide. [Time expired.]

It is a very sad reflection on our Parliament that not one hon. member has stood up on that side of the House either to defend or reject this.

It is not in the clause …

It has something to do with the clause. It has something to do with these proceedings. It is a distressing state of affairs as far as the Nationalist Party is concerned, if I may say so. We are dealing with extremely important matters in this clause. We are dealing with matters that affect every single one of their constituents; I do not think they are going to thank the hon. gentlemen on that side of the House for saying nothing and not doing what they should do.

May I ask the hon. member whether he is so naive that he is unaware of the fact that he is committing obstruction now and wants our co-operation in that?

Order! The hon. member is not allowed to say that. The hon. member must withdraw it.

I withdraw, Mr. Chairman.

The hon. member may proceed.

He ought to apologize for saying such a disgraceful thing. As the saying goes: What do you expect from a pig but a grunt.

Order! That has been finalized. What actually did the hon. member say?

I am not casting any reflection on that member, but the expression goes: What do you expect from a pig but a grunt.

The hon. member must withdraw that.

Of course I withdraw it, Sir.

Mr. Chairman, may that hon. member say what he said without having to apologize?

The hon. member may proceed.

Quite apart from the fact that there has been an absence of debate, I think this hon. Deputy Minister said in this debate to-day one of the most disgraceful things that I have ever heard said by any one who represents the Minister of Justice. I think that with this statement he will do us more harm overseas and in this country and will do our selfrespect more harm than anything else could possibly do. He said in terms of the law as it exists to-day, this great system of law we have, it is possible for an accused or a plaintiff to be prevented from giving evidence by a certificate from the Minister, on his own behalf, and the person can be prevented from giving evidence to produce the facts on which his case is based. What absolute arrant nonsense! My hon. friend from Musgrave has dealt with that and I think he has sufficiently demolished this point. However, there are some aspects I should also like to deal with. He mentioned sections 228 and 233 of the Criminal Procedure Act. All of this comes under the heading of “privileges of witnesses”. The accused is dealt with differently. The Act deals with a witness and with an accused. The accused person is dealt with in a separate section. He is there dealt with on the basis that he has certain privileges. Section 228 deals with the privileges of the accused in giving evidence. It says when he is called as a witness upon his own application he shall not be asked certain things. Those things relate to whether he has committed an offence, his character, etc. That is then what section 228 says. Therefore, this section is not only relevant, but it strengthens the case we are making and undermines the case the hon. the Minister is making. Section 233 deals with the privilege from disclosure of facts on the grounds of public policy. It reads:

This is a witness, not an accused and it is dealt with under a completely different section.

In this Act it is provided that the accused may make no statement at all. He may make an unsworn statement or he may testify in the witness-box and give evidence on oath. He may do it. Then he is a witness. If the witness is an accused person, he therefore has certain rights. Section 233 deals with witnesses and provides that “no witness shall, except as in this Act is provided …”. In this Act it is also provided that the accused has certain rights so far as giving evidence, not giving evidence or giving a statement is concerned. In exactly the same way, if that is the hon. the Minister’s argument, there is a clause in the Criminal Procedure Act which says that once you have pleaded you are entitled, subject to the provisions of this Act, to a verdict one way or another. But, of course, this Act also provides for the prospect of an adjournment. If the hon. the Minister’s argument is right I can rely on that one section and say that it says once I have pleaded I am entitled to a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty”. I may say that this actually happened. I once inadvertently misled a court in this regard, because no one realized that in the Act it actually provided for an adjournment. My point is just simply that if this is what the hon. the Minister relies upon, if he says that the law already says that a Minister may produce a certificate and prevent an accused from giving evidence on his own behalf in any of our courts, he is talking nonsense and he, as Deputy Minister of Justice, ought to know it! The hon. the Minister ought to know that prospects he might have, if he tries to persuade any court or any judge of this country that that is the law in this country. He is talking nonsense. Section 292 of the same Act provides for cases not otherwise provided for. It reads:

There are no cases. The cases which have been quoted in the time when hon. members on that side did speak in the debate on this Bill, although they are not allowed to now, dealt with the question of State secrets, i.e. a State document which may not be disclosed in the public interest. They did not deal with the person himself and his right to give evidence or his right not to give evidence if he is the person concerned with those proceedings. I may say that this is much wider in any event. The courts always have an inherent discretion in these matters. By this Bill it is taken away from them in any event. These powers may be applied by various Ministers in any matter affecting, a-f-f-e-c-t-i-n-g, the interest of the State. What are the matters that affect the interests of the State? Look at the Order Paper which is before us. Consider all the Bills we have considered this session. Consider all the administrative matters which are dealt with by this Government. Is there anything which affects an individual from the cradle to the grave which does not affect the interests of the State? That is the scope of the field in which this is to be applied. Subsection (2) appears, on the face of it, to restrict the operation of subsection (1). The restriction is to matters affecting the interests of the State or public security. That is its scope. I hope that the hon. the Deputy Minister, now that he has heard some answers and argument on the points he has raised, on the most scandalous statement which he has made saying that this is law already and always has been law …

Order! The hon. member cannot say that. He must withdraw the word “scandalous”.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the word “scandalous”. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, this is a remarkable debate wherein we find that the hon. the Deputy Minister makes allegations and makes conclusions based on the allegation that clause 29 goes no further than the law reads to-day. He then quoted section 228 of the Criminal Procedure Act…

Order! I want to point out that that is repetition. I have heard that twice already, once from the hon. member for Durban (North), and once from the hon. member himself. I do not want to hear it again.

Mr. Chairman, I want to point out to this House that the hon. the Deputy Minister has relied on sections 228 and 233 for his contention that the law as it is to-day, is what is contained in clause 29. He has also relied on Hoffman. I have addressed this House pointing out that this is not so. The hon. member for Durban (North) has addressed this House pointing out that this is not so. The point I wish to make is that it is an extraordinary situation that we have not heard from the hon. the Deputy Minister to justify his contention. I move as a further amendment:

Mr. Chairman, I will hand this to you, if I may, just before my time expires. While I have still time available I wish to deal with certain other matters. One of the main points made by the hon. the Deputy Minister in replying to the debate in the Second Reading, was to refer to the existing position and to suggest that it was the same as under clause 29. Amongst other things he referred to Gardiner and Lansdown. I should like to quote back this quotation to him because it makes it perfectly clear in what respect the present law limits situations of this type. The passage which the hon. the Deputy Minister quoted from Gardiner and Lansdown reads as follows:

This is a very different situation. It is perfectly clear that what is referred to here are the three situations, namely secrets of State, confidential State documents and communications between the Government and its opposites which could affect the interests of the State. But clause 29 goes a great deal further. There is no limit to clause 29 whatsoever. The Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Cabinet can prevent evidence being given in respect of anything which in their opinion affects the interests of the State.

Order! I must point out that that is a repetition of what the hon. member has said in his first and second address to the Chair.

With respect, Sir, I did not refer to this passage in Gardiner and Lansdown before.

It is a repetition. I rely on Rule 136, which gives me the authority to say when there is a repetition. I have been listening to all the speeches here.

Mr. Chairman, I naturally abide by your ruling. In the little time that is available to me, I wish to pass on to other matters. I want to point out that section 228, which was relied upon by the hon. the Deputy Minister is in entirely different terms to clause 29. It reads as follows:

In other words, it gives him the privilege to refuse to answer questions which may incriminate him. But clause 29 is not limited to incriminating evidence. Clause 29 refers to any matter which affects the interests of the State. It is very much wider and is not comparable at all. In respect to clause 23, the hon. member for Durban (North) has dealt with that. I do not wish to elaborate, other than to say that the relevant words are “no witness shall except as in this Act is provided”. Those are the relevant words. In the Criminal Procedure Act it is clearly provided that if an accused person wishes to give certain evidence which he considers to be material in his own defence, cannot be prevented from doing so either by the Prime Minister, a Minister of State, or by anybody else. To rely on these two sections to justify clause 29 and to suggest that because of the existence of these two sections clause 29 goes no further than the existing law, is not correct. Therefore, we cannot possibly support this clause. In addition to the amendments to this clause which I have already moved, I move this further amendment.

Mr. Chairman, there is obviously no point in continuing further with the arguments that we have advanced. We have had no response whatsoever from any member of that side.

Order! That has nothing to do with the clause. The fact that there was no response from anybody has nothing to do with the clause. The hon. member must speak on the clause.

I accept that. I am just indicating that I am not going to say anything further. We have said all that there is to be said about this. It has not been contradicted. I stand up to move the amendment which stands in my name, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I move as an amendment—

That is in conformity with the amendments moved by the hon. member for Musgrave. I do not intend addressing the Committee on the question of the interests of the State, because we have addressed the Committee on several occasions on that point. I do hope that the hon. the Deputy Minister in his reply will tell us what justification there is for including other Ministers with the Prime Minister in giving the power to produce a certificate prohibiting evidence to be given. I cannot see any justification for including other Ministers. I should like to know what they have in mind and why all Ministers should be included. I can understand that the one Minister in charge of the securities of the State should be included, and there can be an excuse for giving the Prime Minister the power, but there is certainly no excuse for giving all the other Ministers the power. I should like him to tell us why they have included all the other Ministers in that provision.

Mr. Chairman, in reply to this last amendment, i.e. the omission of the reference to interests of the State, I just want to repeat what I have already said, i.e. that this Bureau of State Security is a co-ordinating bureau. It co-ordinates State security. This is being done by other Departments as well. This Department is not a super department which is going to take all matters in regard to the security of the State out of the hands of the other Departments. It is, for example, not going to deprive the military of the state security aspect and bring it exclusively under its own roof. It is going to act in a co-ordinating way, in the same way as the Department of Planning acts in a co-ordinating way for all the other Departments and the State. I want to give the hon. member another reason why I cannot accept his amendment. Let me remind him of what happened in the Duncan case, to which I referred here yesterday, which was decided by the House of Lords. The matter concerned the Thetis, a submarine which went down. A civil action was then instituted. The charge was that there had been negligence with the construction of the Thetis. The Minister then issued a certificate indicating that information in regard to the machinery, etc. of the Thetis could not be disclosed because it would not be in the public interest. What would the position be if the amendment which the hon. member for Musgrave moved were accepted? His motion that only the Prime Minister and the Minister dealing with the Bureau should be allowed to issue such a certificate excludes the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence has information concerning the nature of his weapons. This is a matter with which the Bureau will have nothing to do, or which it would not have investigated and knows nothing about. There are certain aspects of the construction of those weapons which have to be kept secret, and consequently he should also be able to issue a certificate to the effect that, in the public interest, evidence in this connection may not be given. I then come to the Police. The Police also have certain functions which they have to fulfil in the interests of the internal security of the State. There may be certain communications made by the Police affecting the security of the State, and if I were to accept the member’s amendment that only the Ministers he mentioned may issue such a certificate, it would exclude the Minister of Police. The Minister of Police would then have to go to another Minister, the Prime Minister or to the Minister in charge of State security, and ask him to issue the necessary certificate. Consequently I cannot accept that amendment. There is also a further reason why I cannot accept the amendment, i.e. because the amendment goes much further than the existing law. Apparently hon. members on that side do not realize that our law of evidence as far as this matter is concerned, is the same as that of the English law. If hon. members were to make a study of the various decisions of the English courts in regard to this matter, they would see that what I have said here is quite correct, but it does not seem as if they want to accept that our law of evidence in this regard is the same as the English law of evidence.

According to the existing law of evidence in England, as applied in the Privy Council, in the House of Lords as well as in the English courts, it need not be only a Minister who issues such a certificate, but the head of any department. We are not going as far as the English law of evidence does at the moment, because they grant this power to the head of every department while we are limiting this power. to a person delegated by the Prime Minister and other Ministers. We are already placing a restriction on the implementation of this power, but the hon. member wants to go even further now; he wants to introduce a general restriction which would be going much too far under these circumstances.

To which provision of the English law is the hon. the Deputy Minister referring?

I cannot elucidate the entire English law of evidence for hon. members here. I am dealing with these specific provisions of the English law of evidence as applied in the British courts. Does he expect me to quote every court decision to him? I think the hon. member must go and study his law of evidence rather than to ask such nonsensical questions here.

To which cases are you referring?

I mentioned two here yesterday, and if the hon. member would only read those two he would have a good understanding of the whole matter.

They are quite irrelevant.

They are very relevant.

I come then to the other amendment which was proposed here. Subsection (1) as printed, reads—

The hon. member now wants a person to be allowed to give evidence, by the omission of “and no person shall be permitted”. But what would that mean? He cannot be compelled, but he will in fact be allowed to give evidence. Suppose a person wanted to give such evidence and that it was not in the interest of the State. If those words are omitted, how must the courts allow him to give evidence? One really cannot force him to do so, but now the hon. member wants to allow him to do so. That is precisely what we do not want; we do not want him to be allowed to publish such evidence. That would destroy the whole essence of the clause. You cannot allow him to give evidence which is privileged, whether it is a criminal or a civil case.

I then come to the amendment by the hon. member for Durban (North), who wants the following proviso to be added at the end of the subsection—

Let me say at once, Mr. Prime Minister … [Laughter.] Sir, hon. members on that side are emitting this hollow laughter because they have nothing better to do. It is a case of “small things amuse small minds”. Mr. Chairman, I just want to show you how clever the hon. member is. He wants to amend subsection (2). What specific subsection (2)? Did the hon. member ever look at it? Subsection (2) reads—

The hon. member now wants to add to that—

If that is the case, what can such a person put forward there, because these are precisely all the things which according to this clause are excluded, which are not privileged? Subsection (2) therefore excludes all the cases which are not privileged. He now wants to destroy that privilege by adding—

It says the whole section; it does not say the subsection.

No, it does not say the whole section.

Read it again and we will stop you at the relevant point.

The amendment reads—

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the evidence of a plaintiff in a civil action or the accused in a criminal court.

“This section”— the whole section.

What the hon. member wants to propose is already excessive …

Why?

… because subsection (2) already exclude those case of privileged.

Nonsense.

Where?

But he states here the “plaintiff in a civil case’’. But what about the defendant in a civil action? Must the defendant not have that privilege? Must only the plaintiff have it? Surely that is a half-baked motion, to mention only the plaintiff and not the defendant. On the basis of his own arguments, what right does he have to withhold this right from the defendant?

May I ask a question?

No, I am not going to reply any further to nonsensical questions. The hon. member has been asking nonsensical questions all day. For that reason I maintain that I cannot accept a half-baked motion like this. It is quite impossible to do so. But I want to return to the hon. member for Musgrave, and I want to discuss with him again that matter which apparently, he cannot understand. Section 228 of our Criminal Procedure Act grants a few privileges to an accused person. When the accused goes to the witness stand he need not, in terms of section 228, furnish that reply because then he is a witness. As soon as he is a witness, he has that privilege. Section 233 state that he cannot plead one of those privileges unless the document which would be disclosed will prove his innocence. But hon. members are alleging that if he wants to give evidence to prove his innocence the Minister may say that he may not do so. If the Minister were to say that, then I have quoted here what Hoffman said in his book. He said—

If the court found that that document or evidence could not be produced, “if it is upheld”, then this follows—

In other words, if the court were to uphold this certificate and say that it is privileged and that that evidence may not be given, then the accused must walk out a free man because all the evidence is not before the court Then there would be a doubt, and the accused must be given the benefit of the doubt. If the court admits that document, it can only admit it if it does not incriminate the accused, for the court may not allow any document which would incriminate the accused That is after all the ordinary criminal law which we are applying to-day in our courts. Now I cannot get the hon. members to understand that this is really the case and that we are going no further here than the law as it is at present. If hon. members would only look at it, they would see that it is not going further than the existing law.

I want to conclude. I think we have now approached this matter from all angles, and I cannot convince the hon. members opposite of the innocence of this legislation. They are making a terrible fuss over things which really do not exist. The dangers they see in this clause do not exist. The clause codifies the law as we have found it to-day, and that is all it does.

The Deputy Minister says our fears are of no account, because if the accused is not allowed to give evidence Hoffman says he will be acquitted. He read from Hoffman, and Hoffman said that presumably he would be acquitted. Hoffman is not relying on a judgment; he just gives his view, and says that presumably he would be acquitted.

There has never been such a case.

That is just the point. Why should we take that chance with the freedom of our citizens? The Deputy Minister himself admits that there is that chance that it may happen, but he says we must rely on the opinion expressed by Hoffman, who is not a judge of our courts, where he says that presumably the accused will be acquitted. I want to appeal to hon. members opposite. Surely this Committee cannot allow itself to be swayed by an opinion of a legal writer that an accused would presumably be acquitted. We must make sure that he will be given the chance to prove his innocence before the court. The Deputy Minister in his reply only relied on the fact that the amendment as worded by the hon. member for Durban (North) only applies to subsection (2). Otherwise he did not deal with the amendment as it affects the section as a whole. Now, if that is what is worrying him, I move a new subsection (4)—

I cannot see what objection the Deputy Minister can have to an amendment of that nature if he wishes to protect the interests of an accused or of a plaintiff. He in fact has said that the accused would not be prejudiced by this clause, relying on what Hoffman said, but we want to make quite sure that the accused will not be prejudiced, and the Deputy Minister, by accepting this amendment, can, make sure of it. I want to point out that the Minister must bear in mind that by passing this clause we are in fact changing the law, irrespective of what Hoffman or anyone else may say, and I ask the Minister to accept my amendment. The only effect it will have is that the plaintiff in a civil action, or the accused in a criminal case, will be able to give evidence. Duly authorized by the hon. member for Durban (North), I withdraw his proviso.

Amendment proposed by Mr. M. L. Mitchell, with leave withdrawn.

I cannot accept that amendment either, because we will in that way really be changing the existing law. I want to refer hon. members to the cases Redelinghuys v. Geidel in 1963 (2), page 274, and I just want to read the note at the top. It states—

That is the existing Act, as it is being applied in our courts. I am not prepared to change the Act.

But you are yourself changing it.

No, I am not changing it. I am now stating in legislation what already exists in law. I have now proved to you that this is in fact the case. The people who want to change the law, are those hon. members. I have been unable to convince hon. members that we are merely codifying the law. Now we have had an illustration, as a result of this amendment which is now being proposed, that it is in fact those hon. members who want to change the law, and not, I. I am merely codifying what already exists. That is why I quoted this case. I can still quote a great deal from the same case which will confirm this matter beyond any doubt for hon. members.

Amendments proposed by Mr. R. G. L. Hourquebie put and negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

First amendment proposed by Mr. T. G. Hughes dropped.

Remaining amendment proposed by Mr. T. G. Hughes put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—34: Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Eden, G. S.; Emdin, S.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, de V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Jacobs, G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lindsay, J. E.; Malan, E. G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

Noes—85: Bodenstein, P.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, S. P.; Carr, D. M.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, P. R.; Delport, W. H.; De Wet, M. W.; Diederichs, N.; Du Plessis, A. H.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Frank, S.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Havemann, W. W. B.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heystek, J.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, T. N. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J.; Le Roux, J. P. C.; Lewis, H. M.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Marais, W. T.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pienaar, B.; Pieterse, R. J. J.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, M. J.; Raubenheimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, H.; Smith, J. D.; Swiegers, J. G.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Heever, D. J. G.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; Van Staden, J. W.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, L. P. J.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J; van Wyk.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—86: Basson, J. A. L.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, S. P.; Carr, D. M.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee. J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, P. R.; Delport, W. H.; De Wet, M. W.; Diederichs, N.; Du Plessis. A. H.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Frank, S.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling. J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Havemann. W. W. B.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heystek, J.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, T. N. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J.; Le Roux. J. P. C.; Lewis, H. M.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Marais, W. T.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pienaar, B.; Pieterse, R. J. J.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, M. J.; Raubenheimer. A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, H.; Smith, J. D.; Swiegers, J. G.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Heever, D. J. G.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van Rensburg. M. C. G. J.; Van Staden, J. W.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, L. P. J.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Noes—33: Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Eden, G. S.; Emdin, S.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, de V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Jacobs, G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lindsay, J. E.; Malan, E. G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson. S. F.; Webber. W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

Clause accordingly agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported without amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

This Bill is largely a result of the Franzsen Commission’s recommendation that a structural amendment, to the Republic’s tax system had become necessary in order to prevent impediment to economic growth in the national economy. The commission suggested a decrease in the progression of direct taxes and a shift of emphasis to indirect taxes, and this was accepted by the Government.

After careful study of all the systems of indirect taxation, the commission came to the conclusion that a selective sales tax, collected at the source, would be most suitable system of this nature for South African conditions. The considerations which led the commission to this conclusion, are set down in its report and I therefore do not want to elaborate further on that.

What I do, in fact, want to point out is that there was no alternative source to compensate for the relief granted in respect of direct taxes and that the system of a selective sales tax was chosen on the recommendation of an expert commission of experts. Owing to international obligations and the policy of protection, no further revenue can be obtained from customs, while excise is on a very restricted basis and the scales are already very high. The commission recommended that the basis of the sales tax should be private domestic consumption, with the exception of food, clothing, footwear, housing costs, certain medical expenses and certain excisable goods. There still appears to be some misunderstanding about this matter, and therefore I want to elaborate on it for a while.

I want to make it very clear that, with the aforementioned exceptions, the quantity of goods which the Government could choose was limited. It would be very regrettable if the impression exists that the quantity was unlimited and it was therefore unreasonable to tax essential goods such as soap and razor blades. The sales duty is an internal tax on locally manufactured goods with a counter duty on imported goods of the same nature. The choice is therefore necessarily based on local production, and where goods are not manufactured locally, imports could not be included, for example photographic equipment and watches. The latest census for the manufacturing industry, i.e. that of the year 1965-’66, only became available recently. It indicates a gross yield for the manufacturing industry of about R4,640 million, from which the goods for sales duty could be chosen. This figure is outdated and is merely being used as an indication of the extent. However, there are large groups of goods which could not be taken into consideration, for one reason or another, in the choice of the duty. Firstly, there were the following groups, food, clothing, footwear, housing and medical expenses, which had to be excluded, on the recommendation of the Franzsen Commission and according to the decision of the Government, to prevent the sales duty from becoming regressive. No precise figures are available, but manufactured goods to the value of more than R1,000 million are being excluded here.

There is another group for which separate figures were not calculated because those goods, owing to circumstances, were automatically excluded: (a) services, for example shoe repairs, panel beating and spray painting, blacksmithing, the repair of motor vehicles, boats, aircraft, etc.; (b) Capital goods, for example agricultural implements, industrial, mining and construction machinery, railway equipment, commercial vehicles, etc. This group represents a very high value; (c) Production materials, for example all kinds of packaging materials, steel, construction timber, wattle bark extract, explosives, fertilizers, basic industrial chemicals, bricks and tiles, glass, cement, building board, galvanized iron, building requirements, etc.; (d) The traditional excisable goods which in past have furnished the largest portion of the indirect taxes, and which represent a value of more than R600 million; (e) Goods which would have created particular administration problems, for example, agricultural products other than foodstuffs, textiles, etc.

This is the most important group of goods which had to be excluded. The calculated value of the remaining locally manufactured goods from which a choice could be made, only amounted to about R700 million. In the first place the essential goods were selected from the available goods. Subsequently all the durable goods were selected in ascending order of indispensibility. When the amount fell just short of the mark, intermediary production goods were sought that would not have an extensive effect on production costs, and items such as office machinery, stationery, paint, etc. were included to obviate the necessity of including too many essential consumer goods. When it was estimated that there was still a shortage, it is obvious that there was no other choice but to include some of the more essential goods, and even certain less essential items in the food and clothing groups had to be included, items such as sweets, chutney and leather clothing.

The fact is that a given amount had to be found, and it must be clearly realized that the only alternatives left, should there be an objection against the existing list, are essential foodstuffs, clothing and medicine. We are dealing here with taxation on private consumption and certain essential goods had to be included because, according to the available facts, there were insufficient non-essential goods available. All that remains are goods that are even more essential.

Immediately after the introduction of the sales duty, consultations were held with the various industries in order to find a procedure according to which each industry could operate. In this connection I cannot neglect to mention the positive assistance rendered by the Cape Chamber of Industries to the Department of Customs and Excise, particularly in the arrangement of meetings with the various industries. The co-operation of the Chamber and its staff is greatly appreciated. The department also has great praise for the co-operation of the industries, and other bodies, involved.

Although the majority of the industries have already been addressed, there are still a few matters and representations which are being considered and which must be subjected to further investigations before a decision can be reached. One of the matters concerns the question of the documentation and the procedure which must be followed in connection with the quarterly accounts. The department is investigating the matter and is holding consultations with the Federated Chambers of Industries. Applications have also been received for rebates. In many cases the applications were not motivated, while in respect of others there were insufficient facts on which to base a decision. These applications will be investigated and the necessary action decided upon. However, I want to issue a prefatory warning that rebates cannot be freely granted, because this would greatly complicate administration and could so infringe upon the tax source that rates would have to be increased or more goods involved.

In addition I also want to mention that there are one or two industries where the provisional procedure which was decided upon is unsatisfactory, and these cases will be investigated further. The legislation also makes provision for the decreasing or suspension of duties by notification where this is justified.

Except for the annual ratification of notices in respect of customs and excise, this Bill deals almost exclusively with the incorporation of provisions for the application of the sales duty. The list of goods subject to sales duty, is being incorporated as part 3 of schedule 1 in the Act and in the new schedule 7 provision is being made for rebates and refunds of sales duty. The existing schedule 7, in which the list of licences is set out, now becomes schedule 8, and the licence fee in respect of the sales duty is being set at a nominal amount of R1 per year. Over and above the amendments of the Customs and Excise Act in order to make provision for the sales duty, there are a few clauses in the amendment Bill to which the attention of hon. members is drawn.

The position of the seller and the purchaser, in the case of contracts concluded before the 26th March, but implemented after that date, is clearly stated. The purchaser shall not be able to refuse delivery of the goods merely on the grounds of the introduction of the sales duty, and he shall have to compensate the seller for any sales duty which had to be paid by the seller, unless the purchaser is indemnified by an explicit agreement in respect of the sales duty or an essentially comparable tax. This also applies to the hiring out and the use of goods in the furnishing of a service. In addition, there is a provision that the Minister can give retrospective effect to certain amendments introduced by notification, if he considers such action justified.

Mr. Speaker, as the hon. the Deputy Minister has said, this Bill principally deals with the new sales duty or purchase tax, as some people and also we on this side of the House would prefer to see it called. The hon. the Deputy Minister is quite right, because the rest of the Bill deals with the customary alterations to the customs tariffs which are all recommended by the Board of Trade or in conformity with the general agreement on trade and tariffs. Discussions on this Bill will therefore really be confined to this question of the sales duty.

At the start I would like to clear one point up, because during previous discussions on this subject, the hon. the Minister accused hon. members on this side of the House of trying to make political capital out of this proposal.

That is correct.

The hon. the Minister did so several times, and I hear an hon. member on the other side repeating it. It is a very weak argument, one which it is not unusual to hear used by Ministers who are trying to defend the indefensible, but in this case I think it is particularly unjustified. We on this side of the House have agreed in principle to the levying of a sales tax, and to that extent we are particeps criminis. We agree in principle to the levying of a sales tax to take the place, as the hon. the Deputy Minister has said, of the reduction of indirect taxation which is contained in the Budget proposals. But, Sir, what we did do was to criticize the method of application. We were quite entitled to do so. In fact it was our duty to criticize the method of application if we thought we were justified in doing so. We not only criticized the method of application, but we proposed an alternative. The hon. the Deputy Minister in his speech said that there was no alternative to the method being adopted in this Bill. He admitted in his speech that in drafting the Bill and in preparing the Schedule, they had to depend very largely on estimates because they had no definite figures to go on. The things that were excluded at the start were confined to those things which had been recommended by the Franzsen Commission. The hon. the Minister in discussing this matter denied that he had said that the new sales duty was going to be imposed on luxury goods. That is also correct. He did not at the same time say that when he made his speech he also published a White Paper. The very first paragraph of that White Paper, for which the hon. the Minister is responsible, started off by saying that the sales duty was an indirect tax mainly on luxury, semi-luxury and durable goods. What the hon. the Minister did say, and he repeated it, was that this duty was to be a selective duty, not on basic essentials. When we put forward our alternative we were satisfied that it was a practical alternative. We stand by it. Everything that has happened since confirmed us in our view that the proposals and suggestions we made did contain practical proposals which would have been far more satisfactory than the ones we are now called upon to accept. In spite of the somewhat contemptuous way in which the hon. the Minister rejected our proposals, to quote a poet: “My head is bloody but unbowed”. We stand by them. We believe that in the future it will be proved that we were right.

Our criticism was twofold. We criticized the method of application, and we also criticized the Schedule itself. What has happened in the last two months, since the introduction of the Budget, has confirmed our views on the subject. It has become apparent that the hon. the Minister has laid a superhuman task on his department. I make no criticism of the department. I think they are struggling very manfully to make the new system work. That this is a tremendous task that has been laid on their shoulders is undoubted. I think it is also certain that the confusion almost amounting to despair, in some cases, which it has caused among the manufacturers who are going to pay the tax, in the first instance, is also undoubted.

The White Paper which the hon. the Minister laid upon the Table contained 32 pages. Every paragraph required careful study, by the people who were going to have to carry out this Act. After all, you have to remember that these people who are going to pay this tax at its source are going to have to find large sums of money. There are firms which say that their concern alone will be paying something like R500,000 in sales tax. It is quite obvious that any instructions issued by the department had to be worked out very carefully by the people who had to pay. I was glad to hear the hon. the Deputy Minister pay generous tribute to the way in which the manufacturers, the Chambers of Industry, have endeavoured to co-operate with the department and tried to help. But, of course, they are still struggling. In that White Paper mention was made that they were going to issue an explanatory guide to manufacturers, in order to enable the manufacturers to prepare themselves to put this duty into operation as from 1st May. The guide, when it did appear, contained 19 pages of instructions and 101 paragraphs, every one of which was full of detail and very complicated detail in many ways. There were also some 10 very complicated forms to fill in. The Budget was introduced on the 26th March, and the first White Paper was issued at the same time. The guide appeared in the Gazette on 21st April, nearly a month later. As I have said, this guide which contained 101 extremely complicated paragraphs was intended to enable the manufacturers to be ready to pay up by 1st May. In other words, they were given 10 days to work out the details before they could do so.

Sir, it was a completely impossible task, It indicates what I call, the super human task that is being laid on the shoulders of the department. Since then, of course, there has been a number of changes in the method of procedure, and the hon. the Deputy Minister has pointed out that there is still a number of changes to be made in certain industries, which they have not yet been able to finalize. We know that in major industries, like the motorcar industry, in the case of tyres, cosmetics and jewellery, the methods of application have all been altered. It is quite clear that the whole matter is far more complicated and far more difficult than was ever contemplated with the initial introduction of the sales duty. Sir, when one realizes the magnitude of the task, one is surprised at the extremely wide powers taken in this Bill to amend the procedures, to exempt from the duty, to lower the duty, in fact to do almost anything to make the system work; but it all indicates what hopeless confusion can arise when plans are put into operation without proper forethought and proper consideration, as we shall show later on in the course of debating this question.

The second matter which we criticized, of course, is the Schedule. Sir, let us hear no more of this talk of making political capital out of it. We must have some kind of standard by which to examine the Schedule. The hon. the Deputy Minister has said that they are limited in the things which they can tax. He admits that the Estimates, based on the figures which they have been able to get, are not necessarily accurate. The only standard that we have to go by is the two remarks made by the hon. the Minister when he said that he was not going to place the duty on basic essentials and that, as stated in the White Paper, the majority of the taxes were on luxury, semi-luxury and durable goods. Sir, we have examined the Schedule very carefully. We have gone through it with a fine tooth-comb, a comb which, I may say, was bought before the sales duty was put upon it, so that it did not cost us any more. We find that there are many items in it which are either basic essentials, if words mean anything at all, or else they cannot be described as luxury, semi-luxury or durable goods. In the Committee Stage we shall move amendments to make our opinion quite clear on the subject, and we shall discuss the Schedule in some considerable detail. We are not going to oppose the Second Reading because, as I say, we have accepted the principle of a sales duty, but unless our reasonable objections, which are based on the statements made by the Minister himself in his speech and in his White Paper, are met in Committee, we shall have no option but to oppose the Third Reading because we cannot be a party to the Schedule as it stands at present. We do not think that it conforms to the principles enunciated by the hon. the Minister when he introduced the tax, and, furthermore, we are quite sure that after an examination of the Schedule in Committee, he will agree with us that in many respects it is placing a quite unnecessary burden on those people who are least able to bear it. the people who are deriving no benefit from the reduction in direct taxation but who are going to be burdened, in many directions, with extra taxation for which they are getting no compensation in the way of other reductions in their taxation. We shall not, as I have said, oppose the Second Reading but we shall discuss this matter in detail in the Committee Stage in an endeavour to get the Minister and the Deputy Minister to see reason and to conform more closely to the principles which were enunciated when this tax was introduced.

In his speech the hon. member for Constantia concentrated mainly on telling us that although that side of the House supports the principle of the Bill, there is criticism at two levels and that if this side of the House does not take notice of their criticism during the Committee Stage they will oppose the Bill at the Third Reading. I do not want to deal with the two points of criticism which the hon. member raised now. To me the basis of his whole argument was summed up in one of his concluding sentences in which he said that this sales duty places “an unnecessary burden on those people who are least able to bear it”. Sir, I shall come back to this sentence during the course of my argument, because we have often heard this accusation in previous debates in this House this year. I should like this matter to be analysed properly, to the extent to which it lends itself to analysis with the knowledge at our disposal. The hon. member referred to the work which the Department has done in connection with this new sales duty which has to give expression to the necessary tax reform. The hon. member said that the Department had a “super-human task”; he referred to the fact that they produced a White Paper with 32 pages and that in addition to that they produced a guide which went to 19 pages and 101 or 104 paragraphs. I think he could have paid the Department a compliment for having been able to give so much assistance to industries in such a short time. Sir, I want to return to the first point of criticism raised by the hon. member. He said that he had criticism on two levels, firstly, the “method of application”, and secondly, the Schedule itself. The hon. member did not greatly amplify his point of criticism in respect of the method by means of which this sales duty was introduced, and I must therefore conclude that what he really meant by his first point of criticism was that the sales duty should not have come into operation on the date when it did in fact come into operation. In other words, what he wanted was that prior notice should have been given to the effect that the sales duty would only come into operation at a certain stage in the future, three or six months after the Budget speech on 26th March.

Twelve months.

My colleague here in front of me says twelve months. Sir, let us briefly look at what the consequences would have been if we were to have implemented that idea. It is, after all, quite clear that an undertaking with vast capital, if it had been given twelve months’ notice prior to the coming into operation of the sales duty, would have bought up the maximum available quantities of commodities and supplies before the sales duty was imposed. It would then have been in a position, with its far cheaper goods, to compete more favourably on the market with undertakings with less resources, because the undertakings with less resources would not have been able to get hold of the supplies beforehand, nor would they have been able to pay for them. Then they would have had to buy those supplies from the date on which the sales duty became applicable, that is, at considerably higher prices, and they would have been in a far weaker competitive position. That is what hon. members opposite wanted. It would only have meant that you would have had a greater imbalance because you would thereby have eliminated competition to a greater extent and have given an undertaking with more capital the advantage at the expense of an undertaking with less capital. It is the conviction of this side of the House and my own personal conviction that we could not have given prior notice of the introduction of a sales duty, because we would, if we had done that, have distorted the normal industrial pattern and that would have led to trade in South Africa being prejudiced.

But I want to come back to the hon. member’s statement that the other side of the House accents the principle contained in the Act. For the information of hon. members on that side of the House, I should like to quote from the mouthpiece of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Assocom. I quote from the May edition of Commercial Opinion. The whole article deals with indirect taxation; it deals with this sales duty. In the first place the editor says (translation)—

Therefore hon. members never had any grounds for disputing the principle contained in this Act, because even the Federated Chambers of Industry supported the principle. Then in the same article the editor writes as follows on the operation of the sales duty—

From this two things are apparent. The first is that the organized trade accepts a selective sales duty and that they admit that the rates must be high in order to bring in the desired amount of revenue. That implies, as the hon. the Minister said, that a choice has to be made between the goods which are the least necessary and those which one cannot do without, and that a higher tax must be levied on the goods which are regarded as luxury or as non-essential goods.

To continue. I want to come to the hidden sting in the tail of the concluding sentences of the hon. member for Constantia, in which he said that it was their contention that this sales duty places an unnecessary burden on those people who can least afford it, and I want to refer to a publication which the hon. member for Constantia has perhaps already glanced at. It is entitled “An African Day”. The hon. member would do well to listen now, because he can also learn from it. It is a study of the life in the south-western Bantu areas where 520,000 Bantu live, and in which many interesting details appear which may perhaps change the hon. member’s opinion on this matter. From this it appears that, inter alia in connection with these statements which hon. members who were so anxious about the people who were supposedly living below the breadline, the inhabitants of Soweto, had a spending pattern of R39.1 per month in 1962, which rose to R66.9 per month in 1967, that is to say an increase of R27.8 per month or 71 per cent. If one considers this spending pattern as it appeared in 1962 and again in 1967, then it appears that while the total spending on food was 38 per cent in 1962 it was only 32 per cent in 1967, a decrease therefore of 6 per cent. Now I want to ask hon. members this: If these people were living below the breadline in 1962, and if they were earning 71 per cent more in 1967 than in 1962, why was there then, relatively speaking, a decrease in spending on food? After all, this directly contradicts that statement. If they were going hungry in 1962, if they could not buy enough food with their available money to enable them to live above the breadline, why then is the percentage spending on food less than in 1962 while they were spending nearly R28 per month more in 1967? But let us look at other commodities. In 1962 they spent 10 per cent on clothes; in 1967 it was 7 per cent. In 1962 they spent 12 per cent on housing; in 1967 it was only 8 per cent. But let us look at other commodities, for example Bantu beer. In 1962 they spent 1 per cent on Bantu beer: in 1967 it was 2 per cent, exactly double it, an increase of 100 per cent. But let us look at other kinds of liquor. In 1962 they spent 1 per cent on “White liquor”; in 1967 they spent 3 per cent. That is an increase of 200 per cent. In this way there are also other commodities which are not necessary to bring one above the breadline but on which the spending increased considerably in this period of five years. Let us look at what these people spend on liquor, and I now quote from a news report which appeared in The Star of 5th May—

Hon. members must take note of this. The municipal controlled bottle-stores in the non-White areas alone brought in R2.447 million from the sale of White liquor. This figure is very important. I quote—

It is an increase of nearly 50 per cent over a year in the money spent on White liquor alone. In addition this was only noted in respect of bottle-stores in non-White areas, which were owned by White municipalities. Now hon. members on that side say that this Bill is very unreasonable and unfair because it affects the people who are living below the breadline and who cannot afford it. Just in case they may say that The Star wrote nonsense, which it usually does, I should like to quote the following—

In other words, these figures which I quoted, which appeared in The Star, are taken from a report of the Johannesburg City Council. They cannot therefore be disputed.

Hon. members say that they support this Bill in principle but that they have certain objections because the Bill places an unnecessary burden on people who cannot afford this tax. Every time they tell us that it is the non-Whites who will be seriously affected. Earlier this year they said that it was a rich man’s budget, because the poor man who lives below the breadline is penalized. During the Budget debate I mentioned the Whites who do not earn much. I tried to show that the Whites who fall into the lower income groups will benefit by the financial legislation of this session. I was then reproached because we were supposedly imposing a heavy penalty on and doing an injustice to the non-Whites living below the breadline. The hon. member for Constantia said again this afternoon by implication that that was their main objection to this legislation. Now I pointed out to hon. members that the spending of the non-Whites in Soweto increased as far as luxury, semi-luxury and unnecessary goods were concerned Hon. members may say that the information contained herein is not correct. I can only say that according to the evidence before me that argument falls away. What is more, on page 56 of the report on that investigation it appears that the average income of the average Soweto family is R70.1. In other words, if the average expenditure amounts to R66.9 there is still another R3.20 per month which is not spent on the necessities of life, or on any other items which are not classified as necessities of life.

In conclusion I just want to say that this same survey indicates on page 36 that as far as private transport in Soweto is concerned 7 per cent of the inhabitants owned bicycles in 1967 and that 12 per cent owned bicycles in 1962. But 11 per cent owned cars in 1967 as against only 4 per cent in 1962. The percentage of the population which spent money on luxury items therefore increased from 4 per cent to 11 per cent in 1967. Three per cent of them owned lorries in 1962, as against 4 per cent in 1967. One per cent of the population owned scooters in 1967, while in 1962 probably none of them owned scooters. I mention these statistics to disprove the accusation of that side of the House that this sales duty as embodied in this Bill severely affects the people living below the breadline. According to the information in front of me, which I shall loan to hon. members if they want it, that accusation is unfounded.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Wonderboom has produced statistics to show how well-to-do the Bantu are. I shall leave the people of South Africa to judge for themselves how rich they are. I shall leave the pensioner and the person living on a fixed income to answer the hon. member for Wonderboom when they start to pay this tax. One can prove anything with statistics, and I am not going to argue barren figures with him. I shall leave him to be judged by the public of South Africa, of all races.

However, two things I cannot ignore. The first is the way in which the hon. member for Wonderboom misrepresented the case of this side of the House as put by the hon. member for Constantia. At no time has any member on this side of the House suggested that a tax should be announced 12 months in advance, so that people are given a chance to stock up in the interim. That was never the suggestion of this side of the House. If the hon. member had been listening, he would have known that what we suggested was that an immediate tax on luxury items should now be imposed and that arrangements should be made for financing the shortfall, and that in a year’s time the lists could be reviewed in the light of experience. That was the suggestion. Then the hon. member went on to quote, in his defence, from an article in Commercial Opinion, of May, 1969. I happen to have it here as well. He quoted up to the end of the first paragraph, and then stopped. He then went on to quote from the next page. But why did he stop there? The reason he stopped there was that the very next words are as follows—

The article continues, and I now quote from the English translation—

The article goes on to mention the concern expressed by Mr. Harold Groom of the Durban Chamber of Commerce. Instead of quoting that, the hon. member avoided the section which deals with the problems and the difficulties. If that is the value of his quotation, I shall leave the House to judge it.

What is your point?

My point is that the article quoted proved exactly the opposite of what the hon. member tried to prove. What the article said was that industry welcomed the levelling out of the inequalities in taxation, but had found in the practical application that there were problems and difficulties which could have been avoided. That is exactly our case. The weakness is not in the principle. We accept that. The weakness lies in the application and in the scope of these measures, and both those points are made here.

This Bill deals with three different fields. It deals with customs; with excise; and with sales tax. I want to say just a word on customs before coming to the sales tax aspect. Last year we had a similar Customs Act Amendment Bill. We had a Bill which introduced far-reaching and what we then described as rushed, ill-conceived and radical provisions. A year has passed, and now we have the next instalment of amendments. The reason given last year for these amendments was that there were widespread swindles, dishonesty and evasion of customs duty. Figures of R34 million and R40 million were mentioned, creating the impression that the importers of South Africa were swindling the State on a vast scale. We took exception to that implication and reflection on commerce and the importers of South Africa. However, we were told: “Just you watch. In terms of these amendments you are now going to see all sorts of legal actions and prosecutions against the people concerned.” What are the facts, Sir? The mountain gave forth a mouse. There have been four convictions of fraud, with a total value of R2,381. There were only four convictions, after all the talk of millions of rand, and after the impression had been created of dishonesty in commerce on a vast scale.

[Inaudible.]

The point is that in every walk of life you have convictions for fraud, week after week, month after month, for far more important matters and bigger amounts. That hon. member’s profession would be very upset if, because a man was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for fraud this week, the impression was created that all accountants were frauds. The impression created was that this swindling was on such a vast scale that it implicated a vast section of commerce. It was not this hon. Deputy Minister who said it, but I think the hon. the Minister owes commerce an apology. The scope displayed by the prosecutions was so small that that could have been dealt with without all the panic. I hope that the hon. the Minister will do the right thing to commerce and apologize for the false impression which was created last year. Needless to say, in the administration of the Act, we were right in most of our arguments and very little has been applied, except to isolated imports.

I do not want to spend more time on the customs aspect because my time is very limited, neither do I want to spend my time on excise, except for saying that we intend to move an amendment in the Committee Stage in regard to the tax on beer as it is proposed to amend it. We feel that this is the wrong principle, and we shall deal with that in the Committee Stage. However, I want to give notice now that we shall move the removal of the sliding scale on beer. We shall also move for a flat rate on beer, which will enable it to take its proper tax-level, instead of, as at present, being the highest taxed, although the lowest drink in alcohol content on the South African market.

Is beer not a luxury?

I am talking about the inequality. I am talking from a health point of view and from the point of view of Government policy. As I say, I do not want to get involved in the detail of that argument, but I did not want to pass it by entirely.

I now want to refer to the sales tax. The hon. member for Constantia has put our point of view in broad principle. I want to deal in a little more detail with the method proposed for the application of this tax. I want to say that I believe that this is clumsy, unrealistic and impractical. We accept that there are wide discretionary powers and the very presence of those wide discretionary powers indicates that the hon. the Minister realizes that this measure, as proposed, is in fact impractical. If it is going to work he has to have almost unlimited powers to amend and change its application as he goes along. I believe the problem is that the method of application of this tax has been drawn up without a proper understanding or knowledge of the functioning of industry. It is estimated that between eight and ten thousand firms are going to be affected by this sales tax. In the jewellery industry alone I believe there are over 400 jewellers involved, and there are hundreds and hundreds of small factories. Has the hon. the Minister never been into these factories, the small partnership, the man and the wife factory which has hardly any, if any, clerical workers—with only a few books which have to be kept at night in a dingy little corner? Has he never been to these factories where virtually the only paper work is the absolute essentials required for income tax? I know the hon. the Minister is going to say that at this stage he is exempting all firms with a turnover of under a R1,000 per year. That does not change the picture. Many of these firms in any case have a turnover of well over a R1,000 per year. Many of these factories are run by people who can hardly understand English or Afrikaans; they are immigrants. The method of collection and administration proposed—which I submit will not and cannot work,—is being imposed on them. I want to propose an alternative with which I want to deal in more detail later. The point I want to make at this stage is that these hundreds of small factories, with a minimal clerical staff, are all part of the production miracle of South Africa. They are all part of the production capacity of this country of ours and help produce what our people need. They are part of the machinery of production. They are an essential element. On this wide field, varying from major factories with modern accounting systems and computers down to the one-man or husband-and-wife partnership or little back-yard factories, the same system is planned for the collection of sales tax. In many of these factories, in fact in any efficient factory, the emphasis is on productivity and not on paper work. Every minute and every hour that is spent on the filling in of forms and papers, is time taken off the productivity of that plant.

Do you really believe in what you are saying?

I do not only believe what I am saying, but I also know because I have been to these places. If that hon. member has ever been into that sort of factory …

I have been in more factories than you have ever been.

Well, Mr. Speaker, he does not seem to know anything about it.

How can you talk about productivity without paper work?

I said a minimum of paper work. But now, let me see what this hon. member wants. Here I have the two memoranda to which my colleague referred, one of 33 pages and one of 23 pages. These memoranda set out how this tax is going to be applied. I do not want to repeat what was said by the hon. member for Constantia, but I want to refer to the procedure which must be followed. First of all, every factory must be licensed. Then, in addition to being licensed, they must license any warehouse divorced from the factory. If I remember rightly, the hon. the Minister, when he first mentioned this tax, said that there would be no fee payable for licensing. Did the hon. the Minister say that? It is on record anyway in one of the voluminous documents that there would be no fee for licensing. In fact, the Act lays down that a fee must be paid before a factory can be licensed. It cannot be licensed until the fee is paid. That is one of the provisions of the Bill. After the factory is licensed, it must establish a certificate of value for every item it produces. A certificate of value takes three pages, which show the item, the price per dozen, lb., or whatever it is, the price it is sold at to all the different possible markets it could be sold to, institutions, businesses, fulltime merchant wholesalers and appropriation for own use, etc. It shows the discount or commission and the estimated annual percentage of disposal. It goes on to deal with sales and to whom it was sold. It deals with any circumstances affecting the product, any installation charges, discounts, quantity discounts, trade discounts, cash discounts, etc. Then it also deals with delivery costs and in the end it contains the sworn declaration. That form must be filled in for every single sales tax item which a factory produces. That is what the Bill lays down. Of course, it is not being applied. We are being asked to pass a law which is not being applied, which cannot be applied. I have an example of one factory which produces 22 different brands of products. Every brand is divided into two classifications; one for industrial use and one for household use. There are 100 packs. Multiply that and it amounts to some 4,000 items. Another firm produces over 2,000 items. However, the Bill before us contemplates that a certificate of value must be established for each. What in practice is going to happen is already happening, namely firms are told that their selling price to the retailer will be accepted less 60 per cent, or whatever it may be. They are obliged to do that. But that is not what we are being asked to vote for. That is not what the hon. the Minister said the procedure would be. That is not what this explanatory notice lays down. It is only where the department gives a concession that that is avoided. But according to the laid-down procedure, this certificate of value must be completed for every item. Then, having established the value, having licensed your factory and your bonded store, you then come to your ingredients. There is another memorandum which lays down the accounting procedure. This procedure ends up with 10 forms, namely forms D.A.75 10 up to D.A.75 32A. What are these forms for? Incidentally, every manufacturer must have these foolscap page forms printed especially; they are not supplied. These forms deal with the components, with the ingredients, with rebates, with removals, with drawbacks, with removals ex warehouse, collection vouchers, in bond re warehousing. For every item that is moved out of a factory into a warehouse, out of one warehouse into another warehouse, a complicated form has to be filled in with costing, the price and certain other details which are being asked for. A large percentage of factories could not complete these records. The illusion is that each of these will be a bond store and that it will be possible to control the stock in these stores. Has the hon. the Minister not seen factories with stock piled up in the office, piled in the passages, accumulated in odd corners of the factory waiting for an especially busy delivery period? However, this will be a bond store and somehow in the vivid imagination of the Government there will be control over this uncontrollable stock. Every time an item is moved in or out of a store or a factory one of these forms will have to be filled in. Every time a bit of paint is put onto a toy you will have to calculate how much paint there is on the toy so that you can work out how much drawback you will receive under rebate for the component. That is what the law says; that is what the Bill before us says. The hon. the Minister can shake his head. The reason he has to shake his head is because this will not work. In practice he is already having to establish different procedures and different methods. But what we are being asked to vote for is a calculation on every item of the ingredients, how much is in it before filling in one of these complex forms. At the end of all these procedures, the accounting form, D.A. 75 must be filled in. This form will have to be completed by all these factories in quintuplet. It must have a 10 cent revenue stamp and must be accompanied by a bank guaranteed cheque. This is utter nonsense. These are established factories and if a cheque bounces they can take action the same as they would with income tax. But no; for every payment every month they must go to the bank to obtain a bank guaranteed cheque to accompany this form. D.A. 75, which 90 per cent of industrialists will find it impossible to maintain or to complete. That is what we are being asked to vote for. The hon. the Minister knows that industry has been to him and has explained that this is not practical. When you fill in all these accounts, all these forms, you also fill in “A” forms. Form 32A is to amend every mistake. Then when you send out samples with your traveller you have to charge those samples out and pay sales tax on them. When the salesman brings them back to the factory you fill in another form and can receive a rebate. How ridiculous can one get? Every box of samples that is sent out with a traveller has to be entered in the form as a sale from the factory. The cost must be worked out and sales tax must be paid on it. When the traveller brings these items back they will have to be rebated. But when these samples are sold eventually the full tax will be paid on the full price even though those samples are sold cheaply as they always are at the end of a season. They are shop soiled, handled by the customers and sold for a nominal amount. But because a certificate of value has been established, full tax will have to be paid on that. One can go on with aspect after aspect of this. Cash discounts are allowed, but no other discount. Repacking is a manufacturing process. If a firm buys in bulk and packs that into another packing, that becomes a manufacturing process and sales duty will have to be paid on the final price. Therefore, if you buy a bag of sugar for your store and pack that into half pound packets, you are manufacturing. You therefore have to pay sales duty on that sugar. Then you apply for a rebate on another of these forms so that you can get the sales tax repaid on the original item. Well, sugar is a bad example because there is no sales tax on it. However, this is the case with any item on which a sales tax has to be paid, for example sweets. If you buy a case of sweets and pack it into packets you will have to pay the sales duty on your final packet and apply for rebate on the duty paid on the original box. On every form, book or invoice printers will have to pay a sales duty. But what about the firms with their own printing works, printing their own forms and their own books? Who will pay for them? Will they have to work out the cost, establish a neutral value? We are being asked to place a tax on every book, receipt book, invoice book or whatever it may be. Will every firm that prints its own stationery, by whatever means, have to become a factory, license itself as a factory and pay sales tax on every bit of paper which it processes through its printing works, as well as paying tax on the paper of course? At least with imports the system is simple. There are two documents, namely a certified invoice and a bill of lading.

I want to propose to the hon. the Minister that he should listen to what industry has suggested to him. He should forget all this nonsensical and impossible documentation. He should have a simple sales tax based upon audited sales figures every quarter because every firm must have an auditor for its income tax. That auditor can give him a certified sales figure on taxable items every quarter. Once a quarter they can pay on that auditor’s certificate instead of all this documentation, which is impossible. I want to suggest that the payment be 30 days and not 7 days afterwards. However, I do not have time to argue that. I also want to suggest that ingredients and components be rebated entirely when they are used in manufacturing processes because neither industry nor the Minister’s department has the staff to control this. The hon. the Minister’s department cannot control this. He does not have the staff to control what is being done now. We are simply creating a monstrous mechanism of paper filling which with those who are honest will lead merely to extra cost and trouble, while those who are dishonest will get away with it. I appeal to the hon. the Minister to simplify this and to do away with all this involved procedure. He should let us delete, as we will move in Committee, the essentials, the tax only on non-essentials—on luxury goods—applied on a much simpler basis.

There are also other matters, but I do not have time to deal with them now. There is only one I want to mention now. I have examples here of bills of entry where there is a nil duty, on labels for instance, supplied free with cloth. There is a sales duty in one case on estimated values of 75 cents and of 20 cents. There is no charge, but a form has to be filled in in quintuplet, all these procedures followed to collect a miserable duty of 10 cents at the end. That too could be done away with. It is absolute nonsense.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Durban (Point) and the hon. member for Constantia very clearly stated the case of this side of the House in regard to our attitude concerning the Second Reading of this Bill which is to alter the application of the sales duty especially and the acceptance of that principle at this stage. I should like to address the House on a particular issue concerning the sales duty. Obviously this will be a duty adversely affecting a large number of people and therefore we will have to find ways and means of assisting them in some way. The question of providing rebates and refunds as far as the sales duty is concerned, is a most important issue. If one looks at Schedule No. 7 one will see that rebates and refunds of sales duty are permitted on goods for the use of the State, public hospitals and other institutions or bodies. I should like to suggest that the hon. the Minister should give consideration to extending the rebates to registered welfare organizations. We believe that these people deserve special consideration in view of the fact that they do receive a subsidy from the Government. However, the subsidy falls far short of many of the items they require for equipping these institutions. If the Government does not increase the subsidy to meet the extra sales duty that now has to be paid, it will still have to come from Revenue. Therefore, at the Committee Stage, I intend moving an amendment if the hon. the Minister does not indicate at this stage that he is prepared to give favourable consideration to the plea that these registered welfare organizations should receive rebates in regard to the sales duty.

Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether it is expected of me to reply to the debate now, before the adjournment of the House. I shall in any case probably have to reply further on Monday. We have just dealt with the Estimates of Expenditure this week. The Opposition did not move the amendment for the omission of one single amount from it. We had the Income Tax Act; the Opposition welcomed and accepted it without amendments. There is now an amount of money which has to be found. The hon. the Minister answered and dealt with these so-called alternative suggestions by the Opposition during the Budget debate. All that remains for me to do, is simply to reply to the alternative suggestion in so far as it relates to sales duty. The Opposition has not yet told us what it wants to suggest. So far we have only heard from them in the vaguest of terms that they want to levy a tax of perhaps 15 per cent to 20 per cent on luxury goods. The hon. member for Constantia as well as the hon. member for Durban (Point) both discussed luxury goods to-day. They have still made no effort to tell us what they mean by luxury goods. They have still not defined them. We still do not have the vaguest idea of what they plan to do.

Wait until the Committee Stage.

We can now look forward to hearing in the Committee Stage what they mean by luxury goods and what the tariff is that they want to levy on those goods. Apart from that the Opposition wants to bring in a variety of other goods and make them subject to sales duty. They will also have to indicate to us in the Committee Stage precisely what they envisage in this connection.

The Opposition to-day made quite a point of the initial uncertainty with the introduction of the sales duty. I should like to make it very clear that this sales duty was not dreamt up overnight. As long ago as 1964 the Department had had a very thorough inquiry made into the introduction of a system of sales duty in South Africa. The proof of that lies in the fact that the Customs and Excise Act of 1964, the principal Act, was already worded by the Department at that time in such a way that a system of sales duty could be administered under it. We did not only recently discover it. The Act was drafted as long ago as 1964. In spite of what the hon. member for Durban (Point) said this Bill which we are now dealing with is really of a consequential nature.

It is the same as the Customs Act.

Yes, precisely. In order to show that it fits in and in order to show that it was expected, this Bill is actually a mere consequential one. I can count the clauses with a view to my reply to the House, but here are numerous clauses in which “sales duty goods” was added, or where “excise duty” was omitted and “locally inserted goods” inserted. It shows how well the system of the collection of sales duty fits into the Act which we already have. I shall go into greater detail on the intricacies of the Act which bother the hon. member for Durban (Point). It does not deal with clauses which we have only recently introduced into the Act. It deals with sections which already exist and are applied in connection with the collection of customs and excise duties.

There is one minor point which the hon. member raised towards the end of his speech and to which I should now like to reply. He maintained that we were occupying ourselves with trifles. The hon. member gave the example of office printing facilities. The hon. member wants offices which do their own printing to be exempted. What is then to become of the printing works which do printing as an occupation? Must they alone pay sales duty? Must all people in offices now withdraw their business from him and carry out their own printing to a certain extent in the offices and then not be subject to sales duty?

Must each office with a Gestetner now register as a factory?

No, not duplicating machines. That is not the intention at all. The hon. member for Durban (Point) must not think that the Department will do anything silly with the introduction of this sales duty. We could not consult people before the introduction of sales duty. The Department could not consult persons, but the Department itself could investigate the matter. The hon. member for Durban (Point) must remember that there was no previous experience of this. What experience was there? This is something new in South Africa. I shall go into these guiding suggestions which were made. I shall go into the present negotiations which are there in order to facilitate these quarterly settlements. But to think that we started with this two months ago and that it operates well and to the reasonable satisfaction of the industries to-day is, I think, a very great achievement on our part.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 23 and debate adjourned.