Mr. Chairman, as we indicated during the Second Reading debate on this measure, we will oppose this measure throughout. We will oppose all of the clauses, with the exception of those few parts which we indicated during the Second Reading debate are acceptable or are at least improvements on what stands in the law today. In dealing with clause 1, which amends the definition clause of the principal Act, I wish to move the deletion of paragraphs (c) and (e). The new paragraph (b) of section 1 (2) as it stand in the Bill proposes to alter the definition of a white person and reads as follows—

The following words are deleted from the original paragraph—

The effect of this amendment is to make every person in South Africa who is not a Bantu a Coloured until such time as he proves to the contrary. It now places the onus fair and square on every white person in this country to prove that he is a white person. When one looks at the further provisions of this Bill, such as that of hearsay evidence on the question of heredity not being acceptable, and that the classification of the parents shall be paramount in deciding upon the classification of a person, this makes an absolute mockery of the whole thing. We are therefore entirely opposed to this paragraph.

I now want to deal with the new section 1 (3) of the Act as substituted by clause 1 (e) of the Bill. The new subsection reads as follows—

and then the following words are added—

The subsection then reads further—

We object to this clause of the Bill entirely, as I pointed out during the Second Reading debate.

Order! The subsections are contained in the principal Act, except for the addition of a few words. The hon. member may only discuss the words that are being added.

I agree, Sir, but if you will allow me, I want to lead up to my argument with a few words. The effect that the addition of these few words will have is what counts. What I am discussing is the effect these few words will have.

I now want to come back to the new section 1 (3). In terms of this subsection as it stands in the Act to-day, any person whose census form was filled in in 1951 and the word “Mixed” was added, is classified as being a Coloured person unless he can prove the contrary.

Only if he signed it himself.

Not only if he signed it himself. In terms of further amendments that come later in the Bill, that argument no longer holds any water. I submit that this is the only opportunity we will have to discuss this particular aspect. It is only with the discussion of clause 1 now that we will be able to discuss that particular aspect, namely the question of the signing of the census form where a person himself is concerned. The words “or in any application for an identity card” which are added seem to be quite innocuous when read on their own. Clause 4 of the Bill, however, which amends section 13 (1) of the principal Act, provides that the Secretary may include a name in the register when an application is received for an identity card including—and here again it is merely the addition of a few words which makes it abhorrent to us—an application completed by “or on behalf” of any person. Here again, with due respect to my learned friend, we once again come to the question that whether or not the form was completed by the person concerned, the Department, the Secretary or the Minister shall act in terms of that form. This is why this particular amendment is now even more abhorrent than it was before. We oppose this clause, and therefore I move—

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendment, as printed—

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that no one in this Committee will have any objection to the amendment moved by the hon. the Minister. But surely he is going to reply to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District)?

Mr. Chairman, it is not necessary for me to reply to the amendment moved by the hon. member. We ironed this matter out thoroughly during the Second Reading debate and it is a question of the onus of proof. I agree with the hon. member’s exposition of it; it is necessary. I do not want to argue about this, because I regard these amendments as essential and I am not prepared to accept the hon. member’s amendment.

It is “finish and klaar”.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, but it is not “finish and klaar”. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District) has moved to delete two paragraphs of this clause and has motivated his amendments. He has given reasons why he thinks they ought to be deleted. The hon. the Minister just says that he is not going to accept the amendment. Surely that is not the spirit of this House? The hon. the Minister should say why he will not accept the amendment. May I remind the hon. the Minister that when he replied to the Second Reading debate he said that there were quite a number of matters he could not reply to, but that during the Committee Stage he would deal with them.

Order! The hon. member is now making general remarks. He should confine his arguments to the clause under discussion.

No, I am not. I am dealing with the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District) and the reply of the hon. the Minister. Surely I am entitled to do that? I hope the hon. the Minister will say why he wants to amend section 1 (2) (b) and section 1 (3) of the principal Act. In the new section 1 (3) the words “or in any application for an identity card” are added, which relates to the question of the census form and to the births, marriages and deaths form. This amendment is very important. The whole Act is based on certain documents and is in this subsection based on “any form or return referred to in section 3” of the Act, which is the census form, or referred to in section 9, which are the forms relating to this particular Act including the births, marriages and deaths form which has to be submitted. On that basis, up to now, one’s identity and classification was determined. Now, on a very unsatisfactory basis for determining something like this, if I may say so, namely a form that is filled in very often on behalf of someone, any information in an application form an identity card is now also to form the basis for determining one’s classification. We have heard a lot about experience and how one should be classified. The hon. member has moved to delete the paragraph because this is an unsatisfactory way of classifying people, namely from information in forms which they might not themselves have completed. This might have been completed on that person’s behalf by someone else, and whatever is in that document …

Order! The present Act provides that it can be done that way. The hon. member is now speaking on the present Act; he must confine himself to the amendment.

No, I am not dealing with the present Act, Sir. Section 3 of the present Act says that you may classify someone in accordance with information which is on a census form or a form in relation to this Act, including the Births, Marriages and Deaths Act (section 9). It is now proposed that the other information that may be used is information contained in a form of application for an identity card. This further extends the sort of form on which one is going to be classified. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District) said that we do not approve of this further extension because it is unreal. Surely we are entitled to hear from the hon. the Minister why he thinks it is necessary to have this form on that basis.

I should like to accommodate the hon. member for Durban (North), but I do not think he wants my explanation on this clause; he wants me to give him arguments in order to enable him to go on arguing.

He is looking for arguments.

In any event, I shall very briefly and concisely explain the motives for the insertion of these two paragraphs, the deletion of which the hon. member moved, and then indicate why I am not prepared to agree to that. As regards clause 1 (c), it was decided by the court that this paragraph, as it read then, placed an onus of proof on the person who submitted that he was usually accepted as a white person and that that onus of proof could be discharged on a preponderance of probabilities. In respect of a Bantu, however, the effect of this paragraph is that where a person is not obviously a Bantu in appearance, an onus of proof can be placed on the department to prove that the person is accepted as a Bantu. Section 19 (1), on the other hand, places an onus of proof on a person who in appearance is obviously a Bantu, to prove that he is not a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa, and is not generally accepted as such. These are two conflicting onuses of proof. The effect of the amendment is to remove the reference to a Bantu from the paragraph concerned and to bring about uniformity in respect of the onus of proof. So much for the first amendment, i.e. that paragraph (c) be deleted. In respect of the other proposed amendment on page 5, paragraph (e), the position is as follows: The reference to an application for an identity card was already inserted into the Act on the occasion of the 1967 amendment, and the insertion thereof in this subsection is merely a consequential extension. It should be mentioned that the presumption created by this subsection is refutable. As a result of this necessity I am not prepared to accept these amendments.

Surely the hon. the Minister is not entirely right when he says that this amendment is merely consequential on the amendment which was introduced in the 1967 legislation, in view of a clause which this Committee will be asked to deal with in a moment, clause 7. Sir, I naturally cannot go into that in detail at this stage, but I can at least refer the hon. the Minister to that clause and point out to him that this is introducing an entirely new subsection, and the effect of that subsection is to take the matter a lot further than the 1967 legislation. The effect of this proposed amendment is to make it possible to refer to an application form for an identity card, and it can be an application not only signed or made by the person concerned but one made on his behalf in terms of the proposed amendment which is to be introduced by clause 7. It is that aspect of it which we ask the hon. the Minister to justify. We asked the hon. the Minister why this is being done, because it is a provision which is obviously unfair to an individual if reference can be made to a form in an application made on behalf of such a person, not made by himself but on his behalf, and if that information is going to be deemed to be correct. Surely the hon. the Minister must accept that this is a provision which makes it very difficult for the person concerned, and surely the hon. the Minister is going to tell this Committee why the Government wants to go so far.

Sir, so far speakers have dealt with paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), all of which we have suggested should be deleted. I want to come to paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) has the effect of amending the definition of “Secretary” by the deletion of one word and the substitution of many others in place thereof. I will read it as it is suggested the definition of “Secretary” should read—

This is prima facie a clause which appears in almost all measures where certain powers of delegation are given and where a definition of the person to whom the power is delegated must be included in the definitions. Sir, the Opposition has never really had any objection to delegation where the delegation of powers has been to a responsible officer, and there has been very little objection even to the term “officer”, but we have very positive objections to the phrase “a person employed by the State or the holder of a post in the public service”, because this takes it beyond the realm of a responsible officer of the State. Sir, a “responsible officer” or a “senior officer” denotes one thing. An “officer” still denotes somebody with a degree of authority, with a certain standing or status within the Public Service, and somebody who would have the necessary degree of responsibility to exercise the delegated powers in a responsible manner. But it is a different matter when these powers are delegated to “a person employed by the State”. Even a casual employee, even a person employed just for a month or a person employed only for a specific task, is included in such a definition. Sir, I know why this amendment has been brought and I am sure the hon. the Minister knows why it has been brought. It has been brought to circumvent certain judgments given by the Supreme Court in this country. That is the reason for this definition. The hon. the Minister knows of Mr. Justice Beyers’ ruling in December of last year, and that is why he brought this amendment. Formerly people had a right of appeal to the courts in South Africa. This Minister and the Government are now going out of their way to circumvent the decisions of the highest courts in the country to further their own political ends. I do not think that the hon. the Minister in this case can claim that this is in furtherance of the interests of South Africa; this is to further the political ends of a political party.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

A person employed by the State would include, as I mentioned in the Second Reading, an enumerator employed in 1951 and this is being inserted merely to ratify the classifications that were made by enumerators in 1951.

They were temporary employees.

They were temporary employees of the State acting under certain instructions, without any definitions, without any prior training, without any specialized knowledge of what they were told to do. They were simply told to make certain entries on certain forms or to see that certain forms were fully completed and if they were not completed they had to make these entries themselves. The hon. the Minister is taking the power to-day to ratify the decisions which were made then when the full import, the full implication, of what they were deciding was not apparent either to the persons who were being enumerated or to the enumerators who were filling in the forms. Sir, the second half of this amendment relates to “the holder of a post in the Public Service”. Here once again I want to come back to what we consider is an officer in the Public Service and what would be the holder of a post in the Public Service. An “officer” would denote somebody of a senior grade, but the “holder of a post” could mean the tea messenger, the Bantu employed to make the tea in the office or to deliver the mail.

You are repeating.

With respect, Sir, the argument is no less valid for repetition. In fact, I feel it is such a good argument that it is worth repeating. The hon. the Minister said during the Second Reading that this measure showed the tremendous gulf which existed between that side of the House and this side of the House in the policies followed by the two parties. Let me say that in this amendment which the hon. the Minister is bringing now this tremendous gulf is once again shown up.

Order! The hon. member must stop generalizing and come back to the clause.

Sir, I am dealing with this point about “a person employed by the State or a holder of a post in the Public Service” and I want to say that this is just another manifestation that the Government will go to any lengths to put forward its political ideology …

Order! The hon. member must stop repeating now.

Sir, I submit that I have made my point. I move—

Mr. Chairman, there is a principle involved here quite apart from this particular Bill and the phraseology of this Bill. Here the Government takes the power to delegate powers to the lowest employee of the department, but this is against the Government’s own policy. We had a case a day ago with the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, where, because a clerk had to make an assessment, the hon. the Minister of Finance wanted the power to revise the assessment of the clerk because he said “How can you expect a simple clerk to be able to do the job properly?” This was in relation to the valuation of property, and in that case the Government said, “We do not have faith in our employees in the lower echelons because they have not had proper training.” But, Sir, when it comes to the whole future of a person, then the Government is prepared to go the whole hog and allow anybody to act. What is the Government’s policy in this matter? Is it to delegate powers to senior officials who have the knowledge and training to do the job, or is it to delegate powers to all and everybody? In the one case it is obviously the Government’s policy not to delegate to all and everybody and in this case, because it suits them, it is their policy to delegate powers to everybody.

Mr. Chairman, with reference to paragraph (b) of clause 1, I just want to say that it has all along been the intention of the legislature that the 1951 census forms would be used for classification. It is therefore absolutely necessary for this amendment to be made, in order to make the intention of the legislature quite clear. All the forms filled in during all those years by officers were in the first place used for classification. Persons who were unhappy about their classification, had the right of appeal. Thousands of classifications have been carried out quite satisfactorily with the assistance of those forms. I therefore do not know what the hon. members want to fight about now.

I will not reply on paragraph (c). I think the hon. the Minister has explained very fully to hon. members opposite what the position is.

The effect of the new subsection (3) inserted by paragraph (e) is only to insert a few additional words. The words “in an application for an identity card” are being inserted. If we look at section 1 (2) (d) (ii) of the original Act, we find that that form is mentioned there in connection with the application for an identity card. In other words, this provision is now merely being brought into line with section 1 (2) (d) (ii) of the Act. That is all that is happening here. I just want to tell hon. members that it still remains the position that such a form has to be signed by a person before it can be held against him directly. This provision only provides for a transfer of the onus of proof.

Mr. Chairman. I rise to support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District). We have heard arguments here about the dilution of the powers of the Secretary. When one reads this Bill one realizes that the powers of the Secretary, as enumerated in this Bill, go very, very far. The classification of any individual is a very serious matter. The effect on the future life of such an individual is tremendous. To allow the dilution of the Secretary’s powers to the extent proposed by this clause is, I think, going too far when a matter such as this is involved. The hon. member said that this clause is merely to validate what happened during the time of the census. It goes further than that. The Secretary or the Minister of the Interior can delegate the authority to anybody in the Public Service to go around and carry out investigations. That person will have the right to classify. It is all wrong, and I do not think that that was ever the intention of the Minister. In order to do one thing, he has opened the door for something else. As I have said, this is a very serious matter. It is one to which the Minister should give consideration. He can now have persons appointed by the Secretary to investigate doubtful cases. That person who is appointed can have the power to reclassify such a person. Such an official may be completely incompetent. He may have had only a few years service. He may know nothing about colour. I would hate to think of a person coming from the Transvaal being given such powers, because such a person may know very little about colour. Yet he may have the power to reclassify people. If this were to happen, it would be just too terrible for words.

I should like the Minister to give serious consideration to this matter. [Interjections.] Yes, that is what it means. The hon. the Minister can read into it what he likes. I have had experience of this particular law, and I am speaking from experience. I would hate to see this Bill remain in its present form, because it will create dangers. I am amazed at the Minister allowing his Department and his Secretary to have their powers diluted to this extent. This clause goes very far. In paragraph (e) of this clause the census form can be examined to see whether a person is mixed or not. Whatever is stated on that form counts, and one is classified according to that form. Let us take the case of a person who is classified as White in his census form. In his application for an identity card, such a person may by mistake indicate that he is mixed. Notwithstanding the information contained in his census form, that person will still be classified as a Coloured then. Surely that is just so much rubbish. Are we not going a little bit too far? On the one hand we are diluting the powers of the Secretary for the Interior to such an extent that anybody appointed by him will have his powers in this connection. On the other hand, if a person applies for an identity card, he may, because his father may be Irish and his mother Scottish, indicate that he is “mixed”. They may then decide to classify him as a Coloured on the strength of his declaration. He has then to go through the whole process of law to prove that he is in fact a white person. His own census form may state that he is White, but his application for an identity card may show that he is “mixed”.

Let us take the case of a minor who reaches the age when he has to apply for an identity card. He may have no idea of the law. Such a person may be misdirected, and he may then fill his application form in wrongly. Surely such a person should be protected. Such a person may have a white birth certificate. If someone were to instruct him to fill in his form as “mixed” he would be damned for life as a person of another colour. I should like to ask the Minister to give consideration to these points. Sir, we have spent years here diluting our own powers. Now why does the Minister take powers here so that he can go much further and dilute the powers of his own Department?

Order! The hon. member is indulging in tedious repetition. I put the question.

On a point of order, Sir, the hon. member for Parow stood up.

I did not see him. There is nobody standing now.

Omission of paragraphs (b) and (c), proposed by Mr. W. T. Webber, put and negatived (Official Opposition and Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Amendment proposed by the Minister of the Interior put and agreed to.

Question put: That paragraph (e) stand part of the clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and remaining amendment proposed by Mr. W. T. Webber negatived.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Clause, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I just want to explain briefly why this amendment is being moved. The new subsection (6) will now read as follows—

Subsection (5), to which reference is being made in subsection (6), is the one which provides for classification according to origin. What we are saying now, is that the provisions of that subsection, i.e. the one which provides for classification according to origin, will now be applied “(a) so long as such classification has not been altered in terms of this Act”. In other words, it goes without saying that if the classification of the parent is altered, the classification of the children has to be altered as well, but that the child cannot apply for the classification of the parent to be altered. The second part of the subsection deals with the question which we have discussed at great length during the Second Reading debate, i.e. that the classification of the parent does not cease upon the death of the parent concerned. In other words, even if the parent has died, the child shall still be classified according to the classification of the deceased parent.

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendment—

I think that this is probably one of the most harmful clauses in the Bill because it affects those persons who have been classified in terms of the subgroups of the Coloured people. As from now on any children born out of the union of parents of a subgroup of the Coloured group, will take on the classification of the father. The mother now plays no part in the classification at all. This in itself is intrinsically incorrect because obviously both parents have or should have an equal bearing on the classification of the children.

It is, however, particularly hard in the case of the Indian subgroup and the Malay-Coloured subgroup, which has a great deal of intermixture in the Western Province. There are thousands of families affected by this new classification whereby the children have to take the classification of the father of a marriage within a Coloured subgroup. For many generations these people have been living as Coloured Malays. They are Moslems by religion but they do not in fact have anything at all to do with the Indian subgroup. This is of tremendous importance to these people. It means that the children who have been going to Coloured schools and have been living in Coloured group areas will now presumably under the Group Areas Act be moved to Rylands which is the Indian area and there they will have to mix with children of the Indian group for whom they have little affinity, except for their religious affinity.

Of course this provision is going to be effective retrospectively which in itself is something highly objectionable because it breaks up existing communities and in terms of Government policy I think this is quite extraordinary. It is said that the idea of the Government is to help build up communities. We even have a Department of Community Development but by this paragraph we are deliberately breaking down the existing community life. As I have said, literally thousands of people in the Western Province will be affected. It means too that in future generations, since the descent line passes through the paternal side, children will be separated from each other by virtue of the fact that one lot of children on marriage will be classified as Indian and the other lot not, although both lots may marry Coloureds. I am taking as my example the male child of such a union who is now classified as an Indian but later marries a Coloured woman. His children will in turn be classified as Indian. The Coloured daughter classified now as Indian also in terms of the Indian father, may marry a Coloured person. Her children will be classified as Coloured.

In the second generation of this community there is going to be complete separation of cousins by virtue of the fact that the male line is classified according to the father while although the female line is also classified according to the father, on marriage, the children of that marriage may be classified as Coloureds. This is I think an extremely cruel and far-reaching clause. It should not appear in this Bill. It affects also the property rights of these people who have been living as Coloureds in Coloured areas, have owned properties and have carried on business as Coloured people. They may now all be reclassified as Indians. As I have said they have no affinity whatever for the Indian subgroup. This is manifestly unfair. This clause includes also the so-called subsection which “improves” race classification. I am now referring to the proposed subsection (4) (c). This is the paragraph where the Secretary may at any time with the concurrence of any person, or, in the case of a minor, also with the concurrence of his guardian, alter in his discretion the classification of such person in the register.

[Inaudible.]

Well, this is an amusing and an ironical clause. That is the only way I can describe it. This is the clause which deals with the unfortunate genetic throwbacks, people like the unfortunate Sandra Laing who was obviously very dark in colour but who has two parents classified as White. She therefore had to be classified as White in terms of existing legislation dealing with the question of descent. She had difficulty in finding a school that would accept her. The Department of Education had to pay either for a private tutor or had to send her to a private school. She is likely to have difficulty when she grows up in finding anybody classified as White to marry her. So benignly the Government will allow such people to reclassify.

Both ways.

“Both ways” says the hon. member. I am prepared to take a small bet with him that the number of people whom the Secretary will agree to classify up the social ladder will be infinitely fewer than the number of people the Secretary will agree to classify down the social ladder.

What is your bet?

The hon. member can name his stakes. I used the words “up” and “down” advisedly because there is no doubt whatever that colour is the make or break in South Africa. Colour is the yardstick which determines one’s whole status in life, be it political, social or economic. Whether or not one is proud or not proud to be a Coloured or an African, there is no question whatever that being classified as a White classifies one in all regards as a first class citizen and being classified as a Coloured or African classifies one in all regards as to opportunities and privileges as a second and a third class citizen.

As I have said, the Secretary may at any time alter the classification. I must say that in some ways I wish that this had existed when poor Mrs. Singh was having all her problems. Just to remind the Committee, Mrs. Singh was the case of the white girl who married an Indian. They of course had to leave the country in order to marry. They returned to South Africa and were promptly arrested under the Immorality Act but got off on a technicality because the State could not prove domicile. As a result, of course, the Act was altered and domicile now is no longer important in terms of the Mixed Marriages Act. Domicile does not have to be proved. But the point is that Mrs. Singh at one stage wanted to be reclassified as an Indian. Because she was not in fact an Indian, she could not be reclassified. This is the position although she had been accepted by the Indians and could possibly even have passed in appearance. This I understand was possible. Whether it is so, I cannot say. They therefore had to leave the country. I now want to ask the hon. the Minister whether Mrs. Singh can now apply to be reclassified as an Indian. Would he consider this case so that those two can come back to live in this country or not? This is going to have interesting retrospective repercussions.

It took me nearly two years to have a white male person, fair skin, blond and blue eyes, reclassified as a Coloured Malay. This is the person who happened to have adopted the Moslem religion, was very keen to be reclassified. I finally managed with the greatest of difficulty. I presume those difficulties would have been obviated had this clause been on the Statute Book at that time. It is nevertheless ironical. It is to get the Government out of the difficulties which it created for itself by introducing the strict descent clause in 1967. While I am on my feet I wonder whether the hon. the Minister will explain to me, poor fool that I am, why it is necessary to have the proposed subsection (5) (e) in the Bill, when already a person shall be classified as White in terms of the 1967 legislation if both his parents have white classification cards. Now there is added—

I thought that held anyway under the 1967 descent clause.

So did we.

So did you. And does it not?

No.

No, it does not. I suppose the courts have interpreted it so that you must be classified as White if you have two white parents.

You must have two.

You must have two, “but you shall not be”. It is the other way round. I get it now. My learned friend behind me who was not so good on another legal point yesterday, has put me straight on this legal issue.

I would like to support the amendment just moved by the hon. member for Houghton. This seems to me to be a very harsh provision indeed. The Government has got itself into an impossible situation as a result of the Department itself, before a case is referred to a board over and over again classifying one partner in a marriage Coloured and the other partner White. Now the Government is trying to get itself out of this impossible situation by laying down that whichever of the natural parents is classified as Coloured or Bantu then automatically everybody goes into that category. This clause is even more harsh on account of the fact that the right of appeal is now being very much restricted. I would like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to two aspects which have been brought to the notice of the public by decisions of the courts in the last year or two. The one is the case of Mabitle v. The Secretary of the Interior, regarding the classification of a full-blooded Bantu. How are we going to get out of this mixture with a natural father and a Coloured mother? This is very much involved here. Under this clause the race of the natural father is the factor that is going to decide how the whole family is to be classified.

On 12th March this year a case was reported in which a Bantu was fined for having been in an urban area for more than 72 hours. When he came before the Court he said he had no idea that his father was a Bantu, in fact a Pondo. As a matter of fact he did not even know who his father was, he had a Coloured mother. He had been living with Coloured people because he was brought up by his mother. He married a Coloured woman and was living with this Coloured woman in a Coloured area and had a family by her. On the evidence the Judge ruled that this man ought to be classified as a Coloured. How, in terms of this provision, are we going to establish who the natural fathers of these people are, because there are thousands of such cases? This Bill rules out the admission of hearsay evidence, but hearsay evidence is all these people have got. There are thousands of illegitimate children, fathered by migrant Bantu and Coloured people in this area. How are these natural fathers ever to be identified? In the vast majority of cases these are not identifiable. Therefore, the hon. the Minister is going to be hoist with his own petard and is going to meet considerable difficulty in dealing with these matters.

The Department acts on the tenuous basis of census forms and applications for identity cards. According to a ruling given by Judge Beyers here in Cape Town a few months ago, officials cannot now alter census forms any way they like. But this legislation now negatives that ruling and any officer of the Public Service can now do what he likes. Thus the two partners to the marriage can be differently classified in a completely arbitrary manner and everybody then has to accept the racial classification of the natural father although, as I have been saying, in many cases it will not be possible to find out who the natural father was.

For the information of the hon. member for Wynberg I just want to say that the new paragraph (f) of subsection (5) of section 5 has nothing to do with the children of Bantu and Coloured persons.

And if the father was a Coloured?

Paragraph (f) reads, inter alia—

In other words, there are certain ethnic groups within the Coloured group. Within those groups children are classified according to the ethnic group of the father. If a child is born from a marriage between a Coloured and a Bantu person, we are going to decide according to appearance and acceptance. It may happen theoretically that the father is a member of one of the ethnic groups and that the mother has probably been classified as a Bantu. In that case it would be a child born from one Bantu and one Coloured parent. As I have said, in that case we would decide according to appearance and acceptance. However, there are seven ethnic groups within the Coloured group itself, as set out in Proclamation No. 123 of 1967—the Cape Coloured group, the Malay group, the Griqua group, the Chinese group, and so forth. In other words, what is laid down in this Bill, is already being provided for in the Proclamation. All we have to do now, is to make provision for it in the legislation.

As regards paragraph (3) to which the hon. member for Houghton objects, the position is that section 5 (5) (b) already provides that—

Therefore it has already been provided for. I explained during the Second Reading debate yesterday why we were defining it more clearly in the Bill, namely that there was some doubt as regards certain cases which had served before the courts. There was some doubt because one of the persons had not been classified yet. This is all we are doing; we are not introducing anything that is new here. We accepted the principle as long ago as 1967; in other words, this is already being provided for in the Act.

You have not yet explained (f).

I have.

The Minister has not yet explained the difficulties referred to by the hon. member for Houghton nor the difficulties raised by the hon. member for Wynberg. But it seems to me there are even more difficulties in his way; so I want to add my point of view to those already given by these two hon. members. In this clause there is the most extraordinary phraseology I have ever seen. The words “and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act” are inserted in section 5 (5) by paragraph (c) of clause 2.

They are inserted at the beginning of section 5 (5) of the Act. Section 5 of the Act deals with the classifications of persons whose names are included in the register. In this section it says that every person shall be classified by the Secretary as a white person, a Coloured person or a Bantu. Then it goes on to describe the proclamation for the different Coloured sub-groups. Subsection (5) reads:

It deals with all the things which shall happen. Clause 2 (c) amends subsection 5 (5) of the principal Act to read “In the application of this section and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act”.

In his own Act.

In the Act itself. This is really most peculiar, because it refers to the very Act in which this section is contained. I must say that I do not think that I have ever seen such a provision before. Usually in other Acts the wording is, “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law”. But to make provision in an Act with the words “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained” in the Act itself, is something I have never seen before. I think this is going to cause the hon. the Minister and the Department a few difficulties.

The left hand will not know what the right hand is doing.

Surely one has to read every section of every Act in the context in which one finds it. Here it has to be applied “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act”. Surely there are various aspects of this Act. All this is based upon documents. The whole test as to whether one of your parents was classified, was not classified or was not classified properly, depends to a large extent upon documents. If one looks at for example section 12 of the Act, it says that “the Secretary may require proof of correctness of particulars furnished for purposes of this Act”. Is that excluded or is it not excluded? In section 11 there is a provision relating to objections and appeals. Is that to be excluded, or is that not to be excluded? I put this question, because the words “and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act” are inserted by clause 2 (c) at the beginning of section 5 (5) of the principal Act. Then you shall be classified as this, that and the other, regardless of all the other sections of the Act. I have never seen anything like it in my life. I wonder if the hon. the Minister has given his attention to the effect that this might in fact have. On the face of it, it seems to exclude all the other aspects of this Act, like appeals, lodging of objections, furnishing correct particulars and everything else. This can be done regardless of the fact that the documents or evidence which caused someone to be classified as a Coloured person, were incorrect. Would one then be able to avail oneself of the opportunities in the other sections of this Act in order to put the matter right? It seems as if this is not so. I am sure the hon. the Minister will deal with this and therefore I shall not move to delete this provision as yet until we have heard what the hon. the Minister has to say.

Then I want to come to another aspect of this clause. The hon. member for Wynberg will deal with that again and she will move to delete the proviso in clause 2 (b) which inserts the new subsection (4A). If a case is in terms of subsection (4) (b) referred to the board for decision, which is when the Secretary has doubts about a classification, the provisions of subsections (5) to (9) and section 11 shall mutatis mutandis apply with reference to such case. That means that the matter is referred to the board and there is then an appeal from that board to the Supreme Court. However, there is a proviso which reads:

In practice this means that only the Secretary for the Interior is to have an appeal, because at the moment if one is classified as Coloured and one objects to that classification, but the board in fact says that you will remain Coloured, you are then entitled to appeal, and quite rightly so. In 1967 provision was made for the Secretary to appeal. Here the person who appeals is excluded. Why should the Secretary for the Interior …

But he has already had an opportunity to appeal.

This is a case referred to in subsection (4) (b). It says that when the Secretary doubts whether a classification is correct, he may refer the case to a board for decision.

That is his classification after he has had the opportunity to appeal.

If the board changes it, he can appeal, but if the board does not change it, he cannot appeal. Say for example it appears to the Secretary that my classification is incorrect, what does he do? Does he first classify me Coloured and then refer it to a board, or does he refer it straight to a board? That is the question. If he doubted that my classification was correct and changed it, and he then sent it to a board, but the board did not alter his classification of me as Coloured, I cannot appeal. If they do alter it, then the State can appeal. That is what it comes to. Surely if we provided for an appeal to the Supreme Court, we do so for an extremely good reason. I may say that this right of appeal was restricted in 1967. This was done for the very good reason that one is entitled to have the view of a person who is not only an expert on sifting the wheat from the chaff but also, as many of these appeals have shown, a man who knows what this Act means. How many of the appeals to the Supreme Court are appeals on the ground that the board misread the Act? One is not surprised; after all the board consists of laymen. There is a magistrate as the Chairman, but nevertheless, they are laymen and they are not experts in the law. This is why an appeal should lie. If the board were to leave unaltered the classification which was referred to the board by the Secretary and this was done because they completely misconstrued their powers, their rights and the very Act itself, then that person does not have an appeal. The Minister himself is barred from appealing. Under those circumstances, it is desirable that one should know exactly what the implications of the Act are. The hon. the Minister attempted to justify this in his reply to the Second Reading as well … [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I am not a lawyer, nor do I profess to be one. To me as a layman the provisions of the Bill are very clear, and I do not know why the hon. member for Durban (North) has any fault to find with them. Since 1967 the Secretary has had the inherent right to reclassify people. He has had the right to reconsider classifications as well as the right to refer them to the Board. The amending Bill brings only one difference. In the past if the Secretary wanted to reconsider a case after having received information from any source whatsoever, he could take a decision in that regard. I shall illustrate this by means of an example. Suppose a person is white but there is information which necessarily creates doubt in the mind of the Secretary as to the correctness of the classification. He is of the opinion that the person should be a Coloured. In the past he was able to take a decision in this regard himself, or he could refer the matter to the Board. In any event, he had to intimate to the person in what respect he thought the classification to be incorrect. Now an administrative arrangement is being made which facilitates things a great deal. In the first instance, in considering a reclassification the Secretary may decide that the facts he has at his disposal are adequate for making a reclassification. He then informs the person concerned that he is going to be reclassified and he also intimates to such a person in what respects he is of the opinion that the present classification of such a person is incorrect. That person may then come to the Secretary to put his case. The Secretary may decide there and then to classify the person as a non-white on the grounds of the information he has. In that case that person has the right to appeal, because that changes the situation. The person used to be classified as a white person and now he has been reclassified by the Secretary as a non-white person. In that case he has the right of appeal. This is laid down in the legislation. But in another case the Secretary may say that he has doubts about the case. He has information at his disposal and from that it appears that he has to pay attention to the matter. However, he has doubts about the case and refers it to the Board. The Board has the power to conduct a wide investigation into the case. In such a case the Secretary informs the man that his case is to be referred to the Board. In that case, however, he need not intimate to the man in what respects he is of the opinion that the classification of that man is incorrect. This is the only difference between the position as it used to be and as it will be. If the Board decides that the person should in fact be classified as a white person, the situation remains like that. Then the Secretary and the person concerned are in the same boat. Not one of them may appeal. But if the Board changes the classification, the person has the right of appeal. This is quite correct. Off his own bat the person would probably never have had any objection in respect of his classification. But now the Secretary has broached the matter and has taken the initiative. As a result of that, the Board has changed the classification. In that event, i.e. if the Board has made such a change, the person concerned may appeal. If, however, the Board does not make any change, the status quo is maintained. Why should such a person then have any right of appeal?

Mr. Chairman, we are dealing here with possibly the most important clause of the Bill. What is the effect of section 5 of the Act? Section 5 lays down that if the Secretary believes that a classification is incorrect, he can give notice to the person about the situation. Or, if he is satisfied that the classification is wrong, he can alter it. Or, if he still doubts the correctness of such a classification, he can give notice again and refer it to the Board. There we come to this new subsection (4) (b) and (c) which is added by clause 2 (a) and to the new subsection (4A) which is added by clause 2 (b) with the proviso that reads as follows—

It is obvious from this that the right of appeal is limited to those cases where the classification is in fact altered. What will the result be if the Secretary acts in terms of the new section 5 (4) (b) even if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board? Now I want to ask the hon. the Minister a question. My hon. friend from Durban (North) suggested that the Secretary had the right of appeal. I cannot argue with the views of my learned friend, not being a legal man myself. But it has been put to me that the view expressed by the hon. member for Durban (North) is incorrect. Now I want to ask the hon. the Minister, which is correct? Has the Secretary a right of appeal if there is no alteration of the classification? It is obvious that the applicant or the person concerned, the Minister now by this amendment which he is introducing …

What applies to the Secretary applies to the person.

What applies to the Secretary applies to the person. That raises another vista. Let us assume that a person who has been classified White, a person who holds a card with a “W” on it, goes before the Board in terms of such action taken by the Secretary and is then reclassified as Coloured. Has the Secretary the right to appeal against that decision?

Of course, yes. That is contemplated in the Bill. Why do you not read it?

I am glad the hon. the Minister agrees with me on this. Now we get to another point. It can happen that a person who is classified as a Coloured goes before the Board and is reclassified White. He is then happy with the decision and feels that justice has been done. But he still has the Secretary breathing down his neck, because the Secretary can now appeal and say that the Board’s decision was incorrect. Why is this being done? Why is this power being added to those which the Secretary holds already? What is the reason for this? I fail to understand the real reason for this particular amendment.

But he has always had that right.

The hon. member for Parow says that he has always had this right. Is that correct? I am sure this hon. member will stick out his neck when he should not do so. With respect, this is a completely new provision. I fail to see how the hon. member for Parow can make such a statement. However, let us leave that for a moment. Let us go over to the new subparagraphs (e) and (f) which is added by clause 2 (e). The hon. the Minister did not clear up this position in his reply. What will be the position when a Coloured father and a Bantu mother have a child? What will the classification of that child be?

I have told you. That child will be classified on appearance and acceptance.

Appearance and acceptance? But under what provisions of the Act can the hon. the Minister make such a statement, that it will be done on appearance and acceptance? Is this only in the case of a Coloured father and a Bantu mother? If the position was reversed, and a Bantu father and a Coloured mother had a child, which will the position then be? Will it again be appearance and acceptance? But what is the object of this amendment then? Will it only be if both parents are within these seven groups?

Yes, read the clause and you will understand the position. You are arguing in circles.

I am sorry, I might not have had much legal training, but I can read and understand English. Subparagraph (f) reads as follows:

A member of the group.

A member of the group? How do you decide that such a person is a member of that group in the first place? This is the point. The hon. the Minister says that it is decided whether a person is a member of a group by such a person’s appearance and by association. Thereafter, if it is decided that such a person is a member of a certain group, he would then have to be reclassified into one of these seven categories on the classification of his father.

Order! The hon. member for Durban (North) must come back to his seat.

The point is how the hon. the Minister is going to classify such a person into a group in the first place.

By association.

To me this is completely incomprehensible and it shows the utter ridiculousness, as was said by my hon. Leader, of trying to classify the unclassifiable, not only in regard to Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but now into the seven subgroups again.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister very seriously if he would explain the force of his amendment again in regard to clause 2 (e), because quite frankly, in the English text it just does not make sense. Perhaps something has been left out, or there may be something that should be removed to make it read sense. As it is at the moment, the amendment moved by the hon. the Minister just does not make sense at all.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the hon. the Minister will explain to the House what he considers to be the effect of the introduction of the words …

The hon. member may continue. If the hon. member stands and says nothing I will ask him to resume his seat.

I would particularly like to have the attention of the hon. the Minister.

Carry on with your speech. I will look after myself.

The hon. the Minister does not have to be so touchy. What I want to ask the hon. the Minister is to tell the House what he considers to be the effect of the introduction of the words referred to by the hon. member for Durban (North). The hon. member for Durban (North) drew the attention of the House to clause 2 (c), in which it is provided that the words “and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act” be inserted in the words preceding paragraph (a) of section 5 (5) of the Act. The hon. member for Durban (North) has said that he knows of no similar provision in any other law. If words of this type are introduced, they invariably refer to other Bills, other Acts or to the common law. I also know of no other similar provision in any other law stating that certain things are to happen “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act”. Surely the effect of this is going to be to exclude the provisions, for example, regarding appeals? This will now read—

That is to say, section 5, which relates to the classification of persons whose names are included in the register. In the application of that section, a person is to be classified in a certain way, notwithstanding anything else which applies in this Act. Does that mean that the classification, which is set out in subsection (5), must be applied without the right of appeal? If that is not the effect of the words it is proposed to insert, then perhaps the hon. the Minister will explain what he considers the effect of these words to be. This is the first point I want to deal with.

The second point I want to deal with relates the subsection (6). The hon. the Minister has moved an amendment in this connection. I should like to suggest to the hon. the Minister that he should review his proposed amendment, because it does not seem to me that it reads properly. Let me read the new subsection (6), as it is proposed to be amended by the Minister. It will now read—

When this new subsection is reprinted after my amendment has been included, there will be two paragraphs which will be separated from each other.

Will the second part of this subsection then be numbered “(b)”?

Yes. This amendment could not be put differently on the Order Paper.

Thank you. That makes it clearer, Sir. The hon. the Minister has said that, in terms of the proposed amendment, it will not be possible to classify a parent after that parent has died. Is that correct?

Yes.

How does the amendment, which the Minister has now proposed, bring about that situation? It does not seem to me that it does. It seems to me that the original objection to this clause, which we raised during the Second Reading debate, is still valid. Perhaps the hon. the Minister could amplify his argument, and explain in what way his proposed amendment deals with this particular aspect.

Mr. Chairman, I rise once again to ask the hon. the Minister to explain the new subsection (4) (b), which is inserted by clause 2 (a). The new subsection (4) (b) reads as follows—

Under what circumstances can it come about that the Secretary may “doubt” the veracity of a classification? Then there is also the question of the word “may”. “May” is permissive. The Secretary “may” order such an inquiry, which “may” result in the correct classification of the person concerned. Surely the law should compel him to do his duty. What is the intention of this legislation? The Government’s intention, with this legislation, is to classify everybody, to put every person into his little pigeon-hole where he belongs, and to see that he does not get into the wrong pigeon-hole. Here we are being asked by the hon. the Minister to pass an amendment to this Act, which makes this classification permissive. The Secretary, in his sole discretion, may decide whether a person, whom he thinks has been classified incorrectly, should be reclassified by the Board. Surely, if it is really this Government’s intention to classify everybody into his own neat little pigeon-hole, this provision should not be permissive. On the other hand, is it the intention of the Minister to place this tremendous burden of responsibility on his Secretary? If this is so, the Secretary will, at his sole discretion and entirely on his own, decide whether or not the Board shall reclassify.

The new subsection (4) (c) reads as follows—

This is something for which this side of the House asked in 1950, when the original Act was passed through this House. At that stage the Official Opposition pointed out to the Government that, if it was bent upon placing such a measure on the Statute Book, such a provision should be made. Many individual cases have been quoted in this House. There is a case which was decided a few years ago. I do not want to mention the names again. I do not want to open old sores. This case has been discussed in this House before. In this particular instance a man and his four children were classified as Whites, while the mother was classified as a Coloured, according to the old tests of appearance and acceptance. Now the hon. the Minister has seen the light, and he is opening the door for the reclassification of such a person. May I say that this is the first bit of humanity we have seen introduced into this Act by the Government.

I do not think this clause, as we have it before us, is a model of clear drafting, but I think its terms must now be clear to all of us. I think they are to the effect that in terms of the new subsection (4) (b) the Secretary is allowed, if he has doubts, to reclassify a person. Before reclassifying he refers the matter to the board. The board gives a decision, and if it changes the classification the aggrieved person can object but not the Secretary, of course, because his doubts have been proved to be false. That is the position, as I understand that section. Then I want to refer to clause 2 (c) which contains the words “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act”. I take it that that means that section 5 (5), as amended, now applies in classifications, and “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act” rules out the definition clause as to a white person and as to the other tests applied.

It is the overriding clause.

Yes, I follow that, but it does not apply to procedural points as to the correctness of an entry or otherwise from the ordinary clerical point of view. I think we have that point cleared up. Then, Sir, I come to the last one with which I had difficulty and that was paragraph (e) on page 6 of the Bill, where the following subsection is added—-

That is the amendment—

In other words, so long as that parent’s classification has not been changed, it applies and if the parent is once dead, you cannot change that parent’s classification. Is that correct?

It remains.

The one difficulty I have with this clause arises from clause 2 (a) amending subsections (4) (a), (b), which allows the Secretary to go into the question of any classification, and here, Sir, is my worry: Take the case of a man who was classified under the old law. The Secretary may now have doubts under the new law. If that man is to be reclassified, he is going to be classified under the new law, i.e. the law as now amended, and that is my worry with this clause. This is the matter which I raised with the hon. the Minister at the Second Reading because it seems to me unfair that where a man has once been classified under the law as it existed, the Secretary may now have doubts and may say that the classification is not correct under the law as it exists now. You see, Sir, that was my difficulty with the hon. the Minister. He says that when we were uncertain at the beginning, when we opened the stud book, we could work according to appearance and acceptance and now we have to work according to descent. My worry with this clause and my reason for being against it is this. Here we have a case where a man was classified originally according to appearance and acceptance. It seems to me on the reading of this law that if the Secretary has doubts as to the correctness of his classification under the present law, he can reclassify him or he can say that he has doubts. He can then send the case to the board and the board can reclassify him according to the old law. That seems to be disturbing the original decisions of the inspectors of the stud book, if I may put it that way, and that, Sir, is my objection to this clause and why I feel that we should not accept it.

Mr. Chairman, after the explanation the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has given here of this clause, the entire clause is perfectly clear to us now. I have no fault to find with his explanation. I just want to emphasize once again that the insertion of the words “and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act” in subsection (5), simply means that section 5 (5), as supplemented here, should be the overriding clause. This is the only significance it has as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition also stated. I think this is the most important aspect which the hon. member for Durban (North) raised. Then I should like to make the following statement with regard to the concern expressed by the hon. member in connection with the new subsection (4) (b) in the case where the Secretary has doubts and refers such a case to the Board. In the first place this clause provides that the Secretary himself does not change the classification, but if he has doubts, he may refer the case to the Board and then the Board may make a change.

In terms of the present law, not in terms of the old law.

Yes, this undertaking has already been given.

I appreciate the problems raised by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. The undertaking has been given here that a witch-hunt will not be undertaken and that the department, as far as classifications are concerned, will not go back in history to see whether the odd error had been made in connection with the classification of people. This undertaking has already been given and I am giving it once again to-day, but it is nevertheless necessary to have this clause in cases where doubts do exist, and doubts are brought to the attention of the Secretary also in the interest of people who have been classified and not only to their detriment. Provision is being made for the matter to be referred back to the Board and for the Board to have an opportunity of investigating the classification and taking a decision in that regard. If the classification is changed and the person affected by that is not satisfied with the change, such a person will have the right to go to court. But I want to stress the undertaking that from the side of the Administration a witch-hunt and an investigation will not be conducted in order to detect doubtful classifications which have to be referred to the Board. As far as the department is concerned, classifications which have already been made will be left as they are.

There is only one further point which arises now, and that is the following: The amendment moved by the Minister to subsection (6) reads—

But are we not running the risk now, as the hon. the Minister said, when doubt has been cast on the classification of an individual and the case is referred to the Board on appeal, that the classification of the parent concerned will also have to be proved, which then will determine in what group that individual is to be classified; or does it mean, as it stands now, that unless the classification has been changed prior to the appeal, it will not be changed during the appeal? Am I making the point clear?

The final part is not clear to me.

My difficulty simply is this: Suppose the Secretary has doubts and refers the case to the Board. In that case, of course, the Board has to go into the descent of the person and ascertain how his parents have been classified. Do we have the assurance that the parents will not be reclassified when the case comes before the Board? The hon. the Minister can appreciate the threat this holds for people. He says he gives the undertaking that there will be no witch-hunt. Unfortunately this is merely the undertaking of the hon. the Minister; others may change this. I would have felt much happier had the Act provided that once a man has been classified that is final, but I appreciate the difficulty. May we accept now that if the parent has not been reclassified before the case comes before the Board, the case will not remain pending and the parent be reclassified if he is still alive?

No, I really do not believe that it may be envisaged that we shall do this. I do not know where we can rectify this matter, but I appreciate the problem raised by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. He need have no fear that this will be done. As far as I am concerned, this should not be done and this will not be done. If it is necessary to remove this fear from another part of the Bill, I am prepared to do so. I shall go into that matter, but that definitely is not our plan.

One appreciates the hon. the Minister’s undertaking that there is not going to be a witch-hunt and that the Secretary is going to act in accordance with the spirit of the speech which the hon. the Minister has just made. But, Sir, there is another aspect of it. Let us take the example of someone who in fact has a parent who was classified at some time as a Coloured person, has a white identity card and was in fact, before the passing of the 1967 Act, declared to be a white person, despite the disclosure of that fact to the board, and given a white identity card because of his general acceptance as a white person and because he was not obviously not a white person in appearance, on the test that existed before the 1967 Act. Now, Sir, there is a new test. Someone now goes to the Secretary and says: “One of the parents of this man was classified as Coloured and in terms of this measure he should now be classified as Coloured.” What is the Secretary’s position?

The Secretary will act with sympathy, as we know he does in all these matters, but he is faced with an Act which says such a person “shall be classified as Coloured” if one of his parents is classified as Coloured. This puts the Secretary in a position where he has no discretion whatsoever because this matter has been brought to his attention and he is obliged to follow the provisions of the Act. What happens in those circumstances? The case is then referred to the board because at the very least the Secretary is in the position that he has a doubt in terms of the new section 5 (4) (b). He sends the matter to the board and then the board is obliged to apply the 1967 Act as amended by this Bill, and in the circumstances he suddenly changes the classification to Coloured. If my memory serves me correctly, then either in 1967 or in one of the years when we amended this Act, a proviso was inserted in the Act itself which read, “Provided that this shall not apply to anyone who has already been classified as White”. I think in the circumstances that my Leader has outlined and which certainly can exist, we ought to have a provision that will encompass the undertaking given by the hon. the Minister because in terms of the law the Secretary will not be able to implement that undertaking. I hope the hon. the Minister will indicate whether he is prepared to put that undertaking into this clause so that it forms part of this section of the Act. Then there is another aspect that I want to deal with while I am on my feet, or perhaps the hon. the Minister should first answer and then I can deal with this other matter later.

You may not have another opportunity to speak. How many times have you spoken on this clause?

The other matter is the question of the classification of a dead person. Sir, perhaps at this stage the hon. the Minister should deal with the point which I have raised already.

The problem raised by the hon. member for Durban (North) is a real one, but it is a problem we cannot solve in this clause. I should like hon. members also to accept my bona fides to a large extent. I ask them to look at paragraph (c). I appreciate that through legislation of this nature it is not possible for us to make provision for every individual case. If doubts exist and it is necessary for such doubts to be removed, it will not necessarily be to the detriment of the person in question to do so; it may be to his advantage if such doubts were removed by the board. That is why it is essential and desirable for that machinery to be created. The hon. member for Yeoville was very pleased with this when in the course of the Second Reading debate he snoke on this matter. I think the hon. member also appreciates that the necessary machinery has to exist. But I am aware that the problem raised by the hon. member for Durban (North) may be a real one. My personal opinion is that this is to a large extent a theoretical problem and that it will probably never arise in practice, but if it should arise, I should like hon. members to accept my bona fides as regards the incorporation of paragraph (c).

The Minister has requested that we should accept his bona fides in this matter. Well, we do accept his bona fides; there is no question about that. However, I have already drawn attention to the fact that the approach of different Ministers at different times vary. So, for instance, was the approach of the hon. the Minister vastly different from that of his predecessors who went before him. The Minister now wants us to accept that the assurance he gives us to-day is going to be followed by his successors. There it is not a question here of accepting the Minister’s bona fides; it is a question of entrenching it in the law. We know from bitter experience that unless things are entrenched in the law, there is no continuity of practice. On the contrary, it can vary and has already been considerably varied. As a matter of fact, the provisions of (d) are contrary to the assurances explicitly given in this House by predecessors of the hon. the Minister, directly contrary thereto. For that reason, the hon. the Minister cannot expect us to accept an assurance from him because what may be binding on him may not be binding on future Ministers.

In that case I have nothing more to say.

I am not saying that the Minister is going to depart from any undertakings he gives; what I say is that any undertakings he gives are not binding on his successor in office.

You can ignore my assurance if you like.

Let me say that with a humanitarian approach many of the Minister’s difficulties can be resolved, difficulties resulting from classification. But it is entirely in the hands of the Secretary whether variations or corrections will be made. Obviously we welcome a way out. But we are left with the imperative provisions of (d). These are final and binding without any argument. Let us assume that the Secretary has in his files a case to which (d) applies, i.e. a case in which individual A must be classified as Coloured because one of his grandparents or parents was classified as Coloured. Let us assume that that man is now married to a white woman and that their children are being accepted as White because they have grown up as such. Then the Secretary cannot use (c); he cannot use a discretion because how can he be convinced that this man should be classified otherwise as long as in terms of (d) that person must be classified as Coloured? Our problem with the Minister is that while (c) is there, he is whittling away the effect of it by having (d) of such a compulsory nature. That is why I suggest that the Minister should delete (d). After all, what does section 5 now say? It says that if both parents are White the children should be classified as White. Why is it not left there …

Order! We have had that argument over and over again.

I say that 10 (c) can be effective only if the Secretary’s discretion is not tied down to the provisions of (d).

I can understand that we are primarily thinking of the position of Whites, but it seems to me as though there is not a sufficient understanding of the extent of the tragedies which the subdivision of the non-white groups must cause. There is legislation prohibiting marriages between Whites and non-Whites; that is why there is a saturation. But similar arrangements do not exist in regard to the non-white groups. We may create appalling situations, for example, where two persons are married and already have grown-up children; one of them may die or they may divorce each other and get married again to a person from another group; these people are working together, although there are attempts at separating them by means of separate residential areas. It appears as though in this respect we are totally indifferent to the concept of family life.

The hon. member must advance a new argument now. We have had all those arguments time and again.

That families are going to be separated and that children will not be able to live in with their parents, is something which must necessarily result from this.

That argument has been used time and again.

But it still remains a very sound argument …

Yes, but repetition is not allowed either.

My concern lies in the fact that I did not hear the Minister furnishing a satisfactory reply to the points raised in this regard.

Question put: That paragraph (d) stand part of the Clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, G. P. van den Berg, P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and H. Suzman.

Question affirmed and amendment proposed by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived.

Amendment proposed by the Minister of the Interior put and agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and agreed to (Official Opposition and Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Mr. Chairman, we take the strongest exception to the provision in clause 3 (a) which states that “any person who considers himself aggrieved by his classification … by the Secretary in terms of section 5 may within 30 days, or such longer period not exceeding one year as the Minister may allow, after the said classification became known to him, but in no circumstances later, object in writing to the Secretary against that classification”. Sir, the public has had a very raw deal in regard to this question of a person’s rights of objection through the department. I mentioned this in the Second Reading debate, and I would like to emphasize again that this clause is designed quite clearly to prevent anyone who has been in possession of his card for more than 30 days—one year is the final limit—to make any objection at a later stage. This is quite clearly designed to prevent objections by people who have been hiding their cards, because they were afraid to produce them, or people whose cards have proved prejudicial to them because of some unfortunate aspect of their lives. From now onwards, as I read this clause, they will not be entitled to lodge their objections. This is quite fantastic when we consider that the previous Minister of the Interior in 1967 himself gave figures in this House to prove that over a quarter of a million cases handled by the department had proved to be cases which required some degree of investigation. I refer to clause 3 (a).

There is no amendment to that effect.

The clause states that “any person … may within 30 days, or such longer period not exceeding one year …”.

Order! The present law states that.

Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. The words “other than the classification of a minor” and so on, are to be eliminated.

That is the only change.

I am using the same argument in regard to minors because it applies equally to them. As soon as they apply for an identity card and fill in a form to that effect, they are not told by the department of the machinery open to them. No one, neither minors nor anybody else, is ever notified by the department of the machinery open to him if he wishes to object. This is the point I wish to make. In reply to a question by me the hon. the Minister’s predecessor in 1965 made a statement in this regard. In 1965 I asked the then hon. the Minister whether any objections were not referred to him because the objectors failed to advance grounds for applying for a condonation of the late lodging of an objection. This can happen to a minor or anybody else.

Order! Clause 3 (b) lays down the same provisions in the case of a minor as apply in the case of other persons.

With great respect I should like to say that, surely, a minor has as much right to be given some notification by the department as anybody else.

But that is what clause 3 (b) states.

That is exactly what the amendment does. It gives minors the same right.

It gives a minor the right to object but that is not my point. My point is that neither the minor nor anybody else is given adequate warning, nor has been given adequate warning by the department since the inauguration of this Act, to the effect that he only has a certain time in which to appeal.

Order! The hon. member is now criticizing an existing law.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal with clause 3 (c), which provides for appeals against a decision of the board. Up to now the law has been that you must appeal within 30 days after the decision of the board has been given. It is now proposed to add, inter alia, the words “or within such further period, not exceeding two months as the said court may for sufficient cause allow”. As the law stands at the moment in regard to these appeals, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to extend the time on good cause shown and it has extended the time on good cause shown on many occasions. This provision seeks to limit the court’s discretion to two months. They may only allow the appeal to be noted on good cause shown for a period of up to two months. As a result of the nature of these appeals it is often very difficult to obtain the record. This is done on notice, so that you have to give notice of your appeal in the form of a notice of motion. In terms of the rules of court you have to provide in your notice of motion not only the affidavit but all the papers on which you rely. You have to serve these on the other party. Normally you are obliged to serve these with your notice of motion within one month. In the nature of things the record so often is not available. Hon. members may be aware that this is taken down on a tape. Many cases are dealt with by the board. The person concerned cannot get the record out within a month. In practice one serves one’s notice of motion, to make one’s mark as it were, and then indicates that, as soon as the papers are available, they will be filed and served on the other side. This is all very well for people who are employing lawyers. They can find ways and means of doing it. But in so far as the other people are concerned, they generally wait until the record is available. The record might in fact not be available for more than two months. In the circumstances it seems to be unreasonable to limit the court’s discretion. We seem to do this with gay abandon all the time. We are always limiting the discretion of the courts. There is no reason for it. The courts obviously do not abuse this discretion. The courts have a test. They will only extend the statutory provision on good cause shown. And on good cause shown must be a good cause. It is well defined and well known to the law. I think the matter should be left in the hands of the judges because these appeals are only to the Supreme Court. For those reasons I am sure the hon. the Minister will agree. I therefore move as an amendment—

Mr. Chairman, I just want to reply to this briefly. This amendment was decided upon as a result of the fact that the late lodging of appeals which, according to reasonable standards, was out of proportion, had been condoned in the past. This was carried to such extremes that in one case an appeal was allowed five years after the decision of the Classification Board. I think it is reasonable to set limits thus. If no limits are imposed, it may be practically impossible for us to reach finality in regard to these matters. I think it is fair that we should reach finality within a reasonable space of time. It is provided at present that 30 days are allowed for appeal. This has been the law all these years. Provision is now being made for such further period as the court may decide. However, this further period may not be longer than three months after the board has made a decision, that is to say, the period is to be 30 days plus an extended period of another two months, three months altogether. Personally I think this is fair. I cannot accept the hon. member’s amendment. If the hon. member feels that the period of three months now being allowed is unfair or not feasible, we may discuss adding a month or something to that effect. However, I am not prepared to omit the clause in its entirety. Personally I think that the period of three months now being allowed, is a reasonable one. As I said, the period is 30 days and such further period as the court may allow. The further period is therefore two months that are added to the month, that is to say three months altogether.

Mr. Chairman, if I heard the hon. the Minister correctly, he has introduced this limitation because in his view the court condoned the lodging of an appeal within a time which he regarded as unreasonably long. Am I correct in saying that that is how the hon. the Minister motivates this clause, namely that the court had condoned and permitted an appeal which he, the Minister, felt was an unreasonably long time after the classification?

I did not go into the details of that particular case. I was speaking generally.

Let us then know what the hon. the Minister is asking us to do. Let us realize what he is asking us to do in this clause. That which has been accepted and entrenched, namely that the courts of this country are there for the protection of the individual, is now to be taken away. The hon. the Minister now intends to tell the courts when and in what time they can regard reasons for the late appeal as being reasonable. If the appeal is not made within this two-month period which is now provided, no matter what the circumstances are, the Minister has said that two months is the limit and a court cannot grant to an individual the relief in common law and which has been practised in this country since the establishment of our Supreme Courts.

Can you give any good reason why it should be longer?

That is just the difficulty we have with the hon. Minister and his hon. colleagues. They like to judge in advance. How can any of us sit here and say what the circumstances might be in a particular case? How can we say that there would not be a justification for a longer period? The hon. the Minister says that he is agreeable that they may be given another month. If it is another month, surely it is for the court to exercise, as it has done in the past, its inherent discretion to say when a person has a reasonable excuse for not having acted at an earlier date. Why must that discretion be taken away from our Judges? Why must that right which they have had all these years, be taken away from them by a limitation to a period of time? I am surprised at the hon. the Minister having given that as a reason. If he had said that he wanted to close off his stud book on a certain date and that these matters cannot be reopened in the future then at least it is some motivation. But to suggest that the courts should not continue to exercise a discretion, which is inherent in the very existence of our courts, surely is an extraordinary motivation from the hon. the Minister.

For a moment, I want to deal with another aspect of this clause. I want to deal with paragraphs (a) and (b) of clause 3. As I read paragraphs (a) and (b), the right of objection is now open to all classifications under section 5 of the Act, including classifications under subsection (5). Similarly, in so far as a minor is concerned, he may object no matter what the basis of his classification is. Let us examine these amendments by the hon. the Minister which are before us. They look on the face of them an extension of the right of objection so far as minors and the persons who are guardians who act on behalf of minors, are concerned. But two points arise. The Committee has just approved of clause 2 of this Bill. As a result, subsection (5) of section 5 of the principal Act now reads:

Subsection (5) shall also be applied in the compulsory sense in respect of the race of either of the parents. Where is the right of appeal? What pious words are these that there is a right of appeal when in the previous clause of this Bill anything contained in this clause is negated by the words “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act”? I want to ask the hon. the Minister where is the right of appeal now which he claims to extend to minors?

That brings me to the next point in regard to this question of the right of appeal of minors. Under clause 3 (b), a minor who is classified under section 5 (5) may now object in terms of the new subsection (1) of section 11. In terms of subsection (1) he must object within 30 days or such further period, not exceeding one year as the Minister may allow after the classification has become known to him. What is the value of this clause with this amendment? If the hon. the Minister still feels that the minor who is now classified under section 5 (5) can have a right of appeal, he as a minor must act within 30 days or within such further period as the Minister shall deem fit.

Would you like to take it away?

I want to point this out to the Minister. He gives it to us as if it is a big concession. Tell me what does a minor of 12 years old know about objecting to his classification if his parents or guardian did not worry to have him reclassified and he is told that he is Coloured because his father is Coloured? He is classified in terms of section 5 (5) as a Coloured child. When he gets to the age of wisdom and discretion he realizes that this thing that has happened to him is wrong, but the 30 days and the year have gone. He is then entirely in the hands of the Secretary who may wish, or who may see fit to apply the discretion which is now given to him by the provisions of clause 2 of this Bill. I want the hon. the Minister to tell us, with the limitations of the time of appeal to the Supreme Court, together with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of clause 3, where is this person given any opportunity of appeal or is it his intention that there should now be no more appeals? Is the intention that there should be no more appeals? He is closing down on inherent rights of the courts more than he has ever done before. Without repetition, I support every word which the hon. member for Durban (North) has said in regard to the period of two months. It is an unreasonable period; it is too short and it removes the inherent discretion which has been vested in our courts ever since they were established in this country of ours.

Mr. Chairman, three amendments are proposed in this clause. The hon. member rambled very far, discussing matters which have nothing to do with the amendments. As a result of these amendments, minors are now also being afforded the right to object to their classification. I should like to point out to the hon. member that if we classify under section 5 (5), a minor may argue on the basis that the persons indicated as his parents are not really his parents. This can be a very good and sound cause for objection. Since we feel that it is unfair to deprive minors of the right of objecting to classifications, we are now giving them that right.

But they can do it within this one year.

Yes, they can do it, but surely such a minor usually does not stand alone. He has a guardian who can object and give him advice. The amendment I am introducing here, even if it means only one year, or even if it means only one day, does improve the position. This is a concession to those minors who were previously excluded from that right. I do not know what the hon. member is objecting to. The hon. member also objected to this period within which an appeal had to be lodged against the decision of the board. I should just like to point out that where a person’s classification was dealt with by the board and was decided upon, the matter must surely, from the nature of the case, still be fresh in his memory. Can hon. members tell me under what circumstances it will not be fresh in his memory After all, he is the man whose classification is before the board. It is dealing with it. On a certain day the board notifies him that his classification has been changed or has not been changed. It is fresh in his memory. Why on earth should he be given years to appeal to the court against that decision? Here we laid down previously that a period of 30 days would be allowed for appeal. Surely we cannot negate this. We have to take notice of it. The court still has the right to extend that period of appeal. We are only adding that it should not exceed reasonable limits. We do not want to be indefinite. Therefore we said that an appeal can be lodged within 30 days or within such longer period as the court may allow. However, the additional period which the court may allow may not exceed two months. That is to say, a person is allowed three months in which to appeal in regard to a matter concerning which he has no lack of clarity. He would have been clearly notified of it by the board and it would still be fresh in his memory. If that person wishes to lodge an appeal, he must do it within that period. He cannot do it five or ten years later. That would make the whole matter ridiculous.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot support the argument put forward by the hon. the Minister to the effect that it would still be fresh in the person’s memory and that he should therefore act immediately. The clause provides that the court may “for sufficient cause” allow that person more time. We cannot visualize all the circumstances. A person may have been ill, for example. Other circumstances may occur which we cannot foresee now. But the hon. the Minister himself says in this Bill that the court has to find that there is sufficient cause for such an extension of the period. Surely it is reasonable to assume that the sufficient cause does not cease to exist on the 91st day. If the court found that there was sufficient cause for his being 60 days late, surely that sufficient cause does not cease immediately thereafter. What is being provided here, is that the sufficient cause lapses on the 61st day after the 30 days, while the court may take another view. We may perhaps not appreciate here what that cause may be, but it is a responsible court which has to make such a finding. Therefore I do not think it is a sound argument of the Minister to say that the case would still be fresh in the memory of the person and that he should act immediately. Obviously the court will then find that he did not have sufficient cause. Therefore this clause is quite unreasonable. After all, we are not concerned here with the question of the time or the convenience of the Public Service. We are concerned with the right a man has to receive fair treatment; the opportunity he should have to have justice done to him. We should not even be concerned if that period were five years. A person should always be afforded the opportunity of having justice done to him whatever the circumstances may be.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister asked whether we can give him any examples. This is the whole point of giving a discretion to a court or a discretion to anyone. We make laws here all day long relating to people, relating to circumstances, none of which we, generally, have in our contemplation. We have some of them in our contemplation, but the complete effects of legislation are matters which we do not have in our contemplation, because in the nature of things, every single person is different. This is exactly why the courts have taken unto themselves this inherent power of a discretion regardless of the fact that the Statute says that it must be done within 30 days. There are a number of examples that one could give. I will give one example. There is, for instance, the question of the record not being available. Therefore, people are not sure of what the evidence was and they would have liked to see it on the record before they actually appeal. As the hon. the Minister is aware, the record is not available within 30 days after these cases. It is very rarely available. In fact, I have never known of a case where the record was available within 30 days. Then copies have to be made of the record, the record has to be served and the papers have to be properly prepared.

Mr. Chairman, when the House was adjourned we were dealing with clause 3 and the question of the time limit of 30 days after the decision of the Board in which an appeal can be noted, subject to “such further period not exceeding two months, as the said court may for sufficient cause allow”. The hon. the Minister suggested that this period of two months is sufficiently long. Not only that, but he suggested that it was right that we should restrict the inherent discretion of the courts to grant relief to a particular period. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he would not have consideration for the fact that the State itself in so far as commencement of proceedings is concerned, has limits far in excess of that which he now wishes to impose in so far as objectors are concerned. The hon. the Minister knows that in regard to litigation against the Railway Administration, there is a period in which notice must be given of an intended action and, furthermore, that that action cannot be instituted for a period of time which is in excess of the two months which is now suggested. The reasons are obvious, namely that time must be given to weigh up and to ascertain the facts surrounding the action which is about to be instituted. In so far as an appeal from a decision of a board is concerned, the hon. the Minister knows, from his own experience as a legal practitioner, what is involved before Supreme Court litigation is embarked upon. The procedures in regard to the hearing before the Reclassification Board are very straightforward.

The hon. member is now repeating what has already been said by other hon. members. That point has been made over and over again.

I was just re-stating what has been said in order to develop a further aspect of this matter.

The hon. member is just repeating.

Mr. Chairman, I would not take advantage by trying to mention matters that have been said before. The hon. the Minister has suggested to this Committee that the two months’ period is reasonable. The hon. member for Durban (North) suggested why the period of two months was not a reasonable period. I want to add to what he said. Quite apart from what the hon. member for Durban (North) has mentioned, namely the time taken to obtain a record from the Classification Board, there is the matter of deciding whether or not litigation should continue. It is a serious matter to be considered by the would-be appellant. Nobody knows better than the hon. the Minister what is involved. This litigation is not inexpensive. A person who has gone before the board and has had a decision of the board against the objection must then weigh up what is involved in proceeding further. Apart from having obtained the record, he must then seek advice. These objectors do not appear in the Supreme Court in person. They consult their legal advisers. As the hon. the Minister knows, when it comes to the Supreme Court the legal advisers whom they might consult in the Side Bar cannot appear, and counsel must be engaged in the matter. Counsel must have an opportunity of considering the case upon which an appeal is proposed to be made.

I want to come to one other matter which is of very real concern in so far as these people are concerned. That is the costs that are involved and the risks of costs which they face by proceeding with an appeal. It is well known how expensive litigation can be and what an appeal to the Supreme Court can result in in so far as costs are concerned. These persons want to be advised. They want to be sure that they stand a reasonable prospect of success before they embark upon those appeals. For those reasons I believe that the limitations which the hon. the Minister wishes to impose are quite insufficient to allow these persons a proper opportunity of seeking and obtaining legal advice before proceeding with their actions.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether from his own experience, when a case comes de novo into the hands of attorney and counsel, it is so easy that there can be a decision within a very short time. I refer to the decision to proceed or not to proceed with that appeal. Our practice has been to allow some elasticity as far as the time is concerned to meet the particular circumstances. Let us assume that the appellant is someone from one of the outlying districts of Namaqualand, and that his appeal must come before the Supreme Court in Cape Town. It must be handled by counsel and attorneys in Cape Town. It is unreasonable to expect that in all circumstances the preliminary assessment of the Race Classification Board proceedings should be completed within this very limited period. The hon. the Minister has already conceded that perhaps an extra month will be granted. If it is perhaps to be an extra month, is it not reasonable to say that the court should settle what that period should be? Why not let the court decide whether it is a reasonable period or not, because we cannot possibly legislate to cover all possible difficulties that might arise in the course of an appeal of this kind. I want to appeal to the hon. the Minister not to proceed with this particular clause. He has had difficulty with one case. He has mentioned one case in which according to his assessment the court has been unreasonable as regards the time that has been allowed. Must Parliament now legislate because there has been one case in which the hon. the Minister believes a court has exercised its discretion in a way that he would not have exercised that discretion? Must we legislate for each individual case that has arisen? The hon. the Minister has not been plagued with a number of decisions providing for unreasonable extensions of the period. His department has not been frustrated in the compilation of the register by a series of unreasonable extensions of time. I do trust that the hon. the Minister will look at the matter in that light and not proceed with the particular clause of the Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I am very surprised that the hon. the Minister has not risen to answer to the arguments that have been advanced by my hon. friend.

I have replied to him, and to you too.

No, the hon. the Minister has not replied to the argument which has just been advanced by the hon. member for Green Point.

It is not a new point.

It is all very well for the hon. member for Prinshof to say that this is not a new point, because he speaks as a practitioner at the Bar. That is also what I do, and I was very interested to hear what the hon. member for Green Point had to say, having had experience as a practitioner at the Side Bar.

We have to guarantee counsel’s fees.

As my hon. friend says, he has to guarantee the fees of counsel. He has to prepare the brief and he knows the practical difficulties. We at the Bar do not know these difficulties, as we merely appear. Here the hon. member for Green Point has explained all the practical difficulties that are involved in an amendment such as this. I think that the hon. the Minister, who himself has experience of the practice of the law at the grass roots, as it were, would appreciate what the hon. member for Green Point has said. I think that what we have to decide here is whether we really in our heart of hearts want to have an appeal to the Supreme Court in these matters or not. If we do want to have an appeal to the Supreme Court, then surely we can trust the discretion of the Supreme Court Judges. That is really what the issue is.

That point has been made over and over again.

When I was interrupted by the adjournment for lunch, I had begun to make the point that when we legislate we do not know what we are legislating for. We legislate to curb some evil or circumstance, or whatever it may be, but we never know what effect it is going to have, because this legislation applies to all the people in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that all the people in South Africa are different, one from the other. The circumstances in which they live are different, one from the other. The circumstances in which they make their appeals, because of the various things that can happen to people, are different one from the other. The Supreme Court has for years and years interpreted the expression “on good cause shown”. In this clause the expression is in fact “as the said court may for sufficient cause allow”. The expression “on good cause shown”, which has the same meaning as this phrase, is one which is known well to our lawyers, our courts and our Judges. It has a meaning. To reject this amendment is, in my opinion, to say in effect that our Judges do not know what they are talking about.

Order! The hon. member must use an argument which has not been used before.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I am now speaking to my amendment. My amendment is to the effect that this provision should be removed and that this matter should be left to the discretion of the Judges. I am addressing the hon. members in this Committee and I am saying that, if this amendment is refused …

That has been said over and over again.

No, Sir, I have not said that yet.

Yes, it has been said. When the hon. member moved his amendment, he raised this matter.

No, Sir. With great respect, I have never said that the effect of rejecting this amendment would in fact be to cast a slur upon the Judges. That is in effect what it does. Here the Minister is taking away from our Judges the discretion to say whether or not…

That has been said.

No, Sir, it has not been said.

It has been said.

Sir, I have not heard it said.

The hon. member must now abide by my ruling or else he must resume his seat.

Very well, Sir. Let us look at some of the circumstances which could constitute “good cause”. What can be interpreted as “good cause”? If someone were to be run over by a bus, and if he were unconscious in a hospital for four months, would that not be “good cause”? It would be, Sir. I guarantee that any Judge or any court in this country would say that that was “good cause”. The hon. the Minister now wants to restrict this discretion. I am taking only one example. We are legislating for the people in the country. Anything can happen to them. All these particular circumstances do occur. That is why this amendment is being introduced. The reason for this amendment is because such things have occurred. That is why this amendment has been introduced to restrict the time to two months. In other words, the hon. the Minister is not satisfied that our Judges have been doing what they should do. Let us take this example of someone who has been run over by a bus, and who spends four months in hospital.

That point has also been made.

Yes, but I am just trying to develop my point. Such a person would not be able to appeal. No attorney can take instructions from him. Sir, you will appreciate that no one else can act on that person’s behalf. He has to give the instructions, and no one else can do this on his behalf. No attorney will take instructions from anyone else but the person concerned. Surely it does not matter how many cases have come before the Supreme Court. This is a point that has not been made before, Sir. I think the hon. member for Green Point counted these the other day. He found that only 39 cases had come before the Supreme Court as a result of appeals. Surely, at this stage of the Session, we do not have to pass provisions like this to deal with appeals to the Supreme Court when, in the whole history of this Act, there have been only 39 appeals.

Let us face it, Sir, after the 1967 Act and this particular legislation there are going to be even fewer appeals. The whole thing is now becoming so tight that your scope of appeal is almost nil, and in all those circumstances I really do appeal to the hon. the Minister to leave with our Judges the discretion which surely they have properly exercised in the past. Surely, the hon. the Minister does not want to cast a slur upon our Judges as to the way in which they exercise their discretion?

I have already replied fully to this debating point this morning, but I shall once more reply briefly to the few points raised here by the hon. members for Durban (Point) and Green Point. The hon. member for Green Point said I ought to realize how long it took if one started a case de novo. Surely, Sir, this is not so. The people who appear before the board, appear with their attorney or their counsel.

Not necessarily.

Of course, not necessarily, but this is so in the large majority of cases.

But this is necessarily so when they go to court.

Apart from that and as I said this morning, the person concerned would still be able to remember quite well everything that had happened in court and there would be no need for him to be informed about one thing or other. In 1950, when this Act was placed on the Statute Book, this Parliament was of the opinion that 30 days were sufficient. We know that the courts have the power to condone belated appeals and that this has, in fact, been done in the past as well. But, surely, if this House regarded 30 days as sufficiently long in 1950, it is reasonable to say that if this were extended by another two months so that three months were allowed instead of one month, it would be sufficiently long. The argument advanced by the hon. member for Durban (North) to the effect that the person might be in hospital, is no argument either, because his attorney may visit him in hospital. Such a person need not appear before the court personally when lodging an appeal; surely the documents could have been submitted to the court in the meantime even if he were in hospital. No, Sir, the hon. member is surely advancing hypothetical cases. To tell the honest truth, I think the Opposition are getting rather petulant about this matter. I told hon. members emphatically this morning that I wanted this principle to be laid down in the Act, and I do not see my way clear to deviate from this principle. This is not the first time a provision such as this is being written into the Act. The decision of the courts is being retained. The court still has to decide whether it is fair and reasonable for the period for lodging an appeal to be extended, but it must simply not be unlimited. The court retains its discretion, but the period allowed for the loading of an appeal is now being restricted. I cannot deviate from this principle, namely that this period has to be limited. I said here this morning that if hon. members thought in all fairness and sincerity that this period was not sufficiently long and that it might be extended a little, we could extend it. I shall not put up a terrible fight about that.

It is a matter of principle.

Their argument is that the person concerned does not have sufficient time; that he should be given more time and when I want to allow more time, they say it is a matter of principle.

Sir, the debate so far has been conducted on legal issues between learned gentlemen who have concerned themselves with the law. I have listened to the debate from the point of view of the layman, the layman who does not handle these cases professionally but who gets those problems from constituents as a Member of Parliament. Inevitably in every single case that I have had to deal with, the problem has always arisen because of the failure to exercise the right of appeal either after classification or after the hearing by the board. That has always been the problem, because people do not come to you as a Member of Parliament when there is no problem. They come to you when the normal avenues have been exhausted. The second aspect of this is that without exception the people concerned in these cases are poor people. They are not the rich of South Africa; they are not the managing directors or company directors or big farmers. The people concerned with this measure are essentially from the poorest class of our people. I do not want to reflect on the legal profession …

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

Sir, I am dealing now with the question of legal representation to which the hon. the Minister referred. I do not want to reflect upon the legal profession, but it is common knowledge that any legal representation is an expensive business.

That point has been made.

I am sorry, Sir, the point that I am making now has not been made. What normally happens in practice in many of these cases, is that a person will come to a M.P., to a layman like myself or like the majority of members in this House; we will then go to a lawyer; we will discuss the case with him and he, on a pro amico basis, will advise and guide us. In case after case that I have dealt with the lawyer has always given advice free of charge. I have gone to him as a friend; if there is one of my colleagues available I have gone to him and I have got the advice at that level. But when it moves from the level of advising to the level of lodging an appeal, at that point counsel has to be briefed, and that is the point of decision for the appellant. He can get the earlier advice free, but when it comes to lodging an appeal before the Supreme Court, the lawyer who has given free advice up to that stage must then brief counsel and it is at that point that the question of cash comes in. The person must then decide whether he can afford to pay counsel; whether he can afford to take the matter to court, and he must then weigh up the whole life which lies ahead of him either as a White or as a Coloured and all that that implies, against the question of whether he can afford to take the case to the Supreme Court. All that has been suggested by this side of the House is that the discretion to allow that person to come to that decision on which his whole future depends should be left with the courts. Sir, only last Sunday, on the front page of a Sunday newspaper, there appeared a public apology by Die Beeld because the week before it had published an article under the heading “Howe se Vlerke sal Geknip word”, the suggestion being that the wings of the courts were going to be clipped by this measure. The content of that article indicated that the Government was dissatisfied with the way in which the courts were behaving and that they were going to clip their wings. The heading of the article was “Regters se Vlerke Geknip”. As a result of the publication of this article in Die Beeld of 8th June, Die Beeld was obliged to publish a public apology on its front page.

What has that to do with the Bill?

On a point of order, Sir, is the hon. member aware of the fact that that report was withdrawn in the next week’s Die Beeld?

In other words, the suggestion that this Bill was going to clip the wings of the courts was regarded as contemptuous of our courts, and the apology made by Die Beeld was to the effect that it had always respected the courts, that it intended no reflection on the courts and that it in no way meant to imply that the courts were unfit to exercise their judgment. In this clause a limitation is being placed upon the power of the courts to decide. In other words, Die Beeld was correct.

Order! The hon. member must stop repeating arguments advanced by other hon. members. He is just repeating what every other member has said.

Sir, I am asking the hon. the Minister whether the first report of Die Beeld was in fact correct; whether the report that the wings of Judges were to be clipped was true and correct, and that therefore Die Beeld was not required to publish an apology because in fact this clause is limiting the rights of the courts. What does “clipping wings” mean? It means limiting the scope. If you clip the wings of something you limit its scope. This clause is limiting the scope of the courts; therefore I submit that there was no need for Die Beeld to apologize.

Order! To whom did Die Beeld apologize?

It apologized to the courts for a reflection on them.

It did not apologize to this Committee.

I ask the Minister whether that apology then was unwarranted, whether in fact there was no need for it?

Order! That is a matter between the courts and Die Beeld. It has nothing to do with this debate.

Sir, may I ask who would approach a newspaper—the Government on behalf of the courts or an individual court?

That has nothing to do with this debate.

Sir, I submit that this is the essence of this clause, namely whether the courts are being limited and whether that limitation is justified. My submission is that the hon. the Minister should tell the country whether in fact he is dissatisfied with the courts and therefore feels that their rights should be limited or whether he has confidence in the courts of South Africa. That is the simple issue. Does the Minister, does the Government, have confidence in the judiciary of South Africa or does it not? I conclude by emphasizing that the fundamental problem which faces the poor people affected by population registration is to make up their minds on the spending of money to determine their own future.

Before I call upon the hon. member for Musgrave, I want to point out that the hon. member for Durban (North) and the Minister have both said that this is a matter of principle. The principle was accepted at the Second Reading, so I am not going to allow any more arguments about the principle involved in this issue.

On a point of order, Sir, I did not mean that it was a principle of the Bill; I meant that the period allowed for appeal was a matter of principle. When the hon. the Minister said that he was prepared to talk about making the period three or four months, I said that it was a matter of principle, not a matter of time. That was the context in which I said it.

Order! The principle involved is that the hon. the Minister is not prepared to allow an indefinite period and the hon. member wanted an indefinite period. That is the principle involved.

I rise to deal with the reasons given by the hon. the Minister a moment ago to justify the proposed amendment. The hon. the Minister furnished these reasons, in answer to our contention that all sorts of circumstances could occur which may be of such a nature that the person concerned may not know his rights or may not know that a decision has been given within this period of two months. The example given to the hon. the Minister was that the man may be in hospital; that he may have had an accident and may be in hospital. The hon. the Minister replied to that by saying that invariably, or in most cases, these persons are represented either by an attorney or by an advocate; that they are advised of their rights and that they therefore are fully aware of the position. There is no doubt that if the person concerned is represented he would be advised of his rights. The hon. member for Durban (Point) was quite right when he said a moment ago that many cases under the Population Registration Act occurred amongst the poorer people and, consequently, were often not represented. It is that type of person who is entitled to protection and it is for these people that we are pleading for a change in this amendment. There are a substantial number of people who appear on their own behalf and who may, consequently, not be fully aware of their position and fail to act, for reasons beyond their control, within the two-month period.

Order! The hon. member is discussing a change in this amendment. What change is he discussing?

This amendment is limiting the discretion of the courts to two months.

The hon. member has not said what change he wants there.

We have suggested that the existing discretion of the courts should be preserved.

That will be a change of principle and is not under discussion.

I shall leave it then. I have made my point to the hon. the Minister and should like to ask him to give his attention to the following aspect of it. The Minister gave us a further reason for wishing to proceed with this proposed amendment. That is that the existing law provides for an appeal within 30 days. He said that if the legislature at that time thought that 30 days was adequate, then an extension of the period by two months should even be more reasonable. The point the Minister made was that if 30 days were regarded as reasonable by the legislature previously then this extension would even be more reasonable. But what the Minister overlooks is that under the existing situation the courts have a discretion to allow an appeal beyond the 30-day period if sufficient cause is shown. The period is, therefore, not limited to 30 days only.

That point has been made over and over again.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely replying to the argument…

The hon. member is repeating.

The Minister then said that in terms of this proposed amendment the court was being given the power to decide whether the appeal should be allowed within this further period if sufficient cause was shown. But the difference between this proposed provision and the existing provision is that now the court is not limited to a further two months whereas in terms of this proposed amendment …

Order! If the hon. member continues repeating himself he must resume his seat. The hon. member is now just repeating what other hon. members have said.

Mr. Chairman, nobody has yet dealt with the reply of the hon. the Minister …

Yes, everybody has dealt with the same point. The hon. member must resume his seat.

Although I do not wish to keep the hon. Opposition’s debate alive, I nevertheless want to reply to the sophistry of the hon. member for Durban (Point) in suggesting that the Minister does not trust the courts with the period of appeal. I say that three months is a reasonable period for any person to decide whether or not he should appeal. Those of us who appear in race classification courts, know that the record is a short one and that it is possible to decide within a matter of hours whether or not one should appeal. Furthermore, it is easy for a person to note an appeal immediately and then to abandon it later on when he finds that he has no appeal. If he finds that he does in fact have an appeal, he may then proceed.

What about the costs?

What does it cost? The costs are the same in any case. In both criminal and civil cases there is a specified period within which appeals are to be lodged. Surely, in regard to these cases it would be ridiculous for us to grant the courts the power to decide on the period of time within which a person may lodge an appeal.

Mr. Chairman, I have some difficulty about a ruling you gave a moment ago and I should like to address you on a point of order. I understood you to rule that the question of the limitation of the time has now been accepted in principle.

The hon. member himself called it a principle and so did the Minister.

If you have accepted that as being a principle already accepted why then did you accept an amendment to delete this provision?

That was before it was brought to my notice that this is a principle.

May I then continue to address you on the question before us?

The hon. member may proceed.

First of all, in reply to the hon. member for Prinshof, who made a statement here … [Interjection.]

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, is the hon. member for Prinshof entitled to reflect on the Chair by suggesting that an hon. member speaking under your direction is filibustering?

I did not hear the hon. member say that. Did he say it?

I told the hon. member that he was filibustering.

The hon. member must withdraw that.

I withdraw it, Mr. Chairman.

I would not have risen but for what the hon. member for Prinshof said. He has told us only half a story. He said there was a time limit within which appeals had to be noted in criminal and civil cases. That is quite correct. But he did not tell us that the court has the inherent power to condone a late appeal. Why did he not tell us that? Why did he not tell us that a court may condone a late appeal without limit as to time? I think it is wrong for an hon. member to get up here and make a statement which he knows is totally wrong, unless he is unlearned in the law. [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. the Minister in his reply to what we have suggested, said that every objector appeared before a race classification board represented by an attorney and/or counsel. That may be correct, but the hon. Minister also knows that there can be no order for costs against an objector before the race classification board. The objector incurs only his own costs when he or she appears before a race classification board. But when he or she appears in the Supreme Court on an appeal then they run the risk of having to bear not only the cost of their counsel, but also of having to pay the costs of the State, if the State is successful. That makes this an entirely different matter. These costs can run into any figure, depending on the length of the hearing. The hon. the Minister ought to know that an appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court usually costs nothing less than R1,000.

But there is another point I should like to raise. Under section 5 (4) of the Act the Minister himself has certain powers to condone late objections. A person who wishes to object to a classification must object within 30 days, or such longer period as the Minister may allow, but not exceeding 12 months. The Minister recognizes that there can well be reason for delays of as much as 12 months. He can exercise his discretion within that period of 12 months.

The circumstances are completely different.

The Minister suggests that the circumstances are completely different. Here he wishes the courts to be restricted to a period of three months only. Sir, I want to read to you a letter signed by the Minister personally. This letter was written in reply to a request for a case to be re-opened. This is the wording of the hon. the Minister’s letter: “As section 11 (1) of the Population Registration Act, 1950, provides that a person may object to his classification within 30 days, or such longer period not exceeding one year as the Minister may allow, after the classification has become known to him, I regret to inform you that I am precluded from granting condonation for the late submission of the objection.” Sir, the Minister expresses regret that he is bound by a time limit under the Act. Either this expression of regret is hollow hypocrisy, or it is genuine regret because he could not help this particular objector. In this letter he expresses regret, because his hands are tied by a limitation of time. Now, Sir, having expressed his regret in this form, he now wishes the courts to have their hands even further tied.

I am always sorry when I cannot help a person.

May I then ask the hon. the Minister to express that feeling of humanity by not proceeding with this limitation on the court’s discretion? By so doing he can ensure that no person will feel that he has been harshly done by because of a decision of this Minister. Sir, you have ruled that the question of limitation in this clause has already been accepted as a matter of principle. I want to move, as a further amendment—

The hon. the Minister shakes his head. I want to suggest to the Minister that we give to the Supreme Court of South Africa the latitude which he requests for himself in terms of this clause. That is all we are asking. All this amendment asks is that the Supreme Court should be able to grant condonation of up to 12 months. The Minister himself can grant such a condonation in respect of an initial objection. Sir, if you feel that the other principle that there must be a limitation, has been accepted, then I suggest that the limitation should be no less than the limitation imposed on the Minister.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Green Point himself referred to a de novo case a moment ago. When an objection is lodged for the first time, it is a de novo case. Under such circumstances I am prepared to say that a longer period may be granted. That is why provision is being made for a period of 12 months. But in the case of a person who has already appeared before the board and subsequently has to take his appeal to the Supreme Court, it is a case which is already in progress and with which all the parties are already acquainted. In such a case it would be absolutely unreasonable to say that we should once again allow the same period we did in the first place. I am not prepared to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, may I ask whether you ruled the first amendment out of order?

No, I did not, but hon. members are more and more bringing me under the impression that it is out of order.

I should like to know what your ruling was in this regard, because we …

I am going to put it without ruling it to be out of order.

The original one?

Yes.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has stated that his discretion of 12 months, and the discretion of three months, which he is prepared to allow the courts, are not the same, because, in the case of a first appeal, the facts are new to the parties concerned. I want to ask the Minister whether he will give two undertakings in this connection. The hon. the Minister says that a period of three months, that is to say a period of one month together with an extension of two months, is long enough. Will he give an undertaking that the department will guarantee the cost of any appeal to the court against the Race Classification Board? That is the real issue which delays a decision. It is quite easy to take a decision to the Appeal Court. The delay is occasioned by the cost of such an appeal. If the hon. the Minister wants such a matter to be dealt with while events are fresh in the minds of the parties concerned, is he then prepared to say: “In the interests of justice I will assist such appeals to come before the court immediately, by undertaking to pay the costs of any action by a person who cannot pay those costs?” Surely that is only fair? If Parliament is going to impose a time limit in which justice must be exercised, then surely Parliament, or the department, should make it possible for that justice to be exercised. There is a principle that justice must not only be done, but that it must also be seen to be done. If justice is to be done and is to be seen to be done, it is the duty of South Africa and of our system to ensure that it is possible for justice to be done. The least the hon. the Minister can do is to undertake that a pro deo defence or pro deo representation will be arranged, so that the appeal can be lodged immediately, that is the limiting factor, not the question of whether or not the person wants to appeal. The person always wants to appeal.

Order! That has nothing to do with this clause.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, this has to do with the amendment to this clause.

This has nothing to do with the amendment either.

The amendment proposed places a limit on the time within which a person can seek justice from the courts. We have argued that in practice the reality of the situation makes it difficult for a decision to be taken within that limit in all cases. I am now arguing that if the Minister is determined that no more time can be allowed for an appeal, he should make it possible for a person to appeal, by providing the necessary legal representation.

The point regarding the difficulty people have in meeting these costs has been made over and over again.

Sir, is it then your suggestion or the suggestion of the Minister that this is only a theoretical right to justice?

Order! The hon. member is now reflecting on the Chair. I have not made any suggestions about theoretical rights. The point the hon. member is making now, has been made over and over again, in different words.

Sir, I shall leave that point. I shall not refer to your ruling. May I ask the hon. the Minister whether, in imposing a restriction on the time in which the person has the theoretical right to appeal to the courts, he is not prepared to ensure that it is possible in practice for that appeal to be lodged? That is our objection.

I disagree with you entirely. That is the long and the short of it.

The hon. the Minister has also not answered the question I asked before, as to whether he then implies that he does not have confidence in the court’s ability to take a decision in this regard.

Mr. Chairman …

Order! The hon. member has already spoken three times on this clause.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, when I spoke immediately before lunch I only spoke for exactly two minutes.

It is the hon. member’s own fault that he did not get up when the House resumed at 2.15. He should have continued his speech then.

Mr. Chairman, would you have allowed me to continue my speech after lunch?

Yes, of course I would have allowed you to continue then.

Question put: That all the words from “(c)” in line 35 up to and including “exceeding” in line 51, stand part of the clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, P. S. van der Merwe, H. J. van Wyk and W. L. D. M. Venter.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and amendment proposed by Mr. M. L. Mitchell negatived.

Question put: That the word “two” in line 51, stand part of the Clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Tellers: G. P. C. Bezuidenhout, P. S. van der Merwe, H. J. van Wyk and W. L. D. M. Venter.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and amendment proposed by Mr. L. G. Murray dropped.

Mr. Chairman, this clause looked at in vacuo as an isolated clause would appear to be merely an administrative amendment to the existing Act. It, however, has far greater significance than purely an administrative matter. The present position in so far as identity cards are concerned is contained in section 13 of the Act, which lays upon the Director the obligation, as soon as practicable after the inclusion in the register of the name of any person who has attained the age of 16 years, or after any person whose name has been so included attains the age of 16 years and subject to the succeeding provisions of this section, to issue an identity card. At the present moment the obligation is upon the Director to issue an identity card. In terms of section 16 (1) of the Act, a person who is desirous of obtaining an identity card is obliged only to submit two photographs, after which a card is issued by the Director. This clause which is before us now prescribes that the Secretary shall issue that identity card upon receipt of an application for an identity card in a prescribed form. He should then issue it. The person submitting the application has to submit it with the two photographs in terms of the present procedure under section 16. There again it would appear to be merely a matter of a change in procedure, namely that there should be a prescribed form. If we look at the Bill before us I think this clause should be read first of all in relation to clause 6 of this Bill. If clause 4 is passed, we must anticipate that clause 6 will have application. Clause 6 now makes it compulsory for a person to obtain an identity card. A person has to make application for it. It says that he shall make application for it as soon as practicable after it has become known to him that his name has been included in the register or after he attains the age of 16 years. Now it becomes obligatory. Now there is this obligation to be introduced. But it goes further. In the proposed section 1 (3) in clause 1 (e) which the Committee has just approved of, we now include for purposes of assumption this application for an identity card. We now see that under this new sub-section 1 (3) where in any application for an identity card the race of any person is described as “mixed”, that description shall be deemed to be in reference to a Coloured person unless that person proves that he is in fact not a Coloured person. This application form which has been solely a procedural matter up to now, now becomes a compulsory application. It becomes a compulsory application with again one of these assumptions, or “deeming” provisions, as to its contents and as to the meaning of its contents. But the clause goes even further. I should like to draw to the attention of the hon. the Minister that this deeming of a person to be a Coloured person, or “mixed”, can now arise when that application for an identity card is completed by a person other than the person who is to be identified.

The hon. the Minister will find in line 13 the following words: “Application for an identity card in the prescribed form completed by or on behalf of any person”. This is also in effect making the application compulsory. The application may also be completed by a person other than the person involved and the application gives rise to legal assumptions and deemings once it is completed. The non-application for an identity card also becomes an offence if such an application is not made within a limited period of time. The hon. the Minister is correct and we appreciated his action in deleting the inference that any census form or application for classification by someone on another’s behalf should be binding on the person concerned. The hon. the Minister has deleted that provision in regard to sections 3 and 9 and I see no reason why he should continue to enact the same objectionable provision, namely that there is a vicarious responsibility or obligation for somebody else’s writings so far as this clause is concerned. That is the whole gravamen of this clause, namely that in the case of an application in the prescribed form completed by some other person there can be these various “deeming” provisions. We on this side of the House will oppose this clause. We believe it should be deleted from the Bill for the same reasons the hon. the Minister himself saw fit to withdraw clause 1 (d).

Mr. Chairman, this clause is merely aimed at rounding off the procedure regarding the acquisition and issuing of identity cards. In terms of the present position, the Secretary is obliged to issue an identity card. On the other hand, under the present section 16 of the Act, a person is obliged to furnish the photos. These two provisions are, therefore, inconsistent with each other, not so? To eliminate this inconsistency the procedure has now been amended in such a way that the person concerned is now made responsible to apply for his identity card and to furnish the photos at the same time. This is all that is contained in this clause, nothing else. As I see it, this clause is essential.

Mr. Chairman, I can appreciate the one point the hon. the Minister has made, viz. the purely administrative one. It is purely an administrative matter that there should now be an application and that the Secretary is not obliged to issue the identity card. But what is attached to that procedure has changed. The hon. the Minister has not dealt with that. Why should it be binding on the individual if the form is completed by somebody else and not by the applicant himself? [Interjections.] The hon. the Minister has been silent about that. The hon. member for Parow may join in this discussion, but all I am asking the hon. the Minister to do is to do exactly what he did in regard to clause 1 (d), namely not to have obligations attaching to a person whose application form was completed by somebody else.

Do you not think that we should leave that argument until we come to clause 7?

Under clause 6 it becomes obligatory and it provides for additions to section 18 of the Act. Section 18 now has this additional provision. This section deals with a series of offences. If this application form is not completed it becomes an offence which is subject to certain penalties. The hon. the Minister is, however, not satisfied with that. In clause 6, which I will not now discuss in detail because we will have a chance of discussing it further, the proposed subsection again raises presumptions. That is what we have against the way in which this legislation is now amended. Clause 4 amends a purely procedural problem, namely whether a person should apply for an identity card or whether the Secretary should send one to him. As the hon. the Minister has said, we also feel it is quite understandable that the Secretary should not be held responsible for this, but that a person should apply for an identity card. The clause does not only amend that, however. The clause also states that an application on behalf of a person must be submitted within a certain period. If it has not been submitted within that certain period it raises presumptions and a person cannot be heard to say why he does not have an identity card in his possession. He then becomes subject to a criminal offence. The clause further states that if some person unknown to the applicant uses the word “mixed” in the form it immediately has a connotation for purposes of race classification. That raises a presumption against such a person. That is our objection, it is the method in which this matter is being dealt with, simply to deal with the amendment of one simple administrative act. For a simple administrative change, which the hon. the Minister wants, he raises criminal sanctions, assumptions and deemings and vicarious responsibilities for somebody else’s action and then asks this House to accept it.

There are no assumptions raised in this clause.

There is. This clause must be read with clause 1 (e). This clause states that “an application for an identity card in the prescribed form completed by and on behalf of any person” would be acted upon by the Secretary. In subsection (3), substituted by clause 1 (e), it is stated that if the word “mixed” is used, it raises a presumption until the opposite is proved. Surely, that was not the intention of the hon. the Minister, because he himself, as I want to point out to him deleted clause 1 (d), because he quite rightly does not want to have a census form or an application form for classification filled in by a third party to be binding on a person concerned. Why impose it here and bring it into this clause with all the strings to which I have referred, attached? When we raise these matters we are accused of trying to make a mountain out of a molehill.

Order! The hon. member should not raise the same point ten times in one speech.

The hon. the Minister has not quite understood the point. That is why I had to do it. I had to come back to the hon. the Minister because he does not understand the point I am trying to make. I want to ask the hon. the Minister to look at the points I have raised in regard to the Bill before us and to read clause 4 with clause 1 (e) and with clause 6 without the reference to the principal Act. He will then see that this is not an administrative correction, but the piling on of more difficult issues and problems in so far as persons, requiring classification, are concerned. I hope the hon. the Minister will withdraw this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I wholeheartedly agree with the argument raised by my friend, the hon. member for Green Point. He has raised the argument very well and pertinently with the hon. the Minister. But there is another aspect to this matter, if I may continue with the argument raised by the hon. member for Green Point, namely the provision of clause 9. Clause 9 of this Bill makes every one of the provisions here retrospective to the 7th day of July, 1950. This is the same point I raised during the Second Reading debate and to which the hon. the Minister did not reply. Every one of the application forms which during the 1951 census was completed and wherein the race of a person was marked “mixed” can to-day be dug up and used to classify a person as “Coloured”.

Order! That point is not at issue now. It should be raised under clause 9.

No, Sir, it is the retrospectivity of this particular clause.

That clause has not been agreed to yet.

Are we not entitled to discuss the effect of this clause having that clause in mind?

Only when clause 9 is under discussion.

I wish to ask for your decision on this matter now. May we discuss the effects of all clauses from 1 to 8 under clause 9?

Yes, in so far as clause 9 might affect the other clauses, and the points have not been dealt with under those clauses.

Thank you. Then I will resume my seat.

Mr. Chairman …

What are you going to say now?

My hon. friend says, “What are you going to say now”? I want to say that when I first looked at this clause I thought that it was purely an administrative matter, now, however, I think the whole Committee is most indebted to the hon. member for Green Point for pointing out certain aspects of this clause. I hope hon. members appreciate that they are members of this Committee. I hope the hon. member for Parow also appreciates that he is a member of this Committee. Although the hon. the Minister is the only one who takes part in the discussion, all hon. members are entitled to exercise their own mind on this matter. I just wanted to point out that although the hon. the Minister is the only one who takes part in this debate other hon. members are also entitled to exercise their own mind on this matter. I must say that I am most indebted to the hon. member for opening my mind to the implications.

Have you been dense all these years then?

One of the things which disturbs me is this—and I merely rise to ask for clarification on this particular point —Is the moment one receives a card the moment one is classified or is one classified before one receives a card? When one receives a card it is the first time one is aware of the fact that one is classified. I wonder whether the hon. the Minister will indicate whether that is the moment of classification or not? If it is the moment of classification for all practical purposes, then this clause has the most important consequences.

Order! Hon. members are not allowed to stand in the passage over there surveying the scene.

I ask these questions because if this is the moment of classification, then it is a most important moment in the life of the person to whom the power relates. The hon. member for Green Point has pointed out that one should read this with clause 1 (e) which has been passed already. If in the application for an identity card you are described as “mixed”, the consequences are that you are then classified for all times, except for the procedures which are available. Someone else can do it. The words proposed to be inserted here are “by or on behalf of any person”. This could have the most shattering consequences if this were to happen. I hope the hon. the Minister will answer because I am not certain in my mind as to whether that is the moment of classification or whether the classification has in fact taken place and the identity card is merely evidence of that classification.

I want to say something else to the hon. the Minister. Earlier on he moved an amendment to “omit paragraph (d) of clause T’ which paragraph includes, in the information available, a form completed in respect of someone else. He then very wisely—and we are delighted about that—

No, Sir, he did not make this point.

Oh yes, he did.

With great respect, Sir, he referred to clause 1 (e) and I am referring to clause 1 (d).

The Minister’s amendment was to clause 1 (d).

Yes, of course, but what I want to point out has not been mentioned as yet, and that is that clause 1 (d), which the hon. the Minister moved to omit, dealt with hearsay evidence. If you look at this clause you find that we are now going to provide for hearsay evidence …

Which is prohibited in the Bill.

… which is prohibited later in the Bill, in so far as pedigree is concerned. Here we have hearsay evidence. I want to say to the hon. the Minister that I think he was most evasive when he explained why the amendment which he moved, namely to omit clause 1 (d), was necessary. I say this because this paragraph provided for hearsay evidence which was, according to him, not reliable. Exactly the same thought applies to this clause. If you do something on somebody else’s behalf it is worse than hearsay evidence.

You must have the authority to do so.

No, you do not need any authority. Someone can do it on someone else’s behalf. This is why the question I am asking is so important. If the moment of the issuing of the identity card is the time the classification takes place, and thereafter you have a month in which to register your objection, or a year in the Minister’s discretion, then this becomes even more significant. It becomes more significant because someone can fill in a form on your behalf on which a card is issued. The time may or may not elapse. I shall sit down so that the hon. the Minister can first give us an indication.

Mr. Chairman, a person who applies on someone else’s behalf for an identity card, must have the authority to do so. If he has not the authority, the person on whose behalf he applies must be able to show that the person who has applied on his behalf did not have the authority to do so. The second point raised by the hon. member for Durban (North) was the question as to when the classification is made. That is really of no significance. It is done administratively in the offices of the Department, but what really is of importance is that the moment the person who is affected is notified. The period during which he will be allowed to object to his classification starts from that day. This is the position and I think it is perfectly clear. I do not see any problem in connection with that.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister who does in practice apply for an identity card on behalf of anyone else, except a parent who applies on behalf of a minor.

In terms of this clause you can authorize me to apply on your behalf.

But is this desirable? I can authorize the hon. the Minister to apply on my behalf for an identity card …

And then he puts down “mixed”.

Is this not going to introduce …

It is only for the convenience of the people. If it had not been for that I would easily have it removed.

Then take it out. Why do we not take it out? This is going to introduce even more difficult situations than those which exist at the moment. I see the hon. the Minister is receiving advice. That is fine; I am quite happy …

I am listening.

No, I am glad the hon. the Minister is having a conversation …

I have two ears.

No, he does not have to listen to me at the moment, if he has the answer and he has got the message. I should like to know who ever applies on behalf of anyone else except parents because they are authorized to do so.

Is that the amendment you want to move?

No, I should just like to know whether the hon. the Minister has an explanation or not. What I want to suggest is why do we not take out “on behalf of”?

Mr. Chairman, the only reason why we have this provision, is simply because circumstances may arise where a person cannot apply for his identity card personally. That is the only reason why this provision is contained in this clause. If hon. members opposite are satisfied that such circumstances will never arise and that there are no people who can neither read nor write …

Or people who are ill.

… or people who are bedridden and who are therefore not able to make application, I am prepared to withdraw this provision. Personally I think this provision is essential and advisable.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister to be consistent and to adopt the course which he did under clause 1 (b). With regard to these circumstances which he has mentioned, I should like to point out that the Secretary remains empowered to issue an identity card to those persons. Why we propose that the words “on behalf of” should be deleted, is because it is not a simple application for an identity card. It is an application with certain legal consequences. For those reasons I move as an amendment—

Mr. Chairman, this principle is the same as those contained in clause 6, clause 7 and even in clause 1, I should not like to agree to the deletion of those words at this stage. Personally I am of the opinion that it is advisable and right that those words should remain in the clause. I thought that I had almost convinced hon. members on that side of the House that this was, in fact, advisable because there were people who could not apply personally. A person may only apply on behalf of another person after he has; been duly authorized by the person concerned. Under the circumstances I do not think hon. members should insist on the. deletion of those words. I am not over-keen for those words to be retained. However, I should like hon. members to give me an opportunity of going into the matter. If we become convinced that it would be possible for these words to be deleted, I would prefer to do so in the Other Place.

Mr. Chairman …

The hon. member already had three turns to speak.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to prolong this discussion unnecessarily.

The hon. member may not speak. He already had three turns.

I merely wanted to say that in the light of the assurance given by the hon. the Minister …

Order! The hon. member may not speak. The hon. member must withdraw his amendment or must resume his seat.

In the light of the statement made by the hon. the Minister, I should like to withdraw the amendment with the consent of the House.

Mr. Chairman, this clause is quite an innocent one. This cannot be used at all as far as the classification of people is concerned. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, this is a completely innocent clause. It has no legal implication whatsoever. The position is that when a person is classified, one is restricted by section 1 (2) (d) (ii) in such a way that there can be no presumption against such a person unless he signed the form himself. The hon. the Minister is quite right in saying that the only reason for the existence of this form, which is referred to in clause 4, is to make matters convenient for people who want to apply for identification cards. The person applies for an identification card but if the question of his classification should ever arise or become involved, such identification card, which has been applied for by another person; will not be held against him because he has not signed it himself. Therefore, a presumption can only be held against him if he signed the card himself; otherwise it cannot be held against him. This provision is merely intended to make matters convenient for such people.

Mr. Chairman, with respect to my learned friend, the hon. member for Prinshof …

Order! I first want to ask the hon. member for Green Point whether I understood him correctly. Did he withdraw his amendment or did he not?

You would not let him. I will do it on his behalf just now.

I am asking now. He can say either yes or no.

I am doing it conditionally, namely the undertaking of the hon. the Minister that he would consider this in the Other Place.

But is the hon. member withdrawing his amendment?

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, the hon. member withdrew it and he used certain words that it is on the basis that the hon. the Minister undertook to deal with the matter in the Other Place.

Yes, but the hon. member unfortunately could not use those words because he had three turns to speak before.

Well, Sir, if he could say “I withdraw”, then I submit …

Order! The hon. member is now playing with words.

With leave, amendment withdrawn.

Mr. Chairman, I was standing up to argue with my learned friend the hon. member for Prinshof. Once again he is out of court. He has just referred to the proposed amendment to this Act which was proposed by the hon. the Minister, but which was withdrawn. Therefore, he moved for the deletion of this clause.

Order! The hon. member is now repeating what has been said over and over again.

Mr. Chairman, we have just dealt with the clause which makes it compulsory for everyone in future to carry a card. The amendment in clause 5 proposes the substitution for subsection (2) of subsection (2) (a), (b), (c) and (d). The new subsection (2) (a) is perfectly in order when it refers to a Bantu Affairs Commissioner. With that we are familiar. However, the words “or the Secretary” are now being added and it reads as follows:

I am a little bit worried about this. I would like to ask the hon. the Minister for an explanation. How does it come to the notice of the Secretary unless the Police or some other party is involved in this instance? Now that the word “Secretary” has been added it potentially affects every Coloured person on the population register. How is this information to come to his notice as the wording of the clause is at present? Can the hon. the Minister please tell us whether the Police are to be brought in here as they are with regard to the checking of documents of the Bantu population? Bantu reference books and the issue of identity cards to Coloured people are involved here. Without invoking the assistance of the Police, how else can this be done? I want to know from the hon. the Minister whether he has thought this out in depth; whether we are to be regaled in future with mass Police raids on Coloured townships for the purpose of checking up who is Bantu and who is Coloured? By what other means can it come to the attention of the Secretary that these people are holding two cards? There may be a great many of them. I have recited a case to the hon. the Minister this morning. I would like him to tell me how a card is seized in the first place if it is not seized without Police assistance? Who will do it? There are no statutory offences specifically laid down in the Bill. Are these people to be stopped in the streets, as in fact the Police are entitled to stop the Bantu, and ask them about their identity documents? I want to know whether this will mean another pass system, for the Coloured people. If it is left to the discretion of the ordinary policeman on the beat to decide that a person’s documents may be in question may I say this. He may have received anonymous information. The hon. the Minister told me in a previous debate that the Police frequently acted upon anonymous information with regard to identity cards. Suppose they do take action are they in a position to stop a person who is travelling on a train and suggest that he is in the wrong compartment or something of that kind? I think this clause potentially carries with it a great many rather unpleasant possibilities, especially if it does mean, by implication, the introduction of a pass system for the Coloured people. In other words, if that is not so, how does the hon. the Minister intend to apply this section as it now reads, not only with regard to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, but the Secretary who is involved as well? Then I would like to ask the hon. the Minister for an explanation with regard to the new subsection (2) (b). Perhaps he can give me his reasons for that. Am I correct in my interpretation that if the first card issued was Coloured and the second was Bantu, the first card is valid? And if the first card issued is Bantu and the second card is Coloured, I presume they will take away the Coloured card in that instance. Can the hon. the Minister please clarify that clause?

As far as this provision is concerned, the hon. member for Wynberg is really seeing things which do not exist. In the first place, this provision is intended solely for Bantu. If the hon. member envisages that a Coloured person can also have a Bantu card, she has a point, but as far as I myself am concerned, I simply cannot imagine a Coloured person keeping a Coloured as well as a Bantu card. What the Bantu are trying to do, is to have themselves classified as Coloured persons, i.e. they try to obtain Coloured cards. As regards the question of information, there are 101 manners in which information may reach the Secretary. The only thing this provision is doing is to give the Secretary the power which the Bantu Affairs Commissioner has had up to now. That is the only thing we are doing here. It may happen that someone may apply to be classified as a Coloured person whereas he is a Bantu in appearance. That may then be referred to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner who may say that that person has been classified and has in fact been classified as a Bantu. I do not know how the hon. member can see a new witch-hunt being launched by the Police in that they will stop people in the street to find out whether or not they have two cards. It cannot be done in that way; it is simply not practical. In any event, a person, even if he has two cards, will not carry both in his pocket, but only that one which he wants to carry. Under the circumstances I cannot understand the point of the hon. member.

I cited a case to the Minister this morning. This case was heard on 11th March in the Supreme Court here in Cape Town. The Judge, Justice Van Zyl, found that that person had been issued with a Bantu card but had also subsequently obtained a Coloured card. What I want to know is, which of these cards is going to be withdrawn?

The last one.

If he is a Bantu, then the Coloured card must be withdrawn.

Will it then be assumed that he is in fact a Bantu? As I read this clause, it is the last card issued to him that will be withdrawn. If he had been issued first with the Coloured card and thereafter with a Bantu card, then the former card is invalid …

Or the matter can be referred to the board for investigation.

And if the first card was a Bantu card and the second one a Coloured card, then, I presume the Coloured card is taken away. So, whatever happens, he loses his Coloured card and is demoted to a Bantu.

If you read the proposed paragraph (2) (c), the position will become clear to you.

Well, paragraph (c) says—

In other words, he will be allowed to remain a Coloured.

That is perfectly correct.

The hon. member for Wynberg wants to know whether this is going to imply the demand of identity cards from the Coloured people. But I submit this goes even a little bit further The words “any person” in the second line of the proposed paragraph (2) (a), I submit, refer to any person in the Republic. As long as the powers were confined to a Bantu Affair Commissioner, acting as such, it obviously referred only to Bantu. We have heard from the hon. the Minister that it is not his intention to start a “heksejag”, to smell out people and to demand the production of identity cards. But is this not the beginning of that, and not only with the Coloured people?

It is impossible to start a “heksejag”. One just cannot do it.

And what happened at the Thomas Boydell building?

With respect, Mr. Chairman, this is something that can happen, because when you get this combination of words, i.e. “or the Secretary” with “any person”, then every person in the country is involved. Hence the production of an identity card can be demanded from every person in order to ascertain what his or her classification is. What is the effect of this going to be? When a person is found to have two cards, the one which is going to be seized is the one which classifies him as White, Coloured or Indian, and in every case he is going to be left with the card classifying him as a Bantu, and we all know what that means, particularly in the urban areas. There are certain rights which go along with being classified as a Coloured, or Indian, or as a White in the urban areas. And there are certain disadvantages accruing to being classified as a Bantu in the urban areas. Is it right that we should now give the Minister and his Department the administrative right to prejudice and jeopardize the continued domicile of any person in a white area …

That has nothing to do with this clause.

With respect, Sir, it is quite clear from the proposed paragraph (2) (a), from the words “shall forthwith seize the identity card on which the race of the person in question is not reflected as Native or Bantu”, that it means that he is going to be left with the Bantu card, even if he is a Coloured person. Until such time as a decision has been taken, he is going to be left with the card which says that he is a Bantu. As such he will be subject to the pass laws and every other law applying in the urban areas. It is obvious that the hon. the Minister disagrees with me. If the Minister can tell me that I am wrong, I am prepared to admit that I am wrong.

I should like to bring to the notice of the hon. the Minister a matter of procedure. It has already been referred to by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District). Now, as I read paragraph (2) (a), the position is that when a person is found to have a Bantu and a Coloured card, the card that must be seized is the one which classifies him as a Coloured. That leaves him with the Bantu card.

That is correct.

If this Coloured card was issued after the Bantu card had been issued to him, the Secretary shall cancel the first-mentioned identity card, in terms of paragraph (2) (b). In terms of paragraph (c), however, if it has been issued to him prior to the other one it shall be returned to him. The point I want to make is that there is a time lag between the two. What is to be done with the individual in the meantime? It takes time to investigate; meanwhile a person who may be genuinely a Coloured person may be left with a Bantu card with all the obligations attached to that. Will this person be given some interim certificate, or chit, in order that he shall not be subjected to the treatment a Bantu is subjected to? This is only a procedural matter, but I should like the Minister to take note of it.

Suppose such a person is entitled to a Coloured card. If what that hon. member has described does happen, it will mean that he will not have that card for a specific time, but only a Bantu card. The position can easily be explained by him, but I am prepared to have an investigation made into the possibility of giving such a person a receipt, or something of that nature, so as to cover him. That, of course, will require a regulation. However, I shall investigate this matter.

This is the clause introducing compulsory identity cards. So much has been said about this clause, in the Press and elsewhere, that I hope the hon. the Minister, who thus far has not dealt with this at any great length, will give us an indication of what he intends doing in terms of this.

The amendments in clause 6 are closely bound up with the amendments in clause 4 to section 13 of the principal Act. No penal provision is proposed if a person fails to apply for an identity card. However, if he fails to produce his identity card to a peace officer, as required by section 14, he shall be guilty of an offence. The object of the proposed amendment is to prevent a person who has failed to apply for an identity card from advancing it as a lawful cause for not having complied with the provisions of section 14. The provisions of section 14 require the production of such a card to a peace officer.

There is a point that worries me about this. During the course of this Session the Minister gave us particulars of the number of identity cards already issued. It can be assumed that the majority of the white population have been referred to in census forms, if over 18 years of age now—in other words, they would have been taken up during the 1951 census. As far as the Bantu and the various sub-groups of the Coloured groups are concerned, there must be hundreds of thousands not in possession of identity cards. This clause, if passed, highlights the non-application for an identity card to a point of criminal prosecution. That means that every South African citizen—White, Coloured and Black—who has not applied for an identity card will be liable to prosecution. If prosecuted, he has no answer if he did not as soon as practicable, after attaining the age of 16 years, apply for a card. Sir, I ask the hon. the Minister please to enlighten us, first of all, as to whether the department itself would be in a position to handle applications if they were to descend upon them from every person in South Africa, White and non-White, who has not yet applied for an identity card. I cannot guess at the figures but they must be considerable in the light of the figures which the Minister gave the House during this Session. I do not know whether perhaps the Minister has the figures available as to the total number of cards which have been issued. Unfortunately I have not got the figures before me from a previous Hansard, but I do not think it represents 10 per cent of the total population of all races. If 90 per cent of our people are potentially liable to prosecution it will be a very serious position.

Potential criminals.

The Minister is legislating here for criminal sanctions and I wonder whether it is his intention that this law is going to be applied. Members of the public have been lulled for years into believing that they need not worry about making application, that they need not worry about registering and that they need not worry about asking for identity cards. I think they should be warned and given ample time before this clause becomes operative and criminal sanctions are imposed. If there were to be a complete registration within the next month, perhaps the hon. the Minister can tell us what number of identity cards would have to be issued by his department. It must run into millions, and one wonders at the wisdom of passing this legislation when it really cannot be put into effect as far as prosecutions are concerned.

I should just like to stress and explain that in this clause no provision is made for any punishment to be imposed on a person if he has not applied for an identity card. [Interjections.] Let me just finish first. It is very clear that no punishment is contemplated in cases where a person has failed to apply for an identity card. All that is contemplated by this clause is the following: When a person is asked to produce his identity card in certain circumstances, such as to a peace officer in terms of section 14, he will in future no longer be able to say, “It is the responsibility of the Secretary to send me a card; do not ask me for a card; he has not yet sent me one”. In terms of section 16 (1) a person is obliged to have two photographs taken of himself and to send them to the Secretary. It is a legal obligation under the Act, and it is an offence if the provision is not complied with. Under section 16 (1) a person is obliged to send two photographs to the Secretary. What must the Secretary do with the two photographs? All the Bill is doing now is to require of that person to apply for his identity card when he sends the two photographs to the Secretary, as provided in section 16 (1). If he does not do so he is not liable to punishment, but if he is in future asked by a peace officer, as provided in clause 16 (1), to produce his identity card, he cannot put forward the excuse that he is not in possession of his identity card. Then only it is an offence, and can he be punished. In the past, while every person was legally obliged to send two photographs to the Secretary, a person could, when a peace officer asked him to produce his identity card, simply say: “No, under the Act there is no onus on me to apply for an identity card; I do not have one and therefore you can do nothing to me; the Secretary has not yet sent me one.” The position is merely being rectified now, and no punishment is contemplated if a person does not apply for an identity card. He will only no longer be able to hide behind the excuse, when he is asked to produce his identity card, that the Secretary has not sent him one.

I just want to say that I cannot explain the position any better than has just been done by the hon. member for Parow. The position is as he explained it here.

The hon. the Minister says that he cannot clarify the position any better than the hon. member for Parow did, but the hon. member for Parow, as I understood him, says that it is not an offence not to apply for an identity card.

He says that it is only an offence not to produce it.

The person cannot be prosecuted.

Where does the hon. member get that from? We are here amending section 18. The proposed new subsection provides that when a person who in these circumstances does not apply for an identity card may be “charged with a contravention of subsection (1) (f) of this section.” Subsection (1) (f) of this section reads—

shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to certain penalties. Let us see what section 14 of the Act says—

Section 10 (1), which is also referred to here, says that you have to notify your change of residence, and this applies to everyone who is in the register. It is only people in the register who have to do it. Sir, here we have an offence created and the hon. the Minister cannot tell us how many people are going to be affected. The hon. member for Green Point suggested that there might be millions of people and the hon. the Minister says that he cannot say. There might well be millions of people, considering how many people are involved. Here we are creating an offence which might take up the best part of three years and five courts in every town. The part of this clause to which I want to come immediately is the last two lines of the clause. Let us have a look at this clause. It says—

How he knows whether his name is included in the register is a matter which has not been explained to us by the hon. the Minister—

Here we have this again—

These are the important words—

The note which I made here was that even if he did have lawful cause, then this clause says that “he shall have no defence that he had lawful cause.” Sir, how on earth can one put this sort of thing into the Act? How can you say that a person shall have no defence against the charge of failing to comply with the provisions of the section even if there was lawful cause? How can you make unlawful something which is lawful? How can you say that you shall not have a defence which is a lawful defence? How can you say a thing like that, Sir? I do not understand it. I have never seen a phrase like this in my life. If a person is charged “he shall have no defence that he had lawful cause for failing or refusing to comply with the provisions of the said section 14.” Surely a defence to the charge would be that you had a lawful cause for failing to comply with the provisions of the section and therefore you did not commit an offence. But apparently what is intended here is far wider than the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Parow have indicated. What is involved here is that if you commit an offence, then even if you have a lawful defence, you may not use it. This is really the most extraordinary provision, and I hope the hon. the Minister will indicate to us why it is here and what exactly it means. What is a lawful cause? When do you have a lawful cause? Surely you have a lawful cause if it is not known to you that your name has been included in the register. I would have thought that the fact that you did not know that your name had been included in the register would give you lawful cause. If you are asked by a peace officer to produce your identity card and you did not even know that you were required to have one, because the enumerator came round while you were overseas during a census and you did not know it, then you would normally have a lawful cause and a lawful defence that you did not know that you had to do it and that there was no way in which you could know that you had to do it. This clause now says that even if you have a defence, you shall not have a defence. Even if in fact what you have done is lawful it shall become unlawful and you shall be guilty. What absolute nonsense, Sir! I hope the hon. the Minister will explain this last extraordinary provision.

Section 14 makes it an offence if someone fails to produce his card without a lawful excuse. In other words, we say that one has to produce one’s card to a peace officer except when one has a lawful excuse; that is what is provided by section 14. All we are doing here now, is to say that it will not be a lawful excuse to say that one has not applied for one’s identity card. If a person fails to apply for his identity card, he is not liable to punishment. But if he is asked to produce his identity card, and he cannot do so, then we are making provision that if he has lawful cause why he cannot produce it, it is quite in order. But we are now providing here that it will not be lawful cause that he has not yet applied for his identity card. In other words, by means of this clause we are compelling him to apply for his identity card. That is all it means.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has stated quite clearly now what the object is that the Government seeks to achieve by this proposed amendment. I must say that it makes the proposed amendment a lot more reasonable than it appears on its face value, which, as the words read, was in our view a remarkable proposal. The hon. the Minister states that the object of this proposed amendment is to prevent someone who is charged with a contravention of subsection (1) (f), read with section 14, from raising as a defence of lawful cause the fact that he has not applied for his identity card. This is the reason given by the hon. the Minister for this proposed amendment. I hope the hon. the Minister will have another look at this, because this goes much further than he intends. It goes much further than the proposition he has put.

No, it does not.

I should like to explain to the hon. the Minister.

I will explain it in English next time if you want me to.

The hon. the Minister need not be …

… snide.

Perhaps he could listen to my reasons for saying this first. Then he can tell me whether I am right or wrong. But to say this without even hearing my reasons I think is being unreasonable, to say the least of it. I do not want to have a personal argument with him now.

Section 18, the section which is being amended now, is the section of the principal Act creating penalties. As it is at the moment, it simply states that any person who does certain things, which are tabulated, will be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to certain penalties. Section 18 is proposed to be amended by the insertion of a new subsection, the existing section becoming subsection 1. The new subsection provides the following—

I leave out the words which do not apply to my argument—

Subsection (1) (f) read with section 14, is not limited simply to lodging an application for an identity card. I should like to elaborate this point. First of all, subsection (1) (f) of section 18 reads as follows—

What does subsection (1) of section 10 deal with? Section 10 (1) makes it obligatory on every person whose name is included in the register within 14 days after any permanent change in the ordinary place of residence of that person to notify that change of address.

Order! I think the hon. member is going very far into all the different sections affected very indirectly, indeed.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. I will explain the reason for this. The offence which is being created by this new subsection, which is now being introduced, is the contravention of subsection (1) (f) read with section 14.

I have seen it.

The point which I am making, is that the offences created by subsection (1) (f) are not only the offence of failing to make application for an identity card.

This clause only has to do with failing to make application for an identity card, and nothing else.

Sir, this is precisely my point. This clause goes far beyond that. The hon. the Minister made the point that this amendment is intended simply to provide that, if a person fails to make application for an identity card, it shall not be a lawful cause for failing to lodge the application with the Secretary.

For failing to produce his card.

No, it is not the fact that he is failing to produce his card.

It refers to section 14.

The failure of any person whose name is included in the register to lodge with the Secretary an application for an identity card, is being made an offence in terms of section 2. The Minister’s point is that the words at the end, “he shall have no defence that he had lawful cause for failing or refusing to comply with the provisions of the said section 14”, are inserted simply so that it will no longer be a lawful cause in a contravention, for failing to lodge an application. It will not be lawful cause to say, “I have not made application; therefore I cannot lodge an application”. Is that the Minister’s point? If the hon. the Minister could elaborate on the point, it would assist us; because at the moment, as I read this section, it goes further than the Minister intends.

Mr. Chairman, section 14 provides that a person shall produce his card, except if he has lawful cause. This clause provides that to say that he has not applied for his card, will not be a lawful cause. That is all it says. In other words, a person is compelled to make application for his card. In a roundabout way we make it obligatory for him to make application for his card. I want to read this clause differently—

In other words, the fact that he failed to apply for his card will not be regarded as “good cause” for not complying with the provisions of section 14. That is the whole story.

Mr. Chairman. that is precisely the point. The hon. the Minister has not appreciated the point I am trying to make. As the Minister rightly pointed out, the failure to lodge with the Secretary an application for an identity card, is an offence. The hon. the Minister now wants to rule out the possible defence that the person concerned had lawful cause for not applying for an identity card. This is what the hon. the Minister wants to rule out. I can appreciate his point, but the words he has now included, in the last line of the passage he read out, are not limited to the making of applications for identity cards. The reference there is to the “provisions of the said section 14”. The reference is not just to the application for an identity card, but to all the provisions of section 14. There are other provisions in section 14 than those dealing with the application for an identity card. Section 14 deals also with the production of identity cards. Subsection (1) of section 14 states—

In other words, my point is simply that section 14 deals with other matters in addition to the application for an identity card.

It does not deal with the making of applications at all. Section 14 deals with the production of identity cards.

Yes, quite, Sir. It deals with the application only indirectly, because it means that a person can be called upon to produce an identity card. In order to have one to produce, a person must make application for that card. Therefore it only deals with an application indirectly. Section 14 really deals with the production of an identity card. What the hon. the Minister, in his amendment, is saying, is that if a person is charged with failing to lodge an application for an identity card, he will have no defence that he had lawful cause for failing or refusing to comply with the provisions of section 14. In other words, he will have no lawful defence for failing or refusing to produce that card. Sir, this goes very far indeed. It is not limited, as the hon. the Minister has suggested, to the provision that a person may not use as his defence the fact that he had lawful cause for not making application. This matter is related to a contravention of the existing section 18 (f). Paragraph (f) states that any person who, without lawful cause, fails or refuses to comply with any of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 10 or subsection (2) of section 14, shall be guilty of an offence. Surely it follows, if an offence is committed when one does something without lawful cause, that if one has lawful cause, there can be no offence. Surely this completely circumvents the words of paragraph (f)? On the one hand paragraph (f) says …

The hon. member has said that so often that everyone should know it by heart.

But, Sir, the hon. the Minister does not seem to appreciate our point.

I cannot help it if the hon. the Minister does not appreciate the hon. member’s point.

Mr. Chairman, will you then allow me to try to put this in such a way …

Order! The hon. member must stop repeating now. The hon. member has been saying the same thing over and over again.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, I am not saying the same thing over and over again.

The hon. member is. He must not argue with the Chair.

On a point of order, Sir, I am dealing with a point which the hon. the Minister has made.

Yes, and the hon. member is repeating what he has to say on this matter over and over again. I am not going to allow it any more.

Well, Sir, will you allow me then to deal with this matter from another aspect?

Yes, try again. Try to start something new.

Sir, if hon. members would enter into this debate, perhaps they could tell us what their views are, instead of trying to make our task difficult.

The hon. member must confine himself to the clause now.

Paragraph (f) relates not only to section 14, and section 14 in turn relates not only to the making of an application for an identity card.

So the hon. member has said, over and over again.

Sir, I shall stop at this stage and ask the hon. Minister if he would kindly elaborate on his contention that this proposed amendment is simply limited to the fact that the failure to make application for an identity card is no longer to be regarded as “lawful cause”.

The hon. member must have said that at least ten times by now.

Mr. Chairman, I shall just briefly explain again what we mean by this clause. There is nothing more than the following in this clause. Section 14 (2) makes provision for a person having to produce his identity card when he is asked to do so.

But such a person cannot obtain an identity card without applying for it.

Yes, he must apply for the card. Now we say that there is no other provision in terms of which he can be punished when he does not apply for the card.

Why do you not simply say that it shall be no defence to allege that he has not made application.

That is what I am saying.

No, it is not. That is not what you are saying.

It is what I am saying. In other words, the fact that a person has not applied for his identity card, will be no defence for him when he is asked for his card and he cannot produce it. In section 14 (2) we say that a person must produce his card, except if he can show good cause why he Cannot do so. Now we are making provision for a case where a person has not applied for a card. It will not be good cause to put forward in order to explain why he cannot produce his card. That is the whole long story. That is all there is in this clause, and nothing more. The alternative is that we must directly make provision for a penalty where someone fails to apply for his card for a certain period of time. But instead of making it a direct offence and making provision for a penalty in that connection, we say in section 14 that a person must produce his card. If he has not applied for his card, it will not be a good excuse.

Mr. Chairman, during the Second Reading debate on this Bill we stated that there were certain provisions in this Bill which were of an extremely harsh nature. One of the clauses that is in this category is clause 7. The amendment which it will bring about has very harsh results indeed. This is one of the clauses which we cannot support under any circumstances. The proposed amendment reads as follows:

So what this clause is doing is to place the onus of proof on a person who claims to be White or Coloured, as the case may be, whereas in fact the classification has been done by the Government through the Secretary. It goes further and places on him the onus to prove this beyond reasonable doubt which is the test used not in civil matters, and this is after all a civil matter, but the test used in criminal matters. It is the test which is placed on the State to prove its case in criminal matters. What possible justification can there be for placing the onus on the person claiming to be a white person but, above all, what possible justification is there for placing such an onus on him to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt? This is an entirely unwarranted, harsh and unreasonable provision, which must result in numerous injustices to persons seeking classification hereafter. I think that it is important also for the House to note that section 19 of the principal Act is one of the sections which has been amended from time to time to make it on each occasion more difficult and harsher for the person seeking to be classified. Section 19 of the original Act simply reads as follows:

In other words, there was no onus Whatsoever on the person in question and in fact the contrary had to be proved by the State. This provision was amended in 1967 by Act No. 64 of1967. This amendment introduced some very far-reaching provisions.

Order! Those provisions are not under discussion now.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to say with respect that I am surely entitled to show in relation to the amendment which is proposed here to-day how previous amendments to this section made it harsher and more difficult for a person seeking classification until to-day we have one of the most severe provisions. This is what I am showing.

The previous provisions are not under discussion now. The hon. member must discuss the new amendment.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. Surely I am entitled to refer to previous provisions in order to compare …

Yes, in passing but not to analyse them here.

Mr. Chairman, I shall not deal with them in any length. I wish now to refer simply to the amendment of 1967 which raised a presumption at that stage. Section 19 (1) of the original Act read as follows:

Here again we have a more difficult provision but the onus is still …

Order! That section is not amended by this Bill.

The onus is still not on the person concerned. The proposed amendment introduces a new subsection which does away with what has been the law for the past 19 years in terms of the Population Registration Act. The law was that there were certain deeming provisions and that the contrary had to be proved by the State. The proposed amendment now does away with that altogether and places the onus on the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is in fact a member of the race group concerned.

We cannot support this provision, and I move—

While I still have time I wish to deal with the other aspect of the proposed amendment, namely the new subsection (1B). This relates to the forms or returns under section 3 or section 9. The new section 19 (1C) introduces another extraordinary provision which again makes it extremely difficult for a person who seeks classification, particularly in relation to the onus which is being created. The new section 19 (1C) provides that “hearsay evidence of declaration as to pedigree shall not be admissible in evidence in proceedings before aboard”. The hon. the Minister will know that one of the ways in which pedigree has been proved in the past has been by hearsay declarations by a deceased parent or persons who were alive at the time. [Time expired.]

Is the hon. the Minister not going to explain?

I have nothing to say.

Does the hon. Minister have nothing to say?

I made it perfectly clear.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment which has been moved by the hon. member for Musgrave is an important one. I want to draw to the hon. the Minister’s attention certain remarks of the judiciary in regard to this question of proof. I think this might sway him towards accepting the amendment which has been moved by the hon. member. I will not be long because the hon. the Minister, being a lawyer himself, will grasp it if I merely give very brief excerpts from one or two of these particular decisions. The first one I want to refer to is the case of Du Preez and Others v. Race Classification Appeal Board, 1967 (2), S.A.L.R. 275. That was a judgment of the Cape Supreme Court by Mr: Justice Van Zyl and Mr. Justice Banks. They dealt with the question of grouping, and I just want to refer briefly to the headnote of the report without going into the case itself. I read the following passage—

That is without the “herkoms” aspect of the “herkoms” test.

I mention this because this would still have application to the person where one of his ancestors has not been classified or there is no possibility of ancestors being classified. The person then objects to a classification and must be classified on acceptance and appearance. These Judges dealt with the question on the balance of probabilities.

Then, Sir, there is a further case, and here, too, I will just read out short excerpts from the headnote of the report. It is the case of T. v. Secretary for the Interior, 1966 (3), S.A.L.R. 565. Here it again is a question of classification. Mr. Justice Watermeyer and Mr. Justice Corbett of the Cape Provincial Division said this—

Again it was based on the balance of probabilities.

And finally, there is the case of Backhouse v. Race Classification Board and Another, 1967 (3), S.A.L.R. 114. This is the case in which the hon. member for Durban (North) was personally involved as Counsel. He appeared on behalf of one of the parties. Here again I will merely deal with the footnote to the headnote of that report, without going into this very lengthy judgment. The footnote reads—

In other words, even if a balance of probabilities could not be established, then the benefit should be given to the person who is objecting to the classification. That is in accordance with what had been the accepted approach by the hon. the Minister’s Department and by his predecessor, namely where there has been any doubt at all, the Appeal Board gave the benefit of the doubt to the objector. This was said by Senator De Klerk when he was Minister of the Interior.

We have listened in the Second Reading debate to the hon. the Minister’s reasons for shifting this onus. He suggested that information was particularly within the knowledge of the objector and that the objector should therefore prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. We on this side of the House are not convinced by the hon. the Minister’s motivation for this particular amendment to the Act. Surely it is going too far to expect that in every case ancestry must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Surely the very fact that these difficulties have arisen, that reclassification boards have had to be constituted and that cases have gone to the Supreme Court, is because there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt. If there was proof beyond reasonable doubt readily available on one classification or another, there would be no need for appeals to the reclassification board. Classification could be established quite simply. There would then never be any difficulty with the hon. the Minister’s Department. Everybody would come to the Department and say, Now look, I am White and here is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There would be no question about it. The Secretary would accept it.

What is happening now? This clause when linked with clause 1 of the Bill, makes more difficult the discharge of the onus on every South African who is presumed to be Coloured unless he has proved the contrary. Now he must go to the extent of proving the contrary beyond reasonable doubt. I hope the hon. the Minister will see fit to accept this balance of probabilities. It is a shift of onus; it is making it more difficult. Even the amendment of the hon. member for Musgrave makes it more difficult than it has been before. There is now a balance of probabilities and not the benefit of the doubt to the objector. The test of balance of probabilities is not going nearly as far as the hon. the Minister’s predecessor said the boards would go in dealing with these matters.

I should now like to turn to the question of hearsay evidence in the proposed subsection (1C). This subsection reads—

I must say that I was a little shocked when I found that one had evidence as to the pedigree of humans. I am informed that the dictionary says that it is a correct term to use. The stud book appellation is therefore not so bad after all if we can have reference to the pedigree of humans. What I am concerned with here is the question of hearsay evidence. The hon. the Minister will know that he has gone beyond the normal rule that hearsay evidence will be admissible if better evidence is not available. The normal position is that hearsay evidence is admissible. I am sure the hon. the Minister will appreciate that there must be numbers of cases where it is quite impossible to establish the acceptance and appearance factors, particularly the acceptance factor, in race classification without hearsay evidence. It must be well-nigh impossible to produce evidence unless it is hearsay evidence. In order that the hon. the Minister may put this in its right legal perspective, I move the following amendment—

Mr. Chairman, I hope the hon. the Minister has changed his mind having heard the hon. member for Green Point when the Minister said that he had nothing to say after the hon. member for Musgrave had moved his amendment. I think the hon. member for Green Point has done this Committee a great service by indicating exactly why, in the light of all these cases, this is the only test available, namely, that of “on the balance of probability”. I hope the hon. the Minister will indicate to us that he will accept that amendment. The amendment of the hon. member for Green Point deals with the question of hearsay evidence being excluded in pedigree cases. When one deals with pedigree—I do not like the expression but it is in fact used—one obviously has to deal with matters that are not within the knowledge of living persons. Scoble’s Law of Evidence deals with declarations as to pedigree and on page 289 of the Third Edition the following is stated—

This is one of the exceptions to the rule. Hearsay evidence can, of course, not be tested by cross-examination. The rule is stated correctly here. The following is also stated—

The hon. member for Middelland may not be interested in what I am saying, but I hope he will keep his disinterest quiet. The rules for such declarations are also set out in this book. I will not go into them as they can be read. This is, however, one of the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, namely, that so far as pedigree is concerned the court may receive such evidence. Over the years our courts have been biased against hearsay evidence and they would never without reason have accepted “statements of deceased persons who were connected by blood made ante litem motam” to be admissible to prove pedigree. This clause proposes to negative the whole of the law of evidence relating to pedigree and says in effect that one may not prove pedigree. That is the effect of this clause. I hope the hon. the Minister will have regard to that amendment and will accept it as well.

I want to move an equally acceptable amendment. I move—

The proposed subsection (1B) reads as follows at the moment—

My amendment proposes to have the clause read—

I think my amendment has the same effect, but that it is easier to prove acceptance …

Order! Which hon. member is whistling here?

I was, Mr. Chairman.

The hon. member must not think he is being funny. The hon. member may continue.

The hon. member was looking at his colleagues and thought this was a music hall. As I have said, I think it is easier to prove acceptance in a group than to prove that someone is not accepted in another group. If one looks at the judgment given in the Backhouse case, one will see there how the Judge defined “acceptance” and how much easier it is to prove acceptance and how difficult it is to prove that a person is not acceptable. For all these reasons I move my amendment and I hope that it will be received in the same way as the other amendments.

Mr. Chairman, when looks at this clause, one should actually read it along with the inserted subsections (1A) and (1C). Subsection (1C) provides that hearsay evidence shall no longer be admissible, and subsection (1A) provides that the onus shall be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The fact that the onus has to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, remains a relative concept. It only means that the board has to be sure; the board has to feel convinced that the position is as the applicant stated it to be. Any other onus in connection with status is really a ridiculous position, if I may put it in this way. Let us take the case of a person who has been classified as a Bantu and then tries to be classified as a Coloured. Such a person then appeals before the classification board with a lot of hearsay evidence. I am now referring to real facts which came up in a certain case. That person then tells the classification board that he had heard that his grandfather was a white man. He may say that he heard it from his aunt, but that he had never known the man and had never seen him; he heard that his grandfather was a white man. The Department cannot refute that evidence because it is impossible to do so, and now the board finds itself in a state of uncertainty. Now a clever advocate, such as the hon. member for Durban (North), says … [Interjections.]

Hear, hear!

… that the board then finds itself in a state of uncertainty and that all available evidence is hearsay evidence to the effect that such a person’s grandfather was a white man. Therefore, according to the hon. member for Durban (North), on the balance of probabilities this person is a Coloured person, and therefore he has to be classified as a Coloured person. In this way it is possible for thousands upon thousands of Bantu to break through the colour bar since they know that Coloureds do not have their own areas. They would then roam about here at the Cape and create the nuisance of which we have heard such a great deal. That is why it is necessary, in the first place, to eliminate hearsay evidence so that persons who say, “I heard that my aunt had said that my grandfather was a white man”, must bring their aunts as witnesses. His aunt now has to prove that she knew the applicant’s father, that she knows that that person is in fact his father and that she knows that he was in fact a white man. That is not hearsay evidence; it is direct evidence. Then the whole case is altered. The evidence which has to be led, has to be such that the board may be quite convinced as to the status of the person in question. Under those circumstances I think these two new subsections, namely subsections (1A) and (1C) as inserted by clause 7, are a great improvement on the existing Act. The new section (1B) is apparently in conflict with section 1 (2) (d) (ii) of the principal Act, for the information of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District). That paragraph provides that a statement cannot be held against a person unless he has signed it himself. If one reads that provision, then on the Surface it appears to clash, but it does not clash, because it is merely applicable to a change of category in a race group, such as the Coloured group. In other words, we are not creating here a presumption against a person, which may cause his classification to be altered from white to Coloured or from Coloured to Bantu. This new subsection only provides for people to be moved from one Coloured category to another, and therefore this new subsection is not in conflict with section 1 (2) (d) (ii).

Mr. Chairman, I want to assure the hon. member for Prinshof immediately that the amendment we moved is not designed to keep “tannie” away from the hearing of the Race Classification Board, if she is available. That is the point of the amendment. We suggested that hearsay evidence should not be admissible if better evidence is available. I agree entirely with what the hon. member has said. Hearsay evidence is always suspect, but it is admitted in our legal system under certain circumstances. Now the hon. member says that we must not admit it under any circumstances, because some Bantu is keeping “tannie” away from the Race Classification Board, so that she cannot give evidence. Let me put it in reverse. Some of these appeals have been successful. The people concerned were able to prove their white identity and are now accepted as white people. These cases were successful solely because there was hearsay evidence. The board weighed up this evidence and decided whether it should be accepted as entirely valuable or valueless. I want to ask the hon. the Minister what is the position of a young person who has been adopted at a very early age and who has been brought up as a white child. This child then is able to trace back that he or she is an illegitimate child but the mother’s name appears on the birth certificate. The mother, however, might be dead or cannot be found. How on earth can that child prove her ancestry and how she was brought up, unless the hearsay evidence is available and will be accented? The point is that there may be one injustice done by allowing hearsay evidence: somebody might get away with something, but against that there could be dozens and dozens of people who suffer injustice. My hon. and learned colleague from Prinshof knows that it is often said amongst lawyers that rather should ten criminals be saved the gallows than one hanged unjustly. The sole point we have here is that there are disadvantages and that one realizes that hearsay may be abused. Therefore the amendment which I move makes it clear that hearsay evidence is only to be admissible if better evidence is not available. I might repeat that if “tannie” is available, she must give the evidence and hearsay evidence will not be admitted.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to put my standpoint briefly in respect of the proposed amendments. At the Second Reading the hon. member for Yeoville discussed this clause in quite some detail. He maintained that if a person is classified that person must be able to prove that his classification is correct beyond any doubt. When I told the hon. member that such a person first has to allege it before he will be expected to prove it, he apparently did not really understand it. I should like to emphasize that clause 7 (1A) provides that when a person alleges that he is a member of one race group, then he must furnish proof of his claim. I should just like to say that the department is in an unenviable position in dealing with this Act and with the classification of persons as regards the giving of evidence. These people go to the boards and afterwards to the courts with the simplest evidence, with flimsy evidence, as it were. This is the best word with which I can describe it. Hon. members must realize the position of the Department. The Department does not have other evidence to bring in against it.

They seem to do very well.

The Department does not have much in the way of evidence to bring in against it. As has been pointed out, this information is the information which the person alleging possesses and has knowledge of. That is why it is right and fair that we should make sure that he has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that his classification agrees with his allegation. Under the circumstances I am not prepared to accept that amendment to subsection (1A). As far as subsection (1C) is concerned, I must say that more or less the same circumstances apply. The hon. member for Durban (North) actually substantiated my argument with the amendment which he moved in respect of subsection (1B). He himself said that he wanted it this way because it would be easier to prove it the other way round. The. Department finds itself in difficult circumstances. That is correct. In our law of evidence provision is made that in the case of “pedigree”, as we call it, hearsay evidence can be taken into consideration, while it is not admissible in other respects. However, I again want to ask hon. members to realize that if a person appears before the court and then tells the Judge or tells the board that his father said that his grandfather was a Coloured he places the court or the board in a difficult position. It may perhaps be a Bantu who wants to be registered as a Coloured. He or she comes along and says that they never knew their grandfather, but that their father had told them that their grandfather was a Coloured. What evidence can the department or anybody else adduce to refute that evidence?

What direct evidence can be adduced?

That may be so, but he is in a position where it is easier for him to obtain direct evidence through his family or some other person, as the hon. member for Prinshof pointed out. He is in a position to obtain evidence from people who can say that they knew the person, that he was a Coloured and was accepted as such in his community. This clause in terms of which hearsay evidence is not admissible is there mainly for the protection of the Coloureds. If those hon. members want to protect the Coloureds against Bantu infiltration in the Coloured community then they must agree with us and allow us to retain this clause.

Then the Whites will be in trouble.

The hon. member for Durban (North) moved another amendment, which is an amendment to the proposed subsection (1B). He proposed that “unless he proves that on that date he was not accepted as such a member” should be replaced by the words “unless he proves that on that date he was accepted as a member of another group”. He said that it was easier for the court to prove that than to prove the opposite. I should like the hon. member to take into consideration that when this person, in the first instance, completed the returns in terms of section 3 or section 9, he was the person who determined that he belonged to a certain group. This is of course only applicable to a group within the Coloured group, and not in general. He said that he belonged to such a group on a specific date. If he wants to come along and refute that, he must from the nature of the case prove that he was not accepted as a member of that particular group of which he had alleged that he was a member. This appears to me to be the proper way in respect of the new subsection (1B) as well. I am sorry, but I do not see my way clear to complying with the request of the hon. members. We discussed this matter at length at the Second Reading, and unfortunately I do not see my way clear to accepting any of these amendments.

Mr. Chairman, it is disappointing to hear that the hon. the Minister is not prepared to accept any of these amendments. I hope, however, the hon. the Minister has not finally closed his mind to these amendments and will give them further consideration, particularly in the light of further arguments which may be drawn to his attention in reply to the points that he has made. We think that these provisions are very severe. They will undoubtedly cause many injustices for reasons for which I will try to elaborate. So I do hope the hon. the Minister will keep an open mind about this and will reconsider his attitude not to accept these amendments. The hon. the Minister, in refusing the amendment which I moved, namely to reduce the basis of proof to that of a balance of probabilities, stated that the new subsection (1A) is limited to those cases where a person alleges that he belongs to a particular racial group; where he alleges that he is a white person or a Coloured person. The hon. the Minister said that it is limited to such cases. Clearly; the hon. the Minister is right. This is what subjection (1A) says. But I would point out to the hon. the Minister that once clause 7 is passed and this amendment becomes law, every person who from now on applies for a particular classification, every person who applies to be classified White or Coloured, will be by that very act alleging that he belongs to that group. Therefore, all applications for classification emanating from the individuals concerned will fall within this category. It will be an allegation of belonging to that certain group. This is the first point that I want to make. It will affect practically everybody who wants to be classified.

The second matter that I should like to deal with is the arguments raised by the hon. the Minister to the effect that in many of these race classification cases it is difficult for the department to obtain the evidence to challenge statements made by persons seeking classification or to obtain a contrary proof. The hon. the Minister also made the point Chat very often the evidence is of a flimsy nature. This is not so in all cases, but in some cases it is. Surely, the hon. the Minister will concede that in many cases it is equally difficult for a person seeking classification, to produce better evidence. Take, for example, the number of illegitimate children born to Coloureds here in the Western Cape whose fathers were Bantu. It is very often impossible for a child, if he is not classified at birth but at a later stage, to produce proof who his father was. He may not be sure whether his father was a Coloured person or whether he was a Bantu. In all these cases these persons would be prejudiced by this proposed amendment, if hearsay evidence is ruled out completely I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the present position. I am sorry that the hon. member for Prinshof is not here. He suggested to this House that under the hearsay rule, as it exists to-day, it is terribly easy to overcome these provisions. But it is not so; this is not correct. No court of law will accept a statement, as the hon. member for Prinshof suggested, by a person who will come forward and say: I heard my oupa was a white man. He said that a court will simply on that statement, accept it and classify him as Coloured.

They did that.

The hon. member for Parow is not correct. A court of law does not simply accept a statement of that sort. They question the person concerned. The court will question to find out whether there are other relatives, whether there were not other persons who could possibly help to clarify the position. The point is that a court, under the present law, must base its decision on a balance of probability. The court will consider that hearsay evidence with that test in mind. They do not simply accept that statement made. They will weigh up that statement with other evidence which has been extracted as a result of questioning and will then decide whether, on a balance of probabilities, the probabilities are that the father was or was not White. It is not just a matter of accepting a loose statement of that sort. In any event, we have confined the position in terms of our amendment to Che situation where hearsay evidence will be used only if it is proved that no better evidence is available. Surely, this is fair to allow hearsay evidence where no better evidence can be produced. The hon. the Minister says that we must appreciate the position of the department. But the department is only one party to race classification. Surely, the paramount consideration is the individual concerned and not the department. If the amendment is limited to the use of hearsay evidence where no better evidence is available, surely this is the fairest possible situation both to the department and to the person concerned. What can the person concerned do in many cases if there is no other evidence available than the type of hearsay evidence which a court of law or a race classification board can produce?

The hon. member is again starting to repeat.

Well, I would merely ask the hon. the Minister, when he replies, whether he would indicate what the Government and the department have in mind in such a situation? If the person concerned cannot produce better evidence than hearsay evidence, what is his position to be? What does the department expect him to do? What does the Minister expect him to do? I hope that the hon. the Minister would explain this to the House. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister did not seem to appreciate the substance of the amendment which I moved, which was to provide that the person concerned in (1B) should prove that he was accepted as a member of another group rather than saying he was not accepted as a member of that particular group. In any event, it seems that it is much easier to prove, as I indicated, that you are a member of a group than that you are not a member of the group. In this regard I should like to quote a passage from the judgment of Justice Burne in the case of Backhouse v. the Race Classification Board. This was reported in 1967, volume III of the South African Law Reports, on page 114. I should like to quote a passage at the bottom of page 119 starting at the letter G. The board had made a certain finding which was quoted and reads as follows:

Then the learned judge went on to say:

This is what the judge said, not me.

Now, here you have a judge indicating how you prove acceptance. He says you cannot go any further than this. And you cannot be expected to go any further than your own experience. I submit that his views are correct. This is the correct approach. If this is so, how can you, if you have no experience of other people, if you are not accepted in another group, have any experience of the fact that you are not accepted? If you are not accepted, you therefore do not know anyone in that other group and you do not have any experience of them. You can only go on your own personal experience if you have that personal experience. It follows that obviously if you are not accepted by another group, you will have no experience of that group. So, how do you prove it? Who do you bring in as evidence that you are not accepted and that you are not in that group? I really think that the hon. the Minister’s intractable attitude is unnecessary if you look at the merit of the three most reasonable amendments that have been moved.

You expect if from the department from time to time.

Expect what?

To prove that a person is not a member of a particular group.

No, Sir.

When he claims to be a member of that particular group, it is also expected of the department to prove that.

No, Sir. The test, as has been shown in the most able argument by the hon. member for Musgrave in dealing with all the cases, is “on a balance of probabilities”. In the case that I have quoted, the position is that if in fact you cannot find where the probabilities lie then, the judge said, where he wants to go is where you should put him. That is the law. The department has to deal with the law as stated in these cases, just as everyone else does. I think the hon. the Minister is being unreasonable in not accepting these amendments. Whether or not he wants to say any more about it, it is obvious that the hon. the Minister is not with us. It is most unfortunate, because the three amendments that have been moved will not affect the working of this particular new clause which he wishes to make law. They will merely make it work better and more fairly.

Mr. Chairman, let us first of all understand clearly that the proposed subsection (1B) deals with the ethnic groups within the Coloured group. What are the problems we are experiencing in that regard? The only real problem we are experiencing in that regard, is that Indians want to have themselves registered as Coloureds or Malays. That is the problem. What the hon. member wishes to do now, is to increase that danger which is threatening the Coloureds and which we should like to put a stop to. That is what the hon. member wants to do. The hon. member ought to know that numerous Indians who, in those times were accepted as such and who of their own accord indicated that they were Indians, which was the right thing to do, because they did not appreciate the implications of being classified as Indians and not as Coloureds or Malays, would now, after many years have passed, like to be classified as Coloureds or Malays. Now the hon. member wants us to make it easier for them. This is the real position. In the first instance, they claimed to be what they were, i.e. Indians. We may as well elaborate on that very same case now.

Or someone else on his behalf.

Yes, that is true, but that was at the time of that application. At that time they claimed that they were Indians. Now they want this to be changed. Let us suppose that they want this changed. Now we say that they have to prove that they were not Indians at that time. Now now, but at that time. We are not laying down the procedure as to how they should prove this. One of the methods whereby they will prove or try to prove this, is in all probability by saying that they were members of another group. Over and above the fact that they may perhaps furnish proof to the effect that they were not members of the Indian group, they may also go further and try to prove that they were in fact members of another group. In other words, we are not depriving them of that part of the evidence which they can use. But we say that they must convince us that they were not members of that Indian group when they indicated that they were in fact members of that Indian group. To my mind this is not unreasonable. Nor do I think that the hon. member need to be concerned about problems being implied in this. But, indeed, if we were to change it in this way, we would be making it a great deal easier for a small number of people to go to court and to testify that it was like this or like that. In that case we would be doing so to the detriment of the Coloured or the Malay community, and that is something we ought not to do. For that reason I am not prepared to accept this amendment.

Sir, the hon. member for Musgrave furnished us with a lengthy explanation as to how the courts analyze hearsay evidence. What he said the court does not do, is exactly what happened in a case which was tried here in the Cape Division of the Supreme Court, i.e. the Mabitle case. In that case the woman said that she had heard that her own father was a Coloured person, and on the basis of that hearsay evidence, i.e. that she had heard that her father was a Coloured person, a ruling was given by the court. I do not blame the court for having done that. Whereas the hearsay rule is followed in these cases, it is hearsay evidence which, on the balance of probabilities, may be the decisive factor and was in fact the decisive factor in this case. The Department is absolutely powerless if the woman comes along and says, “I heard that my father was a Coloured person”. What on earth can the Department say in such a case? The courts have passed such a judgment before. This will give hon. members an indication of the unenviable position in which the Department finds itself in such cases and why it is necessary to provide that hearsay evidence may not be used.

Sir, we are extremely disappointed in the attitude that the Minister has adopted. This clause, if it is adopted by this Committee, without the amendments which have been moved, will enable the State to assume unto itself certain legal advantages in legal proceedings which are denied to the ordinary citizen in the ordinary course of legal proceedings. This clause in subsection (1A), without the amendments, introduces into civil proceedings an unheard of burden of proof, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hearsay evidence, which is now to be precluded, is allowed in our system of law so that the truth can be established when direct evidence is not available. I want to say to the hon. the Minister that if he refuses these amendments, he must not take it amiss, and the Government must not take it amiss when we on this side of the House accuse them of assuming powers in the conduct of the affairs of this country which are not compatible with the democratic system of law that we have in this country.

Question put: That the words “beyond reasonable doubt” in line 17, stand part of the Clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Tellers: P. H. Torlage, P. S. van der Merwe, H. J. van Wyk and W. L. D. M. Venter.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and amendment proposed by Mr. R. G. L, Hourquebie dropped.

Amendments proposed by Mr. M. L. Mitchell and Mr. L. G. Murray put and negatived (Official Opposition and Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Clause, as printed, put and the Committee divided:

Tellers: P. H. Torlage, P. S. van der Merwe, H. J. van Wyk and W. L. D. M. Venter.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell. Clause, as printed, accordingly agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to the new section 21A (1) (b) which has the effect of striking off once and for all all outstanding third party appeals presently lodged with the board. I would like to say straight away that I feel that the inclusion of this provision in this Bill is an absolute disgrace under the circumstances. It is in fact a gross injustice to the people whose appeals are still outstanding. The hon. the Minister knows very well that there are only a few of these cases left, as we pointed out to him during the Second Reading debate on this Bill. He knows also that all the cases in the hands of the Department have now been referred to the board. The board is now, if I may say so, for the first time, working full steam ahead in an attempt to give these people the hearing which they deserve. The fact that the few cases that remain are still outstanding, is not only due to the delay caused by the appeal in the Bell case, for which the Minister was not responsible. It is not entirely due to that, although the Minister has tried to suggest that it is. I would like to draw the Minister’s attention to this fact by referring to two recent court cases, in which the Minister submitted affidavits himself. He denied that the Department was responsible for dragging its heels and not referring these cases to the board as timeously as it should have done. There was a case heard before the Supreme Court in Cape Town in March this year. The hon. the Minister said in the debate the other day that no one was responsible for holding these cases back in the Department before referring them to the Appeal Board. The Judge in this case said exactly the reverse. That is why I think this clause is so extraordinarily unfair. This was a case against the Secretary for the Interior, heard in the Supreme Court, demanding that he forward certain third party objections to the Race Classification Appeal Board in the Western Cape. As the hon. the Minister knows, the Judge’s findings were in favour of the appellants in this case. I would like to read a newspaper report on what the Judge President of the Cape had to say in this regard. The report reads inter alia as follows:

The Judge’s comments are reported as follows:

The Judge went on to say:

The Secretary had not referred these timeously. The Judge continued:

The Judge agreed with that entirely, but he did go on to say:

The Judge said that it was the Secretary’s duty to send objections to the board “as expeditiously as possible”. That was the ruling of the Judge President of the Cape in March of this year. I quote this case in order to prove that in fact the Department, for one reason or another, was dragging its heels. Now, because of this delay, we find that this clause is in effect going to eliminate, with a stroke of the pen, all these cases. The hon. the Minister knows that no further objections can be lodged with the Department in terms of this clause, because these objections were, to all intents and purposes, eliminated in 1967. The hon. the Minister was perfectly honest in his own affidavit in a subsequent case.

He is always honest.

I shall not comment on that interjection. The hon. member for Parow can make his own comments. I would like to quote sections of the newspaper report dealing with the affidavit of the Minister of the Interior. It reads, inter alia, as follows:

This is what the hon. the Minister said in his own affidavit, which was presented to the court:

The judgment in this case and the judgment in the case I mentioned previously, as well as the affidavit submitted by the hon. the Minister, make it perfectly clear that the Secretary of the Department was stalling over the referring of cases to the board and that he had no right to assume the functions of the board. This is a reflection on the Secretary of the Department, and I am sorry to have to mention this. In the second instance we find that the Minister had every intention of abolishing these cases. But what else did the Minister say in his affidavit? He said:

Of course it was not irrelevant to those particular proceedings. Nothing could have been more relevant.

Sir, I simply want to say that I think that the provisions of this clause are most ungenerous and unkind to these people. They are surely entitled to a hearing. When the Department itself accepted third-party objections as being valid at the time when provisions relating to such objections were incorporated in our law, the Department notified these people concerned of the validity of their claims. As we have already asked in this debate this afternoon, how many of them are poor people who now find themselves irrespective of whether their cases are struck off or not, financially committed in a legal sense, with absolutely nothing to show for it? They still remain liable for the payment of attorney’s fees. I want to remind the hon. the Minister, as I reminded him during the debate on the Interior Vote, that many of these cases have been held up for as long as two or three years before being referred to the board by the Department. I do not have to tell the Minister that every time over a period of two or three years, an attorney writes a letter, to the Department, asking when something is going to happen and when the case is going to be heard, his client is charged accordingly. These are people who struggle. One does not know how they struggle, unless one talks to them oneself. They struggle very hard to find sufficient money to pay the attorney’s fees which are involved. When they finally reach the stage when their cases are set down for hearing by the board, we pass legislation here and strike all the remaining cases off with the stroke of a pen. I think that this is grossly unfair. We object particularly to the new section 21A (1) (b), inserted by clause 8 of the Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. member for Wynberg has very effectively stated our objections to this clause in general. I wish to move one amendment in connection with the new section 21A (5), which reads as follows:

This is an incredible state of affairs, when one considers how this information is collected. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (District) indicated his personal experience in this regard. Surely such a deeming clause should only exist if the Secretary has given such classification his personal attention. I therefore move the following amendment:

Mr. Chairman, all I can say is that this amendment will be quite impossible to apply in practice. I cannot accept the amendment.

Amendment put and negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause, as printed, put and the Committee divided:

Tellers: P. H. Torlage, P. S. van der Merwe, H. J. van Wyk and W. L. D. M. Venter.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Mr. Chairman, during the course of this Committee Stage you indicated to us that we could under this clause review every clause of this Bill in the light of the retrospective effect which is provided for in clause 9. I do not propose to do so because I think we have made our objections to this retrospectivity and the clauses themselves known to the hon. the Minister. This is a harsh and an unnecessary provision and it will lead to untold uncertainty although the hon. the Minister has given as the motivation for this Bill the fact that he wants to achieve certainty. Giving these provisions retrospective effect will not only not bring that certainty, but will also cause untold hardship.

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendment:

Question put: That the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the Clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

Tellers: P. H. Torlage, P. S. van der Merwe, H. J. van Wyk and W. L. D. M. Venter.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and amendment negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Mr. Speaker, when the House adjourned last night, I was dealing with the points on which the hon. member for East London (North) had contradicted himself. I also apologized on his behalf to the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration for the hon. member’s failure to have understood the fine explanation of National Party policy which the Minister gave here in this House yesterday afternoon. For example, he wanted to know what “the end of the road of apartheid” was. The speech had made that very clear. I tried to put it to him very simply so that he could understand it. I think it would be a good thing for the hon. member to read that speech again. He may perhaps be converted. The hon. member also said, inter alia, that the United Party would oppose this legislation to the very last, I want to tell him that the more the United Party opposes the legislation the better for us and the worst for them. We are grateful to them for wanting to do so.

The hon. member for South Coast put up a terrible show last night. I began to have some doubts as to whether Zululand belonged to him or to the Zulus. It seems to me he takes strong exception to anything the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration wants to bring about in Zululand. It seems to me his permission has to be obtained before any action may be taken. The hon. member was also extremely angry because this legislation was being handled by the hon. the Deputy Minister and not by the hon. the Minister, I say that is an insult. I say that is an insult to the Deputy Minister who has been handling this matter very efficiently. It seems to me the hon. the Minister must also obtain permission from this hon. member for the way he is conducting the affairs of the department. If the hon. the Minister cannot be present, and he has two Deputy Ministers, should they simply act as onlookers? Should they, in such a case, not do the work? If the hon. member does not want to have a debate with the Deputy Minister, seeing that he is so sanctimonious, he may leave that to the garrulous member for Pietermaritzburg (District). The hon. member is so fond of the Deputy Minister that he wanted to ask him a question already during the Second Reading speech last night.

Why did you not listen to what I said.

I did listen. I listened very carefully.

Look at my Hansard and apologize.

No, I shall not. If I ever saw a display which to me was symbolic of really arrogant political snobbery, I had such a display last night from the hon. member for South Coast.

A senile politician.

Order!

Three members of the United Party spoke last night.

Is an hon. member allowed to refer to another hon. member as a “senile” politician?

Order! What did the hon. member say?

I used the word “senile”. I withdraw it, Mr. Speaker.

Three members of the United Party spoke on this legislation here last night. The central theme of their speeches was that they were concerned about one thing, i.e. the value and the mobility of the Bantu labour force. They have no other interest in the Bantu. Those hon. members are interested in the Bantu only as an appendage to the white economy. That is quite obvious. They also referred to the amendments proposed in clause 3 which contemplate the combatting of illegal squatters on farms. They made a great fuss here about the inhumanity of that. Those amendments do not contain any new principle. Those principles have existed for donkeys years in the Urban Areas Act of 1945. In that Act illegal residence towns was already combated. This legislation will not be implemented in an inhuman way. The amendments to be introduced will simply facilitate criminal proceedings. The hon. member for Port Natal was being very clever last night when he referred to us on this side as being 126 squatters. I just want to remind him that there are 127 of us.

Order! Yes, but those words were withdrawn.

Oh! I beg your pardon, Mr. Speaker. I just wanted to say that we are here legally. Apparently they, too, are here legally, but I think their legality will be something of the past soon. Their time will have expired within a few years.

This legislation is part of the main stem of the apartheid policy of the National party.

If that is so, why have you waited so long to come forward with it?

No, I shall tell you in a moment. Twenty-one years ago this National Party was given a mandate by the people. But what have we been hearing during this Session? Hon. members made fun of the fact that we have been ruling for 21 years, and they made disparaging remarks about that. Those unkind remarks and their ridicule were nothing but expressions of the fear and the despair in their minds. In 1948 those hon. members said that it was a terrible mistake that it had to happen. The people had allegedly voted for a political slogan. There was a psychological reaction among the people. It was said that this National Party could never continue to rule. They also referred disparagingly to us as a lot of “backvelders” who did not have the ability to rule. They, allegedly, were the only people who could rule. It almost sounds like that when one listens to the hon. member for South Coast who wants to prescribe to the Minister. That was what hon. members said, but what happened? The people knew that that was not merely a political slogan. It was a mandate which had come from the people. It was honest and there was no deceit in the National Party. They, the United Party, presented our policy as being something deceitful. I want to say that the United Party is the heir to the old British colonial view in Africa. The United Party is its heir.

But they have left.

That is correct. We are coming to that. What was the old British liberal colonial view? They tried to rule in Africa in various ways. In brief, they had a method of co-operation, partnership and leadership. There was also a form of veiled baasskap (supremacy). They were for ever making concessions and sharing the task of governing, but they always retained control. But they failed. An hon. member has just asked where they were to-day. He said that they had left Africa. There is no longer any trace of them in Africa, because they had to flee. In 1948 the National Party made allowances for the national aspirations of the people in South Africa. The United Party had no contact with their national aspirations. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition spoke a few days ago about what General de Gaulle had said, i.e. that nationalism was apparently hatred and that patriotism was the real thing. A true nationalist loves what is his own, and does not care about another person loving what is his own. Patriotism grows from true nationalism. That is what happens. The United Party, with the view it still holds to-day, has been as much of a failure as British Imperialism was in Africa in those days. The result of this is that only a remnant remains of the erstwhile great party, as the hon. the Minister of Transport said. I want to suggest that the United Party is another remnant of the old British colonial liberal view. They still hold the same view to-day.

Order! The hon. member should come closer to the Bill now.

I am coming to it now.

The hon. member is digressing very far.

According to its mandate from the people the National Party recognized colour differences. It recognized the ethnic population groups in this country, and it recognized that each population group or ethnic group had a right to an individual identity.

They never said that in 1948.

Of course we did. The National Party made a sincere attempt to place all these Bantu national groups on the road of political development, to uplift them and to bring about development in their own areas. The United Party is caught up and has been rendered powerless by the positive measures devised by the National Party.

Why is that programme so slow?

That development programme has caught the United Party, because they announced that we would not undertake such a programme. This legislation lies at the root of our policy and introduces an arrangement in the field of labour. The National Party had to do something unique at that time, something which had not been done anywhere else in the world. The National Party had to build itself a road into an unknown, unchartered and virgin territory. In the heat of the struggle the National Party had to devise plans and pave its way. This is precisely what is happening here with this legislation. As time passed and certain problems cropped up, legislation had to be introduced to cope with those problems. I consider it to be a wonderful achievement on the part of the National Party to have reached its present position. Within the economic framework and co-operation which we have to-day with the Bantu people, there is one very important point of contact, i.e. on the labour level. This point of contact can be very important to the continued existence of a people. It can also be a tremendous point of friction if not handled properly. It can also disturb relations if not handled properly. This point of contact on the labour level can hold the germs of a people’s downfall, but it can also hold the germs of a people’s preservation. But the United Party is opposing this legislation, and I am now referring specifically to clause 11. Why are they opposing it? Because they see the Bantu as a citizen of the whole of South Africa and not as a citizen of his own area. They see the Bantu merely as a labour factor for the convenience and profit of the Whites. They want to see the Bantu freely absorbed into our economy in all spheres. If the United Party could move the House to do this, the free absorption of our Bantu into the labour market will eventually lead to integration. The United Party sees the Bantu in South Africa as a second-class citizen, because he offers him limited rights. According to the view of her party, the hon. member for Houghton sees the Bantu as a first-class citizen. The National Party sees the Bantu as a first-class citizen in his own area and not in the white area.

To stay there for the rest of his life.

That is our policy.

And an immigrant?

As regards immigrants, we can admit whomsoever we want to admit. We shall only allow those who can he assimilated. The United Party maintains that the Bantu is a citizen of the entire country. If we were to concede to this, we would be moving along the road towards integration, i.e. the road on which the United Party is. I do not say that this is their intention at this stage, but even if they did not want to do so, necessity would compel them to take that course and that is where they will end. Concessions in the field of labour will eventually mean concessions in the field of ownership. This in turn will mean that the Bantu will become taxpayers and then they will demand the right to vote since they are taxpayers. Once the Bantu have the right to vote his rights will be extended until, in the long run, the United Party will give the whole of South Africa to the Bantu. We, however, shall retain a smaller White South Africa. For this reason this legislation is perfectly natural and it is logical for us to continue with this legislation. Here we are dealing with people who can never become citizens of our country. They are people who will become citizens of their own country to-morrow.

Yes, to-morrow.

To-morrow, the day after to-morrow, or at a later stage. They are capable of developing in that direction. We have to introduce legislation for the protection of our own people, and we have to introduce legislation which gives no vested rights to the Bantu here. However, there are many of our people whose profit motive knows no “patriotism. Such people would very easily make use of Bantu if they could pay them less and thereby increase their profits. There are people who do not care at all what happens to our country in the future, and who do not care what happens to our children. That is why we are introducing this legislation. As I have said, we shall not allow those foreign people to obtain vested interests in our country. At the same time we shall ensure that those people obtain unrestricted vested interests in their own areas. We shall carry out our guardianship with the last grain of moral strength we have. This Government has a duty to the majority of the voters in this country on account of the mandate which it was given in 1948 and also many times after that.

It has changed since 1948.

Yes, the position has changed indeed, because the United Party is only a remnant of what it used to be. I am grateful that, through the mouth of the hon. the Minister, the Government is taking the powers it is in fact taking now. I shall return to my constituency with a song in my heart because I am happy. I shall return with a message because I shall be able to tell my voters that their interests, traditions and ways of life and all their aspirations are safe in the hands of the National Party. What is the United Party going to say? They shall simply be returning to a remnant. In my constituency the United Party is no longer of any importance. There it is the party which everyone hears about but in which no one has any faith any longer. It is also the party that everyone knows about but no one supports any longer. The more the United Party continues in its attempts to thwart the National Party as regards these progressive steps for the extension of separate development, the more they are helping, each time they do so, to drive a nail into their political coffin.

Mr. Speaker, I listened with a great deal of interest to the Second-Reading speech made by the hon. the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, and to the speeches made by the hon. members on that side of the House who followed him. Mr. Speaker, let me say immediately that if I ever saw a person reading with his tongue in his cheek …

Order!

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw that remark. I will put it this way: If I ever saw anybody trying to defend the indefensible, then that person was the hon. the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education. I have to say that I sympathized with the hon. the Deputy Minister, because quite obviously he had been given a very unenviable task in being asked to pilot this very contentious legislation through this House. Then we had the hon. member for Brakpan, and I am very sorry to see that he is not here at the moment. He spoke at great length and I must say that I have never seen any hon. member treat such an important and urgent matter as lightly as the hon. member for Brakpan did last night. He was very concerned about the fact that Africans were taking over jobs that were previously held by white women. Quite obviously this happened because there were no white women to fill these jobs. Then he was terribly concerned at the fact, and he made a point of this, that the Bantu in South Africa were now aspiring to white-collar jobs. He said quite plainly that in his opinion they should do their traditional type of work, and that of course means that they should be drawers of water and hewers of wood. He made a remark to which I want to react. During his speech he said that this legislation would be on the Statute Book by Saturday because the people outside were waiting for it and wanted it. The hon. member did not qualify these remarks and I want to ask him whether he included in these people the 12 million Bantu people who will be vitally affected by this legislation, the Bantu people who have done their full share in making South Africa the great country that it is to-day. He quite obviously did not include in these people the 45 per cent of the electorate that support this side of the House. I want to say that I am quite sure that the Bantu people in particular are waiting for this legislation, but I suggest that they are waiting in fear and trepidation, because we know what effect this legislation is going to have on the lives of all the Bantu in South Africa.

Then we had the speech of the hon. member for Pietersburg. He did not say very much, except that the United Party were only interested in the Bantu from the point of view of the economy. I want to say to him that the very fact that the Government can sit here and boast of the wonderful economic progress that is being made in this country is to a large extent due to the labour of the Bantu people in South Africa. The longer I sit in this House, the more amazed I become at the Government’s capacity for deluding itself on this whole question of separate development.

Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very strange position. On the one hand we have the evidence which has become conclusive and which points to the obvious failure of separate development, while on the other hand we have Government spokesmen who tell us almost every day of our lives that separate development is in fact succeeding and that it will succeed. I want to say that there is a bit of a change because I find that the supreme optimist on that side of the House, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, had the following to say at a meeting the other day. Under the heading “Apartheid by Kruispad” in the Dagbreek of 15th June, the hon. the Deputy Minister was quoted to have said the following—

So hon. members can see—and there is no question that some hon. members on that side of the House are starting to see—that they are running into trouble. Quite obviously this Bill before us is another attempt to bolster the crumbling façade of separate development. At the same time it seeks to give substance to an unattainable ideological dream. There can be no doubt that the Government, through their own policy, are to-day riding the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, if they turn the screws too tightly to encourage industry to go to the border industries, they will, without any doubt, upset the economy of South Africa. On the other hand, if they do not remove enough Bantu from the urban areas, their ideology will crumble. This is something of their own making. But without any doubt I think the writing is on the wall as far as separate development is concerned.

When I read through this Bill for the first time I did so with a sense of amazement and disbelief, because I wondered whether the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration, who after all is a very responsible person and a capable politician, could really be serious when he comes along to this House and asks us to consider legislation of this nature. Let us make no mistake about this. The effect of this Bill will in fact be to make the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration a virtual dictator over Bantu labour in South Africa. Because Bantu labour is such a vital and integral part of the economy of South Africa to-day, by the same token the hon. the Minister will also become the arbiter over nearly all productivity in South Africa in every possible sphere.

That this Bill is putting unheard of powers into the hands of the hon. the Minister, is perfectly obvious. I want to list just a few of the powers that he will have under this new clause. I want to challenge the hon. the Deputy Minister who is piloting the Bill to tell me that he will not have these powers when this Bill is placed on the Statute Book. For instance, we find that the hon. the Minister will have the power to control labour and the employment of labour. He will have the power to control who may work, what work they may do, where they will work, and for whom they will work. He will have the power to control who may employ labour. He will have the power to control industry and commerce, to close factories, to terminate employment contracts, to abolish domestic labour, to control and deny free enterprise and to ensure that all labour will be Government-controlled migrant labour. He will have the power to curtail, abolish or remove African locations, villages and hostels. He will also have the power to remove any African community without compensation for any single African to any place at his whim. Quite obviously the hon. the Minister is serious. The Bill is before us; we are debating it and we have to accept the fact that he is serious and that he does require for some ideological reason these really enormous and fantastic powers. You must then ask yourself what the effect of this Bill is going to be, firstly on the Bantu people of South Africa, and secondly on the economy of South Africa. Let me say immediately that the answer is quite obvious. This Bill can certainly not be in the interest of the Bantu people of South Africa or the economy of South Africa. There can be no doubt that this Bill will serve to strip the last remnants of security and dignity from the Bantu people of South Africa. I use the word “dignity” advisedly, because there is an old saying which says that when you take a man’s dignity away he has nothing left. The Bantu people in South Africa are to-day truly facing their moment of truth, because they now have to face up to the fact that from now on their whole lives, from cradle to grave, will be regimented and controlled by ideological legislation. What is even worse, the Bantu people in South Africa are now going to feel that while white South Africa is perfectly content and happy to make use of their labour to bolster our economy, they themselves will never be accepted as a part of the population of South Africa. To me, this truly is a tragedy. We are speaking here of the largest section of our population, a section of the population which has always proved to be loyal and a section which withstood every attempt by agitators to spur them on. These are the people we are now treating like numbers and not like people.

They say that numbers do not matter.

Surely the Government must realize the desirability of a stable, contented labour force. Surely the Government must also realize that the economy of South Africa must stand or fall by collaboration between the races in South Africa. One can well imagine the deep sense of insecurity and frustration that the Bill will create in the minds of the Bantu people when the full implications of the Bill are brought home to them. The tragedy, of course, is that this Bill will not decrease the number of Bantu in the urban areas because we know, in spite of all the talk of separate development and all the stories we hear, it is an indisputable fact that for every Bantu leaving the urban areas 26 others promptly move in to take his place. Sir, there is no doubt in my mind that the Bill is not in the interests of the Bantu people and certainly not in the interests of the economy of South Africa. We find too that if this Bill is implemented it will without any doubt impose a stranglehold on South African industry because the hon. the Minister will have the power to decide where African labour may be employed, in what category and by what employer. This is an unheard-of power to give any Minister. I want to highlight here that this power is even greater than the power given to the hon. the Minister of Planning under the Planning Act. I want to say too that at least in regard to job reservation there was a clause in the Industrial Conciliation Act which gave the employer the right to comment on proposals before the hon. the Minister took a decision, but not here, Sir. Now the hon. the Minister will take decisions without consulting anyone at all. I wonder how even this Government can relate this type of legislation and this type of power with the democratic progress of South Africa, because surely in no other country in the world do you find powers of this sort given to any Minister.

In Russia you do.

I have watched the position very carefully; I have done some homework on this and I cannot find a single instance where any Minister has been given this type of power. Sir, I had hoped, when this Bill was so long in coming forward, that a certain amount of reason prevailed on that side of the House and that we would not see this Bill. I want to make an appeal here again this evening to the hon. the Deputy Minister to consider withdrawing this Bill even at the last moment, because it can do South Africa no good at all; it can only serve to change a stable African labour force into a discontented unstable labour force, and we know that we do not want that. Sir, Governments come and go but South Africa will remain here and my plea is that further thought should be given to this particular Bill. Sir, during the Committee Stage we will obviously have very much more opportunity to prove the various clauses.

When?

On Tuesday.

I am certain that the hon. the Minister will be very sorry indeed that he did bring this legislation forward in this particular form. For these reasons I support the amendment of this side of the House that this legislation should be considered six months from to-day.

I do not want to spend a great deal of time on the hon. member who has just sat down. He obviously looked up the arguments which were advanced in 1956 with reference to the Industrial Conciliation Act, and took his arguments from there to use in this debate. But I would be failing in my duty if I did not point out to him that this same argument, i.e. that the economy of the Republic would collapse as a result of the work reservation clause, section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, was also bandied about across the floor of the House by the Opposition in 1956. Sir, what are the facts? Subsequent to that we experienced an economic boom, virtually an economic revolution, in this country.

May I ask the hon. member whether 2 per cent of the workers or more are affected by job reservation?

Sir, I do not have that figure at my disposal. I am not basing my argument on the figures; I am basing it on the fact that we in this country are experiencing racial peace and labour peace, and that in spite of the arguments which were advanced here in 1956 to the effect that we would experience an economic recession as a result of that clause. [Interjections.] Sir, will the hon. member for Durban (Point) please allow me to make my own speech? The hon. member for Johannesburg (North) used the same argument this evening, i.e. that the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development was now suddenly going to control 13 million people by means of this legislation. Sir, we are one of the few countries in the world to-day which enjoy racial peace and harmony in the labour field, thanks to the sound relations which were established by way of legislation in our multi-racial labour setup. Sir, it is very clear to me from the debate so far that the Opposition do not have the faintest notion of what we envisage by separate development. In fact, I think they do not even realize what the concept means, It is perhaps necessary for the sake of clarity that we should show them where we are headed for with this policy and what exactly we have in mind with it. The first great pillar on which this policy is founded is that everyone, irrespective of race or group, is afforded the fullest opportunity to develop within his own national relationship to his full potential. This is the first great pillar on which this policy is founded. The second is that it creates the climate for the various races of which the population of this country is composed, either to eliminate racial friction or to limit it to the minimum.

Or cause it.

Sir, proof that the policy has succeeded in this respect is the fact that we enjoy labour peace and, what is far more important, racial peace in this country as is enjoyed by no other country in the world.

What about Rhodesia?

In America, where the policy is integration on all levels, racial disturbances are taking place on a scale unprecedented in their history. Integration, no matter on what level, has over the years been proved to be a myth, or not applicable in all its consequences.

Who is pleading for that?

The Opposition. The Opposition is pleading for it every day. I shall show in my speech that the Opposition is pleading for integration here every day. Sir, where integration is applied, no matter where in the world …

You are carrying it out.

… so much racial friction is caused and so many conflicts occur that it can indeed be regarded as an evil of this civilization. Integration is indeed a violation of all natural laws. I do not have the time to go into this, and you, Sir, will not allow me to go into it any further, but I make this statement.

Sir, clause 11 of this Bill is purely and simply aimed at eliminating or at least checking integration which is now rearing its head on several levels. We know that the Opposition stand for economic integration. They prove it to us every day in this House. All the steps taken by this Government to restrict this integration process, are opposed by them and they want to undo them.

Integration is a fact under your policy.

The hon. member says that it is a fact that integration on the economic level is taking place here. Sir, any measure which is taken in terms of the separate development policy of the Government is opposed by the Opposition, and then they tell us that it is a fact that integration is taking place; and when we come along here with legislation to stop this integration process on certain levels, what is their attitude? Then they keep this House busy for a day in order to oppose it. It is no use beating about the bush. Their opposition is not to this legislation; they are opposed to clause 11, because in clause 11 they see the destruction of integration on other levels as well. That is why they are opposed to it. We are not going to be taken in by the Opposition, and even less by the hon. member for Durban (Point). They are pleading here in the first place for integration, and in the second place the Opposition is opposed to this measure because they are supporters of these people being exploited so that they can employ them at lower salaries than those which they have to pay Whites. Sir, it is not tradition in this country that non-Whites should be typists, telephone operators and clerks behind counters. It is not the traditional policy of the country, and why should we not oppose this practice at this stage when it rears its head?

Mr. Speaker, I have in my possession a document which was drawn up by the allies of the Opposition, and I should like to refer to it; it is a circular which was sent out by the South African Council of Churches. I presume that it was sent to all members of Parliament. This is what they wrote with reference to the Bill which is before the House now—

Then it goes on to say—

Is that wrong?

Sir, I want to express my strongest disapproval of this circular which was sent to me. As a professing member of the D. R. Church, I object most strongly to the fact that in the portion read out the impression is created by implication that this Government in general and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in particular do not keep to the precepts of the Word of God.

Of course not.

I take strong exception to the fact that reference is made in this way to the powers which the Minister is taking in this Bill. In the first place, as an adherent of the Christian National Protestantism on which this National Party, of which I have the privilege to be a member, is founded, I find it objectionable that religion and particularly the name of God should be dragged into the political field here in such an irresponsible and in fact blasphemous way. Here we have a striking example of how the dearest and most treasured possession of the Afrikaner, that which is very near to his heart, namely his deep-rooted religious feeling, is being peddled on the political market place by unscrupulous people who call themselves ministers of certain churches. One’s whole nature revolts against this. To this liberal group of integrationist clergymen I want to give the friendly advice to stop doing this sort of thing. In the past they have even on occasion arrogated unto themselves the right to reprimand our Prime Minister. This group regard themselves as the watchmen on the walls of Zion and as interpreters of the Bible in so far as they see precepts in it as to how we should treat our non-Whites. If their standpoint were motivated by what the Bible really says about that, one could still have taken notice of it. Unfortunately, their past actions create the undeniable impression that instead of the promotion of the Church of Christ here on earth, a task which should be their primary calling, they keep themselves occupied with political matters where their attention is not only uncalled for, but also motivated by sinister liberal political motives. If what I quoted here is a true exegesis of Scripture, then it implies that a state of anarchy is willed by Scripture. Surely it is impossible that Scripture will prescribe that anarchy should reign here. The Government rightly claims to be a Christian Government. As such it is its task and calling to see to it that the country is governed in an orderly fashion and well in order to create thereby the climate for the practice of neighbourly love, one of the two great commandments of Scripture. Anarchy is in conflict with our view of life and with our Christian convictions. If the quoted document contains such an implication, I reject it with everything in my power. As a person of Christian upbringing and a responsible being, responsible, inter alia, to this Parliament, I, nor anybody else, has any fear that clause 11 is motivated by hate. After all, the duty rests on the Minister to apply his legislation in a civilized, upright and fair way. Where unhealthy conditions (wantoestande) threaten to arise, conditions which threaten good order and our co-existence in this country, it is his Christian duty to act against them. I also have the fullest confidence that he will act against them according to the light which he receives.

Do you expect all of us to share your touching faith?

If you do not have it, you are not worthy to sit in this House. I regard this document which was drawn up by the Council of Churches, this group of sanctimonious gentlemen who assume responsibility for determining the norms in this country, as blasphemous and malicious, to say the least of it. This is my reply to these associates and partners of the hon. the Opposition. We have a mandate from the people to carry out our policy of separate development, and I emphasize the separate aspect of it as well as the development aspect of it, and we intend doing so in an upright, Christian and fair manner.

The hon. member for Cradock has expressed the view that we on this side of the House do not understand what is meant by the concept “separate development”. On the contrary, let me tell the hon. member that we on this side understand every aspect of separate development—that is why we are so intensely against it. We realize it cannot work. My appeal to the hon. member for Cradock is to study what the real position in South Africa is, and not to follow pipe dreams. The United Party bases its policies on the realities as they exist.

But I want to confine my remarks to that which has been said by the hon. member for Brakpan. Therefore I regret that he is not present in this Chamber. I presume he found things getting too hot; otherwise he would have been here to listen to the comments I have to make on his speech. He said he supported this Bill because it would be possible now to prevent Bantu from replacing white women in certain spheres of work. Up to a point I have no quarrel with his contention; it is a problem which has arisen in his constituency and in the area from where he comes, the Witwatersrand.

Largely imaginary, I assure you.

But I cannot agree entirely with the contention of the hon. member. We must bear in mind that in our country there is a shortage of semi-skilled and of skilled labour and that we may be doing the white people of this country a disservice by constantly protecting their position by legislation. Competition still is the great factor for the promotion of efficiency. Too much protection may well have the opposite effect. I have plenty of confidence in the white people of South Africa to maintain their position because of their superior skills, and the sooner we get away from the idea that we can protect our position mainly by legislation instead of maintaining our position by virtue of our superiority, the worse it will be for this country. Hon. members opposite are doing their level best to do a good job in their constituencies, because they know there is a very efficient United Party man ready to take their place. It is that type of competition that keeps the world going and any legislation which tends to eliminate competition between people is courting economic disaster. Sometimes I gain the impression that the legislation we put on the Statute Book here aims to achieve that very object. If the hon. member for Brakpan accepted the policy of this side of the House that there should be equal pay for work of equal value, then the problem he referred to in this House yesterday may quite easily fall away.

I want to come to clause 7 of this Bill. It amends section 18 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, as amended. Section 18 of that Act reads as follows—

That is the law as it stands to-day, Sir, but in terms of the Bill we have before us, that section is to be amended. Paragraph (a) of the existing section 18 (1) is replaced by the following paragraph—

The words “under its control” are now omitted after the words “Bantu village”. In other words, the effect of this Bill is that any Bantu location in which unsatisfactory conditions prevail, may be demolished, and the occupants removed to another location not necessarily under its control. They can now be moved from province to province. But this provision goes further. The new paragraph (b) which is being substituted for the existing section 18 (1) (b) reads as follows—

In the light of all this I want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister what the position is in respect of the many Bantu townships in the Eastern Cape which now fall to the west of the so-called “Kat-Vis-lyn”? These townships are administered by local authorities who find themselves in an extremely difficult position. Being in a Coloured preferential area they can no longer obtain loans from the Housing Commission at a low rate of interest, and the housing in these Bantu townships is now in a deplorable condition. I should like the hon. the Deputy Minister to go there and see what is in fact going on. Sir, just to give you some idea of the position in these areas, I have here some comments describing the housing in these particular Bantu townships. Let us take Middelburg in the Cape, for instance, These are some of the comments they have here—

Let us take Mossel Bay. Sir. The conditions there are described as follows—

Let us take Humansdorp. The conditions here are described as follows—

Let us take the position in Graaff-Reinet—

Sir, the conditions became so bad in Middelburg that a large portion of the location was demolished. The occupants were transferred to Mngqesha. According to reports I have received, the position there is, however, less satisfactory than it was in the dilapidated location they had left at Middelburg. Many of them tried to return, and on their return to Middelburg were arrested. The point I am making is that, with the stroke of a pen, an imaginary line has been drawn on a map. For no reason other than the colour of their skins, people are suddenly denied elementary human rights because they happen to live on the wrong side of that imaginary line. Not only is this the position, Sir, but they are being deprived of their rights under section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, No. 25 of 1945, which we on this side of the House believed implicitly were entrenched rights as far as the Bantu were concerned. Last year in this House I raised the question of the state of these locations. I made a speech which I should like to quote now.

Order! Those are matters which should have been dealt with on another occasion. We are discussing a Bill now.

Bear with me, Sir. It helps to make my point. I shall be as brief as I can. What I said was—

Little notice was probably taken of that speech, Sir, because I am aware of my position in the back benches, and I was then a new member. However. I knew what I was speaking about. What has happened? Exactly one year after I made that speech a raid was carried out on the location in Graaff-Reinet and 25 person were removed from that location. Here is a report I have in this connection—

Sir, my point is that if we do not take drastic steps to put these African townships in a proper condition, we create the very conditions where people with communistic tendencies can develop their ideas. The hon. the Deputy Minister must agree with me; he knows what the position is. He has seen those locations. I challenge him to deny that the conditions I have described here are in fact true. The reason why this has happened is because these Bantu locations, with very considerable Bantu populations, are west of the Kat-Vis-lyn, and the local authorities can no longer obtain funds at a cheap rate of interest from the Housing Commission to put those Bantu townships in order. This is creating a very serious problem. I now come to clause 11 of the Bill. My hon. colleague who spoke earlier mentioned the very far-reaching powers which the new section 20A confers upon the Minister.

I agree with him that there must be few countries in the world where a Minister of the Cabinet can be vested with the powers which this Bill is handing to the Minister of Bantu Administration. I do not want to read the whole clause, but one point arises and I raise this point specifically as a Member of Parliament for the area of Port Elizabeth. I want to know from the hon. the Minister whether in terms of this particular clause, as far as Port Elizabeth is concerned by virtue of the fact that it lies west of the Kat-Vis-lyn and is thus a Coloured preferential area, he is going to use the powers conferred on him by the new section 20A to restrict the employment of Bantu in Port Elizabeth. I know that in terms of the Planning Act the Minister of Planning has drastic powers to control the employment of Bantu in industry in any area, but here additional powers are given. We who are concerned with the future development of Port Elizabeth I think have every right to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister who is piloting the Bill whether this is going to affect the position in Port Elizabeth further. We in Port Elizabeth get no advantages from the border industrial concessions. We have many problems, and we see here that our Bantu labour force might well be restricted. We are definitely concerned about this matter and I should like the hon. the Deputy Minister, when he replies, to tell me what the position is as far as Port Elizabeth is concerned.

By restricting the field of their employment, many Bantu may find themselves out of work. If they are out of work they will qualify for repatriation to the Transkei or other Bantu reserves where there is already an excess of unemployment. I should like to know what the position is in respect of Port Elizabeth. We in Port Elizabeth have always accepted that our approximately 200,000 Bantu people are a permanent part of the Port Elizabeth community and any disruption of that situation will very drastically curtail industrial development in Port Elizabeth. We are therefore interested in what the position is going to be. I am concerned because I have before me a statement by a fairly senior official in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Through an interpreter he spoke for about 1½ hours on general Government policy. He told the Bantu Board “that although there are African townships in white areas, they are not permanent homes for Africans. Africans remain there while they are at the disposal of the white employer”. That is my answer to the hon. member for Pietersburg, who accused this side of the House of only being interested in their labour. This is what a senior official of the Department said: “Africans remained there while they were at the disposal of the white employer. Old men and women, other women and children were redundant. They were a burden on municipalities because they wanted homes and services. These people, he said, should give way to others who could be placed in employment.” I view this statement very seriously, and I should like to hear what the hon. the Minister has to say about it. This gentleman went on to say, while addressing people in Port Elizabeth …

Who was he?

I will give this newspaper cutting to the hon. the Deputy Minister later on, as I do not want to mention names in the House. But while addressing the Bantu Board in Port Elizabeth he said: “If I were a Bantu I would drop everything in the urban areas and go to the homelands.” In other words, he was encouraging what we believe to be a permanent part of the population of Port Elizabeth to pack up their bags and leave Port Elizabeth to go to the homelands. This is a very serious situation, because every Bantu that is employable in Port Elizabeth is in work and every Coloured man in Port Elizabeth who is employable is also in work. Industry is expanding and it in fact needs more labour. I therefore do not think that we can tolerate a situation that is going to reduce the amount of labour in Port Elizabeth.

Order! The hon. member must return to the Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I think I have made my point as far as the Bill is concerned. I am concerned about the drastic powers the hon. the Minister is taking by means of the new section 20A. Mr. Speaker, if you will allow me to speak for one or two more minutes, I will conclude now, because there is one more point I want to raise with the hon. the Deputy Minister. The hon. the Deputy Minister said yesterday that the Bantu population of Port Elizabeth is being reduced. I was quite upset to hear that, but here we have the planning department of the University of Port Elizabeth planning for the future of this great industrial area and saying:

The hon. the Deputy Minister said that our Bantu population was decreasing. The planners of the future Port Elizabeth are saying that they anticipate a tremendous increase in the Bantu population. I think that these matters should be cleared up.

Mr. Speaker, if a man is afforded such a reception it does give him a little encouragement. If the hon. member who has just spoken had listened to the Second Reading speech of the hon. the Deputy Minister, he would, instead of elaborating on those pictures which he presented to us as being so dreadful, have realized that one of the objects of this Bill was to clear up properly those places which were so undesirable and in respect of which the local authority was perhaps unwilling, unable or not quite competent to devote the necessary attention in order that those terrible conditions which he described might be cleared up.

I actually stood up to speak about a particular aspect of this Bill, because the hon. member for South Coast made a particular attack on this matter, i.e. that he would, as the hon. the Deputy Minister explained, use two-thirds of the profits made on beer in order to grant benefits to the Bantu as well. It will be used to provide housing and other benefits, not only in the areas where the beer is being sold, but also in the Bantu homelands. The hon. member for South Coast attacked that principle vehemently. If I understood the hon. member correctly, he said that he thought that that money should be spent in the area where the beer was sold. He saw an element of injustice in this money being used for the provision of facilities and benefits in the Bantu homelands. It is quite understandable that the hon. member should attack that principle. It is here that the clash between the policy of the United Party and that of the National Party becomes clearly evident. The Government’s standpoint is that that money which is being spent in the homelands, is money which comes from the pockets of people who ought to be living in those areas where the facilities will be provided. We therefore want to make conditions attractive for them there. We therefore want to use all the money, which belongs to their country, for their own benefit, because they are the people who earned the money, just as they sometimes also spend in their homelands the wages they earned in the white areas.

In the same way the benefits which are being provided out of money which comes from their own pockets, must be established in the homelands so that benefits may accrue there for them, because one’s heart is where one’s riches are. There is very clear proof to the effect that this is an attempt on our part to spend money, where possible, for the benefit of the Bantu in the country in which he will eventually settle, where he ought to be living, where he ought to live in the future, where his family is, where his whole heart is and ought to be, where he will have to exercise his vote. I cannot omit to call attention to the way in which the hon. member for South Coast pleaded on the basis of a report published by the United Party of Johannesburg, about which we also read in the newspapers and in which they stated their policies very clearly. It is very clear that the hon. member for South Coast also pleaded for this indirectly. What is the content of that report to which he referred? They suggested, inter alia, that in Johannesburg and in other metropolitan areas the State should provide large blocks of flats, magnificent buildings, and such other attractions for the Bantu as one may think of. This has to be done in order to entice the Bantu, in a rather unseemly fashion, to leave their homelands so as to live in this paradise which the United Party wants to construct at the expense of the State for the convenience of certain employers in Johannesburg. That is, of course, what the hon. member for South Coast also pleaded for. I suspect that he also had this in mind. Therefore he does not want this money to be spent in the Bantu homelands either, but rather in those areas where it has ostensibly been earned.

This is where the two policies come into conflict. When one has given an indication of how one wants to spend one’s money, it is very clear where one wants it to be concentrated. Can one imagine a greater enticement than when that report of the United Party in which these things are proposed, were to be heeded in the Johannesburg City Council? It would entail hundreds of millions of rands. They are always implying that they are dissatisfied with the continually increasing numbers. Now they want to make the conditions so attractive that those numbers will increase still further. In other words, they expect the State to spend hundreds of millions of rands in order to promote their policy, i.e. further integration in residential areas, industrial areas and nearly every possible sphere. The influx would consequently be aggravated. There is no greater enticement for the Bantu than the proposal of the hon. member for South Coast and the report of the United Party in the Johannesburg City Council would be if they were to be carried into effect.

Who placed influx control on the Statute Book?

Oh, have you also woken up?

Mr. Speaker, this is a particular aspect which I want to recommend, and I am very glad that it is contained in this Bill, because money which will be spent for the future benefit of the Bantu, will be spent in the homelands, and because we are not going to provide them with these attractions where they do not belong. However, we shall provide them with ordinary, elementary housing facilities. But when one is dealing with additional funds which accrue as a result of profits made on the sale of beer, it is basically only right that they should be spent in the actual homeland of the Bantu. These funds should not be spent where there is already an over-concentration of all kinds of things and where, I am tempted to say, they are being led astray in an improper way by certain employers.

Mr. Speaker, I should also like to touch upon another aspect of this Bill. I am now referring to clause 11 which is now being opposed so vehemently.

Mr. Speaker, since this matter concerns the question of the provision of employment or the permission to work, you will allow me to make this statement. I want to make this statement very emphatically, even though I must do so at the risk of causing members of the United Party to lose a night’s sleep. We saw the other day that a very large number of Whites had emigrated from South Africa, people who had originally immigrated here. To-night I want to lay this at the door of those who are responsible for it. It is no use saying here all day that we should entice Whites to South Africa and then we find this state of affairs here. When foreigners come here to make South Africa their homeland, they find that the largest employers and employers’ organizations in this country bring him into immediate conflict with the Bantu workers in this country. Then those people from Europe find that they cannot stand it here. They cannot reconcile themselves to that basis which the United Party advocates, i.e. the rate for the job. He is not capable of doing so. What happens then? One finds that large-scale emigration takes place, and that that large number of Whites leave the country again. This question was asked very pointedly in the Press the other day: Why are those people leaving South Africa? I lay this at the door of those large-scale South African employers, who, under the guidance of Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, tell them that they must not employ Whites but Bantu. [Interjections.]

Yes, I know that I am once again incurring the wrath of the entire United Party, but this must be said so that the country and the world may know that it is not the Government’s fault, but the fault of these employers who black man in the place of a white man. Once we have made every effort to entice those Whites to this country, they find it impossible to remain here, because the largest employers in the country do not want them. The largest employers in this country want to employ black people, not those Whites. The sooner South Africa and the world knows this, the better. I challenge anyone on the United Party side to prove to me that this statement is incorrect. The statement that those people are simply leaving South Africa as a result of the policy of Mr. Harry Oppenheimer and all those 159 bodies which he has under his control, because he constantly applies pressure and a stranglehold on them to “employ black labour instead of White”….

According to a report in the Rand Daily Mail the other day, we now find that the mines are eventually becoming aware of the fact that that complaint will be laid at their door, because they are among the leading employers in South Africa. They realize that a Bantu stigma attaches to that industry. This is not what I say; those are their own words. Whose fault is it that a Bantu stigma attaches to the mining industry to-day? Despite the fact that the Ministers concerned have done their best to ensure peace and calm in the industries, one suddenly wakes up one morning to find that attempts are once again very cunningly being made at employing Bantu instead of Whites. That is why this clause, to which the United Party is objecting so vehemently, is an attacking measure. It is by no means a new principle. If I had had the time at my disposal, I would have shown hon. members that there are several Acts which lay down this very same principle.

As a result of this principle which we introduced in South Africa, we have a state of peace in our mining and other industries. But, when this Government is constantly doing its best to effect peace and calm in our industries, I do not want these bodies which derive the greatest benefit, to take the greatest unfair advantage by once again disturbing the peace and calm in this country. They are the cause of the wrath of the white labourers in South Africa, because they continually insist that Blacks should be employed in the place of Whites. When newcomers come to South Africa, they have to flee, as I have now indicated to hon. members, because they see that the policy of the largest employers in South Africa is not to have white labour, but black labour.

Mr. Speaker, it is obvious that the hon. member did not have a licence to speak as long as he did. During the time he was on his feet he has made many statements. I am not going to reply to all of them, because many of them do not warrant a reply from this side of the House. It is the same old story we have heard from this “weerbarstige” for a long time. We are used to his Hoggenheimers, Haakenheimers, Oppenheimers and other Heimer-stories, and therefore I am not going to waste time on that. But some of the things he has said do warrant a reply. I am going to deal with his speech from back to front, because it was a back to front speech anyway. He referred to certain large industrialists in this country and to the United Party as putting non-Whites in white jobs. I want to know who is the greatest employer in South Africa of non-Whites in jobs which were previously occupied by Whites?

The Government over there.

Who is the largest employer in this country? The largest single employer in this country is the hon. the Minister of Transport. He is the only realist on that side of the House and the only one who has had the courage to stand up and say that he sees the reality of the situation in South Africa and that is that we are going to have to employ non-Whites in these jobs, irrespective of what this hon. Minister says. I should like to see what is going to be the effect of this Bill when it is put on the Statute Book. Let the hon. the Minister, who is not here, try it on the hon. the Minister of Transport. Let us see what will happen. I know what the hon. the Minister of Transport’s reply will be. It is going to be exactly the same reply as that which he gave in this House on a previous occasion, namely: “I shall put the interests of South Africa first.” The interests of South Africa demand that we should utilize all the available labour in South Africa to the best degree. How many thousands of Bantu gangers, platelayers, shunters and checkers do we have in the employ of the Railways? It will not be long before they will be on the footplates. Mark those words, Sir. They will be on the footplates, because, as I say, that hon. gentleman is the only realist on that side of the House. The hon. member referred to the question of immigrants. He said that they were leaving the country because they could not compete against the non-Whites. What an admission for a front-bench member of this Government to make!

An old member.

Which Government is in power? Under whose control are these matters to-day? They are under the control of the Nationalist Party, and that hon. member has the temerity to say that! He is like our hon. friend from Klip River who unfortunately has left. I should like to speak to him again if one of the Whips would kindly call him back. I should like to speak to him later. He is also now developing a new policy for the Nationalist Party; so is the hon. member for Krugersdorp. He said that he was of the opinion that the Bantu should spend their money in the homelands. We have heard this story before from hon. members on that side of the House, including Ministers. I want to know how this concentrate on employing, where possible a is going to work, even in the so-called border areas. These people are not going to spend their wages in the homelands unless we do as the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, who unfortunately is not here, has said he will do. He said that he would close down all the white shops in the border areas. I should like to see him close down all the white shops in Durban, in Pietermaritzburg …

And Hammarsdale.

… at Hammarsdale, Ladysmith, Newcastle, Howick and every other town in Natal.

Then you can serve behind the counter.

Then we shall have the hon. member for Umhlatuzana serving behind the counter.

No, he will not qualify.

Oh yes, he does not qualify; I beg your pardon; he will not be working there because he will not qualify. But that is what that hon. Minister has said and I want to see him implement that policy.

The hon. member took my colleague, the hon. member for Walmer, to task for what he has said about slum conditions in the Bantu townships in the villages and the townships in the Eastern Cape. Of course he said that these slum areas had to be cleaned up. This, I must admit, represents support and we welcome his support, but I want to say to this Government that they must not use this as an excuse to removed those Bantu. This must be slum clearance in the true sense of the word and alternative accommodation must be provided for those people in that area, as was so capably advocated by my colleague, the hon. member for Walmer. This must not be used as an excuse to remove the Bantu, as the hon. the Minister of Bantu Development— who is not here at the moment—knows was done illegally in the case of Middelburg, Cape. That townships was closed illegally; the people were removed illegally to Mnxesha. This Government has no right to remove them. Do not let any Deputy Minister, Minister or hon. member on that side tell me that those people were moved voluntarily.

It was for their own good, and you know it.

Whether it was for their own good or not, they were deprived of certain rights they had formerly enjoyed. That is my answer to the hon. learned gentleman.

Did you see the circumstances under which they were living?

They had rights in terms of section 10 of the Urban Areas Act of 1945. Those rights were done away with deliberately. They were disregarded by this Government and those people were removed illegally.

The hon. member for Krugersdorp referred to clause 8 of the Bill. I have not finished with him yet. He referred to clause 8 and spoke about the beer profits and said it was a “skande” that these profits should have been used to provide facilities in the urban areas. He also said that no large buildings should be constructed and that we should not make the facilities too attractive. Of course, he is only echoing the ex-Deputy Minister, the present Minister of Community Development, who said for years that we should not make the amenities in the urban areas too attractive. He said we must not keep the Bantu people in the white areas by making conditions there too attractive for them. I want to tell this House a few things, particularly with regard to the largest urban area and local authority we have in this country. This local authority started its first beer halls in 1937. Since then the revenue from those beer halls has been in excess of R40 million; the profits—and this will interest the hon. member for Krugersdorp—being in excess of R20 million. Without that money the local authority would never have been in the position to provide the housing, recreational and other facilities which it did in Soweto for the Bantu people. To-day many of those facilities which were provided with this money are shown to visitors from overseas by this Government as show places. This Government is proud of what has been done in Soweto by the Johannesburg City Council when it comes to showing visitors from overseas what is happening. These are the profits which the hon. member for Krugersdorp says should be taken to the Bantu homelands instead of being spent in the places where these Bantu are living. The Government is to take this money, as is intended by this clause, and compel the local authority to spend all the profits in the homelands. I am prepared to say that the hon. the Minister is now taking the right to compel the local authority to spend its money, but I shall explain it in a minute.

Who is going to compel them?

The hon. the Deputy Minister must wait a moment; I said that I would explain it in a minute.

The hon. member does not know what he is talking about because he has never read the Bill.

It amounts to an indirect tax on the Bantu. I should rather put it this way. I should like to see the hon. the Minister compel the local authorities to reduce the price of the beer to the Bantu, thereby giving them food at a lower price, rather than compel the local authorities to spend these profits in their homelands. The price of beer should be reduced, because this money is being spent by the Bantu in the areas in which they live. The argument that it is spent by people from the homelands, who are temporarily in the urban areas of the white people, cuts no ice as far as I am concerned, because even though they may be there temporarily in the eyes of this Government, they are still entitled to facilities. That is what this money should be used for. I have said that the hon. the Minister will compel them. Let us look for what purposes the money shall be spent in terms of the original section 19 (3) (b) which reads as follows:

However, subparagraph (b), as it is proposed to be amended, now reads as follows:

So, the words “which may be certified in writing by the Minister” are still retained in this subparagraph. The point that I am making is that it is a simple matter for the hon. the Minister to decline to certify. In this way the pressure will be brought in the urban local authorities to spend the money in the homelands. That is why I make the statement that I have made. While we are talking about Bantu beer and the profits therefrom, these powers are now being sought by the hon. the Minister. What has been the position up to now? What is the history of this? Why has this amendment been brought before the House to-day? In 1966 the then hon. Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration made an appeal to the urban local authorities for donations from the profits that they had made from the sale of Bantu beer to be used in Bantu homelands. The response initially was poor. Ultimately, it bucked up a little bit and they received quite a large amount of money. We find from the Controller and Auditor-General’s report that during the financial year 1967-’68 the donations from local authorities totalled R281,400. This is quite a sizeable sum. Some very nice amenities could have been provided with that money. What did this Government do with that R281,400 that was donated to them? What was done with that money? Nothing. Of that R281,400 a total of R3,749 only was expended. What is the Government doing with all this money? From that same report I also find that the total in the fund at the 31st March, 1968, was R908,135. They are sated with money, but they are not doing anything with it. At the moment, I believe, that fund stands at over R1 million. What have they done with it? Nothing. What are they going to do with it? This is the question: What are they going to do with it? This House will never know what they will do with it. We now have, also in that report, a statement that the Bantu Affairs Commission has now decided to include this money in the Bantu Trust General Fund. It will not be accounted for separately anymore. Nobody will ever know what has happened to that money—the money that was donated by these urban local authorities for a special purpose. The hon. the Minister is taking power to curtail that expenditure within the urban areas. Thereby he forces them to give it to the department for expenditure in the homelands.

You do not know what you are talking about.

The hon. the Deputy Minister for Bantu Administration, when he introduced this Bill, said that it had been necessitated by a need to implement the policy of separate development. I must admit that they have to do something to implement their policy of separate development. Because it just is not working.

You have been pleading for integration all the time.

I am tired of inane comments from that hon. member. He knows perfectly well that that is untrue. He knows perfectly well that this side of the House has never pleaded for integration.

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the words “He knows perfectly well that that is untrue”.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw those words and say that he should know that that is untrue. He has sat here long enough to have heard that being denied over and over again by this side of the House.

Order! The hon. member must proceed with the discussion of the Bill.

The hon. the Deputy Minister went on to say that the Bantu must realize that they are only in the white areas to do the work allowed by Whites and that they have no right in the white areas at all. That is the whole crux of this Bill. The whole crux of this Bill is that there are certain rights which have been given to the Bantu.

Mr. Speaker, may I put a question to the hon. member?

Mr. Speaker, my time is limited. [Interjections.]

The hon. member has said that this is the standpoint as put forward by our side of the House. I want to ask the hon. member whether it is the standpoint of the United Party that a non-White in a white area can demand what kind of work he wants to do or not to do? Is that the United Party’s attitude?

The hon. member put two questions. Firstly, he wanted to know whether we say that the Bantu should have rights in urban areas and secondly to claim which sort of work they want to do. I think the answer is quite simple. To the first part, it is this Government, the late Dr. Verwoerd, who gave these people the rights that I am going to refer to. He gave those rights to the people. It is the law of the country to-day. We have always said that we stand for a settled urban middle class Bantu community. That is the answer to the first question. The answer to the second question is that we have repeatedly said that, subject to influx control, we will allow the Bantu to sell his labour in the best market. Those are the answers to the hon. member’s questions. Anyway, I must get on with what I have to say. What I have said is that the hon. the Deputy Minister has made it quite clear that the object of this Bill is to remove those rights that the Bantu have had all this time. These are rights which we considered were entrenched in this House by the late Dr. Verwoerd when he introduced the amendment to section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, 1945.

Mr. Speaker, may I put a question to the hon. member?

No, hon. members must not waste my time. It is quite obvious that I am hurting and this is why they try to waste my time. We had the experience last night with the hon. member for Brakpan asking the question, when he visited a labour bureau, how many Bantu do they find who want to work for local authorities; how many for the E.S.C.O.M.; how many for builders? He gave the answer himself: None. But when asked how many wanted to work in offices, the answer was that all wanted to work in offices. Is this not a natural tendency? It is quite obvious from comments that have come, not only from the hon. member for Brakpan, but also the hon. member for Klip River a little while ago and from the hon. the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, that this Government intends now to channel Bantu labour into certain channels and is not going to allow them to change. The first clue we had about this was when the hon. the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development made certain statements when he spoke to a farmers’ association in his own constituency. He said that the farmers need not worry. They only had to register their Bantu and in the bureau they will be registered as farm labourers and then would never be able to do anything else. In this way they will be sure of having their labour.

When did I say that?

I will produce the speech. It was in 1967. That was the first time.

Where?

In his own constituency. That was the first time. Then we had the ex-Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission, the present Deputy Minister of Planning who also spoke two years ago of classification in the homelands. He said that the Bantu there would be registered in their tribal labour bureaux as either a builders’ labourer or a plasterers’ mate, or a shunter’s mate or a platelayer, etc. They will then for all time remain classified as such. This borders on slave labour; I would go so far as to say that it is forced labour.

That is fit for export.

Yes, it is good for export. The most remarkable thing of all was said in a statement by the present Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission, the hon. member for Klip River. It appears that he has jumped the gun, and in the same way as the hon. member for Krugersdorp wants to be the mover of new policies in the Nationalist Party. We have this hon. member, who now is a senior member of the party and the Leader of the party in Natal and who has aspirations to a Cabinet post, who referred to Bantu farm labour in the Weenen area. He said that it was rumoured that they would refuse further service when their six months employment period terminated at the end of the month. He said that it was rumoured that they would refuse. Then he had to be “kragdadig” like the man he is following up and was reported as follows in a newspaper:

The hon. member agrees with the other hon. gentlemen that I have quoted. He went further and said:

This is a complete reversal of policy. This is the grand somersault. Here we have a man who goes completely against the hon. the Deputy Minister. Apart from that, is this honest? Here we have a case where both the hon. the Deputy Minister, when he introduced this Bill, and the Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission, two senior officials in the Nationalist Party, saying that the Bantu will be kept here as long as they are wanted. If they do not want them, out they will go.

I will explain it to you. You are talking absolute nonsense now.

I want to come back to another aspect of this Bill. I want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister about the statement he made in connection with clauses 1 and 2 of this Bill. He said it was the intention of the Government to take over townships which were “aangrensend” to Bantu areas. I asked the hon. the Deputy Minister if he meant Kwa Mashu and he nodded. I want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister across the floor of the House now whether Kwa Mashu borders on a Bantu area. Does Kwa Mashu border on a Bantu area to-day?

I cannot reply to the hon. member across the floor of the House. I will do so in my reply.

I know what the reply will be; the hon. the Deputy Minister may save himself the trouble. The reply is “we will make it”. Is that being honest? That is their reply. I am now talking about a large Bantu area and an area of white farms between that and Kwa Mashu.

In terms of the law it is and I will reply to the hon. member in my speech.

I am not certain how far the negotiations have progressed and whether the department has already managed to purchase these farms. That is why I ask the question: “Is it bordering on a Bantu area today?” if it is bordering to-day, I want to say that a year ago it was not bordering. This is where the Government’s dishonesty comes in. All it has done was to buy a thin corridor of white-owned land to link Kwa Mashu with the Bantu areas, the traditional Bantu reserves, and then to make it our “border”. Why have they done so, Sir? To carry out United Party policy. The United Party, as I have said earlier, has always said: “Give the Bantu the chance to own their own land in the townships surrounding the white cities.” They need these amendments to carry that out. I know they do. I am not saying that I oppose this. In fact I welcome it. I say: “Hooray! The Nationalist Party is once again taking over United Party policy.”

This Bill amends two other Acts, namely the Bantu Urban Areas Act and the Bantu Labour Act of 1964. In both those Acts certain rights are given to the Bantu. Section 10 of the Bantu Urban Areas Act gives them certain rights to remain within the urban areas. This has been said by so many speakers on this side that I shall not repeat their arguments, but this Government is now going in the back door to take those rights away. We have heard murmerings and mutterings from the other side for a long time about removing the rights granted to these people under section 10 of the Bantu Urban Areas Act. They have hinted at this often enough, but they have not had the courage to come right out into the open and take these rights away, because they realized what an outcry there would be throughout the country. They were warned of the effect this would have on the Bantu people themselves. Those people are jealous of these rights and I want to warn this Government that they must beware of touching the rights of these people. They are extremely jealous of those rights. The Government has not had the courage to amend section 10 outright. They have come in the back door. Clauses 4, 5, 6 and 7 take away residential rights.

You are being irresponsible.

No, I am not. I am saying something in all fairness and in faith. I believe in what I am saying. Clause 11 takes away their work so that they will lose their rights.

Sir, I want to turn to the Bantu Labour Act. The proviso to section 28 (1) (u) gives certain rights to the Bantu. The proviso reads as follows:

In terms of that proviso certain rights were acquired by Bantu who worked in the urban areas. What do we find now?

Have you read the White Paper?

We find that clause 15 (b) reads as follows:

The hon. the Minister in his introductory speech, and in the White Paper, glossed over this little point. It was passed over as being unimportant. What explanation is given? We are told that this is now being taken care of by the system of “call-in cards”, which is being introduced. But, Sir, this does not give any rights to any Bantu. The regulations under which the “call-in card” system was introduced, do not give any rights to any Bantu. This amendment, however, takes these rights away. It removes their right to return. A “call-in card” is dependent upon the goodwill of an official and upon the goodwill of the department and the Government. This proviso, as it stands in the Act to-day, is dependent upon nobody’s goodwill provided that the department and the Government act bona fide. It is not dependent upon anybody’s goodwill. It is there as a right, which the Bantu have, to return to an urban area. That right is now being removed by a mere one and a half lines in the Bill. As I have said, this has been glossed over by the hon. the Deputy Minister in his introductory speech and in his White Paper. [Time expired.]

Mr. Speaker, to judge by the first eighth of the speech made by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (City), one cannot really attach much importance to it. He made a few statements here which were utterly devoid of truth. He mentioned the town of Middelburg where, according to him, Bantu were removed unlawfully and against their will. Where he gets that information from, I do not know. The present Minister of Community Development and I visited the Bantu location in Middelburg together. We did not merely drive past it; we made a tour of the entire location and we were astonished at the over-population we encountered in the Middelburg location. The hon. the Minister immediately decided that some of those Bantu had to be removed. I can furnish proof that about 200 families were removed from that location. I do not know how many children and women were removed, but 200 families were in fact removed. Each of the families was removed voluntarily. I want to tell the hon. member that if that is the type of speech he wants to make here in this House in order to create the impression with the outside world that Bantu are being forced to leave their homes, he should rather not rise to speak, because by doing so he is creating the wrong impression with the public outside.

I never once used the word “force”.

The hon. member used the words “against their will” and “unlawfully”.

No, that is not true.

Yes, I wrote down the hon. member’s words. Now that the hon. member has obtained the information, he has begun to water down his words. In Middelburg there are still many Bantu who have to be removed, but the Government happens to be favourably disposed towards the Bantu. The Government first wants to make room for them in the homelands to which they are to go. Does the hon. member know that there is a surplus of 5,000. Bantu in the Bantu residential areas of Middelburg? I am now referring to Middelburg alone. Do hon. members know what the conditions are there? The conditions are such that the white housewives in Middelburg still cannot get servants, despite the fact that there is a surplus of 5,000. Why can they not get servants? As a result of the loafers in the location a very great deal of prostitution is being practised in Middelburg all the time, and that is what those Bantu servants are living on. They do not want to go out to work. I should like it to be recorded that on a Friday afternoon, when the Bantu men are paid, those Bantu women stand around and say, “First pay me for the week’s work I did for you”. The hon. member has now made the statement that they were removed against their will. I think this cries to high heaven, and therefore I do not want to judge the rest of his speech. I shall leave it to others who can perhaps say more about it than I can. However, I should like the hon. member to refrain from making statements about things of which he has no knowledge. I have therefore merely outlined this picture for him so as to indicate what the conditions in Middelburg are.

I know.

The hon. member admits it. In that case, why did he say that the Bantu were removed unlawfully? [Interjections.] Mr. Speaker, I am not going to argue with that hon. member across the floor of the House. I merely wanted to point out that he had made statements which were utterly devoid of truth.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Colesberg touched upon a matter affecting his constituency, to which the hon. member for Walmer also referred. The point made by the hon. member for Walmer was that there are a large number of Bantu locations in smaller country towns situated west of the Eiselen or Kat line and that as a result of the policy of this Government the local authorities in nine cases out of ten do not know where they stand. As a result of this they are not in any position either to make decent accommodation available for those people. That was the whole point.

That is not the point.

The hon. member for Colesberg should have reacted to that. I do not want to carry the dispute with that hon. member any further, for the matters I want to touch upon extend beyond the boundaries of the constituency of that member.

This legislation is part of a pattern we have had during the past 21 years. Every year legislation had to be submitted and steps taken to amend the Bantu Urban Areas Act of the early twenties and the subsequent consolidation in 1945. This was done because it is the policy of this Government to pretend to the peoples that they are effecting apartheid in South Africa. With every amendment that showpiece is brought forward and an attempt is made to prove with legislation that this Government is effecting apartheid, particularly in our white cities. In other words, although the figures have indicated that they are unable to carry out the policy of apartheid as they think it ought to be carried out, frequent intermittent attempts, almost every year, have had to be made to prove that they were working on this policy. The background to this legislation is therefore that it forms a further part of this pattern of pretending to. the nation that they are succeeding in their policy of apartheid. So, two years ago, we had the Physical Planning Act. This was a further step to prove that they have succeeded in reducing the number of Bantu in our white areas.

And during this Session there has not been one word of criticism against it.

I shall inform the hon. [Minister what the criticism is. The criticism was levelled by the hon. Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration himself. That hon. Deputy Minister stated during the course of the debate that during the past few years there had been an increase of 46,000 applications for Bantu in our white areas. The hon. the Deputy Minister stated in this House that the Government had acceded to no fewer than 26,000 of these requests. That legislation was placed on the Statute Book. The industrialists applied for 35,000 and the Government granted 26,000 applications. The point I want to make is that this is part of the pattern of pretending to the nation that this Government is succeeding in its policy of apartheid.

A shadow policy.

It is definitely a “shadow policy” as the hon. member for Durban (Point) says. They are engaged in a shadow policy. In this way this legislation also forms part of that pattern.

Watch us this year.

The hon. the Minister is using their favourite expression, i.e. “watch us this year”. We will watch them next year and we will watch them again in ten years’ time if they are still in power then.

May I put a question to the hon. member?

No, I am not going to reply to any questions. The situation will simply be that we will have more and more Bantu in our white areas. For that reason the hon. the Deputy Minister is now coming forward with clause 11 in terms of which he will have the power to prohibit the employers of Bantu in a specific area for a specific industry and by a specific employer. Here the Deputy Minister states that he must do this because the Whites in particular are objecting to it. He says the Whites are objecting to the fact that Bantu women are working as clerks and typists. Because these Bantu women would supposedly come into contact with Whites, the Whites are objecting to that, and the Government must now have these powers to enable them to take steps. The Deputy Minister states in addition that this is supplementary to section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act. This same clause, he says, is now the great fly in the ointment. According to the White Paper any industrialist or any other person in the Group Areas in the homeland can employ as many Bantu women as they want to. When it comes to homelands, one can understand it. That is correct. But according to the hon. the Minister this is a terrible thing in a white area, yet there is obviously nothing wrong with it if it were to take place in a border area. Let us now look at the border areas of South Africa. This includes the entire East London complex of Border. It includes almost the whole of Natal, as well as the whole area to the north of Pretoria. This may not be allowed in Johannesburg now. This cannot be allowed in Cape Town or Port Elizabeth.

Or in Pretoria.

No, wait, after all, that is just outside …

It is a border area.

It is a border area. I am talking about Rosslyn now. There a white man can enter a border industry. I must point out that those areas are on the white side. They are not in the non-white area. There you can walk into any shop, factory or any industry; then it will not affect you if a Bantu typist is sitting behind the desk. The fact that there is a Bantu telephonist, will not affect you either. This is the policy of the Government.

You do not know what you are talking about.

The hon. the Deputy Minister is saying that I do not know what I am talking about. Here is his own White Paper. The justification for this policy is stated herein. He states that they will certainly not implement it in all areas. In the border areas it will in fact be allowed. I find it quite strange that the people of South Africa always object, according to the hon. members on that side, when they may perhaps come into contact with a Bantu. But they do not object when that Bantu is in their own homes. The Whites do not object to having a Bantu driver for their motor cars. The Bantu do not affect the Whites when they are working in their homes as servants. But in any other place, according to their arguments, the Whites when they see a Bantu, are immediately so antagonistic and this causes so much friction that legislation has to be piloted through Parliament in order to eliminate that form of friction.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 23 and debate adjourned.