I move—

No one who has the interests of South Africa at heart, who is worried about its welfare and its future and its good name overseas, can fail to have a feeling of frustration that we are being asked this morning to give final consent in this House to legislation which writes yet another chapter in that ideological law book which has done so much to promote South Africa’s unpopularity amongst the nations of the world, to the point where it has given rise almost to active hostility, and has done so much to outrage the conscience of the citizens of South Africa. It is a book designed to reduce social conventions to rigid statute law with certain penal clauses, thereby losing both flexibility and acceptability to wider public conscience both in South Africa and in the outside world.

The first object of the Bill, in the words of the Minister, was to close one loophole. This Bill has emerged for its third reading from the Committee and the Report stages with one or more amendments from the Minister, and one or more amendments accepted from this side of the House. The Bill at the moment is one which has narrowed the gateway into the White group, but it has done it in a way which has created uncertainties, and may create anomalies of a cruel and vicious nature. When one examines the Bill, one sees that the yardstick for acceptance as a White person has been changed. It has been changed in such a way that, while appearance and acceptance are both given weight, there are circumstances in which appearance triumphs over acceptance, because the Bill lays down specifically that where a person obviously is a Coloured person in appearance, then he will be classified as a Coloured whether he is generally accepted as a White person or not. That is a change from the former law and a change which may lead to hardship in that you may find that a person with not one drop of Coloured blood in his veins will be classified, because he obviously is a Coloured person in appearance, as a Coloured person.

The second change concerns the question of admission—and here I may say that the Minister has met us in accepting that those admissions should be freely and voluntarily made. and that they should be made for the purposes of classification under this Act—the second change is that where a person admits that he is by descent a Native or a Coloured person, then he will be classified as such unless it is proved that the admission is not based upon fact. Despite a prolonged discussion, we still do not have complete agreement as to what constitutes an admission, and that must create uncertainty.

Secondly, Sir, we have not complete agreement as yet as to when it is proved that the admission is based on fact. That has been taken up with the hon. the Minister, and he has quoted to us an except from the judgment in the case Rex v. Gill, which had to do with the prosecution under the Mixed Marriages Act. He quoted to us the passage—

What we have never had clarity on is exactly what the criterion is in this statute. We had hoped that the criterion might have been taken from another part of the judgment, where it says—

We still don’t know when the facts will contradict the admission. We still don’t know what yardstick will be applied when the facts are gone into. Sir, I give you an example which shows the sort of difficulty with which one is faced, which shows the sort of situation that has arisen. If a person is obviously Coloured in appearance, he will be classified as a Coloured person regardless of the fact that he is generally accepted as a White person and regardless of the fact that he admits for purposes of classification under this Act that he is a White person by descent. In other words, the whole effect of this clause is a restrictive one, and one feels that the hon. the Minister has gone far beyond what was necessary to stop the loophole which he had in view. It is clear that under this Bill it is possible to reclassify people already classified and, in fact, the hon. the Minister has told us that he has frozen the classification of a number of doubtful people until this Bill becomes law. But he assures us that this Act will not be used for purposes of reclassifying people already classified. But nowhere in this Act is there a provision preventing the reclassification of people already classified. Nowhere.

So we are now at the final stage of this Bill asked to give our final consent to its passing in this House, and that consent is to be based on an assurance by the hon. the Minister which is not given the force of law in this Bill. It has been pointed out on many occasions that the hon. the Minister can bind no future Minister. I go further: In this Bill the hon. the Minister has taken powers of investigation which he did not have before. Those powers of investigation, he has assured us once again, will only be used in respect of cases where there have been admissions in regard to descent. But once again there is no provision in this Bill limiting that power of investigation to questions of admissions on descent. That places us in a most unsatisfactory position, and we are satisfied that under this Bill, although it may in practice not happen on many occasions, it can happen that a child will be classified differently from its parents, and there has been no indication that our conclusion in that regard is wrong. We feel that this Bill has gone far further than is necessary to meet even the evils which the hon. the Minister saw—whether we regard them as evils or not is another matter. We feel that there is no justification whatsoever for provisions as wide as those which are here set out. Therefore we feel that we are being asked to give approval to a Bill outraging the consciences of a large number of people in South Africa who think differently from this hon. Minister. We are being asked to give our consent to a Bill which will cause untold misery to many people and many families in South Africa. Therefore we feel that at this stage the correct amendment is the amendment which we moved at the second reading, and which I now move—

I second.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition again conjured up the same old bogies in regard to this Bill this morning, those stories to which we had to listen for the few days this debate has lasted. He admits that the measure closes up certain loopholes. In other words, he admits that there were loopholes in the principal Act. Let me say this, that the old definition was a good one, because it took the Opposition, with all the ingenuity they displayed in looking for loopholes, more than ten years to find one, and now that they have found it it is the duty of the Government immediately to close that loophole, which is being done in this Bill. I want to tell the Leader of the Opposition and his followers that I do not believe for a moment that this measure has anything to do with the actual borderline cases. The actual borderline cases will be dealt with in the same way as in the past. But this measure deals with cases which obviously lead to an interpretation being given to the Act which was never the intention when we passed this Act ten or twelve years ago, and a stop is now being put to those cases where the Act is obviously being contravened by means of certain technical loopholes which have now been discovered.

The hon. member said that the activities of the Population Registration Office are now being suspended in respect of the classification of people until such time as this Bill is passed. But surely that is obvious. The hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) mentioned the case here of this Mr. Song, who is a Chinese and who was classified as White. He has now applied for his whole family to be classified as White, whilst Mr. Song has stated very clearly that he is a Chinese, his wife is a Chinese and all their children are Chinese, and his son or daughter is also married to a Chinese. But he now wants them all to be classified as White because his friends are White. I am sure the Leader of the Opposition will not approve, if we must have population registration in the country, of Chinese being classified as Whites, contrary to the law. Therefore the loophole is there very obviously and it must be closed up.

Whilst referring to this Chinese family, I just want to make this point. Supposing the Population Registration Office now wants to continue with its work as in the past, without its activities being suspended, and they have now classified this Chinese as White. Then it means that they must classify Mr. Song’s daughter-in-law as White also, or his son-in-law, and then the relatives of that person will again come along and say: “We have a son who is classified as White and now you must classify us all as White.” Where would that process have ended? Eventually one would have had hundreds of people classified in this way.

I want to touch on another matter in this regard. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition referred to the reasons for this measure and complained that as the result of the new definition the Population Registrar can now appoint officials to gather information to refute a person’s statement. I find that is imperative. That is one of the loopholes which was clearly pointed out in the decision given by Judge Snyman. After dealing with everything which has to be taken into consideration in a classification, Judge Synman pointed out that these people should also make use of “other records” in regard to the person concerned, and then he said—

There we have it clearly stated that the Population Registrar is absolutely powerless to controvert what is submitted to him by any person by seeking evidence himself in order to prove the contrary, and therefore this loophole must be closed.

The second point which appears very clearly from Judge Snyman’s decision in regard to the Song case is that even though the person, according to his own admission, is a Chinese or an Indian, and he just proves that he associates with Whites, he is classified as a White by the Population Registrar and by the Board and by the Appeal Board. I just want to point out to the United Party what a dangerous game they are playing here. Mr. Ray Swart of the Progressive Party, through his tricks, allowed them to step into a very cunning trap. It is quite clear that Mr. Ray Swart used this Song case as a test case. He obtained 300 witnesses to say that this person’s friends were White.

What has that to do with the third reading of this Bill?

The reasons given in the decision in the Song case form the background of this Bill. It was a test case, and that is what hon. members do not want to understand. That is why the whole Song family now want to be classified as White. The point I want to make is this: In this case Mr. Swart obtained 300 statements that Mr. Song associated with Whites. He then won his test case and Mr. Song was classified as White. But having won this test case, he will not in future go and look for 300 witnesses. He will perhaps look for 10 or 15, and on that basis he will win the same type of case, not only for the Songs but for all the Indians in Natal who want to play along with him.

Is Song a Coloured?

Song is a Chinese.

Then how do you classify him?

It seems to me the hon. member has no conception of what the definition of a Coloured is. The Chinese are included with the “Coloureds” in the broad sense of the word. I say that the test case was won to get Mr. Song classified as a White, and now they will come along with one Indian or Chinese after the other and ask on the same grounds that he should be declared White, and when they have classified 20 or 30 Chinese and Indians as Whites, all the Chinese and Indians will come along and on the basis of these 20 who all said, “we are Chinese or Indians, but we associate with Whites”, they will be able to get the whole of the Indian population classified as White, and every Indian who is classified as White can be put on the White voters’ roll. And now I want to ask the United Party, if this process develops freely in Natal …

Order! That is not relevant now.

Sir, may I just complete my sentence, then you will see that this is a cardinal point in this connection. If these people are classified as Whites and are put on the voters’ roll, nothing will remain of the United Party in Natal, because the Progressives will kick them out there.

Order! The hon. member must now come back to the content of the Bill.

I have completed that point, but I feel that we have here the background for this Bill. If the old definition remains in force, and the judgment stands, and in my opinion it is a very sound judgment based on the law, one cannot prevent them from being classified as Whites in their hundreds or thousands on the same basis, viz. that they associate with a number of Whites. But this classification does not provide that they may not also associate with the members of their own race. They must just associate with enough Whites to be able to say, “We associate with Whites ”, and then they are classified as such. This is one of the most dangerous things with which we can be faced. The danger is that whereas the Electoral Act very clearly provides that the classification as a White is the same for purposes of that Act as the classification in terms of the Population Registration Act, one can have 1,000 of these people being put on the voters’ roll. which would eventually in Natal wipe the Whites completely off the political slate.

Having now come to the end of this long debate, I am in any case glad that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has changed his term “human studbook” into a better term and called the Bill the “ideological statute book”. He said this was one of those ideological Acts which are being placed on the statute book. He saw fit to mention in regard to this Bill, as he has done on many former occasions, that it will harm South Africa’s good name abroad, because we are dealing here with an ideology which we are forcing through and we are making it still more difficult now for people who should in fact be classified as Whites to be so classified. I just want to say that this is no ideological measure. It has nothing to do with ideology. It only deals with an actual need which exists in our country, because just as the hon. member and his party strive to preserve the White race, in the same way this Bill forms one of the cornerstones in order to attain that ideal. Without this Bill, and without a proper classification of citizens into the various groups it is simply impossible to ensure that the Whites and the non-Whites, each in their various categories, can continue to exist without intermingling. The Leader of the Opposition is looking at these amendments through a very dark pair of glasses. He has made the point that cases may arise as the result of this new definition where appearance will be a more decisive factor than acceptance. I want to say immediately that, viewed objectively, I cannot appreciate his difficulty, for the following reasons: Does the Opposition want to have the position that when someone is obviously a Coloured person in appearance, he should be classified as a White? Does the Leader of the Opposition think that this person will be accepted by society as a White person? I think the confusion in regard to the terminology comes in here: It is possible that the White community will be willing to treat this person as a White person. But that is something different. They will treat him as a White, but will they accept him, with all the implications? To me, acceptance means this: If I accept somebody who is a borderline case then I must satisfy my brain and my conscience that I accept him in such a way that he may associate with me socially, that he can associate with me in my home, and that if I had a daughter and he happened to be a man, I would be willing to allow them to get married to one another; in other words, that I would be willing to accept that person as a member of. my society in every way. All that this amendment now does is simply this. The Leader of the Opposition has said that the amendment has the effect that if someone has to be classified, if he looks doubtful, it has to be done on these two main principles that when he is obviously a Coloured person in appearance, the judge who has to decide, i.e. public opinion, will not accept him as a White person. But supposing this judge decides that it wants to accept this person—then he will not so obviously be a Coloured person. That is the point. But what has happened? The Leader of the Opposition now wants to pretend that because of this single case of Mr. David Song, all this publicity is being given to the matter, just for the sake of one Chinese who was declared White. But that is not so. I did not want to mention these matters, but having come to the end of the debate, and to show how necessary it is that the Act be amended, I just want to say that it is a fact that many more people have slipped through who should never have slipped through, and that there are more forces actively trying to make this legislation ridiculous than is generally known. But it was not so obvious and so provocative as in the case of Mr. Song. He is obviously not a White person, and he admits it. But others came along with sworn statements to the effect that a person was completely accepted in their circles. And the obvious fact that they were Coloured in appearance was not taken into account. Surely one cannot continue in that manner. I just want to repeat that I do not look down upon the Coloured groups. I have never in my life looked down on a Coloured or an Indian or a Chinese. But the world and the Opposition will have to accept, because the majority of people in South Africa, including supporters of the Leader of the Opposition, have for a long time accepted it, that there is an earnest desire that there should not be intermingling amongst these various groups. That is why we have introduced this Bill, and it was pleasant to be able to fight this battle. One knows that one is not doing it with any ideological motives, but because one is trying to preserve the White race, something which is becoming increasingly difficult, because we did not have to deal with liberal elements in the past. Thank God it was possible in the past, as was suggested here to-day by the Opposition, to allow these things to a very large extent to sort themselves out. But that is becoming increasingly difficult and we shall have to take steps, and we will yet be thanked by posterity, and posterity will curse the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) for having adopted the attitude she did.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition went further and said that it was possible for a person with not a single drop of Coloured blood in his veins to be classified as a non-White, solely as the result of his appearance. I reject that completely as an argument, for the simple reason that the Leader of the Oppositions pretends that in future appearance will count and that acceptance will no longer count. Where does he get that argument from?

But what about your own argument?

The Leader of the Opposition considers that the only yardstick for appearance is colour, because there are dark people with dark eyes, perhaps with slightly curly hair, and such things. But that is not “appearance”. “Appearance” is something which is almost indefinable. [Laughter.] Yes, one cannot tabulate it mathematically according to hard facts and say: “If I judge a man’s appearance, I grant so many points for this and so many points for that out of 100 points.” One does not do that. It is not done in the same way that the Leader of the Opposition, as a well-known breeder of Friesland cattle, is accustomed to in judging a bull. We are dealing here with an over-all impression; and we who have been living in this country for all these years can immediately evaluate “appearance ”, and I challenge the hon. the Leader of the Opposition to define “appearance If he and I walked down the street together, he would be able to say, in all honesty, ‘‘That one is a Coloured, that one is a Malay, and here we have a Bantu, and this one looks like a Pondo to me, and that one is certainly a Zulu, and that one is a Chinese.” That is “appearance”.

Will the hon. the Minister allow me to put a question? I do not want to mention names, but will the Minister tell me whether in his files he has perhaps seen a letter written by his predecessor, Mr. Tom Naude, now President of the Senate, to a person, a White person, to whom classification as a White person was refused for three years on the basis of his appearnce, a person who in appearance was not a White person but who was able to prove that he did not have a single drop of blood in his veins which was not White. In that case the Minister wrote a personal letter of apology.

I did not see it, but I will readily admit that such cases are possible. But we have 15,000,000 people in the country, and now to use that argument against the Bill, that it should not be passed because one exceptional case occurred, does not hold water.

But is this Bill not based on an exceptional case?

It is quite clear that this argument is based on grounds of which notice cannot be taken, because this Bill is now worded in such a way as to achieve the real co-ordination of appearance and acceptance.

Then the hon. the Leader of the Opposition raised the question of reclassification. That was another point he made. Reclassification does not depend only on my assurance that it will not take place. Even if we had not changed the definition, reclassification could still have taken place every day. On the one hand, the Leader of the Opposition says that I have taken all the flexibility out of the law, but on the other hand he does not want to allow any reclassification; and what about flexibility now? But what about a bona fide case classified under the principal Act, in terms of the old definition, where the person was wrongly classified as in the case just mentioned here by the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell)? Is that person not to have the right to appeal and to ask to be reclassified? During the second reading and in the Committee Stage hon. members used this argument and said that there should only be the right to be reclassified when the person himself requests it. That was one of the amendments. But now they do not want to allow a reclassification to take place where a bona fide mistake has been made. Take the case mentioned here by the hon. member for Durban (Point) (Mr. Raw), where a child of two White parents is registered at birth as being of mixed race. Then that poor child can do nothing and must wait until such time as he himself can ask for the classification to be changed. Hon. members now want to restrict him. What logic is there in the argument that any person can at any time apply for reclassification on the grounds that he is not satisfied with his classification? Do hon. members want it to be this way, that if the person is not classified according to his appearance and also his acceptance—if he does not comply with the requirements, must that person then on the strength of his application alone, and with a few documents which have been signed, be accepted as White?

At what stage is the provision applied that he can be reclassified?

Do you mean at what stage is this new definition applied? It will be applied as soon as this Act is promulgated.

In other words, he is classified once under the old Act, and if objection is raised he can be reclassified under the new Act.

There is no difference between the old Act and the new Act. [Interjections.] Of course not. Hon. members opposite have just raised a bogy. The only difference is this, that the original intention of the Act is now being implemented by means of the new definition. The original intention of this Act was that appearance and acceptance would count equally. My predecessor, the Minister of Finance, stated that very clearly and unequivocally. I stated it very clearly and repeatedly, but there was a loophole here, viz. that appearance fell away and that acceptance was the only thing which counted. That is why such a silly thing took place, that a Chinese was classified as a White person.

That is not the point.

Of course that is the whole point. It is no use arguing further. Hon. members opposite do not want to listen. I shall pass on to the next point, viz. the objection raised by the Leader of the Opposition that I am now taking powers in respect of investigations which can be made by my Department, which hitherto the Department has not had. With all respect, I think the Leader of the Opposition is making a big mistake here. The amendment in Clause 1 and the amendment in Clause 4, which provides for these powers, must be read together. The two amendments must be linked up with each other. Descent will not be investigated, nor will investigations be made in regard to a person’s descent, except when a person frankly, voluntarily and without being forced to do so—the hon. member paid me the compliment that I had adopted that suggestion made by the Opposition—admits that in so far as his descent is concerned he is a Coloured person or a Bantu. There must be this power to investigate, because that person may make an admission for various reasons of his own. I have mentioned a few examples. The connection between Clauses 1 and 4 will be seen in the amendments which put the position more clearly, that questions will be asked in regard to the descent of a person only when that person admits that he is a Coloured person or a Native, but not when it is suspected that he is a Coloured person or a Native, and not when his descent is such that he looks doubtful and that we want to investigate his descent.

Can you not investigate other matters also?

That is correct, but I am talking about descent. The objection of the Leader of the Opposition was that we would set afoot a witch-hunt; perhaps in the case of people who apply and who look doubtful we will not make it just a question of appearance and acceptance, and investigate his descent. That was his objection—if we are in any way doubtful we will investigate his descent. That may not be done. The Act is drafted in such a way that any person to whom this happens can take the person who did it to court and prove that he did something illegal. In terms of this amending Act we can do only this one thing: A person says, “I voluntarily admit, without any coercion, that I am a Coloured person or a Native …”

Or a White person.

No, of course not. That does not count. The hon. member was never present here during the whole debate and he should not ask such silly questions. He knows nothing about the whole matter. And, Mr. Speaker, when this person has admitted it, my Department gets the right, when they want to prove the contrary, viz. that the man is not a Coloured person or a Bantu, to institute investigations. It is therefore quite wrong to say that I gave only this assurance. That is not correct. I did not only give an assurance, but I am legally bound, together with my Department, to do it that way.

I also want to dispose of the last argument advanced by the Leader of the Opposition. He said it could happen that a child is given a different classification from that of his parents. Let us see what happens in practice. When a child is born, his parents register the birth, and if the two parents are White, they will be very silly people if they register the child as being of mixed race or a Coloured child or a Bantu child. The registration of that child remains like that. I accept that any parent, when a child is born, registers the child according to the way he or his wife are classified. After the child is registered in that way, that registration stands, and when he reaches the age of 16 he receives his identity card according to the way he was registered in the register of births. Having been so registered, he can only be deprived of that registration if, in terms of the Act— not the amending Bill—objection is raised to his classification. When objection is raised, that objection is heard in terms of the provisions of the Act. If the objection is allowed and he is not satisfied with it, he goes to the Supreme Court to seek justice. But how can the Leader of the Opposition make the point that children can be classified as belonging to a different race from what they were at birth? There is no logic in that. [Interjections.] But what is the hon. the leader referring to? Surely it has nothing to do with what happens at birth. At birth only one thing takes place, namely that the parent registers the birth of the child. And the Department, and the political party, and all the ideologists, do not interfere with that. They do not know about it. For the rest, the whole process continues in the way ordinarily provided for in the law.

Mr. Speaker, I am glad to have had the privilege of piloting this legislation through the House. I only want to say this, that this legislation is another assurance that when it is applied we will succeed to a larger extent —I will not say 100 per cent—in preserving racial purity in this our fatherland.

Question put: That the word “now”, proposed to be omitted, stand part of the motion.

Upon which the House divided:

AYES—87: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G.F. H.; Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Villiers, J. D.; de Wet, C.; Diederichs, N.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Frank, S.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Knobel, G. J.; Kotze, G. P.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, A. I.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A.H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M.C.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Viljoen, M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Waring, F. W.; Webster, A.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

NOES—46: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Bowker, T. B.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cad-man, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; le Roux, G. S. P.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker, H.; van der Byl, P.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: N. G. Eaton and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and the amendment dropped.

Original motion accordingly agreed to and the Bill read a third time.

Mr. Chairman, I propose to move an amendment at this stage and speak to it because I think the hon. the Minister and the Committee will have a better understanding of what I am trying to get at if I do so. The amendment I propose moving reads: “To omit the expression ‘Bantu beer’ where ever it occurs and to substitute ‘Mbara Beer ’.” The Committee knows that there are many different types of brews that are made by the Natives.

Order! I am sorry but I have to warn the hon. member at this stage that I will not be able to accept such an amendment as it contains a word which does not belong to either of the official languages.

Sir, may I address you on that particular point? I handed a copy of this amendment to the hon. the Minister this morning so that he would be acquainted with what was coming. He indicated to me that we were trying to use words that could be either English or Afrikaans when he used the word “Bantu”. Now, Sir, “Bantu” is no more English or Afrikaans than “Mbara”.

Order! I am afraid the word “Mbara” is not a word known in either of the official languages. I will not be able to accept the amendment.

If you will not accept it, Sir, then I will not move it. That being the case I wish to speak to the definition.

On a point of order, the word …

Order! I have given my decision. The hon. member knows the Rules. He must accept my ruling.

It is not that I do not accept your ruling, Sir …

Order! I am sorry I cannot allow the hon. member to proceed. The hon. member for King William’s Town (Mr. Warren) may address the Committee on the definition.

Very good, Sir. I want to address the Committee on this question of the definition and that is Bantu beer. The hon. the Minister is well acquainted with the fact that a special name is applied by every one of the Natives throughout Africa to beer when it is brewed for sale. Now, Sir the word Mbara, or sila Mbara, is the word used. This word could be most aptly applied as a definition of the particular beer which it is proposed to sell.

We must make it Kaffir Beer.

Well, why not leave it at Kaffir Beer instead of Bantu beer? When you use the word “Bantu Beer”, whether you use it in Afrikaans or in English it is a complete misfit when it is applied to the Native languages, any one of those Native languages. It is for that reason, Sir, that I want the hon. the Minister to consider changing the word “Bantu beer”—not because I have any objection to the word “Bantu” as applied to the Natives—but because this would apply suitably to the beer which it is proposed to control under this particular amending Bill. In view of the fact that you won’t allow me to move the amendment, Sir, I want to ask the hon. the Minister to go carefully into this because that word is applied by every Native ethnic group which is to be found between the southern point of Africa and Central Africa, with one change only namely that when you get north of the Equator it becomes Pombi, because the bulk of their beer is made from bees.

I regret very much that the Chairman will not allow me to go further with this because I do think that this particular word depicts in the correct sense what we want and it can be applied to English or Afrikaans. What is more, it will fit in most suitably with what the Native will commonly call Mbara. He says “iza soku sela mbara” (Let us go and drink our beer).

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, that you will not allow it.

I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the hon. member who has just sat down. I am 100 per cent in favour of the principles contained in this Bill but I feel very unhappy about the name “Bantu beer” which for hundreds of years been known in this country as “kaffir beer”.

“Kaffir corn” we are not changing that to Bantu corn. Throughout the centuries of the history of South Africa kaffir beer has been brewed both in the Afrikaans language and in the English language from kaffir corn. If the beer is to become Bantu then the corn should also become Bantu. If we are trying to get away from the word “kaffir” in the langauge, a word which has for centuries been used by both the Afrikaans- and English-speaking sections, we will also have to change the Latin language and we will have to change the name “Sorghum Caffrorum Why can we not call the child by its right name in both Afrikaans language and in the English language. Mr. Chairman, “kaffer” in Afrikaans or “kaffir” in English or “caffre” in Latin was originally used by the Arabian Mohammedans to describe the infidels but never in the history of South Africa has any White person, whether Afrikaans- or English-speaking, used the term “kaffir” in a derogatory sense towards the Black people in this country. I want to show in what position we will find ourselves. If that is the position every one of us in this House is a kaffir to-day because not one of us is a Mohammedan and they were the people who coined the word. Just see in what position we will find ourselves if we try in principle to avoid the word “kaffir” in a Bill and to substitute it with the word “Bantu”—I do not know for what reasons. Just imagine what we will come up against in Afrikaans, English and Latin; and our languages are from 300 to 160 years old in this country. We will have to start with the dear old Kaffir watermelon. It will become Bantu watermelon and in future the children will have to eat preserved Bantu watermelon and what will that taste like if it is not called by its right name? One of the most beautiful trees of which South Africa can be proud will no longer be the “kaffir tree” but the “Bantu tree” and there too we will have to change its botanical name, because in Latin it is called “Erythrina Caffra Thaub” and call it “Erythrina Bantu Thaub” because Thaub was the person who gave it its name. In future we will have to call “kaffir beans” “Bantu beans”. Nor will we know what to do with the names of the following trees, shrubs, plants and cereals as far as their Afrikaans, English and Latin names are concerned. I want to mention them hurriedly because my time is limited: Kafferpruim or Kaffir plum or Ximenia Caffra, and there are five varieties of it. Or must we call it “Bantu plum”? We have the kafferdadel or kaffir date or Harpephyllum Caffrum. We will also have to change that to “Bantu date”. You have the “kafferaartappels” or kaffir potatoes and “kafferdoring” or kaffir thorn (Acacia Caffra). You have the “kaffer wag ’n bietjie” or cat thorn or Acacia Caffra. Must we, to be consistent and logical, change the names of all these things in the three languages? We are starting with Bantu beer and Bantu corn but I want to show you, Sir, where we will end up. We will no longer be able to talk about “kaffir pig” which is a breed of its own. It will become a Bantu pig. The old kaffir ox, although there are various breeds, such as the Zulu ox, the Bechuanaland ox and the Damara ox, will become the Bantu ox. These are not scrub cattle; they are properly bred, although they are an inferior breed [Interjections.] Hon. members need not tell me anything. I have checked on everything. But what about all the other things? We have the “Kafferwortel” or pile root, “kaffersterhout”, kaffir bread and the kaffir bread tree of which there are five varieties, kaffir hut, kaffir sorrel, kaffir tea, kaf-fertjie” or Wurmbea Capensis, “kafferboetjie” and “kaffervriend” (negrophilist). You have kaffir shrub, and “kafferdoring”, “kafferdruiwe ”, kaffir millet, “kaffermannakoring ”, “kafferslangwortel”, “kafferkersie”, “ kaffergifboom”, “kafferhennep” and “kafferkamferfoelie ”, “kafferysterhoud ”, “kafferui”, “kaffe rlemoen”. Now I am coming to a very good point. You have these two words “witkaffer” (white kaffir) spelt with a small “w ”, which means an albino, and you have the word “Wit kaffer” with a capital “W ”, or a Boer kaffir. It is an honour for a non-White to be called a “Wit kaffer” by the Afrikaans-speaking people. It means that he is somebody who has been educated by the Afrikaans-speaking people, that he is a good person and that is why it is spelt with a capital; you are calling him White although he is Black. What are we going to do with “drakaffers” or “Carrecadores”, whom we use in the north and in South West Africa and in the Portuguese territory? What are we going to do with “rooikaffers” “Knopneuskaffers ”, “kaalkaffers” and the seven kaffir wars and the “kaffervink”, the “kafferpik” and “kafferblits”, the kaffir dance, the kaffir captain and kaffir beads? What about kaffir kraals or “kafferstatte”.? What about kaffir sheeting? What about “kafferleër”, the Impi? What about the old kaffir spoon which we all know and the kaffir location and the “kaffermanier” (way of a kaffir) and the “kafferopperhoof ” and “kafferpokke” (amaas)? What about the “kafferstem”, the “kafferhoender” the kaffir blanket, the blanket kaffir and the “kafferpot”; and what about the “kafferbrak”? When they had the expedition in South West Africa some of the young men suffered very badly from saddle-sores and one of them said: If they give the whole of South West to me as a present to-morrow, I will exchange it for a spotted grey “kafferbrak” and then I will poison it so that it dies. Then I come to “kafferpak”. What will we do with our place names and rivers such as Kafferfontein, Kafferskraal, Kafferspruit, Kafferrivier, Kafferskuil, etc.? What do we do with “kaffertaal”, “kafferdokter ”, “kaffertabak”, whose scientific name in Latin is also “Caffre”, and what do we do with the “kafferbok” about which Eugene Marais wrote such a beautiful article? What do we do with our old archives where the old Dutch Government called the Native Department the “Kaffir Department”? What do we do with “Kaffirland” or Caffraria? I want to sit down, but what do we do with our “kafirs”, our gold shares? Are we going to call them Bantu shares?

Order! The hon. member has kaffered (uitgekaffer) the word “Bantu” quite enough. [Laughter.]

I have a serious objection to raise in connection with Clause (7), something which I unfortunately noticed too late to have discussed it thoroughly with the hon. the Deputy Minister. I discussed it with him but we could not finish our discussion. I refer to the definition of “Bantu beer”. Subsection (iii) (a) reads “the drink generally known as kaffir beer and commonly brewed by Bantu from kaffir corn or other grain”. But no reference is made to the alcohol content of this kaffir beer; there would have been nothing wrong with that had we not stated in a subsequent clause which I cannot discuss at this stage—I am not discussing it; I am only referring to it—that Bantu beer may be sold by local authorities and employers but that it may not have a higher alcohol content than 3 per cent. In other words, coming back to the definition, it immediately means that we have more than one kind of kaffir beer.

Hear, hear!

Surely it is wrong to make it possible for certain people to brew Bantu beer containing any percentage of alcohol and in the case of others, such as local authorities and employers, the alcohol content may not be higher than 3 per cent. I have in mind the “shebeen queens” in particular. One of the main reasons really why a commission was appointed to review the entire Liquor Act was to eliminate the weaknesses in our law which these people were exploiting. If we leave it as it stands at the moment, we will have a repetition of the old difficulty. The shebeen queens will immediately brew a much stronger Bantu beer, without adding anything to it, and that is why you cannot call it a concoction, by allowing it to ferment long enough and that beer will have an alcohol content of between 6 per cent to 8 per cent. The shebeen queen will say her Bantu beer is much better and it will be much better from the consumer’s point of view, because for the same price—there is no additional cost attached to it—the consumer will get beer with a much higher alcohol content, three times as high as the ordinary beer before that beer goes bad, because if you let it stand too long it goes bad. I really want to make an appeal to the hon. the Deputy Minister to consider this matter. During the few minutes in which I could speak to him, I understood that the legal advisers were of the opinion that those people who usually brewed Bantu beer with a higher alcohol content than 3 per cent, could not test it. The ordinary person, the Bantu who brews it in his own home, cannot test it and for that reason it should be allowed to be a little higher than 3 per cent. I have nothing against that but then we should delete it everywhere, and if we do that we will have a concoction in future which will no longer be kaffir beer, but something which has become strong liquor and which may possibly cause intoxication. Surely it is obvious that if you throw a product open on the market you want to have a stable product and lay down that it should not be higher than a certain percentage, otherwise it will not be the product we would like to have, and whereas it has contained approximately 3 per cent alcohol throughout the generations, it would be a very good thing if we provided in this Bill what its alcohol content should be.

My third objection is to the discrimination. We are discriminating against the local authorities and the employers because we say how strong their Bantu beer should be but we say nothing in respect of all the other people. They can brew any sort of beer. We are particularly benefiting the shebeen queens. We have made a mistake here which I do not know how we can overcome. Fortunately there is another hon. member here, the hon. Minister of Information, who sat with me on the Liquor Commission and he will be able to tell you, Sir, that one of our great difficulties was the fact that the shebeen queens were the very people who had complicated the Liquor Act, and here we are giving them an opening which will make them flourish. The hon. the Deputy Minister told me that they could in any case make the Bantu beer stronger by adding a little brandy but that would be too expensive and that they would not do it in that way. They will simply allow the beer to ferment for a longer period to obtain that strength. It is for this reason that I should like to move the following amendment—

The effect of this amendment will be that the beer cannot have a higher alcohol content than 4 per cent in volume. That is about 3 per cent in weight; that is the standard which we have always regarded as the alcohol strength of Bantu beer.

I wish to support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan). I do not want to say much about it but I wish to draw attention to two matters. In the past kaffir beer has been defined in accordance with its alcohol content. The object of this was not to protect anybody against kaffir beer or to say what recipe had to be used. That was done in order to make all the provisions of the Liquor Act applicable to kaffir beer when its alcohol content was higher than the prescribed percentage. In that case the police had the power to treat kaffir beer as though it was strong liquor, such as wine or brandy. The object of the definition which we are discussing to-day is different but I nevertheless think it is necessary that we prescribe the alcohol content. When we have Bantu beer and kaffir beer —I purposely make the distinction—kaffir beer which is not brewed by local authorities, it means that you have two kinds of beer, one of which will be subject to this Act and one which will not be subject to this Act or to the Liquor Act at all, unless you also include in the Liquor Act a definition defining this sort of beer. These are the two points of view which make it necessary that we should have one definition and that we continue with the old system of making all the provisions of the Liquor Act applicable to what is known as alcoholic liquor. I think it is necessary that we have all those provisions. What the Deputy Minister is doing is to make an exception in the case of a great amount of this liquor and to draw it away from the provisions of the Liquor Act.

I really cannot associate myself with the amendment of the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) supported by the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze), because if this amendment is inserted all the evils which we are trying to eliminate by means of this legislation will again arise. It will mean that in every case where beer is brewed the police will have to go and to see whether those Bantu are brewing beer of a certain content or what the content is. The very thing which we are trying to avoid with this legislation will be perpetuated. It may all sound very well, but the very idea of this legislation is not that we wish to re-introduce the provisions of the Liquor Act in general, because our attitude is that kaffir beer is more of a food than a drink and we wish to give it the greatest possible freedom. The provision in respect of the alcohol content of municipal beer is only to bind the municipalities. As far as the shebeen queens are concerned, it is illegal for them to sell beer in any case. Why must we make it more illegal if they sell beer with an alcohol content of over 3 per cent, when it is already illegal for them to sell beer of even 1 per cent? It makes no sense and I cannot understand the argument.

Before I sit down I want to ask the Deputy Minister whether he will not change the name Bantu beer in the Other Place. I really have serious doubts about that name for all the reasons which have been mentioned. It has nothing to do with the principle, but I think we are going too far. In terms of the definition it is the drink generally known as kaffir beer, and we define a new word “Bantu beer”, What is the idea of calling it Bantu beer? Why do we want to use the word “Bantu” wherever we have used the word “kaffir” in the past? Call it by its right name and it will not be necessary to define it.

I am not objecting to the percentage of 4 per cent alcohol, as the amendment says, but I do want to say that it makes the whole position uncontrollable. I want to give this as an example. We all know that kaffir beer continues to ferment if you keep it a long time. Assume the beer has an alcohol content of 3 per cent when it is purchased at the beer hall and the Native keeps it for a day or two in his home. It will be more than 4 per cent and he will be guilty of an offence. It will be impossible to apply the law in that case and control will be impossible. The idea is to make the beer more freely available, but it will be impossible to brew it without testing it, something which cannot be done in the circumstances. And where the Natives themselves brew it at home it will not be possible for them to test the content. That is why this amendment will make the operation of this law impossible. The idea which the hon. member for Hercules has, namely to eliminate the shebeen queens, is out of the question because this Bill already forbids it. Why should we introduce an additional measure to forbid it because nobody except municipalities can sell it? I really trust that the hon. member will not insist upon his amendment because that will only give rise to all the difficulties which we have had in the past.

I am also opposed to this amendment, and if the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) would reduce the 4 per cent to 2 per cent, I may consent to it. For the sale of this kaffir beer no trading licences are necessary, but for the ordinary lager beer a trading licence is necessary. Therefore I think that Bantu beer should have a lower alcohol content than lager beer, the alcohol content of which by weight is also 3 per cent, approximately. This beer is regarded as a food for adults, so why should it have an increased alcohol content equivalent to that of lager beer, and why should it be sold without a trading licence? I appeal to the hon. member for Hercules rather to accept a 2 per cent alcohol content than 4 per cent.

They do not want to drink water.

I too want to make a serious appeal to the hon. the Deputy Minister not to deprive the English and the Afrikaans language of a very pretty and typical word, namely “kaffir beer”. If we leave the Bill as it stands at the moment I foresee that it will only be the magistrates and the Judges who will talk about Bantu beer in a case and all the witnesses will talk about kaffir beer. It is a word which has become ingrained in both the English and the Afrikaans languages and this Bill should not deprive us of such a pretty name. I want to make a serious appeal to him to abandon the word “Bantu beer” and to call it kaffir beer again.

I want to move an amendment to the definition—

The position is that after listening to the hon. member for Karas (Mr. von Moltke), one realizes how ridiculous we are when we try to get rid of the word “kaffir beer”. There is nothing derogatory about the word “kaffir”. It is derived from the source mentioned by the hon. member for Karas, so is there any reason why we should not apply it here? We have coined this word “Bantu beer”, but that word does not exist in the English or Afrikaans dictionaries. I am not asking that the word “Bantu” should be removed from all our legislation where it appears, but I appeal to the Minister to leave this word “kaffir beer”, because this product has been known as “kaffir beer” and will always be known by it. It is important that we do this, and as indicated by the hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman), the only people who will apply this word “Bantu beer” will be the magistrates and the Judges. So why not let us use the word “kaffir beer”, because then everybody will know what we mean, but it is ridiculous to use the word “Bantu beer”.

I rise to associate myself with those who have already objected to the proposed amendment by the hon. member for Hercules. His intentions may be the best in the world, but I am convinced that if we were to accept that amendment, we would be sounding the death knell of this legislation. That is what it amounts to. The hon. member for Heilbron and the hon. member for Christiana have stated it very clearly. We cannot make a bigger mistake than to accept an amendment at this stage which will subject the Native to a greater extent to the sort of provocation to which he has seriously objected all these years namely to be prosecuted when he brews beer which he regards as a food. We must get away from the idea of regulating people to such an extent that we make it impossible for them to remain within the provisions of the law. As far as the name “kaffir beer” or “Bantu beer” is concerned, well, a rose by any other name smells as sweet. I do not mind what it is called, but I believe that if we accept that the word “kaffer” carries a stigma and that we should try to get away from it and rather use the word “Bantu”, it will be right and reasonable and wise to make the change in this case as well, and for that reason I am in favour of the name “Bantu beer”. Just like any new idea, it is not so easy to accept it to-day, but that is what happens along the road of progress and development in this country and for that reason I support the new name. I sincerely trust, however, that the hon. the Deputy Minister will not accept the proposed amendment by the hon. member. I take it that in moving it the hon. member’s intentions were good, because we never doubt his intentions, but what he suggests is simply undesirable and impracticable and I should not like to see us placing a provision on the Statute Book which will make every Native subject to arrest, prosecution and imprisonment. In that event we might just as well prohibit the brewing of beer completely.

I agree with the hon. member for Vryburg (Mr. Labuschagne). I can well understand that the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) wants to prevent a beer from being brewed which will in the course of time attain a very high alcohol content. But I wish to put this possibility to the hon. member: If Natives on a farm or anywhere else are allowed to brew beer and the police arrive to see whether the provisions of the law are observed, who is going to test that beer to determine its alcohol content? Must every police official have an apparatus in his office to test the alcohol content of beer? I think this amendment of the hon. member for Hercules is an out-and-out impractical suggestion. You cannot expect the police to test the beer. That can perhaps be done at a municipality where the local authority have all the facilities at their disposal to test the alcohol content of the beer. In that case it is a totally different matter, but what about the major portion of the country where those facilities are not available? If the police have to keep that beer in the local police station until such time as the case comes up before the court, what will its alcohol content be?

No, they just add a little pill and send it to the Government laboratory and they wait to hear what its alcohol content is.

The hon. member for Standerton is perhaps right, but it is not as simple as all that; it may take a considerable time before you get the results from the laboratory.

Where will you find the little pill?

I do not think, therefore, that under the amendment of the hon. member for Hercules we will prevent the beer from exceeding a certain percentage of alcohol. I think this matter can better be discussed under Clause 4 than under this Clause.

I just want to tell the hon. members for Vryburg (Mr. Labuschagne), Heilbron (Mr. Froneman) and Port Elizabeth (West) (Mr. Streicher) that they have really missed the important point which I have stressed and that is that we should understand the same thing under “Bantu beer” in all circumstances. We cannot in one case say Bantu beer is a beer which may not have an alcohol content higher than 4 per cent and in another case say that Bantu beer is a beer which may have an alcohol content of 6 per cent or 7 per cent and more. It must have the same alcohol content throughout.

May I ask the hon. member a question? The difficulty I foresee is this: When the beer is brewed it has an alcohol content of 3 per cent but in the evening the alcohol content of that beer exceeds 3 per cent. How are you going to prevent Chat?

No, you cannot prevent that; that is my very argument. The hon. member is really strengthening my argument, because the alcohol content of the beer can rise to 7 per cent. I say we should be consistent. We must lay down a fixed percentage or we should not mention the alcohol content at all. We must stipulate that it should be brewed from grain and that it does not matter what its alcohol content is. We should do one of the two but we should not say that in the case of certain people the alcohol content should be 4 per cent and that in the case of other persons it can be any percentage, because if we do that we are not consistent. What are we doing here? The definition says that kaffir beer should be made from grain— and nothing further—and in the following clause we provide that kaffir beer which is sold by local authorities and employers should not be of a higher alcohol content than 4 per cent. I object to that inconsistency. If I were sure that this Committee would at a later stage delete the 4 per cent I would withdraw my amendment. I only do not want us to be inconsistent. If hon. members wish to be consistent they should say, when we get to Clause 3, “Very well, we are also going to provide here that the beer may contain more than 4 per cent alcohol”. If hon. members will do that, everything is in order; in that case we will be consistent; we then have the name “kaffir beer”; we do not limit its alchohol strength, and we leave it at that. We cannot on the one hand refuse to limit the alcohol content because it will be difficult to test it and on the other hand say that its alcohol content must be tested in the case of those people who are in a position to test its alcohol content, because in that case we will be playing into the hands of the shebeen queens. The activities of the shebeen queens are illegal to-day, but they do sell alcohol in the locations to-day. If hon. members say that they do not care for this amendment and if they agree that no reference should be made in Clause 3 to alcohol content, I will withdraw my amendment.

I must say that I agree with the hon. member who has just sat down. I think if we are going to be at all logical, then we have to know what is Bantu beer. Is it one thing for the purpose of one clause in the Bill and another thing for the purpose of another clause? I am looking at this matter, as I said at the second reading, from the point of view of alcoholism. The hon. member who has just sat down is quite right in saying that this is playing right into the hands of the shebeen queens. I say that this Bill is not going to detract from the duties of the police. What is the good of our saying in Clause 3 that for certain purposes we are going to have the alcohol content limited to 3 per cent, when we have been told by hon. members that if Bantu beer is kept for a long time while the fermentation process is going on, it will build up its own alcohol content. But that will be precisely the position so far as Clause 3 is concerned. We are either going to try and limit the alcohol content and then say “That is the kaffir beer that this Bill is dealing with; it is limited to that amount of alcohol”, and then if people keep it for a longer period they are going to be in trouble because they will have exceeded the legal percentage of alchohol. But now we are going to be caught between two different clauses with two different meanings for what is called precisely the same thing. In fact I go so far as to say that where it is called Bantu beer in Clause 3, it is not Bantu beer in terms of the definition at all, because Bantu beer is not limited to a certain alcohol content unless we accept the amendment of the hon. member who has just sat down, and then that should be 3 per cent; then you have the definition and Clause 3 working together. But in Clause 3 we are not dealing with Bantu beer in terms of the present definition because the definition is silent on the question of alcohol content; it may be 7 per cent. How then can you say under Clause 3 that it is going to be Bantu beer if the percentage is only 3 per cent? You see, Sir, this is going to put the police in the difficulty that they will virtually have to find the source of the kaffir beer, because if it comes from municipalities and employers and so forth, it must have not more than 3 per cent; if it comes from any other source then there is no limitation on the percentage of alcohol, so what is going to be the position? The shebeen queens or other people will simply have to go to court and show that is kaffir beer in terms of the definition but that it is not kaffir beer in terms of Clause 3, and then the whole trouble starts all over again. I think the hon. member is quite right. If we are going to have a thing called Bantu beer, then let us say precisely what the amount of alcohol may be. We will then have a standard by which we can define the object called “Bantu beer”; but if you are going to have two separate objects both called “Bantu beer” with totally different alcohol contents, then I think the Act is simply going to be riddled by the people who are going to try to make their living out of the illicit supply of this beer as a base for hard liquor. In that respect the hon. member is quite right in saying that this is playing right into the hands of the shebeen queens.

I just want to deal with the last argument advanced by the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell). He says that if reference is made to the alcohol content it is not in conformity with the definition. I wish to refer the hon. member to the Liquor Act. He knows that a light dry wine has a lower alcohol content than sweet and heavy wines for example, but it remains wine in terms of the definition of wine in the Liquor Act. It is not only the alcohol content, therefore, which determines whether it is Bantu beer or not. That argument holds no water, therefore. It is argued that we are playing into the hands of the shebeen queens. We are not fighting the evil of the shebeen queens by determining what the alcohol content of the beer should be but by the fact that any person can brew as much kaffir beer as he wishes to. Why would I go to a shebeen queen if I want kaffir beer, if she brews beer with an alcohol content of 6 per cent or 7 per cent if I can brew the same beer in my own home with an alcohol content of 7 per cent? We are fighting the shebeen aueen by lifting all prohibitions; we are not fighting them by limiting the alcohol content. Let me point out that Clause 3 has reference to Clause 10 alone, as hon. members will realize if they read it carefully. Clause 10 provides that certain employers can brew, sell and provide Bantu beer. The limitation is only placed on those who sell Bantu beer. No such limitation is placed on persons who do not sell it; that is the point. We are not fighting the shebeen queen by introducing these limitations. The shebeen queen can brew beer with an alcohol content of 1 per cent or 7 per cent or whatever it may be but it is illegal in any case because she may not sell it. The point which has been made, therefore, in connection with the alcohol content has no substance in it.

I once again wish to point out that what the hon. member who has just sat down has said, is not correct. We are not talking about all those varieties of wines with different alcohol contents. That is why we talk about natural wines with an alcohol content of up to 12 per cent and you talk about fortified wines with an alcohol content of up to 20 per cent. The hon. member’s terminology, therefore, is incorrect. In order to remove this inconsistency I wish to move—

Let us first see what we do to Clause 3 and then we can return to this clause.

Agreed to.

On Clause 3,

This clause provides that Bantu beer manufactured by a local authority or by an employer shall not exceed an alcohol content of 3 per cent, and if the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) moves his amendment again and it is accepted, he will be altering the provisions of this clause. In the circumstances I move—

Motion put and negatived.

The point I would like to raise at this stage is this: How do we control the alcohol content, whether it be 3, 4 or 5 per cent, in a brew which goes on fermenting from the time it has been made …

Order! On which clause is the hon. member speaking now?

Clause 3. Hon. members know full well that if kaffir beer is brewed to the strength provided for in this Bill and it is then carried away to the location where it is to be consumed, the alcohol content will be higher by the time it gets to the location. The beer goes on fermenting and by the time it gets to the location the alcohol content may be 5 per cent or even more, depending on the quantity. Supposing a large quantity is drawn from the source and it is taken in, say, a 44-gallon drum on a motor-lorry to some place for consumption at a wedding the following day. By the time that beer is going to be consumed, the alcohol content is going to be 7 per cent—and the hon. member for Hercules knows that.

Does it not come under the Explosives Act?

Judging by the appearance on Sunday morning of some of the people who consume it on a Saturday evening, it is pretty explosive. What I am trying to get at is how we are going to control the alcohol content, whether it be 3, 4, 5 or 6 per cent. When it is kept for 12 hours the percentage will jump up to 6; if it is kept any longer it will possibly become sour. I am sorry, Sir, but there seems to be something wrong with this whole set-up. We cannot enforce a provision to the effect that the alcohol content of the beer shall not exceed 3 or 4 per cent.

I merely wish to draw the attention of the hon. the Deputy Minister to the fact that he really does not require Clause 3 at all. I want to ask him seriously to consider withdrawing it completely. As I see it the definition is contained in Clause 1 which is now standing over. Clause 3 is really not a definition; it prescribes how the beer is to be brewed. It really has nothing to do with the definition, but because we also call it Bantu beer in Clause 3, the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) sees the problem as though we will really have two varieties of beer.

The hon. the Minister really does not require Clause 3 because Clause 15 (a) gives him the power to determine and to control by regulation the quality and constituent elements of Bantu beer, the way in which it should be brewed, packed and bottled, the analysis of Bantu beer, that is, what its alcohol content should be in certain circumstances. The Minister has the power to issue regulations which will apply to the local authorities or employers who manufacture beer. He can, therefore, solve these problems by way of regulation. He does not solve any problem for the police or for the country by insisting on the retention of Clause 3 and that is why I want to ask him whether he will be good enough to consider withdrawing Clause 3. In that case it is not necessary to amend Clause 1. If there are no other hitches this Bill ought to go through within a few minutes.

I too, like the hon. member for King William’s Town (Mr. Warren) have some difficulty over this question of the percentage. The hon. member for King William’s Town has dealt with the situation where a Native who buys kaffir beer from the municipal authority, takes it to the location where it will be drunk some time later. But the situation about which I am concerned is that of the employer, possibly the farmer, who is brewing beer for his employees. If one is a local authority, it may well be that by putting the beer in some form of cold storage, one can temporarily halt the fermentation process, but that sort of facility will not be available to the farmer. As the hon. member for King William’s Town has correctly said, when once the brewing is set in motion it proceeds steadily onwards and there is nothing we can do about it. The farmer who has no means of control by way of cold storage or any such appliance is likely to be put into difficulties by a limitation on the percentage of alcohol in the sense that although at the time the beer is brewed the alcohol content might be 3 per cent, if the beer is consumed at some later stage when the alcohol content has risen, the farmer may find that he has committed an offence. I would ask the Minister to consider that point so far as the employer of possibly 30 or 40 men is concerned, who does not have the facilities for limiting the alcohol content to that specific percentage.

I want to support the idea expressed by the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze). If the hon. the Deputy Minister accedes to his request to withdraw this clause, it will have this tremendous advantage that we will first see in practice how this measure works before we do anything in this connection. If anything has to be done to lay down what the alcohol content should be, it can be done under Clause 15. It will offer a wonderful solution at this stage, because we will not at all be laying down what the alcohol content should be and if difficulties develop which we cannot foresee to-day, they can in any case be dealt with by way of regulation under Clause 15.

I must admit that the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) has been more logical in his discussion on the possibility of withdrawing Clause 3 than in the case of the previous clause which we will now only discuss at a later stage. There is one point, however, which I want to emphasize very strongly, a point which hon. members have not considered in connection with the reason why we are limiting local authorities and employers as the manufacturers of Bantu beer as far as its alcohol content is concerned. I want to state very clearly why we are doing this. The hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman) partly touched upon it. That is that they are two bodies which make and sell beer; that is the point; they sell it. In other words, the profit factor comes into play. [Interjections.] If the hon. member reads the relevant clause he will see that certain employers are allowed to sell Bantu beer, that is employers who already have liquor rights. They are not employers who house their own Bantu etc.; we will come to them in a moment. But the point is that it is the local authorities and employers who manufacture Bantu beer with the object of selling it, to sell it subject to control as far as the price is concerned, as far as the profit which they make is concerned and the manner in which that profit is used. All that is controlled under this Act. If we lifted the control over the alcohol content of that beer which was sold by manufacturers, what would then become possible? You will make it possible for them to produce a product with an unlimited alcohol content thus increasing its sale value and the margin of profit. I said very clearly in the second reading debate that it must be understood quite clearly that the object of this Bill was not that profits should be made on the sale of Bantu beer. We are not introducing Bantu beer—and we are imposing this control—because we wish to see large profits made on the sale of Bantu beer. If we do not determine the alcohol content of the beer which may be sold you make it attractive to the manufacturer of that beer to push up the sales and thus the profits, and we must avoid that for many reasons, amongst others, for moral reasons. For that reason I do not think we must abandon the idea of exercising control over the alcohol content of the Bantu beer which will be sold.

I now come to the suggestion made by the hon. member for Standerton that we should withdraw Clause 3 and act by way of regulation. That may seem correct at the first glance. I will say this that from the point of view of the hon. member for Hercules that is perhaps a logical suggestion. But what do we achieve by doing that? We will only be using a backdoor method, because if we delete Clause 3 because it provides that the beer which a manufacturer sells may not exceed a certain alcohol content and it remains possible by way of regulation to say to the person who manufactures Bantu beer for the purpose of sale that its strength should not exceed 3 per cent in weight or 4 per cent in volume, what does that mean? That means that we will have 300 or 400 local authorities on our heels. We have been told in this House what we will be told by 300 or 400 people. The hon. member for Hercules has suggested 4 per cent; the hon. member for Albany has suggested 2 per cent. Between 300 and 400 local authorities and employers will be selling beer and we have to exercise control over them as far as the profits which they may make are concerned. We will find that these people will continually come to us and say: Make mine a little higher, or make mine a little lower because those regulations will be applicable to local authorities and there is a host of local authorities in the whole country. From this point of view, therefore, I think hon. members will agree that control has to be exercised over those people who manufacture alcohol for the purpose of sale, and that the control should be exercised in terms of the law rather than by way of regulations.

What the hon. the Deputy Minister has just said is quite true. In that case why does he not make that clear in that clause? Why does he not say clearly in the clause “Beer which is manufactured for the purpose of sale”? What he does say is “Beer manufactured by local authorities”—it is obvious that it is for sale but then he goes on and says “and by employers”, and beer which is manufactured by employers is not always for sale. Many employers manufacture beer who do not sell it as, for example, farmers on large farms. Under Clause 4 the employer has the right to manufacture his own beer. It happens every day that beer is manufactured and given gratis to the people; there is no difficulty there, but the hon. the Deputy Minister has emphasized that what he has in mind is beer which is manufactured for the purpose of sale. Why does he not say that in the clause? Why does he not say “Bantu beer which, in accordance with the provision of this Act is manufactured by a local authority or by an employer for the purpose of sale may not …”. If he does that he will be consistent.

I just want to reply to the point raised a moment ago by the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan). You have to read Clause 3 in conjunction with the other clauses of the Bill, Sir, and when you have studied the whole Bill thoroughly, you will realize that there are only two kinds of bodies which may manufacture beer for the purpose of sale. Firstly the employers who can manufacture a limited quantity which must comply with certain requirements laid down in the Bill; they constitute the lesser group. Then you have the more important group, namely, the local authorities. We know that the cardinal principle contained in this Bill is that all Bantu beer which is sold, except in the case of the employer to which I have just referred, must be manufactured by the local authority. That is a cardinal principle throughout the Bill and it is entrenched in this clause. That is why it is not necessary to say it in this clause, but it is clearly stated in the other clauses where it is relevant. If the hon. member read this particular clause in conjunction with the others, he would realize that it is not necessary to say it here because it is stated very clearly elsewhere.

I would like to support the retention of this fixed strength of 3 per cent, for this reason: Many members speaking in this House in the second-reading debate—and I know many members of the public—felt that this Bantu Beer Bill presented a means of making available to the Bantu a liquor of low alcohol content and that in doing so we would prevent the Bantu from going for the stronger European liquor. But if no alcohol content is laid down, then that purpose is very largely defeated because it means that the liquor can be sold at any strength. I feel for that reason that we should retain a definite fixed strength for Bantu beer, whether it be supplied by local authorities or any other person brewing such beer. Once it leaves the hands of the brewers of the beer, and goes to the house of the Bantu, then we can do nothing about how long he keeps the beer. But if no fixed strength is laid down it means that in many ways the brewers of the beer will be competing with each other, and the stronger the Bantu beer the more it will be in demand. People will buy their beer from the authority which supplies the strongest liquor. I feel therefore that we should lay down a definite strength.

I am sorry to have to return to this again. My only concern is that this measure should be very clear. We have already seen that it is also possible to regard Clause 3 as a definition clause, although it does not fall under the definition clause. Clause 3 really contains a prohibition so that people who manufacture beer for sale, that is employers and local authorities are forced to brew beer of a certain quality. If that clause were worded differently so that it placed a prohibition on certain employers and local authorities so that the beer which they manufactured did not contain an alcohol content higher than a certain percentage, nobody would regard it as a definition clause. But what will we have in practice, Sir? Somebody is charged with having Bantu beer in his possession and it may appear that the provisions of the Liquor Act are applicable to such a case—I cannot imagine such a case—but I can imagine that somebody will rely on the fact that there are two definitions in the Act, and because the position is not clear, it may be that you do not know what you have before you. I have not had time to think about the matter properly and to carry my argument right through, but I think we should really go out of our way to state this matter clearly. As it reads at the moment it would be easier if we provided that a local authority or an employer who manufactured Bantu beer in terms of this Act, was not allowed to manufacture Bantu beer with an alcohol content in excess of 3 per cent or 4 per cent in weight or volume, or whatever the case may be. It will then be clear that it is a prohibition. Then there can be no question about it that it may perhaps be a definition. I am convinced of it that the lawyers in this House will agree with me that it is possible to read two definitions into this. Mr. Chairman, I will not speak about this again.

I should like to say something in reply to what was said by the hon. member for King William’s Town (Mr. Warren) and the hon. member for Zululand (Mr. Cadman), and partly also the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) in regard to the possession of Bantu beer. I think it is really more the hon. members for King William’s Town and Zululand to whom I have to reply on this point. The provisions of Clause 3 are clearly intended to deal with the preparation stage; it is at the preparation stage that the 3 per cent applies, and not to later stages. It is quite clear that anyone who is allowed to make and to sell beer must limit it to an alcohol content of 3 per cent at that stage. If it is therefore kept standing by someone who has bought the beer and it ferments a little more, that is of course natural fermentation which we cannot prevent. But I think we can perhaps meet hon. members a little—perhaps even the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan)—by inserting a few words in this clause to make it clearer that it refers to beer brewed for purposes of sale. I do not know whether hon. members will be satisfied with that. To me it is clear, and perhaps it is clearer to one when one has read the Bill many times, as I have already read it hundreds of times, but if it will satisfy those hon. members, I can insert at the end of the second line, after the words in the Afrikaans text, “gemaak word”, the words “vir doeleindes van verkoop” (for purposes of sale), and then the clause will read as follows—

Linguistically that is not correct.

That will still not help.

That is what I am suggesting, but now that hon. member says it will not help. Then he will just have to speak and move an amendment. But that is what I suggest to meet the difficulty of hon. members. It is perhaps unnecessary to do so, but I should like to assist them.

I want to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister again whether he will not consider inserting in Clause 3 a prohibition on manufacturers who will make Bantu beer for sale. I think that if he just inserts a prohibition and says that local authorities or employers who make Bantu beer may not make beer containing more alcohol than 3 per cent by weight, then he need not add the words “for sale”, because, if he adds those words, it appears as if they can make beer with a higher alcohol content as long as they do not sell it; because to define it is to limit it. As far as I am concerned, the Deputy Minister can let this clause pass as it is, but I think that his Bill will be clearer; that it will state more clearly what he wants to say, and that thereafter no problems will arise. I humbly submit that for his consideration. He can consider it and remedy the matter in the Other Place.

Would the hon. the Minister just repeat to me what amendment he proposes to move in this clause?

I just have the Afrikaans text here. I shall read it to the hon. member, and then I will later give him the English text. I will move—

In English it will then read: “Bantu beer made for the purpose of sale.”

Will the hon. the Minister move that amendment, because I think if he does he will get the support of this side of the House.

I will move it.

We are faced with this position, even if it is for sale, that Bantu beer or kaffir beer—call it what you like— starts to ferment from the time it is made, and the alcohol content to be found in it depends on the length of fermentation. Personally I see great troubles lying ahead because this beer is going to be bought, not for consumption in the place where it is bought, but it is going to be carted away and consumed some time afterwards, and it is at that stage that we are creating a problem for the police which they will never be able to overcome.

I just want to reply to what the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) said a moment ago. He wanted to introduce a general prohibition. May I just point out that if the prohibition as suggested by him is inserted, Clause 4 will also be materially affected. Beer can be made for two purposes, for sale and for giving away, and Clause 4 deals with the case where it is given away. If he introduces the general prohibition in the form proposed by him, he will be eliminating Clause 4 entirely. A person will then no longer be able to make beer at all, as I understand him, for the purpose of giving it away.

I asked the hon. the Deputy Minister a moment ago to state this clause more clearly, and he now says that this is for the purpose of sale. It goes without saying, therefore, that I accept this as a very great improvement. I want to put just one further point to him in connection with this clause, and that is that he should amend the words “three per cent by weight” to read “four per cent by volume”. We all understand the term “volume” perfectly clearly. When a person talks about “four per cent by volume” we know that it means four bottles of absolute alcohol per 100 bottles or four gallons per 100 gallons. In the new Liquor Act everything is given in terms of volume, and I wonder whether the hon. the Deputy Minister will not bring about the same change in this Bill as well. Actually three percent by weight is 3.75 per cent by volume, and we might as well make it four per cent—it is not such a very important point—and then it will correspond with our new Liquor Act.

I do not want to become involved in an argument about three per cent or four per cent and about the use of the terms “by weight” or “by volume”. We have definitely been advised by the C.S.I.R. that they would prefer it to be stated in this way; that is to say, by weight. The C.S.I.R. are the people who have to assist us to test these things. I want to suggest, if it will satisfy the hon. member for King William’s Town and the hon. member for Hercules, that the amendment which I have mentioned here should stand over, and that I move it in the Other Place. That will give me more opportunity to see where precisely the words should be inserted. The hon. member for Standerton had certain misgivings with regard to the place where the words should be inserted. I shall consider the matter and then move the amendment in the Other Place.

I just want to ask the Deputy Minister whether he will not consider my proposal as well.

Yes, I shall do so.

My suggestion is this—and I say this also for the information of the hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman). I do not think that the Deputy Minister should insert the restriction (which the hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) apparently accepts now) in that position, because, as the hon. member for Heilbron has said, he may then find that it clashes with Clause 4. But if this matter is approached from the point of view of a prohibition and if he amends the clause as follows—I shall give him the wording in a moment—then the manufacturer of beer can either give it away or sell it, but we will then be imposing a prohibition. Let me read out the wording to the Deputy Minister—

As I have said, there will then be a prohibition. I ask the Deputy Minister to consider this. I shall hand this over to him; I am not going to move any amendment.

May I just point out that the hon. member for Standerton does not understand the position. We are protecting the employers on the farms, the farmers, in this sense that, when they make Bantu beer to be supplied to their employees, we do not lay down what the alcohol content is to be; it may even be 10 per cent. But if the hon. member imposes that prohibition, then he makes the position impossible for the farmers. If a person makes Bantu beer for his own use, we want him to be able to make it any strength he likes, but if the proposal of the hon. member for Standerton is accepted, it will hit every person who makes beer for his own use.

I was pointing out just before dinner that Clause 3 prohibits certain brewers of beer, that is to say, local authorities or employers, from making beer with an alcohol content exceeding 3 per cent by weight. The reply of the hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman) to that was that if my proposal was accepted we would be making it clear that this was a prohibition and not a definition, and that farmers, who are employers, would then not have the right to make beer and to supply it even free of charge to their employees. I just want to make this point that if that is an objection to the proposal which I have asked the Deputy Minister to consider, then the same objection is implicit in the clause as it now reads. In other words, if my proposal is not acceptable, then by the same token and on the same grounds Clause 3, as it now reads, is not acceptable either, because there it is specifically stated—

I readily admit that the solution suggested by me may not be a solution, but I come back to the solution that I suggested earlier on in this debate, namely that Clause 3 be deleted and that we regulate this matter under Clause 10 where the power is granted to prescribe the quality of the beer, the composition of the beer and where the various employers who have to be licensed in order to be able to manufacture beer under this measure are prescribed. It would be a different matter if there was a section to the effect that farmers shall not be regarded as employers under this measure. I am not being obstructive. I am only assisting to make this an effective measure. I shall vote for this clause as it stands if the Minister will only promise me that he will discuss this matter with his advisers and see whether he cannot find some other way to solve this problem which I should like to be solved. I suggest in all modesty that the solution which he is trying here is no solution.

Arising out of what the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) has just sat. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether this clause interferes in any way with the Liquor Act provisions whereby a bona fide farmer outside an urban area is entitled to give his employees permission to brew what is termed in the Act “a reasonable quantity of beer”.

That falls under Clause 4.

This is the first time that my hon. colleague next to me (Dr. Coertze) and I differ, but I want to point out that the objections which have been raised here by the hon. member for Standerton are not valid. The hon. member’s objection is that the term “employers” as used here may also include the farmers. Let me point out that the employer, if it is a farmer employing more than 25 employees, does not manufacture Bantu beer and give it to his servants or employees; in that case the employee brews his own beer, with the permission of his employer. Permission will no longer be required now. This provision relates to the employer in an urban area. I am referring to Clause 9 now. In the urban area it is only the local authority that can brew beer. It is only the local authority that can determine the alcohol content of the particular beer manufactured by it. And the employer has to buy it from the local authority; that is laid down in Clause 9. I simply cannot see what my colleague’s difficulty is in this connection.

You were not here during the debate.

No, I was present. What the hon. member for Standerton says is not relevant here. As a matter of fact, I do not know why the hon. the Deputy Minister wants to move an amendment to this clause. The clause should remain as it stands; it is correctly worded. The local authority which manufactures beer is in a position to determine what the alcoholic content of that kaffir beer is when it manufactures it, and it has to see to it that alcohol content of the beer does not exceed 3 per cent at the time of manufacture. This will not affect the farmer who is an employer—and this only applies to employers who employ more than 25 employees over the age of 18 years. This does not refer to the farmer who supplies beer free of charge to his employees; it only applies to the employer who is within an urban area and who cannot manufacture the beer himself but who has to buy it in terms of Clause 9. He has to buy it from the city council, and as far as that beer is concerned the city council will certify that its alcoholic content at the time of manufacture did not exceed 3 per cent. I hope my hon. colleague will accept that is the position and that he will raise no further difficulties with regard to this clause.

I am not raising difficulties. I am talking about a legal matter and not about beer, and my hon. colleague next to me says that he is not a lawyer. I also believe that he is not a Bantu beer drinker. The clause can remain as it is; I do not mind but then it must be a prohibition if it is intended to prohibit certain people from making beer with an alcohol content exceeding a certain specified percentage. But the hon. the Deputy Minister has already promised that he will consider this matter; he has promised that he will give attention to it, and I leave it at that.

I do not want to intervene in what is quite obviously a private fight. I know it is a dangerous thing to get involved in a private fight. But I do want to support the view expressed by the hon. member for East London (North) (Mr. Field) this morning that a number of members in supporting the second reading of this Bill, said distinctly that they were doing so because they felt it was the lesser of two evils. I want to make it clear now that this particular clause we are dealing with which lays down the standard for the potency of the kaffir beer, the 3 per cent alcohol factor is defined in this clause. That does set a standard and I feel that to have any increase of the alcoholic contents introduced into the Bill at this stage, after the second reading, would upset the principle which has already been accepted. We have had very harrowing tales this morning about the potency of this liquor. I have often wondered what the basic component of a Molotov cocktail was, and I have now discovered it—it surely must be kaffir beer. In fact we had a demonstration this morning as to how potent it is. The hon. member for Hercules (Dr. A. I. Malan) who was only speaking about increasing the alcoholic content, and we have seen how it affected him, when he started calling his hon. colleague in the Chair to order. You see the effect it can have. This alcoholic content is a basic principle which a number of us have accepted and any departure from that, any departure in a direction of making the liquid more potent, will be violating that principle. It is true that once the liquid is brewed there is no way of controlling the strength to which it may develop. One of the best safeguards we have against that is to ensure that in the initial stage it is produced at the lowest possible alcoholic content that is acceptable. It will then have further to go to get to the dangerous stage which we have heard about here this morning. It has been argued that if we allowed a higher alcoholic content at the start it will to some extent counterbalance the efforts of the shebeen queens to produce something more potent and attractive. Here I think a similar argument applies in reverse, namely if it has a lower alcoholic content at the initial stages you limit the amount of damage they can do. I think whatever alcoholic content is finally fixed, we have to accept the fact that if there are illicit sellers of liquor who have to produce something more attractive, they will do it irrespective of what we do in this House. All we can do is to try to limit the initial damage as much as possible.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 4,

I wish to move the amendment which stands in my name—

If this amendment is accepted this clause will read—

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is in keeping with the principle of regulated control provided in this Bill in respect of those municipalities which run beer halls for the Bantu. When we think of how beer can increase in alcoholic content, as we have been told here to-day, we realize that it is actually a danger if let loose in rural areas and small villages among our own Bantu people to a considerable extent. I do think there should be a measure of control. I know as a farmer that we have never found any difficulty in regard to the control which we exercise on our farms in the past. We have never even asked for legislation of this nature. We know that when we give our Natives permission to brew a certain amount of beer and there are transgressions and they brew more than is good for them, the police can be asked to pay an occasional visit and control the brewing of this beer. But under this clause, as it reads at the moment, there is no control as regards the administration, brewing and giving away of beer in any area except those limited number of municipalities running beer halls. Where a municipality runs a beer hall there is the strictest control. All brewing and selling of beer within that municipal area is in the hands of the municipality. I feel that in the smaller villages where they do not have beer halls there should be some measure of control. I have tried to provide for a certain amount of control by way of an amendment, but it is not easy to do, Sir. My legal adviser saw a way to provide for a certain amount of control and I do hope that the Minister will accept the principle that areas where there are no beer halls a certain amount of control should be exercised as regards the manufacture and use of kaffir beer. I appeal to the Minister to give this amendment his serious consideration.

I cannot agree with the hon. member for Albany (Mr. Bowker) when he asks for the insertion of the following amendment: “Provided that such person or employer has obtained a permit to do so from a police officer”. Surely the hon. member is not going to suggest that the ordinary farmer in charge of his farming unit will have to go to the local police office to ask that a permit be given to him so that he can give the right to his labourers to brew beer.

For once I can agree with you.

That man who is in charge of his farming unit will know whether it is in the interests of his workers and his farm to allow them to brew beer and how much he should allow them to brew on the farm. I do not think that the hon. member for Albany has so little faith in the levelheadedness and fairness, in the sense of justice and responsibility of the owner of such a farm as to refuse to allow him to have this right except under a permit; surely he does not have so little faith in the farmers as to believe that they will brew more than they can consume. Why should the owners of farms have to go to the local police office to ask for a permit? Are the police in a better position than the farmer to say how much these people should be given? Of course the farmer is in a very much better position to say how much his own employees can consume. The hon. member told us in the second reading debate that it often happens that Natives consume so much beer over the week-end that they cannot cope with the milking on Sundays, for example. That type of thing is the farmer’s own responsibility, and it is much better to place that responsibility on the man who knows his own employees than to leave it to somebody else, because I do not believe that a farmer would do anything to harm himself by giving the right to his own employees to brew beer. That I cannot believe.

But, Mr. Chairman, I should like to move another amendment to this clause. As this clause now reads, it means that subject to the provisions of this Act. any person may brew as much beer as he likes for domestic consumption. I said in the course of the second reading debate that I thought that this was rather far-reaching. I think it should be kept within reasonable limits, and I should like to propose the following amendment therefore—

What is “reasonable”?

It will then read: “Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person may for reasonable domestic consumption and any employer may for supply free of charge to his employee brew Bantu beer.”

What is “reasonable”?

Hon. members want to know from me what “reasonable” means. Let me refer them to Clause 15. In terms of that clause the Minister may promulgate regulations in respect of warrants of arrest and in respect of persons who may enter properties to institute investigations, and there we also find the words, “or where it is presumed on reasonable grounds …” What are “reasonable” grounds in this case? I think it is a reasonable proposal therefore to ask that people should be allowed to brew beer for reasonable domestic consumption. I do not think that any person who wants to brew for reasonable domestic consumption. say, a gallon per person per day, would go and brew 200 gallons. I simply do not believe it. But, Mr. Chairman, the point is that under Clause 4 he has the right to do so. Let me say to hon. members on the other side, and also on this side, because it seems to me that this is a free debate, that if we allow unrestricted brewing of beer for domestic consumption, it means that we are going to have endless difficulties when the police have to institute investigations when they believe that there has been a contravention of the Liquor Act. But if there is reasonable domestic consumption …

There will be court cases then.

There will only be one or two court cases and then we shall have a definition of “reasonable”, just as the hon. the Minister will have to have a definition of “reasonable” when it comes to the interpretation of “reasonable grounds” in Clause 15. I believe that if we leave this clause unchanged, it will mean that under the cloak of domestic consumption people will be able to brew so much beer that it will lead to illicit traffic in kaffir beer. I am convinced of that. If the police, for example, go to a shebeen or to a person brewing kaffir beer because they presume on reasonable grounds that those people are brewing for the illicit trade, the person concerned can simply say. “No. this is for domestic consumption”. What will the authorities be able to do to prevent the brewing of beer for illicit purposes? But when you go to the man’s house and find that he has a gallon or two—because it must be remembered that Whites will also be able to brew this beer, not only the Bantu …

We know that.

Does the hon. member want to leave it to people to brew as much as they like? We want it for reasonable domestic consumption. But the hon. member may perhaps drink 20 gallons a day while I drink only one gallon.

And who would be “reasonable” then?

That would be determined by the effect it has on the hon. member and on me! One gallon may have the same effect on me as 20 gallons on him. He has a much stronger constitution than I have! No, Mr. Chairman, I think this clause is very dangerous if we are going to leave it to people to brew as much beer as they like for domestic consumption. I feel that we should have some measure of control here. There must be some limitation. A person should not be allowed to brew as much as he likes. If a person has too much liquor in his home, or if the police suspect that he is using that liquor for illicit trading purposes, the police can always find out because they can go from one bottle store to another to ascertain how much he has purchased for the illicit liquor trade. But that cannot be done under this clause. It means that I can have as much kaffir beer in my home as I like, and I can get away with the defence that it is for domestic consumption. That is why I say that the word “reasonable” should be inserted before the words “domestic consumption” so that there can be proper control.

Mr. Chairman. I think that the motion to insert the word “reasonable” is in this case unreasonable. I do not agree there with the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) (Mr. Streicher). I appreciate the fact that in other respects he supported us in regard to this Bill. He came to discuss it with me privately. but I regret that I cannot agree with him. There is one main reason why I cannot agree with him, and that is because it will put many practical problems in our way: secondly, because it creates another potential source of prosecution. And as you know, one of the objects of this Bill is to eliminate as far as possible all those raids and unsavoury prosecutions. The word “reasonable” will again give rise to prosecutions. Then I come to the second argument, which I also intimated to the hon. member privately. The intrinsic character of Bantu beer as such makes the insertion of that word unnecessary. One of the controls we have in regard to the whole measure is the character of Bantu beer itself. [Interjection.] Yes, and therefore he will not drink it. If a person makes a reasonable quantity of Bantu beer for home consumption, he will certainly for this reason not make an unnecessarily large quantity. He will make as much as he can drink. He knows that from experience, and if he does not know it he will soon enough learn that if one keeps Bantu beer standing is becomes sour and undrinkable. It becomes poisonous and undrinkable. That, I think, is the strongest control we have over the householder who brews beer for his own consumption. Which one of us prepares too much food and keeps it for a week? Nobody. Who of us makes too much ginger-beer for domestic consumption and keeps it for a month? No, we prefer to make it two or three times a month. We have that same control in the case of Bantu beer. but even more so than in the case of the two examples I gave. I think those are sufficient reasons.

Then we come to the question of what is a reasonable quantity. In reply to my interjection, the hon. member said that after a court case or two a definition will be evolved of what “reasonable” means. It is not so easy. What is reasonable may differ from one premises to another. On one site one may have a householder with a wife and four children and they will make a certain quantity which they regard as reasonable, but at a later stage they perhaps become accustomed to it and can drink a little more, or perhaps they drink a little less. They have their own yardstick for reasonableness. There are families of different sizes. Some of them receive visitors regularly and need more for domestic consumption. How can “reasonable” be defined from site to site? I do not think it is possible. However much I would like to meet the hon. member, I do not think his amendment should be accepted.

I should like to ask the hon. the Minister how he can explain the word “reasonable” in respect of “reasonable grounds” in Clause 15?

The two are not comparable. The word “reasonable” also appears elsewhere in the Bill. The hon. member for Albany (Mr. Bowker) says there should be a police permit. Here I again take pleasure in calling in the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) as my main witness. I think he has replied fully to the hon. member for Albany on that point, but I just want to add this. I think it is really superfluous to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Albany, because it would mean that, by means of a police permit, we must confirm a general right the Act gives to the Minister, and what is the necessity for that? The Bill makes it possible in these two cases, namely the person who brews for home consumption and the employer who does it for private provision, to brew Bantu beer, and why must the householder still obtain a police permit seeing that the Bill gives him that right? It simply means that the police are dragged into the matter unnecessarily. It will only cause unnecessary friction. I want to ask the hon. member to view the matter in this light and to abandon his amendment. Seen in the same light, the hon. member can also remember this. Would it not appear rather peculiar if we were to accept his amendment and provide that the person who brews Bantu beer for his own home consumption should require a police permit, whilst in terms of the Liquor Act he can take a bottle of brandy home without a permit—he can take the bottle of brandy to the backyard because the owner of the premises gave him the right to do so, or if he lives in the location he can do it in terms of the general provisions of the Act. A permit is not necessary for that. We must be logical, and I think that the request by the hon. member that there should be a police permit is quite superfluous.

I have difficulty in understanding the hon. the Deputy Minister’s objection to my hon. friend’s amendment on the ground that the word “reasonable” is difficult to define, because if you read Clause 9 of this particular Bill you find that every word used. From line 25 onwards it reads—

If it is impossible in my hon. friend’s amendment to put into practical effect the term (reasonable quantities), I suggest what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the Ministerial gander and the same objection will apply in Clause 9. It seems to me that my hon. friend’s amendment has something to be said for it in this sense that whereas one does not expect the police to go out and carry out raids in order to find out whether people are brewing in reasonable quantities, it might assist in this sense that if one had a neighbour who was brewing totally unreasonable quantities probably for the purpose of illicit sale, one would be able to lodge a complaint with the police to have that sort of situation investigated if there is a limitation such as the amendment of the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) (Mr. Streicher) envisages. It seems to me that on that basis there is a lot to be said for the amendment. I do not think the hon. the Deputy Minister’s objection to the word “reasonable” is a valid one seeing that the Minister has used it himself in Clause 9.

Mr. Chairman, the objections being raised now again introduce the obnoxious things we had in the past which caused so much misery in South Africa. In other words, the hon. members opposite still want the police to have control, whereas it is the object of this Bill to eliminate it as far as possible.

I want to point out to the hon. member that argument has already been used.

I would like to expatiate on it.

It has already been used repeatedly.

Sir, I do not want to continue with that argument. A certain amount of beer is allowed to be brewed, and it is also given away gratis. Surely it is inconceivable that any person who does such a thing will continually brew unnecessarily large quantities of beer and give it away. It is subject to the approval of the Minister. Why must we now provide that the police should control it? That is exactly what we want to avoid, and that is the reason why this clause was inserted. Therefore the word “reasonable” must be omitted. We do not want it at all.

I appreciate the Minister’s reply but I am not satisfied with it. I do not for a moment think that the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) (Mr. Streicher) has opposed my amendment. He stressed the unlimited brewing of Native beer and that it should be controlled. When I introduced my amendment I said that I had found it very difficult to introduce an amendment that would satisfy the Committee. All I am against is the brewing of Bantu beer in unreasonable quantities. That is all I want to stress. The hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) accepted that principle and made a very strong case for it. I would like the hon. the Deputy Minister to realize that all we want is to prevent beer from being brewed in unreasonable quantities. I would not say unreasonable quantities for consumption; I say unreasonable quantities. Clause 4 provides for the unlimited brewing of beer.

May I ask the hon. member a question? When the hon. member makes those observations has he in mind the Bantu people on the farms? If so, I can give him an assurance under a different clause. That does not fall under this clause. He must not argue from the point of view of the Bantu on the farms under this clause.

I did mention that apart from the areas where beer halls were run by municipalities there would be no control. I do not mention farms in this amendment. I mention the unreasonable brewing of beer by employer. That can take place in villages and in thousands of towns in the Republic. I discussed my amendment with legal advisers who found it difficult to frame an amendment that would provide for adequate control. I have done my best. I would like to assure the Minister that all I am aiming at is to limit the brewing of Bantu beer in areas other than municipalities that run beer halls.

I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will not accept the amendment of the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) (Mr. Streicher). Although perhaps he and the hon. member for Albany (Mr. Bowker) may be glad at having found their lost unity again, that amendment contains dangers which may make it very difficult to apply this clause. The hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) now suggests that it should be a “reasonable amount”. Let us just see what the effect of that will be. I want the hon. member to read this clause together with Clause 13, which contains certain provisos. The employer now, e.g. gives his employees the right to brew kaffir beer. The police come there and say: “That quantity which you brewed is not reasonable.” The employer and his employees say: “No, it is reasonable.” Now the hon. member wants the matter to be decided as to who is right, the employer and his workers, or the police. You will not blame me, Sir, if I say that is just as vague as everything else we are accustomed to getting from the United Party. It must always be something which can be interpreted in two ways.

You miss the whole point.

No, I do not miss the point. I miss the intention of the hon. member, but what I do not miss is the effect of what he suggests.

May I put a question? Does the hon. member know that under Clause 4 he himself can brew for domestic consumption?

Sir, I know that I can brew also. I just want to give the hon. member for Hillbrow (Dr. Steenkamp) the assurance that I am not interested in kaffir beer. He can brew it if he likes, but I will not.

You spoil matters (verbrou).

The hon. member perhaps knows more about spoiling matters than I do, and perhaps also about brewing (brou).

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the clause.

Yes, Sir, but it is very difficult to do so, in view of these interjections. The hon. member now wants to insert a restriction in the clause that it should just be a reasonable quantity. That is too vague. We now place the onus on the person who has to apply this law to determine what a reasonable quantity is. I think the hon. member’s amendment is unreasonable and I trust that the hon. the Deputy Minister will not accept it.

I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will abide by his decision not to accept the amendment, because the word “reasonable” is completely out of context— it qualifies the word “consumption”; it does not qualify the word “quantity”, as my hon. friend from Zululand (Mr. Cadman) indicated in another clause. What is reasonable domestic consumption? I suppose you must not bath in it. Yes, as my hon. friend says, it would also be wasteful. “Reasonable” in relation to “consumption” is completely out of context here and I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will not accept the amendment.

Amendments put and negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to.

On Clause 5,

In sub-section (3) the local authority shall not supply Bantu beer to any person under the apparent age of 18 years. Who is going to decide what the age of a Native is? Native youths appear the same from the age of 15 onwards. Apart from that, what disturbs me most is that the Native objects to Natives who have not arrived at maturity, according to Native custom, drinking in the same place. It is against their tribal laws, and it will certainly lead to trouble. I know of incidents where these boys who have been to the mines come back and although they have not arrived at maturity, by Native law and custom, they exert authority at gatherings and cause trouble. I think it would be unwise for Natives in beer halls who have not arrived at maturity according to Native law to be served with beer. People ask me how the age can be arrived at. If hon. members knew the Native they would know that if a young Native applied for a drink in a hall he would get a hiding. It would be generally known whether he has reached maturity or not, and if the man behind the counter has to serve a doubtful customer he would only have to ask whether this man has arrived at maturity to receive the answer. That would be easier than deciding the apparent age of 18. This is a difficult clause to amend, but I want to move the following amendment—

That is the best we could do. I have explained to the Minister what the principle behind it is, that it would be most difficult for a municipal employee to decide whether a Native is apparently 18, but there would be no difficulty in deciding whether such Native had arrived at maturity, and it would lead to the peaceful administration of beer halls.

I do not think it would be wise to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Albany, and I want to tell him why. I want to preface what I want to say by saying this first. I think the hon. member for Albany would also like to see Bantu youths not taking liquor when they are too young, but that is what we also intend and it would be unwise to accept the amendment because the age of majority of the Bantu youth is linked up with certain Bantu customs, which depend on biological and psychological changes in the Bantu, and it may be that the age of majority can be reached at an age lower than 18. So if this amendment is accepted it may be possible that a Bantu youth who has reached the age of majority according to Bantu custom will still be younger than one who is eighteen and is permitted to drink beer, and I do not welcome that. There is also another reason, namely that the age limit of 18 is the age applicable to White youths and I think it is a good thing to treat them in the same way as the White youths.

I just want to ask the hon the Deputy Minister why in sub-sec. (5) the maximum selling price of Bantu beer which may be sold by a local authority may be fixed by the various local authorities at different levels. During the second reading debate I was particularly interested by what was said by the hon. members for Brakpan and Hospital. The one said that his municipality sold it at 14 cents, and the other sold it at 20 cents. Why should there be a difference? Surely liquor has one fixed price, whether one lives in Cape Town or Johannesburg. A bottle of beer costs the same.

The sprouted grain differs in price.

Why should there be one municipality on the Rand which sells it at 14 cents and another which sells it at 20 cents?

Production costs.

Petrol also costs more in one place than in another.

I put this question so that the Minister can tell us. I cannot see how kaffir beer can be cheaper in Brakpan than it is in Johannesburg. I do not think we should have this unhealthy competition between municipalities. Take the smaller municipalities. They cannot afford to acquire these installations and will have to buy the beer from other municipalities, so why should there be this unhealthy competition? If Worcester cannot make kaffir beer, why should it be able to buy it cheaper in Cape Town than in Port Elizabeth, for example? I want the Minister to say that all municipalities must sell it at the same price.

They cannot but it for re-sale.

Naturally they can buy it from other municipalities. Why is there not a fixed price for the beer?

I should like to reply to the hon. member, because then I hope we can dispose of this also. I am surprised the hon. member asked that question. He ought to realize that there are all kinds of production and administrative factors which have to be considered when fixing the price, and we take precautions, but it is not possible to have a fixed price throughout the country. Kaffir beer is made from certain products, like sprouted grain, which does not sell the same price everywhere. It is brewed on premises the capital value of which is not the same, and by means of machinery which in some cases costs more than in other cases, and it is administered by people who do not all earn the same salaries. I can assure the hon. member that administratively the Department can control it, because all the expenditure incurred by the municipalities has to be submitted to us, and we try to keep the margin of profit as low as possible. Therefore some measures of price control is necessary. But I think the hon. member rather exaggerated the difference in prices. There is not such a great disparity in the prices charged by the various authorities. The general price level is about 2s. a gallon. The hon. member referred to unhealthy competition between municipalities, but that is not really relevant, because the Bill particularly provides for co-operation between the municipalities in regard to the supply of kaffir beer. In an unban area where there are various local authorities, it is possible for two or three local authorities to agree to buy all their beer from another authority, and provision is made for that. Some local authorities brew less beer, and that also affects the production costs. But no one need buy from the other. I said in my second reading speech that there were powders and pastes which could be purchased by local authorities and simply mixed with water to make beer. The hon. member need not be afraid of competition. Provision has been made for the co-operative supply of beer, so that there need not be competition, and there are also other methods by which small authorities can make Bantu beer cheaply.

Paragraph (3) says that the local authority shall not sell beer to a person under the apparent age of 18 years. I would like some information about the word “apparent”, because the Liquor Act, and also Clause 9 of this Bill, refer to people over the age of 18, and in the Liquor Amendment Act of last year it also refers to Natives of the age of 18 or more. So this use of the word “apparent” is a new provision and I am particularly concerned because under the existing liquor laws a good deal of abuse already exists in regard to the age limit. I have known cases where young persons of 15 and 16 have been served with liquor in bar-lounges or bottle-stores. I feel the use of the word “apparent” will loosen the control, and I think that if the word apparent was omitted it would be consistent with the existing liquor laws which say that a person shall be over 18 years. I would like some clarification in regard to the use of the word “apparent”. I know it is difficult to prove the age of a Bantu, because they do not always carry indentifying documents from which their age can be proved, but in some cases they produce their identity card or reference book, which sometimes contain an estimated age. I would like an assurance from the Minister that there will be strict implementation of the clause and I would like the Minister to omit the word “apparent”.

I think the hon. member for Umbilo (Mr. Oldfield) put forward a very good point in suggesting that the word “apparent” should be dropped. I think it is much better to have a specific age. But unlike him, on the other hand I see no difficulty at all in enforcing the provision of 18 years or older, because every Muntu in a local authority area must carry his identity book which shows his age. For that reason I am not in favour of the amendment and if the Deputy Minister amends this law, I hope it will be by dropping the word “apparent”, because even a farmer knows the ages of his Natives up to the age of 16, but after that, when they become 18, they must take out an identity book which states his age. So there should be no difficulty at all over the question of age, and I hope the Committee will not accept the amendment, but I think the word “apparent” will lead to a lot of trouble, because anyone can say that in his opinion the man is apparently 18, when he is only 14, and then it is difficult to get a conviction.

Mr. Chairman, we must read what stands in the Bill and not what does not stand there. This provision reads: “A local authority shall not sell or supply Bantu beer to any person under the apparent age of 18”. It says what the local authority shall not do, not what it may do. If a young Bantu appears at the counter and says he wants beer and the person looks and sees he is only a child, then he knows that he shall not sell to someone apparently under the age of 18, and he refuses to sell. This is a provision to make it possible for the person behind the counter to say no to the youngster, and not to say yes to the man who is over 18. He can refuse a youngster under the apparent age of 18, and I am sure hon. members will agree that in the majority of cases it is possible to judge whether such a prospective client is under the age of 18.

I do not want to delay the passage of the Bill unnecessarily. I appreciate the reply the Minister gave me. I do not agree with the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg when he says that a pass is the guarantee of the age, because he should know that many Natives say they are not 18 when they are 19 or 20. [Interjections.] I am not going to withdraw my amendment. I do not think the Committee appreciates the value of it. All my amendment aims at is the introduction of sound Bantu customs in the drinking of Bantu beer by the Bantu in Bantu drinking-halls, and that is all I have to say about it. I say it is a sound amendment which aims at maintaining Native customs.

I am rather disappointed in the Deputy Minister’s reply in regard to dropping the word “apparent”, because the onus is on the local authority whether to serve this person or not. If it is specifically stated that no person under 18 may be served, it is perfectly clear, but if we use the word “apparent”, if the person acting on behalf of the local authority is of opinion that the person is apparently over the age of 18, he might be miscalculating the age of this person. I think the use of the word “apparent” creates a loophole in the clause, and therefore I would like to move this amendment—

I support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Umbilo (Mr. Oldfield) in preference to the one moved by the hon. member for Albany (Mr. Bowker). Going by custom means that it would be impossible for the person serving that liquor to make a decision whether he is to sell the man liquor or not. According to the hon. member for Albany, it means that the youth must have reached maturity according to Bantu custom.

Does the hon. member realize that if this amendment is accepted, that young Bantu could not even enter that beer-hall? The Natives would not allow him in.

He may be the first one to enter and there is nobody else to say what age he is. In any case, you are leaving it to the Bantu themselves to decide whether the man at the counter may sell or not, and I do not think that is a practical method, but I feel that the proposal of the hon. member for Umbilo is more satisfactory. The Deputy Minister’s reply seems to assume that the man behind the counter is anxious not to supply the person who is under age, whereas obviously in most cases he would be prepared to serve everyone who came unless it was very obvious that he was under age. Then if a. dispute arises, the police may decide that he is under age and the man behind the counter will say that he was apparently 18, in his opinion, and therefore he supplied him, and then the police have not got a case, whereas if the age is fixed and as we have a passport system it would be possible for the man behind the counter, if he has any doubt, to ask this person for his passbook which would settle the issue both for the man who served and for the police.

I feel that the hon. member for East London (North) (Mr. Field) has missed the meaning of my amendment. He does not seem to realize that the amendment provides that only Natives who have attained maturity, according to Native custom, will be allowed in a hall. Juveniles would not be able to enter. They would be barred from entering and there would be no difficulty about serving those who are in the hall, because the barman would know that by the general consensus of opinion all there would be recognized as having reached maturity. But the hon. member still argues about the word “apparent” and asks how the man at the counter can tell the age of the person. I tried to put a question to him so as to indicate that the person who was not eligible would not be in that hall at all, and the administration would be much easier. Even if the Minister does not accept my amendment, I hope he will give consideration to it in the Other Place.

The difference between the hon. member for Albany and East London (North) is that the one argues from the standpoint of the detribalized Native and the other from the standpoint of the tribal Native, and I am glad that the hon. member for Albany, after having quarrelled with us for three days when we said there was no such thing as a “tribalized” Native, has now accepted it, which shows that we have persuaded him. But what the hon. member for Albany forgets is that the man who stands behind the counter does not know who is mature. [Interjection.] If they are not mature they will not come there, but the man behind the counter must decide and he must say that his apparent age is 18.

Now I come to the hon. member for Umbilo. Everywhere in our legislation dealing with the Bantu the words “apparent age” are used for the very good reason that in so far as the Bantu are concerned there is no system of registration of births in S.A. at the moment. It is not practical just to say “eighteen years”, because immediately such a person, if he is accused, can simply say that he is eighteen years and it cannot be proved that he is not eighteen years, because one does not have his birth certificate. Even if he has an identity book, he can still not be convicted in terms of this Act. We find that the words “apparent age” are used right throughout our legislation.

I may just point out that in this amendment two points are being raised: one is the abolition of the age limit of 18 years, and the other is the omission of the word “apparent I have already said something in that connection, and all I wish to add is this: Whether it is Bantu custom or not, I do not think we should reduce the legal age limit for the consumption of Bantu beer to a possible lower age than 18 years, and if we were to take into consideration the age of majority according to Native custom, it is possible that it may be under 18, and that is why I feel that we should not accept that amendment; we have to retain the age of 18 years. That is the position regarding Whites, and it already is the existing provision in the Urban Areas Act. It has been put at 18 years for years already, for the Bantu male youth. So I do not think we should change it.

Then as regards the omission of the word “apparent” as proposed by the hon. member for Umbilo (Mr. Oldfield) there are practical problems to which the hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman) has also referred. The identity book will not help us there, for the identity book does not mention the ages. The practical problem is this: As soon as you specify an exact age of 18 years, you have all those difficulties, for then you have to apply the law exactly. What is the object of such legislation as refers to the apparent age of 18 years? It simply seeks to indicate an age; it is not intended to specify an exact age to the hour and the day; it is to give an indication of the age at which you may give liquor to persons.

Amendments put and negatived.

Clause, as printed put and agreed to.

On Clause 6,

This is one of the clauses which is going to be affected by the definition of “local authority”. I would like to put the case to the Minister because he is going to bring about an injustice to certain sections of the country. Sir, in certain of the settlements that were allotted to certain immigrants who came to this country, they adopted a system where they had a small township and a far-flung distribution of farmers. Those local authorities have grown up, and they are an urban area within the meaning of the law, but under the Ordinance their functions cease at the last surveyed erven. If I may give an example, let us take Stutterheim and upper Kabusi areas which total something like 56 acres on which there must be 150 to 160 farmers. They fall within the urban local authority. What is the Deputy Minister going to do about that, because if he gives the exclusive right to the urban area to brew and dispose of beer within the urban area, it is going to affect every farmer in that section while they in fact are equal in character. I should like the Deputy Minister to give consideration to this matter. It is impossible to move an amendment here because the definition may be changed to make provision for such cases. Sir, these are not isolated cases; there are many of them. I could tell the Deputy Minister of at least 50 such areas with far-flung communal grazing systems on which we have bona fide farmers, completely rural in character. I think some provision should be made either in the definition or perhaps the Minister himself will introduce an amendment at a later stage so that we can exclude those people from the provisions of this Act.

I may just explain that of course this merely relates to local authority areas, and I may also just say that the position will be rectified if it is not yet in order. If the hon. member will refer to it once again, he will see that the clause provides that where in such sole right areas permission for home-brewing has been granted—and due notice of that has been given —that permission will continue automatically; but if a new situation should arise, where you may have such areas where those people ought to get the right, then the local authority could always take the initiative by having that sole right area converted, with our assistance, into a dual area, that is to say, into an area where the municipality brews and the individual may also brew. The necessary conversion may be made, or the sole right area may be reduced. It does not mean that the area of the municipal sole right necessarily has to include the entire area completely. The area of the sole right may be reduced to exclude that type of case to which the hon. member has referred. It is possible already.

The hon. the Deputy Minister has raised the very point that I feared. He says that the local authorities can apply for the exemption. But will the local authority not be more inclined to spread their tentacles so that they can get a greater distribution of their beer rather than to reduce their area? However, if he is prepared to take note of this item and make the necessary provision, I am quite happy.

They were very co-operative in the past.

I want to raise one or two matters on behalf of the hon. member for Port Elizabeth-Central (Mr. Dodds) who unfortunately is not here to-day. The hon. member for Port Elizabeth-Central has always taken a very keen interest in local affairs and especially in Divisional Council affairs, and according to the hon. member for Port Elizabeth-Central, Clause 6, as it reads here, means that municipalities will have the exclusive right to supply Bantu beer. According to the hon. member for Port Elizabeth-Central this will mean that some Divisional Councils, who are also regarded as local authorities in the definition clause, Clause 1, will be excluded as suppliers of Bantu beer.

Who will be excluded?

According to Clause 1, Divisional Councils are also local authorities for the purposes of this Act. The hon. member for Port Elizabeth-Central wants to know whether Clause 6 will mean that municipalities will have the exclusive right to supply Bantu beer to Natives. I think the Deputy Minister should make this point perfectly clear. You have, for example, areas in Port Elizabeth like Hankey and Bethalsdorp; these areas fall under the Divisional Council; they are excluded from the municipal area. Now, who will supply these areas; who will have the exclusive right? Will Clause 6 mean that the local authority—in this case the Municipality of Port Elizabeth— will have the exclusive right to supply Bantu beer to the Bantu people? I think the Deputy Minister should clear up on that point because the marginal note says. “Exclusive municipal supply of Bantu beer.” I think we should know where we stand in this matter as far as the Divisional Councils are concerned.

There is a matter arising out of this clause to which I should like to draw the Deputy Minister’s attention to, dealing as it does with exclusive municipal supply of Bantu beer. The situation as I see it is this, that you have your Native areas almost always on the edge of a municipal area. They will accordingly be adjacent to the free sale area. I foresee trouble in giving any municipality the exclusive right to manufacture and trade in beer, bearing in mind that adjacent to that municipal area there will be an area where they are allowed to brew domestically themselves. You are going to have the urban Natives precluded from brewing beer themselves, but they are adjacent to an area where their friends can brew themselves, and it seems to me that we are heading for trouble, if by giving a municipality the exclusive right to brew, one allows that municipality to fix the price of beer at a price substantially higher than the cost at which those Natives could brew it themselves. One can see that there are certain merits in giving certain municipalities the exclusive right to brew. One can see too that the higher the profit, the greater would be the advantage in a sense if those profits are used for the benefit of the Bantu. But if you allow that profit to be high —and the Native knows that the profit is high —if you allow it to be as high as 100 per cent, for example, as it is in Johannesburg at the present time, 100 per cent higher than the cost at which they can brew it themselves, and just a mile or two away, or very often less, all their friends are able to brew because they live outside the municipal area, then there is going to be trouble. There will be a tremendous incentive for the Natives living in the urban area to brew illicitly for their own domestic consumption because they will be able to do it at half the price charged by the municipality. I think that the difficulties can be met to a certain extent if the price charged by the municipality is fixed by the Minister at very little indeed above the cost price. It has its disadvantages in the sense that there will then be not as much revenue available, but these people are human beings and one must accept that there there will be large-scale illicit brewing in an urban area which has the exclusive right unless the price is kept as low as possible.

May I take the matter raised by the hon. member for Port Elizabeth-West (Mr. Streicher) one stage further. The provision of the clause that we are dealing with relates to the local authority of any urban area in which there is a Native Advisory Board or in which there is an urban Bantu Council. There seems to have been a certain omission in this legislation in that it does not provide for a different type of township which is controlled by Divisional Councils in the Cape.

No, it does.

I question whether the definition of “local authority” in Clause 1 extends to Divisional Councils?

It does, and it is applicable already in some cases to Divisional Councils and to the Peri-Urban Areas Board in the Transvaal.

Is the Minister satisfied therefore that it will apply to townships like Hankey and Bethalsdorp.

Yes, definitely.

May I ask the Deputy Minister if he will make that perfectly clear also with regard to the Cape Province where local authorities are very sharply divided between urban and rural local authorities. As the Deputy Minister knows, in the Peninsula one of the local authorities dealing with probably the largest Native re-settlement area is the Cape Divisional Council, a rural authority. The marginal note to this clause reads, “Exclusive municipal supply of Bantu beer,” and the clause says that “the Minister may, upon the request of a local authority for any urban area …” If you take this literally it does seem that the urban authority of the City of Cape Town would have to apply for authority to be granted to the rural authority, the Divisional Council, which has in its area a very large proportion of the Native labour force employed in the Cape Town municipal area. I think that does require some clarification. The two subsequent clauses appear to give authority for the withdrawal of the municipality’s exclusive right to supply beer and for certain other facilities to be made available by the Minister. But I think this is a point which should be made absolutely clear in view of its importance. It would seem that a suitable amendment should be inserted in the Bill itself, so as to make it absolutely foolproof, if I may put it that way, that this provision does in fact cover both the urban and rural local authorities.

I think I can satisfy the two hon. members who have raised this point. If they look at the definitions in Clause 1, they will see that “local authority” is defined there as meaning in the first instance what we ordinarily call municipalities, but in the last two lines the definition goes on to say, “any body designated as an urban local authority under Section Thirty-Nine of that Act”, that is to say, the Native Urban Areas Act. We have done this for many other purposes already. In the Transvaal the Peri-urban Areas Board and in the Cape the Divisional Councils have been acknowledged as local authorities for different purposes, and they can also be so acknowledged for the purpose of the sale of Bantu beer.

Will the Deputy Minister give consideration then to the question of amending the marginal note which talks about “municipal” supply, because they are not municipalities?

I will go into that.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 7,

This clause provides that—

This immediately suggests that there are two systems in existence already, in the first place the dual system where the municipalities already have waived that exclusive right so that brewing may also take place domestically. But the other aspect is where that exclusive right still exists. My question to the Deputy Minister is simply this: May municipalities who for instance may have gone over to the dual system, and who find in course of time that they have made a mistake in respect of their beer profits or in respect of the income, again request leave to revert to the previous system, that is to say, the exclusive right to supply Bantu beer?

They may do so, but of course one has to think twice before something like this is done, for you may always irritate many Bantu by so doing, but it can be done.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 8,

This clause is linked with Clause 6 that you have already discussed, but I should like the Deputy Minister to give an expression of opinion as to how it is proposed to prevent the illicit brewing of beer in the municipality where the exclusive right for the manufacture of beer has been given to that municipality, particularly, as I said earlier, where we have the situation that the municipality brews the beer and makes something like 100 per cent profit. One of the objects of this Bill, as I understand it, is that one wants to do away with the constant liquor raids by the police in the Native locations; quite understandably so, and I commend the Deputy Minister for having that object in view, but he is going to have that very difficulty raised again under this Bill if, having given an exclusive right to brew beer to the municipality, the Natives know very well that their rural friends may brew in their own homes at half the price at which they can buy beer from the municipality, and yet because they happen to be in an urban location they cannot brew it themselves and are forced to buy it from the monopoly, namely the municipality, at double the price at which they could brew it themselves. That seems to me to be asking for trouble, because they will brew it themselves although it will be illegal, and the only way in which you can control it is by having constant police raids. Pressure will be exerted upon the police by the municipality to stop the brewing in private houses because the municipality will be losing an important source of revenue. It seems to me that if that situation were to arise it would create one of the very difficulties that one has at present and that this Bill is designed to overcome. Naturally I do not propose moving any amendment in this regard because one knows that the municipalities enjoy this privilege at the present time and no doubt there will have to be negotiations with them, but it may necessitate some form of financial aid to the municipalities in so far as Bantu a menicipalities drastically to reduce the price of beer under the monopolies which they enjoy.

I have some sympathy with the argument of the hon. member, when we contrast it with my own statement, and the point of view of so many of us in this House, that we should Like to eliminate as far as possible the prosecutions and raids. But it simply was not possible to go the whole hog on that course. Here we have the case of the municipalities with their established capital works for the manufacture of Bantu beer, and at the request of the municipalities, too, we had to consider protecting their interests where they have the sole right. Here we shall just have to allow ourselves to be guided by experience. I do think, though, that it has appeared from our experience in the past, generally speaking, that in the Bantu residential areas in the cities and the towns, the Bantu men and women are very busy and that in many instances they gladly welcome the fact that they do not have to do domestic brewing, and that they can go to the municipal beer hall and buy as much as they require, or that they may go there to drink as much as they feel like drinking. Their daily lives are so fully occupied with so many things that they take the line of least resistance. But we shall have to allow ourselves to be guided by experience in this respect. If it appears that raids and unpleasant undertakings of that sort are still necessary on a large scale, we shall at a later stage, have to take the necessary steps but I do not think that will be necessary.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 9,

I wonder if the Minister would not consider withdrawing this clause altogether. This clause will only give the Minister a considerable amount of trouble. What I do not like about it is that it incorporates the tot system, but apart from that private brewing for employees is allowed here to an employer who has over 25 employees. It says here—

I think this is quite unnecessary. Where there is no municipal beer hall, the employer of labour can brew beer freely for his employees; that is provided for in the Bill, but why should an employer not buy from the municipality? It is very easy to purchase. I have no doubt that the Minister is going to have great difficulty. If the Minister has to approach the municipal authority, there will be objections raised immediately. It will not be easy to carry out the provisions in this clause, and it will also be very difficult to define what a reasonable quantity is. I would appeal to the Minister to accept this suggestion as to facilitate the administration of this Bill, and excise this clause from the Bill.

I do not think the hon. the Deputy Minister should withdraw this clause. We have now given the farmers the right to brew beer for their own employees. We find many employers in South Africa who have more than 25 employees. Very frequently they are very far away from the nearest town and they will have that right. For instance, I am thinking of a place such as Prieska, where there is an asbestos mine 25 to 30 miles from the town. The Bantu there are now going to get the White man’s liquor, but if this clause is to be withdrawn, they will not be able to obtain their own Bantu beer. That mine owner will have the right to have beer brewed for his employees. There are many Bantu who work until late at night, and it is very difficult for them to proceed to town from their place of employment in order to obtain other liquor. Why should an employer who is 25 miles distant from the town be permitted to brew Bantu beer in order to supply his own employees, while the employer in town is not allowed to?

It is within the municipal area.

Yes, we know it is within the municipal area, but many of these people work until six o’clock in the afternoon or later. The bottle stores are closed then, and here the employer is being permitted to brew and supply beer to his employees. I think it is a very good principle. The hon. member for Albany (Mr. Bowker) and I now have the right to give Bantu beer to our Native workers on the farm, but now the hon. member does not want us to grant the same right to a large employer in a municipal area. No, I think this clause is one of the clauses that will assist in bringing about a healthier relationship between employer and employee, and it is the sort of thing that the Native labourers want. If we were to omit this clause, we would be discriminating between the rural Native and the urban Native. We are prepared to make certain concessions to the rural Native but if we were to accept the proposal of the hon. member for Albany, we would not be prepared to make a similar concession to the urban Native. I do not believe the hon. the Minister ought to withdraw this clause.

I have allowed myself to be swayed by the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (West) (Mr. Streicher) but I should here like to emphasize something that may not have appeared quite clearly enough, and that is that this clause deals with employers who themselves house their Bantu employees. They have compounds on their places of employment, not right away in the location, and so it restricts this kind of phenomenon quite a lot, for it concerns employers who have their own compounds. If they themselves want to manufacture beer there and give it away for nothing, they may do so. I should like to emphasize that it is intended for those employers who themselves house their Bantu employees.

I would like to support the hon. member for Albany (Mr. Bowker). I cannot see any necessity for this clause. Seeing that it applies only within the urban areas, it means that Bantu beer is available from the municipal authority. I cannot imagine many employers wanting to be bothered with brewing Bantu beer. How many industrialists will want to supply this Bantu beer to their employees, and if they do want to supply it, they can get it from the municipality, and the municipality will then get a certain margin of profit out of it which will be used for the benefit of the Bantu in that area. It does seem to me to be quite unnecessary to give employers in the municipal areas the right to brew beer for their employees.

In connection with this clause, I should just like to point out that it already is an existing privilege under the Liquor Act, in terms of Section 127 (1). In this connection I should also like to refer to an instance at Pretoria, namely the great compound of Iscor, where it also is already an established right. It is impossible for those Natives, for instance, to go to the municipal beer halls; it would simply be impossible to accommodate them all there. I therefore wish to plead for the retention of this clause as it stands here.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 10,

I oppose the delegation of authority by municipalities to agents for the manufacture and sale of Native beer. I fear that it may lead to irregular practices. It may result in the selling of rights by municipalities to an agent and I do not think it is a healthy provision in this Bill.

I should just like to point out that this is a consequential amendment arising from the Liquor Act. If employers of this type who have not yet supplied Bantu beer to their employees in the past, now wish to supply hard liquor to their workers, they may in addition supply Bantu beer.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 13,

I should like to move the amendment standing on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Transkeian Territories (Mr. Hughes)—

To add the following proviso at the end of sub-section (1):

In terms of this clause, anyone wishing to be in possession of liquor at a particular place will have to obtain the permission of the owner of such place. For the sake of certainty and clarity, the hon. member for Transkeian Territories has suggested this amendment that I am moving now. I think it is a very important amendment. The position is that if the clause is left in its present state, it means that even a labourer or a non-White “bywoner” on a farm, for instance, may be in possession of Bantu beer without the consent of the owner of the land. In terms of this amendment, such a person may not be in possession of such liquor unless he has obtained the consent of the owner himself.

Why the restrictions?

Where does the hon. member now come in? I think the Minister will accept it. It is merely a formality.

I think the amendment makes for greater clarity and for that reason I am quite prepared to accept it.

Amendment put and agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and agreed to.

On Clause 18,

I want to move the amendment standing in my name—

Mr. Chairman, this is a peculiar clause. It states here—

It appears to me that in a police charge, the police can assume that any liquid perhaps found in the home of the individual who is charged, is Bantu beer. How on earth can the accused prove that it contains alcohol, because Bantu beer has to contain alcohol, otherwise it is not Bantu beer. I think to be charged under a presumption is not justice. When charged under a presumption, the accused has to prove his innocence, but how on earth is this possible under conditions of this nature? I appeal to the hon. the Minister to accept this amendment which provides that this liquid will be acknowledged as prima facie proof that it is Bantu beer on the proof that it contains alcohol. It is very easy for any policeman to prove that a liquid contains alcohol, because any chemist can furnish him with that proof. I think it is wrong that powers should be given to the police to prosecute people on a presumption.

I think it is only necessary to reply in respect of one point and that is that we only incorporate in this Bill what has been the statutory provision in the past under the Liquor Act. It is the existing practice which we simply continue.

Amendment put and negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to.

Remaining clauses put and agreed to.

The Committee reverted to Clause 1, standing over.

On Clause 1,

The hon. the Deputy Minister has now provided that all the beer that comes on to the market will have to be of a certain quality, and in terms of the definition it will have a certain alcohol content. For this reason I should like to withdraw my amendment, for there would be no sense in standardizing the other kinds of beer that are brewed in private homes. What we really want to be protected against is the beer that comes on to the market, and if the hon. the Minister proceeds with the amendment he has envisaged to standardize the beer that may be sold, the need for my amendment falls away.

With leave of the Committee the amendment proposed by Dr. A. I. Malan was withdrawn.

I move the amendment standing in my name—

I may just say that the words are superfluous, but when the Bill was revised this was inadvertently overlooked.

Question put: That the words “Bantu beer” in line 29, proposed to be omitted, stand part of the Clause,

Upon which the Committee divided:

AYES—75: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cray wagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; Diederichs, N.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Knobel, G. J.; Kotze, G. P.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, A. L; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Otto, J. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Taurog, L. B.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Webster, A.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

NOES—20: Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; de Kock, H. C.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Malan, E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Moolman, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Swart, H. G.; Thompson, J. O. N.;

Tucker, H.; Warren, C. M.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: N. G. Eaton and A. Hopewell.

Question accordingly affirmed and the amendment proposed by Mr. Warren dropped.

Amendment proposed by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development put and agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and agreed to.

The Schedule and the Title of the Bill having been agreed to,

I move—

As the hon. House knows, this Bill has had a very long history. The Bill, inter alia, went to a Select Committee and at an early stage during this Session it was also discussed. The Bill has been drafted very clearly, and so it is not necessary for me to say much about it at this late stage of the day. This Bill as proposed now is an agreed measure between myself and the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Not only did I have very long discussions with the Cape Town branch of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, but I also had lengthy discussions with the Federation of Associations for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and with very few exceptions, to which I shall draw the attention of hon. members, this measure is as agreed with the people who are directly interested in this matter, namely the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. And whilst on the subject, it is my earnest desire also to say that I have had an opportunity of visiting the clinic of the local branch at Grassy Park. I should like wholeheartedly to recommend to hon. members, if time permits them to do so, to visit that clinic, for here we are dealing with people who are rendering outstanding services and because we are dealing with a society which it is worth the trouble to support if hon. members are interested in such a society. I take the liberty of lauding these people for the splendid work they are doing for the protection of animals.

This Bill then in the main follows the Bill that came from the Select Committee, except that hon. members will notice that the provisions that really concern the Department of Agriculture have been omitted from the present Bill, as well as the provisions in respect of the protection of animals that really resort under the Department of Education in so far as experiments at universities and other institutions are concerned. The latter provisions have also been deleted from this Bill. That is as a result of the fact, as I have previously explained to hon. member, that my task and functions are merely to deal with the ordinary protection of animals, and it is not my task and my function to introduce legislation in respect of abattoirs and cognate matters, or to interfere in university spheres as far as experiments are concerned. That is why this Bill is now in the form in which it is printed here. Hon. members will recall that in the other Bill there was also a principle in respect of private prosecutions. That principle has not been included in this Bill. I may tell hon. members that the Federation of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals fully approves of that principle not being included in it. Hon. members will note that the principle whereby the Societies would receive half the fines has also been omitted from this Bill, although it was included in the old one. The Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals also no longer desires to have that principle in the Bill. That is a principle we cannot readily concede, that people who are concerned in a matter, who have the benefit of it, should prosecute people in the courts and then receive half the fines. But the Societies there agree with me that this is not a principle that ought to be in this Bill. In case hon. members perhaps presume that we are now depriving these Societies of a large proportion of their revenue, I may give hon. members the assurance that is not so. If my memory serves me correctly, for instance, the Cape Town Society last year derived only the sum of R55 from this whole source, and it certainly is not worth while incorporating such a dangerous principle in any law for the sake of such a negligible amount. That the So-officials of those Societies was also discussed, this matter at the commencement of this Session, the principle of entrusting powers to officisl of those Societies was also discussed, and hon. members will recall that I expressed myself rather strongly on that matter as being a very dangerous principle. I readily concede that it is a principle one should rather not have if it can be done without. But after my discussions with the Societies and after my discussions with the police and other persons, I am satisfied that the type of person who has been appointed as an official of these Societies in the past is the type who may be trusted with these powers. I am satisfied further that these people have not abused their powers in the past, and that there has been no reason to complain about it. Adequate provision is made in the Bill also to withdraw those powers if there is any reason to believe that the powers are in fact being abused. But I should like to state very clearly that the Society has satisfied me completely, not only that the powers have never been abused as yet, but the Society also impressed me greatly with the point they made to the effect that their work will be rendered powerless to a very large extent if their officials do not have those powers. Because it is so, I gave those Societies an undertaking that I would restore those powers and hon. members will find them in this Bill again.

I have referred hon. members to the fact that I have had discussions with the Federation, and that they made certain suggestions to me, the majority of which I have incorporated in this Bill. One of the things they asked me to do I said I did not see my way clear to doing, because it is not my function to do so. It concerns the various motor ordinances of the various provinces. The Societies asked me to amend it. To mention the Cape Province, for instance, hon. members will know that it is an offence for a person to run over an animal on a public road and not do the necessary reporting, etc. But in the ordinances of the Provinces that have been passed comparatively recently, it is expressly provided that a dog is not an animal for the purposes of that particular section of the ordinances. In other words, it is not necessary to stop when you have run over a dog. The Societies expressed their view to me that it is our duty to amend those ordinances in this Bill so that a man should also be compelled to stop when he has collided with a dog. My point of view was that it is not my function and, as I had not had the time to consult with the Provincial authorities, and that had I started consultations with them, this Bill would not have been introduced during this Session, that I could rightly adopt the attitude that it is not my function to amend the provincial ordinances. It is the function of the Societies to make representations to the various provincial authorities to amend their ordinances as they think fit. I think we understand one another on that point now, that I cannot be expected to do so under these circumstances.

However, further representations were made to me by these Societies subsequently. If hon. members will look at Clause 2, they will find that in Clause 2 of the Bill the offences are provided for what one may not do in respect of an animal. It commences at 2 (a), which provides that you may not overload or overwork an animal. It is remarkable that nobody has ever thought of doing that as far as people are concerned, particularly not with us in this hon. House, in order that we should not overwork ourselves, but nobody worries about that. Hon. members will find, if they look at Clause 2, that we have covered just about every possible transgression that may be committed. However, the Societies made representations to me, and when we reach the Committee Stage, I shall move the necessary amendments, that in practice they are finding that when they charge a person with having neglected or ill-treated an animal, or when they find an animal in a state of ill-treatment and charge the owner of the animal, the defence of such a person is that it is no longer his animal and that he has relinquished his ownership in respect of the animal. You may of course relinquish your ownership of an animal, and if when you are charged you at that stage come along with the story that you have relinquished your ownership in respect of the animal, you cannot be convicted in a court of law. Now they are finding in practice that in many instances where a person is charged, especially among certain sections of the population, he simply raises the defence that it was his animal or his dog, but he relinquished his ownership in respect of the animal on such-and-such a date—a date just prior to the charge of cruelty—and then he walks out a free man. I shall therefore move a provision at the Committee Stage, apart from the various provisions of Clause 2, as follows:

That will then cover the cases that the Societies have informed me they frequently come across in practice. I also know of other hon. members who will be proposing futher additions to Clause 2 when we reach the Committee Stage, when we shall consider the proposed additions on their merits.

Mr. Speaker, in view of the history of this measure and the clarity with which it is drafted, and the fact that it is an old law that is merely being brought up to date, I do not think I can be expected at this late stage of the afternoon to say anything further, and I accordingly move.

The hon. the Minister in introducing the Bill has rightly said that this was a measure which has received a great deal of consideration. It has been considered by a Select Committee and subsequently certain aspects of it have been dealt with by an interdepartmental committee of the departments concerned with certain clauses of the Bill. I would personally like to express my appreciation to the hon. the Minister for the manner in which he has met the representations made to him by the various animal welfare associations to which the hon. the Minister has referred. Some of those representations have been, what one might call, specialized representations. Those organizations have been established with the specific object of protecting animal life and of preventing cruelty to animals. I was particularly pleased that the Minister paid tribute to the S.P.C.A.D. animal welfare home at Grassy Park. I know the place well; I have been there very often and I share the Minister’s views with regard to the magnificent service which they do there, particularly in view of the fact that service is largely a service of love. I agree with the Minister that Grassy Park well merits a visit by anyone, not only by Members of Parliament but anyone who has animal welfare at heart. I think it is an example which you can take as reflecting the general standard in which the people of South Africa as a whole see to the welfare of their animals. There are similar institutions all over the country and their sole purpose is to look after our dumb friends on whose service we depend in many respects.

The Minister also said that there were certain aspects of animal welfare which were dealt with in the various Bills which were previously before this House but which were not proceeded with, aspects of animal welfare which fall outside the scope of this Minister’s Department and which, for that reason and probably for other technical reasons, have not been included in the Bill now before us. One is perhaps sorry that the Minister has not been able to go a little bit further in some of these directions, but at the same time one appreciates the obstacles which the Minister faces in that regard and accepts, that with this Bill, one is laying down an animal charter, a step, which considered in conjunction with the times we are living in and the changes which have been effected to our original animal welfare legislation, is a step forward and must go very far towards assisting not only the welfare animal organizations but our own police and other authorities on whom the responsibility for maintaining animal welfare lies.

The hon. the Minister mentioned that it was not found possible—and he gave his reasons —to incorporate the condition which was laid down in previous legislation whereby in certain circumstances the animal welfare associations received a certain percentage of the fines which were levied at prosecutions. I am inclined to agree with the hon. the Minister, perhaps not only for the same reason he mentioned, that it is not a good principle. To me it is similar to local authorities receiving a portion of the fine imposed for motor offences. There is a certain amount of incentive to make crime if you make some financial gain from tracing it. I do not think that is a good principle in any law. I know from discussions with the societies that for a long, time they have to a large extent disregarded this aspect and that the amount of income which they derived from it was negligible and could easily be discounted, particularly as far as the Cape is concerned. I understand it is slightly larger in other parts of the country but even there, as the Minister has said, the societies have accepted that particular condition should be left out of the Bill. The other benefits which will flow from this Bill in regard to the welfare of animals, to my mind, far outweigh anything that is lost in that respect in other words, the societies have no objection to this particular withdrawal.

I appreciate the reasons which the Minister has given for not having found it possible to deal with what is probably a pet obsession of my own with regard to the question of a dog being injured by a motor vehicle on the road. Again I understand the hon. Minister’s reason. It is a matter which is dealt with in provincial ordinances. It seems to me a decided flaw which exists in the Cape Ordinance at any rate. I appreciate the Minister’s attitude that he cannot interfere with what other government bodies are doing but that it is a matter for the various societies to make representations to the provincial authorities so that particular weakness can be remedied, because a weakness it certainly is, Sir.

On reading the Bill I think that it does help to minimize the fact that such a proviso regarding injury to a dog does not appear in the Provincial Ordinances. Clause 2 (1) (a) of this Bill reads—

Now, when you run a dog over with your motorcar you definitely maim that animal. It seems to me that although it is not possible to go all the way in providing that the motorist must stop and report, this implies that the man who runs over any animal, including a dog, will be liable to prosecution for having maimed an animal.

I wonder whether the Minister will clear up this particular point when he replies.

If he does not kill the dog, it it is possible that he will fall under this clause.

The animal may die eventually but in many cases, it remains in a state of suffering for quite a long time. So it does seem to me that this Bill does to a considerable extent remedy the weakness which existed previously.

I know the Minister has also had representations made to him with regard to certain other features of the Bill. I know in an earlier Bill it was made an offence to release a dog for the purpose of attacking any other animal, and I know the jackal and other vermin clubs were very worried about that. But that is now provided for, I take it, in sub-section (g) of Clause 2 which lays down that hounds trained for this purpose are exempt from the conditions of this clause.

I regard this Bill as one of those measures which we are pleased to have before us, a measure which we can approach on a non-party basis. This is, I think, to a very large extent an agreed measure. It seems a coincidence that we have been dealing with two such measures to-day, perhaps for widely divergent reasons. I believe also that a Bill of this nature, a Bill in which we are laying down our creed in regard to the protection of our animals, is to a very large extent the yardstick which can be applied when judging the standard of civilization which we have reached. It is our duty to look after the animals which the Almighty has committed to our care. As compared with the legislation in other countries, I think this Bill goes very far to establish our standards as far as animal welfare is concerned, as very high. As far as the public’s standard in general is concerned, in dealing with its animals, I think I can say without fear of contradiction, that the Minister will find that the public in general will appreciate the placing of this Bill on the Order Paper and its eventual translation into the law of the land.

As the Minister has explained, the Bill before us has for various legitimate reasons, had to be limited, to deal with certain sections of control. At the moment it does not include the section which was previously suggested dealing with the control of the experimental use of animals for scientific purposes. I know it is a very touchy subject to some people but I do hope that the stage is not too far distant when it will be found possible to lay down a code there too. I believe a code is necessary in respect of the treatment of all animals, irrespective of who is dealing with them, whether they are universities or other scientific people or not. Where a certain amount of suffering must be accepted as part of the work which is being done for the general welfare of humanity as a whole, that suffering should be limited to the absolute minimum.

The Bill to some extent, although one hopes later to see it go further, covers certain unsatisfactory aspects which have existed with regard to the treatment of our domestic animals who. by virtue of the standard of living which we have adopted—not only ourselves but the whole world—are used for human consumption. As the hon. the Minister knows there has been wide and valid criticism of the manner in which these animals are sometimes treated both in the course of transport and during the period of hold-over before slaughtering takes place. The number of animals which arrive at an abattoir may be beyond the capacity of that abattoir and there have been severe strictures on the lack of food, the lack of water and the lack of shelter at those abattoirs. I am pleased to see that there are general provisions in this Bill, not directly applicable to abattoirs but to the country as a whole, but which to a fairly considerable extent will make it possible to see that those weaknesses are remedied. Because there too I feel that if animals are necessary for our feeding, then it is imperative that we see to it that they are subjected to the least possible amount of such suffering. The very work which is done at an abattoir must inherently bring about a certain amount of suffering, even if it is only psychological fear and suffering, to an animal and I think it is up to us to see that suffering is limited to the utmost extent. This is one of the aspects amongst others which does not fall under this hon. the Minister but under his colleague, the hon. the Minister of Agricultural Economics and Marketing. I know the agricultural community of this country well enough to know that they themselves would be the very first to help to build up a code to prevent any injury and any unnecessary suffering of the animals with which they have to work. I hope it will not be very long there also, the same as with medical science, that we will have it reduced to a code applicable to the whole country, and that animal life will be protected in all its aspects.

I wish to draw one further aspect to the Minister’s attention, something which he may consider in any future animal protection legislation which he may be contemplating. I refer to the training of animals for performance in the various circuses and other shows. The Bill does provide that no goading or cruelty should accompany that training, but there are certain facets in that regard which I think need re-examination. You only have to see the difference between a wild animal in its natural state in one of our large game reserves and the same type of animal in captivity, under the best conditions which it is possible to keep them in captivity, to realize the loss which the animal himself has sustained by having been transferred from the freedom of its wild state into captivity. I believe, there too, we should limit as far as possible the loss and suffering which such an animal sustains. We find the same position in the case of human beings, the difference between a free human being and the one in captivity. One of the features which has occupied the public’s mind to some extent over the past year or two has been where members of the public by some chance or other acquire in a very young state an animal whose normal life cycle is in the wilds, the leopard for example Whilst they are cubs they are regarded as playthings but when they grow a little bit older they become a nuisance. We had a case in the Peninsula quite recently where eventually the neighbours complained that such an animal had become a menace to the surrounding public. The animal was taken away in babyhood from its natural surroundings and brought up in all the unnatural surroundings of civilization and treated on quite a different basis to its natural state. When it grows up a home must be found for it and it is often very difficult to find a suitable home. That animal eventually has to be pushed out into the wilds or semi-wild to live under conditions which we ourselves have made completely foreign to the animal itself. I believe that is a type of cruelty and I think we should have more stringent control over the keeping of wild animals as pets. Because in regard the larger animals they will eventually outgrow that pet stage of their life and they are thrown back into conditions and circumstances which we have made foreign to them. There may not be many such cases, Sir, but they do occur. We have had them all over the country. There are private zoos and people who have seen them must in general often have been struck by the complete absence of comfort, the complete absence of exercise and the cramped and unnatural conditions under which those animals have to live. I notice that the Bill covers certain of those features. I think this is one of the things which we must explore to see how far we can go in that direction.

Mr. Speaker, we on this side of the House are going to support the Bill. Other speakers may deal with, I will not say weaknesses, but perhaps little encroachments on the liberty of some particular body or other, but by and large we accept this Bill. We give it our blessing and we hope that not only will this Bill be translated into law soon as an up-to-date charter for animal welfare in our country but that it will as soon as possible be followed up by the other supplementary Bill which will be necessary to deal with the other facets of animal welfare which it has not been possible to incorporate in this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, any lover of animals and persons in general who are interested in animals, I am convinced, are in favour of the protection of animals and will do their best to protect animals as far as possible. There is certainly nothing which hurts one so much and makes one think sometimes of what steps one can take to protect animals than to see how animals are treated injudiciously and are harmed and hurt. Therefore, one is glad that there are private individuals who devote their time and money and go out of their way to protect animals. But, Sir, when we think about this matter in general and we come to legislation which we generally welcome, there are considerations we have to bear in mind. Here we have legislation introduced by the Minister, for which we are grateful. We are glad that the major portion of the old legislation is being reviewed and brought up to date, but we must realize that this legislation will be limited, and particularly will it have a limited effect in two directions. The first is that the implementation of this measure will be subject to the steps taken by the police. In the second place, private associations are being introduced, which I accept will be registered associations, and if we bear that in mind the thought comes to mind that this Bill provides what one cannot exactly define as a condemnation or an abuse, but something which is subject to human judgment. Then one feels that one can land in trouble here and that there are people, even the greatest animal-lovers—that in terms of this legislation there is hardly a single person who cannot land in trouble at some time or other. And if one has full confidence in the Police Force, which is subject to its higher officers, sworn persons, who must handle it, one knows that they will use their commonsense in judging whether a crime has been committed, and one has no objection to that. But I think that it is dangerous for private persons to be appointed by an organization, as the clause provides, even though it is done on the recommendation of a magistrate on the recommendation of such an organization. One asks oneself what judgment such a private person will use, and whether he will not get people into trouble unnecessarily. I trust that the Minister will allay all our fears in this regard, that malpractices will not take place here, and that there will be no convictions when the case has normally been handed over to the police. Allow me just to mention a few of the points in regard to which I have doubts.

I begin with Clause 2, the overloading of an animal. When is an animal overloaded? That person must now judge whether the animal is overloaded, and if it is done in the normal way by the police, who are subjected to the discipline of higher officers, who will take this step and say: You must continue with this case, or not … But we should like to know from the Minister, where this is left to an individual appointed by an animal organization, who will judge whether this man’s judgment was correct and whether that animal was overloaded.

The next is overtiring an animal. That is a very wide term, depending on the animal’s condition and on the judgment exercised by the person. An animal may easily be able to do three miles at that speed, but it may be in poor condition so that it will become tired sooner than it otherwise would and that would be an offence. But I go further. “Over-drive an animal”. What does that mean? That is in (a). I see in (i) a distinction is made and it says “shall drive or use any animal which is so diseased or so injured or in such a physical condition that it is unfit to be driven or to do any work”. In other words, here there is a difference. First it says that one may not drive the animal, but in (i) it says one may not drive an animal which is unfit. Now there must be a person who must use his human judgment, and one is subjected to the judgment of that person, who has to decide whether one will be prosecuted or not.

I want to refer to another one—tying up an animal, or injuring that animal. That is just as wide a term. Supposing a farmer loads a number of cattle into a truck and they arrive in Cape Town with all kinds of injuries. The animals have been injured. Now some person will decide whether that man is to be prosecuted. I admit that there is a proviso here, providing that all reasonable precautions have been taken to prevent such a provision, but a very wide discretion is left to that person. I think now of an animal which pulls in harness. It depends how that animal is pulling on that particular day. His chest may be chafed. It depends on the way he pulls in that harness on that day, and the man will now be guilty of an offence if that animal is hurt. I would like to refer to the matter referred to by the hon. member for Simonstown, (g), which refers to dogs maintained by a duly established and registered vermin club and training them to exterminate vermin, and to liberate an animal in such a way that it will immediately be exposed to attack by wild animals, or to incite an animal to attack another animal. Mr. Speaker, this clause is quite unacceptable to any farmer. There is a big difference between the type of dog mentioned here which is kept in a city and a dog which is kept on a farm. Here dogs are kept as pets mostly by people who have nothing else to do. On a farm it is quite different. There the dogs have to work. Those dogs are used. But those animals run the risk of being hurt. Supposing this clause is accepted and I keep dogs which do not belong to a hunt club, but I keep them specially to catch jackals on my farm or monkeys which destroy my lands, and I incite that dog to catch the monkey and the monkey hurts the dog and severs its jugular vein and it bleeds to death, as has already happened, I would be guilty of a crime. Or if a jackal attacks the dog, as often happens when they fight, and the dog gets hurt, and I do not belong to a hunting club, I have committed a crime. But we even use dogs to go and fetch cattle which have run away, and when once the dog has gone to turn off such a beast, that beast will soon return to the kraal, but the dog runs the risk of being hurt by the animal. Or take a horse. One may not make an animal angry, and it has often happened that an ox becomes angry and gores the stomach of the horse and the horse dies. Then it is a crime. I hope the Minister can assist us there. Perhaps he will say that is what is contained in the old Act, but an Act is there to be amended. If former generations have passed Acts which are defective and we get the opportunity to remedy them, we must use that opportunity. Surely we do not want to have an Act which makes every person feel that he is committing a crime when he is just leading a normal life.

You should read the definition of “animal”, and you will see that you are quite wrong.

Any farmer who handles animals may contravene the Act. The Bill applies severe penalties, and we are now allowing officials of that association—I accept that it is necessary to do so because the police cannot devote all their time to it—to take action where animals have been maltreated, and it is right that they should be protected, but here we now allow an association to appoint a person. He is appointed with the consent of the magistrate, but his powers will be exercised by that person and the Bill does not provide that this person should be under oath or subjected to any restrictions and he can enter any premises without a warrant and arrest a person. I think the Minister himself has some qualms about this Bill, in regard to certain matters contained in it, because he makes special provision to prevent vindictive people from taking steps. That is in Section 9. And if malicious complaints are made, those people will be found guilty of a crime. In other words, it seems to me that the Minister himself is not so sure that there cannot be abuses. Therefore we do not feel quite happy about all the aspects of this Bill, although we welcome it and we all feel that there should be legislation to protect animals and that it should be made as stringent as possible, but one does not want to expose people in general to prosecution. I also accept that a Bill like this is subject to human judgment, but then one must limit that human judgment to people over whom one has authority and who are trained and who are under oath and are subject to special restrictions, so that one has confidence that they will not come to the wrong judgment. I hope the Minister can remove our doubts and pass the Bill in a better form than the one in which it is at present.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure there is not a person in this House or outside it who is not glad that this Bill is being introduced to protect animals, modernized as it is and with the additional clauses. If he has a warm heart for animals he will be glad. But I would like to point out, and the Minister did not refer to it in his introductory speech, that in the definition in Clause 1 (i) we find reference to a bird or a wild animal or reptile kept in captivity. I want to point out that there have been great changes since the time the original legislation was introduced and that, in so far as our game is concerned, many of us have become protectors of game, and that it is necessary to catch the game if one wants to spread them or to ensure their propagation, and one does not just want to shoot the game. This one finds in Clause 2 (i) (a) where the words “terrify, torture or maim” appear, in regard to the distribution of game, and I want to allege that neither the Provincial Administration nor the Parks Board nor the individual farmer on his farm, under the circumstances in which we have to do it to-day, can catch wild animals for distribution without making himself guilty of the contravention of a whole series of the provisions of this Bill. There are only two or three methods we use. The one is to make camps in which to catch the game, and the other is to chase a wild animal on horseback, or else to chase it with a lorry or a jeep in an attempt to catch it, and all of them contain a certain element of cruelty—not that it is less cruel to shoot them. But many of us are no longer inclined to do that, and we would rather preserve the game on our farms, which are now present in large numbers, particularly in the Karoo, where over a period of years the preservation of game has continued, with the result that to-day there is more game in the Karoo than there was 25 years ago. In order to catch this game for distribution, it is very difficult not to be cruel to the animals, because they have to be chased into camps and they are injured and break their legs, or else they are chased until they become exhausted. Every method contains a certain measure of cruelty, and the Administration or person ought to be guilty of cruelty in terms of this Bill. I want to appeal to the Minister particularly to see whether a clause cannot be inserted in the Bill, or whether an exception cannot be made in this regard. But when I do that, I am not pleading that we should continue to be cruel to animals. We will always have game in this country. This is the country with the most game, and the person who loves animals would rather see them preserved than shot. I want to plead that particular research should be done in this regard to see what methods can be evolved and what drugs can be used to catch the game without being cruel. The present method available to us is almost as primitive as the bow and arrow. It is a spring gun, but its effective range is not more than 25 or 30 yards, and a farmer who has hundreds of springbok or blesbok on his farm and who wants to reduce their numbers, who wants to sell a few or give them to his friends, finds it difficult to do so with the methods available to us and the methods evolved here. In parenthesis I want to say that this research must be done here because there is no other country which has as much game as South Africa. Research should be done to see whether a better method cannot be evolved, and I want to suggest that it should take the direction that whereas to-day one can buy air-guns with an effective range of 200 to 300 yards and which makes no noise—they are not allowed to be sold in this country—research should be done in regard to finding a tranquiliser which can be put on to the bullet so that at a distance of 200 or 300 yards one can quietly tranquilise buck in order to distribute them.

I have already said that we will always have game. We are fond of our game. We have large game reserves of which we are proud. They earn foreign currency for us and attract thousands of tourists to this country. Perhaps it is one of our greatest attractions for tourists, and we are proud of our various species of game. In passing, I just want to say that so long as we want to live together with game and domestic animals, so long will we have external parasites and the spreading of diseases, and so long will we need to have the best research in the world. It cannot be otherwise. If one has uncontrolled movement of animals which are the bearers of the external parasites which spread the diseases, it is obvious that one has to do the best research in the world in order to control those external parasites. That brings me to the most important clause in this Bill, Clause 2 (e), which says that it will be an offence if the owner of an animal allows that animal to become infested with parasites and does not provide veterinary or other treatment, within his means, for such an animal. The penalties are fairly heavy. For years now the farmers of this country, and in particular the S.A. Agricultural Union, and also the Woolgrowers’ Association, have been pleading for legislation in regard to dipping for ticks and other external parasites like sheep lice and the Australian lice, and we have never yet succeeded in obtaining legislation to make dipping compulsory. Now we see a special provision in the Bill which says that it will be an offence to allow an animal to have too many external parasites, and the penalties are fairly strict. We welcome these new clauses, because, even though they are not directly concerned with the compulsory dipping of our animals, they are concerned with it indirectly, because one is not allowed to allow this animal with its external parasites to move around and to cause suffering. I just want to mention—and I am more au fait with the sheep farming industry than with the cattle industry—that the damage done by sheep lice to the wool clip of South Africa is estimated at between R3,000,000 and R4,000,000 a year. What should be done to combat it I do not know, and I do not know what it costs us, but it must be millions of rand. I am always surprised that a country which has a wonderful clip like ours, which has a high reputation for its quality, allows its good name to be besmirched by the fact that a percentage of the wool is spoilt to such an extent by sheep lice that even in the washing process it gives the wool a blue tint. That is why we are so glad that a new method has now been evolved in these clauses, and the only methods as far as we know which has been adopted over the years, which although it does not provide for the compulsory dipping of animals, at least provides that the person who allows an animal to be infested with external parasites can be punished. We are very glad to see that in the Bill, and these penalties in regard to the presence of external parasites are very welcome. At last the farmers now see a new clause in this Bill which not only gives us some measure of protection, and in terms of which we must keep free from external parasites not only our domestic animals and the animals on our farms, but which also enables us to reduce to a large extent the carriers of disease, the external parasites in the case of wild animals, if we are compelled to disinfect our domestic animals. I am certain that every right-thinking person in this House will welcome this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, perhaps it is quite fitting that it so happens that I am the one to congratulate the hon. member for East London (City) (Dr. Moolman), who has just made his maiden speech here, because there are people who think that I am the person who is responsible for the hon. member being here instead of in the Wool Board. [Laughter.] The hon. member for East London (City) has a wide knowledge of agriculture and of animals. We know that he is a lover of game, as he also showed in his speech to-day, and we are glad that the hon. member has come here to implement the ranks of his party, where there is such a scarcity of people who can talk authoritatively about these matters. I do not wish at this stage already to start correcting the hon. member; there will still be many opportunities for that. I want to give the hon. member the assurance that this place, however friendly it might have appeared to him this afternoon, can sometimes be quite cruel in its actions, and even though sometimes people who catch game may ill-treat their animals, if this were not his maiden speech hon. members might have pointed out to him that this Bill deals only with game kept in captivity. But that is only in passing. We hope and trust that the hon. member will have a long and fruitful career here, and that his practical knowledge of animals and their protection will be to the benefit of the Republic.

Now, to come to the Bill itself, the hon. the Minister correctly stated that this Bill has travelled a long road. It is not necessary to cover that field again. I want to point out that in 1957 a Select Committee was appointed which considered all these details Now it was significant to me that hon. members who spoke this afternoon very soon raised certain objections to the Bill. You might also very correctly have stated, Sir, that those objections could be dealt with in the Committee Stage, and that possibly amendments could be moved there. However, I just want to refer to a few of the objections raised here to-day which are not relevant to the Bill at all. I refer to the hon. member for Christiana (Mr. Wentzel). The hon. member referred here to Clause 2 (1) (g). His objection was that it would only be the farmer who is a member of a hunt club who will now be allowed to incite hounds to catch certain animals. But the hon. member did not read the clause correctly. The Select Committee which was appointed to consider this Bill investigated all these matters. The position is that there are people who keep an animal in a cage and then they call a number of dogs. That animal becomes very nervous and frightened, and then they open the cage and set the dogs on to the animal. It is in order to make that illegal that this clause has been inserted. It is not intended to deal with the cases where vermin are legally eradicated. I want to point out—and that applies also to the hon. member for East London (City)—that the application of this clause, as proposed here, is subject to certain provisos to the effect that any action taken must be justified. But I do not intend dealing with the details of this Bill now. I want to agree that one cannot instil love for an animal in anybody’s heart. I want to put it this way. One can no more compel a mother by legislation to love her own child, than one can force anybody to love an animal if he does not have an inborn love for animals.

May one love a little wolf?

I should have liked to react to that remark, but the hon. member’s interjection is open to misunderstanding and I think under the circumstances I will desist from doing so.

I say that one cannot force anybody by lesiglation to love animals, but what one can in fact do is to point out their misdeeds to them if they maltreat animals, whether they do so because they have no love for them, or whether it is as the result of negligence, or whether it is for some other reason. We who love animals simply cannot realize for what reasons people maltreat animals. But we must point out their misdeeds to those people. Sometimes there are cruel people who lose their temper and cruelly ill-treat animals. That is the type of person who must be prosecuted, and when hon. members object here and say that it is difficult to institute compulsory dipping to eradicate all parasites, and to ensure that animals always have enough grazing even in times of drought, then I want to say that I do not believe that this is the object of this Bill, in such cases to burden people with a difficult task which they cannot perform. I am sure no court will ever convict anybody and punish him if he has committed an offence as the result of circumstances beyond his control. I do not think it is necessary for me to expand on this and to say what I mean when I talk about circumstances beyond one’s control. If we look at the various clauses of this Bill, there is much which can cause trouble to us. We can, for example, even say: What about the farmer who brands his animals; is he not torturing them? I want to say that this Bill excludes all those legal actions which are done in a decent and civilized manner. But there might also be a farmer who brands an animal in a cruel manner, not necessarily through ignorance alone, but in many cases deliberately, so that action must be taken against him, and therefore I am glad that this Bill provides that such a person can be dealt with.

Mr. Speaker, it is already late. I do not want to detain the House too long. We are glad that this Bill has been introduced. We hope that further chapters will also be introduced in the near future. I refer particularly to the chapter which provides for the manner in which animals have to be treated at the abattoirs. I think that is one of the places where we who love animals quickly see how animals are maltreated. I need only think of our experience of the local abattoirs.

Order! That is not relevant now.

No, I will not say anything irrelevant, but I just want to point out that certain things are so repeatedly done in regard to animals that we often do not appreciate that it is maltreating those animals. I think hon. members will be interested to hear what happened one afternoon in Hout Bay to the wife of one of our members of Parliament. She arrived there and stood watching the Coloured fishermen selling crawfish. The crawfish were still fairly lively. One could see that they were still alive. She came from the Free State where there are no crawfish andshe then asked them: How do you fishermen kill these things? The reply was: We put them into boiling water and then they die. The woman then said: Is that not terribly cruel? The reply was: Ag, Madam, they are so used to it that they do not even notice it any more. That is what it amounts to, that animals are sometimes maltreated in a way to which we have already become accustomed. This Bill now makes it possible for us to point out to those people who make themselves guilty of such things that we expect them at least to act in a decent and civilized manner in regard to animals. I welcome this Bill, and I want to conclude by saying that the country should be grateful for what has been done by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and for what it is still doing to bring these matters to the notice of the people of South Africa.

I think the hon. member for Simonstown (Mr. Gay) came very near the mark when he said that any country might perhaps be judged by the standard of its care for its dumb creatures which it has to protect and the degree of care that it shows for them. The hon. member thanked various organizations and people and thanked the Minister for having come forward with this Bill. Sir, I want to thank the hon. member for the part that he has played. As the hon. the Minister has said, there is a long history attached to this measure, and one of the people who has played a part in that long history has been the hon. member for Simonstown. I think it was probably a very happy day for him to be able to-day to speak first on our side to indicate our acceptance of the principles of this Bill when he was replying to the introductory speech of the hon. the Minister.

The hon. member for Simonstown did deal particularly with one aspect which he felt was a point that was missing from the Bill, and that is the point mentioned by the Minister in his introductory speech. I refer to the question of injury to dogs by traffic on the roads. The Minister, I think quite wisely, indicated that he had felt that this was not a task which was placed upon his shoulders but that it was for the various Provincial Administrations to deal with it. I would say to the hon. member for Simonstown that if it is a hiatus in the laws here in the Cape, in the Provincial Administration Ordinances, that is not the case in some of the other provinces. In Natal we have had a provision in the law for a considerable time which makes it obligatory for a person who runs down a dog on the road to stop to find out who is the owner and to take any such measures as may be necessary to deal with the animal if it is left in pain. We have found that provision of the law works very well indeed. I mention that just in passing.

Before coming to some specific clauses in the Bill, I would like to mention that I would like to move an amendment in the Committee Stage, which I hope will appear on the Order Paper in due course, to deal with one aspect of the Bill in regard to a clause which I would like to insert in Clause 2 as a new paragraph (k), and that is to deal with the question of the trapping of animals. It is a curious thing that in our laws and in quite a number of statutes provision has been made by the provinces for it to be illegal for persons to be found in possession of traps, snares, nooses and so forth. I wonder sometimes whether if all the cruelty which is practiced from time to time, intentionally, thoughtlessly and deliberately, simply because it is less trouble that way, could be assessed in terms of some particular standard, it would not amount to at least the equal of all forms of cruelty which are inflicted on our animals by chance or mischance or deliberately. I know I have the Minister’s sympathy and more than his sympathy here, so I am going to be brief in dealing with this particular matter. But I want to move an amendment, when the Committee Stage comes, to make it illegal to sell such applicances, because while the laws to-day make it illegal to have them, there is nothing to prevent anybody from having them for sale. You can sell them as long as you are not found in possession of them for an illicit purpose.

Is it being sold?

Yes, it is sold openly, and that to my mind is how illogical it is that you say to a man who is found in possession of a trap under various provincial laws then he must prove that he is using it for some specific lawful purpose—which is obviously impossible—but you do not prevent the dealer from selling appliances openly. The intention of this amendment will be to prevent the sale of such appliances, unless the person concerned, i.e. the seller, shall have a licence from the magistrate. Where people are concerned with jackal, rooikat and that sort of thing, where it is necessary to have some kind of trap, they can then make out a case to the magistrate in exactly the same way as a person who wants to get a firearm. He will have to make a case and show that he is a responsible person, and the magistrate must be satisfied prima facie that is the only way of dealing with the matter and then he can issue a permit. In this way then the door will not be completely closed to those who are making innocent use of these contrivances at the present time. Sir, I have letters here which I do not propose to quote from a wild life organization and other bodies supporting this proposal very strongly indeed.

Sir, to come to one or two of the clauses in the Bill itself, may I say that in the main I have little to object to. I know that these clauses will be said to be restrictive by some hon. members, and I realize that; you cannot deal with the question of suffering amongst animals without restricting somebody’s activities somewhere. Sir, I am the last person in the world to pay a tribute to a Nationalist Minister, but I want to say to the Minister that I think that here he has steered a course between Scylla and Charybdis, between the people who would have gone the whole hog the one way or the whole hog the other way, and he has brought to the House what I believe will be found to be more or less a generally acceptable measure, and on an issue of this kind, and even taking into account the long discussions that have gone on in the years behind us, I must admit that from time to time I have thought that in a measure of this kind it would have been virtually impossible to bring a measure here which would not be the subject of the strongest controversy, but I think the Minister has done it. I say to him that I am pleased that he has been able to introduce a measure which I believe will have little controversy attached to it in the debate here in Parliament. I should like to say a few words in connection with Clause 2 (1) (1) dealing with the conveying and carrying of animals under such conditions or in such a manner or position as to cause that animal unnecessary suffering, or in conditions affording inadequate shelter, light or ventilation, etc. I hope these provisions will be looked at from the point of view of the South African Railways as the carrier of tens of thousands of livestock, and I should like to see somebody in the confidence of the Minister of Transport stand up and give his views of this clause. This clause, I hope, will be enforced against everybody, also against the Railways, because we have had instances where with a little more care and attention the arrival of a truck load of dead animals could have been prevented. A little more care and attention could have saved the animal’s lives. And what did they have to suffer before death overtook them? I therefore hope that these provisions are going to be strictly applied.

Another clause to which I should like to draw attention is Clause 6 in terms of which a poundmaster shall be entitled to recover from the owner of any impounded animal any reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by him in rendering or providing veterinary or medical attention to such animal. The point about this clause is that it appears to me that the poundmaster concerned will be entitled to payment of such expenses without a judgment of a court being necessary in the event of the owner refusing to pay. In other words, as the clause is now drafted, the poundmaster will only have to render his account and this account must be paid forthwith. As far as I can see. there is no provision here requiring the account to be certified.

The account can be disputed in court.

I should like to hear the views of the hon. Minister on this matter. As I said, it seems to me that, as the clause is now drafted, it will be mandatory upon the person who receives the account to pay it, because the statute says so. It does not, in other words, seem to me that person will be entitled to go to court in connection with the account.

The person to whom such an account is rendered will be liable to be taken to court if he does not pay.

If that is so, the matter is clear to me and I am satisfied.

Another clause which is of great interest to me is Clause 8. This clause provides that the magistrate of a district can authorize any officer of any Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in that district to enter any premises where any animal is kept, for the purpose of examining the conditions under which it is so kept. There provisions seem to be all-embracing but I should like to know from the hon. the Minister whether they would also apply to scheduled and released Native areas. Will the Act, in other words, be applied to these areas in the same way as it will apply to other areas? I ask this because I have an instance at the present time where a member of the S.P.C.A. has been refused a permit by a Native Commissioner enabling that member to enter such an area for the purpose of caring for many of the Natives’ mongrels—putting many of them out of their misery, caring for those that are sick and injured, as so many of these dogs belonging to Natives are. The point was made that as this person was a White woman, although being a member of the S.P.C.A., she was not allowed to enter the schedule Native area concerned. If a person of the Bantu race could be found to do the job, then that person would be given permission to enter the area. Now, it is inconceivable, under the present state of affairs, that you will get a Native woman who will be acceptable to the Natives and at the same time have the necessary qualifications for the work—because this job does require high qualifications as well as a high character. Neither would one be found who will have the necessary time to give to such a project, or the inclination to undertake it. I have made a full investigation of this aspect. The tribal Natives have not only raised no objection, but they are feeling somewhat aggrieved that these services are no longer available. It is, therefore, unfortunate that this difficulty should have arisen. However, I only mention this in passing. I will deal with it further when we reach the Committee Stage.

I should now like to refer to Clause 10 dealing with regulations which the hon. Minister may make under the Act, inter alia relating to the method and form of confinement and accommodation of any animal or class, species or variety of animals whether travelling or stationary. It is quite clear that the provisions of this clause are wide enough to enable the Minister to make regulations relating to caged birds, etc. In this connection, I should like to recommend to the hon. the Minister to in vestigate, before issuing such regulations, what regulations, if any, are already in existence in the various provinces. As far as the province of Natal is concerned, I think I can say that we are proud of the regulations already applicable there relating to the capture, the placing or restraint on the freedom, etc. of wild animals, birds, etc.

All provinces have adopted Ordinances dealing with these matters, very useful regulations.

That may be so, but I can speak with authority only in regard to my own province, namely Natal. While I agree that the hon. the Minister should have these powers given to him in this Bill, I would ask him to be a little loath to promulgate any regulations under this clause if such regulations will be at cross purposes with those already in existence in the provinces, especially in cases where provincial authorities have proved that they are capable of ministering effectively to the needs of animals and birds in captivity.

All provinces will be consulted before any regulations are promulgated.

I thank the Minister for that assurance. I should now like to refer to a matter which was dealt with by the hon. member for East London (City) (Dr. Moolman), viz. the capture of animals, and I should like to deal for a moment with the new techniques which are to-day applied in this connection, especially the technique of translocation. This means taking an animal from one place to another. It is a high sounding word but that is all that it means. This technique has been developed in Natal to such an extent that White and Black rhinoceroses and other animals of that size—some even weighing up to three tons—can be taken from one place to the other. The means is not the bow and arrow technique which was referred to by the hon. member for East London (City). On the contrary, a gun is used, a shotgun which fires a specially prepared charge, i.e. a self-operating hypodermic syringe which operates immediately pressure is released on its being fired from the barrel of the gun. This technique has been developed in Natal to such an extent that we can with a good deal of certainty capture any animal under conditions where the animal continues to go for a short period and then losing consciousness but only to the extent that it will lie down. It is then injected with an antidote consisting of one of the many drugs which were in the original injection. This antidote although a lifesaving antidote, acts at the same time as a tranquillizer. This makes it possible for the animal, even a full-grown white rhinoceros bull, to be helped on to his feet and lead by one man, by the ear, or by the horn, into his cage.

Have you already tried it?

Order! Hon. members should not allow themselves to be led away by interjections!

In any case, I do not know whether this technique will fall foul of the provisions of this Bill in any respect. I mention it, however, because the conception of what is cruelty takes different forms for different people at different places. To prevent any possibility of these techniques falling foul of the provisions of this Bill, I considered that I should mention the matter.

It falls entirely outside the scope of this Bill.

I am grateful to the Minister for that information. I should like to add that by no means everything has already been said in regard to this technique for the capture of wild animals. We think it can be perfected although it is very expensive. Nevertheless, we would like to be able to go on with our experiments with a view of improving on the technique because we consider that it is a very big step forward in the care and protection of our wild life.

What is the range of the gun which is being used?

30 to 40 yards at present.

I move—

I second. Agreed to; debate adjourned.