Mr. Chairman, I move—

Sir, this is the definitions clause and is as such associated with all the other clauses. In the circumstances I am sure the hon. the Minister will not object to it being held over until the other clauses have been disposed of.

Mr. Chairman, I move as an amendment—

I do not think it is necessary for me to give a lengthy explanation of my reasons for these amendments. The first one is obvious, because I am not reassured of the protection of young people under 18. As a matter of fact, I do not think the hon. the Minister in his reply yesterday even attempted to give such assurance. I am worried about the opening sentence of clause 2, i.e. “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained”. That has the effect of removing the protection which is normally given to children either under the Children’s Act or under the Criminal Procedure Act. Hence my amendment to insert after “contain” the words “but subject to the provisions of sections 159 and ”42 of the Criminal Procedure Act”; in other words, to protect children under the age of 18.

My second amendment concerns the laying down of minimum sentences in this clause. There are, of course, two different sets of people involved—dealers on the one hand for whom a minimum period of five years' imprisonment is laid down and a minim urn period of not less than ten years on any subsequent conviction, and those who are found in possession, where the minimum period is not less than two years and five years on subsequent convictions. The effect of my amendment here is to omit those words which involve the translation of these minimum sentences into law. I have already said during the Second Reading of this Bill that I am in principle against minimum sentences. I have no objection to strong maximum penalties being laid down, particularly where drug pedlars are concerned. The sentences of 15 and 25 years I consider to be quite justified when it comes to pedlars. But let us leave these as guide lines to the courts of law, for them to realize that Parliament takes a very serious view indeed of drug peddling. But let us leave it to the discretion of the courts thereafter to decide on the sentence to be imposed.

There are subsequent clauses, as I have already mentioned, providing for the setting aside of minimum penalties in the case of persons found in possession of drugs— for instance clause 7. But one really does not know to what extent this is going to be used because it is a question of deciding whether there are extenuating circumstances attached to a case or not. There are magistrates who will use their discretionary powers and there are many who will not. There are some for whom the sight of long-haired youngsters is like the sight of red rag to a bull. They immediately assume that because people are wearing their hair long or dress eccentrically they must immediately be dubbed as hippies and as drug addicts, while in fact, it may only by a young person going through a stage of adolescent experiment and takes a pull at pot once in his life and is caught while doing so. A magistrate might very well decide that there are no mitigating circumstances and consequently many young people might find themselves in gaol for a minimum period of two years, with the stigma attaching to them for the rest of their lives.

It is for these reasons that I move these amendments

I want to indicate that this clause as it stands is acceptable to the official Opposition. Let me make it clear why it is that we support this clause as it stands. What is provided for here is a very severe penalty for those who deal in drugs—that is to say, those persons who are cold-blooded pedlars of drugs, without any extenuating circumstances whatsoever, for no other reason than to produce a market in which to sell drugs and enrich themselves thereby. The reason why we are able to support this cluase is that there are other provisions in this bill for any complicating circumstances that might attend the peddling of drugs. One of these factors would be if, for example, a drug pedlar was also a drug addict and because of that cannot get a job and consequently peddles the drug he is addicted to in order to get money to provide for his subsistence. This bill deals also with that circumstance. If a person is a dealer and an addict the provisions of clause 62, which provide for an amendment to section 341 of the Criminal Procedure Act, provide that a court in such circumstances may have him referred to a rehabilitation centre, first of all for the purpose of an enquiry and thereafter to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of clause 30. One is then left with the situation where there is no such circumstance. In other words, where a person is none other than a cold-blooded pedlar of drugs in the same way as a murderer who commits murder without any extenuating circumstances—in other words, a cold-blooded and premeditated murder. Such a murderer has ever since the inception of our Criminal Code been getting a compulsory sentence of death, unless of course there are extenuating circumstances. But I fail to see how there can be any extenuating circumstances for someone who is peddling drugs and does so with the object merely of making money. That type of person should be dealt with very harshly. But I want to make it clear, because it does not seem to be clear from what one sees in the press, that we do not understand this to deal with the person who is in fact a drug addict. Now, Sir, one has principles. The hon. member for Houghton has said that she stands by the principle that the court should have a discretion. So do we. Sir. In principle the court should have a discretion but there must be a reason why the court has a discretion, and the court has a discretion because there may be mitigating circumstances. In the case of the cold-blooded pedlar of drugs, there are no mitigating circumstances whatsoever, and that is why my hon. Leader said yesterday that you can compare this with a compulsory sentence, where the court has no discretion in our law, where someone commits murder without any extenuating circumstances. Sir. I think one must appreciate too that there is a right of appeal against the decision of a magistrate in this respect. The hon. member has said that some magistrates will exercise their discretion and some will not. But a discretion has to be exercised properly according to the evidence, and on appeal the Supreme Court may change the decision of the magistrate. Furthermore, Sir, every conviction under this section will be the subject of an automatic review by the Supreme Court. That means that even if you do not have the means to appeal or do not want to appeal, nevertheless the record of the proceedings is placed before a judge of the Supreme Court, and he has to examine the record to see whether the judgment of the magistrate is in accordance with the principles of justice. In these circumstances, especially in view of the fact that the complicating circumstance of a person being a drug addict is adequately dealt with in terms of the rest of the provisions of this Bill, we are prepared to support this as it stands.

Sir, I wonder if the hon. the Minister will explain to me whether the interpretation now given by the hon. member for Durban North is correct. As I read clause 62 drug pedlars are completely excluded from the ambit of that clause because it specifically relates to subsections (3) and (4) of clause 2. In other words, the case that the hon. member has mentioned of a man being a pedlar and an addict is not, I believe, covered by clause 62 at all. I believe that the very fact that the man is also a pedlar excludes him from clause 62 and therefore from the discretionary rights. But even leaving that aside. I want to say that I still object to this because it violates the principle of the discretionary rights of courts of law. Secondly, another thing that worries me very much is the fact that the presumptions in a later clause can also bring all sorts of people under the definition of “dealer” where the onus of proof is on the person concerned that he is not a dealer when there has been found on him an amount of any of the prohibited drugs which has been specified; it can be one pill of a prohibited drug, and he can be presumed to be a dealer unless he can prove the contrary. If one is found with an object lying next to one, one is presumed to be a dealer unless one can prove the contrary, and I do not know how one can prove that something does not belong to one. I know how one can prove that something does belong to one, but how one proves that something does not belong to one, is beyond me. The presumptions in clause 10 also make me very nervous of these minimum penalties, and it is for these reasons that I am going to press my amendments. There is nothing in this clause about cold-blooded pedlars, unfortunately. The man is considered to be a dealer in terms of the definition contained in this Bill and this Bill does not mention anything about cold-blooded dealers. It talks about a person who is declared to be a dealer or considered to be a dealer, unless he is able to prove the contrary, according to any number of widely-worded presumptions.

I cannot accept either of the hon. member’s amendments, and the reason is very obvious. What the hon. member is concerned about, is that under this clause we shall deal very firmly with youngsters. I want to tell the hon. member at once that we are merely creating an offence here. We are merely determining what the offence is. The procedure in this regard will automatically be subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 159 of that Act provides very clearly that if any child is tried in any court for any offence, except for murder and rape, the court shall convert the trial into a juvenile court inquiry if it appears that the child is in need of care. In other words, that provision is overlapping and covers the position in this respect. If the child is in need of care, the trial is automatically converted in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. I am satisfied that in actual fact we are only creating an offence here, but this provision will also be applicable in that regard. The hon. member need therefore not be concerned about our taking unnecessary steps against young children in this regard.

What about the opening sentence in this clause, “Notwithstanding anything in any other law contained”? What does that mean?

It merely relates to the penal provisions. The fact that the trial can be converted into a juvenile court inquiry, is not covered by that provision; only the minimum penalties are covered by it; that is very clear.

I am not prepared to argue with the hon. member about the question of minimum and severe penalties. We considered the matter thoroughly before we introduced these penalties, and I am going to stand by these penalties, irrespective of the arguments the hon. member may advance. In conclusion I may just tell the hon. member that the person concerned will, after his conviction, have the right of appeal. Therefore, that right of appeal automatically brings the case before the Supreme Court, where he will be afforded the necessary protection in the event of the wrong steps having been taken against him.

It is a very expensive procedure.

The sentence is also, as the hon. member for Durban North said, automatically reviewed by a judge. I am therefore of the opinion that the necessary precautionary measures do exist.

It is not the same.

I move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

I have exactly the same argument here as in the previous clause about the protection of young people. I am afraid that there is a difference in legal opinion because I am definitely assured that the insertion of the words “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law” may very well override the protection afforded under the Criminal Procedure Act.

My reply to the hon. member on this clause is exactly the same as was my reply to the previous clause. Perhaps I may just furnish the hon. member with this additional information: The provisions of clause 2 only come into operation after there has been a conviction, but the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act may be applied at any time during the course of the trial, also as provided in clause 62; in other words, before the conviction. Therefore, those words, i.e. “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained”, are only applicable to the penalties. I hope that the position is clear to the hon. member now and that she will withdraw her amendment.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister a question here. It is quite apparent that children may be arrested under clauses 2 and 3, and I was wondering whether the Minister was going to make any special arrangements for the housing of those children who are arrested, between the time of arrest and their appearance in court. There may be delays, and I would like to know whether, especially if they happen to be schoolchildren, any provision will be made for the housing of the children in the interim period.

If they are children, we can remove them to a place of safety, and we need not necessarily adopt the other course. We do have a place of safety, and there we shall handle the matter in that way. The hon. member need not concern herself about that, for we are also concerned about our children. But I just want to state very clearly that if we do not retain the restriction on children in this clause as it stands, we know beforehand that the drug pedlars will simply make use of youngsters under 18 to do the drug-peddling for them. For that reason I dare not leave this loophole there.

I would like to move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

Again it is the question of a minimum sentence. This is a most extraordinary clause, because it introduces an entirely new category of offences as far as I can make out, and it sets out minimum sentences of not less than five years on the first conviction and not less than 10 years on the second and subsequent convictions. The clause allows for the forfeiture of property if anyone fails to report to the police his suspicion that there has been an abuse of drugs or the using of drugs on his premises. I do not really know how anyone is ever really going to prove that people did have suspicions. I do not know how this duty can be laid on people with such a heavy penalty and a minimum sentence, and I am against the clause altogether. I think it is unnecessary to introduce this new principle into the law at all. If I see somebody breaking into a house, the chances are that I will try to do something to prevent it, but I do not go to gaol if I do not report this crime, or even more serious crimes, if you come to think of it.

And if you saw a murder being committed?

I will still not go to gaol if I do not report it. I do not say the duty is not on me as a citizen to do so, but there is nothing in our laws under which I can be sentenced to gaol for five years if I do not report it. I think this is an extraordinary principle which is being introduced into our law, and I will vote against it, particularly as it also includes this minimum sentence.

This is a clause which is a very necessary clause in the fight against the abuse of drugs. The idea behind this is, as the hon. the Minister indicated at Second Reading, to clamp down on these so-called clubs where most of the pushing is done and most of the young people are introduced for the first time to drugs and where the most frightful abuses take place. I speak from experience, not of the clubs themselves, but of a number of cases that have come before the courts in respect of some of these clubs. As the law stands at the moment, there is nothing at all the police can do about these clubs. There is nothing they can do to shut them down. There is nothing in the law which enables them to do it. I have spoken to many of the people concerned with the matter and it is almost impossible. [Interjections] The hon. member for Houghton must not say it is nonsense.

I did not say it was nonsense; I said surely they can shut them down if they find abuses.

As the law stands now, it is very difficult. But I think another thing that one should appreciate is that many of the owners of these clubs run the clubs for the purpose of making their profits out of (a) liquor and (b) drugs. There is also no doubt in my mind that a lot of the people who own those clubs know very well what is going on in the clubs, and there is nothing that can be done about it. The presumptions which are provided, in relation to this clause, in clause 10 (6), are very wide. In fact, they are necessarily wide in order to get convictions under this type of clause. But they are so wide that there may be circumstances where people may in fact be convicted where they genuinely did not in fact know that this was going on, although they should have known. In other words, a reasonable man would have taken precautions, but this fellow was a bit naive, or perhaps even negligent. It seems to us that in these circumstances, if that were to be the case, in those particular instances, the court ought to have a discretion as to the sentence. But we will deal with that under clause 7. In the second place, it seems to us that before a prosecution is instituted because of the possibility of this happening, the Attorney-General should give his written consent. It happens in a number of cases, and it happens under a number of our laws where minimum sentences are prescribed, that the Attorney-General in those cases should first give his fiat before there is a prosecution. Indeed, the Minister of Justice indicated earlier this Session that under the Immorality Act, where there is no minimum sentence prescribed, there shall be no prosecutions except upon the written authority of the Attorney-General. And we have in fact seen, since the Minister mentioned this, a number of cases being withdrawn from the magistrate's courts upon the fiat of the Attorney-General. In those circumstances, as far as this clause is concerned, I would like to move the amendment standing in my name. My remarks in relation to sentence will be dealt with under the next clause. I move—

1. (3) No prosecution shall be instituted in respect of an offence referred to in this section except upon the written authority of the Attorney-General concerned.

I should like to support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban North. I think if any person has studied carefully the report of the committee of inquiry into the abuse of drugs, it becomes evident that drastic legislation is required in dealing with the menace and the drug-peddling that takes place at a place of entertainment. This clause now before the committee does take drastic steps to try to curb this unfortunate position that exists and is increasing in our various harbour cities in South Africa. That is why we believe it is necessary that there should be such drastic measures as are contained in this clause. The hon. member for Durban North has also indicated the reasons why his amendment should be accepted. I think if we look at this clause and take into account that it endeavours to reduce the trafficking in illegal drugs at any of these night clubs which are being used for the purpose mainly of pedlars dealing in drugs, then we see that these provisions take into account a number of factors. I know, from being in charge of and supervising youth clubs on many occasions, how necessary it is to keep a vigilant attitude towards the persons who might endeavour to infiltrate into that club and use that club for purposes of trafficking in dagga and other dangerous drugs. I can see that there are practical difficulties in so far as the implementation of this clause is concerned. I would like to ask he hon. the Minister whether he could perhaps give us some further clarity in regard to one portion of the provisions of this clause. If you look at line 45, you see that if a person has reason to believe that any person in such place of entertainment is in possession of, or uses, or deals in dependence-producing drugs, he commits an offence. It is quite clear that the person in charge of such a club is possibly aware of persons who might be in possession of such drugs. If such a person is frequenting the club, the person in charge of the club or place of entertainment would possibly have suspicion in regard to such a person who is dealing in dependence-producing drugs. However, the question of users is the one which requires some clarity from the hon. the Minister. It is indeed difficult for a person who is in charge of such a place of entertainment to try to judge whether a person is in fact using such a drug. The word in the clause is “uses”. It is evident that possibly the person in charge of a club will see indications of the effects on both a dagga smoker and a drug addict or a person who has used drugs some time after that person has taken the drug. However, as I have said, the wording here is “uses”. The clause definitely states “has in his possession, uses or deals”. My main point in raising this with the hon. the Minister is to get some clarity in regard to the practical application by a person who is in charge of such a place of entertainment, who has to try to ascertain whether a particular person uses such dependence-producing drugs or not.

On the premises.

Yes. I realize that there is also taken into account a further clause, the presumption clause, namely clause 10 (6) which specifically deals with this aspect. Possibly we will have further clarity in that regard when we reach that clause.

It might be too late then.

With regard to the question of being too late which the hon. member for Houghton has mentioned, I would like to draw attention to the report where, in every instance, it is clearly stated that immediate action is required, particularly at the sources of distribution, which in many instances are the clubs which are being utilized by dealers trafficking in drugs The point is that immediate action is required. That is why we on this side of the House have indicated our support of this Bill so that immediate action can be taken.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the amendment moved by my colleague, the hon. member for Durban North. I would also like to support the hon. member for Umbilo. He speaks from a wealth of past experience and I speak with a certain degree of personal experience too. I can say quite sincerely that anything that can be done to limit or wipe out the activities of some of these clubs is a responsibility of this honourable House. Through the co-operation of the Police and other public-spirited people who are interested, I have been able to see what goes on in these clubs. They are very sordid. The first time I went to a club, it was after closing time and there was no more dancing, but the street in which the club was situated was packed with young people for hours afterwards. The second time I visited the same club the dub was in operation but there was very little dancing.

Order! I think the hon. member must confine himself to the contents of clause 6.

Certainly, Sir. I am giving reasons why I support this Bill. With respect, I believe that the Committee should realize the responsibility that we have to protect the young children who are exposed to this danger and also to indicate the serious attitude with which they accept this responsibility. The parents too have a big responsibility in this regard. I make this appeal because many of the people in this House are parents and I believe that they do not know what is going on with their own children, and with the children of their friends. Sir, if that is your ruling, I accept it, but I make an appeal that the amendment of my hon. friend for Durbar North is given the serious attention of this Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Houghton deals with the minimum penalties, and I am not prepared to accept it. I am not going to argue about it, for I think that we shall be wasting our time by doing so. I am not prepared to accept her amendment. In respect of the attitude adopted by the Opposition, I want to say at once that my first reaction is that the proposal they have just made, is unnecessary. According to my information the Attorney-General may personally, or by any other person delegated by him under section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955, conduct any prosecution before any court in his jurisdiction. Furthermore, under section 8 (1) of that Act, he may, at any time before conviction, stop any prosecution. He exercises his authority and performs his functions in terms of section 5 (3) of that Act, subject to the control and direction of the Minister of Justice, who may reverse his decisions and may himself exercise any authority or perform any function of the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General will therefore, if he thinks fit, be able to stop any prosecution in terms of clause 6, and he will, for instance, consider something of that nature on the strength of representations made by or on behalf of the accused. Furthermore, he may, as is now being done in the case of the Immorality Act, in general issue instructions to the effect that such prosecutions may not be instituted without his consent. This is a general instruction which he may issue. Therefore, in my honest opinion this amendment is unnecessary, but if the Opposition really feel that they want it to be incorporated, I am prepared to accept it because it makes no difference to the situation as a whole. This can already be done, and if this amendment is accepted, it will have to be done. In the light of that I am prepared to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this is a clause which gives the court the right to exercise its discretion to impose a lighter sentence than the prescribed minimum sentence where circumstances justify such a step. Of course, we approve of this clause. However, in the light of what I said in respect of clause 6, namely that there may be certain circumstances which we cannot now anticipate, I should like to move the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows:

1. (c) if it is bound to sentence such person to the punishment prescribed by section 6 (2) (a), impose upon him, in lieu thereof, a sentence of imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years; or
2. (d) if it is bound to sentence such person to the punishment prescribed by section 6 (2) (b), impose upon him in lieu thereof, a sentence of imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years.

If a person is convicted under clause 6, he is subject, in the case of a first conviction, to imprisonment for a period of not less than five years but not exceeding 15 years, and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, to imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years, but not exceeding 25 years. However, if this amendment is accepted and there are any extenuating circumstances, such circumstances must be recorded and the judicial officer may then pass a lighter sentence than that which is prescribed as the minimum. This provision already exists in respect of the possessors or users of drugs, and it seem to us that this provision could also be extended to offenders under clause 6. The position is not that the court has a discretion here. It has a discretion only where there are special circumstances. I think it is clear, if you read clause 6 together with clause 10 (6), that there may be circumstances which we cannot now anticipate. To provide for minimum penalties in all cases at this stage would therefore in our opinion be wrong, because these different circumstances can arise and we cannot anticipate them. Only a court, having all the evidence before it, and knowing all the facts of the particular case, can say: “This case is different from the one that Parliament intended should be dealt with in this way, because of certain factors.” It is possible that this could happen. Because we believe that the court should have a discretion when such circumstances arise, I should like to move this amendment to include clause 6 offences under clause 7. I may say that our attitude in respect of the pedlar is different, because we do not believe that there are any circumstances which warrant a cold-blooded drug pedlar having anything but a prison sentence. Here, however, there may be such instances, and I hope the hon. the Minister can see his way dear to accepting this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I shall of course support this amendment of the hon. member for Durban North, because it gives at least some discretion to the court with regard to people convicted under clause 6 for failing to report to the police. I wonder, though, whether the hon. the Minister will at this stage clarify a point raised by the hon. member for Durban North earlier. He has not mentioned that point again, although it now directly concerns this clause. I want to know whether or not these mitigating circumstances are going to apply to people who are not the cold-blooded pedlars he has just mentioned, but people who are users of drugs, and who also sell drugs in order to be able to continue using them. As I read the clause, these mitigating circumstances do not apply to such people. There is a distinction between this type of person, who is an addict, a sick person who is really not in control of his own actions, and the cold-blooded pedlar who does not use drugs himself, but deliberately sets out to sell drugs to other people in order to profit from this trade. I may mention that the Grobler Committee recommended that a distinction be drawn between these two types of pedlars, namely the cold-blooded, ruthless pedlar, peddling for his own gain, and the person who is as an addict peddling drugs in order to obtain his own supplies. I see absolutely nothing in the Bill which distinguishes between these two classes of drug dealers. There should be such a distinction. The one class of person needs psychiatric treatment apart from anything else. As I read clause 7, there is nothing to permit a court to consider mitigating circumstances if the seller is considered a dealer, even though he is also an addict. I should like the hon. the Minister to consider this point. I have not drafted an amendment, but if he considers this point to be valid, and if he considers the point made by the Grobler Committee to be valid, perhaps he could give me an assurance that he will consider drafting an amendment which could be introduced in the Other Place.

Mr. Chairman, in the first place, I want to clarify the matter which the hon. member for Houghton has just put to me. It depends, in the first place, on the charge laid against such a person. That is very clear. If the hon. member will only have the patience to wait until clause 62 is dealt with, she will find that the procedure is defined very clearly there. In that clause we distinguish between the person who is purely a dealer, who cold-bloodedly deals in drugs, and the person who is a user and also engages in some peddling in his spare time in order to keep himself alive. Clause 62 makes specific provision for those cases, but if it is found that a person is purely a dealer, I do not want mitigating circumstances to apply in his case. For that reason I cannot amend clause 7 in that regard. Clause 62 draws a very clear distinction between a person who is a dealer and the kind of person who needs rehabilitation. I want to point out again that a case can be stopped at any time. On the contrary, we are going further than that. I do not want to discuss clause 62 now, for you will not permit me to do so, Sir, but the necessary precautionary measures are taken in clause 62, and I am quite satisfied that those precautionary measures are adequate. The person who may benefit by mitigating circumstances under clause 7, is definitely the user. It is not the dealer.

These two types can be combined.

I have just said that such cases will be dealt with under clause 62.

Well, it does not say so there.

It definitely says so there. When we come to that, I shall prove it to the hon. member. She should merely read that clause together with clauses 29 and 30. If she reads those three clauses together, she will find that we do have the opportunity to deal with this matter in that way.

As far as the hon. member for Durban North is concerned, I want to say that I am unfortunately not prepared to accept his amendment either. There is no valid reason why the owner of a place of entertainment, i.e. a person guilty of an offence in terms of clause 6, and the user of dependence-producing substances should be dealt with in the same manner. The starting-point of clause 6 is in fact to treat him like a dealer, and he can very easily save his own skin by simply summoning the police. This has been stated very clearly. The presumption, as far as clause 10 (6) is concerned, will have very little significance if the State does not have credible evidence at its disposal. When we come to clause 10 (6), hon. members will notice that it is very clearly stated there that the State must be in possession of the necessary evidence. The State cannot merely make an unfounded allegation. To that I want to add that, in the light of my concession under the previous clause, i.e. that the written authority of the Attorney-General must now he obtained, the hon. member ought to be satisfied. He should not try to press me now. I cannot make a concession here.

First of all, I should like to refer to the matter dealt with in clause 62 and to place on record that we do not agree with the interpretation placed on it by the hon. member for Houghton. Instead, we agree with the interpretation of the hon. the Minister, that a person who is both dealer and addict can be dealt with under clause 62. If that fact becomes clear during a trial the case can be converted into an inquiry. It is because we do not share the interpretation of the hon. member for Houghton that we do not have the same fears in regard to the dealer being given a minimum sentence. We see no possibility of the straightforward dealer who is not an addict at the same time, being able to produce any extenuating circumstances notwithstanding the presumptions in clause 10, presumptions we shall deal with when we get there.

I rise now to ask the hon. the Minister to reconsider his attitude towards the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban North. Here we accept two things and in both respects we are ad idem with the Minister, Firstly, we deem it necessary to deal very severely with the owner, occupier or manager—the person in charge —of places of entertainment where a lot of trafficking in drugs is taking place, die sort of places referred to by the Grobler Committee. We also accept that the obligation placed upon the owner, occupier or manager of a place of entertainment in terms of clause 6 can be fulfilled by simply a phone call. We do not see any problem as the hon. member for Houghton does in the matter she has referred 1o. We do not see this on the same basis as somebody witnessing a murder and who has no obligation to report and who, if he does not report, cannot be convicted. This is an entirely different situation. This deals with a person who runs a place of entertainment where drug-taking and trafficking is or may be taking place. If he is such a person an obligation must be placed upon him not only not to shut his eyes to what is going on but an obligation to be aware of what is going on and when he has a suspicion that drugs are being used he should report it to the Police. We accept, as I have already said, that this obligation can be fulfilled by a phone call and does not impose an undue burden on the person concerned.

But the respect in which we see a difference between the provisions of clause 2 relating to the pedlar, and the provisions of clause 6, is causing us concern. The provisions of clause 6 have to be read with the presumptions in clause 10 (6). The Minister will concede that these presumptions are wide. But we feel that presumptions as wide as these are necessary in order to curb this evil. However, we think it is possible in this case, as opposed to the case of the straightforward dealer, that there may be circumstances which would justify a sentence less than the minimum. There may be such circumstances. Consequently we consider it to be fair that the provisions of clause 6 are brought within the provisions of clause 7. The court will then be in a similar position to a court dealing with a murder charge. This court knows that a death sentence is mandatory, unless there are extenuating circumstances. We suggest that a similar approach be adopted by a court if clause 6 were brought within the provisions of clause 7. The court will then know that a conviction will carry with it the minimum sentence unless there are certain circumstances which justify a sentence less severe than that. I suggest that in this case such a course of action is warranted because of the far-reaching presumptions in clause 10 (6), presumptions which may make it possible to obtain a conviction which could be one of a technical nature, where there would not be true guilt on the part of the accused—in other words, a situation which would warrant a lighter sentence then the minimum.

I want to emphasize that we do not want to be weak towards the manager or owner of such a place of entertainment. We realize that a lot of trafficking takes place in such places and that a lot of young people are introduced to drug-taking there. However, we also see the possibility in this case of a man who may merely be technically guilty being found guilty of a contravention of clause 6 on account of the far-reaching presumptions. The court would then be obliged to impose the minimum sentence.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister to reconsider his attitude towards the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban North. I suggest that this amendment is reasonable and does not take the teeth out of his clause 6.

I also want to ask the hon. the Minister to reconsider his attitude in this regard, I have been concerned with youth organizations for many years. Even as a teacher I found out how difficult it was for a person in control of an organization or meeting which falls within the definition of a place of entertainment. There may very well be mitigating circumstances. As a teacher I found that one’s scholars were caught as users and dealers, whilst the teacher himself, in his subjective judgment, was not aware of these things. I have personal experience in this regard, and for that reason I really do not think that it is asking too much to take mitigating circumstances into account, as we propose here.

I would like very briefly to add my plea to those already made by other hon. members and to support the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Durban North. My concern is also to assist the Minister to combat this evil. We do not wish to see any weakening of the effect of this law or of this provision. What we do wish is to ensure that when people are tried in terms of the Act which will flow from this Bill, justice will effectively be done and be seen to be done by the population as a whole.

The reason why I make this plea is that it is most important that this Bill, if it is to become an effective and successful Act, should draw the support and the co-operation of the entire population. The sympathies of the population must be with this Act in its operation. It is possible that in these special circumstances which might arise under clause 6, people will be found technically guilty and sentenced, because of their technical guilt, to what appears to the public to be unduly harsh punishments. There might then be a kind of revulsion against the Act, if it seems to the public in general to be operating too harshly. Sir, I repeat that it is most important that the co-operation and the support of the public should be retained. I make this point because one has seen what has happened in other countries in Europe—in Greece, Turkey and elsewhere—where the law has been very severe and where, because it has struck automatically at people guilty of technical offences, it has impinged so harshly on these people that it has in fact evoked a certain kind of reaction.

We must bear in mind also the attitude of our youth who are in a state of semirebellion against grown-up society. It is important to have their co-operation and sympathy. We want them to be on our side in this thing, and it is for this reason that I plead most earnestly with the Minister to consider this and to provide a degree of leniency in those cases where people are found technically guilty but where morally one does not really see the justification for a minimum sentence of five years.

Sir, I have listened to all the arguments by hon. members. I honestly think they are unduly concerned about the situation, particularly in view of the concession I made in clause 6, in terms of which the Attorney-General now has to give written authority. I think the concession I made there is sufficient to cover this case, because even under the presumptions established in terms of clause 10 (6) the State has to have reasonable grounds for accepting certain things. The word “reasonably” appears twice in that subsection. In other words, the State may not just make an assertion that is entirely unfounded and then expect the person to prove his innocence. Hon. members opposite are now adopting the attitude that the nightclub owner is innocent and that he falls into the trap innocently, but I want to argue the other way around: Suppose that nightclub owner is the master-mind behind the trafficking in that entire vicinity and that he has a number of ladies in his establishment who serve as an attraction and who act as pedlars in the club. That man can then simply say, “I did not know what was going on here”, and then he is free. He can then plead extenuating circumstances; he need simply say that he had no reason to believe trafficking was going on there and then he is free. It is also possible under the circumstances that this may in fact be the case. Sir, I am not a lawyer, but I think hon. members are wrong, because extenuating circumstances only come into operation when a person has been convicted on a charge, and only then are the extenuating circumstances brought into the matter. We are dealing here with the situation before the charge and before the conviction.

The hon. member for Von Brandis says we must have the support of the public for this measure. I fully appreciate, and I have said so several times, that we shall not be able to act effectively through legislation alone unless we are able to range public opinion on our side. Let me mention the following example to the hon. member: he says a person may technically be guilty. If a person is technically guilty, it was the easiest thing in the world for him to have got off by simply telephoning the police. That is all I am asking him to do. He need only telephone the police and say: “I suspect things are happening in my establishment this evening which have not happened here before; come and take a look at what is going on here.” That is all I am expecting him to do and nothing more. If he has done that, he is immediately not punishable under any of these provisions. Is that asking too much?

I am convinced that I shall gain the support of the right-minded public of South Africa if I say that this is the only condition I lay down, because if a person suspects that he may be guilty technically, the safest course for him is to telephone the police before he falls into the trap, and if he does telephone the police, he is free. The police can then go and see what is going on, and if prosecutions must be instituted, the police will do so. I honestly think I cannot put this matter more clearly. I cannot leave a loophole here which is so big that I cannot take action against the master-mind who is the manager of a nightclub, because I have made concessions here which I should not have made. Therefore I am telling hon. members once again that, with the best will in the world, I cannot make this concession in the clause, particularly in the light of the concession I made in clause 6, i.e. that the Attorney-General has to give written authority. I think hon. members should be reasonable and accept the clause as it is.

Mr. Chairman, what the hon. the Minister has just said now about mitigating circumstances, convinces me that I am right about clause 62. The Minister has said that mitigating circumstances only come into operation after the conviction.

Order! The hon. member for Houghton is now dealing with clause 62; the Committee is only on clause 7.

So am I, Sir, but the two clauses happen to be closely related.

The hon. member should not discuss clause 62 now.

No, Sir, but may I please point out that in rejecting various amendments, the hon. the Minister has referred to clause 62, which has a bearing on clause 7. The point that he made was that a dealer-addict, that is to say, a person who is a combined dealer-addict, will fall under clause 62 and that therefore it is not necessary to accept an amendment in clause 7. My point is that the person who is convicted of dealing and who is then excluded from the ambit of clause 62 …

He is not.

He is. He has been convicted of dealing in drugs. Let the hon. the Leader of the Opposition look at sub section (1) (b). The man has already been convicted of dealing and the public prosecutor is precluded from changing a conviction for dealing into a trial. He is only allowed to do so in the case of users. I do not believe that this clause makes allowance, as recommended by the Grobler Committee, for a distinction between the real dealer, the man dealing in drugs, for profit, and the man who is a dealer-addict, and there are large numbers of such cases. People get hooked and then in order to get the drug they turn to dealing to make some profit in order to be able to get some more drugs for themselves. These are sick people and they should not be treated on the same basis as the cold-blooded dealer. This is my whole case.

I move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

This is the forfeiture clause, which goes very far indeed and, as far as I can see introduces a new principle. I do not believe that property should be forfeited if somebody has been found guilty under clause 6. I do not see that subsection (1) (d) should figure in this either, because a man may very well have gone to gaol for dealing in drugs, but it is just possible that he also carried on a legitimate business. I think if he is punished for the crime of selling drugs, and punished severely, because our law allows such severe punishment now, there can really be no justification also for forfeiting his property and forfeiting the rest of his possessions. He has, after all, a family as well, and I think that some consideration should be given to them. People do not lose their property and they do not forfeit their bank balances if they are sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for murder or rape or any of the other crimes of violence. I cannot understand why it is considered necessary to introduce these sanctions, as well as the very heavy prison penalties, and I will vote against it.

I just want to reply to the hon. member. Clause 8 (1) (c) provides very clearly that immovable property used for the purpose of or in connection with the commission of the offence, may be declared to be forfeited. This does not affect other property. This is the specific property used by him for the purpose of the offence, the premises on which this offence is committed by him. Therefore I say we are entitled to do so. This must serve as a deterrent. The man must realize that he cannot fool around with this thing, and I am not prepared to accede to that. Then I also want to point out that in the case of the confiscation of money, this takes place after a second conviction only. In other words, he has already fallen into the trap once and has already been punished once, but he nevertheless decides that it is so profitable that he will continue with the situation despite the penalty. Then I say that the next time I will take the money, which he most probably made from the high prices which he charged for the drug. That is upon the second conviction. I am not prepared to accept the amendment.

I move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

I must say that really and truly I object to much more than simply paragraphs (d) and (e) and I will vote against this clause, because I think that the presumptions are far too wide. They carry the most heavy penalties on people who cannot prove their innocence. As I have stated, it is always very difficult to prove the negative. I think that, subsection (1) (a) (ii) is a very difficult proposition. If someone is found with any small quantity of a prohibited drug, he is immediately deemed to be a dealer.

You know what the definition of “prohibited drug” is, and you are prepared to allow a person to have a small quantity of it?

Why a dealer? It might be an addict.

But he should not touch it.

I agree he should not touch it, but are you going to send him to gaol for a minimum of five years?

Then he should not touch it.

Goodness me, if the hon. the Minister says that, he does not understand what addiction means.

We are talking now about the prohibited drugs.

I am also talking about the prohibited ones, and among the prohibited drugs, if I am not mistaken, is dagga. The quantity is given, admittedly, but there are others as well. The man may not be a dealer but an addict; yet he may have a small quantity of heroin or one of the other prohibited drugs. He can be an addict, for heaven’s sake. The whole Bill should be designed not only to punish people, but to help people. I do not see that it will help an addict if he is going to be deemed to be a dealer. I do not know how he proves that he is not a dealer if he happens to have a small amount of a prohibited drug in his pocket.

He can prove he is an addict.

He may say he is an addict, but he may never have been to a doctor. It is not so easy.

Order! The hon. member must talk to her amendment. I cannot allow this discussion.

I am talking to the whole clause. I have moved the amendment and now I am talking to the whole clause.

The hon. member must continue.

Thank yon, Sir. Then there is paragraph (c), which I call the “medicine cupboard clause”, which worries me no end. I am sure if you go to anybody’s bathroom and open the medicine chest there, you will find dozens of drugs which have been prescribed by doctors years ago. People bang on to these drugs in case they get sick again and they do not want to go the the expense of going back to the doctor to get another prescription. Then there is a terrible onus on you. You have to prove that you are not an addict and that you are not a dealer. I am sure there is not a person in this House who does not have drugs in his medicine chest which were prescribed for him more than 30 days before. There are certain cases, and the medical men in this House will bear me out, where you have to prescribe drugs for a longer period, in cases like epilepsy; you do not prescribe the drug for use on one occasion only. It is a continuous process. A man could be given a prescription which could go on for months in the case of epilepsy, and drugs falling under these schedules are used for it. I think this is a ridiculously far-reaching clause, and again the onus of proof of innocence is placed on the accused.

You can have a supply for 30 days.

But that does not help you if you are an epileptic, and you have to go on using these drugs. People do not want to continuously go back to doctors to get new prescriptions because it is expensive, and as I say, you don’t throw drugs away. I possibly have drugs in my medicine cabinet which were prescribed for some complaint I might have had years ago. One does not chuck them out. I think this is a ridiculous clause and I will vote against the whole clause for these reasons.

I rise to move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

This relates to subsection (3). The object of this amendment is to make the subsection a little clearer than we think it is at the moment. This subsection introduces a presumption that if a drug is found in the vicinity of an accused person, it is presumed to be in his possession. As the clause is worded now, we think it goes around in circles, because he will try to discharge this presumption by saying it was not in his possession; it was near him, a foot or two foot away from him. The court is then in a position to go back to the presumption and say to him that because it is near him, the court regards that distance as being in his immediate vicinity and therefore he falls within the presumption of subsection (3). We think that, if the last few words are changed to “he proved he did not have it in his possession”, it makes subsection (3) clearer and still maintains the presumption. We think the presumption is necessary. We are not suggesting that that subsection should be omitted, because one has the case where a drug pedlar or a person using drugs may either sec the Police coming or suspect that they are coming and throw the drug away, possibly towards someone else. Therefore, it is necessary to have such a presumption. But the point that we make is that, as it is worded, it seems that one goes around in circles when a person is trying to discard a drug. The word “contrary” could refer to the immediate vicinity. So we think that, if the words are changed as suggested in the amendment I have moved, it will make the position perfectly clear. In discharging the onus, the person will then say that he accepts that the drug was two feet away, but that he did not put it there and he would then explain the circumstances. Whereas, if he has to prove the contrary, as subsection (3) suggests at the moment, one tends to go round in circles.

Mr. Chairman, there seems to be a certain amount of misunderstanding in connection with clause 10 (1) (c). I believe I understand the hon. the Minister’s problem in this regard. It is not as easy as it is in the case of dagga, where he can lay down a specific quantity and where any quantity in excess of 115 grams implies that the individual in whose possession it is, is in fact trading. In so far as other medicines are concerned, it is not easy. I believe that paragraph (c) is workable if it is approached by understanding. But the point that worried me is the impression that has been given to this Committee that this paragraph (c) limits a doctor to prescribing drugs sufficient for a period of 30 days only. I want to read this paragraph if I may. It reads:

I trust that the hon. the Minister will clarify this. My interpretation is that a medical practitioner has the right to prescribe drugs for an extended period, if in his own wisdom he feels that it is necessary. There is no restriction there that he can only prescribe a quantity sufficient for a period of 30 days. But the presumption will come into effect if a prescription has been issued within 30 days and the patient cannot reasonably establish why the drugs had not been consumed and, in fact, the supply which the doctor ordered legitimately, may have been augmented by illegal means such as purchasing from a trafficker or in fact trafficking himself. I would welcome some clarity on this particular paragraph.

Mr. Chairman, firstly in regard to clause 10 (1) (a), where it is provided that if a man is found to be in possession of—

1. (i) dagga exceeding 115 grams in mass;
2. (ii) any prohibited dependence-producing drugs;
3. (iii) it shall be presumed that the accused dealt in such dagga or drugs, unless the contrary is proved,

I think he can prove the contrary quite easily by producing a doctor's certificate. I think that a certificate will be available in most cases. These drugs which are enumerated in part I of the Schedule, should not be in the possession of any person except if prescribed by a doctor.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member for Houghton has other ideas about this. When this legislation becomes law, they will be prohibited drugs and individuals should not be in possession of them, unless they have a doctor’s prescription for them. If the person is an addict—the hon. member mentioned heroin, and we know what a terrible effect heroin has on a person—I want to suggest that there will be no difficulty at all for a doctor to certify that such and such a person is an addict of heroin. Paragraph (c) is a difficult paragraph to interpret. It would also be difficult to get a conviction under it. Firstly, I am one of those people who never prescribes for more than 30 days at a time. I think a prescription for a drug should not exceed 30 days in quantity. Thirty days’ supply of the drugs should be sufficient on one prescription. The prescription can he repeated by the doctor if necessary. I think some of my colleagues will agree with me that there is no necessity for us to prescribe for six months ahead of time. Anything can happen within six months. The patient may die. And what happens to the accumulation of drugs on the shelf? I advocate that no drugs should be prescribed in excess of 30 days’ use. It can always be repeated after that. This paragraph provides that if a patient or an individual has a drug in his possession and cannot account for the number still in his possession after 30 days, he can be charged.

It must only be less than the prescription.

It must be less than the prescription. I am much more concerned with the person who, after the second day of receiving a prescription, only has one tablet left. Then you would he able to ask that person: “What have you done with the tablets for the other 29 days. You should only have used three of those tablets. The prescription provides one three times a day. What have you done with the rest of the tablets?”

Only if it exceeds the prescription.

It cannot exceed the prescription.

That is all we want.

Is that all you want? What happens if the number in the man’s possession exceeds the number specified on the prescription?

Then he must have got them by illegal means somewhere else. Then I must act.

Then they can act. But the hon. the Minister just now said that if it is less than the prescription after a certain number of days … What are you going to do then?

Then he is covered.

If he sold them?

Then he is covered.

Yes, he is covered. I thought you said he sold them.

No.

I am sorry. I thought you said he sold them. That takes away the objection that I had.

Mr. Chairman, I am only concerned about the one term which the hon. member for Houghton tried to coin. This is the typical way in which legislation is given a nice popular name and which then attaches a stigma to the Act. The hon. member spoke about the “Medicine Chest Act”. I just want to tell the hon. member, as I have just explained to the hon. member for Rosettenville, that there is nothing on earth to fear. The hon. member may keep her medicine chest remedies. No one is going to rummage through them. They are quite safe. The position is simply that a person should not within 30 days after having received the prescription have more of that drug in his medicine chest than was specified by the prescription. Then it means that he has obtained the additional quantity illegally. But if there is less, as there ought to be, because such a person has used some of it, the clause covers him fully. There is no presumption. The person is using the drug and still has some left. The supply he has at any particular moment will be less than the supply he obtained. He is therefore using it gradually. It is only when there is an excess that steps are taken against him. The hon. member really does not have the right to call this clause the Medicine Chest Clause. If the hon. member attaches that negative connotation to this clause she is doing a disservice to herself and to South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, there are medical instances, and I have mentioned one to the hon. the Minister, namely epilepsy, where it is necessary to prescribe for longer than 30 days. I refer to barbiturates, which are in fact on the list of potentially dangerous drugs.

They are in the C category and are not included here.

Why should it be necessary to prescribe for more than 30 days?

This is what doctors tell me. There are other doctors in existence apart from the hon. member. I am married to one. This is what I am told. There are cases where you simply do prescribe for three months as in the case of, for instance, people who have epilepsy and who take barbiturates.

Is it not only for a matter of convenience? That could be regulated.

Those are the sort of cases that might arise. I did move the other amendment but I did not speak on it again. I did mention it daring my Second Reading speech, namely this business of “found in the vicinity of" in subsection (3). I think this is a very dangerous subsection. You have to prove that you are innocent of possessing something of which you really quite honestly may have no knowledge whatsoever. I gave the instance of a person sitting on a park bench who suddenly finds a packet of dagga or something of that nature next to him, dumped there by somebody seeing a policeman approaching or for that matter a plain-clothes policeman whom he recognizes and then disappears. You are then arrested for being in possession of dagga. How is innocence going to be proved in that case? I am interested in protecting innocent people. I know that you have to have law and order to trap criminals in order to bring them to justice, but you must not frame the law in such a way that without difficulty large numbers of innocent people can also be ensnared in the toils of the law. This is why I object to subsection (3),

Mr. Chairman, I rise in order to reply to the Opposition in this regard. However. I should just like to tell the hon. member for Houghton once again that she is not fully acquainted with the position. Subsection (1) (c) only deals with offences in respect of the category mentioned in section 2 (c). Section 2 (c) in turn deals only with dangerous substances as defined in the Bill. The dangerous ones are not barbiturates. The dangerous ones are amphetamines, pethidine, morphine and so forth. Accordingly, barbiturates fall away completely. They are not covered by this clause. They fall under other clauses and the hon. member is therefore not correct in her argument.

I just want to tell the Opposition I am glad that they are supporting us in the view that we should also have presumptions when a person is in possession of a drug. Let me mention a practical example. I appreciate the problem. However, I cannot allow such an obvious loophole here. I shall tell you what the practical problem is. Say, for instance, the police become suspicious about a certain motor car which they see somewhere or which they want to trap, and the vehicle speeds away. The police suspect that there are all kinds of illegal articles in that vehicle. The police then pursue that vehicle. The police see how a parcel is thrown out of the window. The car is pursued and the persons concerned are brought back to where the parcel lies next to the road. It may be dagga or it may he some kind of tablets. The question that immediately arises is whether that person was in possession of that parcel or not. Is he responsible or not? Now I have to place the onus on him. I have a presumption and the presumption is placed on him. He is guilty of having had that parcel in his possession, because the police themselves saw him throwing it out of the car. The onus rests on him until he can prove that the parcel was not thrown out of his car, but that it dropped from heaven. That is to say, if he can prove that. This is the kind of problem one has to combat by means of this measure. One cannot do otherwise. I am not a lawyer, but I honestly cannot see the difference between what the hon. member for Musgrave suggested and what is contained in the Bill. The suggestion that it must be proved that a person did not have it in his possession, or to prove the contrary, as the Bill now reads, is only a matter of playing with words as far as I am concerned. I should like to hear more from hon. members about that. The lawyers on our side can debate it, hut to me there really is no difference in this regard. Let us look at the definition of “possess” again, before drawing further conclusions. “Possess” includes “keeping, storing or having in custody or under control or supervision”. This is the definition of “possess” as it reads at present. If this is taken in conjunction with the whole situation, you only have to prove that you did not do any of those things in respect of the parcel. If you can prove that, you are innocent. However, if you cannot prove it, you are guilty until you can prove the contrary. I do not see the point of the Opposition’s amendment. As far as I am concerned, the two are the same.

Mr. Chairman, could the hon. the Minister give me an answer in regard to my query in connection with clause 10 (1) (c), namely whether a medical man is entitled to prescribe drugs for a patient in excess of 30 days' requirement?

Mr. Chairman, the position is very clear. In clause 4 of this Bill the rights of medical practitioners as laid down in their present Act are protected. In terms of their present Act they have the right to prescribe any quantity. The fact just remains that the patient must have a prescription. The quantity he has with him, may not exceed the quantity prescribed for him. However, this does not prevent the doctor from making his prescription as he wants to. Clause 4 protects him in respect of the powers he has in terms of his own Act. This Act will be amended later if it should appear necessary.

Mr. Chairman, this is the clause which gives the power to detain for interrogation persons who are suspected upon reasonable grounds of withholding any information relating to drug offences from the police. I wish to move the first portion of the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows:

Mr. Chairman, there is other legislation like this on the Statute Book. Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act, 1966, provides that for certain purposes, the person suspected of being guilty under the Terrorism Act, the Sabotage Act and under certain sections of the Supression of Communism Act, namely those parts relating to training for sabotage and terrorism overseas, could be arrested and detained for interrogation. The principle as introduced by the Government, was that the person should come before a judge of the Supreme Court within 14 days and he would then lay down the conditions of detention applying to such a person or he could order the release of that person, having inquired into the matter and having heard both sides of the story. We were prepared to accept that power of interrogation of these persons, because it was necessary. But we were prepared to accept it only because there was control by the courts. We are prepared to accept this power subject to the controls which we feel should be incorporated in this legislation. Therefore, the first aspect of my amendment is that before a magistrate can grant the warrant of arrest for detention, he should not only do it on the ground of information submitted to him by the public prosecutor. That is not enough, because he will just be reading from a docket or what is second-hand information which has come into his hands and the veracity of which cannot be checked. Therefore, we feel that whatever evidence is placed before the judicial officer in this instance, should be evidence on oath just as is provided for in section 22 of the General Laws Amendment Act of 1966. In the second place, we feel that the judicial officer making this order, should also, as under the former Act, determine the conditions subject to which such a person shall be detained for interrogation. That will improve this clause considerably. We also feel there should be a right of appeal in certain circumstances and according to certain procedures.

Although this appears in my name on the Order Paper I only move the amendment up to “determine” while the hon. member for Musgrave will move the rest of the amendment appearing in my name because that goes together with the amendment standing on the Order Paper in his name.

I want to say at once that I accept this amendment. I indicated during the Second Reading already that I would accept an amendment of this nature. The amendment of the hon. member improves the position. It means that one cannot simply make a wild allegation, but that the person making the allegation, must do so under oath. It is therefore an improvement, as is the fact that the magistrate must be able to lay down the conditions under which a person is detained.

Mr. Chairman, I move the second part of the amendment which stands in the name of the hon. member for Durban North and which has as object the addition of subsection (6) to this clause, as follows—

1. (6) (a) The detainee shall have the right to appeal against any order made by a magistrate under this section to a judge of the Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court having jurisdiction in the area where the magistrate has jurisdiction in camera.
2. (b) Whenever the detainee appears before a magistrate in terms of this section the magistrate shall inform the detainee of his rights of appeal in terms of this section.
3. (c) If a detainee wishes to appeal against such order he shall state forthwith, upon oath or otherwise, grounds or reasons upon which he wishes to appeal and such statement shall be recorded by the magistrate.
4. (d) Such recorded statement, together with a record of such other evidence or information which was before such magistrate when he made the order being appealed against shall he lodged with the Registrar or Assistant Registrar of the Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court referred to within two days, accompanied by a certificate by such magistrate that the record so lodged is a true copy of the statement and other evidence of information which was before him when he made such order.
5. (e) Upon receipt of the documents referred to in paragraph (d) the Registrar or Assistant Registrar shall forthwith lay such documents before a judge who shall, having regard to the record referred to in paragraph (d) by certificate endorsed on such record confirm, vary or set aside such order of the Magistrate.
6. (f) The judge shall have the right/power to order that the detainee or any other person appear before him at any time and at any place to answer such questions as the judge may wish to ask in order to determine what decision he should make in terms of paragraph (c) of this subsection.

At the same time I move the following amendment standing in my name—

This really goes together with the previous amendment. This means that I do not move the first amendment which stands in my name.

The amendments I moved provide for a limited form of appeal to a judge of the provincial or local division of the Supreme Court. I should like to emphasize that this is in fact a limited form of appeal. It is limited particularly because we do not provide for any form of legal representation, This I want to emphasize in case the Minister thinks that by accepting the amendment this Committee would be nullifying subsection (5) which provides that “no person, other than an officer in the service of the State acting in the performance of his official duties, shall have access to a person detained”. We accept this subsection; we see the necessity for it and should not like to see it being tampered with in any way. So I emphasize that the form of appeal we are suggesting is a limited one in the sense that no legal representation is being provided for— in other words, it will not be necessary for the procedure to be followed that an accused must call in his legal representative to draft grounds of appeal and appear on his behalf. All that is being provided is that he shall merely state what he wishes to bring before the judge. He should do that in the form of a written statement, which could be on oath if so provided. This then could be placed before the judge together with the record of the proceedings before the magistrate.

I hope the hon. the Minister will accept this amendment because clause 13 provides for what amounts to a detention for an unlimited period of time. The only limit to the period lies in the attitude of the magistrate to the person concerned. The magistrate is empowered to enquire whether the person concerned has satisfactorily replied at his interrogation to all questions and whether it will serve any useful purpose to detain him further. If the magistrate comes to the conclusion that all questions have been satisfactorily replied to, then he must obviously release the detainee. Similarly, if he comes to the conclusion that further detention will serve no useful purpose, he must again release the detainee. This means that the detention although unlimited as to time is limited when it comes to the findings of the magistrate in regard to these two matters. This is one man's opinion and while I accept that the magistrate may be perfectly bona fide in his approach, that there may be nothing objectionable in his approach, it still is only one man’s opinion. The object of appeals in our courts is to bring another mind to bear on the problem. The fact that appeals are very often allowed, that a superior court often takes a different view, even an Appeal Court to a matter presided over by a judge, shows how necessary it is that there should be provision in cases of this sort for another mind to be brought to bear upon the matter, and for someone else to give consideration to the problem. The procedure we have suggested is simple, and will not give rise to the undue complications. It is simple one of presenting the record and the accused’s statement to the judge who can then review the position and if necessary call the detainee personally before him—in other words, he can place himself in exactly the same position as the magistrate was in dealing with the subject.

I should like to point out that the definition of “magistrate” in the definitions clause includes any magistrate, even a very junior magistrate, one who has had as yet very little experience. We suggest that it is reasonable in that event to give a Judge the power to hear anew a case which was placed before a magistrate—in other words, to reconsider the position and to decide for himself whether or not the attitude of the magistrate was reasonable. I would point out also to the hon. the Minister that if the provisions of clause 13 operate in a smaller centre, the probability is that the same magistrate, the same person, will reconsider the detainee’s position at every inquiry. The same person will hear the case; the same prosecutor will put the case for the Stale and the tendency under such circumstances is that the magistrate will not have as impartial an approach, simply because he has heard the story over and over again, as an independent Judge reviewing the case anew would have. I would therefore urge the hon. the Minister to accept this amendment, and I stress that it is a simple procedure, it does not involve legal representations. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I intend to vote against this entire clause. As I said in the Second Reading debate, this is one of the main reasons why I opposed the Second Reading in principle. I am against any more laws on our Statute Book which allow for detention without trial. I do not know why it is necessary to insert this provision in this particular law. I do not know of any other country in the Western world that has anything remotely resembling this provision in the fight against drug abuse, and other countries are engaged in fights against abuse as well. In Britain they have a Standing Committee which advises the Government on drug abuse; America has Presidential Committees which do the same thing, and strong police action is taken in all these countries, I know of no country where provisions have been introduced into the permanent law on the Statute Books which allow the police to detain people without trial on the evidence of a policeman or the statement of the public prosecutor. This does allow for a person to be brought before a magistrate but as far as I am concerned, Sir, that is not sufficient protection. Take the case of a young person who is detained under this clause on suspicion of knowing something—because that is what the clause provides for—about drug-dealing or about premises where drugs are used. He is held incommunicado. There is no need for anybody to be informed that he has been taken. Will the hon. the Minister undertake that the parents of young people will be informed that they have been detained under this law, or are we going to have the same sort of procedure that we have under section 6 of the Terrorism Act where people run round in circles trying to find out what has happened to people who have disappeared? Is any information going to be given to the parents of young people who are detained under this law? Because, as various committees investigating drug abuse have found, the major proportion of people using drugs and dealing in drugs are young people between the ages of 18 and 25 and even younger people. The Children’s Act and the Criminal Procedure Act, do not mention a word about detention because those detention laws were framed long after those Acts were put on the Statute Book and, to the best of my knowledge, they have not been amended to accommodate the new conditions. Is there going to be any protection for people under the age of 18 who are detained under this law? I would like the hon. the Minister to answer those questions.

Sir, the so-called protection afforded by the magistrate having to see the detainee once every fortnight is not very great protection. Take the case of a young person who is taken into detention; he is not allowed to see anybody; he is held incommunicado without legal advice and brought before a magistrate. Sir, this person is in no position to defend himself. He does not know how to start. The average person who does not know court proceedings or who has never appeared before a court before really does not know how to defend himself, and this is why I am absolutely shocked at the fact that the amendment moved by the Official Opposition excludes legal representation. What has happened to their respect for the rule of law?

The normal rule of law is that you are not detained unless you are charged with an offence and unless you have been given an opportunity of knowing what the offence is supposed to be. You are given the opportunity of defending yourself and of getting legal advice and legal representation. Then, thereafter if you are judged guilty by a court of law, you can, of course, be sent to prison. But this does not in any way fall within the normal definition of the rule of law. I cannot understand why the Official Opposition, in terms of its amendment, does not allow such a person to have legal representation. Sir, such a person is not guilty; such a person is merely suspected of having knowledge of drug-dealing or the use of drugs on premises. Why should such a person not be entitled to any legal representation? I am dead against this clause because it goes against every normal concept of the rule of law and civil liberties, and I shall vote against it,

Sir, arising out of the argument of hon. members of the Opposition, I should just like to point out that the information which is being required here, the information which is actually being sought in this clause, is information relating to dealing in drugs. Everything refers back to dealing in drugs; in other words, everything refers back to the murderer. It is the murderer we want to get our hands on here. As far as I am concerned therefore, no provision can be strict enough if it enables us to get hold of this murderer. That is the basic premise as far as clause 13 is concerned. My standpoint is that there are enough safety valves in the clause to make provision for those things the hon. member for Musgrave for example, is concerned about. The hon. member for Musgrave would like to have some other person decide on this problem as well, But there are sufficient safety valves here, for in the first instance this information must be submitted under oath to the magistrate; in the second instance, it must be done by the public prosecutor. We are dealing here, as far as the public prosecutor and the magistrate are concerned, regardless of their age and regardless of their experience, with trained people. We cannot say to a young magistrate, who is able to try an accused person on a serious charge and sentence him, that a trial under these measures cannot be entrusted to him because he is too young and inexperienced. Here we have two trained people who have to consider information, given under oath.

A further safety valve lies therein that the person is admitted within a certain period of time to one of the places described here and is interrogated there by the magistrate. If the magistrate is convinced that the detainee has replied to all the questions at the interrogation satisfactorily, or that it would serve no useful purpose to detain him any further, he can release him. In other words, all the man has to do is reply to the questions put to him satisfactorily. But if he does not want to give a satisfactory reply to those questions, if he wants to continue to protect that murderer, what sympathy can he then expect? If he replies satisfactorily, he may be released. A further safety valve is the fact that he must be brought before a magistrate every 14 days, and what obligation is being laid upon the magistrate in that case? At every such appearance the magistrate must satisfy himself again as to whether the person is replying to the questions satisfactorily. The obligation is therefore placed on the magistrate to satisfy himself again on each such occasion what the position in respect of that person is. Even if the magistrate is a young, inexperienced person, the obligation rests on him that he has to satisfy himself.

Then there is the further safety valve that the detainee may at any time make representations in writing to the magistrate relating to his detention or release. This of course also relates to the other parts of the section which deal with the question of whether or not he is giving satisfactory information. Therefore I cannot share the concern of the hon. member for Musgrave and the other hon. members for I feel that there are enough safety valves in this clause which can be applied by people who are trained and people whose objectivity we must at all times accept. I cannot in any respect associate myself with any objection which is being raised which could indicate that the magistrate or prosecutor may in any respect be acting subjectively.

I cannot accept the explanation of the hon. member for Potchefstroom as satisfactory. Let me give him one reply to his argument. If we could be certain that magistrates never made mistakes, there might be something in his argument, but we have frequent cases of magistrates, and even Judges, making mistakes. This is the point that I was getting at. The man may be acting perfectly bona fide, but he may be wrong, and if you are expecting the same man to be hearing this inquiry fortnight after fortnight you do not do justice to the person concerned. I accept that there are various steps which must be taken, which were referred to by the hon. member for Potchefstroom. First of all there is the submission which must be on oath, etc. He has detailed them and I do not wish to repeat them. I accept the point that the hon. member for Potchefstroom makes that the accused can at any time make a statement to the magistrate and that is a further safeguard. I accept all that, but I say that in the final analysis it is the magistrate who must decide on these two things, whether he has satisfactorily replied to the questions or not, and whether there is any useful purpose in keeping him detained. The hon. member for Potchefstroom says he can easily get over that; he must just answer the questions satisfactorily. But the point is that you may get a situation where the detainee says this is all the information he has and he does not know anything more; and yet the prosecutor may feel that because of circumstances, because of other evidence, he must know more. He must know, for example, the names of other people in the ring, or he must be in possession of other information because of the circumstances. This detainee may genuinely not have this information, although the other facts and circumstances may suggest that he should. The whole question is whether he has or has not satisfactorily replied to all the questions. He will say he has and he may genuinely consider that he has. The magistrate and the prosecutor may feel that because of the circumstances, he has not. Surely in such a situation it is reasonable that another mind should bear on the subject, because, as I say, magistrates can be wrong. One must accept that, and the fact that the same man may hear it over and over again, emphasizes the need for having another mind bearing on the subject. Furthermore, the hon. member for Potchefstroom has dealt very lightly with the point I made that this may be a very junior and inexperienced magistrate. He says no matter how junior or how inexperienced he is, he has the qualifications. But this is a very simple way of approaching it. It is true that he must be properly qualified in order to be appointed a magistrate, but because of his inexperience he may very well tend to be more severe in dealing with a matter of this sort, or because of his inexperience he may tend to accept the view of a prosecutor who says to him: He has not answered satisfactorily, and I ask that he be kept in further detention.

He may be an assistant additional Bantu commissioner.

So I do think that if you couple clause 13 with the definition of “ magistrate" and have regard to the fact that comparatively junior and inexperienced magistrates may deal with this matter, the amendment which we suggest for an appeal to the Judge, in the limited form which we propose, is a very reasonable request to make. I do hope that the hon. the Minister will give serious consideration to it.

I rise to support the hon. member for Musgrave for this reason. We must remember that we are now dealing with magistrates and detention. You want to destroy the source of the drug, and much of it will be in the Bantu Reserves. We know that the policy is that in Bantu Reserves you have magistrates and Bantu commissioners and more and more power is being given to them, and in fact Bantu magistrates have been appointed. I rise to support this in order to protect the Government, the Department of Justice and the Department of Bantu Administration against any mistake happening. Here we are dealing with people who will be dealing with their own people, and you know as well as I do, Sir, that they are harder on them than anyone else. Here we must have the hand that can guide and look after the whole procedure.

I want to deal first with the hon. member for Houghton, who rejects the clause as a whole and who has objected to the fact that the Opposition does not want to object because we are depriving the man of the right of access to his legal representation. I want to begin by saying that I made it very clear in my Second Reading speech what the reasons are for our inserting this clause here. The only way, as we interpret the matter, in which we can trace the network which normally lies behind this entire scheme, is when one is able to obtain the necessary evidence. And if you are not able to deal with a person in this way, and if you therefore have to give him immediate access to his legal representative, you are simply saying to him that he need not say a word: your legal representative speaks on your behalf, and you need not say a word. And then you can do whatever you like, you will not get that evidence from him. This morning it still happens that I have very good evidence to help me in this case, and it comes from the Cape Times. As a result of this legislation there was apparently a reaction in London, and there a certain Dr. George Birdwood commented on it. He is Chairman of the London Regional Association for the Prevention of Addiction. To a large extent he rejects our legislation. He says our legislation is too crude, it is phrased too harshly, and he is afraid that it will have the reaction of causing a rift between the people and us, etc. But there is an interesting item towards the end of the article which I want to read out—

This man, who has the knowledge, says he feels it is worthwhile trying to apply strict measures. But then I come to what I actually wanted to quote—

Why? Because they do not have a clause 13. That is why they are impotent. They are unable to do so because they do not have a clause 13. That is why they are powerless. The article goes on to say—

In other words, here we have the written admission of a person who has to deal with this problem in Britain, that it has assumed “classic proportions”. He says that they are only able to get hold of the small-time operator, but not the big brain behind it all. Why not? I maintain that it is because they do not have provisions as in clause 13 with which they can get at a person and force him to give evidence. That is why they are powerless. In their impotence they now want to adopt a more moderate attitude towards these substances, and dagga in particular. They do not have the measures with which to solve the problem. Nor do they have the courage to apply the measures South Africa is applying. That is why they now want to take a more tolerant view of the evil. They now say that it is not really as serious as all that and also that they should not concern themselves too much about the evil. That is precisely what South Africa will not do, and that is why I need clause 13, and I shall have it. Britain’s experience as seen in this statement, convinces me that we need clause 13 to enable us to take effective action. We shall definitely need clause 13.

I want to reply to the arguments of the Opposition. I have already accepted the amendment of the hon. member for Durban North. I have said that I think it is an improvement on the present Bill. It makes it more efficient. I want to make a few remarks in regard to the recommendations of the hon. member for Musgrave. The hon. member said that it is one man’s opinion, the magistrate’s opinion as a result of which a person is being released or not being released. I want to limit myself to saying that it is not the opinion of one man. At that stage too it must also be the opinion of the public prosecutor or of the police. Otherwise they would already have released him. They are therefore also of the opinion that he has information which he is withholding. When that person is brought before the magistrate, the position is that the magistrate must also be convinced that this is the case. I want to go further. The other position is also very clear. The hon. member said that perhaps the magistrate could not form an opinion on such a situation, particularly if it was a young magistrate, for example. The fact remains however that the moment a magistrate is appointed he is given according to law, the right to try cases which are much more serious than these cases, when he has to decide whether or not a man is trying to withhold evidence. The magistrate is given the power to make decisions and to impose sentences in certain cases. In terms of the present legislation he is given the right to sentence a man to a fine of R1 000 or to five years’ imprisonment in respect of dagga. Under the present Act the magistrate has these powers. In addition to that I just want to say—and this is not a reference to any person that I have every confidence in our legal system and magistrates and believe that if a person is appointed to such a position he must have the experience and training to be able to form a judgment. The hon. member said that magistrates make mistakes. I agree with that view. Everyone makes mistakes. On this side of the grave all of us make mistakes. It is true that no person is infallible. The Judge is not infallible either. From the nature of the case he, too may make mistakes. That is why I want to make it very clear that I cannot concede to these ideas, although I know that the Opposition feels quite strongly about this matter. I have considered the matter thoroughly from all angles and have looked into all the problems in this regard. I really cannot deal with the situation as has been proposed. The point is that a man has the right, after we have apprehended him, to appear before a magistrate within 60 hours. Then he can state his case there. If the person in question acts correctly, he can be released within 60 hours. In other words, it is no problem for him to be released if he wants to co-operate. This type of arrangement we have already had in two laws in the past. Similar provisions appear in the General Law Amendment Act of 1966. Therein it is provided that he may lodge an appeal with a Judge. In the Terrorism Act, Act No. 83 of 1967, precisely the same as we are providing here is very clearly provided there. There is no appeal to a Judge in the 1967 Act. On the contrary, section 6 (5) of that Act is virtually identical to clause 13 (4) we have in this Bill. In other words, it is almost precisely the same situation. What is our object with this detention? It is not a punitive measure against that man. Our object here is to get from that person the information he has and through withholding which he is protecting an unscrupulous drug pedlar. That is the object we set ourselves. The detention in terms of clause 13 is in fact aimed at getting people who have information on smuggling to furnish that information. The actual premise is therefore that it must be possible to detain him. This is a powerful weapon to persuade a person to furnish that information eventually. In the first place, if he knows that be can appeal to a Judge, he will say nothing. He will say nothing before he hears what the Judge is going to do, because the Judge may perhaps release him. I am convinced that this will be the case, because this is what we have learned from experience. The moment such a person knows that the opportunity for an appeal to a Judge exists, he is certainly not going to say anything before he has appeared before that Judge.

The hon. member for Durban North tried to expedite in his amendment the procedure for the submissions of a statement, for he said that it should be done within two days; but in the meantime, while this procedure is still in progress, the criminal we actually want to get our hands on, gets away. The actual smuggler, on whom we want the evidence, is then given the necessary leeway and enough time to get away. He is then for example given a chance to get out of the country, because he knows that that man is perhaps going to talk. It gives him enough leeway to leave the country if that is in any way possible for in this way he gains time.

To that I want to add the following: The indefinite detention is a powerful instrument to force the unwilling person to divulge his information quickly. As I have already said, clause 17 is nothing new. It is cast in the mould of the Terrorism Act of 1967. Any person who does not want to furnish information voluntarily will not divulge it either if he thinks that it is possible that a Judge may order his release. The uncertainty in which he finds himself is in fact the greatest motivation for him to throw in the towel and to start talking, for then he does not know how long he is going to be detained. However, if he knows that there is going to be an appeal or that he will be able to speak to his legal representative after a certain number of days, it simply means that he has a goal. All he has to do is to hold out until that stage, and then he has a chance of getting away. If he does not know where that goal is, he will in his own interests and in the interests of the country divulge the information he has much sooner. For that specific psychological reason I am therefore not in a position to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with interest to what the hon. the Minister has had to say in turning down our amendment. In particular I was interested in his reference to magistrates and the powers they exercise. He referred to the fact that a magistrate can give judgment relating to matters involving as much as R1 000. Therefore they are given power by the State, which regards them as responsible people.

I cannot talk so much for the magistrates and the assistant magistrates in the Department of Justice, but I would like to refer to the question of the Bantu commissioners. It is well known that there is a shortage of suitably trained commissioners. Assistant commissioners are now being appointed who are young men with very little service and with no legal training whatsoever. I have been in court when a commissioner has had to take a young clerk and put him on the bench beside him, where he would then proceed to show him how to make entries in the different books they have to keep. When I inquired from the commissioner why he was doing so, I was told that this clerk was going to be appointed as an assistant Bantu commissioner and would have to try cases in one of the smaller villages. That clerk had had no experience whatsoever. Because of the fact that the definition of “magistrate" includes an assistant magistrate, we feel that some precautions should be taken. I appeal to the Minister to alter the definition in cases such as this under this clause, so that only a magistrate himself will have these powers. I should like to point out to the Minister also that an assistant commissioner cannot hear an appeal from the chief’s court. A commissioner, or a magistrate, as he is generally known, or an additional magistrate may hear such an appeal, but not an assistant magistrate, because there is a difference in their status. I therefore want to ask the Minister whether he will not consider amending this clause in that regard. He need not do so now. He can consider the matter first, but I do feel that there should be some restriction. The Minister has said that magistrates can hear serious cases, but I should like to point out that in the case of ordinary cases under the Criminal Law and under Civil Law, there is always the right of appeal from their judgments to another court. In terms of clause 13, however, there can be no appeal to anybody else. That is what we are against Some right of appeal should be allowed. If the Minister is afraid that the person they want to convict may get away while an appeal is being considered, can he not consider setting a time limit within which an appeal may not be made? Can provision not be made for such an appeal to be lodged after a period of two weeks, for instance? The person they are really after will then not be able to get away during that time. I repeat that I should like the Minister to reconsider the question of junior officers being allowed to deal with such serious matters.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has raised certain points in regard to our amendment, and the hon. member for Transkei has now reacted to certain of those points, I also want to reply to a few of the points made by the hon. the Minister, which have not yet been dealt with. In the first place the 1966 Act was mentioned. In 1967, when the hon. the Minister of Justice did not retain the provisions of the 1966 Act, he said, if I remember correctly, that he was taking that step because it was difficult to find a judge. That was the only objection he had, as far as I can remember. With this clause that is not the case at all. We can at any time find a magistrate, and consequently that is not a good point.

Then there is the question of the time which a person has to get away. The Minister said that such a person could get away while the possibility of an appeal to a judge still existed. However, I cannot see how accepting this amendment could actually increase the chance of that person getting away, because the person who is being detained can always refuse to speak. He is brought before a magistrate every 14 days, and I cannot therefore understand why this would make any difference, because the judge, just as the magistrate himself, can also terminate such a person’s detention, The magistrate may himself, after such a person has appeared before him a third or a fourth time, put an end to that person’s detention, and a judge cannot do anything else. As the hon. member for Transkei correctly said, it is true that when a sentence in any other case has been imposed by a junior magistrate, a right to appeal exists. It is in fact true that a junior magistrate is able to impose a sentence of as much as five years’ imprisonment, but the right to appeal still exists in that case, and it is precisely that right which does not exist in this case.

I come now to the last point I want to make hon. members on the opposite side, just as we on this side of the House, set great store by South Africa’s interests and our image. This point affects many other matters. I am thinking for example of sport relationships, which could be affected as a result of judicial matters or matters of the nature we are now discussing. It could perhaps be interpreted that we are now doing something bad. Hon. members know that there are many people who want to present our case in the wrong light, and that there are others who, on the other hand, will misinterpret it. I think that this palliative, as proposed in the amendment, should be accepted, unless there are very good reasons why it cannot be accepted. We are not giving in to the opinion of people overseas. We are viewing this matter solely from the point of view of our own interests. That is the only approach I have to this matter.

In the light of these arguments, together with the others which have been raised, I want to request the hon. the Minister to consider this amendment very carefully. I can understand that the hon. the Minister may perhaps have one objection in this regard which would prevent him from accepting this amendment. He may wonder whether this right of appeal against any judgment, would not possibly lead to too many appeals. That is of course a practical abjection he could have to this amendment. But I am very certain that we will be able to work out an amendment which would eliminate this practical objection. Since the time the Opposition had at its disposal was very limited, and it was therefore forced to draw up its amendments in short order, one can understand that there could be room for improvement. However, I am certain that it will be possible to eliminate some of these practical objections. It is quite probably practical problems of this nature which made it impossible for the Department to recommend something like this to the Minister. Consequently I am asking that this amendment should not be summarily rejected and that we be given time, perhaps in the Other Place, to ponder it.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the additional arguments which have been raised on both sides of the House in this connection. I want to say at once to the hon. member for Transkei that I shall consider the matter he raised. I did not have enough time to give it full consideration, and cannot therefore make a decision in regard to it now. I shall consider whether something could be done about it, and if the necessary cover is not there, I shall consult with my colleague, the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in regard to it, for as the hon. member himself said, it deals principally with people who fall under his Department. I am not committing myself in this connection, but if it is in fact found necessary and is possible, I shall move an amendment in the Other Place to remedy the matter.

I want to return to the arguments raised by hon. members in regard to the right of appeal as such. One of the arguments raised on that side of the House, the problem of the uncertainty of finding a judge, is in fact an argument which I, on my part, also wish to raise. Hon. members stated that the case should be submitted to a judge within two days and that he would then be able to decide, then the judge would be able to decide whether the person in question should be brought before him, etc. My whole objection to this is based on the simple practical reason that the moment a person is told that he has a right of appeal to a judge in regard to a certain matter after a certain time, even if it is only 30 days as the hon. member for Transkei suggested, this is in fact an indication to this detainee that he merely has to hold out for 30 days and that he will subsequently be able to appear before a judge, and may perhaps be able to get off.

No, he cannot go to the judge.

Yes, but then his case can be brought before the judge. In other words, he immediately has the assurance that as long as he says nothing for 30 days, the case will be brought before the judge and then there is a chance of his getting off. In this way we would be giving such a detainee a goal. That I do not want to do, for psychological reasons. I do not want to give him a goal, for if he does not know how long he could be detained, he will talk within the first week, But if he knows that he will he able, after 30 days, to lay his case before a judge, he will say nothing during those 30 days. It must be in his own interests to divulge any information he has as quickly as possible. What purpose would it serve to hold out for three or four weeks if you know that you will be detained until such time as you do divulge that information? That is the reason why I feel that I cannot accede to this request. As for our image overseas, I agree with the hon. member for Pinelands. In my other capacity, as Minister of Information, I am particularly concerned about our image overseas. From the nature of the case I understand the problem in this context better than any other Minister. So I do therefore understand the hon. member’s argument. But the one advantage we have in regard to this matter is that this problem is emerging in numerous countries in the world. They have the same problems overseas and the same inability to deal with them. There, too, they are experimenting by implementing legislation in this connection in order to determine what is effective and what is not effective. I am convinced that this evil, as we see it today, and as it is manifesting itself in various countries, will cause the idea to take root among those people that although these are extraordinary measures, this is South Africa’s way of dealing with it. I am convinced that when we defend it, as we are at present defending and explaining it here, we will find the necessary respect and the necessary understanding on the part of those people. I am prepared to listen to further arguments in this connection. I shall also, as I have just said, look into the matter broached by the hon. member for Transkei. However, I must add that I am sorry, but I cannot accept the concept of an appeal.

This is the clause which provides that the magistrate’s court shall have jurisdiction in respect of offences under this measure. We do not agree that magistrates should have jurisdiction in respect of these offences. In the first place, the ordinary jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court is six months’ imprisonment. The regional courts have a maximum jurisdiction of three years. Not only are magistrate’s courts given jurisdiction in respect of the minimum sentences of five years or ten years but they are here given a discretion to determine whether on conviction for a first offence the sentence shall be between five years and 15 years and, on conviction for a second offence, between ten years and 25 years. I want to say that it is not fair in our view to the magistrates concerned that they should have this huge jurisdiction and have to exercise their discretion in this regard. The jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court has remained more or less unchanged throughout the long history of our criminal law, under both the United Party Government and for 23 years under this Government. There has always been a distinction between the jurisdiction of magistrates in respect of sentences, viz. six months, and the jurisdiction of regional magistrates, viz. three years, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which is unlimited. That distinction has remained for good reasons. I am pleased that the hon. the Minister of Justice is here. I am sure that he will support the view that that difference exists for good reasons. It was not just arbitrarily fixed, and in fact the regional courts were introduced to make provision for the discrepancy between the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s courts and of the Supreme Court. Sir, I want to move the amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Firstly we wish the discretion as to sentences such as these to remain where they have been over these years and that is with the Supreme Court. Sir, the other advantage of my amendment is going to be this: It may be argued that you cannot bring a case to trial before a Supreme Court as quickly as you can in a magistrate's court. By and large this is perfectly true. But this Government introduced the provision that an attorney-general may order a summary trial. In other words, you do not have a preparatory trial in a magistrate’s court before the case is tried in the Supreme Court; you may immediately proceed to the Supreme Court as you do now to a magistrate’s court without a preparatory examination and have a summary trial. This amendment of mine provides that you may have a summary trial, that you may bring the matter quickly before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court will then exercise its discretion as to sentence. Sir, sentence is always a matter of discretion. Apart from the minimum, which is five years for a first offence in respect of certain offences and ten years for a second offence, the sentences vary, within the discretion of the court, from five to 15 years and from 10 to 25 years. This is the sort of discretion that should be exercised by the most senior of our judicial officers with the experience that they have and with the peculiar and particular qualifications that they have to do this.

In regard to sentences, I said that in respect of a court’s discretion it is very hard, on appeal, to have a sentence altered. Our courts have said over the years that the only grounds upon which they will interfere with a sentence imposed in the discretion of a judicial officer, are either if it induces in them a sense of shock, or if the magistrate misdirected himself in imposing that sentence. The important point is that they are not entitled to draw upon their own experience and say: “In these circumstances I would have acted differently; I would have imposed a different sentence.” They are bound by the discretion of that judicial officer and they can only interfere in the first place if it induces in them a sense of shock, and one has to go an awful long way in order to induce a sense of shock in an Appeal Court in relation to a sentence. Secondly, they can interfere if they feel that the magistrate has misdirected himself. For those reasons the ordinary appeal and the ordinary right of review do not, as far as sentence is concerned, have the same salutary effect as it does in respect of the merits of the case, when a man is found guilty or not guilty. I do hope that the hon. the Minister will see his way dear to accepting this amendment. As I have said, it will produce a quick and efficient method of bringing these trials to court. The procedure will be as quick as it is in the magistrate’s court, and may indeed in many instances even be quicker. It will certainly be quicker than in the case of the regional court, and it will provide senior judicial officers, our Judges, with the sort of discretion they ought to have in regard to sentences of this nature.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that I wish this clause had not been clause 14, and that it had rather been clause 2, because then I might have received some support from the official Opposition when I opposed clauses 2, 3 and 6. In this clause minimum sentences and very high maximum sentences are provided for, and these sentences can now be imposed at the discretion of a magistrate. As the hon. member correctly said, these sentences should not be left to the discretion of a magistrate. They should be in the hands of the Supreme Court, because very severe penalties indeed are provided for here. Particularly when one examines this in relation to the presumption, one feels that this matter should not be left to the magistrate. I support everything the hon. member for Durban North has said about this clause, but I find it very difficult to see why they were prepared to allow these heavy sentences under earlier clauses, because they will also be administered by magistrates. Perhaps they have information that the hon. the Minister is going to accept this amendment. If they do, I can understand the logic behind their actions, but if they do not believe that the hon. the Minister is going to accept their amendment. I really cannot see how they could have supported these heavy sentences which were provided for in earlier clauses.

Mr. Chairman, with respect to these matters the position is that magistrates already determine whether a man is guilty or not. Convictions and sentences in cases concerning dagga, etc., are already in the hands of magistrates. In other words, the same discretion that a magistrate must exercise at present, with regard to the evidence before him, will also be exercised in future. That aspect is, therefore, not changed. The fact that the Act now prescribes minimum and maximum penalties is, in my opinion, facilitating a magistrate’s task, because now the legislature is giving a clear indication of what it regards as a reasonable penalty. The same discretion in deciding whether a person is guilty or not guilty, a magistrate already has today in connection with dagga, for example. At present he has that authority. The case need not go to a higher court. By way of these provisions in the legislation, the legislature is actually imposing the penalty. I therefore want to state that it is going to be easier for the magistrate, as far as penalties are concerned, than it is at present, because the legislature gives a clear indication of what it regards as a reasonable penalty. I want to add the following. The other problem is a practical one. I said in the Second Reading that this Act must be practicable. I hope the Act is going to serve its purpose in reducing the number of offences, but does the hon. member realize that if I concede to his amendment, the Supreme Court will have an additional 30 000 cases on its roll annually?

That is the present position, and the question is whether the Supreme Court will be able to handle that without extra staff and all the necessary additions. The provision that not a Supreme Court, but an ordinary magistrate, should deal with the matter already exists as section 61 (3) of the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act, Act No. 13 of 1928. The same provision is at present included there. I acknowledge that the penalties have been increased, but this House accepts responsibility for the increased penalties, and it is not for the magistrate to decide about that. The legislature gives very clear indications and guidelines about what it regards as the necessary penalties. My whole feeling is that we are dealing here with a factual situation. The magistrate uses his discretion, with regard to the information he has, to determine whether the man is guilty or not guilty. The moment he finds him guilty, which he also has to do at present, then he can, according to the provisions of this legislation, as laid down in clause 2, clause 3 and the other clauses, immediately decide what his penalty must be. In other words it actually facilitates his task and makes it practicable, in the first place, and in the second place because the man at present does, in fact, have the discretion, I unfortunately cannot accept this amendment.

The hon. the Minister has given us reasons why he unfortunately, as he says, is not able to accept this amendment. I would like to deal with his argument and I am sure that he will listen very carefully. The hon. the Minister said that in fact he is simplifying the task of the judicial officer by setting limits to the sentence, and that therefore punishment is less difficult. Therefore you can leave it to a less qualified man. But I want rather to direct the hon. the Minister’s attention to what I believe is a much more fundamental question, namely that our whole legal system is arranged so that it is our Judges who take those crimes where a sentence in excess of a certain amount may be involved, and only in the case of crimes likely to involve much lesser sentences is the jurisdiction given to the magistrates.

This is absolutely fundamental to our system and if we accept this principle that in a matter where a man can get a 25 years’ sentence, a magistrate is the man to impose such a sentence, we are departing fundamentally from the whole scheme of our judicial system. One might say that if you can apply it here, why do you not apply it to virtually every other case? This is such an absolutely fundamental question and negation of our whole approach to our superior and our inferior courts, that I think any hon. Minister or Parliament should think very seriously before introducing such an exception. One hardly needs to add to that point, but there is also the fact that in these cases now, for good reasons, there are a variety of presumptions in regard to facts which require a good deal of very careful weighing. It is perfectly true, as the hon. the Minister said, that he regards these as factual questions. But so indeed is the case in regard to murder and in regard to so many other matters. They are factual questions, but in their wisdom countries throughout the world have drawn this distinction between those offences carrying high penalties and those carrying low penalties and have submitted to the superior courts the former and to the inferior courts the latter. I again stress that when there are, in addition, as in this case, this extra factor of presumption of one kind or another, there is an added reason for bearing this in mind.

The hon. the Minister then raised the very fair and practical question that an additional 30 000 cases might then go to the Supreme Court. Well, I think we must meet that. I think it would be possible to meet that perhaps by a variation of the amendment of the hon. member for Durban North as it stands. It should be perfectly possible to introduce an amendment to the existing Bill whereby a case goes to the Supreme Court only when the Attorney-General considers that the likely sentence would be in excess of the present jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts. In all cases, therefore, where in the opinion of the Attorney-General the sentence is likely to be less than five years, the cases could go to the magistrates’ courts. In that way, I believe, we would dispose of perhape 25 000 to 27 000, or virtually 95 per cent, of the cases in question. I do hope that the hon. the Minister, doubtless influenced in his opposition to our amendment by this practical aspect, will consider the matter afresh and perhaps say that we can come with an amendment, which would meet this practical aspect, which he would be prepared to accept. I think we then should meet the difficulty with regard to this practical aspect. I certainly was not aware that there are quite as many cases that might be involved, but we can meet that situation. I ask the hon. the Minister, therefore, not to put this legislation completely out of line with our whole system here in South Africa with regard to the court it goes to.

The hon. member should not refer to magistrates’ courts as “inferior courts”.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, that is what they are called in the Criminal Procedure Act—“inferior courts” as against “superior courts”.

I am sorry. I have been out of practice for a long time.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. the Minister has not quite appreciated the purport of this amendment. It is not that the “wetgewer” says what the penalty shall be, the “wetgewer” merely says in this Bill what the minimum penalty shall be. It then leaves the court with a range of discretion in respect of first offences prescribed by section 2 (a) and (c) of ten years. Again, in respect of a second or subsequent conviction in respect of sections 2 (a) and (c), it leaves to their discretion a range of another 15 years over the ten years. They have never before exercised jurisdiction like this. They are not in a position to exercise that discretion because of the nature of their qualifications and experience in the nature of the tradition of our profession. I think that that is the point. It is not a case of the lawgiver saying it is to be a minimum of that and, at your discretion, up to 15 years and, at your discretion, up to 25 years later. That is the difficulty. A further difficulty is, as I have pointed out, that once they have exercised that discretion, albeit wrongly and not in accordance with the manner in which it would be done by a superior court with that traditional experience, there is very little the Appeal Court can do about the sentence in that regard.

The hon. the Minister said there would be approximately 30 000 cases a year going to the Supreme Court. I wonder whether that is so. How many of the 30000 cases the hon. the Minister mentioned are going to be first offenders under sections 2 (b) and (d), that is to say, persons who will he dealt with in accordance with the provisions of clause 2 (d) (iii) and (iv), but (iii) especially. I refer to a first offender who, in respect of section 2 (b) and (d), must be sentenced to a minimum of two years and whose sentence may be less than two years if there are special circumstances in the opinion of the magistrate. I do not have the figures, but I should imagine that this type of case would account for the majority of the prosecutions which will take place in terms of this Act. Two years is within the jurisdiction of a regional court. If the Attorney-General feels that there are circumstances in respect of which a lesser sentence may wel be imposed, he can refer it to that lower court. Therefore, the argument of 33 000 cases that will appear before the Supreme Court, I do not think necessarily applies, because I think, in the initial stages of the implementation of this legislation, these are going to be the majority.

May I just say in conclusion, where before we have provided for a minimum sentence of five years, notably in the General Laws Amendment Act of 1962, and under the Terrorism Act of 1967, we have not extended the jurisdiction in those instances to the magistrates courts. If I may say so, the hon. the Minister did when he introduced this Bill at Second Reading, make an analogy between that sort of situation under that sort of legislation and this sort of legislation. I do not think anything has been said to justify the deviation from this principle as applied by this Government and as accepted in our laws. In 1968 we had the Dangerous Weapons Act which laid down that the minimum penalty was to be two years, but if there were special circumstances, it could be recorded and some other penalty could be prescribed. That was in respect of magistrates courts, A minimum sentence of two years up to a maximum sentence of eight years could be prescribed by a magistrate’s court in rest t of an offence under the Dangerous Weapons Act. But they still had the discretion in that regard. I should imagine the overwhelming majority of the charges brought against persons in terms of the Dangerous Weapons Act, must have been brought in the magistrates courts despite the fact that there was this minimum sentence. The hon. the Minister of Justice can contradict me if I am not correct. Even if the hon. the Minister is still not prepared to accept this amendment, I do hope that he will indicate to us what he is prepared to do about it and whether the thoughts that I have expressed and which he did not deal with, are worthy of consideration and whether they will be considered.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has given two main reasons for giving the magistrates courts jurisdiction under this Bill. The first reason was the large number of cases which are likely to arise under this legislation if recent figures are any indication. He has made the point that such a large number of cases could not be handled by the Supreme Court without additional judges being appointed. I do not wish to spend time on this argument. I think this has been dealt with by the hon. members for Pinelands and Durban North. Both have pointed out that a large number of the cases under this Act are likely to be not the pusher or dealer cases, but the case of the user or the possessor. Those cases could possibly be left in the hands of the magistrate with suitable safeguards.

But regarding the hon. the Minister’s second reason or justification for leaving he matter in the hands of a magistrate, his argument was that under the present legislation, dagga offences are in the hands of magistrates and therefore, there is no reason why the offences under the new Bill should not likewise be left in the hands of the magistrates. With respect to the hon. the Minister, there is no analogy between present dagga offences and the crimes which are being created by this Bill. It is true that it may involve dagga in both cases, but the crimes which will be created under this Bill will have far heavier penalties than the penalties for dagga offences at present. Therefore I do not think that the hon. the Minister can rely on his arguments that magistrates are presently handling dagga offences, with any justification. Those do not have the minimum penalties which are being provided for in this legislation, very severe minimum penalties. Furthermore, they do not have the wide range of conviction, of up to 15 and 25 years, which is the case in this Bill. This brings us an entirely different situation. It means that the magistrate’s court will really be dealing with an entirely different crime. Even though they may still be handling a dagga offence, the crime itself becomes, because of its serious nature, an entirely different one. I would urge the hon. the Minister to review his altitude in the light of this consideration. If the hon. the Minister feels that it is impossible to refer all the cases under this Bill to the Supreme Court, I think he has probably some justification for saying this. This I say in the light of the figures which he has given us. I hope he will indicate whether he will accept the amendment which will provide that at least the more serious cases should be referred to the Supreme Court. Again I want to point out that under the definition of “magistrate” a magistrate is not only what one normally regards as a magistrate, in other words, a fully-fledged magistrate, but also the additional magistrate and the assistant magistrate. Above all, it also includes Bantu Affairs Commissioners and assistant commissioners. I think it is quite unreasonable to expect Bantu Affairs Commissioners to handle these more serious offences.

It will not be the case. I will explain what the position is.

All right. I will leave it at that. I do hope that the hon. the Minister will indicate that he will be prepared to accept some amendment to the amendment which we have proposed and which will ensure that at least the more serious cases under this Bill will be handled only by the Supreme Court.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to point out to the hon. member three aspects of the legislation which he failed to emphasize. One of the three aspects I want to refer the hon. member to is an argument which the hon. member will probably say has been done to death. It is the case of automatic review. I do not want to elaborate, and I therefore leave it at that. The other aspect is that the relevant clause, as it stands here, does not, in fact, make it compulsory for the cases to be heard in a magistrates court. It merely says that a magistrate’s court will also have jurisdiction. I foresee that, as with other cases, mutual arrangements will be made to decide in what court they will be heard, whether in the magistrates court, the regional court or in the Supreme Court.

We should like to see it obligatory that certain cases should be heard in the Supreme Court.

Yes, but there are many other cases in which it is not compulsory, but where this arrangement is nevertheless made, depending upon the seriousness of the case. Thirdly I think that section I52bis of the relevant Act makes quite enough provision for the Attorney-general to be able to decide whether he wants to have the case heard in the inferior courts, superior courts or even in the regional court. I therefore think that the specific legal provision provides for what hon. members are asking for. I think that they are actually unnecessarily concerned. I think that it can be properly arranged within the framework of the existing legal provisions.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to put the matter to hon. members in this way. As the hon. member for Durban North’s amendment reads at present, he covers not only the serious cases, not even only the cases relating to trafficking offences, but all penalties in terms of this Act. He is therefore deleting the section that we prescribe, i.e. that the provisions only relate to clauses 2, 3 and 6, and applies it to all of them. If I were, therefore, to accept his amendment as it reads at present, these penalties, which must be referred to the higher court, could even be in excess of 30 000. But I do not want to argue with the hon. member about that.

The hon. member for Musgrave asks whether I will accept an amendment that only affects the more serious cases and clear up this misunderstanding. The question is now, who decides when the case is a serious one before it has been concluded, and who passes judgment on a serious case. Let me add that in terms of the present provisions, as the hon. member for Potchefstroom rightly pointed out, the Attorney-General can already provide at any moment that one of these cases cannot be heard by an ordinary magistrate, but that it can be heard by the regional magistrate or by the Supreme Court. There is nothing at present which prohibits him from doing this. That safety measure exists.

I now come to the second safety measure that is automatically included. I repeat my argument. The normal jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court embraces up to six months’ imprisonment, except in terras of the provisions of certain acts according to which he can impose a heavier penalty. If one does not make special provision here, it means that the magistrate cannot even impose the minimum penalty prescribed by this Act, because this is two years, and in some cases six years. If one consequently does not make provision for this, the magistrate’s court cannot handle these cases at all, because it cannot even impose sentences in excess of six months. Then the position would be the same as it is at present. I therefore cannot support that argument by hon. members. And in practice what this amounts to further is that these cases—the hon. member for Potchefstroom also referred to that—are, of necessity, automatically reviewed by the judges in every instance. Moreover, there is also still the right of appeal in each of the cases. I must pilot a Bill through that can be implemented and administered in practice. There are three safety valves to prevent problems developing. I honestly think that hon. members must concede that we cannot amend this clause.

The hon. the Minister said that he was not certain as to what we on this side of the House referred to by “the more serious cases”. Would the hon. the Minister be prepared to accept an amendment which would provide that cases falling under clause 2 (a) and (c) in respect of which there is a minimum sentence, and offences not falling under clause 7, in other words, clause 2 (a) and (c) and clause 6 offences, would be referred to the Supreme Court? If we would indicate that he is prepared to accept such an amendment, we will move such an amendment. It seems to me that these are the three categories of more serious offences being created under this Bill, and are the offences which I suggest ought to be dealt with only by a Supreme Court. I accept the point made by the hon. member for Potchefstroom that clause 14 does not make it obligatory for the magistrate’s court to hear these cases. The words are “shall have jurisdiction” and that does not exclude the Supreme Court. I also accept the reference that the hon. member has made to the section of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, which provides that an Attorney-General may refer a case at any time to a superior court, if he choses to do so. But we would like to see it made obligatory in this Bill that the more serious cases shall be heard in the Supreme Court by a judge and not by a magistrate.

In answer to the hon. the Minister’s query as to what we have in mind by more serious casts, I suggest to him the offences referred to in clauses 2 (a) and (c) and clause 6. I should like the hon. the Minister to indicate to us whether he would be prepared to consider an amendment to the effect that the magistrates’ courts will have jurisdiction in respect of all the crimes referred to in this Bill except those referred to in the clauses I have just mentioned.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be unnecessarily difficult but I am saddled with a practical problem, i.e. that according to our own definition and presumptions in clause 10, a person, for example, who has more than 115 grams of dagga in his possession is subject to a charge of trafficking, in other words, a contravention of clause 2 (a). He will then be charged with trafficking and found guilty unless he can prove the contrary. In other words, cases where persons have more than 115 grams of dagga in their possession, will automatically come under the exceptions which the hon. member has just spoken of. There could be many such cases, but we do not know. We shall first have to implement the legislation and see how it works. Subsequently we could consider the matter and be in a better position to form a judgment. However, I feel that I cannot make that concession now, because the measure would thereby perhaps be made impracticable as a result of so many cases appearing on the roll for the superior courts that they cannot deal with them in time. There are, of course, additional problems involved, for example, the detention of persons for a long period. I Moreover, I want to tell the hon. member that the attorneys-general are at present in a position to have any of these cases, which seem to them to be of a serious nature, transferred from the magistrate’s court to a regional court or a supreme court. I feel that I cannot acquiesce in this respect because I am afraid that I shall make the legislation impractical and impracticable and that I shall make it impossible to administer the legislation; then it is only a dead letter.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take our amendment any further. We recommend it to the hon. the Minister, but for the moment I want to leave it at that. I just want to point out to the hon. Minister that he has not yet, in fact, given a full reply to my argument about the arrangement of our various courts. Consequently I want to ask him to indicate how he feels about that. The hon. member for Potchefstroom and the hon. the Minister explained that it is within the power of the attorney-general to refer a case to the Supreme Court. Would the hon. the Minister now be so kind as to just give an indication of whether he will recommend this to the attorneys-general or give instructions, whatever it is possible for him to do, that in serious cases he definitely wants them referred to the Supreme Court? I trust that the hon. the Minister will give us a reply in this connection.

Mr. Chairman. I want to repeat that I am not a legal man. I therefore do not want to go into the merits of the jurisdiction of the various courts. I leave this in the hands of the persons who are dealing with it at present and dealing with it very well. However, I want to give the hon. member the assurance that I shall consult my colleague, the hon. the Minister of Justice. I will suggest to him that in this case his request be such that serious cases can, in fact, be handled in that way. I am prepared to do so immediately.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to part III of the schedule. In this part mention is made of barbituric acid and certain other preparations being “potentially dangerous drugs”. Among these preparations the following are mentioned: Chlordiazepoxide, diazepam, medazepam, nitrazepam and oxazepam. These substances are freely used by the medical profession as mild tranquilizers. To tell the truth, these preparations are also used when addicted patients are treated and detoxified. I therefore feel that they should not be placed in this part of the schedule. I do not know whether the hon. the Minister could, at this stage, tell me whether he would be prepared to remove these substances from the schedule, but I would be glad if he would discuss the matter with his advisers. If they cannot be removed, the manufacturers of these preparations could still have recourse to this clause and submit them to the Drugs Control Council, so that the State President can then be asked to remove these preparations from the schedule. If it can be done now, I would be very glad if the hon. the Minister would do so.

Mr. Chairman, clause 15 specifically provides that, at the recommendation of the Drugs Control Council and on representations from the Minister of Health, the State President can amend these schedules from time to time. According to the circumstances, he can leave out some of these preparations and add others. The schedule, as it now exists, was drawn up by the Drugs Control Council. I am an amateur as far as medical science is concerned and I have accepted the names as they drew them up for me. They are consequently the responsible body. I also understand that the possibility is being considered for an amendment to the definition of the concept “medicine” in their Act of 1928. This will then enable them to make adjustments in this connection and to amend these schedules. In that way they will be able to make these preparations available as medicines. I therefore think that the case is in hand. This clause specifically provides for the schedules to be amended by way of an announcement by the State President, without Parliament having to be approach again.

In Part I of the Schedule where the Minister lists the prohibited dependence-producing drugs, reference is made to cannabis (Indian hemp) including cannabis resin, “dagga”, and “Itsangu”. I do not know whether it is a spelling mistake or not, but in the English and in the Afrikaans version it is spelt “Itsangu”.

Order! There will be a later opportunity to discuss that. We are not discussing the Schedule at the moment.

I move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

I ask the Minister to consider this amendment because this board is an important body. The Minister has indicated that he regards this particular board which he is to appoint as being a very important body. The public regards the whole subject as a very important matter and I believe it is of importance for the public to know the personnel serving on this board. I believe the only permanent way which the public will have of knowing these facts will be to have the names published in the Government Gazette. I know the answer could be given that the Department of Information will issue a Press release and that the Press will probably publish the names of the people, but in most homes newspapers are not kept indefinitely. A newspaper is read and it is thrown away, and it is not always possible to refer to an old edition of a newspaper, whereas it is possible in many instances to have access to Government Gazettes. I think it is important both for the members of the board and the members of the public, because I think the members of the public should know the names of the members of the board and they should know that they have access to these members. It is also important, I believe, for the members of the board to be kept aware of public opinion in a matter like this. There have been many examples I could quote in regard to this particular matter where the names of the members of important councils and statutory boards, etc., are published in the Government Gazette for information. I trust that the Minister will accept my plea in this respect.

As the hon. member for Berea has indicated, this is an important clause in that it establishes a new advisory board which shall be known as the National Advisory Board on Rehabilitation Matters. If we look at the provisions of the clause we will sec that in terms of subsection (12), the National Alcoholism Advisory Board which was established in terms of Act 86 of 1963, the Retreat and Rehabilitation Centres Act, is now to be abolished. In considering the position as far as this board is concerned and the important aspect of its work, I hope, Sir, you will allow me just to refer to clause 17 briefly as the existing legislation, the Act of 1963, deals with establishing the board and the functions of the board in one section. It becomes obvious that this board is to play an increasing role in many spheres as far as the whole problem is concerned. The Advisory Board on Alcoholism was established following a revision of the Work Colonies Act of 1949, and abolished the Work Colonies Act of 1949. That came about as the result of a commission of inquiry into the treatment of alcoholics, whereby certain recommendations were made, one of which was to reconstitute the old Work Colonies Board and to create the Advisory Board on Alcoholism. I refer to this previous board because as far as the activities of the hoard are concerned, it was necessary in terms of the old Work Colonies Act that this board should submit a report on an annual basis. This gave an opportunity to those persons interested to study the activities of that board and to be conversant with what the board was doing. This report made available various statistics concerning the activities of the board, and indeed, dealt with the whole question of rehabilitation under the old Work Colonies Act. When the Advisory Board on Alcoholism was established, it was stated in terms of the 1963 Act that, instead of the board reporting on an annual basis as was previously the position with the Work Colonies Advisory Board, the Advisory Board on Alcoholism would only be required to report at least once every five years. At the time the 1963 Act was discussed in this House, we also drew attention to the importance of the work of this board. In terms of the legislation and the clause which is now before us and in terms of clause 17, the following clause, it is obvious that this board now has to play an even greater part in the whole question of tackling this problem, particularly in regard to research and other matters whereby the problem can be combated and in regard to steps which should be taken. So, not only do they have to deal with the problem of alcoholism, but they now have to deal with this new challenge of dealing with the problem of drug dependence. This is a matter about which the whole country is obviously deeply concerned. That is why I want to move the amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The clause as it now stands merely reenacts what was included in the 1963 Act where the situation was that the Advisory Board on Alcoholism would report once during five years, which was improved slightly to at least twice during its term of office. We believe that, because of the importance of not only the alcoholism problem, but also particularly the drug dependency question, we should have available to Us a report on an annual basis. It is hoped that the amendment I have proposed will result in our actually receiving these reports and having them tabled in the House, as provision is made in the legislation that such reports should be tabled in the House and in the Senate. If we look at the situation as far as the old Advisory Board on Alcoholism is concerned, which is now to be abolished, it is disturbing to find that it is impossible to find that a report of the Advisory Board on Alcoholism has ever been tabled in this House. I have endeavoured to obtain a copy of a report and I have been informed that no such report has been tabled. That means, in terms of the legislation of 1963, that this House has not had an opportunity to even study the question of the activities of that board and to have made available to it various statistics, such as those that were previously available in the annual reports of the board established in the Work Colonies Act of 1949. I believe that this is a serious situation since we are now asking this board to take on an added and very grave responsibility and are requesting it to report, in terms of the proposal here, twice during its period of five years of office. We would like to see a report submitted on an annual basis and we would like to get back to the situation whereby members of this House are kept fully informed of these activities. For instance, the old reports under the Work Colonies Act of 1949 show that the last report of that advisory board was tabled in 1964 and was for the year 1962. Unfortunately that report was not printed and was only available in the offices of this House. Similarly, the report issued in 1963 referring to the year 1961, was only available in the Minutes and was not available to members in printed form, as was previously the position. Therefore, the last actual printed report of the Work Colonies Advisory Board was for the year I960. This means that a considerable period of time has elapsed since we have had an opportunity of studying the various statistics we require to try and assess the position. These reports, which give various statistics concerning occupations, causative factors for the committal of these persons, etc., are indeed of great importance, if one reads the report of the Grobler Committee of Enquiry, one finds that it was one of the matters which hampered them in their investigation in trying to gauge the severity of the problem of drug dependence. One of their problems was the question of the lack of statistics to enable them to form a true picture of what the situation is. In actual fact, if one looks at the last report that is in printed form available to members, namely the report for 1960, one will see that as far as addiction to drugs was concerned, committals in terms of the old Act, was only a very small percentage. Indeed, during the year 1960, only three persons were committed to a work colony, now known as a rehabilitation centre. Consequently, the purpose of this board is a good one. There is no doubt about that. We on this side of the House wish to see this board taking a leading role in the coordination and planning of tackling this problem of drug dependency.

Clause 17 indicates what the hon. the Minister has in mind as far as the role of this board is concerned. Some persons have mistakenly believed, due to erroneous Press reports, that this board will only concern itself with drug dependency. If they studied the defintions in this Bill, they would see that alcoholism is now to be regarded as a dependence-producing substance. Consequently, the board will still deal with this enormous problem of alcoholism which indeed is one that has received attention for a number of years, but somehow or other, we do not seem to have a great deal of success at this stage in tackling this problem effectively.

In dealing with the question of the function of this board and the personnel involved, we know that the number of members of this board is to be reduced in spite of the fact that the responsibilities of the board are to be extended. In terms of this clause the old national advisory board on alcoholism is to be abolished. This board consisted of a larger number of members than the new board. The Act stated that they shall not exceed 15 members. The number of members of the new board is to be reduced in that in terms of the clause, they shall not exceed nine members of whom two will be appointed by the Minister in official capacities. One will be a senior officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions and will evidently be the chairman. Then there is the new position of Director of Rehabilitation Services who shall be the vice-chairman. It therefore means there is a reduction in the number of persons who will serve on this board and who will be appointed as a result of their expert knowledge of the problems involved. That will reduce it to seven persons who may be appointed by the hon. the Minister and who must have, in his opinion, an expert knowledge of drug dependency and also the question of alcoholism It is really difficult to see why the hon. the Minister should wish to reduce the size of this board from 15 to nine members whereas he has to appoint people to serve on that board who must have a knowledge of both drug dependency and the question of alcoholism. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply to the two representations which have been made. In the first place there is the request of the hon. member for Berea that the names of the members of this board should be published in the Gazette. I want to say at once that this will in fact be done in practice by way of a general notice in the Gazette. But the fact of the matter is that if it is specified in the legislation, it will mean that whenever a vacancy arises, the names will have to be announced once again in the Gazette. In practice it will in fact be the position that this will be done by way of a general notice in the Gazette. I want to say at once that this is an important board which will do important work. From the nature of the case this information will be available to the Press by way of a Press statement. Any person who wants to know who the members of the board are, can ascertain that immediately by telephoning the Department. Any hon. member of the House of Assembly will be able to ascertain the names of the members of the board by asking a question in this House. Persons who have a real interest in this matter and who want to know who the members of the board are can ascertain their names from any one of these sources. There should be no problem in this connection. If I were to insert this in the legislation, it would automatically mean that I would have to publish the names of all the members of the board in the Gazette if a vacancy should, for whatever reason, arise. It would then place a legal obligation on us, and I think that is unnecessary and unpractical. It is not a case of our concealing the names of these people, because they will be published. For that reason I do not think it is necessary to insert this in the legislation.

As regards the question raised by the hon. member for Umbilo concerning the constitution of the board, as well as its reports, the hon. member is aware that the Bill provides that the Board shall report at least twice during its term of office. The term of office of the Board is five years, and they must therefore report at least every two years. Then there is also a provision in clause 16 (11) (a) to the effect that the Minister may provide that reports shall be published more frequently. Once again I want to be practical, and that is the whole object of its being there. If nothing sensational has happened in a specific year, it is in fact unnecessary to issue a report and to follow the entire lengthy procedure. From the nature of the case, and this I can tell hon. members at this early stage, I shall call for regular reports at the outset. I shall lay the reports upon the Table, but there are going to be occasions, and the proof of that is there, as the hon. member himself stated, such as when in the past it was decided that in some cases the report of the board would not even be printed, because there was no need for it. The report was therefore laid upon the Table in the office only, and was therefore only available on request. There was no need to print it or to make it available. In view of such cases I feel that it is unnecessary that a law should provide that a report must be published every year, come what may, whether or not publishing a report is worth while. Since this matter is now in its initial stages, I shall call for regular reports and they will be laid upon the Table regularly, as the position may require. However, I want to see to it that these people do not have to write unnecessary reports, because they have much more important work to do.

Then the hon. member raised the question of the reduction of the size of the board. I think a smaller board can do its work much more efficiently and effectively than a large, clumsy board. This is, however, no reflection on any existing board. In my opinion, a board should be of such a size that it is able to assemble in its ranks all the knowledge required to deal with the matters which are involved. At the same time it should be so compact that it can be convened promptly, effectively and quickly so that it is able to take decisions effectively. That is the idea behind such a board.

The Cabinet should be reduced in size.

No, we always have need of expert knowledge, and that we have in the Cabinet. We cannot manage with a smaller one. The position is very clear and I feel that with nine members on the board we shall be able to have the various disciplines concerned in this matter represented. The object is not to be representative of all bodies and organizations. Then a board consisting of 15 members would also be too small. If we wanted to give representation to all bodies that have an interest in this matter, it would be necessary to have a board of 40 or 50 members. The object is not to establish a representative board. This board is an expert one consisting of persons who really know their subject. I can bring together the necessary disciplines as I wish in this board consisting of nine members. That immediately makes it a small efficient board, which can convene quickly and react promptly, because it will definitely have a task of much broader scope than that of the previous board. That is why I think hon. members should simply leave these matters exactly as they are at present.

Mr. Chairman, this clause deals with the registration of certain institutions and in subsection (4) it provides that the Director of Rehabilitation Services, who will be appointed, has control to a certain extent over the overall administration of these various institutions. The position is that where registration is required of an existing institution, or a group of persons might wish to create a new institution, we find that there is a time limit and, that the director may grant a temporary certificate of registration for a period not exceeding 12 months. The director may issue to the applicant a temporary registration certificate specifying certain conditions which he wants to be complied with before he grants full registration. There is no argument as far as the necessity for having such registration is concerned. Obviously, it would be impossible to have such institutions unless they were duly registered and met certain requirements. However, I believe that a period of 12 months could place some of these institutions in difficulty. We know that the previous legislation, the Retreat and Rehabilitation Centres Act, 1963, automatically granted registration to institutions that were registered as certified institutions in terms of the Work Colonies Act of 1949. Consequently this might and could entail that certain conditions must be met. It might entail certain alterations being made to the buildings, the structures, etc., which could involve these people in finding funds, having plans drawn up and approved and proceeding with these buildings, so as to meet these conditions. That is why, to grant these persons a little more time to enable them to meet the conditions that the director might lay down before full registration is granted in terms of this clause. I move the following amendment:

I move this amendment in order that these persons will have the necessary additional time to meet various conditions.

Mr. Chairman, I have looked at the amendment moved by the hon. member. I think it is fair to allow these people a little more time than the 12 months mentioned here. It might create problems as far as their financial years are concerned, and I am prepared to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, on the question of dealing with the treatment of persons who are dependent upon drugs, and the drug addict in particular, the Grobler Committee report made very strong recommendations for separate institutions for these people so that intensified treatment and treatment which is perhaps different from that afforded to the person who is addicted to alcohol can be provided for. The hon. the Minister indicated during the Second Reading debate that he agreed with the principle involved that these institutions, where possible, should be classified, and if at all possible, that there should be separate institutions. However, the clause as it stands, only deals with the question of the rehabilitation centres. In later clauses the establishment of after-care hostels is dealt with. After-care treatment is also extremely important in achieving the object as complete as possible of a rehabilitation of the addicts concerned. After-care hostels should accordingly also be provided for here, so that they might be classified on a separate basis in the same way as rehabilitation centres might also be classified in terms of this clause. Therefore, I should like to move:

Mr. Chairman, I want to put a suggestion to the hon. the Minister, a suggestion which I think he should consider in all seriousness. According to the clause as it stands, the greater part of the treatment—and I say so advisedly will take place in the rehabilitation centres. I want to suggest that centres be provided in the large hospitals as well, and that the Minister takes these under his care. There is a great shortage of trained personnel today. The people who deal with these cases are in the main psychologists and psychiatrists. I think that in all the branches of medicine there is a greater shortage of psychiatrists than of other specialists. I can see the difficulties of the hon. the Minister in providing sufficient of these people to serve at the various rehabilitation centres.

The hon. the Minister must realize that there is a great difference in treating the alcoholic and in treating the drug addict. A drug addict may have to have treatment every day. One cannot just put him away and say “put him off his drugs”. He is as greatly disturbed mentally, and may be as badly affected physically. I want to suggest to the hon. the Minister that he must make provision for these people in hospitals. There may be difficulties in persuading provincial hospitals to take the responsibility for treating this type of person, the person who is not covered by the Mental Disorders Act. We may find that the hon. the Minister will not know where to place patients who need, as my hon. leader has said, detoxification as quickly as possible. I therefore say that the hon. the Minister must make arrangements with the hon. the Minister of Health to provide wards in general hospitals, in the large centres especially, where these people can be treated.

Mr. Chairman, the matter which the hon. member for Rosettenville has just raised, is one of which I am fully aware. The problem, however, is that I cannot nor do I want to interfere with the authority and administration of my colleague, the hon. the Minister of Health; he is responsible in the first place for the medical treatment of people and their hospitalization. However, I want to inform the hon. member that we will negotiate with the Minister of Health in regard to the administration of this legislation in order to establish the necessary facilities. However, I cannot make provision in this measure for such facilities. If it is specified in legislation, it must be legislation by the hon. the Minister of Health which may later on in the Session make provision for this. The hon. member talks about detoxification; I want to translate this into Afrikaans as “ontwending”, i.e. to rid a person’s body of the drugs. This is almost exclusively a medical process and that is why it must be done in hospitals under the supervision of doctors. After that such a person goes to a rehabilitation centre, whereupon the provisions of this legislation come into effect automatically. I want to add that I also support the hon. member in his statement that there is a vast difference between the treatment and the rehabilitation of the person addicted to drugs and the person addicted to alcohol. I appreciate that there is a tremendous difference and the necessary provision for this is being made at the moment. That is why the various rehabilitation centres are also being classified, so that the groups of people will not be mixed up. We are therefore already taking cognizance of this aspect.

To the hon. member for Umbilo I just want to say that I do not think his amendment is really necessary. The first step is that a person is admitted to a rehabilitation centre. The after-care homes, the “hostels” to which the hon. member referred, only come into the picture after a person has already been rehabilitated at a rehabilitation centre. After that he goes to an after-care home. There is no compulsion of any nature on a person when he goes to an after-care home. He goes there voluntarily; no compulsion of any kind is imposed on him, and because he cannot be forced to go there, he can go to any one of the after-care homes he wishes to go to and where he feels at home and where he feels that he can be treated. I do not think it is the right thing to do to force him or to classify the after-care homes. By the time he visits an after-care home, he is a person who has already been rehabilitated and who went there of his own accord. That is why I do not think it is necessary to include the after-care homes in this clause.

Sir, I appreciate the hon. the Minister’s point of view. It is true that the person will be able to choose the hostel himself, but I think it is important that some provision should be made for the classification of the various types of hostel. This would merely be an enabling provision in terms of which they may be classified. They do not have to be classified. If the Minister considers that it should be done, then in terms of clause 22 he may classify these after-care hostels. I think that the question of after-care is a very important one and I believe that the hon. the Minister should have the right, if he so decides, to classify after-care hostels. Sir, there is another point on which I would like to get some clarity from the hon. the Minister and that is in connection with persons who are committed to a rehabilitation centre and who are under 18 years of age, in other words who normally speaking would be dealt with in terms of the Children’s Act. But in view of the fact that the Children’s Act is not being amended, it is assumed that a child in need of care will be committed to a rehabilitation centre in terms of this Act.

We have a departure here from the position as it existed under the Retreats and Rehabilitation Centres Act of 1963, which is being repealed in terms of this Bill. Act No. 86 of 1963, i.e. the Retreats and Rehabilitation Centres Act, specifically precluded any person under the age of 18 from being committed to a rehabilitation centre or to a registered rehabilitation centre. In terms of the legislation that we have before us now, that is no longer applicable and that means that a considerable number of persons of a very young age may be committed to a rehabilitation centre or to a registered rehabilitation centre in terms of the provisions of this Bill. I think it is important therefore to ascertain from the hon. the Minister whether it is the intention to use clause 22 in order to establish separate rehabilitation centres which can cater for young persons who are committed to such institutions so that they will not have to mix with other persons who may be hardened drug addicts or alcoholics. Such young persons will then be committed to an institution which will he there specifically to deal with the rehabilitation of young persons under the age of 18 years.

I just want to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that we are to a certain extent making provision for what he has just requested in clause 34 (5), to which we shall come later on. That clause already provides that a child may be detained in a place of safety and not necessarily in these centres. I should also just like to inform the hon. member that as the legislation reads at present there is nothing which prohibits me from classifying these after-care homes administratively. I can in fact do so without making specific provision for that in the legislation. I can do this administratively, and I think in practice this will from the nature of the case be done, because people who will be responsible for the detoxification or the after-care of these persons must specialize in a certain direction. That is why the homes will automatically become professional in a certain direction and the direction in which they may render specific assistance to people, will also become known. I think that this is going to happen in practice in any case. But another interesting possibility which this legislation creates, is that under the provisions of the clause, as they read at present, I can create special rehabilitation centres, if the need for them is so great, for children under 18 years of age, and then they may together be rehabilitated at these centres. The provisions of the legislation are quite wide enough to make this possible. We will be able to deal with this matter administratively.

Sir, I want to suggest to the hon. the Minister that provision should be made at the hostels as well as the rehabilitation centres for an out-patient clinic. I hope that he will take note of this suggestion. I think it is very important. I would also suggest to him that the clinics, the rehabilitation centres and the hostels should be as near to a large city as possible. They should not be far out in the country, because of the difficulty of access to them by the few people who have been trained in the treatment of these people. I would like them to be as near to the cities as possible. We want as many addicts as possible to go to these centres on a voluntary basis, That is the object of the Bill; it is to try to rehabilitate as many as possible. The Minister knows that some people do not like the stigma of having to go to a work colony, and I would like to suggest to him that these rehabilitation centres and hostels should be given some other name, and that they should be known as work colonies or as rehabilitation centres for drug addicts, because that is not going to attract these people. If, however, they are given names, such as, “Muldersoord”, as has been done at “Magaliesoord”, people would be prepared to go there. I should like the hon. the Minister to bear that in mind. It is a small matter, but I think it would help to attract persons to these institutions.

I shall definitely bear in mind the suggestions made by the hon. member. This can be done administratively. He referred to the question of out-patients and suggested that the institutions should be near hospitals and other institutions so that the necessary facilities can be made available. The people cannot be within a city, but they must be near enough to the city to have the necessary facilities there available. I therefore accept the hon. member’s suggestions, as well as the idea that we should try to find another name. We shall think hard about such a name because that would immediately remove the stigma. The whole idea behind this matter, as far as alcoholics are concerned as well, is to remove the stigma entirely from the institutions, and that is why we are not committing a man to such a place for a specified period of 12 months or two years; there is no time limit; it is not a question of a sentence or a punishment which he must go and serve. He will be discharged as soon as he has been cured, and he then returns to normal society.

Sir, the hon. the Minister was good enough to accept the amendment that I moved to clause 21, which is of a similar nature, and I would like to thank him for having accepted that amendment. Sir, the amendment to this clause is the same except that this deals with the question of the registration of the after-care hostels. I know that the hon. the Minister is fully aware of the important part that welfare organizations can and will play in the future in assisting the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions in the rehabilitation of the various persons. These after-care hostels will possibly be run by certain welfare organizations who have every intention of assisting the department in every way possible. Sir, the clause now before us contains the same provision as is contained in clause 21 in respect of registered rehabilitation centres. Registered after-care hostels too are given a period of 12 months to meet certain conditions and requirements. I therefore wish to move the amendment printed in my name, as follows—

Sir, for the same good reasons as in the previous case I accept this amendment as well.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (4) The Director shall inspect or cause to be inspected by an officer in the service of the State designated by him every rehabilitation centre, registered rehabilitation centre, hostel and registered hostel at least once during each calendar year.

I do so for two reasons. Firstly, I think it will be beneficial to have an inspection made of the rehabilitation centres and of the hostels and that reports should then be made on those inspections to the Minister himself so that he will know what the latest developments are. Secondly, I feel that the inmates of the hostels and the rehabilitation centres must know that we are taking an interest in what happens to them. It is important for the inmates to know that the Minister is aware of what is happening in these rehabilitation centres. This type of inspection should not mean merely a visit to the office and an investigation of records. It should become a much more important event. Every inmate of these hotels and rehabilitation centres must know that the inspector is coming to see what is happening to them and to report on their welfare. That is what we want to see. I think the inmates will appreciate these visits. According to the Bill as it now stands, there is no obligation on the inspector to undertake such inspections. It merely states that the director “may” undertake an inspection. It is an enabling clause. I want such an inspection to be carried out at least once a year, and I want such a visit to a centre to be an important event so that each inmate will feel that he is not an outcast but that we are taking an interest in him and his welfare.

Mr. Chairman, I agree very strongly with the hon. member that inspections should be carried out regularly. It is also necessary that these people must know that an interest is being taken in them. However, I want to explain why I cannot accept this amendment. At present certain inspections are ordered, but in clause 25 a special director of rehabilitation services is being appointed. His only task will be to keep an eye on what is happening in all these rehabilitation centres. That is his specific task. He can even carry out inspections himself, or he can instruct others to do so. He can carry out inspections whenever he wants to and as many times a year as he deems necessary. He must carry out an inspection every time the Minister instructs him to do so, and subsequently he must issue a report in that connection. The Minister is finally responsible to this House for what happens in those centres. In other words, as I see it, what this will amount to in practice is that if something undesirable takes place in one of these institutions, one single letter to the Minister will immediately result in the Minister instructing someone to find out what is taking place. The reason why I do not want to make provision for such inspections in this Bill is that when the activities of these centres are running smoothly, in accordance with all our rules and provisions, and there is sound management, the director would nevertheless still be forced, come hell or high water, to pay a visit to those establishments every year, whether it is necessary or not, while other places, where there may be a much greater necessary for inspections, will be neglected, because he must first pay a visit to a far-off centre. In the interests of sound administration we shall keep an eye on the matter. I, as the responsible Minister, am responsible to this Parliament for everything that takes place, and if the hon. member is not happy about the inspections, he will be able to raise the matter here and I shall then have to explain what is happening. However, I should not like to bind this director, because then he would have to pay a visit to those institutions every year, I want to leave these inspections to his own discretion. He himself will then be able to decide when he must pay a visit to the various centres.

I may add that at present, as Minister, I frequently receive letters from these people in the institutions. These people write to me personally, and not only do I treat their letters with the utmost respect, but also with the utmost care. Those people are not in a gaol; they can post letters, etc., if they want to, and they write regularly. Any one of them who feels wronged can just post a short letter to the Minister, or whoever the case may be, as they are also doing at present. Immediately after that an investigation into the specific circumstances will be ordered. That is why I think that, from a practical point of view, it is not necessary to pin these officials down. The inspections will take place; they will take place more regularly than in the past, because now more people are available to do this work, and also because specific instructions will be issued for this work to be done. That is why I want to ask the hon. member not to pin us down unnecessarily to this requirement.

This clause establishes the new post of Director of Rehabilitation Services, and I am sure that the hon. the Minister will be fortunate enough to appoint to such an important post a highly competent and expert man in this field of operations, a very responsible operation he will have to undertake. The position is that this Director of Rehabilitation Services, if one looks at the various clauses, both prior to this clause and some further clauses which still have to be dealt with by the Committee, has considerable powers in terms of the administration of this Act whereby he has to make various decisions concerning various matters as far as registration and releases from committal orders are concerned, where they are committed to a rehabilitation centre, etc. In other legislation we have a clause which provides for appeals to the Minister. This appears in quite a number of Acts, whereby certain decisions will then rest with the Minister and the person has the right to appeal to the Minister for such a decision. For instance, if one looks at some of the other legislation administered by this Minister, one sees that there are specific clauses enabling persons to appeal to the Minister in certain instances against the decision taken by the Secretary for the department, which is subject to appeal to the Minister. This new post of Director of Rehabilitation Services will be subject to the control of the Secretary of the Minister’s department. However, there is no provision made anywhere in the Bill for an appeal to the Minister should a person feel aggrieved at some decision which might have been taken by the Director or the Secretary. This amendment merely enables the person to have that right to appeal to the Minister so that the matter might have his consideration. That is why I wish to move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

1. (3) Any decision or action by the Director or by the Secretary, in the administration of this Act, shall be subject to an appeal to the Minister.

This will then give the person the opportunity to have some recourse in regard to a decision taken, possibly in all good faith, whereby they would like to have another opinion and to place this matter before the Minister so that the Minister might have an opportunity of reviewing the situation in regard to some decision or action which might have been taken by either of these two officers or one of them.

In practice this amendment is already included in the measure, although it is not stated there in so many words. The fact remains that the Director falls under the administrative control of the Secretary, and is accountable to the Minister. If he should refuse for example to discharge an inmate, which can be a legal reason for complaints, clause 34 (3) provides that he shall do so if the Minister instructs him to. The authority therefore remains in reality in the hands of the Minister. Anyone who is not satisfied with the Director’s decision may, without the legislation expressly empowering him to do so, make representations to the Minister, as I have just explained in the discussion of the previous clause. From the nature of the case, this simply means that the entire administration of these rehabilitation centres ultimately fall under the authority of the Minister. Any person in the centre, the staff or the inmates or whoever it may be, has the right to get the immediate attention of the Minister by way of representations. We do not call it an appeal; that is not necessary. Then it would look like a charge against a person, something which we would not like to have. Why should we now want to start the proceedings for an appeal, because that would seem as if the man had been charged? A letter to the Minister, or to anyone else for that matter, through any body whatsoever, or through the Board, will immediately have the effect that the necessary attention will be given to this matter. That is why I do not think it is necessary. I think that we can do the same thing the hon. member is asking for here administratively. There is much of value in what the hon. member said, but I do not think it is necessary to mention it specifically in the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, clause 30 deals with the question of the committal of persons to a rehabilitation centre, to a registered rehabilitation centre, after an inquiry has taken place and the magistrate has issued a court order. The practical application of the provisions of this clause is indeed most important in order to ascertain that the people who are committed, are being committed in the best interests of the persons concerned. In terms of subsection (4) the position is that the magistrate holding the inquiry is obliged, before he issues any order under subsection (6), to direct the public prosecutor or other persons appearing in an inquiry to submit to him a report from the social welfare officer in terms of clause 29 (2), the clause we have already passed in Committee Stage. This is indeed a most important aspect, since obviously the magistrate to a great extent must be guided in his decision by the contents of a report from a social welfare officer who, in terms of the definitions, shall be a person who is a professional officer in the field of welfare work. In terms of subsection (4) (b), the magistrate holding the inquiry—

This, too, is most important in order to ascertain the full information concerning the person who is appearing before the magistrate and is to be committed either to a rehabilitation centre or a registered rehabilitation centre. Consequently, the classification that the hon. the Minister has referred to in clause 22, which has already passed this Committee, also has some bearing. Obviously, to decide which type of rehabilitation centre this person should be committed to, it should become obligatory for the magistrate to consider a report from a district surgeon or psychiatrist or clinical psychologist before the committal order is made out to a particular rehabilitation centre. I think that, with regard to the position the hon. the Minister has indicated for the classification of these rehabilitation centres, it should be essential that the magistrate receives medical information in order to ascertain to which type of rehabilitation centre this person should be committed in the interests of that person in order to endeavour to obtain the highest degree of rehabilitation for him. Therefore I think it is necessary that this clause should be amended. Instead of the magistrate being able to call for such a report at his discretion, I think he should be required to call for such a report. That is why I move the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, which reads as follows:

This would make it necessary for the magistrate to take into account such a report on the basis of an inquiry being held when the person is to be committed to such a rehabilitation centre. I hope that the hon. the Minister will realize that this is a question to achieve the greatest possible degree of rehabilitation in the interests of the person concerned, by committing that person to a rehabilitation centre most suited to his needs.

Mr. Chairman, the Bill as it reads at present, makes far better provision for what the hon. member for Umbilo has requested than the amendment he has moved. I refer the hon. member to clause 30 (1) (b) which provides—

In other words, not only is he able to request a report from them, but he may also summon them to sit with him and form an opinion together with him. This is much better than the proposal in respect of a report which the hon. member made here. Now the hon. member wants to place the obligation on the magistrate to call for a report. The hon. member motivated his motion by saying that the magistrate would then have the advantage of such a report which would give him a much clearer indication of the kind of rehabilitation centre the specific person should be referred to. We are making provision for that as well in clause 30 (6). The court does not determine to what rehabilitation centre such a person will be sent, but clause 30 (6) makes it quite clear that after the court has established that the person in question should be rehabilitated, “he may, subject to the provisions of section 31, order that the person concerned be detained in a rehabilitation centre or registered rehabilitation centre designated by the Director”. I refer the hon. member to lines 23 to 25 on page 34 of the Bill. In other words, the court does not determine which place the person in question should go to. The court establishes that the person needs rehabilitation and then, in terms of clause 30 (6), the Director who is an expert in this field and whose specific task this is, determines which centre this person should go to where he will receive treatment from which he will benefit the most. Therefore, what the hon. member is asking here, is I think, fully provided for in this Bill. The court does not need to have that information. The Director has the authority to determine this. In practice it will be the case that the court must have a report from a welfare officer. I imagine that when the magistrate receives the report of the welfare officer, and if he is not one hundred per cent certain whether the person concerned requires medical treatment, psychiatric treatment or any other kind of treatment, he will, from the nature of the case, immediately ask for a report. The legislation provides that he may in fact call for one. Otherwise he can request one of the experts to sit with him as assessor at that inquiry. He may feel that it is a difficult case and that he needs the assistance of an expert because he does not have the specific expert knowledge. If the magistrate does in fact determine that the person in question should receive treatment, he will tell the Director that he is the man whose task it is and that it is he who must decide to which centre the person in question should be sent. I feel that that is adequate provision.

Mr. Chairman, l merely rise to ask the hon. the Minister to clarify something. I should like to ask the hon. the Minister whether the only alternatives open under this clause are either that the person gets a prison sentence if it is so decided, or that he goes to a rehabilitation centre, or hostel or whatever it is? Is there any other line of action that the magistrate would be entitled to take when a person has been declared, in terms of clause 29 (1) (a), the sort of person who should come under this clause? In other words, could he give an order that this person should attend an out-patient clinic at a hospital and that he does not have to become an inmate of a rehabilitation centre? Is it still open to him to do that?

Clause 31 provides for that.

In other words, he does not have to put such a person either in gaol or in a rehabilitation centre?

Yes. He may also postpone the matter indefinitely, if necessary,

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the hon. the Minister for his reply in regard to this matter. I fully realize that the position is that this clause has been taken over from Act No. 86 of 1963. The procedure laid down in section 15 of that Act is the same as the basis upon which provision is made in subsection (4) of clause 30. Clause 30 (4) of this Bill reads as follows:

The magistrate holding the inquiry—

1. (a) shall, before he makes any order under subsection (6), direct the public prosecutor or other person appearing at the inquiry in terms of subsection (1) (d) to submit to him the report obtained from a social welfare officer in terms of section 29 (2).

Before the order is made, there could be evidence of a medical nature which the social welfare officer has not included in his report by virtue of the fact that he is not qualified to make such a report. This magistrate has to come to a decision before making the order. We on this side of the House believe it would be in the interests of improving the position as it exists today. We are fully aware that this is a provision that exists in the Act of 1963. We are endeavouring here to achieve a degree of improvement, if possible, to certain of these provisions which are being re-enacted by this Bill. That is the reason why this amendment has been placed on the Order Paper. If this amendment is accepted the magistrate will be compelled to receive a report from a medical person such as a district surgeon, a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist and this is where the difference is. The social welfare report can be completely different to the medical report. This will enable a magistrate, before he makes the order, to consider both reports, the social welfare report and the medical report. As the position now stands a situation may occur where a magistrate who might not have had a great deal of experience in dealing with the committal of such person to such institutions, would take the report of the social welfare officer which he is compelled to receive, and consider the case before he has a report of a district surgeon or of a medical person before him. The report of a medical person could directly affect the committal order— not necessarily the classification of the rehabilitation centre he is committed to as the hon. the Minister has explained, but whether or not an order should be made for his committal. The reason for this amendment is that the magistrate will have two reports to consider, a report of the social welfare officer and of a medical professional man before he makes such an order.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member is quite right. The law at the moment is as is stated here in the Bill. It has been taken over in precisely the same way from the existing Act. Now we have been informed that we are not at present experiencing any problems in regard to the implementation of this specific measure. We must have at least a little confidence in the opinion of these people, and leave it to them to do what is necessary and not to take matters into their own hands. Let us now take this absurd example. If the hon. member's amendment were to be accepted, the magistrate would have to receive a report from one of three persons. He would then have to receive a report from either the district surgeon, or a psychiatrist, or a clinical psychologist. If I have no confidence in this man to do the right thing, because the fact that I force him to do what is mentioned above shows that I do not have any confidence in him, then he can simply circumvent the legislation by saying that he had called for a certificate from the district surgeon and that certifies nothing psychological. I think we must have sufficient confidence in these people to know that they will, from the nature of the case, knowing that they are dealing here with a specific problem, select one of the methods which in their opinion is the best. In some cases these people will be called in as assessors and in either cases a report may be called for. They have every right to do so. In the third place a magistrate will be assisted by the Director when he has to decide where that person should be sent. In any case this can also be revised. In clause 31 further provisions in this connection are being introduced. Because the matter works well in practice at the moment, and because I do not want to place unnecessary obligations on the magistrate, I think that we should rather leave the matter as it is.

Mr. Chairman, I want to move the amendment as it stands in my name. I want to say at once that I am afraid there is a mistake in the latter part of the amendment. Instead of “24 hours”, “14 days" should have been printed in the amendment. This change will have to be made, because I think it is unreasonable to expect the magistrate to conclude any inquiry within 24 hours. However, I do think the period of 28 days, as is provided fur in this clause, is too long. I would therefore like to alter the amendment so that the latter part reads: “Shall be detained for a continuous period of longer than 14 days”. I think this amendment is self-explanatory. I do not think that a person about whom an inquiry is being held by a magistrate in terms of clause 30, should be detained in a prison, and therefore I ask the omission of the word “prison”. I think there must be some other place of safety where a person could be held in the meantime, while the inquiry is pending. I really do not see why it should take as long as 28 days for such an inquiry to take place. I want to reduce the maximum period of the inquiry to 14 days instead. Furthermore, I want to omit the word “prison" so that such a person can be held in any other place but a prison. There is a stigma attached to having been in prison, even if it is only for the duration of the inquiry.

Mr. Chairman, I move my amendment in its amended form, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, again I am faced here with a position that already exists in the Act and furnishes a minimum amount of problems. I just want to state one problem very clearly to the hon. member. There are certain localities where we have no place to hold these people other than a gaol. There is simply nothing else available. At certain places this just happens to be the case. This is not long detention. In practice it would mean that at the moment the situation cropped up the Director would be called in and immediately asked to place the man. He will be placed as quickly as possible in practice. There is no question of one purposely wanting to put a man in gaol. But one cannot let the person go; one must hold on to him in some way or other. In many places we have no other choice but to keep him in prison. In that case he is not treated as a prisoner. He is just held until a decision is given about where he must go to and what must happen to him. Because this is so in practice, and because I again have to carry out the law In practice, and I cannot acceed to the request; because then I bind myself such that I cannot come to grips with these people in any way. Therefore I must unfortunately tell the hon. member that I cannot accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, there are three amendments I wish to move to this clause, as well as to ask for certain information concerning subsection (5) of this clause in regard to places of safety My amendments are as follows:

1. (6) In the event of an inmate who has been ordered to be detained in a rehabilitation centre or a registered rehabilitation centre under section 30, and who has not been discharged within three years after the making of such order, shall nave his case reviewed by a magistrate in accordance with the provisions of section 30.

The first amendment deals with the question of detention and the period during which a person is detained at a rehabilitation centre. If we look at the Retreats and Rehabilitation Centres Act of 1963, which is now to be repealed, we see the committal of a person to such a centre was based on a period of three years. In terms of this clause, it is now to be on a basis that, when a person is committed to a rehabilitation centre, he shall remain there, but from time to time, after the end of the first period of twelve months, if he has not been released on licence or discharged from the centre or the provisions of this Act, the Director will have cause to ask for a report as to the reason why that person has not been released from that rehabilitation centre. Similarly, the position is then further that, if he has not been released after a period of another six months, the Director shall again call for a full report as to why the person has not yet been discharged from the centre. Thereafter it is confined to reports of at least six-monthly intervals. It is obvious that there is no provision here limiting the time that a person could remain at such a rehabilitation centre. There are certain cases, applicable in both directions whereby a person might be detained at the rehabilitation centre for an unreasonably long period of time; although his case is subject to report every six months, there is no limitation as to how long he could remain at the rehabilitation centre. It has also been the experience of persons who are directly connected with running such centres that there are cases of abuse. Remember, we are not just catering here for the drug-dependent cases, but for the alcoholics, the “won’t works” and for all those who are provided for in terms of the legislation. These persons could remain in the rehabilitation centres for many, many years. They could indeed abuse the position here, if they wished to do so, and take up almost permanent residence at such a rehabilitation centre. However, I would like to suggest, in moving the first amendment, that the person be subject to a report at more regular intervals. As far as a person who has been voluntarily admitted to a rehabilitation centre is concenred, the period of commitment is for six months. There are some people who feel that this is a short period and that it should perhaps be longer. I believe that during the first six months there should be some indication of the progress being made and where they feel that their rehabilitation has taken place over such a short period to have a report after the first six months. This is the reason for the first part of my amendment.

The second part of my amendment deals with the question of the Director who may at any time discharge an inmate from the provisions of this Act and that such a person will consequently be discharged from the rehabilitation centre to which he has been committed. It further makes provision that the Director shall when the Minister so directs, discharge such a person from the provisions of the Act. We have no arguments in regard to this part of the clause. However, situations arise whereby it is extremely difficult for the management of a rehabilitation centre, if suddenly informed that a particular inmate has been discharged from the provisions of the Act, in this case by the Director, to allow such a person to leave immediately. I think it is only fair on the management of such a rehabilitation centre to make it necessary for the Director at least to consult the management of such a centre before a person is released and discharged from the provisions of this Act. This is the reason for the second part of my amendment. This applies specifically to a registered rehabilitation centre. Others who do not fall under this classification are of course the State rehabilitation centres. I am particularly concerned about the position the management of registered rehabilitation centres will find themselves in.

The last part of my amendment is to add a subsection at the end of the clause, whereby an inmate who has been ordered to be detained in a rehabilitation centre shall have his whole case reviewed at the end of a period of three years. This will result in such a person having his case once again considered by a magistrate, in other words, the recommittal of a person at the end of a three year period. I think this will obviate the practical difficulty that could arise of a person remaining almost indefinitely at such a rehabilitation centre or a registered rehabilitation centre. This is then also the reason for my moving the third part of my amendment. These are the three amendments to which I hope the hon. the Minister will give his serious consideration.

I would now like to deal with another aspect. In clause 34 (5) special provision is made for any person under the age of 18 years who is subject to the provisions of this Act to be detained in a rehabilitation centre under certain conditions laid down in this subsection. This subsection states that “a place of safety shall in relation to such a person be deemed to be a rehabilitation centre for the purposes of this Act". In this regard I would like further clarity as to the hon. the Minister’s intention as far as these places of safety are concerned. In terms of the Children’s Act a place of safety is regarded as a transitional institution and certainty not as an institution where rehabilitation might take place. It is certainly an institution which, in terms of the Children’s Act, can be used as an observation centre. Professorial officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions do indeed use such a place of safety as an observation centre in dealing with the placement of persons who have been committed in terms of the Children’s Act. I should therefore like to ask the hon. the Minister what the practical implication is of this clause which says that a place of safety shall be deemed to be a rehabilitation centre for the purposes of this Act. I should like to know what the hon. the Minister’s plan is in dealing with those persons under the age of 18 years who will be subject to all the provisions of this Act except that as far as their detention in a place of safety is concerned, they will fall under the provisions of the Children’s Act and any period of detention in a place of safety shall be deemed to be detention in a rehabilitation centre. I hopse that the hon. the Minister will be able to give us some clarity with regard to the practical application of subsection (5) of this clause.

May I first give the explanation which the hon. member asked for at the end of his argument. In practice we shall have to find our way in this regard. In the first place, we do not know at this stage how many rehabilitation cases there will be of persons under the age of 18 years. One will have to allow oneself to be guided by the circumstances prevailing from time to time. If there are not so many cases that a separate institution is justified—we do not wish to detain these people in the same institution as hardened adults—then the children may be detained for observation at an ordinary place of safety. From the nature of the case this will not be detention for a very long period, because these will be children in the initial stage of addiction; one will be able to react to it quickly, therefore in practice we shall convert these places of safety into rehabilitation centres for this purpose. If the demand is such that we shall need a separate centre for the young people, such a centre will be established, which will immediately overcome this problem. I hope this meets the hon. member's problem in that regard.

I now come to the hon. member’s other proposals contained in his amendment. His first proposal is that if a man has not been released from a rehabilitation centre after three years, his case is to be reconsidered from the beginning by the court. Sir, my practical experience is that as soon as one prescribes a maximum period, it becomes a minimum period in practice in many cases. If a man were not rehabilitated after a few days, a weekend, two weeks, a month, six months or a year, I would not need to look at him again before two years had expired, because the Act would provide that I need take him to court for his case to be reconsidered only after three years had expired. Therefore, for the next two years I would not have to concern myself with this man, because there would be nothing binding on me before three years had expired. In practice a maximum period often becomes a minimum period. The object very clearly is that the attitude of the Minister and the Director is to be that these rehabilitation centres are in existence for curing and healing people whereupon they may be returned to live a normal life outside. This is the whole spirit of this rehabilitation idea. This case may be compared with that of a person going to hospital. There are no provisions in terms of which a man may not remain in hospital for a longer period than six or nine months and in terms of which it is prescribed that this or that is to happen subsequently. Similarly, there is no attempt here to detain a man for as long as possible. As soon as he has been rehabilitated, we want to release him. I want to put it very clearly that the whole object is that he should be released or discharged as soon as possible. At the moment we have some latitude in that a report has to be made within 12 months. The hon. member now proposes that a report shall be made every six months. I understand this, but if the spirit and the attitude were right, namely that one wanted to release the man as soon as possible, it would only cause a lot of unnecessary administrative work if a report had to be submitted every six months. We want to try to discharge the man from the centre before the expiration of those six months. If the Director had to write a report on each of the inmates every six months, he would have to sit in his office writing reports for weeks on end, and at this stage I do not want to burden him with that work. The whole spirit emanating from this part of the Bill dealing with rehabilitation, is to return these people to normal life as soon as possible. These are not penal settlements; they are places where people are to be cured as soon as possible.

The hon. member requested further that we should give consideration to having consultations with the managements of these institutions. In practice we shall do this. In practice we shall have consultations with them and we shall notify them in good time that we are going to release a person. However, I cannot bind myself to that, because, although I do not want to cast any reflections or mention any names, if such a management were intent on keeping people there for as long as possible in order to receive the subsidy for as long as possible, they could make it difficult for me to release the person concerned after I had decided he should be released because he had been rehabilitated. They may act in that way merely with a view to benefiting materially. I am not saying this is the case, but I must bear the possibility in mind, and for that reason I cannot allow such a management to determine whether or not such a person is to be released. The main protector of these people is the Director who is specifically assigned to do so. If he finds that a person should be released, I shall consult the management concerned in the sense that I shall notify them in good time that the person may be released on a certain date. In that case they will be able to make the necessary provision in that regard. However, I cannot bind myself to consult those managements each and every time I want to release a person. There may be ulterior motives why they do not want to release a person. Under the circumstances I cannot accept these amendments.

Mr. Chairman, this clause is one which deals with the method of dealing with absconders from rehabilitation centres or registered rehabilitation centres. The position is that the 1963 Act is now in the main being re-enacted in this particular clause. However, the Minister indicated that he hoped hon. members would, if necessary, put forward suggestions and amendments which might improve the position as it existed under the 1963 Act. The question of absconders is a very difficult one, and many problems have to be faced in this regard by the management committees of registered organizations, particularly the registered rehabilitation centres. In terms of subsection (3) of this clause, a magistrate before whom such an absconder is brought shall, after having inquired into the reasons why the inmate absconded, order that he “(a) be returned to the rehabilitation centre, registered rehabilitation centre or hospital from which he absconded; or (b) be detained in custody, pending the decision of the director, in any place referred to in paragraph (a) of section 32 (1) designated by the magistrate .. “ Other provisions then follow in terms of which the magistrate may take certain action to deal with an absconder. There have, however, been cases where difficulty has been experienced because the magistrate was not required to take into account a report from the social welfare officer. There might be reasons why the person who has absconded is not able to put his case to the magistrate. There might be other factors involved. Most of these people are emotionally disturbed in some way, particularly the absconders. Therefore it would be an improvement, in my opinion, if the hon. the Minister would accept this amendment which would make it necessary for the magistrate to have the benefit of a report from a social welfare officer so as to enable him to come to a decision as to how the absconder shall be dealt with in terms of this clause. I understand that there can be certain practical difficulties involved where a decision has been made, and perhaps the magistrate has ordered that the absconder be placed in the care of his wife. This is a difficulty, in that the magistrate endeavours in his decision to find ways and means of dealing with the absconder until such time as the machinery runs its course whereby he reports to the Director the result of his inquiry and the magistrate makes an order in terms of the provisions of subsection (3), under which he might be returned to the rehabilitation centre or dealt with in any other manner which the magistrate considers appropriate. However, the magistrate has not had the benefit of a report from a social welfare officer, and here we are dealing with a particular type of person who is an absconder from such an institution or such a rehabilitation centre. I submit that this is a position where the magistrate requires assistance from a professional welfare officer in order that a report may be submitted which will assist the magistrate in coming to a decision. I therefore wish to move the amendment standing in my name, as follows—

This is an attempt to assist in getting a more effective administration in dealing with absconders from the various institutions.

This is a very gallant attempt by the hon. member to improve the present legislation. I want to say at once that he took a very interesting example, namely that the magistrate may decide to commit a man to the care of his wife. That is exactly what a minister did with me years ago when I said “Yes” in front of the pulpit; he committed me to the care of my wife.

What did you do?

I have not done at all badly under the circumstances. The hon. member can see it for himself. I accept the good intentions of the hon. member, but once again I am faced with a practical problem here. If I illustrate it to the hon. member he will understand it at once. The person absconds from an institution in, say, Johannesburg, and he is found again in, let us say, Beaufort West Now clause 43 (2) (a) provides very clearly that he must be brought before the magistrate of the district in which he was found. In other words, he must now appear before the magistrate in Beaufort West. The social welfare officer in that area knows absolutely nothing about him. He does not know his case, he knows nothing about him, and now, out of the blue, he has to write a report on this man. He has no knowledge of him and that report must be awaited before the magistrate can give a decision. I appreciate the good intentions of the hon. member, but this is my practical problem. In such a case it is much better for the man to be returned as soon as possible to the centre from which he comes, where they have a full report and a full record on him, so that they can decide there that he is to continue his treatment or else be discharged. This is the practical problem which prevents me from accepting this amendment moved by the hon. member. It seems to me that he is not sufficiently covered here. In addition I want to tell the hon. member that the person is at the moment still covered by the previous report submitted on him at the original inquiry, in respect of which he has not yet been fully discharged because the institution does not yet regard him as being fully rehabilitated. Consequently there remains a report on him which is still applicable and which has not yet been fully satisfied. For these reasons I am afraid that I cannot accept the amendment moved by the hon. member.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the following amendment—

1. (5) The Minister shall, not less than 3 months before any regulation is made under this section cause the text of such regulation to be published in the Gazette together with a notice declaring his intention to make that regulation and inviting interested persons to furnish him with any comments thereon or any representations they may wish to make in regard thereto.

   The purpose of the amendment is to seek the Minister's approval for the suggestion to publish the text of any regulation three months before the regulation is made in order to allow interested parties to submit their comments. This amendment has been moved primarily because we have been approached by the Chamber of Industries, who feel that there may be certain aspects which their members would like to consider and upon which they can offer advice and assistance in the framing of regulations. It is a principle that is not unknown to this House, because this particular principle is already used in the Drugs Control Act in which a period of 90 days’ grace is given for interested bodies, organizations and parties to submit their comments. I believe this would be a very useful innovation and trust that the hon. the Minister will accept this suggestion because we are aware of and have already commented on the haste with which this legislation has been introduced. We appreciate the many reasons for it. By virtue of the fact that this Bill was tabled this week, no interested parties other than those approached by the hon. the Minister have really had an opportunity to consider the Bill in all its ramifications and to express their opinions on it. I believe it is therefore important that they should at least be given the opportunity to comment on regulations before they are promulgated and that, the regulations should be promulgated in draft form for the information of and comment from interested parties, so that, thereafter, the comments may be taken into consideration before the regulations are gazetted.

Mr. Chairman, in his amendment the hon. member has in reality lost sight of two matters. In the first place, these regulations are concerned only with rehabilitation. No regulations will be made on any preceding part of this Bill From the nature of the case, the interested parties in the rehabilitation aspect of this Bill are in a certain sense the public and the specific private organizations and welfare organizations that deal with these matters voluntarily. In practice, however, it is our experience that these people mainly look to the department, with its experts, for guidance in this regard. As a result of studies and research conducted by our department, we send information papers to all of them from time to time. These papers are received very gratefully. In reality they usually become their manuals. I want to add that my problem is once again a practical one. If I had to give notice of a regulation three months before promulgating it, it would mean, in the first place, that this Act could not be implemented for the next three months. In reality it would be more than three months, because I still have to draw up the regulations. This will take time as well. After that it would take three more months before I could promulgate the Act and implement it. In my opinion this would be delaying the matter unnecessarily and I do not think very strong and positive contributions would really be forthcoming. I am saying this without being arrogant from the point of view of the department. As I have said, the regulations are concerned only with rehabilitation. My honest opinion is that the department is in reality best equipped to handle this matter. In addition, I want to give the undertaking that in framing the regulations we shall consult with the various interested parties, because we should like to take them along with us and have their co-operation. We should like to benefit from their practical experience. I cannot concede that every time before I announce a regulation I should give notice three months in advance because that would cause unnecessary delay and really hamper the entire implementation of the Act. Therefore, because this only concerns rehabilitation, I fear I cannot accede to the hon. member’s request.

Mr. Chairman, this particular clause implies that the sixth schedule of Act 13 of 1928, will now be amended. Schedules II and III are affected by this particular clause. I should like to ask the hon. the Minister a question which I know is exercising the minds of many professional people. Is it the intention that the long list of drugs which have now been deleted from the sixth schedule of the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act, and put into schedule II of this particular Bill, will now be under register as was the case with the old fifth schedule of habit-forming drugs under Act 13 of 1928?

Not as far as I know.

They will not be subject to register? This new schedule II now includes the habit-forming drugs which in terms of the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act, had to be kept under register. As I see it, there is no difference between the two.

Mr. Chairman, the provisions of Act 13 of 1928 still apply to these specific matters. From the nature of the case they will therefore still be under register, as is the case at present. This is not provided by this Act, but by Act No. 13 of 1928. There is no problem. The present schedule II is mainly taken from Schedule 5. The present schedule III is, with exceptions, mainly taken from Schedule 6. The provisions of their own Act, Act No. 13 of 1928, remain applicable as they stand. We are not touching them. That is a matter they can arrange themselves. I do not want to have anything to do with the medical and professional people; my colleague, the Minister of Health, will deal with them. As regards this matter, therefore, the provisions of Schedule 6 of their Act remain in force unchanged.

Mr. Chairman, I am not clear on this issue According to a recent Government Gazette, amphetamine which now fall under schedule 2, were, in effect, declared a habit-forming drug. It now has to be under register. It is also included with the other habit-forming drugs which now appear in schedule II of this Bill. Therefore, is there to be a differentiation between certain drugs in schedule II and certain drugs which were previously listed in schedule 5 and which were known as habit-forming drugs?

Mr. Chairman, I cannot understand what exactly the hon. member’s problem is. Let me just explain what exactly happened here. As the hon. member will understand, the habit-forming drugs are divided into three groups. Schedule I contains the totally prohibited group of drugs which have no medical value. I do not think we differ on this at all. Schedule II contains mainly amphetamines, which are the more dangerous habit-forming drugs. This was drawn up by the Medical Board, and is an extract from the present schedule 5 of the existing Act. Schedule III contains mainly the barbiturates and milder drugs, if I may put it this way, and was taken mainly from the present schedule 6 of the Medical Act. These are the three groups as now drawn up. The fact that these drugs are being taken from that Act and put into this Act, does not remove the responsibility under the provisions of that Act as it stands at present. It is being embodied in this Act because here we must indicate precisely what penalties apply to the various dependence producing drugs. I cannot, however, interfere with the provisions of that Act. What is professionally provided by that Act must remain so, as, for example, the registration of these drugs, etc. If the hon. member is not clear on this, we must try to obtain clarity, and then I will go into the matter in the Other Place. These drugs are mentioned in this Bill with the specific object of determining which penalties apply to the abuse of the various drugs. But the existing schedules to Act No. 13 of 1928, with their professional aspects, will still be dealt with professionally by that Act.

Mr. Chairman, if I understand the point of the hon. member for Berea, it is that this Fifth Schedule is now being repealed in clause 60. It is repealed altogether and it therefore disappears from the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act. That Act prescribes what the duties of pharmacists are in respect of the drugs in that schedule. That schedule is hereby repealed and not replaced at all. That is the point. Once this goes through it is out of the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act and there is no regulation as to what the pharmacist must do with his drugs.

I appreciate the hon. member’s problem. The position is that I have already said in my Second Reading speech that that Act, Act No. 13 of 1928, will also be amended and adapted this session.

And in the meantime?

In the meantime this legislation will not come into operation fully before that Act of 1928 has been amended; otherwise there will be a gap in between. The repeal of this schedule can therefore take place only after that Act has been amended to provide for the new coverage which may be necessary. This is clearly the position.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment in my name on page 360 of the Order Paper. I propose to move only the second part of the amendment. Therefore my amendment now reads—

I do not wish to move the first part because on reflection it appears to us that the prosecutor or the counsel for the accused may in any event draw the court’s attention to this provision. Therefore it is not necessary to have an application. The effect of this amendment is to give a complete and unfettered discretion to the court if the court finds—and this is a very important clause—that someone charged with pushing, for example, or peddling, is also an addict. If this is the court’s findings, then an inquiry may be ordered in terms of clause 29 in terms of the procedure provided for in clause 30. Then the circumstances which we discussed earlier will be avoided. With submission, there is no reason why this amendment should not be accepted. I say this because if one looks at subsection (5), it is provided that even after he has been found guilty, an inquiry may be ordered and then the verdict becomes null and void. In those circumstances, I submit this would greatly strengthen the point of view which has been expressed already and which I am sure the hon. the Minister wishes to make quite clear to the public.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to move the amendment standing in my name. I have also had some time to reflect on this matter. The idea of this amendment was to bring into the purview of this particular clause, those people who were using potentially dangerous dependence-producing drugs. As I read the clause more carefully now, I see that they can be included anyway because compulsory sentences do not apply to them. Am I correct in believing that those people can be included anyway without this amendment?

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Durban North, with the friendly way in which he made his offer, nearly persuaded me to say something. I have considered the matter very thoroughly and from all sides. I have considered every possibility. The principle that the prosecutor’s approval must be obtained for the conversion of a trial is a fixed one. This applies, for example, to preliminary inquiries in a magistrate’s court, and it is so provided by section 70 (3) (f) and (g) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955. The principle on which this is based is quite simple and logical. The prosecutor who has the dossier of a case to his disposal, knows what the nature of the available evidence is, while the magistrate does not know this until the case is concluded. Should a case not run its full course, the magistrate may be in danger of ordering a conversion which, after hearing all the evidence, would perhaps not have been justified at all. Subsection (1) (b) of the proposed section 341 is definitely there for a purpose. Sections 334ter, 334quat and 335 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, for example, make the application of the penalties mentioned therein compulsory if the accused has certain previous accumulated charges.

The prosecutor has his list of previous sentences and the magistrate can see that list only if he finds the accused guilty. If he should now be able to stop the trial without the approval of the prosecutor, and to order an inquiry under clause 30, while he, for example, does not even know which previous sentences the accused has, he would be able completely to frustrate the provisions of the abovementioned sections. I think that the amendment would definitely not promote good administration of justice. I understand that the hon. member would like to improve the matter—I understand that very well—but I maintain that we are dealing here with a practical situation, We do not want to run the risk of anybody being dealt with in an unnecessarily strict way, but at the same time we believe that only the State Prosecutor, and not the magistrate, should have all the particulars concerning the accused at this stage. He may see them only after the trial. That is why we are making provision for various occasions in the case, the trial, or even after conviction, so that this may nevertheless be done. I think the hon. member must accept my standpoint in these circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, I move—

This Bill gives extensive powers to magistrates, which extend the jurisdiction to them beyond any limit laid down before. I do not think that we have ever empowered magistrates before to impose the penalties provided for in this Bill. We moved amendments to restrict their jurisdiction so that it will be more in keeping with the power they have enjoyed in the past. So we wished to transfer the more serious cases under this Bill out of their hands to Judges in the Supreme Court, where they can be tried summarily. However, our amendments were rejected. Now, Sir, clause 13 entitles the magistrate to detain a witness indefinitely. We attempted to amend this clause by providing for an appeal to the Supreme Court, to a Judge. This amendment was also turned down. I want to stress again that a witness could be detained indefinitely on a magistrate’s order under clause 13. I addressed the Committee on clause 13 and raised my objection to giving a power of this nature, more especially to assistant Bantu commissioners. After thinking about it, I contend that this power should not be given to any additional or assistant magistrate, and do not exclude only additional or assistant commissioners. A power of this nature should only be enjoyed by a magistrate. The Minister pointed out that assistant magistrates and additional magistrates can try serious cases. As far as the other penal clauses of this Bill are concerned I want to mention that accused will be subject to the jurisdiction of additional and assistant magistrates. There will however, be one difference.

All those cases which fall under the jurisdiction of magistrates are subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court and also to automatic review. This is most important, Under clause 13, however, there is no automatic review and no appeal. We would prefer clause 13 to be dealt with by a Judge, but that cannot be since the Minister has rejected our suggestion in this regard. What we are asking for now is to provide for a magistrate only to have these very serious powers, and that it cannot be exercised by any junior officer. After all, we hope that there will not be many of these cases, so one cannot say that magistrates will not have the time to deal with them themselves. I submit that in a ease of this nature a magistrate should find the time to deal with it himself and that it should not be entrusted to junior officers. I appeal again to the Minister to consider my amendment and to accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the problem of the hon. member for Transkei and the attitude adopted by him that serious powers are being given to these people. I fully appreciate that. I must say, however, that the hon. member surprised me by the sudden introduction of the amendment, and that I am not ready at this stage to reason about all its implications. In respect of the first part of his amendment, my feeling is immediately that the suggestion to exclude additional magistrates is a little drastic. As the hon. member knows, an additional magistrate is not always necessarily a junior man. Sometimes an additional magistrate is a very senior person. In the second place we do not have fully-fledged magistrates in all the towns in our country. In some towns there are only additional magistrates in command.

There are always magistrates.

Yes, but they are assistant magistrates. There are towns which have no magistrates. I am being told that in the Free State, for example, there are many towns which have only assistant magistrates. As a result of this practical consideration I am inclined not to accept that part of the hon. member’s amendment. By accepting it, senior persons will in fact be excluded from these rights. These are people who are called additional magistrates, but who are in fact not junior men. In respect of that portion of the hon. member's amendment which deals with the Bantu Affairs Commissioners I want to tell the hon. member that the assistant Bantu Affairs Commissioner acts only in cases concerning the provisions of the Act entrusted to that Ministry, in other words, only with the rehabilitation of certain people. This is also made very clear in this legislation. It is only in respect of those aspects where the Minister of Bantu Administration administers the Act, and he only administers that part of this legislation which concerns the rehabilitation of Bantu. Clause 13 does not come under these commissioners for that purpose. This is my first argument. The second is that I cannot accept that amendment at this stage without consulting that department. At first sight I feel I cannot accept the amendment at this stage.

Mr. Chairman, as far as the additional magistrates are concerned I admit that they can be senior experienced officials. But the powers given here are so great that I still say it should only be given to magistrates, the highest man in the office. Only he should be empowered to detain someone in this way. As far as the Bantu commissioners are concerned, the hon. the Minister says that the Bantu commissioners and additional commissioners will only deal with the question of rehabilitation but I want to know from him who is going to try an accused person; who is going to apply the rest of the Bill in a reserve where you only have Bantu commissioners who act as magistrates? Who is going to try these cases? It is only the Bantu commissioners who act as magistrates.

The Bantu commissioner has an appointment as magistrate.

That is the point; he has an appointment as magistrate or as additional magistrate or as assistant magistrate. He applies the penal sections as well because he holds that appointment as magistrate, additional magistrate or assistant magistrate by virtue of the fact that he is a Bantu commissioner, additional commissioner or assistant commissioner. In terms of this Act he is therefore going to act not only administratively under the rehabilitation sections of this Bill but also in terms of the penal sections. I think that is quite wrong.

Sir, I should like to have time to have some consultation with the Department of Bantu Administration. If the hon. member will now withdraw his amendment I am prepared, before I propose the Third Reading, to …

You can do that in the Report Stage.

No, I cannot do it in the Report Stage.

In the Other Place.

I could propose an amendment in the Other Place, if necessary.

But what is wrong with the Report Stage?

Order! If notice is given, the hon. member can move the amendment in the Report Stage.

In any event, I am prepared, after consultation, to give my standpoint in my introductory speech at the Third Reading, hon. members can then argue the matter, and afterwards I can look at the matter in the Other Place again, if necessary,

The matter that I wish to raise with the hon. the Minister is the definition of “place of entertainment” in paragraph (xvi). Sir, this is a very important definition, particularly in view of the many consequences which flow from the application of the clauses with which we have already dealt. The owner for example of a place of entertainment has to report to the Police that he suspects that a person on his premises is in possession of or dealing in drugs, and then there is the presumption under clause 10 (6) as well as clause 8 dealing with forfeiture. It is important, therefore, to have clarity with regard to this definition. Sir, certain social welfare workers have experienced a great deal of difficulty in dealing with a new phenomenon in South Africa, namely the hippie communes and the dagga dens which have come into existence and which cause a great deal of anxiety the the Police and to social workers. “Place of entertainment” is defined here as including—

Sir, what concerns the welfare workers is whether action can be taken against certain landlords who may permit their premises to be used as hippie communes or dagga dens. They are anxious to know whether such premises would be covered by this definition. The difficulty is that in many instances no music is played in these premises; no dance is held there and no film is shown there. The premises are merely used for the purpose of dagga-smoking or the use of strong drugs. There is no admission charge. When social workers have endeavoured to try to find some means of combating this problem and have approached the landlord, the landlord in one particular case in Cape Town—and I believe that there have been similar cases in Durban—expressed his complete disinterest in what was taking place on his premises, which were old, dilapidated premises. He was only concerned with the payment of his rental; the person renting these premises was paying the rent and it was no concern of his what was taking place on the premises. My question to the hon. the Minister, therefore, is whether particularly in view of the use of the words “to which admission is obtained by virtue of any consideration, whether directly or indirectly,” he is satisfied that this definition covers premises where there is no admission charge, where there is no association of persons or a club or anything of that sort and where these premises are merely used for the purpose of dagga-smoking and for trafficking in drugs? These premises are from time to time subjected to raids by the Police and they form the subject of complaints from people living in the vicinity who ask the Police to take action. In almost every case where the members of the Narcotic Squad or the Drug Squad raid such premises they are able to take action against persons on the premises in possession of dagga. In terms of the clauses which we have just passed, the Police will now be able to take action against persons present on the premises, but will the hon. the Minister indicate whether, in terms of this definition, action could be taken against a landlord who permits his premises to be used for such purposes?

It is always very difficult to find a suitable definition, because one has to think of every possible situation which could arise in the course of years. As it stands, the definition of “place of entertainment” is already very wide, so wide that some people think that under these specific provisions we shall be able to take action against innocent people as well. What the hon. member has in mind is actually to make the definition still wider in order to cover the specific case he has in mind. Of course, action can be taken under the normal provisions of clause 2 and 3 against people who contravene the Act in the case he mentioned; action can just not be taken against them under clause 6; that is the position at the moment. I want to tell the hon. member that I will look at the definition again. I do not know whether the case he mentioned will be covered if no admission charge is paid and no specific entertainment is offered. But if we make the definition wider, we must be careful not to place people who have formed a club in all innocence, under the same obligation. I will look at the definition again, and will rectify it in the Other Place, if necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make a request to the hon. the Minister, even though I do not have an amendment on the Order Paper. I should like him, in addition to the names given in the Schedule, to add the trade names or common names of these drugs. There are very few pharmacists and medical practitioners, who can identify the drugs that are mentioned here. Even medical men and pharmacists have developed the habit of using the trade names of drugs. I may say that the list of drugs in the Schedule is a mixed one. In some cases the trade names or common names are used, and in some cases the chemical or pharmaceutical names are used. I should therefore like to ask him to add the trade names in all cases. It should be a simple task to add these names for the convenience of medical practitioners, pharmacists and also lawyers.

And the police.

The police probably know what these names mean.

Mr. Chairman, once again I have a practical problem in this regard. It would be an almost impossible task to add the ordinary trade names here, although the hon. member said it would be an easy task. The reason I am saying this is that we would have to check each of the medicines distributed today so as to establish which of them contain these substances in some quantity or other. Then it would also have to be established what percentage of these substances such medicines should contain before any product would have to appear in this list. The whole mass of medicines would have to be checked from start to finish. This seems unpractical to me. I want to point out to the hon. member that this list was compiled by the Drugs Control Council. Clause 15 of the Bill provides that this list may be supplemented or amended. I think the intention is clear that if the medical profession or the pharmacists experienced any difficulty in this regard, they would have the opportunity of contacting the Drugs Control Council. Then, if the Drugs Control Council could be convinced that this step was possible, they would make a recommendation in this regard, and in that case we would be able to add these names by means of an announcement in the Government Gazette. I think this is a matter which should be solved in professional circles. I have no objection to adding those names if the Control Council finds it practicable. Clause 15 is the channel through which this list may be amended without Parliament having to be consulted again. That is the very reason for the insertion of clause 15.

Sir, does the hon. the Minister realize what difficulties he is putting in the way of the medical profession, the pharmacists and the lawyers? I am telling the Minister that we are going to find great difficulty in interpreting this Schedule. It is all very well to say that some drugs have three or four names, but I should like to see those three or four names added. It will not involve a tremendous amount of work, because the persons who have drawn up this Schedule will know what the common or trade names are. If these names are included it will certainly make things much easier for those people who have to write prescriptions. We also do not want to fall foul of the law.

Mr. Chairman, may I just add my voice to the appeal of the hon. member for Rosettenville? In the Drugs Control Act provision has been made in section 22 for the Drugs Control Council to furnish certain information to medical practitioners and chemists and druggists. It states, inter alia: “The Council shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary for Health, in such manner as it considers most suitable—(a) as soon as practicable after any drug has been registered, inform medical practitioners, dental practitioners, chemists and druggists and the person who applied for the registration of such drug …’ of certain properties of the drug. Sir, I rise because this particular section has never been put into effect. I want to appeal to this Minister, who now shares the responsibility for these Schedules, to use his influence with the Minister of Health and to ask him whether he will put into effect the provisions of this section. This will help the professions to solve a very difficult problem.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether this is a typographical error or not, but there is definitely a spelling mistake in Part I of the Schedule, which mentions certain prohibited dependence-producing drugs. The word “Itsangu” should be spelt “Intsangu” in both the English and the Afrikaans versions.

Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the hon. member for Umlazi that this is merely a typographical error and that the matter will be rectified. To the hon. members for Rosettenville and Berea I just want to say once again that I fully appreciate the necessity and the need of what they pleaded for. My department is not able to effect these amendments. That will have to be done by the Drugs Control Council, if it is possible to do so in practice. The Drugs Control Council compiled this list as it now appears in the Schedule. I am glad the hon. member requested only the trade names and not the popular names as well. For example, I have in mind names such as “black bombs”, “purple hearts”, etc. The hon. member will appreciate that the Drugs Control Council is the body which in fact has authority over this, and which is in fact able to supply us with expert information in this regard. The list appearing in this Schedule is the one the Council compiled for us. I shall go back to the Council and talk to my colleague, the Minister of Health, in order to see what can be done in this regard. If the hon. member’s proposal is practicable, I can see nothing wrong with it. However, I do not know whether it is in fact practicable. They will have to decide about that. I am not able to do so.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Since 1968 the procurement of supplies and services required by the Department of Defence has been channelled through three separate organizations, namely: Firstly, the Armaments Board; secondly, the State Procurement Board; and thirdly, the Stale Tender Board. The functions of the aforesaid boards were demarcated administratively. During 1970 the Minister of Finance directed that the relationship between the functions of the State Tender Board, the State Procurement Board and the Armaments Board be investigated and that recommendations be submitted in regard to the more specific demarcation of the procurement functions of these boards. This investigation revealed, inter alia, that the functions of the three boards overlapped. In view of the fact that the powers and functions of the State Procurement Board and the Armaments Board are almost identical, it would be virtually impossible to establish a clear demarcation of procurement functions as far as the requirements of the Department of Defence are concerned. As the result of the investigations certain recommendations were made to the Cabinet and the Government decided that the procurement of all supplies and services required by the Department of Defence, excluding those requirements that could be procured satisfactorily by way of general contract which could be arranged by the State Tender Board, should become the responsibility of the Armaments Board. Secondly, the procurement of all arms, ammunition and secret communications equipment for the South African Police be undertaken by the Armaments Board. Thirdly, that the State Procurement Board should be abolished. My colleague, the hon. the Minister of Finance, will in due course introduce legislation to abolish the State Procurement Board. The Armaments Board will now be in a better position to promote co-ordination and standardization of armaments used by the various State departments, With this end in view, the Cabinet also decided that the Department of Industries, the Treasury, the State Buyer and the S.A. Police would be represented on the Tender Committee of the Armaments Board. To enable the Board to undertake the additional procurement functions which I have outlined, it is now necessary to amend the Armaments Act in certain aspects. I have also deemed it advisable at the same time to amend the Armaments Act to remedy certain shortcomings which have been revealed in the course of time in practice.

I now proceed to explain briefly the various amendments in the Bill before the House

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister was good enough to make available the services of the chairman of the Armaments Board to discuss this Bill with some of our members. That discussion was a very great help for which we thank the Minister. As the Minister mentioned, this Bill is necessary because of the reorganization in the procurement system for requirements of the Defence Force and also to enable it to enter into contracts to erect buildings, etc, We, on this side of the House have no objection against this at all. We are, however, not very happy about the very wide powers of delegation as is provided for in clause 5. We feel that these powers are very wide and that there is no limitation. As this is a matter of detail, I think we can leave the discussion of these powers to the Committee Stage. Therefore, we on this side of the House, support the Second Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Mr. Speaker, during the Second Reading and the Committee Stage, the Official Opposition dealt with the unacceptable aspects of this Bill which is before us, in detail. The effects of this Bill as it is presented for Third Reading will have we believe, far-reaching undesirable results which I will endeavour to enumerate. They are results which will be inevitable if this Bill becomes operative, but we would prefer to avoid them. For that reason we will oppose the granting of a Third Reading of this Bill by this House.

In the Committee Stage on Tuesday the hon. the Minister of Transport intervened in the debate and he made certain statements in the course of a short speech which I believe cannot be left unchallenged. I want to quote what the hon. the Minister has said. In one instance, and this was a motivation for this particular Bill, he said—

He continued to say—

(the taking over of certain powers)

I want to say quite categorically that we query the accuracy of the information which has been placed before the Minister of Transport and which prompted him to make these demands. I know that he personally has perhaps not been involved in the negotiations with the provinces but I want to assure him that our information is quite clearly and categorically that that is not the case. The provinces do not accept and concur in the provisions of this legislation. It would be extraordinary if that should be so. It makes it all the more suspect when one looks at the Schumann Commission Report in which the attitude of the provinces was made perfectly clear. I agree that that was in 1964, hut it is a material aspect. I want to quote what in fact the attitude of the provinces was. I quote from page 94 of the Report of the Schumann Commission. In dealing with the Cape it says—

As far as the Transvaal is concerned, the quotation in the Schumann Commission Report reads—

I.e. the control which was even then, before this Bill was introduced, being exercised by the commission—

The quotation, as far as Natal is concerned, reads as follows—

Then it goes on to refer to the safeguards. When we look at the Orange Free State the same sentiment is echoed—

The commission itself goes on to record that even the hon. the Minister’s own department, the Department of Transport, said—

All that is in the second clause.

Yes, Sir, I will come to the so-called “second clause”. The only person who indicated that he would like to have this procedure, was in fact the Chief Engineer of the National Roads Division. That was in 1964. I accept the information which I have, although it is not official information. I hope that there is sufficient documentation to show that I am incorrect, that correspondence letters or documentation will be placed before this House.

My Deputy will confirm everything that I said.

Well, I wish your Deputy would give us factual proof of that, because my information is that there has been no change in attitude since 1964, so far as the provinces are concerned. However, my hon. friend from Natal tells me that in fact Natal has recorded in writing its objection to this particular Bill. Perhaps the hon. the Deputy Minister will place that letter before hon. members.

I want to refer, in this matter of the attitude towards the provinces, to some other comments that were made by the hon. the Minister. I trust that the provincial administrators and the provincial administration executive committees, as well as the staff of the provinces, will take note of what the hon. the Minister saw fit to say about them in the course of this debate. I quote from his Hansard—

The hon. the Minister went on to say that “it is in the interests of the country that we are doing this, not because we have decided to take away powers from the provinces”.

Quite right.

Does the hon. the Minister repeat that the administration and construction of roads have therefore been inefficient?

National roads.

The Minister says that the building of national roads by the provinces has been done in an inefficient way, that the provinces have wasted public money and that the job could have been done very much better by the National Transport Commission than by the provinces.

Not deliberately, as a result of the system.

The hon. the Minister now says that it is as a result of the system, but it is extraordinary that the Schumann Commission agreed that the system of road building was correct but that it was the interference on the part of the National Transport Commission which caused all the trouble and wastage. There was abundant evidence that the wastage was as a result of the interference and duplication and unnecessary supervision exercised by the National Transport Commission. I agree that the hon. the Minister has the Marais Report to support his contention, because that commission recommends that the National Transport Commission should go so far as construction. The Marais Commission recommended that the new freeway system, referred to in the commission’s report on the re-organization of transport in South Africa, should be under some centralized control. That has been its motive.

I want to go further and deal with other remarks made by the hon. the Minister. He said—

Let us assume that that is so. Where is the State going to get engineers for the central road building organization to be established?

Where do they obtain them from today?

That is the question I am asking the hon. the Minister, and I hope the hon. the Deputy Minister will tell me. As far as the Cape Province is concerned, there is a shortage of 79 engineers to cope with the work they have to handle at the present moment. Does the Minister think that by introducing further complications in our manpower problem he will, by the wave of a hand, find the technical staff to operate a central road building organization? The overlapping will continue because what is provided for in this Bill? First of all, it provides that existing national roads will be handed back to the provinces for maintenance and reconstruction. The present network of roads and the present responsibility will be handed to the provinces. The infallible National Transport Commission—it is presented to us as a body of infallibility and super-efficiency—will then decide where the next new highways and roads are to be sited and in what manner they should be built.

They decide now.

Yes, they decide in consultation, but even this consultation has become irritating and should be done away with. They do not even have to consult the provinces in respect of the manner in which highways are to be built.

The Bill provides for consultation.

It provides for consultation in regard to one aspect only, namely whether or not the job of building is to be delegated to the province. But Jet us go further. Not only are we going to have this national road construction organization which will design and plan the roads, but it is going to delegate back to this money-wasting province the job of actually building the roads. That overlapping is going to continue and I cannot see how it is to be avoided. In fact, it will now be overlapping of a more disruptive nature because the provinces will now be told what to do as mere agents of the National Transport Commission, without a mind or an opinion of their own in so far as the handling of these national freeways is concerned.

Sir, I want to refer to one particular paragraph in the Schumann Report; it is a paragraph which puts this matter very succinctly. I refer to paragraph 712 on page 101 of the Report. There the Schumann Commission says this—

What do you think is the purpose of the Department of Transport taking over those functions from the provincial administrations? Surely you do not think that it is a question of empire building?

Sir, may I refer the hon. the Minister to the White Paper which was tabled by his colleague, the hon. the Minister of Finance. Let me quote to him what is stated in paragraph 7 on page 13 where the so-called advantages of this take-over are set out as follows—

I do not want to suggest to the hon. the Minister that the irritability which he sometimes exhibits in the House has passed through to his department and that the department now becomes rather irritable of criticism when it comes from the provinces. I believe that the whole concept of this Bill is contrary to what has been recommended by the Schumann Commission and the Borckenhagen Committee and that it is an unnecessary step which is being taken here to remove the powers from the provinces. I believe that this Bill will further reduce the powers and the authority of the provinces. The hon. the Minister has suggested that the power to build national roads was handed to the provinces only in 1935. But, Sir, the nomenclature of a road, whether it is a national road, a provincial road, a high road or a by-road, does not change the fact that it is a road within a province. Under the South Africa Act that was the responsibility of the province.

These roads go through all the provinces.

Yes, they may link province to province, quite naturally. The normal provincial roads link from province to province.

They only link up on the boundaries.

That is correct. Sir, the matter which I wish to develop further is the question of the constitutional rights of the provinces which are being affected here.

At this stage, Sir, I would like to move—

That the debate be now adjourned.