I move—

The main object of this Bill is to make provision for the inspection of registered financial institutions by full-time inspectors of the Office for Financial Institutions, which forms part of the Department of Finance. By “financial institutions” we mean registered banking institutions, building societies, insurers, unit trust schemes, pension funds and friendly societies. Our reason for coming forward with such a comprehensive Bill is to obviate the cumbersome procedure which would otherwise have to be followed to amend separately all the separate Acts under which the aforementioned categories of financial institutions are controlled. We are doing it in one comprehensive measure instead of six separate Acts.

In the first place I must emphasize that this Bill really contains no materially new principle. Powers are already granted in all the separate Acts to which I have referred to cause the affairs of the institutions concerned to be investigated under specified circumstances by investigators who have to be specially appointed for that purpose. The particular circumstances which the various Acts prescribe under which an investigator may be appointed are of such a nature, however, that a stigma will inevitably attach to such an investigation. Those circumstances are, for example, where an institution fails to do something that it is required to do in terms of the relevant Act, or fails to furnish information which the registrar may demand from it in terms of the Act, or where the auditor reports an irregularity or undesirable practice which is not remedied or discontinued within a given period, or where the registrar has information which, in his opinion, makes it necessary to investigate the activities of the institution.

If investigations can only be carried out in these particular circumstances, as is the case at present, it inevitably makes the institution concerned suspect in the mind of the public, and it is hardly necessary to say that such suspicion, even in the case of an institution which need not be a poor proposition at all, may have dangerous consequences. In the case of an institution which is, perhaps, rather weak, but which may have a good chance to recover if the undesirable factors are removed, it is almost certain that suspicion of this kind will have disastrous effects. These institutions are all organizations which handle public moneys, and, whenever such an institution goes under, it inevitably involves a certain section of the public in losses. The object of the control that we exercise under the various Acts that I have mentioned is to safeguard public moneys, and, in the last instance, this means that, if losses can be obviated by nursing a weak organization back to health, no obstacles should be placed in the way of its recovery. It goes without saying, therefore, that the downfall of a financial institution, inasmuch as the confidence of the public would be shaken merely as the result of an investigation, is something that should be obviated as far as possible.

The method that we are now using to overcome this difficulty is to make provision for ordinary inspections by permanent inspectors and to give such inspectors a routine character as far as possible. In this way we are trying to ensure that there will be no stigma attached to an inspection. We no longer talk about an investigation of an institution by an investigator who is specially appointed for that purpose; we talk about inspections. I may mention that inspections of financial institutions such as we are contemplating here are customary in other countries—particularly in the United States of America, where the largest and the strongest institutions are treated in precisely the same way as the smallest and the weakest.

The power that we are now taking to cause inspections of financial institutions to be carried out is generally acknowledged to be essential. It has happened in the past that, by the time the registrar has found sufficient cause to order an investigation, the financial position of the institution concerned may have deteriorated to such an extent that its recovery is practically impossible. By means of these routine inspections that we now contemplate, we hope to keep in touch with institutions to such an extent that normally we shall be able to take precautionary steps to ensure that an institution does not get into difficulties, instead of coming along after wards with measures designed to bring about the recovery of that institution.

We have found in recent times that quite a few financial institutions have got into difficulties. I do not want to go into the reasons for the failure of the institutions concerned; suffice it to say that these failures can be attributed mainly to mismanagement or the fact that sound and recognized principles of investment were not properly observed. In the light of these experiences in recent times, the powers for which we are asking in this Bill are regarded as urgently necessary. It is very desirable that our inspectors should start at the earliest possible stage with their routine inspections. Our experience has taught us that every effort should be made to ensure that financial institutions remain sound. Moreover, it will undoubtedly have a salutary influence on the management of institutions if it is known that there is always a possibility of an official inspection.

Another reason why this legislation is urgent is that inspectors will first have to be trained properly before they will be able to perform really useful work. In view of the fact that no steps can be taken until such time as this legislation is on the Statute Book, it is clear that we should lose as little time as possible in getting the contemplated inspectorate functioning.

Having made these general observations, which explain the set-up of the Bill in general terms, I want to explain the most important provisions of the Bill just briefly:

Clause 2 provides that inspectors (subject to the laws applicable to the Public Service) are to be appointed. These permanent inspectors may be appointed from the ranks of the Public Service or may be recruited from outside the Service. They will be full-time public servants. In this clause we also take the power, if circumstances require it, to appoint persons from outside the Public Service as temporary inspectors to assist a permanent inspector at a particular inspection. These temporary inspectors will be experts whose assistance may be needed under particular circumstances; for example, in the case of a technically involved or major inspection. Furthermore, this power gives us this advantage, since we may experience a certain amount of difficulty at the beginning in getting suitable inspectors, that we shall be able to make use of the assistance of temporary inspectors so as to give our permanent inspectors the necessary experience, and, furthermore, so that, during periods of pressure, one permanent inspector, together with the assistance of temporary inspectors, will be able to carry out the inspection of more than one financial institution simultaneously.

Clause 3 provides that the registrar may at any time carry out an inspection of a financial institution or cause such inspection to be carried out by an inspector. This is the power which enables us to undertake routine inspections to which, as I explained, we attach great value. In this clause we also mention a number of circumstances under which the registrar must cause an inspection to be undertaken. These particular circumstances are practically the same as those set out at present in the various Acts as reasons why an investigation may be instituted. According to the proposed arrangement the emphasis is placed on routine inspections which may be carried out at any time. These particular circumstances are only mentioned really because we feel that it will serve a useful purpose as a warning to all institutions. If they fail to comply with any of the aforementioned requirements, it is practically certain that under normal circumstances an inspection will follow immediately.

This clause also provides that any person may apply for the inspection of an institution. It does not necessarily follow that such a request will be acceded to. The registrar has a discretion in this connection and if he decides to have an inspection carried out in such a case, he may demand security from the person who applied for it for the payment by him of any expenses that may be incurred in connection with any temporary inspector who may be appointed from outside the Public Service for such an inspection. In this respect we are following the example of the Companies Act which contains similar provisions.

At this stage it is desirable that I should deal at once with Clause 7 which provides that any expenses in connection with an inspection carried out by a temporary inspector may, in the discretion of the Minister, be borne by the State, or recovered from the institution concerned or from the person who applied for the inspection. The intention is that if an inspection shows that there was good reason for incurring the additional expenditure connected with the appointment of temporary inspectors, such expenditure may be recovered from the institution, or if a person, without good cause, applies for an inspection which necessitates such extra expenditure, it may be recovered from the applicant. On the other hand the expenditure connected with the services of permanent inspectors will always be borne by the State. As far as temporary inspectors are concerned, however, as I have said, there will be a discretion which will depend on the circumstances.

In Clause 4 we are taking a number of powers which it is necessary for inspectors to have in the carrying out of inspections.

Do you regard these provisions as necessary in the case of routine inspections?

The point in this connection is that where such a routine inspection takes place and something is discovered which requires further investigation, a stage is reached where such a routine inspection becomes something more than a mere routine inspection. But it is not the intention to cause an investigation to be instituted, as was done in the past where there were good grounds for instituting an investigation, but simply to have an inspection carried out. The powers which are mentioned in Clause 4 do not differ much from the powers which already exist under the various Acts. They amount to this that inspectors may peruse books, make copies of documents, search the premises for books, securities, etc., take affidavits from the persons concerned, etc. There is one respect, however, in which a new power is being taken here which will be of the utmost importance to inspectors, and that is that they will now have the power to examine any debtor or creditor of an institution or any person, partnership, or company in which the institution has a direct or indirect interest with reference to his or its relationship with the institution which is being inspected. In this connection we have always experienced a certain amount of difficulty in the past. We have had cases already where we have had to make use of the Director of Companies because we have not had the power to follow up all the various ways in which money is invested in other bodies, institutions or companies. It is the intention to remedy this defect now. In practice it is found that institutions sometimes have relationships or alleged relationships with outsiders, which it is necessary to go into properly and which can only be controlled if the books of the other party are available to an inspector.

Clause 5 provides that the registrar or an inspector undertaking an inspection shall prepare a report on the inspection and that a copy of it shall be sent to the institution concerned.

In Clause 6 we are taking the power also to cause an inspection to be carried out into the affairs of any person, partnership or company that is suspected of transacting the business of a financial institution without having the necessary authorization. All the various Acts contain provisions indicating under which circumstances a person is deemed to transact the business of the relevant type of financial institution. It is extremely difficult sometimes to determine by means of investigations whether a particular undertaking is operating within or outside the limits which the Act prescribes. In these circumstances it is now proposed to inspect such an undertaking with a view to ascertaining what is actually going on. The granting of this power remedies an important defect. At the same time I want to announce that I intend moving an amendment to this with a view to placing a clear limitation on this power. The amendment will be to add the following words at the end of Clause 6(1)—

I do not want it to be a general investigation, therefore, but simply an investigation to ascertain whether that is actually the case. In the past we had this difficulty that a person or a partnership transacted such business although they were not registered under the Act and were not under proper supervision. We were not sure, however, whether that was so, and the only way to make sure was to go to the police and to ask them to institute investigations. Hon. members will agree that the police are not equipped for this type of specialized work. That is why we are asking for authorization for the registrar himself to cause investigations to be instituted in such cases. It must not, however, be a wider investigation than is necessary to determine whether or not the particular body is transacting the business of a financial institution.

Clause 8 provides that every person who carries out an inspection and every member of the office staff of the registrar shall preserve proper secrecy. Information obtained as the result of an inspection may, however, be used in connection with the institution which is being inspected and may be conveyed by order of court or by the registrar to a different Government Department if he has reason to believe that an offence or irregularity affecting that Department has been committed. If another Government Department, on the strength of information received in this way, wishes to institute a prosecution the inspector who obtained the information initially will be able to give evidence in such a prosecution on an order of a court of law.

The remaining clauses of the Bill deal with penal sanctions, make this legislation applicable to the territory of South West Africa and amend the various Acts applicable to financial institutions in so far as it may be necessary to transfer to this Act the powers of investigation at present contained in those Acts.

Mr. Speaker, we had prior consultations in connection with this Bill with the central organizations of the various categories of financial institutions. Where there is no central organization, as in the case of banking institutions, for example, the leading institutions were consulted individually. Most of the suggestions that were received with a view to improving this legislation were put into effect. All the institutions support the principle of this legislation and some of the leading institutions have unambiguously expressed their satisfaction with this legislation, which is designed to safeguard public moneys. Moreover, all the financial and other publications which have commented in the Press in this connection in recent times have urged that effective powers should be taken to protect the public. Hon. members will be aware of the fact that there have been cases in recent times which make legislation of this kind urgently necessary so that the investments of the small investor in particular, such as the premiums that he pays on his policies, can be properly protected. The existing laws do not provide adequate safeguards in this connection. I hope therefore that this legislation will help to provide these extremely necessary safeguards. In the circumstances I confidently recommend this Bill to the House.

In view of the large sums of money which are in the hands of institutions referred to in this Bill, this Bill is one of considerable public interest. I agree with the hon. the Minister, therefore, on the necessity there is for taking steps to ensure that, when members of the public deposit their money with these institutions, there will be no suspicion in their minds in regard to their deposits not being secure. It is common cause, as a matter of fact, that further legislation is necessary so that the interests of the public can be safeguarded and the machinery created for that purpose be strengthened. For these reasons, we on this side of the House will support this Bill. The hon. the Minister has told us that he has consulted the bodies, which are being affected, fully and that they support the principles contained in this Bill. That is also my information with the exception of one clause which has been inserted in the Bill since the original draft was circulated amongst them. This, however, we can discuss in Committee.

Having said this, however, I should like to say that there are some points in connection with this Bill to which attention should be called. The hon. the Minister spoke about “routine inspections” and about the appointment of full-time inspectors. I am not, however, clear on what he means by “routine inspections”. The bulk of the money with which we are concerned, is in the hands of large and reputable companies and an inspection of their affairs is not a light matter to undertake. One wonders, therefore, to what extent a routine inspection, which if it is to be mere routine will, of necessity, have to be superficial, is really necessary. At what intervals does the Minister visualize these routine inspections to take place? Because if it is to be a routine inspection, I presume it will be on the basis of inspecting everybody once every year or once every five years as the case might be. I am not happy about the appointment of full time inspectors to undertake these routine inspections being at the moment quite the answer to the problem. There is another aspect attached to it, namely that if full-time inspectors are appointed, they will have to be highly qualified and capable and will have to be highly paid, and they, in order to justify their existence, will have to be very active in what they are doing. The question of routine inspections is, therefore, rather an important one. Apart from the “snap” inspections which the Minister might consider necessary for sound reasons, normally, provided the institution concerned is complying with the law, is rendering satisfactory returns as required, and is complying with the requirements of the registrar, the necessity for a routine inspection is not apparent. As I said, a routine inspection, if it has to be an inspection at all, has to be a thorough one. As the concerns which have to be covered are large concerns, a very large staff will be required to carry out such inspections, and provided it is a reputable institution and is complying with the terms of the law and its returns are satisfactory to the registrar, I wonder whether the expense of a routine inspection will be justified. That the Minister should have the right to inspect the affairs of any concern in respect of which he has suspicion that it is not complying with the legal requirements or is not carrying out its duties towards the public, I fully agree with, but on the other hand I feel that the Minister is taking powers wholesale here, powers which are not really necessary unless he can tell us more clearly what is meant by “routine inspections”.

Another point to which I should like to draw attention is the fact that the Minister earlier in the Session referred to a committee which was investigating the manner in which the conditions under which deposit-receiving institutions can be registered, can be tightened up. I think it is common cause as well that such tightening up is necessary. Questions have been asked in this connection in the House during the course of this Session to which the Minister replied—although the replies were guarded—that he too was not satisfied with the present position. I hope the Minister will tell us in this debate exactly how far he has moved in that direction and whether he is likely to introduce an amendment to the Banking Apt next session with a view to tightening up the conditions under which deposit receiving institutions are registered. These are, after all, the institutions which the Minister is really after. He is really after the people who go in for this type of business either with the idea of being fraudulent, or else not properly financed to undertake the burden which they offer to undertake on behalf of the public.

Another aspect which I should like to mention is that the greatest care must be taken in the appointment of registrars. Under the six Acts which are affected by this Bill there are six registrars. It is no use blinking at the fact that there has been a good deal of public comment as well as suggestion that at least one of these is not coming up to the requirements of his post. As a matter of fact, many of the difficulties which the Minister had to face up to in the past, has been due to the fact that this particular registrar was not functioning as efficiently as he should.

Whilst we support this Bill in principle, therefore, we should like to be more specifically informed of what is involved in these routine inspections and what will be involved for the large and reputable companies. At the same time we should like to impress on the Minister the necessity for the utmost care to be exercised in the appointment of registrars. Furthermore, we should like him to indicate when he expects he will be able to introduce amendments to the Banking Act which will have the effect of tightening up the general conditions under which deposit receiving institutions may function.

This Bill fortunately is, not a contentious one in the sense of being in any way politically objectionable. It is a measure which should be looked at by members on both sides of the House, from the point of view of the investing public—particularly the small investor—and from the point of view of the good name of our registered financial institutions. I intend approaching the Bill in this spirit. It would be foolish however not to recognize that a chilly wind is blowing through some of the financial institutions in South Africa, especially some of the smaller and more recently established institutions and that this is, caused not entirely by economic circumstances.

Whilst the Treasury Vote was under discussion, comment was made by members on this side of the House about the seemingly ineffective way in which the financial institution section of the Treasury had been able to operate.

In addition, comment was made about the way in which certain financial institutions, particularly deposit receiving institutions and registered insurers, had been able, apparently with the permission of the registrar or, at least with his cognisance, to delay the submission of periodic accounts and balance sheets, as well as other financial statements for scrutiny in terms of the law as it stands to-day. The Minister in his reply to that comment, foreshadowed the introduction of the Bill we are considering now, he also said that in terms of the existing law, the registrar could only carry out inspections of financial institutions where there were reasons for suspicion—a suspicion I presume of some irregularity or other undesirable business practice. He also indicated that under the existing legislation the registrar had no power to interfere with the actions of insurance companies. It is quite obvious that something has to be done in regard to defaulting financial concerns. Whilst we have made that perfectly clear, as far as this side of the House is concerned, but it seems to me that before new machinery is created for controlling not merely the defaulting institutions or defaulting groups of institutions, but of all financial institutions in the country, this House is entitled to learn why the existing machinery for this purpose has failed. I think we should be loathe to create a new machine when machinery for that particular purpose already exists. The Minister in this connection went so far as to say that there was need for a comprehensive measure of this nature.

This Bill, however, goes considerably further in the granting of powers than what the Minister originally indicated he would require. As a consequence, this Bill contains very wide powers and these, it seems to me, will have the effect of placing a stigma, not on the individual concern so much as the Minister has indicated, but on the operations of all banks, building societies, insurance companies, etc. And this stigma has to be imposed because of a few failures and because the Minister’s own Department has been ineffective, mainly perhaps because it is inadequately staffed. What I fear therefore from a comprehensive measure of this nature, is that it does cast a stigma on financial institutions generally; and that whilst only a few have given cause for complaint. I should like to refer in particular to three clauses of this Bill which to my mind are very far-reaching in their effects. Firstly, I should like to refer to Clause 3 (1) (f) where powers are given to carry out, seemingly, both a routine as well as a major inspection—

I know that the Minister made some reference to security being given for costs, but this is a very drastic provision nevertheless to place in a measure which affects financial institutions in general.

Such a provision exists to-day!

In that case, the position is made worse by this addition. Let me say that I as far as I can see, the Minister’s Department may be engaged more in resisting applications of this nature than in complying with them. A very onerous duty is, therefore, being placed on the registrar and a wrong conception as to the scope of his responsibilities may arise in the minds of the investing public. To this I shall, however, come back later on.

The second clause to which I should like to call special attention to it Clause 4 (1) (d). Here, again, very drastic powers are being given, because an inspector may—

Unlike Clause 4 (1) (f) which grants such a right only when there is some definite irregularity taking place, this clause is wide and simply leaves it to the discretion of an inspector to remove documents from an institution. The Minister will be wise, I think, to impose some limitation here. The last one I want to draw attention to is Clause 4 (4). It says—

Here too an extremely onerous duty is being placed on the Registrar and I think that the hon. the Minister should consider inserting into this provision some qualifying circumstances which will guide the director as to when a drastic provision of this nature should be carried out. As far as the business is concerned, these wide powers may be regarded as poking an official nose into the business of a private concern. I think limitations are desirable, both in the interests of the public and because of the onerous duty which this section will place on the registrar himself.

I agree entirely that something must be done. But I cannot believe that the building of a bigger bureaucratic machine which this Bill does, is the remedy. I think the Minister will be well advised to examine the position and to see whether the minimum standards with regard to such matters as capital and liquidity are really adequate, especially with regard to deposit receiving institutions. These according to the latest report of the Registrar of Banks, are growing more rapidly than any of the other constitutions. The number of deposit receiving institutions to which he refers now total nearly 50 against a very limited number of banking institutions and also a very limited number of building societies. I think that possibly the remedy may be sought in tightening up the minimum standards which are required from financial institutions before building this big bureaucratic machine. In spite of the work of the financial institutions section of the Treasury having increased so much in recent years, it was apparent from the hon. the Minister’s reply during the discussions on the Treasury Vote, that very little or nothing appears to have been done to strengthen the staff. During that debate the Minister admitted that the staff position was a serious one. There is no chartered accountant on the staff of the Registrar and there is no actuary on his staff. The Minister rather indicated that belated attempts had been made to increase the staff by two inspectors. In spite of that precarious position having existed for some time the Minister now comes forward with what he calls a comprehensive measure to provide for the inspection of financial institutions generally. The hon. member for Con-stantia (Mr. Waterson) has pointed out that this is going to place greater and added responsibility on the Registrar of Financial Institutions. This makes it necessary for the Minister in particular and the Public Service Commission in general to be careful in the selection of officers to fill a post of that nature, the importance of which is growing very very fast to-day if legislation of this type has to be placed on the Statute Book. I recognize that the Bill empowers the registrar to augment his staff by employing “a person who is not in the full-time employ of the State as a temporary inspector to assist the registrar”. Speaking for myself I have no enthusiasm for a provision of this nature. I think it is an unsatisfactory practice to give executive functions to persons who are not in full-time employ of of the Public Service, to persons who are not subject to the disciplinary control of the Public Service, and to persons who have other interests than purely the interests of the State at heart. That is the main reason why in a democratic State such as we are trying to have, we have a Public Service capable of being the permanent non-political part of the executive machinery of government. That fundamentally is the reason for having a Public Service, if you want one which is completely independent, which is not subject to any dangers of nepotism and one which can place the public interests before any possible self-interests. Therefore, Sir, speaking for myself, I have no enthusiasm for this provision. I see much danger in this new principle which the hon. the Minister is incorporating in this Bill of employing persons who are not full-time in the service of the State on work of such an important nature as this and work which has very far-reaching implications to the businesses concerned. I know the Minister will say that he has tried in the Bill itself to take precau tions in regard to the observance of secrecy and by saying something which to me seems to be quite fantastic to put into a Bill (Clause 2 (3)—

Putting that into the law is not going to produce the man. I think it tends to be positively a deceptive factor because it is a safeguard which is really not a safeguard at all.

That brings me to the point which I made at the outset that this legislation will have the tendency of giving a false impression of security to the investing public. During the debate on the Treasury Vote I instanced the feeling which was abroad that the powers which the State already possessed constituted some form of guarantee as far as the investing public was concerned that their investment was secured and fully protected. When the Minister then embarks on legislation of this nature, when he embarks upon this comprehensive measure, there is the danger that the public will see in this an added form of security or an added form of guarantee by the State in regard to the soundness of the concerns to which they are invited to place their money, either as depositors or as investors. I think the Government will have to face that position with legislation of this nature on the State Book.

I come back to what I regard as the unsatisfactory principle introduced into this Bill namely the principle of placing responsible executive work of this nature in the hands of persons who are not full-time employees of the State. I do so because I want to anticipate any reply that this sort of thing has happened before. It did happen during the war and it had to happen during the war that persons in private capacities did work for the State not as full-time employees of the Public Service. Those, of course, were exceptional circumstances and they ended as soon as they possibly could. I think, therefore, that the Minister would be well advised in introducing legislation of this nature, if he placed a limitation on the period during which this Bill would continue. It is an experiment up to a point. I think this House should be able, say in a year’s time, to re-examine this position and to re-examine the powers which are being vested in a registrar to employ persons to do responsible work of this nature and to exercise the wide powers which this Bill gives to them. I would invite the hon. the Minister, therefore, to give consideration to this aspect of the matter and to place some limitation on the period during which this Bill will be in operation. I suggest that for the reason also that the hon. the Minister has indicated that a committee consisting of representatives of the Reserve Bank and the Treasury, are at present investigating the legislative measures which already existed for the guidance and control of financial institutions. Because that I believe is where the remedy lies; the remedy does not lie in adding to bureaucratic machinery. For that reason too I hope the hon. the Minister will place a limitation on this Bill so that there can be a hastening of legislation of that nature which to my mind will be a better remedy. I hope, therefore, that the hon. the Minister will take those matters into consideration.

Finally, Sir, again in case there might be some reference to this practice which I am deprecating now, by saying that it has taken place in the past, I wish to add this: I know perfectly well that legislation exists by which the controller and Auditor-General is empowered to employ professional accountants and auditors to carry out work for him. There is, however, a very great distinction between that case and the present one. Because people so employed have no executive functions and they have no responsibility to executive government as such. They are employed on behalf of the Auditor-General who is responsible solely to Parliament. Therefore they have no executive functions and no executive responsibility to anyone except to Parliament through the Auditor-General. To me that is a very great safeguard which exists in that case, if anyone chooses to use that as an example to justify what is taking place here.

There is no doubt that the investor in South Africa of to-day will welcome the provisions of this Bill. The investor is a very unfortunate person, because, human nature being what it is, when he invests, he invests where he hopes he will get the greatest return with the greatest security. Unfortunately, that is not always what happens, and there are two ways of dealing with protection for the investor. As has already been mentioned, there is the conditions governing the establishment of an institution and the regulations by which these institutions will be controlled. This Bill endeavours to take care of the second aspect. The Minister has a dual responsibility in this matter. He has a responsibility to the investor, a responsibility to see that he will be protected; sometimes against his own folly, to the greatest extent; but at the same time he has a responsibility to see that any laws which are introduced will not reduce the scope of private enterprise, and will not have the effect of new institutions not being able to open up, or of existing institutions having to curtail their scope of business. I think this Bill in the main takes care of both these aspects. In his second reading speech the Minister said that he was going to introduce an amendment to Clause 6, an amendment which is welcomed. I should like to draw the attention of the hon. the Minister to Clause 2 (2), where the right is given, not only to investigate financial institutions, but any person, partnership or company not registered as a financial institution. This is a very, very wide clause, Sir. In effect it gives the hon. the Minister the right to investigate anybody, anywhere, at any time. In view of the amendment which the hon. the Minister himself has suggested, it would appear that this is not the intention. It seems to me that the intention of sub-section (2) of Clause 2 is tied up with Clause 6. In other words, where the Minister is of the opinion that some company may be carrying on the functions of a financial institution, then he wants the right to investigate any person or partnership. But there is no such limitation in sub-section (2). It says clearly—

This is the whole world; there is absolutely no limitation on the rights of the hon. the Minister or his inspectors to walk into any place of business to-morrow and to say: “I want to inspect your books.” I would express the wish that at a later stage the Minister would introduce an amendment to make Clause 2 (2) only applicable for the purposes of Clause 6.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to reply to the previous two speakers, and particularly to the speech of the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (South) (Mr. Plewman). I am very sorry that this hon. member, after making a very good contribution, in my opinion, to this debate, sank to the level he did in attacking those outsiders—those inspectors the Minister may appoint, and who are not members of the Public Service—and making, such insinuations against them.

Where did I attack them?

The hon. member very clearly suggested that those inspectors who may be appointed by the Minister are persons who cannot be trusted, and who will be incapable of reporting objectively and independently.

You misunderstood me.

I think the hon. member made that insinuation very clearly. He also attacked some of the officers because they have not, according to him, been equal to the task, as hon. members of the Opposition also stated earlier this year. That is the point, if the hon. member doubts in his heart and soul that some of these officials have done their work properly—and I cannot agree with him in that regard—if he says they have not done their work properly, he should remember that they are full-time officers of the Public Service—why should outsiders, who are professional people, people who have the knowledge and the time and the machinery, and who enjoy the confidence of, not only the Minister and the Public Service, but of the whole country, why should those persons not be used to do this work? It is technical work, and they are trained persons. They are the persons who now may be used to train people in the Public Service. That also is the source from which inspectors may be recruited in future. I am very sorry the hon. member has made those insinuations here.

As regards the hon. member for Park town (Mr. Emdin), I wish to agree with him in this respect, that this Bill aims at restoring the confidence of the public fully and completely. It aims at strengthening the confidence the public should have in the financial institutions of our country. For, Mr. Speaker, there is an enormous amount of money concentrated in these institutions, and if there is no confidence in the institutions, then it is the end of our country’s economy. And that point about which the hon. member is so concerned namely that the other companies have to be investigated in terms of Clause 2 (2), is one in regard to which I should like to quote an example. If a financial institution has a subsidiary company which is a full subsidiary and all its money is sunk in that subsidiary, and that subsidiary is exploited by reckless directors or owners, how can that financial institution’s affairs be investigated to determine that its great investment in the subsidiary is valueless? That is why the inspectors should have the right to investigate that subsidiary, and by so doing ascertain that the affairs of the financial institution are in fact sound. It may also be retrospective if the controlling company of such an institution is in a similar position. It is in those cases that the registrar must and should have the power, with the consent of the Minister, to give the right. Sir, if it cannot be done, it means that this Bill and the whole investigation mean nothing, and you might as well write them off. That is why I should like to urge the hon. the Minister to let this clause remain as it is, for it is the point at which the inconsistencies, the fraud and the chicanery can be discovered and eliminated.

I think the ground has been covered very well in this debate but there are one or two suggestions I should like to make. It is a pleasure to be able to try to do something together in the House. I think the hon. members for Constantia (Mr. Waterson) and Port Elizabeth (South) (Mr. Plewman) have covered the whole scope of the Bill. It seems to come to this, Sir, that the annual audit is not enough. Frequently the annual audit of a company is a perfunctory statement which does not convey the information it should. It is not so much what is says as what it leaves unsaid. Therefore, as the hon. member for Constantia has said, we are prepared to support this Bill. But it is an experiment and it is an experiment which we shall have to be very careful about. In the first place it should be recognized that we are now going to build a new department of State, namely and Inspection Department. The type of Department I visualize is a department similar to the Department of Inland Revenue. The class of man we should have in this Inspection Department should be similar to the senior men in the Department of Inland Revenue. They have a very high reputation in South Africa, most of their work is confidential, and it is essential that the work of these inspectors should be regarded as confidential work. Therefore, in addition to having a good type of public servant, we need a registrar who will be placed in a senior position in the Service. It is a great responsibility and the hon. the Minister should take that into consideration. I do not like the idea of a temporary inspector—unless, of course, the temporary inspector could be the auditor of the company itself or of the individual or of the partnership business. In that case I foresee that the temporary inspector could operate with advantage to the Department. It would be a joint undertaking. If we are going to appoint temporary inspectors from firms of accountants, I think we are going to run a very great risk if we go outside the audit of the Company itself. I think that we should try to build up this Department as rapidly as possible. We should have men in this Inspection Department who are permanent Public Servants and who have taken the oath of secrecy as men do in the Department of Inland Revenue. Only on rare occasions should it be necessary to call on accounting firms outside the Service. An auditor of a company has to keep his job and that is the illogical part of the auditor’s work. If he is not persona gratae with the directors of the company the probability is that they will look for another auditor. When the auditors present their report and say “This is our report; according to the information supplied to us…” that does not go far enough. As I said at the beginning, we need something more, some further investigation. I should like the hon. the Minister to tell us in his reply whether he intends to make the institution of temporary inspector, temporary only for a special investigation or whether the temporary inspector should be a temporary inspector attached to the Department as it were permanently. If those are his intentions then I think they should be very seriously considered. If the intention is to get temporary inspectors to teach other men then it should be for a very short period. I think it is a very dangerous thing to say that people who are not part of the company organization should, as the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (South) has pointed out, delve into the books, the records, the securities etc. of any individual or partnership or company. I should like to say, that we will assist the hon. the Minister wherever we can in making this a success but we do not want to have a snooping department. I know it will not become that. We are very anxious to assist him and we will watch him with very great interest how this Department is built up.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is necessary for mg to say a few things in general before I reply to the particular questions which have been addressed to me. In the first place, I want to say that we must accept it that legislation can never be effective to stop all types of playing about with the money of the small investors. I pointed out in my introductory speech that there were really two reasons why institutions landed into financial difficulties. The first is ordinary malpractices. The second is following an unwise scheme of investment. Legislation can never provide people with a criteria as to what their investments ought to be. Many of the difficulties into which institutions land are the result of a lack of knowledge of proper investments and no legislation can cover that. As far as malpractices are concerned, we can attempt to make it difficult for those malpractices to take place. We can attempt, provided we know about it timeously, to persuade institutions to adopt more ethically correct and wiser procedures, but we can never guarantee any success. I would be the last one to say that this Bill is going to be a guarantee for every investor in a financial institution that his investment will be safe. I can merely say that we are trying to do our best, but the principle on which any investor should still act is the principle of caveat investor. If he goes to an unknown institution and entrusts his money to it without any knowledge of the integrity of that institution or its financial soundness or its business principles, then it is caveat investor. We cannot provide against that. We can only hope to mitigate the dangers to the investor; we cannot hope to exclude them altogether. I want that to be understood very clearly, that this Bill is not intended to make investors sit back and say: Now we are absolutely protected and nothing can happen to our investments. They should still be on their guard and feel that they should have the necessary advice from other financial people in whom they have faith, as to whether this is a proper investment or not.

In the second place, I want to say something about the point raised in regard to the Registrar of Financial Institutions. His first duty is to safeguard the interests of the small investors, but that puts him into a dilemma very often. At what stage should he take proceedings against a company, when by taking proceedings against the company he knows he will endanger the investments of small investors in that company? He has to weigh up matters and it is very easy for us who sit here, to say he ought to have done this or that, but he has to decide whether that is the proper time to step in, regardless of the fate of the investments of the small investors. He has a very difficult task to perform. It is easy for us to stand on the sidelines and criticize. If we had been placed in that position, our whole judgment might have been different. He has to exercise that discretion, and it is not easy. He has to know when he must act strongly against an institution, even if it does mean that all the savings of the small investors in that institution will go west. He will have to see whether it is not possible, by delaying action against an institution, to nurse it back to financial health and thereby save the investments, and no one can presume to exercise that discretion for him unless he has at his disposal all the facts which the registrar has at his disposal; and even then he may err. But he has to try up to the very last to nurse back to health an institution in which the savings of small people are invested.

The third point I wanted to make in general is this. If hon. members want to make this Bill a success, they will not help to do so by depriving the registrar of the means of exercising control. Let me just give one example. Clause 4 (4) has been referred to here—

That is a very necessary provision. We have had cases where the directors of a company have invested moneys and we have not been able to follow it up. I will give one example. In a certain inspection it was found that an insurance company had paid R205,000 to one of its directors in his personal name. The explanation was that the said director had to buy certain assets for the insurance company. After four months the assets had still not been bought. We would like, in such a case, to inspect the affairs of the director to see how he has used that R205,000, whether he used it as suggested, or whether in the interim he has applied it for his own purposes with the idea that ultimately he may use it for the purpose specified. But unless we have this power, we cannot follow it up into his hands. It may be a payment to someone else. As I say, I do not want us to tie the hands of the registrar unnecessarily. We have to accept that he will not exercise these powers in an unnecessarily strict manner. But on the other hand we must not make it impossible for him to carry out his first function. I quoted that one example, but there are many other similar ones. That is why we discussed this Bill with all the various institutions concerned, and asked for their opinions, and this is what has been more or less crystallized out from the views they have given.

The hon. member for Constantia (Mr. Waterson) has asked me in regard to routine inspections, what is a routine inspection. The whole object of this Bill in regard to routine inspections is to avoid a stigma being attached to it when a particular institution is being inspected. Therefore we have said that we will call it an inspection, or a routine inspection, if you like. In the U.S.A. they have these inspections, and their financially strongest institutions are also subjected to this routine inspection. But in their case what often happens is that the inspector walks into the institution and says: I have come to see how you are getting on, and he passes a few friendly remarks and he leaves. But the point is that if he now goes into the next institution then, as far as the public is concerned, he is doing an inspection, and there is no reason yet for any suspicion that that institution is on its last legs. That is the whole object of the routine inspection. There may be cases—we have actually experienced that—where people are dilatory in making their returns and we have to write reminders, but under this scheme we will go in and have a routine inspection, and instead of having lengthy correspondence about it we may be able to get to the root of the trouble quickly.

Surely that would not be a routine inspection; it would be an ad hoc inspection.

We do not use the word routine inspection here, but what we have in mind is an inspection, without giving it a label. Once you give it a label, as under the existing law, your difficulty is that immediately people think there is something wrong with that institution, and we want to avoid that if possible because it may be that such suspicion may occasion a “run on the bank,” and if it were not for that we might still be able to nurse that institution back to health and so save the money of the investors.

There has also been objection to some of the clauses—Clause 3 (1) (f) and Clause 4 (1) (d)—but I want to point out that similar provision exists in other legislation, in the Companies Act, and so far as 3 (1) (f) is concerned, and also 4 (1) (d) there is also similar provision in other legislation. As far as Clause 2 (3) is concerned, I think it was the hon. member for Port Elizabeth-South (Mr. Plewman) who asked why we say that this temporary inspector must be able to report objectively and impartially on the affairs of a financial institution. This clause was inserted as the result of representations received, as institutions are afraid, e.g. that an auditor whom they may have dismissed, or who had an argument with the institution, may be appointed as a temporary inspector to inspect that specific institution, and may consequently be prejudiced. It is on their representations that we made it clear that we want to avoid that. We do not want to appoint a man as a temporary inspector who may be prejudiced, and we put that into the Bill merely to make it quite clear that if there is any objection this man ought to recuse himself.

That brings me to the question of temporary inspectors. The whole idea of temporary inspectors is that they are not people on the fixed establishment. They are people who are obtained for a specific inspection and who may have the necessary technical knowledge.

Our permanent inspector may have gone in there and seen that the matter required specialized knowledge, and he may be able to call in the assistance of such a man. But the same person will not be called in all the time. I think there will probably be a panel from whom we would select these men, after having seen what type of knowledge is required for such an inspection, and even then you would select such a man and appoint him as a temporary inspector. But he is not going to be a fixed temporary inspector. The only reason why we call it “temporary” is because he is not on a fixed establishment.

The hon. member for Constantia has also asked me a further question in regard to the Committee of the Reserve Bank and the Treasury which I mentioned. That Committee is still busy with its investigations. It is not an easy job, but I understand that they have a draft ready now and we are trying to expedite their work. But it is not possible for me to say at this stage when their report will be ready. It may be that as the result of this Bill and the comments made here they will have to go into some of the matters raised here, if they have not already done so. I do not think that the idea that we could, for instance, tighten up the minimum standards for admission to act as a financial institution is the solution. That is a point we can go into, but do not think that will remove the need for inspection. I think the inspection is a vital aspect. The institution may comply with all the minimum requirements and be allowed to begin business, but that is not a safeguard that it will be a satisfactory business. You must have the inspection. We will go into the question of the minimum standards, but an institution must also be subject to inspection. The mere fact that it may have an inspection at any time may also be an incentive to walk in the narrow path of financial virtue. This idea of temporary inspectors is not something new. In fact, it is existing practice. What is new is the permanent inspector. Now we call it an investigation, when the registrar has reason to inspect various things, and then he appoints someone to make an investigation. So that is not new, but what is new is that we now want to have inspectors attached permanently to the Public Service and to this Department.

The hon. member for Park town (Mr. Edmin) asked a question in regard to Clause 2 (2), and his argument is that as I want to make it perfectly clear that the inspection under Clause 6 is not to be a wide, snooping investigation, but must be limited for the purpose, why do I not put it in here? But Clause 2 (2) actually links up with Clause 6. I will just read it—

I think that deals with all the points that have been raised. I am almost reminded of the story of the man whose wife asked him to go and listen to a sermon, and when he came back she asked what the sermon was like? He said “good”. She asked what the parson preached about? He said “Sin”. She asked what he said about sin? He said: “Well, I gathered he was against it.” I can only say, from what has been said here, that I gather that the hon. members opposite are not against this Bill!

Motion put and agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

This clause extends the provisions of the Act which was passed last year, the General Law Amendment Act of 1961, and the relevant section, Section 4, which is being amended here, is to allow the period of 12 days during which a person may be detained without bail being granted, when the discretion of the court to allow bail has been removed to be extended for a further year. Under Section 4 of the Act passed last year, the operative words say that the provisions of this section may from time to time by resolution of the House of Assembly be extended for a period not exceeding 12 months at a time. Now the Minister is circumventing that by including in the provisions of the Bill before the House now, a clause which enables him simply to extend that period of detention for 12 days without bail for a further year. I want to say at once that, when the Act was amended last year, we opposed very strenuously the introduction of that section. It was felt that this was a derogation from the normal discretion of the courts of law, and strong arguments were put up asking the Minister not to do that, not to remove the discretion of the courts in granting bail, but to leave the criminal law as it was, i.e. that a person could be held for 48 hours without a charge being laid, but even during that 48 hours, of course, such a person could be granted bail. Various arguments were advanced by the then Minister of Justice in support of that clause and the argument went as follows: that we were going through a very difficult period, and the House was reminded that this Act was being introduced just prior to the promulgation of the Republic, and that there had been signs of various disturbances, and that this was a preventive measure to try to forestall such disturbances. As the result of that, the House was asked to pass this clause, giving the Minister the powers to see that persons who were detained or arrested could be held without bail being granted, and the discretion was given to the Attorney-General, but this means in effect the Minister, because, under our existing law, the Attorney-General acts under the Minister, who can reverse any decision of the Attorney-General. So it was simply an extension again of ministerial powers. We were told that the times were exceptional, that this was simply a temporary measure, and that, although provision was being made whereby the Minister could come back to Parliament and renew this provision annually, it was not intended to be a permanent part of our law. Well, although this has only been extended for a further year, it seems to me that the writing is on the wall, and there is no doubt in my mind that this will become a permanent part of our law, just as the banning of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. was called a temporary measure….

Do you say that we should not have banned those two organizations?

I do not think that banning organizations helps at all. When you put such organizations underground, they are far more dangerous. I have always held that view, and it is held in England, where the Communist Party has not been banned, and it has negligible influence. We will find that year after year the Minister will come back to the House banning organizations, taking greater powers and extending his existing powers. That is already what is happening. If one looks at the changes made to the criminal law since this Government took over, one finds statute after statute has been introduced…. [Interjections.] I want to get back to the clause. I only diverted because the Minister dragged a red herring across the trail. I say it is obvious that the Minister intends that what was originally introduced as a temporary piece of legislation should become part of the permanent criminal law of South Africa, and I object strongly to that. I do not see why it should not be left to the discretion of the courts to decide whether bail should be granted, and why that discretion should be given to the Attorney-General, who, in any case, are under the control of the Minister, who may at any time take such discretionary rights away from them. This so-called special crisis for which the section was originally introduced last year has now finally become a permanent part of our life. Are we to assume from this clause, and other clauses in the Bill, that we are really in a permanent state of emergency, where the Minister has to take powers which allow him to extend the state of emergency beyond the area where it is declared, and now he is taking the power once again to detain people without the right of bail. Another argument used at the time was that the Crown did not have sufficient time to prepare its case in 48 hours. I would like the Minister to tell us how many people were in fact detained last year without bail.

That has nothing to do with this clause.

It has to do with the clause, because this provision is being extended for another year. Surely one is entitled, therefore, to discover from the Minister how this worked in the past year. Therefore, I want to ask the Minister how many persons were detained last year without bail, and how many charges were ultimately laid against them?

I have not got the information available here, but if you put a question on the Order Paper I will reply to it.

Yes, but perhaps the Minister can indicate generally whether those people were charged, and whether the Crown found that 12 days was long enough to prepare its case, or are we going to have the Minister coming back to the House and saying that 12 days without bail is not enough, and he would like to extend it to a further two weeks? That is the principle embodied here, and I object strongly to it, and I shall vote against this clause.

There is a very important principle involved in this clause. The Minister has not given the House any reason why this clause is necessary. Last year we were told by the Minister’s predecessor that it was to do two things. One was to help to quell disturbances which we expected on 31 May, which did not arise, but that is not the point, and, secondly, we were told that it was necessary to protect White civilization in South Africa. Now I suppose hon. members opposite will all say “Hear, hear!” but you do not protect White civilization by throwing overboard the corner-stone of that civilization. The corner-stone of that civilization is the freedom of the individual, and it is a very serious and a very important matter to interfere with the freedom of the individual to the extent that this clause does. This is the difference between the Western democratic countries and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. I do believe that hon. gentlemen sitting on that side of the House would find that their forebears would turn in their graves to see the attitude that these hon. gentlemen adopt towards the liberty of the individual. [Interjection.] That is part of the clause; it is a very important part of it.

Order! I wish to remind the hon. member that the principles of the Bill may not be discussed in Committee, but only the details.

One of the details of this clause is that no longer is the individual protected by the courts, because, under this provision—the extension of last year’s Bill for one year—it is not the courts which determine the freedom of the individual, it is the hon. the Minister. It now becomes an executive decision whether a man shall be free or whether he shall not be. A man as yet innocent, in respect of whom the normal presumption of innocence applies, who has not been convicted of any offence, is to be deprived of his liberty for 12 days at a time, not just for 12 days, but for periods of 12 days, if necessary, at the instance of the Attorney-General. The other detail which is involved here is the question of the determination of bail. The hon. the Minister has not made out any case why the courts should not determine bail in the normal way. Surely bail must be determined having regard (a) to the crime with which the person is charged and (b) the circumstances attending the commission of the crime and the circumstances attending the society where that crime was committed.

And whether in fact he will stand his trial.

Yes, whether he will in fact stand his trial. But, Sir, the courts have dealt with this for centuries. Why does the hon. the Minister now want to take this away from them again for another year? Does the hon. the Minister not have any faith in the courts? I remember that last year the case of Rex vs. Shaw was quoted, in which one of the Local Divisions of the Supreme Court held that public safety was not a factor which the courts should take into account in determining bail. But the simple answer to that argument, of course, is that if the hon. the Minister wants them to take it into account, he can pass legislation making it possible for them to take that factor into account. But now we have the situation where, so far as the individual is concerned, no matter what he is charged with, if he is charged with contravening a traffic regulation, he could be locked up for 12 days, and I fail to see how any situation in this country can be cured or prevented by putting people in gaol for 12 days at a time without bringing him to trial and without necessarily prosecuting to the end the charge upon which he was originally arrested. I think the hon. the Minister owes this Committee some explanation as to how these powers have worked in the last year; whether in fact they have prevented the mischief that they were designed to meet; whether in fact those persons who were detained under this clause were charged, and how in the next year the Minister intends to use these powers, because this is a clause giving him the power to do so just for one more year. Perhaps the hon. the Minister will explain just why.

The hon. member who has just resumed his seat put certain reasonable questions to me and then he also made certain wild interpretations. I first want to deal with the questions both the hon. member and the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) asked me. It is very clear, as the clause is drafted here, that it is still only a temporary measure. The hon. member immediately charged the Minister with putting people in gaol at will. It is not the Minister who has that arbitrary power, but it is the Assembly that has to decide whether it wishes to extend the application of that rule for a year. It does not concern the Minister’s power at all; it is concerned with a resolution of the Assembly. But in the second place, the one question was put to me, both by that hon. member and the hon. member for Houghton, as to whether we have in fact used this section, and the reply is yes, we used this section in respect of the saboteur Strachan in Port Elizabeth. We availed ourselves of it in respect of the alleged sabotage by Mr. Peake and Mr. Toruk and others who are alleged to have committed certain acts of violence. The hon. member has come along here with the interpretation—and I do not know where he got it from—that you may detain a man for an indefinite period of 12 days at a time. It is beyond my comprehension where he gets that from, for the truth of the matter is that you may detain a man for only one period of 12 days.

You can arraign him again and then follow the same procedure.

No, you charge him within the fixed period, but for 12 days he is unable to obtain bail. However, you cannot detain him for 12 days, and then again for 12 days, and that is the impression the hon. member gave me. Whether he deliberately wishes to create that impression on the Committee I do not know. But the fact is that you may detain him for only one period of 12 days in respect of the crime with which he is charged. I therefore put it to the hon. member that we have in fact used it in respect of saboteurs who have been convicted by the court, and in respect of others who are alleged to have committed certain acts of violence. And why is it necessary? The hon. member knows as well as I do that we are dealing with a class of person here who will not attend his trial if he gets half a chance to escape. But apart from the fact that we know from bitter experience—and the examples are legion; I need not mention them to the hon. member—of people who in fact did not stand trial, but who fled, we also know (and they openly boast about it) that organized escape routes are organized for these people and that they flee the country by those escape routes. If the hon. member looks at yesterday’s papers, he will see that reference is again made to a communist who departed from the country in that manner, and accordingly will not, if the Appeal Court dismisses his appeal, serve his sentence because he is alleged to have fled from the country. And because that is so, we have been placed in this position: The man applies for bail; we have to show cause why he should not get bail. In the normal course of events, when a man has committed an ordinary crime, it is easy to show those reasons within the short time at your disposal, but in the case of these subversive activities it is not always possible. The man’s history must be traced; his associations must be traced so that you may put it all before the Court, and it is simply impossible in practice to do so within the space of 48 hours and at all times to bring that evidence to Court. You do not know yet what all the consequences of the crime with which he is charged are; you first have to trace it, and that appeared in the Strachan case. If this rule had not existed in the Strachan case, it would have meant that we probably would have been able to produce very little evidence to the court within the 48 hours, as to why Strachan should not be released on bail, and that means he would have obtained bail. It is customary for us to have the information before the Court after the time at our disposal has expired. It was done and he was refused bail. One need not be a prophet to know that if Strachan had secured bail, he would never have stood his trial, and if we had not had the 12 days to satisfy the Court that in fact he was the type of person to whom bail should not be allowed, he would simply not have been tried. I do not wish to deal with the hon. member’s statement that you may gaol a person for 12 days on account of a traffic offence. This section has never been used in respect of ordinary offences. This section only comes into play—and it has been so used by the Attorneys-General—where subversive activities are involved because from bitter experience we know that these people flee the country and will not stand their trial if they were admitted to bail.

I have allowed two hon. members to talk about the principles of detention which is contained in the original Act and which was also agreed to at the second reading. I have allowed the hon. the Minister to reply to that but I shall not allow other hon. members to continue along the same lines.

On a point of order, is the effect of this amendment not to re-enact the whole of the relevant portion of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of last year?

That was decided at the second reading.

Mr. Chairman, will you permit me to point out to the Minister the reason why this Committee should reject this clause and why it is not necessary to extend the period from 1962 to 1963. In other words, I want to try to convince the hon. the Ministerx2026;

Order! I have just pointed out that I have allowed two hon. members to deal with the question of detention but it is the principle that has been agreed to and the hon. member cannot continue along those lines.

Sir, I would like to abide by your ruling but will you tell me, for my own edification, what principle was accepted at the second reading that the time should be extended?

Order! The principle of detention was accepted.

And your ruling is that I cannot give the Minister reasons why this Committee should reject this clause?

The hon. member can discuss the period only.

Why it should be for an extra year?

Why it should be 1963 instead of 1962.

On a point of order, in referring to the discussion in Committee last year, I notice that there was considerable discussion on the question as to why a person should be detained and why the Attorney-General should be given this power. The Minister at that time elaborated on the temporary nature of the measure. That was in the Committee Stage of the main Bill in 1961. Surely we now have the same privilege in this Committee?

That was decided last year, and I am not going to allow the principle to be discussed in this Committee.

May I ask, Mr. Chairman, whether you will accept an amendment to delete “1963” from the clause.

No, the hon. member can vote against the clause.

I will have to give reasons why the hon. the Minister does not need these powers.

Order!

This Clause 17 in effect repeats Section 108bis of the Criminal Procedure Act, and I should like to confine myself to this clause alone. One of the provision of Section 108bis of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that this detention for 12 days that we now wish to extend to 12 months …

On a point of order …

Order! The hon. member cannot discuss that. The principle has been accepted at the second reading.

I was under the impression that you ruled that we could discuss the question as to whether it should be extended for 12 months.

As regards the detention for 12 days, a decision was taken at the second reading.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to discuss the 12 days but the 12 months. If we now were substitute “1963” where formerly it said 1962, we are a year further, surely. I want to discuss that only. I must give the reasons why we now substitute “1963”, and why we do not let it lapse, as I understood your ruling.

The hon. member may confine himself to the clause only. Detention without reference to the Court has been accepted at the second reading.

What may I discuss then?

Only the substitution for 1962 of 1963. The decision that it may be extended has already been taken at the second reading.

May I say why I think it is good to substitute 1963 for 1962?

I have allowed two hon. members to say why they are opposed to it. I have allowed the Minister to reply to that and to deal with their objections. I cannot permit further members to discuss the principle.

We realize that you permitted some latitude.

The hon. member cannot address me on the ruling I have given.

May I just say what I wish to say if I am out of order then, you may rule to that effect. You have given hon. members on both sides an opportunity to state their points of view, but one party in this House has not yet stated its point of view. Will you be so kind as to give the representative of the Coloureds an opportunity, as this group has not had an opportunity of stating its views yet?

I have given my ruling and it applies to all parties.

While the hon. the Minister has suggested that this provision should be extended for another year, in order to deal with saboteurs, I hope the hon. the Minister will listen to the point I want to put forward. The hon. the Minister was at pains to point out that this provision has not been used and will not be used during the next 12 months except in special cases. He gave examples of the sort of persons that would be dealt with in the next 12 months. One of them was Turok and the other was Strachan. The hon. the Minister said that when these people in the next 12 months come before the courts and are charged, it may be necessary to detain them for 12 days because possibly they won’t come back. I want to remind the hon. the Minister that the court recently refused Turok bail on the very grounds that the hon. the Minister …

Order! That has nothing to do with the clause. The hon. member must come back to the clause.

Mr. Chairman, what I am endeavouring to point out is that it is not necessary to have that power in the next 12 months because the courts have indicated that in the next 12 months they will deal with these cases, there being the law of stare decisis, exactly as they have dealt with cases of sabotage during the last 12 months. If the hon. the Minister now suggests, as he has done, that it is necessary in the next 12 months to have these provisions because in the next 12 months it will be impossible for the hon. the Minister to put before the courts within 48 hours the circumstances why bail should be refused, then I want to suggest to the hon. the Minister that there is something wrong with his department if he cannot do it within 48 hours, and especially so if he needs 12 days to do it.

Order! The hon. member is now once more dealing with the principle.

May I ask the hon. the Minister whether he will give an assurance to me and to this House that this particular clause will only be used in respect of the people he has in mind, under this Act. I have a reason why I am asking this question and, Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to evade your ruling. The reason for asking this question is that on a previous occasion several Coloured people and several Bantu people were taken off the streets because they did not have their passes with them, or they could not give the constable good reasons why they were at that particular spot. The hon. the Minister’s department will have records of appeals which were made in regard to certain people who disappeared from the streets. I want to ask the hon. the Minister to give us an assurance that in cases of the kind I have quoted he will not use this clause, but that he will only use it in regard to the people he has in mind. He has mentioned a few names.

You have the assurance in 108bis of the original Act.

The hon. member’s insinuation now is that we used this provision arbitrarily in the Western Cape in respect of people in regard to whom it was not necessary to use it. I just happened to obtain the figures as regards the Western Cape. In the whole year, in spite of all the Langa troubles there have been, and of which the hon. member is aware, this section was used only 30 times in the Western Cape. The hon. member can now himself infer from that what the position is.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—82: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, D. J.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Viljoen, M.; Visse, J. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Webster, A.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Noes—50: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Mool-man, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Tucker, H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Clause accordingly agreed to.

On Clause 18,

I object to this clause because I think that the hon. the Minister is now going to act on hearsay evidence about somebody who had left the Republic and returned. I think it is outrageous that on the production of—

He has not even got to be satisfied that what is listed in that document is correct. So that any rag, no matter how disreputable, can print an article to say that Mr. So and So was either in Ghana or Nigeria and that will be prima facie proof that the accused had left the country. A letter can be produced also from outside the Republic to the effect that such a person was seen outside the Republic. And as long as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs certifies that this is a document of foreign origin, that apparently is sufficient prima facie proof. I think this is an outrageous provision and intend voting against it.

Sir, the hon. the Minister owes this House an explanation as to what the purpose of this clause is. The clause provides that in any criminal proceeding, on the mere production of a publication published outside the Republic recording that the person is outside, that shall be prima facie proof that the accused was outside the Republic at that time. I expect, Sir, that we are entitled to know a little bit more about this. In the first place, will this apply in respect of the trial of third parties. It is not at all clear what the object is and we wait to hear from the hon. the Minister exactly what he has in mind and why this is necessary. Perhaps he will provide us with a little more clarity on the matter.

Mr. Chairman, before giving the explanation to the hon. member, I should like to say at once that I have had only one representation from the Bar Council in respect of this matter, and that was that I should provide in this legislation that it applies only in respect of the Passport laws.

Of the Union?

Unfortunately I cannot do that, and that is what I shall now explain to the hon. member. The hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) is aware that this House has made it unlawful for a person to leave the country without the requisite documents provided for in that Act. The hon. member is also aware that various people, numerous people, do leave the country on that basis. When those people return, we have to have provisions relating to them. Let us take an example now. Robert Resha and Tambo have left the country. The hon. member knows as well as I do that they are in Britain at the moment. Their photographs appear in the leftist newspapers every day. When those people return, and if I were to indict them under the Passport Act, that they have left the country without a passport, then I can prove that such a person did not have a passport. That presents no problems. But how can I now prove that the person has been in Britain, save by going to the enormous expense—if I can find such a person who will be willing to do so—to subpoena the person who saw him in London in Piccadilly Circus or wheresoever it may be. Does the hon. member appreciate my problem? I then either have to abandon a prosecution against him, and make a mockery of the Act of Parliament, or I must go and search for that man. As regards Britain, I may perhaps find somebody, at tremendous expense. But where am I going to find someone in Tanganyika who will be prepared to come here and say that Patrick van Rensburg is there? And the hon. member knows he is there. Where shall I find someone to come from Ghana and say that Kgosana is there? All of us know he is there. It is written in the newspapers and periodicals of Ghana. There is a photo where he is photographed with Nkrumah. What does this clause provide now? The clause only wants to place the onus of proof on the person. In other words, he is now compelled to go into the witness box and say whether he has been in Ghana or not.

Has the hon. the Minister considered the possibility of taking evidence on commission?

Mr. Chairman, I have considered that often, but the hon. member is aware that in terms of international agreements, matters with a political colour or bearing a political character, are excluded from those agreements. We have already dealt with it in this House. In respect of criminal matters co-operation is not given by countries to prove of crimes of a political character. I have now dealt with the matter of passports, and to me it is quite clear that this is the only manner in which I can bring those people to book. It is not unreasonable to require him to come to Court and say that he was not in Ghana. It is very easy for him, if he was not there, to bring the necessary proof. But in the second place I cannot limit it to the Passport Law alone, for if a person has been confined to an area, he may also be charged under this. Let us take the case of Patrick Duncan. It is immaterial whether or not hon. members agree with it, but the fact is that he was confined to the Peninsula. All of us know he is in Basutoland. His photo has been in the newspapers where he was photographed at the new house he occupies there now. Supposing he were to return, and I may wish to charge him in Cape Town for having contravened the area restriction, where must I get the evidence from? Do you think that the people who have protected and assisted him will be prepared to come and give evidence here? Is it unreasonable now, while all of us know that he is there, to make use of this rule of law for only this one purpose, that he should go into the witness box to say he was there or he was not there? For that reason and that reason alone this section has been placed on the Statute Book, and in view of the escape routes to which I have already referred, and the methods used in that connection, I think it is quite reasonable to come to the House and ask that this rule of law be accepted.

I am not satisfied with the Minister’s explanation and I will tell him why. The first thing I want to point out is that some time ago in this House I put a question on the Order Paper to the hon. the Minister asking him about political offenders. He replied that he did not know what a political offence was. Now apparently he knows what it is.

[Inaudible.]

Now when it suits the Minister he knows what a political offence is.

A political offence; not an offence of a political character.

That is exactly the same thing. The hon. the Minister should not try to split hairs over this. He knows perfectly well what a political offence is. Anyway, the point is this. Sir, that if anybody leaves the Republic without a passport surely he is committing a crime, is he not? He is committing a crime, and as far as I can remember there is also a penalty of three months’ compulsory imprisonment. Therefore, although some persons may leave because they are political fugitives for whatever reason, they will be committing a crime and I cannot see why evidence on commission cannot be taken in overseas countries. I believe, in any case, that the alternative which the Minister is proposing to this House, that is that any letter, any document, any article appearing in any newspaper, no matter how disreputable it might be, stating that such and such a person was seen in a territory, will be regarded as prima facie evidence of the fact that the person had left the Republic, is outrageous. I think it is far too flimsy to make prima facie evidence in a crime which is going to be severely punished. Therefore, Sir, I propose to vote against this clause.

Sir, looking at this clause one can foresee some difficulty in practice as far as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is concerned. I notice that the certificate is to be signed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I do not know why it should be the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Perhaps the hon. the Minister could indicate why he should be the person to do this. One of the difficulties which I foresee for the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is that he must satisfy himself that such a document is of foreign origin. That is fairly easy to do, Sir, as far as some of the documents mentioned are concerned. In the case of a newspaper it would be a fairly easy matter; in the case of a periodical it would be a fairly easy matter and I suppose in the case of books it would also be fairly simple. But as far as a pamphlet is concerned, Sir, I would imagine that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs might have some difficulty because pamphlets do not necessarily have their country of printing on them. So far as a letter is concerned, I should think that unless he has the envelope the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will be placed in a very difficult position to certify that a letter is of foreign origin.

If he is not satisfied he does not give the certificate.

I appreciate that. He obviously would not give it unless he is satisfied. I am not suggesting that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will misuse the power or the discretion which is given to him here. I am just trying to point out some of the details which are involved here. In the case of a letter it could be difficult to determine that it is of foreign origin, unless you have the actual envelope with a postmark on it and unless you had seen the letter being taken out of that envelope.

Business suspended at 12.45 p.m. and resumed at 2.20 p.m.

Afternoon Sitting

I wish to move an amendment to Clause 18, the effect of which will be to limit its operation to charges which may be brought in respect of offences against the Departure from the Union Regulations. Before the adjournment the Minister, in reply to a question by the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) gave examples of the difficulty of bringing proof in respect of persons who have departed from the Union without passports, and in respect of charges brought in respect of that conduct. It seems to this side of the House that a case has been made out in that regard and the effect of my amendment will be to allow this new principle in the law of evidence to be used in those cases, but not in other cases. My amendment reads as follows—

Of course I cannot accept the amendment. As I have already explained, if I were to accept it, I cover only the case of a person who has left the country without a passport, while the underlying idea is to cover also the case of persons to whom the area restrictions are applicable. I shall of course frustrate the whole object if I were to accept this amendment.

I want to move the amendments as printed in my name—

There are several amendments here and I should like to discuss them each in turn. The effect of the first amendment is to make it impossible for the hon. the Minister to serve a notice on a person prohibiting him from attending a public gathering by publishing it in the Government Gazette unless the person is actually wilfully evading service. In other words, service by publication would only be valid if the court was satisfied that the person has wilfully been trying to evade such service. This clause applies to the prohibition on persons from attending public gatherings, as against previous clauses which prohibited people from attending any gathering; that is the distinction here, and I want to introduce the same amendment here that I attempted unsuccessfully to introduce in those clauses which relate to any gathering as against public gatherings. That is the effect of the first part of the amendment that I have moved. The second part of the amendment is to omit the proposed sub-section (3)ter inserted by paragraph (a). It is the one which enables the hon. the Minister to ban all public meetings with the exception of those which are specifically allowed by him or by a magistrate if he deems it expedient for the maintenance of public peace. Under the law as it stands to-day a magistrate if authorized by the Minister could ban a particular public gathering if he had reason to apprehend that public peace would be seriously endangered by the assembly of that gathering. Alternatively under sub-section (3) of the principal Act the Minister had the right to prohibit all gatherings during any period whenever if in the opinion of the Minister there was reason to apprehend that feelings of hostility would be engendered between the European inhabitants of the Republic on the one hand or any other section of the inhabitants on the other. That, of course, was under the Riotous Assemblies Act. The Minister had very vast powers, and I believe that the new phrase that he is using here, “if he deems it necessary or expedient for the maintenance of the public peace”, goes even further than the existing provision in the law which I maintain gave the hon. the Minister all the necessary powers to ban any gathering which he felt would engender feelings of hostility between the racial groups. I therefore move to omit the proposed sub-section (3)ter.

The final objection that I have to this clause is in the latter part of paragraph (b), the omission of which I am moving anyway, but in the last three lines of (b), there I have the same objection that we have voiced over and over again in the course of this discussion, and that is the sentence that reads, “Unless at the same time the prohibition or particulars thereof had been notified in the Gazette.” The same objection that I voiced to the first part of this clause I obviously have to this part, because equally it means that notification in the Gazette should be taken as service on the person concerned, and I do not consider that sufficient.

I move the amendments as printed in my name—

It is not necessary for me to say much about this clause because we had precisely the same wording in Clause 9 on the one hand and in Clause 10 on the other hand. The amendments which I have moved are precisely the same as the amendments which have already been accepted by the Committee to Clauses 9 and 10. Hon. members will notice that in the first instance we are also dealing with the service of instructions on persons who cannot be traced and that provision is made to publish them in the Government Gazette; and in the second place, the Minister is empowered to prohibit a meeting at certain places if the Minister is of the opinion that it will threaten and endanger the peace. Hon. members adopted the attitude at an earlier stage in the debate that the Parade and the City Hall steps in Johannesburg were covered by Clause 7 but it is really Clause 19 which deals with them. As I have already indicated, in view of the fact that those are the places—and I use these words deliberately—where meetings are held to disturb the peace, as it were, and which are used as malicious propaganda against South Africa, I will not hesitate, if this measure is accepted, to apply it to those two places.

As far as the second part of this clause is concerned, the amendment is also the same as that moved to Clauses 9 and 10, and in view of the fact that we discussed it in detail in the Committee Stage it is not necessary for me to enlarge further upon it. The hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) quite rightly said that in essence the amendments were the same as those moved by her to a previous clause and which were rejected by the Committee, for the same reasons, and consequently it is not necessary for me either to reply to the same arguments.

I have three amendments standing in my name on the Order Paper. I wish to move the first and the third. The first reads—

The third one reads—

Then I wish to move my second amendment—

As regards the first amendment, the Minister has accepted a similar amendment …

I am accepting the first part of your amendment.

In that case I will not address the Committee on it. As regards my second amendment, the effect of it will be that this clause will now read—

I would like to suggest to the hon. the Minister that this section is entirely different from Section 10 (1) (e) where this side of the House failed to convince the Minister of the necessity to insert the words, “and for the purposes of furthering or in circumstances calculated to further the aims or objects of Communism or of an unlawful organization The type of speech, the publication or dessimination of which the Minister intends to prohibit under this clause, is quite different from that under Clause 10 (1) (e). Under Clause 10 (1) (e) it would be the speeches and utterances of listed people or communists, whereas the type of speech the reproduction of which the Minister wants to prevent under this clause is a speech by a person who, although not a listed communist, can be prohibited by a magistrate from attending a specific meeting to make a specific speech because the magistrate has apprehensions that he might make a speech which will engender feelings of hostility between various sections of the population. If that is the case, the argument that was advanced on the other side and particularly by the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) as to why the Government was not prepared to limit even the speeches of communists only to political matters and matters aimed at furthering the cause of Communism, was, as the hon. member for Standerton said, that once a person is listed as a communist, then an infamy surrounds him and clings to him, and even his non-political utterances and speeches, even on scientific matters, cannot be reproduced, because that is the effect of Clause 10. Here the Minister will agree that the situation is entirely different. I do not know what type of person the Minister wants to prevent from speaking at these meetings but it might be the type of person who is quite clearly not a listed communist but who holds political conceptions which differ from those of the Government and which the Government fears might engender feelings of hostility between the various races. I suggest, for example, that a person who propagates the concept of “one man one vote” need not be a communist. The same applies to a person who propagates equality of opportunity. It is only for a specific occasion that that person is prohibited from addressing a meeting; for the rest he is not restricted at all; no infamy clings to him in terms of this Act as does to a person who has been listed as a communist. I suggest therefore that it is going very far, if a person is prohibited from attending one specific meeting, to prohibit the reproduction of any other speech that he might ever have made in the past and which might be of a completely non-political nature. It might be a person who has sincere religious beliefs and who believes in equality of opportunity for all people and in an equal vote for all people and who might in his own right be an outstanding theologian or a scientist or professor at a university, whose political views differ from those of the Government but who is certainly not a communist. I think this clause goes far beyond the necessity, as seen by the Minister himself, of banning the reproduction of all speeches of a person of that kind; so although the Minister refused to accept a more or less similar type of amendment in Clause 10, I would like to suggest to him that here we are dealing with an entirely different set of circumstances and a different situation. It could lead to absurd results if a professor of physics, a physicist, for example, were prohibited from addressing a particular political meeting and if as the result of that prohibition nobody is allowed to publish or reproduce anything of a scientific nature that he might have written before—because that is the effect of this clause. I would like to appeal to the Minister therefore to accept this amendment.

I now come to my third amendment which reads, “and to omit all the words after ‘concerned ’ in line 49 to the end of the clause”, that is to say sub-section (5) (b) which now reads—

That is followed by the words, the deletion of which I have moved—

Here again the circumstances are totally different from those in any other clause. First of all, this first part of the clause already puts the onus on the person who is being prosecuted to satisfy the court that at the time of the alleged offence he had no knowledge of the prohibition concerned. There is already an onus of proof resting on him; it is not for the Crown to prove it; he has to prove that he had no knowledge of it. By adding the words, “unless at the said time the prohibition or particulars thereof had been notified in the Gazettethe Minister is going much further than he does in any other clause because here again it is just a prohibition applying to one particular meeting. Can one really expect all publishers, all newspaper people and all distributors of publications in the country to keep themselves constantly informed of every single prohibition placed on every particular meeting throughout the country? As I say, the onus is already on the accused to prove that he had no knowledge of the prohibition concerned, and in any event if the Minister would accept my second amendment, then I think my third amendment logically is in line with the second amendment. I would therefore ask the Minister to accept these three amendments which can in no way affect the aims which he himself has in mind but which can certainly obviate absurdities which would otherwise arise.

Mr. Chairman …

Stupid official.

On a point of order, is the hon. member for Cradock in order in calling the hon. member who is on his feet a “dom amptenaar” (stupid official)?

Order! The hon. member for Cradock must not be so personal.

Sir, people who live in glass-houses …

Order! The hon. member must not retaliate now.

I will accept that suggestion. Sir, one of the amendments which the hon. member has just moved meets in part the difficulties which my amendment on page 698 is intended to overcome. This new subsection (5) creates a penal provision and it must as such be interpreted strictly to give full effect to the prohibition. That prohibition is directed against anyone reproducing anywhere and in any form a speech, utterance or statement by a person prohibited. The Minister has recognized that this wide prohibition will affect proceedings in a court of law and therefore he has moved his amendment. The terms of sub-section (5) are also wide enough to affect the proceedings in Parliament as well as in subordinate legislatures such as the four Provincial Councils or the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa. It is perfectly correct that both Houses of Parliament are free to prescribe their own rules and orders with respect to the order and conduct or business and proceedings. The provision here may well be such a method of prescribing the rules of conduct and proceedings.

The law advisers are unanimous that it does not apply.

The Minister says that the law advisers are convinced that that is not so but. I would like to try to convince the hon. the Minister that there is a very great danger that it may apply. Moreover Parliament is the body responsible for ensuring that such an interpretation cannot possibly be applied, namely that this provision may affect any proceedings in Parliament itself. But as I have indicated, Parliament itself will be free to alter this provision at any time. It could alter the provision should the law advisers be wrong and should the Minister find that it was a restrictive provision. But in so far as the Provincial Councils and the Legislative Assembly are concerned, they stand in a very different category because they cannot get rid of this bit of legislation themselves. They are completely powerless to pass any law which will be repugnant to an Act of Parliament. The sub-section, as I see it, will therefore be binding on these bodies. Now Sir, in so far as the first category is concerned, the courts, the Minister has specifically exempted not only the Supreme Court, which is a constitutionally established court, but he has also exempted any statutory established court, and as the hon. the Minister knows there are a number of each statutory creations. But the Provincial Council and the Legislative Assembly fall therefore into the second category of being completely powerless to alter any matter, and therefore if this provision extends to them, it will become binding on them. Sir, I do not think that this House should put its own burden on the law advisers. They might be correct, but they have been known to be wrong, and it is the duty of this House to make certain that this does not impinge either on the rights of Parliament itself or on the rights of one of the subordinate legislative bodies. I will not move the whole of the amendment standing in my name because part of it is covered by the amendment of the hon. Minister himself. Accordingly I will move my amendment as follows—

In his utterances since 15 May, the hon. the Minister has been consistent in at least one respect, and that is that he has said categorically that he intends to ban meetings on both the City Hall steps in Johannesburg and the Grand Parade in Cape Town. He said this at a Press conference on 14 May, as reported in the Cape Times of the following day, when, apparently in reply to the questions of the reporters present, the Cape Times stated he had this to say—

We have all read that. You need not read it.

I don’t want to consult hon. members over there about what is necessary while the chairman is present. In introducing the second reading of the Bill, the Minister said that two places to be closed to communists would be the Grand Parade in Cape Town and the Johannesburg City Hall steps, and he went on to say “No decent person or body holds meetings of that order”. And this afternoon, a few minutes ago, in reply to the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) he said that under Clause 19 he could ban meetings at those two places. I just want to make sure that I have not imagined this. Because when the hon. the Minister says that every time there is a meeting on the Johannesburg City Hall steps and the Grand Parade in Cape Town, there is fighting and there is a disturbance, one would assume that the Minister speaks with a knowledge of the facts, which are always at his disposal. In order to be quite certain that I was not getting the wrong impression, the day after this Press conference was reported, I put a long series of questions, two of them, with many sub-sections, to the hon. the Minister. I am not going to read them. They totalled 35 questions, everyone of which, in my view, at any rate, was designed to elicit some aspect of the disturbances and of the fighting which, the hon. the Minister had told the world, took place every time there was such a meeting.

Did the City Council of Johannesburg not ask for it?

When did the City Council of Johannesburg ask for this? I should like the hon. the Minister to tell me. Having put all these questions, and in the knowledge that the Minister and the department had access to the facts, because there would be a record of such happenings if anything had occurred, the first reply I got from the hon. the Minister was “This question must please stand over”, and therefore any hope I had of using the information which I hoped to elicit, in the course of the second reading debate, disappeared immediately. I know that the hon. the Minister did not mean to deprive me of the information.

Why don’t you let me write your speeches for you?

I am quite prepared to let the hon. the Minister write my speeches for me if I, in turn, may return the compliment by writing some of his speeches. After having given the Minister that opportunity, he signally failed to give a single answer to any one of 35 questions, but he nevertheless argued the case and said that the department concerned does not keep statistics which would enable him to furnish the information asked for, in detail. Has the Minister not read the report of the Commissioner of Police? I have got it here, and I have read it—and it is packed with statistics; the report proves beyond any doubt that there are certain facts available to the Commissioner of Police and therefore to his Minister. But when a question is put in Parliament, the hon. the Minister states—in both official languages—that the department concerned does not keep statistics. And the Minister’s reply continued as follows (on 29 May)—

Having said that, he goes on again, in line with his public utterances—

He refuses to give a single fact to support that statement, but goes on to say, in a general way—

Have you ever heard of a worse kind of generalization from a Cabinet Minister? The other day the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) was very quick to remind us that generalizations, as he put it, are always false. I am obliged to accept his advice and say that this generalization is false, because there are no facts to support it, anyway.

Now I want to tell you what happened subsequently. Whereas I know little about the Grand Parade, apart from what I have read in the Press, by virtue of my own experience I do know something about the position in the City of Johannesburg, and let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, that is why I want to come to this generalization that there is always fighting on the City Hall steps. That is why I put the 35 questions to him, and since the hon. the Minister refused to reply to a single one of them, I say that there are no facts to substantiate the statement he made. I can tell the hon. the Minister that as a matter of course, meetings are always being held on the City Hall steps in Johannesburg, six days of the week, and sometimes even on the seventh day—to such an extent that for years it has been a subject of discussion if not contention, at the meetings of the City Council itself, because certain people in the Council have argued for years that they find it difficult to work during the lunch-hour in those offices fronting on to the City Hall steps. (I refer to members of the Council and to members of the staff) because of the fact that meetings were taking place. But the odd thing is that the meetings that take place there are not always political meetings. The majority are religious gatherings, at almost every lunch hour. There are at least five sects of the Christian faith that make a practice of holding revivalist meetings at lunch-hour on every day, except when there is a political meeting on, and then they can’t get close to the place. Those are the meetings that are held on the steps of the Johannesburg City Hall, rather than political meetings.

That is not correct.

If I am wrong, the hon. Minister has had plenty of opportunity to give the facts in regard to meetings which have caused trouble. [Time limit.]

The hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) has reproached me for not replying to his questions. Perhaps hon. members did not see the questions which the hon. member put to me and I just want to read them, therefore. The Committee can then judge for itself whether I could be expected to reply to the questions put to me by the hon. member. His questions were—

1. (1) How many (a) political and (b) nonpolitical meetings on (i) the Grand Parade, Cape Town, and (ii) the City Hall steps, Johannesburg, have been attended by the police since 1 January 1956;
2. (2) (a) what were (i) the date and time, (ii) the name, race, age and sex of each speaker, (iii) the estimated attendance and (iv) the number of policemen present and (b) who were the organizers, in respect of each political meeting held at each of these venues during this period;
3. (3) whether any disturbances occurred at any of these meetings; if so, (a) at what meetings, (b) what was the nature of each disturbance and (c) what were the extent and value of damage to property;
4. (4) whether any persons were injured during any of these disturbances; if so, what were (a) the name, race, age and sex of each person injured and (b) the nature and extent of the injury;
5. (5) whether any persons were (a) arrested and (b) charged as a result of any of these disturbances; if so, what were the name, race, age and sex of each such person; and
6. (6) whether any of these persons were (a) convicted and (b) sentenced; if so, (i) on what charge was the conviction obtained and (ii) what was the sentence in each case?

I think hon. members will appreciate it that, when I was asked for the data in respect of six years, I told the hon. member that it would take me half an eternity to supply him with the information. Nor do I wish to react to it. I merely wish to say something in respect of the meetings on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg. Surely the hon. member knows as well as I do the amount of ill-will which has already been engendered, to put it euphemistically, on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg. Surely the hon. member knows how much unpleasant publicity South Africa has gained as a result of the riots which have taken place there. The hon. member knows what damage was caused on one occasion. If my memory serves me correctly I think damage to the tune of R600 was caused to the City Hall as the result of riots which took place there. Surely the hon. member knows what picture is painted of South Africa by the television cameras which are always attracted there and—I put it this way—for whose benefit incidents are provoked in order to illustrate what is happening in South Africa. Surely the hon. member knows that the police often have to be called and that the police are then reproached for not dispersing the crowd quickly enough and that the police are expected to play the role of a referee between the two groups which are clashing outside the City Hall. Last year various riots took place on the City Hall steps, and it is true, as I said to the hon. member, that before the City Council gives or refuses permission the applications of those people who wish to hold meetings there, are first submitted to the police. But it does happen that the City Council does not accept the recommendations of the police because the City Council, which consists mainly of United Party representatives, is as susceptible to the pressure which the Progressive Party exerts on it as the members of the United Party are in this House. Mr. Chairman, you have noticed what a single member of the Progressive Party can do in this Committee with a large number of United Party members. In any case after the City Council had once again ignored the advice of the police last year in September and rioting again took place on the City Hall steps, the Commissioner of Police, on my instructions, wrote as follows to the Town Clerk—I will not make any comment on this because I think the correspondence speaks for itself—

You know who they are, Sir,—

Thereupon the following letter was received from the Town Clerk of Johannesburg, addressed to the Commissioner of Police, and dated 13 September 1961—

Here the City Council complain and say that they often find themselves in an invidious position. I only want to respond to the appeal of the City Council not to place them in an invidious position and consequently I want to achieve with this clause what the City Council as it were, invites me to do in this case in this letter.

Surely the whole point at issue is that the onus of forbidding meetings should be taken from the City Council of Johannesburg and taken over by the Minister or the Department of Justice. Surely the right to protest is a normal freedom enjoyed by citizens in every democratic country.

Quite.

Yes, but in the meantime the Minister takes power to ban any meeting he wishes to ban, and he has a particular vendetta against the steps of the City Hall of Johannesburg and the Grand Parade in Cape Town. Sir, I have been living in Johannesburg for many years, and I have been a politically active person for a long time, and I have attended many meetings at the City Hall steps in Johannesburg. It is a traditional place where the citizens of that city gather to voice their protests against anything which the Government of the time happens to be doing, and at all those meetings I have attended there has hardly ever been really any dangerous incident. Now since I am on that subject, I want to tell the hon. the Minister that the week before last, when the Black Sash women were demonstrating on the City Hall steps in Johannesburg and the demonstration took the form of a few women standing around a lighted torch, saying nothing and doing nothing, but just standing there throughout the day and throughout the night, that would have been perfectly orderly if it had not been for a band of hooligans who arrived to harass them and who interfered with them. Now I am going to say something about this, because it happened on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg. At various times the police were called out when these hooligans began to be unmanageable.

Who were these hooligans?

There were all kinds of people, some in Pretoria University blazers. When the police eventually arrived, after some time had lapsed—it was at least an hour or an hour and a half after the police had been called the first time, that they arrived and they first did nothing at all. Then when somebody argued that some steps should be taken to stop the hooligans, steps were taken. But I want at once to pay a tribute to two of the policemen who were there on the night that I happened to be there, at 1 o’clock in the morning, on Monday morning, when these poor women were being constantly harassed by a number of thugs. When a small batch of policemen arrived at the scene, some of them stood around openly grinning, but two policemen to whom I wish to pay tribute, a sergeant and a constable between them controlled the whole affair, and as long as those two gentlemen were on the scene there was no trouble whatsoever, and they ended up by restraining one young man. And I think this incident is rather amusing, as I think it demonstrates the way in which thinking has changed in this country. This young thug arrived, barefooted, carrying the central spike of an umbrella, with nothing else, just this long central spike, with which he was harassing these women, sticking this spike into the placards that stood behind the torch that these women were guarding. He kept on doing this and the policeman said (the young policeman to whom I am paying tribute), “Move on now you are disturbing the peace”. The thug replied “Move these women on, they are disturbing the peace”.

Quite right.

Sir, listen to this. It is already unlawful in the mind of such persons for citizens to protest quietly and peacefully on the steps of the City Hall of Johannesburg. I am glad to say that the young constable did not take that point of view. He said “there is nothing unlawful in what these ladies are doing; if there had been, I would have moved them on, but there is nothing unlawful in what they are doing”. He again said to this young man “You must move on”. So the young man said “Now I know what they mean when they say this is a police state!” The minds of the youth of this country are so conditioned, that if they are not allowed to break up a peaceful demonstration, that is what they call a police state. I want to say that if the police had done their duty, as did the one sergeant and the one constable there would have been no trouble on the steps of the City Hall in Johannesburg. As long as action is taken by the police in time, before things get out of hand, there is no reason at all why the citizens of Johannesburg should not enjoy the right they have enjoyed since time immemorial, and here on the Parade …

May I put a question to the hon. member?

What was on the placards these ladies were guarding?

It simply said “Reject Vorster’s Bill” in both languages.

With gallows behind it?

No, I am not referring to the Congress of Democrats’ demonstration. It was a peaceful demonstration and if the police do their duty in time, if they do not stand by and watch these young hooligans having their way, there need be no trouble. But the hon. the Minister should not give his tacit consent to this sort of action, as he does for instance by permitting Robey Leibbrandt, a man convicted of treason and sentenced to death and then reprieved, to organize a private army of thugs, which he is doing, to break up peaceful demonstrations; then there is no reason at all why people in this country, in Cape Town and Johannesburg and anywhere else, should not enjoy their normal democratic right of protest.

I want to resume the cosy chat which the Minister and I were having about the Johannesburg City Hall steps. In the first place, I am indebted to the hon. the Minister for reading out the question which I put to him. Sir, you will agree that they were pertinent, and they were also correct in terms of the rules of the House, because otherwise they would not have been allowed on the Order Paper. I wanted to be as fair as I possibly could about this matter. I thought that I knew something about Johannesburg and the City Hall steps, and when the hon. the Minister said that there was always fighting going on, I put on the Order Paper the questions I did in order to elicit just one tittle of evidence about any one fight. When the Minister stood up, I thought he had some kind of bombshell in connection with my questions. He referred to trouble that “was narrowly averted” according to one man’s opinion, when a meeting of the Congress of Democrats was held. But there was no trouble. It may have been “narrowly

averted”, but there was no actual trouble. Then the Minister defends himself by saying that he is now taking the Johannesburg City Council out of its invidious position.

That is what they say.

Clearly the hon. the Minister has construed that phrase in exactly the way it suits him. He cannot come here and say that the Johannesburg City Council has actually applied to him as Minister of Justice to forbid the holding of meetings on the City Hall steps.

The letter speaks for itself.

I can use words just as well as the hon. the Minister. It says anything but that. The “invidious position” referred to is something that has obtained throughout the years. Whereas the council recognizes that the City Hall and its steps are public property and are therefore used lawfully by the citizens, the police for reasons of their own, and on instructions, from wherever they may have come, have taken a certain line, and have been trying to determine which meetings shall be held there and which meetings shall not be held there. Now, as the Council says, in the letter, if the police felt so strongly about certain meetings, they had the opportunity to go to the magistrate and say “don’t allow this meeting”. That has been the attitude through the years of the Council. They simply say: “On our information and experience, we cannot refuse the use of the steps for a particular meeting, unless we have facts to prove that trouble will be caused. If the police have got such facts, let them go to the magistrate and say ‘please ban this meeting ’, and, of course, that will be done, and the Council will abide by that.” But the police have never taken that line. Here is an example of what happened in this same dispute over this very Bill in Johannesburg. I quote from the Cape Argus of 25 May—

In this report the Town Clerk of Johannesburg says—

He said that the request for permission had been made on Monday. So there you have it, Sir—within the last fortnight there was a case where the matter had been referred to the police and they had made no objection. Let us try to be realistic about this. I know the Minister will have the power under this Bill, when it becomes an Act, to do what he has set out to do. I am the first to recognize that, but let us at least be honest about it, and let us at least recognize the fact that the Minister, having set out to ban meetings on the City Hall steps at Johannesburg, is going to do so without rhyme or reason and without justification. Let us recognize that.

I do think the Minister is influenced by Press opinions on this subject. He apparently enjoys good relations with the Press, particularly in connection with this Bill. There has been a tremendous amount of publicity given to it. So I must say that in regard to his relationship with the Press, I hope he will not be influenced by any parochial attitude, whether it be towards Cape Town or Johannesburg. In regard to the same powers which the Minister has under this particular clause, the Cape Argus on 31 May wrote the following in a leading article—the article was headed “Those Usual Disturbances”—apparently the Minister’s phrase: “Those Usual Disturbances” being in quotation marks. I will quote it very briefly, Sir—

Order! The hon. member cannot quote from a Press report of what the Minister said in Parliament during this Session.

Very well, Sir. The Cape Argus—not the Minister—says the following about these disturbances—-

thus reinforcing the Minister’s proposed action against Johannesburg—

The wine is produced here in and around Cape Town, but it goes to the heads only of people in Johannesburg—

I am not going to comment on this “fat cat” complacency which is apparently the attitude of the city of Cape Town, if the Cape Argus has expressed it correctly. The argument of the Cape Argus is that no one but an angel can live in the City of Cape Town, and everybody in the City of Johannesburg is a hooligan. This is the old story of Mr. Merri-man’s about Johannesburg being “the university of crime”. The hon. the Minister lived in Johannesburg; he practised in Johannesburg.

And I saw many of these disturbances.

Yes, Sir, and I asked him by way of a series of questions to give me the details about a single one. But let us make this a little more domestic: The hon. the Minister has practised in Johannesburg. In fact I had the pleasure of being accommodated in the same building, a few floors below him—unfortunately he moved out, for reasons of his own. The Minister says that he can remember those disturbances—why doesn’t he tell us about a single one? I want to tell the hon. the Minister that this whole thing is very much over-rated. I am not speaking specifically about the Grand Parade at Cape Town, about which I have no special knowledge, but the Minister must accept it, from somebody who has lived in Johannesburg for many years and who has had a great deal to do with public affairs, somebody who has observed the activities of thousands of people on thousands of days, that there is no truth whatsoever in the allegation, whether it comes from a Minister of the Republic of South Africa or anybody else, that whenever there is a meeting on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg a fight breaks out. I want to ask the Minister to think again. The Minister was the person who said that “objective regard” must be had to the facts. That runs like a thread through some of the most important clauses of this Bill. Now, Sir, where does “objective regard” come into this sort of thing, when anybody can make up his mind regardless of the facts and say “I am going to ban meetings at such and such a place regardless of what the facts are”. And when he is challenged to produce evidence he gives no evidence, but he reiterates “I will ban those meetings”. The hon. the Minister must, therefore, forgive me if I come to my own conclusions, and if I put my own construction on his intentions. The simple fact in the many years that I have lived in Johannesburg, there has only been one case that I can recall of the Nationalist Party holding a meeting on the steps of the Johannesburg City Hall. There have been cases where other political parties—none of them well-disposed to the policies of the Nationalist Party—have held meetings. It is common cause that in the central area of Johannesburg there is no other venue for the holding of a public meeting.

What about the City Hall?

We know all about the City Hall. It can seat at a pinch only 1,800 people, and what about the trouble if that building gets smashed up? The Minister is so concerned about the condition of the Johannesburg City Hall, the property of the rate payers. What do you think will happen, Sir, if the sort of meetings which the Minister says take place on the City Hall steps, had to take place inside the City Hall? What will be left of that magnificent organ, or the chairs or the chandeliers or the stage? What of the people who will try to prevent those meetings from being held? Those City Hall steps have been Johannesburg’s open-air forum through the years not the City Hall. I say that even members of the Nationalist Party in Johannesburg—I want the Minister to remember that—regard that open-air forum as belonging to the people of Johannesburg. I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that without regard to his prejudices in this matter, the Minister will act with extreme caution before he sets out to ban meetings on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg, regardless of the advice which he is given by the Cape Argus, because the Cape Argus apparently thinks that the Minister may decide to ban only one venue. [Time limit.]

We have been listening to something here this afternoon which will seriously affect us on the Rand and that was the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) and the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) pleading against this clause which will enable the Minister to prohibit meetings from being held on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg. I challenge that hon. member to mention one occasion when the National Party has held a meeting on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg.

I accept your challenge.

The National Party has always held its meetings in a decent manner. Every meeting which the National Party has held in the Johannesburg City Hall, has been an orderly meeting. No chairs were broken, no organ was damaged. The hon. member for Hospital spoke about the rate payers of Johannesburg. Who are the majority of the rate payers of Johannesburg? They do not only consist of United Party and Progressive Party supporters. Thousands and thousands of Nationalists are also rate payers. The hon. member for Houghton ought to be ashamed of herself. She spoke about the Johannesburg “thugs”, but she is speaking on behalf of people who are the biggest crowd of communists and Socialists that you can find, Sir. They are the people who assist the Black Sash and she is their advocate here. She goes to those meetings and to those protest meetings. Why? To make trouble. What is she doing at one o’clock in the morning at a meeting at the City Hall of Johannesburg? It is only to instigate trouble. They are the people who tantalize the Afrikaners and the Nationalists in South Africa. They tantalize law-abiding and peace-loving people who find themselves in that part of Johannesburg. People walk along those streets in pursuit of their ordinary business; they have to pass the City Hall. By holding meetings there they cause a congestion of people there, not only of White people but of Natives as well. They see to it that everything is disrupted; they see to it that there is friction and gradually they play into the hands of the communists. That always happens and that is exactly what the communists do throughout the world. I accuse the hon. member for Houghton to-day of being one of the people who, together with her party, encourage the communists in that way in South Africa. She can say whatever she wants to, but that is the truth.

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, is the hon. member entitled to say that I am promoting the aims of Communism?

Mr. Chairman, I say that that is the result of her actions and the actions of her party.

The hon. member must withdraw that.

Mr. Chairman. I am not saying that she is encouraging Communism.

The hon. member must withdraw that.

I withdraw it, Sir, but I say that the Progressive Party, with the assistance which they are now getting from the United Party, are encouraging Communism.

I also resent that.

The hon. member can resent it but it is the truth. I should like this House, particularly Johannesburg, to realize that accusations have to-day been levelled at those people who objected to the representations by the Black Sash and the Progressive Party in front of the City Hall of Johannesburg, and that they have been called “thugs”,

I say it again.

The hon. member is saying it again. I am telling her that the National Party on the Rand will settle accounts with her. I challenge her to-day to come and hold a meeting at Edenvale and the women will settle accounts with her—not the men. They will deal with her. [Interjections.] The hon. member must not get personal. I can divulge a great many things if I want to become personal. As far as this matter is concerned, it is scandalous to think that South Africans, that members of the United Party, hold meetings such as those, and then the hon. member for Hospital comes here and makes certain allegations and accusations which are not true. He says that the National Party held meetings on the street corners and on the steps of the City Hall. Why does he make those allegations?

I will make them again.

Why does that party opposite hold meetings on the steps of the City Hall? It is not only the Progressives and the Black Sash; the United Party also does it. I remember their holding a meeting there a few years ago when the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell) also put in an appearance. They gathered there together with Natives; it was a mixed meeting. Why? To provoke the people to cause trouble. That was just before the 1958 election. That is how they look for trouble and then they go to the platteland and blame the “thugs” of Johannesburg for it, or the “hooligans” as they have again been called to-day. I say it is scandalous. The hon. member for Houghton is certainly one of the greatest haters of the Boers in the world to-day. That is the Gospel truth, Sir, and we know why? Let her continue doing so. The National Party will continue to stand for the maintenance of the safety of our country. Where the majority of the people in the vicinity of Johannesburg are in favour of it that those meetings should be prohibited why can’t the Minister pass legislation which will give him the power to do so? Why must we listen to a handful of Progressives, to a handful of instigators and a handful of communists? Those are organizations which are the provocateurs and inciters. The band plays in front and they follow behind. They are covered and nobody can see them. We have to stop those things, Sir, before they get out of hand. If we were to continue to allow meetings to be held on the City Hall steps, worse things may happen; such things as we have already had. We saw what happened during the war and we saw what happened after that. At every meeting which was held on those steps people were hit and others injured.

That is not true.

It is true. [Interjections.] I would rather not tell you, Sir, who that hon. member is. He is such a coward that he ran away during the war. He was too scared to go and fight. I challenge him to produce his war record and we will see what the position is. [Interjections.] The hon. member is also sitting here as one who incites these elements which mean nothing to us. I say again that I should like to know what the hon. member for Houghton was doing at a meeting of the Black Sash at one o’clock in the morning at a meeting in Johannesburg. [Time limit.]

Seeing that the hon. the Minister did not refer to the amendment which I moved in regard to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (South) (Mr. Plewman) …

I am still coming to your amendment.

Very well. I do not wish to speak to the amendments which I have moved but I just want to point out, in so far as the amendment moved by the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (South) is concerned, that if the Minister were to accept it, it will not nullify any of his objects. The Minister sayts that his legal advisers have assured him that the question of the privileges of Parliament and of the Provincial Councils will not be affected. But surely they must have thought the same as far as the courts were concerned, and yet the Minister found it necessary to make specific provision at least in the case of the courts. I do not see, therefore, that any harm will be done if he accepts the amendment, although it may not perhaps be quite necessary. I think the Minister should at least accept the amendment of the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (South).

As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (South) is concerned the position is this that the case of Parliament is very definitely covered by the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act. If the hon. member reads that Act he will realize that there can be no doubt on the subject. If he takes the position of Provincial Councils he and hon. members will find that it is definitely covered by the Constitution which we passed last year.

Seeing that this is a subsequent Act, if it is passed, will it not change the position?

No, Mr. Chairman, Section 75 of the Constitution states very clearly—

Not in regard to a motion or speech which he had made in the Provincial Council nor by reason of the way in which he had voted in such a council. It is very clear that it is completely covered by that and consequently it is not necessary to repeat that provision in this Act. Our attitude is that it is inherent in the composition of our courts that they are exempt. But I did not want hon. members to argue at length about it because I could not immediately lay my hands on an Act where this was provided, and that was why we have accepted the amendment. As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Jeppes (Dr. Cronje) himself is concerned, I do not think it is necessary for him to refer in his amendment to what is already very clearly stated in the same Clause in the principal Act, namely, that the meetings with which we are concerned here are described in the principal Act as follows—

And then it goes on. It is not necessary to cover the same aspect of the matter. It is covered in the principal Act itself. As far as the rest of the amendment of the hon. member is concerned, in so far as it concerns the publication of speeches and so forth, the same argument applies. For the same reasons that we rejected it in the other cases, it is obvious that we also reject it in this case. Why is it necessary to incorporate in this Act which deals with riotous assemblies the provisions contained in the Act on the suppression of Communism …

I have withdrawn that amendment.

I am sorry, I was not aware of that.

Sir, the hon. member for Edenvale (Mr. G. H. van Wyk) has challenged me in connection with my statement that the steps of the City Hall of Johannesburg had in fact been used, in my recollection, at least once by the Nationalist Party. What will the hon. member say if, having checked the records of the Town Clerk’s Department and the police records of the time, he finds that the Nationalist Party held a meeting on those steps in 1938? What will he say then? [Interjections.] In 1938 there was a need for the Nationalist Party to protest; to-day, of course it has not got to protest about anything, or listen to anybody else’s protests. In 1941, Sir, there was a certain disturbance outside the Transvaler building in de Villiers Street. And if that hon. member checks the facts, he will find that that started with a meeting on the City Hall steps in Johannesburg. Does the hon. the Minister remember that? All I am trying to say, Mr. Chairman, is this—it has been the market place of the people of Johannesburg, the forum of the people. It has created none of the troubles to which the Minister has referred in his statements, “about that every time there was a meeting there was fighting”. That is not so. Sir, I am trying very hard not to give the Minister merely one man’s opinion on this. I tried very hard to find out what his officials knew about it.

You can’t even convince the Argus; how can you convince me?

I am coming to the Cape Aurgus. The Cape Argus merely argues on the principle which was the principle which Winston Churchill rejected during the war, when he said something like this: He feeds the crocodile in the hope that the crocodile will eat him last. Therefore, Sir, what the hon. the Minister is expected to do is this: He is going to ban two venues, according to his own statement but it may be that because of the urging of members like myself on this side of the House, he will be generous and ban only one venue. Then, says the Cape Argus, he must ban only the City Hall steps in Johannesburg, where there are always hooligans and where the wine of politics goes to their heads. Sir, I wish the wine could go to our heads in Johannesburg. It is enough to make anybody long to get drunk, after observing the political scene to-day. But the fact is that the people of Johannesburg are just as levelheaded and law-abiding as the people of any other city in South Africa. So I am not making a plea to the Minister to ban the Grand Parade, Cape Town, and not to ban the City Hall steps in Johannesburg. I am not adopting that parochial attitude. Whatever I have said about the City Hall in Johannesburg—the facts about the Grand Parade, Cape Town, are not so well-known to me—and whatever the principle involved is, Sir, I plead just as strongly for the freedom of the people to use the Grand Parade, Cape Town as their venue.

When the Minister has to take a decision in terms of this particular clause, he may well reconsider the statement which he made about banning both these venues to the public.

How often have you said that?

I have only said it once. The trouble with the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) is that he has a one-track mind; because he repeats himself all the time, he thinks that other people repeat themselves, too. When it comes to the question of considering banning I hope that the Minister will act purely on the facts of the case and not on an assertion which he has, perhaps, made for political reasons. I think that all the stories which we have heard lately about Communism have gone to the Minister’s head. It has confused him completely, Sir, to an extent that he cannot distinguish between the steps of the City Hall in Johannesburg and the Steppes of Russia; and he cannot tell the difference between the Grand Parade, Cape Town and Moscow’s May Day Parade. These are two venues in the two principal cities of South Africa which have a record of having been used by and large for legitimate, public, law-abiding purposes. And the question of taking them out of public use, is a matter which even the Minister, with his known intentions, should think about again.

The hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) proclaimed the biggest untruth ever in this House when he said that the National Party held a meeting in 1941 on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg and that that led to the riots in front of the Transvaler building.

No.

He mentioned the name of the Transvaler building and said that the meeting which was held on the City Hall steps was held in 1941.

No, I spoke about 1938.

I will check the hon. member’s Hansard and it will be found that that was what he said. I want to ask him who the persons were who caused the trouble in front of the Transvaler building in 1941. The very people who caused that trouble were the hooligans of Johannesburg.

Order! The hon. member is wandering too far from the Bill.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Hospital referred to it.

The hon. member spoke about 1938 and the hon. member is now talking about 1941.

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Hospital specifically pointed out that that as a result of the meeting on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg, the building of the Transvaler was attacked in 1941.

That is precisely the impression which I gained.

What did the hon. member for Hospital say?

Sir, I said: what would the hon. member for Edenvale say if, having checked the records of the Town Clerk’s Department in Johannesburg—I am trying to repeat exactly what I said—and the police records, he discovered that the Nationalist Party had held a meeting on the Johannesburg City Hall steps in 1938. Then there was an interjection and I said: In those days the Nationalist Party had reason to protest; to-day they had no reason to protest… [Interjections.]

Order! Hon. members must give the hon. member an opportunity to explain what he had said.

Then I went on to say: What will the hon. member for Edenvale say if he checks the same records and he discovers that the disturbances which took place outside the Transvaler building in 1941 started with a gathering on the City Hall steps of Johannesburg?

The hon. member for Hospital as a former mayor and town councillor and as a former Provincial Councillor for Johannesburg, has protested to-day while the Minister is trying to rectify one of the most unpleasant matters concerning the inhabitants of the Transvaal. The inhabitants of Johannesburg must not think that the city belongs to them alone. All the inhabitants of the Transvaal have protested vigorously for years against those unpleasant meetings that were held on the steps of the City Hall.

Where did you hear that?

I lived in Johannesburg for 15 years and every time we had our lunch hour or wanted to rest from our daily task, we had to walk past those steps. Then there were always people molesting one and pushing some or other ideology, which one did not like, down one’s throat. Why must I as a citizen of this country listen to some or other person’s ideology which he has not the courage to advocate at a proper meeting in a building? Why must he use that public place? I say that 90 per cent of the inhabitants of Johannesburg welcome this legislation because they are law-abiding people and they do not believe in incitement. No decent organization, if it is worth its salt, will make propaganda from the steps. It will hold its meeting in a hall and the people will support it. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member for Turffontein (Mr. Durrant) persists with his interjections. The hon. member must not do so, nor must the hon. member for Mossel Bay (Dr. van Nierop).

At such a meeting one finds all the flotsam, all the people who are only looking for trouble. We want to end these unpleasant incidents. The hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) told us that law abiding people stood there with posters, but they were hurting the feelings of many people. Why must they stand there? [Interjections.]

Order!

They have every right to vote the Government out of office if they are against the Government’s policy but why must they protest in a public place, on the steps of the Town Hall, where all the people must enter to pay their taxes and why must they be molested? If they do this in a hall none of us will have any objection but if they do so in a hall they will receive no attention. They want to conduct their meetings outside because they want to cause friction. That is why the Minister wants to prohibit meetings at the two main points of friction, the City Hall steps and the Parade, and we know this will be the death-knell of the Liberal Party, the Progressive Party and the communist party.

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the amendment I moved. The Minister has referred to the Privileges of Parliament Act, and also to the Constitution. He knows, of course, that these are not sacrosanct and that in the case of any conflict the courts have always interpreted a later statute as being one which pro tanto modifies or amends any preceding statute. The Minister himself has indicated that in regard to the courts, he is taking this necessary step to ensure that there will be no misunderstanding and that the courts should be free and not hampered in any way by the provision we are dealing with. I, in my turn, feel that the same precaution should be taken in regard to both this Parliament and the Provincial Councils. It seems, therefore, that on the Minister’s own argument the amendment is one which he should accept and I hope he will reconsider it. I am not aware what the position is in regard to the Legislative Assembly in South West Africa and whether there is anything which would give them any protection at all, such as Section 75 of the Constitution Act of 1961. I therefore cannot take the matter further in that regard. But seemingly there is no such provision, otherwise the Minister would have quoted it himself, and I think therefore that is further justification for the Minister to reconsider this amendment.

I do not think that this Committee can allow the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) to create such an incorrect impression and get away with it. He has repeatedly tried to create the impression that the National Party held a meeting on the City Hall steps and that this resulted in the damaging of the Transvaler buildings. [Interjections.]

On a point of order, Sir, seeing that you asked me to repeat what I said yesterday, and seeing that you have accepted what I said, I wonder whether the hon. member is entitled to persist in distorting what I have said.

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the word “distort”.

I withdraw, and I say he is changing the meaning of what I have said.

The hon. member wanted to create the impression that this attack on the premises of the Transvaler was the result of the actions of the National Party. I now want to make this quite clear. The difficulty we experience with hon. members regarding meetings on the City Hall steps and the Parade is due to the fact that hon. members have a Hyde Park mentality, but unfortunately they do not realize that there is a great difference in the circumstances because in the case of Hyde Park we have the position that the whole world regards that as a ridiculous gathering of a bunch of crazy people in whom no one is interested. [Interjections.] They do not realize that the difference is that no one is interested or takes any notice of what is said at Hyde Park. But in South Africa the position is different. We have various racial groups, and we have certain racial groups which are not yet politically mature, and if they are incited by these irresponsible speeches which are made on the City Hall steps, they are carried away and they start assaulting people and damaging property. And then the City Council expects the police to restore order after they originally allowed the fire to be started, and the people to be incited to uncontrollable hysteria. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Turffontein says that we are always doing that at our meetings. The National Party has never had a meeting which has been followed by arson and assault and the destruction of chairs and buildings as has happened at United Party meetings. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member has now replied to that point. He must come back to the Bill.

I am pointing out that the hon. member, together with the United Party and the Progressive Party, would like to continue having the opportunity to hold irresponsible meetings on the City Hall steps, and that is why they are opposed to this clause because they want the opportunity to incite people which results in violence. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. members for Durban (North) (Mr. M. L. Mitchell) and Turffontein (Mr. Durrant) persist in making interjections, and I now warn the hon. member for Turffontein (Mr. Durrant) for the last time.

He thinks he is on the Johannesburg City Hall steps.

If it is the position, as the hon. member for Turffontein says, that the National Party has held irresponsible meetings, he would have been the first to ask the Minister to prohibit the holding of those meetings on those steps. But it is because he still wants to speak there that he does not want the Minister to prohibit those meetings. I say hon. members are obsessed with this Hyde Park mentality, where they do not have the problem of racial relations such as we have it in South Africa; where they have a very much older, established community which cannot be incited by this type of irresponsible speech to resort to violence. They therefore do not want these meetings to be prohibited, but they are losing all sense of perspective, and after all the difficulties have been created, they will sit with their hands folded and hold the police responsible, the police who must maintain law and order, while they have tried to create disorder.

With leave of the Committee, the amendments in lines 13 and 16, proposed by Mrs. Suzman, were withdrawn.

Amendments in sub-section (3)bis, inserted by paragraph (a), proposed by Dr. Cronje and by the Minister of Justice, put and agreed to.

Question put: That sub-section (3)ter, inserted by paragraph (a) proposed to be omitted, stand part of the clause,

Upon which the committee divided:

Ayes>—82: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Noes—52: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bloomberg, A.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant. R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff. de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker, H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Question accordingly affirmed and the amendment proposed by Mrs. Suzman negatived.

Amendment in line 33, proposed by Dr.Cronje, put and Committee divided:

Ayes—52: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bloomberg, A.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker, H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Noes—86: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nieroo, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Amendment in line 34, proposed by the Minister of Justice, put and agreed to.

Remaining amendments proposed by the Minister of Justice put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—83: Badenhorst. F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg. G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Noes—52: Barnett. C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan. J. M.; Cronje. F. J. C.; de Kock. H. C.; Dodds. P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay. L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff. de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes. T. G.; le Roux, G. S. P.; Lewis, H.; Malan. E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell. M. L.; Moolman. J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, P. P.; Radford. A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross. D. G.; Russell. J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher. D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M. : Tucker, F.; van der Bvl. P.; van Niekerk. S. M.; Warren. C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Amendments accordingly agreed to.

Amendment proposed by Mr. Plewman put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—52: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; le Roux, G. S. P.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker, H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood. L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Noes—83: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath. J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd. H. F.; Visse, J. H.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Question put: That all the words from “(b)” in line 46, up to and including “concerned” in line 49, proposed to be omitted, stand part of the clause, Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—84: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Sta-den, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Noes—52: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bloomberg, A.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant. R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel. A.; Graaff. de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hour-ouebie. R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; le Roux, G. S. P.; Lewis. H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield. G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker, H.; van der Bvl, P.; van Niekerk. S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Question accordingly affirmed and the remaining amendment proposed by Mrs. Suzman negatived.

Question put: That all the words after “concerned” in line 49, to the end of the clause, proposed to be omitted, stand part of the clause,

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—84: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Sta-den, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Noes—52: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bloomberg, A.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff. de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty. J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; le Roux, G. S. P.; Lewis, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield. G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker. H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Question accordingly affirmed and the remaining amendment proposed by Dr. Cronje negatived.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—83: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr.); Fouché, J. J. (Jnr.); Frank, S.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots J. J.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoe-man, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; Von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Noes—52: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bloomberg, A.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; de Kock, H. C.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Fisher, E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; le Roux, G. S. F.; Lewis, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield. G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp. L. S.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker. H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Clause, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

On Clause 20,

I am not going to press the amendment which is standing in my name on the Order Paper. I am simply going to vote against Clause 20. This is a very complicated clause and the main objective of course is to make certain provisions of this Bill, namely, Section 5ter introduced by Clause 4 of the Bill apply to the Unlawful Organizations Act. In other words persons who were members of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C., both unlawful organizations in terms of that Act, will now have applicable to them all of the provisions which are introduced by Clause 4 of this Bill. That means that all persons who at any time were members of the A.N.C. or the P.A.C. may not become office-bearers of any organization specified by the Minister. I therefore will simply vote against the clause rather than move the amendment which will make the whole issue rather complicated.

The effect of Clause 20 of this Bill is to introduce into the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, a great number of the amendments which have already been dealt with in the course of the discussions on this Bill. We have already on this side of the House set out why we disagree with those amendments, amongst other things because they include in the net, so to speak, people who should not properly be included in such a net. I am not going to elaborate this matter in detail because it would amount to a reiteration to a great part on why we have objected to so many of these amendments, that is the amendments incorporated in this Bill. It is sufficient for me only to refer to Clauses 8 and 10. Sub-section (2) of Clause 8 for instance throws the net so wide that for example a person who engages in activities which may further the achievement of any such objects is included, and in Clause 10 which also seeks to be incorporated into the Unlawful Organizations Act by Clause 20, the net is also spread too wide. I need only refer to sub-section (e) which we have already dealt with at some considerable length. As I have said, the object of this clause is to incorporate into the Unlawful Organizations Act these amendments which up to now had applied only to the Suppression of Communism Act. I do not share at all the solicitude for the A.N.C. and the P.A.C., which has been expressed by the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman), but if the clauses of this Bill are wrong in principle, and we have demonstrated that they are wrong in many respects, then whether they are to be applied to the Suppression of Communism Act, or whether they are to be applied to the Unlawful Organizations Act, they are still wrong in principle. It is for that reason that this side of the House proposes voting against Clause 20.

Ayes—81: Badenhorst, F. H.; Bekker, G. F. H.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Coertze, L. I.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Wet, C.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Faurie, W. H.; Fouché, J. J. (Sr); Fouché, J. J. (Jr.); Frank, S.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jon-ker, A. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Luttig, H. G.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, J. A. F.; Nel, M. D. C. de W.; Niemand, F. J.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Schoonbee, J. F.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Uys, D. C. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van den Heever, D. J. G.; van der Ahee, H. H.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Eeden, F. J.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Nierop, P. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Wyk, H. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Verwoerd, H. F.; Visse, J. H.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: D. J. Potgieter and P. S. van der Merwe.

Noes—43: Barnett. C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bowker, T. B.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Cronje, F. J. C.; Dodds. P. R.; Emdin, S.; Field. A. N.; Fisher. E. L.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Swart, H. G.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Tucker. H.; van der Byl, P.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren. C. M.; Weiss, U. M.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and N. G. Eaton.

Clause accordingly agreed to.

On Clause 21,

I move the amendment standing in my name—To omit sub-sections (1) and (2) and to substitute the following new sub-section:

1. (1) Any person who, by means of an explosive or with intent to cause insurrection or to interfere with the operation of the affairs of the State, or to seriously damage the national economy, or to seriously interfere with essential services—
   1. (a) murders or attempts to murder any person; or
   2. (b) assaults any person with intent to do him grievous bodily harm; or
   3. (c) commits arson; or
   4. (d) maliciously injures property or attempts to injure property maliciously; or
   5. (e) contravenes Section 37 of the Railways and Harbours Control and Management (Consolidated) Act, 1957 (Act No. 70 of 1957),

and to omit all the words after “Court”, in line 51. to the end of paragraph (a) of subsection (4).

The purpose of my amendment is to substitute for the definition of the hon. the Minister of the crime of “sabotage” a definition which in fact includes within the term “sabotage” what is sabotage, unlike the clause moved by the hon. the Minister. Sir, the precedent from which the amendment which I move is taken, is the War Measures of World War II which were applicable in this country, and therefore it is a form of definition of the term “sabotage” which has stood the test and I believe was found to be satisfactory. Sir, if one looks at the amendment one finds the essential elements of “sabotage” here, because the proposed new sub-section (1) reads that “any person, who, by means of an explosive or with intent to cause insurrection or to interfere with the operations of the affairs of the State, or to seriously damage the national economy, or to seriously interfere with essential services …”, and then I include paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) (e): Murder or attempts to murder any person; or assaults on any person with intent to do him grevious bodily harm; or to commit arson; or to maliciously injure property or attempt to injure property maliciously; or a contravention of Section 37 of the Railways and Harbours Act—shall be guilty of the crime of sabotage and liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason.

Sir, one could add, if one wished, in our modern age, a provision to deal with other transport such as for instance the Airways and Road Motor Services. I believe the hon. the Minister will agree that this definition is in fact a definition of what is the crime of “sabotage” as ordinarily understood. I believe it is a reasonable definition, and in moving this on behalf of this side of the house, we show, I hope to the satisfaction even of hon. members opposite, that we are absolutely opposed to sabotage and that we are prepared to agree to a sentence of death for sabotage. (Laughter.) Hon. members laugh, but I would like to say to hon. members opposite that the definition of the hon. the Minister includes within the term “sabotage” various matters which have nothing whatsoever to do with sabotage in any sense of the meaning of that term. When during the Second Reading debate, my honourable Leader referred to a couple of examples where trifling matters were shown by him conclusively to be sabotage in terms of the hon. the Minister’s definition, the hon. Minister said by way of interjection: Do you really think that any Attorney-General would prosecute for sabotage in a case such as that? Sir, the hon. the Minister thereby admitted that in terms of his definition comparatively trifling matters would fall within the definition of the crime of “sabotage” as defined by the hon. the Minister. Another improvement in the amendment which I submit to this honourable House is that what is essential in the crime of sabotage is that the Act must be committed by means of explosives with or with intent to cause insurrection or to interfere with the operation of the affairs of the state. That of course is sabotage against the state as ordinarily understood. Sir, in addition the amendment follows the sound precedent which we have in our law again and again that the onus must rest not upon the accused but upon the state. That is another objection to the form as adopted by the hon. the Minister. The hon. the Minister, it is true, provides that in the first place the Act complained of must be proved, but he cannot deny (and he does not deny it) that by reason of paragraph (2) (and I must say that I don’t believe it is very much improved by the amendment of the hon. the Minister), he casts the onus on the accused to prove a host of matters, something which it may be very difficult for an accused to do. Sir, when a person is on trial for his life, he is entitled to have the onus placed squarely where it belongs, namely upon the state, and that is what I do in my amendment. In addition, as I have said the elements of sabotage are present, and I believe that the clause as proposed by me is entirely adequate to deal with the situation as the hon. the Minister has described it to us.

I believe that it is utterly wrong, as the Minister has done in his amendment, to include a host of comparatively minor matters in a crime of this nature, matters which in no sense of the term, in the English language or in the Afrikaans language, can be considered by anybody to be “sabotage” in terms of any accepted definition of “sabotage”. I hope that the hon. the Minister will seriously consider accepting this amendment. That would be a vast improvement to the Bill before the House. It will provide for the creation of this crime, which by moving this amendment, we concede is a crime which might well be introduced into the Statute Book, provided it is properly defined and provided we follow the ordinary rule of our law as to the onus of proof. What could be more reasonable than to provide that sabotage by means of explosives with intent to cause insurrection or to interefere with the operation of the affairs of the state, or to seriously damage the national economy, or to seriously interfere with essential services, and to commit one or other of the crimes which are then listed, should be punishable as treason. The hon. the Minister’s definition is one which I rather hope the Minister will withdraw, because it is a provision which if included in the Statute Book will be a blot on the Statute Book of this country. I have no hesitation in using those strong words. I believe it most sincerely. I believe that just as my honourable Leader was able to point to comparatively trivial matters which fall within the terms of the Minister’s definition, many other comparatively trifling matters can constitute sabotage through minor matters set out in sub-section (1) and taking with this the various items which have to be disproved in terms of Section (2) of the Minister’s definition. Accepting as we all do that it is necessary that sabotage should be dealt with the utmost rigour of the law, let us at least be certain that we are defining the crime in such a way that we are in fact visiting that highest of all penalties, the penalty of death, on sabotage as such.

Had the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) analysed his own definition properly he himself would have found the answer why the Minister will not be able to accept it. That is the prediction I want to make. But before I analyse it, I wish to express my appreciation to the hon. the Minister for the amendments he has placed on the Order Paper in this regard. I wish to refer in particular to that amendment which omits the words referring to an accessory after the act. According to our law an accessory is an accomplice—it does not matter whether he becomes it before or after the act—or the doer, and I am pleased that the hon. the Minister has deleted this.

I now come to the hon. member for Germiston (District). You will notice, Sir, that he says that a person who murders somebody or tries to murder somebody by means of an explosive, or who assaults somebody with the intent of causing him grievous bodily harm, or somebody who commits arson, or who maliciously injures property or attempts to injure property maliciously or contravenes certain sections of the Railways and Harbours Act will be guilty of sabotage. But does the hon. member not realize that what he is doing is to describe a certain type of murder, arson, and injury to property as sabotage which has absolutely nothing to do with sabotage as

such? He can be accused of doing what he accuses the Minister of doing. The boot is on the other foot. He must not think that because he joins them with a number of ors (or, or, or) in the section, that they must necessarily be read together. For the very reason that he uses the conjunction “or”, they are separate. The objects which he lists thereafter: or to interfere with the operation of the affairs of the State, or somebody who commits a murder by means of an explosive, or somebody who deliberately causes an insurrection; commits a murder, or somebody, who in order to interfere with the operation of the affairs of the State, commits a murder, are so many ordinary crimes—that is the sense of his text: The sense of his text it not at all: Somebody who by means of an explosive wishes to achieve a political objective and thereby commits a murder. That is sabotage, and that is what the Minister wants to make punishable. However, Mr. Chairman, this is another example of what we always get from the United Party. They do not want the Minister to take action against the saboteurs. We have accused them of protecting the saboteurs, and how do they do that? Mr. Chairman, this is how they do it: They are either the advocates of somebody who wants to abuse the process, as the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) has suggested in connection with Clause 16, whereby emergency regulations can be extended and applied to districts where no emergency exists. He wants interdicts, mandamuses and other orders in respect of declarations of rights to be obtained from the court and in the meantime he wants to suspend the operations to overcome the state of emergency. Here we again have such a case. The hon. member for Germiston (District) and those who support him, come forward and they again want to create a position where it will not at all be necessary to prove a political aim. He continues to say in his amendment—and I am using his own words (I am still coming to the amendment of the hon. the Minister)—“Any person who, by means of an explosive murders or attempts to murder any person or any person who with the intent to cause insurrection, murders any person or any person who, in interfering with the operation of the State, murders somebody. That is the only political connotation. Then he goes on; “… or to seriously damage the national economy.” That has none or very little political connotation. They may be people who are exploiting some grievance or other which they have on the labour market. That does not at all mean that their actions have a political connotation. “Or to seriously interfere with essential services.” Say for instance the fire brigade staff go on strike, why should the hon. member for Germiston (District) give their action a political connotation? They may be dissatisfied with the authority who instituted the fire brigade service or with their conditions of service. That is not sabotage. Sabotage is a condition where somebody tries to attain political results by committing acts of violence and unlawful acts. That is what the Minister wants to get at with this Bill. If you study it carefully, Sir, you will see that the Minister suggests that an unlawful deed must be committed whereby various objectives are attained—and various items. I am speaking about the merits of the clause. Various results are obtained under the clause; either the safety of the State or the health of the public is endangered or the maintenance of law and order is endangered, or a water supply is polluted, etc. In that case such a person would be guilty of sabotage if he cannot prove that that was not his intention and that that was not the object of his actions. The hon. member for Germiston (District) objects to that. But his amendment does not solve the problem which confronts the hon. the Minister when he wants to make sabotage a punishable offence. He may think that he does so but in fact he does not. Because when we consider the onus which rests on the accused we find that when he has intentionally committed an unlawful act which results in one of the items listed in Section (1), it is necessary for him to prove that his intention was not to cause general disturbance, disruption or disorder; that his intention was not to paralyse industry or to seriously jeopardize industrial production and distribution of commercial and foodstuffs. That should always be related to that initial unlawful act which he has committed. That gives his actions a political meaning, a political connotation. The hon. member now says that we on this side of the House object to that onus. I have two remarks to make about that. The first is that we do not object to it, because in the first instance the State must prove that the doer or the accused has acted unlawfully. That is a simple matter. You simply prove that he has committed acts which are forbidden. You also have to prove that he committed them deliberately; that is not so easy but it can nevertheless be done. You have to prove many facts so that the forum or court which tries him can come to the conclusion that the person had as his objective that particular consequence. According to court decisions the Appeal Court says that all the various facts must be considered together and then you have to ask yourself what conclusion you can draw from all the facts taken together; after that the facts must be considered separately and the forum or court must consider what conclusion can be drawn from the facts if taken separately; and only when in both instances the facts indicate that what has resulted was indeed what the accused had in mind, is the intention proved. That onus still rests the Minister to provide in that second clause that the accused should prove that that was not his intention. Because obviously when the State has proved the intention, the onus shifts to the accused to prove the contrary. But the State makes it easy for him by saying: What you have to prove is not that it was not your intention to commit all these various acts, you can also do that, but in addition you have to prove that you did not have these other consequences in mind. [Time limit.]

This clause is a particularly bad feature of this Bill. The hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) has already pointed out what a wide and vaguely refined new crime has been created and my hon. Leader gave many instances of how wide it was and how far it would strike. We on this side of the House, through the hon. member for Germiston (District) have produced a well-defined crime which has in fact stood the test of time and which leaves the subject in no uncertainty as to what he may or may not do. There are other things which I think we should devote more time to, Sir. Before, there used to be several safeguards available to an accused, but those safeguards have been thrown overboard in this clause. I would immediately like to tackle the question of onus which the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) has mentioned. This clause definitely changes the onus of proof as far as the accused is concerned compared with the other normal crimes with which an accused may be charged. Clause 21 (1) sets out what the State has to prove and then Clause 21 (2) says quite clearly that—

The hon. the member for Standerton knows perfectly well, that in the case of murder, for example, it is encumbent upon the State not only to prove the actual deed causing the murder but that the deed was done with the intent to kill. That position is completely reversed here: the deed must be proved by the State, but it is for the accused to prove that it was not done with the requisite intent. Consequently, although it is perfectly correct to say that certain minor matters must still be proved by the State, the main question of the intent has got to be disproved by the accused.

A second safeguard available to the accused charged with a serious crime which is omitted in this clause, is the right of a preparatory examination. Preparatory examinations are made available, as the hon. the Minister will know, where the magnitude of the crime is such or where the previous record and convictions of the offender are such that the Attorney-General considers that it is necessary to have a preparatory examination so that he can then decide what the proper course will be to follow. Such an attitude is taken where the crime justifies a high sentence. In this case the minimum sentence is a very high sentence and an Attorney-General would certainly always call for a preparatory examination where a sentence of five years or upwards could be imposed. As is well known the Regional courts have jurisdiction only up to a period of three years’ imprisonment whereas here there is a possible sentence of imprisonment of five years. It is well known too that the holding of a preparatory examination does furnish the accused with an opportunity of considering the State evidence and considering his defence before he has to face the actual trial. It is also well known that he is entitled not only to the statements and the evidence led at the preparatory examination, but also to any subsequent evidence which is found and will be adduced against him. Here too, therefore, he is in a seriously prejudiced position.

Another principle is involved here. The well-established powers of the courts to control the trial are seriously diregarded. In the first place you have the minimum sentence which must be imposed, namely five years. I think the legislation introduced in regard to compulsory whipping showed conclusively to the profession that to deny the courts the discretion in sentence was a very serious matter. It is perfectly true that this crime is seriously regarded and the courts certainly are guided by an indication that the crime is a serious one, in imposing a considerable sentence. There is no need, therefore, to tie the hands of the courts as is being done here. The further denial of the discretion of the court of introducing if necessary even a suspended sentence is a departure from the normal and I suggest is not justified here.

There are various other aspects which call for explanations and which I suggest have not been adequately explained. It is said by the hon. the Minister that the Attorney-General must say in writing that an accused is being charged with this crime and it is suggested that that is a safeguard. But the hon. the Minister knows well that the Attorney-General, under Section 5 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Criminal Code, is entirely subject to his control and direction. That provision has not been amended and consequently this provision in terms of which the Attorney-General must signify in writing that the man must be charged, is, I think, valueless.

Parliament gives the Attorney-General a specific function and he alone can exercise it.

With great respect to the hon. the Minister, the provision of the Code would override the provision of this Bill and would leave the Minister in an unchanged position. Consequently what the Minister hoped would be a safeguard is, I suggest, no safeguard. Because his function is to perform his duty subject to the control of the Minister and subject to the direction of the Minister. The Minister may substitute his decision under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Code for that of the Attorney-General and there is no departure from that principle in this Bill. If I may read it, Sir—

Except where it says the Attorney-General personally.

With great respect, Sir, this is a clear provision. The terms in which the Clause is couched, in my submission, certainly do not introduce the safeguard desired by the hon. the Minister.

Another objection is the fact that an acquittal does not preclude another arraignment. I know that the hon. the Minister said in his second reading speech that normally if a person was accused of murder, for example, he could be found guilty of a lesser crime. That is perfectly true. But that can only occur in the one trial. But now a different and a more disadvantageous position to the accused arises. He is subjected to a trial. He lays his cards on the table and he is more particularly compelled to do so because he has got to show that he did not have the intent in question. The trial having concluded and he having been acquitted, he can then be indicted entirely afresh upon the evidence that was disclosed at that trial. [Time limit.]

Mr. Chairman, I shall not reply at this stage to all the arguments used by hon. members opposite. I just want to take this opportunity in the first place formally to move the amendment standing in my name—

As far as this clause is concerned, I have also received representations from the Bar Council, just as I have received representations in respect of other clauses, and I should like to tell the Committee what those representations were. The first related to Clause 21 (4) (b) of this Bill. The Bar Council submitted that I should omit the word “unless” from the English version and also the word “otherwise”, and that I should substitute therefore: “If the Attorney-General so directs.” The Bar Council’s attitude is that they can quite understand, particularly after I had explained to them what our problem was, as I have also explained to hon. members, that we are dealing here with people who do not play the game according to the rules, but who will use any underhand and cunning methods. What more can I do than to explain a practical example in the light of the Strachan case to hon. members. As a result of the procedure followed in the case of a preparatory examination, as a result of the fact that the communists know that a certain person has given evidence and what evidence he has given, one witness has disappeared or been kidnapped and is preseumablytion of all Judges having the right to hear such cases, but the Minister sought out certain Judges because he did not trust the others to hear such cases, without a preparatory examination. If it was correct and valid at that time under the then prevailing circumstances, why will it not be correct and valid to-day? The fact that there was a war had nothing to do with the preparatory examination. One cannot win or lose a war because one has eliminated or held a preparatory examination. Then hon. members must explain to me why the principle was thrown overboard at that time. I am not going as far as hon. members went. I am vesting this discretion in the Attorney-General. I repeat that the attitude of the Bar Council was that we should use other words because the wording as it stands here could create the impression that we are giving preference to not holding preparatory examinations while they want the wording to be such that preference should be given to preparatory examinations and that it will be the exception when a preparatory examination is not held. And it is to give effect to this undertaking which I have given that I have moved this amendment.

The Bar Council has asked me whether I would consider providing the accused with copies of the statements taken by the police in this regard. This is a matter which can in any case be further investigated administratively. Hon. members know that one can ask for details and that one can ask for many details, as was proved at the treason trial. The accused will therefore not be in the position that he will not know at all what case he must meet. He has the opportunity to ask for details and he is entitled to obtain those details. I can for very good reasons not give an unqualified undertaking to provide copies. I have also told the Bar Council that I cannot give an unqualified undertaking to provide copies of the evidence to the accused. Hon. members know as well as I do that in the first place these statements are often taken down by inexperienced people. They are incomplete and as a result one cannot hand over such statements without further ado. A further aspect which one can consider—I do not know whether this will work in practice—is to provide a summary, apart from the fact that details can be requested which will be given to the accused. I want to make it quite clear that I do not want to commit myself in this regard at all or make any promises. I just feel that in view of the summons, the details which are provided, and the postponement which the court will grant in those cases where it is necessary, the accused will not be placed in an unfair position in any way whatsoever by having to reply immediately to the case instituted against him.

It is also true as regards the minimum penalty of five years imprisonment that the Bar Council has put it to me that it is opposed in principle to all minimum penalties because its attitude is that this is a matter which should rest exclusively in the discretion of the courts. My attitude on the other hand was that although I subscribe to the general principle that one should interfere as little as possible with this discretion of the courts, we are here dealing with such an exceptional case that Parliament not only has the right but I believe that Parliament would be neglecting its duty if it did not make it clear how strongly it felt about these acts.

Certain members of the Bar Council deputation asked me to omit the words “objectively regarded” and “was not calculated”. The attitude of other members was that those words should be retained. I have preferred to retain the words.

Another request which the Bar Council has put to me was that the phrase “or as an accessory after the fact” should be omitted. Hon. members will find this in the amendment. Another suggestion which has not emanated from the Bar Council as such but from the leader of the deputation was that in the case of Clause 1 we should not specify, as I have done, what will be regarded as offences: or as the hon. member for Germiston (District) has said. We should simply say “any offence”. Hon. members will realize at once that this will make the provision far wider than it is now. It is true that it was added that we should link to this the intentions as set out in (a), (b), (c) and (d) and possibly (i) of the second paragraph in order to constitute the offence of sabotage. I have considered all these matters and I have decided that I prefer this definition as it stands here. I just want to deal with one other aspect, namely that I have also had discussions with the Trade Union Council and that they have submitted certain representations to me. Hon. members will find the result of those representations in the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper and which is aimed at excluding the lawful activities of trade union organizations. I want to take this opportunity to express my personal thanks to the trade union movement for the exceptionally responsible way in which they have acted in this regard. I appreciate it particularly.

Before going further I should like to say a few words about the amendment of the hon. member for Germiston (District). When we examine this amendment of the hon. member we see that far more objections can be raised against it than can be raised against mine. In the case of my amendment I have admitted that it is worded very widely. I have not pulled any punches in that regard. I have on no ocasion tried to mislead anyone regarding exactly how widely it is worded. I have also admitted that there are many offences which technically can be described as sabotage and can be accepted as such. I want to repeat, Mr. Chairman, that to be effective any definition which we attach to sabotage, must be wide, or else we must simply leave the position as it is. If we are not prepared to take the risk of wording such provisions very widely, we must simply leave the position as it is because then all these people will find a loophole on every occasion. I now want to refer to one or two loopholes in the amendment of the hon. member for Germiston (District) which struck me immediately. We are supposed—this is the background—to accept that sabotage is actually the most serious offence a person can commit. I personally—and I do not know whether the hon. member for Germiston (District) also regards the matter in this light—adopt the attitude that in this day and age it is certainly one of the most serious offences a person can commit. But let us now analyse the amendment moved by the hon. member for Germiston (District). He says “any person who, by means of an explosive, murders or attempts to murder any person. In other words, if one murders a person by blowing him up with dynamite, one has a chance of getting a far lighter punishment than when one kills him with a knob-kerrie because if there are no extenuating circumstances when one kills a person with a knobkerrie, the Judge must sentence one to death. But if one has blown him up, according to the hon. member’s amendment, so that not even a trace of the person is found, one has a chance of being sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Will the hon. member concede me that point.

I have confidence in the Judges.

I too. I am merely pointing out one aspect to the hon. member to show how one can pull such an amendment to pieces.

I now come to the second leg of the hon. member’s argument “or with intent to cause insurrection But it is not necessary to insert those words here. That is the old charge of sedition. This is sedition, not sabotage. But we now come to the third: “or to interfere with the operation of the affairs of state”. We shall never be able to charge a man under this provision because interfering with the operation of the affairs of state is not defined, and we shall have to prove that he has interfered with the operation of the affairs of state. When he does not pay his tax is he guilty of interfering with the operation of the affairs of the state? Just as hon. members have tried to ridicule my provision, so I can do the same to theirs. [Interjections.] I shall come to that. I am merely showing hon. members that the same arguments which have been used against my definition can be used against this definition. What one court may regard as interfering with the operation of the affairs of the state another court may not regard as such. How far must a man go before I can say that he is interfering with the affairs of the state? Has he done so when he locks the door of the Prime Minister’s office so that he cannot enter, or when he locks the room in which the Cabinet meets so that they cannot get out? Is he then interfering with the affairs of state? Or if he prevents the Opposition holding a caucus so that they can decide what attitude to adopt towards this legislation, is he then interfering with the affairs of state? One cannot say that the State must prove that he has interfered with the affairs of state when one does not know what the affairs of state are which are being interfered with.

But we go further—“or to seriously damage the national economy”. If a person burns down one sugar plantation in Natal—and this is a favourite trick of the saboteurs—has he damaged the national economy, or must he bum down ten before he damages the national economy? Does the hon. member see how arbitrary this provision is? The hon. member says “or to seriously interfere with essential services”. What are essential services? Nowhere in the hon. member’s amendment are they defined. What are essential services? This is something regarding which I have one opinion and the hon. member another, but it must be defined if it is to be proved. One simply cannot prove it, because what one must prove is not defined, and this, coming from hon. members who always tell us that the law must be certain, and there is nothing certain about this whole amendment. To tell the truth, it is so uncertain that we could never get a conviction even if the person charged has blown up a man with dynamite. [Interjections.] Those war measures made no reference to interference with the operation of the affairs of state, or to seriously damaging the national economy, or to seriously interfering with essential services. Hon. members cannot show me one single decision showing that any of these things were defined.

Now what does the definition we have here provide? After all we all know that in the main there are four ways in which sabotage is committed, and this technique the communists have perfected in recent years. In the first place one endangers the security of the health of the public, and one frustrates law and order. These two go hand in hand. In the third place one tries to put out of action the essential services which hon. members also have in mind but which they have not defined. Here after all we are laying down what those services are. We are defining them as water supplies, the distribution of light, power, and foodstuffs, and sanitary, medical and other facilities. We mention them all and we then come to the communications system, whether by air, by rail or by telegram, because this is what they want to put out of action. We then refer to the damaging of property. If hon. members analyse all these provisions is there one single reason why one of these should not be contained in this clause? On the contrary, these people have after all not left us in the dark. After all they have told us that they will blackmail Parliament—and it has been said not only to me but also to hon. members opposite, because all of us together are Parliament. These people have left us under no illusions. They want to bring about a certain political change in South Africa. They do not want to do this through Parliament because they realize that they cannot achieve their object in this way, and they are now trying to blackmail Parliament. They want to blackmail Parliament by means of certain unlawful acts in order to force Parliament to grant their demands, and this Parliament can simply not allow itself to be blackmailed, not by anyone in the world.

Under these circumstances I remain convinced that despite the fact that this definition is worded widely it will result in our catching in our nets those people whom we want to catch and the people who should not be in the net will not be so caught because for reasons which hon. members on this side have indicated, there are sufficient precautionary measures to prevent that happening.

The hon. the Minister is seeking a definition of “sabotage”, and I propose to give him one. Before I do that, however, I want to say that these offences he calls sabotage could include a number of petty acts, such as tampering with anybody’s property, or with the entrances of post offices. All these things he has given us in terms of his wide definition of “sabotage” could in fact be brought into the purview of this particular clause. There are other objectionable features in his definition, some of which have already been mentioned, such as the shifting of the onus of proof to the accused, the including of juveniles in the punishments applicable to adults, and the whole question of trying to define what is “objectively unlikely” to occur. It is, I believe, legally an impossibility to prove not only that one such intention was unlikely to occur, but the cumulative effect of several intentions which the Minister mentions in the second part of his definition clause. Then there is the whole question of the powers of the Attorneys-General and the question of minimum sentences, all of which I find objectionable. What I propose to do is to try to give a definition of “sabotage”. The definition I propose is one that does not make anything an offence which is not already an offence in terms of our existing law, nor does it increase the penalties for those offences, which penalties are left entirely in the discretion of the courts. What it does do is to enable the particular offence which already exists to be called sabotage in appropriate circumstances, and that, I believe, is what the Minister really wants.

Order! The hon. member must first move her amendment before discussing it.

Then I move my amendment—

substitute the following new sub-section:

1. (1) Any person who commits any violent and unlawful act with intent to—
   1. (a) cause or promote general dislocation, disturbance or disorder;
   2. (b) cripple or seriously prejudice any industry or undertaking or industries or undertakings generally or the production or distribution of commodities or foodstuffs at any place;
   3. (c) cause, encourage or further an insurrection or forcible resistance to the government;
   4. (d) cause serious damage to State property; or
   5. (e) seriously interrupt the supply or distribution at any place of light, power, fuel or water, or of sanitary, medical or fire extinguishing services,

shall be guilty of an offence of sabotage and shall be liable on conviction to a sentence of imprisonment of such duration, or a fine in such amount, or both such imprisonment and such fine, as the court convicting may deem fit. That is my proposed definition of sabotage. It enables offences which are already offences in terms of our existing law to be called sabotage in appropriate circumstances. I said during the second reading that concerning practically everything the Minister wishes to prevent, a person committing such an offence can already be charged, either with malicious injury to property, and if loss of life results of course the person can be charged with murder and the death penalty imposed. If the crime is such that it could be defined as treason, we already have laws on the Statute Book to enable such persons to be dealt with. So what I propose to do is to define sabotage, so that certain offences may in appropriate circumstances be called sabotage. In other words, the object is to define an offence which is less than murder and less than treason, both of which are already capital offences under the common law. That is why I find it difficult to accept the definition of the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker), because there, too, crimes which are less than murder or treason will be made subject to the death penalty if the court so decides. I do not want to introduce an additional death penalty. I want to give a definition of sabotage in appropriate circumstances and leave it entirely to the discretion of the courts to decide what punishment should be imposed. The word “sabotage” already has a very ugly connotation, and it is likely that where sabotage is actually charged and the persons are convicted, heavy sentences will be imposed. If loss of life has been caused, the court may in its discretion impose the death sentences already. If the person is charged with treason and convicted, the court can also inflict the death penalty. I do not want to go any further than that. I want to make it appropriate to define certain offences as sabotage and to leave it in the hands of the court as to what sentence it will impose.

Order! The hon. member does not move the amendment of which she gave notice?

No, I am moving this one instead.

The Minister says that under the Emergency Regulations during the war the Attorney-General did not have to give his personal certificate.

It distinctly says “the Minister”, in your regulations.

When this is considered, one must have regard to two factors. The one is that that was during war-time, when one was dealing with saboteurs in the proper sense of the term, saboteurs who were as dangerous as the enemy was and should have been treated in the same way, in the same way as the people who were shooting at you with guns. Those were the people who tried to blow up the cinemas and the railways. Those were saboteurs and they were as dangerous as the German soldiers armed with guns.

Then what objection is there to taking up the same attitude towards communists?

But you do not. The Minister has not defined the crime of “sabotage”. He calls it “sabotage” and it sounds very good, and people think he is trying to suppress sabotage, as they understand it, but how does the Minister understand it, and how does the public understand it? Certainly not in the way in which it appears in this Bill. [Interjections.] Since when is anyone deemed to be guilty of sabotage because he has maliciously damaged some property, by itself, or obstructs traffic, or tampers with a telephone box and tries to steal the tickeys out of a telephone kiosk? [Interjections.] No, it is not nonsense. As this Bill stands here, subsection (1) says that if you do any of those absurdly small things I have just mentioned, you are guilty of sabotage, finished and “klaar”, and unless you go into the witness box you will get five years’ imprisonment. [Interjections.] But that is not sabotage and it never has been.

I am very pleased to see in the newspaper that the General Bar Council also said that this was not sabotage. What they said—I notice the Minister left this out—is that while the Bar Council could not object to a law properly drafted to deal with sabotage, this clause did not do that. From any body such as the General Bar Council I think that is a clear comment. It neither does nor attempts to define sabotage. The Minister gave an example. He said under our definition it would be sabotage if someone locked the Cabinet up in its room. If the Minister were right, the difference is that under his definition the man must go to gaol for five years, and under our definition the Judge will probably tell him that he has been a silly boy and will caution and discharge him. He will get a punishment suitable to his offence. But one of the frightening things about this clause is that it produces a situation which we should not allow to occur in our courts; the situation where the Attorney-General alone will be able to determine whether or not you will get five years, or the proper punishment which the court feels you should get.

Let me give an example. If someone maliciously damages the property of another, say by slashing the seats of his motor-car, an offence which occurs quite frequently, he would fall under sub-section (1) and he would be guilty of sabotage, unless he went into the witness box and proved certain things. He could not prove that he did not do this to cause substantial financial loss to any person. Of course he did it to cause substantial financial loss to the owner of the motor-car, and so he would be guilty of sabotage.

And under your definition he could also be found guilty if he threw a cracker into a motor-car.

I do not know where the Minister sees the word “cracker” in our definition. The fact of the matter is that that man is guilty of sabotage for that trivial offence, and he gets the punishment, not which the Judge decides, but which the Attorney-General decides, because once the Attorney-General has charged him with sabotage the court has no option. So at that moment the Attorney-General exercises the functions of the Judge and the prosecutor and the gaoler. Surely the Minister can produce a definition which defines what crime it is he has committed. Surely it is undesirable for our courts to be turned into the sort of institutions that this clause would turn them into.

I say that this would be an inquisition and not a trial in the ordinary sense of the word, because it forces the accused to go into the witness box. It is a different means of forcing a statement from someone. There is the third degree method, but you do not usually do that in a court of law, but this uses the court of law to force a statement out of an accused, because if that person does not give that statement he could be hanged, but he knows that he will definitely go to gaol for five years. I think the Minister should consider the amendment of the hon. member for Germiston (District), because it has one great factor. It clearly defines what the offence is and makes allowance for all the extraordinary circumstances which the Minister mentioned because it leaves the question of punishment in the hands of the court.

Does the hon. member move the amendment standing in his name?

No, I will do that later.

If we wish to apply the provisions of the Bill and of the amendment to ridiculous situations, we can do so, as the hon. member has just done, by giving the examples of the damaging of a vehicle if it is damaged by any explosive which includes the firing of a cartridge. If I fire fine shot into the cushions of a motor car, then in terms of the definition of the hon. member for Germiston (District), that would also be sabotage. That is my first point. Let us please try to stop judging this legislation by seeking ridiculous and far-fetched examples of the incorrect and foolish application of these provisions. The second point I want to submit relates to the exaggeration contained in certain aspects of the criticism put forward. The first relates to the question of intention and the onus regarding intention. The hon. member for Standerton has already made the submission, and seeing that it has been so shamefully distorted in the public Press and this distortion has again been emphasized here, I just want to explain it again, namely that the basic provision of Clause 21 (i) is any person “who has committed an unlawful and wilful act”. It rests on the State to prove intention and thereafter, in the ordinary course of affairs, the counter-proof of the absence of intention is transferred to the accused. All Clause 21 (2) does is to define what types of absence of intention the accused can and may prove. This represents an easing of the accused’s position in so far as it charges him with a defined task. The second point I want to discuss is the Attorney-General’s discretion. Hon. members have made so many incorrect submissions that they must at least be refuted. Sub-section (3) deals with the decision of the Attorney-General as to whether the person concerned will or will not be charged with sabotage, and sub-section 4 (d) refers to the decision of the Attorney-General as to whether or not there will be a preparatory examination. From sub-section (3) it is clear in the clearest possible language, that it will be the personal decision of the Attorney-General without interference from the Minister of Justice. In accordance with the principle that the special overrides the general, and based purely on the wording of sub-section (3) no one who wants to claim to be a lawyer can submit any reasonable argument to the effect that the Minister can amend or have a final influence on the decision of the Attorney-General in terms of our penal code. As far as sub-section (4) (d) is concerned, it is quite clear that the general provision of the penal code relating to the Attorney-General’s decision is applicable and that theoretically speaking the Minister would be able to interfere. Having submitted these basic facts, I just want to conclude with this thought. We are living in dangerous times. South Africa has been living dangerously as a nation ever since our forefathers landed here, and this provision can be abused, but is this an unreasonable risk for this nation to take? I now want to make two appeals, namely that the Opposition should consider this matter calmly and let us test it with the co-operation of the Opposition.

I move the amendment standing in my name—

This has a reference to Clause 21 (4) (b) which is rather ambiguously worded at present to the effect that—

The object of this amendment is to ensure that, while the Minister has the discretion to indicate any place within the jurisdiction of a court where it may take place, the trial will be at a place to which the public has access.

Naturally.

I do not think it is quite so clear as the Minister suggests. Because we had experience not so long ago during the emergency when trials were held in public gaols, for instance, to which the public did not have access.

Those were held under the emergency regulations.

Yes. But the wording of this sub-section is capable of the interpretation that the Minister can give a direction that the trial is to be held for example in a gaol; a gaol is “any place”. But a gaol is not a place to which the public have access. I do not think that in view of the Minister’s interjection it is necessary for me to elaborate on the desirability of the public having access to any criminal trial. I take it, from the hon. the Minister’s interjection, that he agrees with the principle that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. If the hon. the Minister accepts that point of view then I can only draw attention to the wording of this particular sub-section which is that “the trial… may be held … at any place within the area of jurisdiction… Now, Sir, quite clearly that could be held in a private place to which the general public do not have access. In view of the hon. the Minister’s intimation across the floor that he is in favour of the point of view which I am advocating, I suggest to him that he considers favourably the amendment which I have moved and which puts beyond doubt the fact that the public will have access and be able to attend any such trial in terms of this particular Clause. One knows, Sir—and I am sure the Minister will agree—that while one knows that justice is in fact done in our courts, it is a tremendous safeguard and it gives heart to the populace, from the highest to the lowest, that they can go and be present at any criminal trial anywhere in the country …

That is the rule; why stress it?

I do not think the hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) has listended to the earlier part of my argument, because these words in sub-section (4) (b) give to the hon. the Minister or to the person concerned, power to cause a trial to take place where the public will not have access, for example, in a gaol. “Any place” includes a gaol and a gaol is not a place to which the public has access.

You ascribe the meanest motives to the hon. the Minister.

I ascribe no motives to the hon. the Minister; none at all, save to say that we are here dealing with a Clause capable of an interpretation adverse to what he intends. If that is so, he and the hon. member for Standerton can only gladly accept the amendment which I have moved.

Your amendment is an insult to the profession.

Order! Will the hon. member for Standerton please refrain from interjecting.

I come to the hon. member for Standerton. To come to this hon. member. Sir, is always a pleasure. In analysing the definition of “sabotage” put forward by the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) the hon. member for Standerton suggested that there must be a political motive.

Connotation.

There must be a political connotation.

Your trouble is that you do not understand Afrikaans.

I am surprised that the hon. member is so touchy to-night. By the time I have finished with him he will be more touchy than he is now. However, he adopted the attitude when analysing this particular amendment, that it was too wide; that the amendment defining “sabotage” was too wide in its terms. He criticized it on that ground. If this amendment is too wide, to use the hon. member’s criticism, how greatly must he criti-size the Clause of his own Minister which is a hundred times wider than the amendment moved by the hon. member for Germiston (District). The only way to approach this problem, in my submission, is to forget the term “sabotage”. Every hon. member in this House gives that term a different meaning, so let us forget that word; there is no magic in it. What we are aiming to put down here are certain acts, serious acts, done with a certain intent or by means of certain things. That is the essence of what we want to get at. Certain acts such as blowing up things or burning things or damaging things, done in a certain way such as for example, by explosives or done with a certain intent. That is what we all mean by “sabotage” if we analyse our own thoughts. We have to devise a Clause which gets at those things. Now, Sir, those things cover a wide area. It is necessarily a wide concept.

What a school master

Some of those hon. members can do with a school master. What a disappointment, Sir, that hon. member must have been to his school master. Any definition which has to encompass all those factors must necessarily be fairly wide. It is a question of degree. Sir. The hon. the Minister has thrown his definition so wide that it can create in a great many instances absurdities. And we have pointed that out. The great merit of the definition of the hon. member for Germiston (District) is that it uses legal concepts which are known to the Common Law—even the hon. member for Standerton will not deny that—such as “murder”, “assault”, “arson”, “malicious injury to property”, etc. Those are concepts known to the Common Law, whose limits are defined in existing law and he uses those concepts with a background where you commit those offences with an explosive or with certain intents. That is an ideal way of defining a new crime made up of those elements and our particular crime here is sabotage. The hon. member for Standerton has not been able to break down this particular amendment. The hon. the Minister has not been able to break down this particular amendment. He attempted to do so, Sir, by suggesting that if one commits sabotage under our definition by means of the commission of the crime of murder, there will not be an obligatory death sentence whereas in the case of a simple murder there will be an obligatory death sentence. [Time limit.]

Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I hope the hon. the Minister will accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Zululand (Mr. Cadman).

It is an insult to the Minister.

There is the hon. member for Standerton again talking about an insult to the hon. the Minister, and the hon. the Minister thinks he is right. But I want to tell the hon. the Minister that this Clause is an insult to the institution of justice in South Africa. I have never ever seen put into a Bill or in a law a provision such as this. It is quite unnecessary where the normal processes of justice are followed. The hon. the Minister must not be surprised if we are suspicious of it when he puts it in when it is quite unnecessary to do so. Why is it necessary for this Clause to be put in if the ordinary processes of justice are to be followed? If the normal processes of justice are to be followed then the court will sit in the usual place. I hope the hon. the Minister will have regard to this Clause and to what the hon. member for Zululand has said instead of having regard to the mumblings of the hon. member for Standerton.

I want to move the amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper—

Since that was placed on the Order Paper, the hon. the Minister has to some extent ameliorated the effect of paragraph (d). He has now changed the situation from what it was namely that anyone had to be tried summarily unless the Attorney-General decided otherwise, to a situation where anyone has to be tried in the normal way unless the Attorney-General decides otherwise. Nevertheless, I am still moving the deletion of this paragraph because I do not believe it is necessary for the Attorney-General, nor desirable, to decide whether a man should have a summary trial. The hon. the Minister should know this. He, unlike the hon. member for Standerton, has practised in our courts. I want the Minister to consider the situation with which he will be faced if he were defending someone charged with sabotage…

Does the hon. member for Germiston (District) now agree with you?

Of course, the hon. member for Germiston (District) agrees with me.

What did he say to the Argus?

The hon. the Minister has practised in our courts. I ask him to consider how he would feel if he were defending a man charged with the crime of sabotage, on trial for his life, and the first thing the Minister knows about the Crown case is when the first witness steps into the witness box. How on earth is the hon. the Minister going to prepare his client’s case? How on earth is he going to find the witnesses to rebut the Crown evidence if the first time that he ever sees the Crown case is when the first Crown witness steps into the witness box, as he does in the magistrate’s court?

There is a procedure whereby you can get further particulars.

I know there is a procedure whereby you can get further particulars, but there is no procedure in the magistrate’s court whereby you can get the statements of the Crown witnesses on oath. If the hon. the Minister would put into this clause some alternative procedure whereby depositions, as they have in England, are presented, that would considerably help the position. As my hon. Leader said in the second reading debate that when he was in practice—and it is so now—that when a witness is not called at a preparatory examination the defence counsel is always given a copy of a sworn statement by such a witness. Mr. Chairman, this is not a case of politics; it is a case of practical necessity. You cannot defend anybody properly if you do not know what the case is which you have to meet. It is undesirable, Sir, to ask the court for an adjournment so that you can investigate the evidence given by the Crown witnesses and call for evidence in rebuttal thereof, if necessary. The hon. the Minister knows that. The hon. member for Standerton does not know it because he does not practise in the courts. I ask him to have regard to this and to consider amending this clause in the manner in which I have suggested.

Paragraph (f) deals with Sections 342, 345 and 352 of the Code. It provides that no person on conviction is to be dealt with under these sections. Let us consider what they are, Sir. Section 342 provides for the manner in which juvenile offenders should be dealt with. Since time immemorial juveniles in South Africa have always been dealt with on a different basis from anyone else and for a very good reason, Sir. Because a juvenile has committed a crime which the Minister calls sabotage but which is really nothing more or less than one of the ordinary petty Common Law offences, and he is found guilty, he is not to be treated in the normal way. Section 342 of the Criminal Code provides that juveniles in the discretion of the court can be sent to proper institutions, like a reformatory. Now the courts are not allowed to send them to a reformatory; it has got to send a 15/16 year old to gaol, where he will mix with the ordinary hardened criminals. And that is an undesirable thing. Surely the object of a sentence is to reform.

You have never read the Prisons Act. That makes provision for the transfer of a juvenile to another place.

Yes, Sir. This section also makes provision for the placing of such a person in the custody of a suitable person; it provides that he can be handed over to an approved agency as defined in the Children’s Act or sent to a certified hostel or reformatory. Does the hon. the Minister now want to leave the matter to the discretion of a prison official? I think the statement by the hon. the Minister is scandalous. He now wants the prison official to decide what sentence should be imposed.

What is the next section? Section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Act deals with the whipping of male children. The whipping which is normally dealt out to male children is different from that dealt out to adults. The court usually specifies where the juvenile is of tender years that the whipping should be with a light cane. I wonder how many hon. gentlemen sitting on that side of the House have seen the cane which is used in the whipping of adults; they are strapped to the tripod and whipped with this large cane. I wonder how many of them have ever seen it, those who are going to vote in favour of this clause? I hope the Minister will tell them what that cane looks like if they do not know it. Are those juveniles of tender years who may have been pushed into doing something going to be whipped with that cane, Sir? I think of the hon. Minister of Defence who made that blood and guts, “skiet en donder” speech the other day when he said that that was the pattern, that that was going to happen. I think, Sir, it is time that we had regard to these children of tender years. I hope the Minister will have some regard for the people with whom he is dealing; that he will have some regard to the fact that the people who are going to be convicted are going to be people and that some will be small children.

The last section is 352. We are now breaking away completely from that. The court will no longer be able to caution an accused, to reprimand him or to suspend any part of his sentence. In the case of Strachan the Judge gave him six years.

He should have been hanged.

I quite agree. The Judge suspended half of that sentence for three years. I think that one of the most corrective things that one can have is a suspended sentence. [Time limit.]

Sir, I may not be a lawyer but I cannot follow the lawyers on that side of the House. I have listened to the tirade against the savage clause dealing with the juveniles by the hon. member for Durban (North) (Mr. M. L. Mitchell). I have listened to the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell) who referred to the same feature. But you know, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) gave an interview to the Press. If this were such a terrible measure, if it were a measure which everybody should be ashamed of, I wonder why the hon. member who is a front-bencher and who was chairman of that Legal Committee which studied this legislation, said this: Mr. Tucker thought too that the proposal to provide for a death penalty for juveniles convicted of sabotage might be acceptable provided it was left to the discretion of the courts. [Interjections.] Don’t run away from it. He said that the death sentence might be acceptable if it were left to the discretion of the courts. I am not a lawyer; I listened to the hon. member about the preparatory examination. He and other members on that side of the House think that this is a very bad feature of this clause. They maintain that an essential principle of the judicial rights of a person is being taken away from him. The hon. Leader of the Opposition is an esteemed lawyer and advocate and I prefer him to the hon. member for Durban (North) (Mr. M. L. Mitchell); the former leader of the Opposition, Mr. Strauss, is also an esteemed advocate. Mr. Pil-kington-Jordan is also a lawyer of repute in South Africa. Now these three gentlemen served on the Select Committee and the report of that Select Committee came from them. Listen to what they said about the preparatory examination. They said this in their report—

The whole principle of preparatory examinations has been rejected. That was in 1950.

Let me now come to the hon. member for Germiston (District). What did he say? He said—

Who is right, Mr. Chairman? He continued to say this—

[Interjections.] That has nothing to do with it. He said—

The hon. members behind him say it is a terrible thing. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition was prepared to accept that preparatory examinations should be done away with in the case of high treason. Who is right, Sir? If the lawyers on that side differ amongst themselves what hope have I as a layman? Then they raised the matter of the onus. The hon. member for Germiston (District) also spoke about the onus clause. But what did the hon. the Leader of the Opposition say in 1950? He is an advocate and a man who has had a great deal of experience, and this was what he proposed in legislation. He said—

If it was good enough in 1950 for the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that a communist had to prove his innocence why, when it comes to a saboteur, is it such a crime if the Minister says that the State must first prove the case against him—he is not deemed guilty—and secondly, he still has right to prove that such and such were not his intentions. That is the situation. The impression is being created that this is something terrible by the Press in this country.

Now hon. members are trying to find a definition for sabotage! The hon. member over there said they were absolutely against sabotage; even against giving it the death penalty; they were absolutely against it. But originally they said they were not prepared to accept this Bill because it created a new crime. [Interjections.] Yes, they said that it created a new crime.

Order! The hon. the Minister cannot make a second reading speech now.

Sir, I know it is very difficult for hon. members to stomach this because they have made such play about this clause on sabotage. That hon. member said originally that these were matters which could be argued in the Committee stage and now they get up and contradict each other. Who is really in the right? Will the hon. member for Germiston (District) deny that this was a true report which he made to the Argus or will he accept it.

In boxing they say that a heavy weight must not fight a light weight, so I will not try to fight the hon. Minister for Information who has just sat down. I think it is a genuine desire of hon. members of this House to try to find a suitable definition for the newly created crime of sabotage.

That argument has been used over and over again.

That was only by way of introduction, Sir. I want to ask the hon. the Minister to consider very seriously the acceptance of either one or other of the amendments moved by the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) and the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker). Section 21 says “anybody who destroys, renders useless, etc. the health or safety of the public”. I can understand that; “the maintenance of law and order”, I can understand that. But when it comes to the next “any water supply” I want to ask the Minister whether he has in mind the public service of water supply, whether he has in mind any dam or water supply which serves the public. I think the words “essential service” used by the hon. member for Germiston (District) should be considered by the Minister.

It is not defined.

I should like to remind the hon. the Minister that “essential” service is defined in the Industrial Act.

For the purposes of that Act, yes.

What I am trying to convey to the hon. the Minister is that “any water supply” is capable of being interpreted to mean the tan in the backyard of a neighbour. If the Minister can tell me that that is not what he has in mind but that he has in mind a water supply which serves the general public which will endanger not only an individual but the whole public if it is interfered with, then I submit that this definition “any water supply” is far too wide. I think the amendment of the hon. member for Houghton does deal with that and so does the amendment of the hon. member for Germiston (District). The point I want to make is that the Minister cannot expect such a loose definition as we have in the Bill at the moment to be acceptable to anyone. I think on reflection the Minister will have to accept some other form of definition. I submit that the Minister should withhold this Clause and consider either the amendment of the hon. member for Houghton or that of the hon. member for Germiston (District) so as to find proper wording to give effect to the intention of sabotage. Because under any law these contraventions as set out would be criminal acts.

Order! That point has been made over and over again.

That is why I am appealing to the hon. the Minister to bring it back within the ambit of the serious offences that the hon. the Minister wishes to create by this Act. I hope therefore that he will consider these reasonable amendments which have been moved.

I don’t propose following the hon. the Minister of Information, save to say that his grasp of the legal concept of “onus” is as profound as the grasp of the hon. member for Lichtenburg of Chinese art. But coming back to the hon. the Minister’s argument, he attempted to attack the definition of “sabotage” put up by the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker) in that he suggested that under this definition if there were a conviction of sabotage, the Judge would not impose the death sentence necessarily, whereas in an ordinary case of murder, there would be a compulsory death sentence, and he attempted to argue that accordingly this was a less vigorous application of the criminal law of the country. But quite clearly, Sir, an element in the offence in terms of our definition is the commission of a murder, and if the Attorney-General, or the Minister feels that that is a case where the compulsory death sentence is requisite to the crime, then instead of indicting for sabotage, he indicts for murder. It is as simple as that, and the Judge would be obliged to impose the death sentence in that regard. So that attempt to belittle this definition is to no avail.

Now the hon. the Minister argued a second point which was the analogy of the burning of cane fields in Natal, arson in those circumstances, and the hon. the Minister’s argument was: How serious must the fire be, how many farms must be burned before the offence leaves the realm of arson and enters into the realm of sabotage? That was the Minister’s case. Sir, where the courts have to deal with the concept of degree, such as that, it is no new problem at all. The concept, as the hon. the Minister will know, of evaluating the acts of a reasonable man, which is as old as the hills, is equally as difficult as the concept here, but it is accomplished in the courts every day. But in any case, if it is a question of the burning of a series of cane fields or farms whether that individual is indicted for arson, or whether he is indicted for malicious injury to property, or whether he is indicted for sabotage, if the judicial officer concerned, is given a discretion as to sentence, whatever count he is found guilty of, the sentence by and large would be the same, and the object of administering a suitable punishment to that man will have been achieved. So the definition of “sabotage” put forward by the hon. member for Germiston (District) stands so far without being successfully attacked.

Now there is the question of the “onus The hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze) tried to argue that the provisions in sub-section (2) of this clause …

Order! The question of the onus has been argued over and over again. The hon. member must now bring new arguments.

On a point of order, the hon. member has moved the amendment only a short while ago and he is only discussing it now.

The hon. member has moved his amendment, but the question of the “onus” has been discussed over and over again. That is my ruling, and the hon. member must abide by that.

With due respect, Mr. Chairman, this is the second time that the hon. member is speaking …

Order! The same point has been made by several speakers already. The hon. member must abide by my ruling.

May I reply to two points made by the hon. the Minister of the Interior and the hon. member for Standerton?

The hon. the Minister of the Interior is not even here.

Order! I have given my ruling.

I may not reply to the points made? I am debarred from replying to the arguments on the other side in regard to the “onus”, which is perhaps unfortunate, seeing that these points still remain unaswered.

The hon. member must now abide by my ruling.

Very well, Sir, I accept that ruling and I move onto the questions of the words “objectively regarded” as they appear in sub-section (2) of Clause 21. Now this is an aspect of the case which was touched on by the General Council of the Bar, and one gathers from the hon. the Minister that opinion was divided as to the desirability of these words. This much at least seems clear. Sir, that those words must be used in contradistinction to “subjectively regarded”, which is the ordinary test. I think the hon. the Minister will concede that. If that is so, then these words can only have one meaning, regardless of the undesirability for any other reason, and that meaning is that the actual intent of the accused person in committing the act for which he is being tried is irrelevant. His true intention in perpetrating that act is irrelevant. The act must be looked at objectively from the point of view of a bystander, observing what is taking placing without knowing the true intention of the person concerned. I think that is a fair summary, and that being so, it means that not only has an accused person got to disprove the eight or ten matters set out in Clause 2, which can hardly be regarded as an advantage to him, as was suggested by the hon. member for Standerton, but he has to show that as regarded by a bystander, that bystander would come to the conclusion that he did not intend any of those results.

And that they were not calculated beforehand.

He may genuinely himself have not intended any of these results, and the court may say to the man: I believe that you did not intend any of those results, but because of the words “objectively regarded” I am obliged to find you guilty, because any man watching what you were doing, and not knowing your true intent, would come to the conclusion, objectively regarded, that you intended one or other of the results set out in sub-section (2). It is important to note that one has to disprove all those items collectively and not one or the other. To say the least of it this is a most novel innovation, even where one accepts that putting an onus on an accused is not something entirely new. This is a most novel innovation, and I believe I have given a fair interpretation of those words. On those facts and on that interpretation this is an extraordinarily stringent provision and makes it extraordinarily difficult for the person accused of this offence in these circumstances, but in fact not guilty of that intent, to disprove his guilt.

Can you give one example where that can happen?

One thinks of hundreds of examples that happen every day.

Mention one of those hundreds of cases.

One thinks of numerous cases. Take an ordinary case of an assault injuring a man. A bystander might think that the assault was deliberately perpetrated, because it looked as if it was deliberately done. But the individual when able to tell his story could show that he had no intent to do so and that it was not done deliberately.

Then he would not be guilty at all.

If the Judge were to believe that individual, he would not be guilty of an assault. [Time limit.]

I want to raise a different question of jurisdiction under this clause. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether Clause 21 is going to be applied in South West Africa as well.

No.

All the other provisions, all the other clauses, of the Bill, will be applied to South West Africa, and the exception is going to be Clause 21. I think the House is entitled to know from the hon. the Minister as to why that is going to be the case. I think we should know as to why 20 clauses apply to South West Africa and only one not.

Order! That is an extension of the principle of the Bill. The hon. member must confine himself to the clause.

I want to speak in support of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Germiston (District) (Mr. Tucker). I am talking not as a lawyer, but just as an ordinary citizen. I have read Clause 21 and have listened to this debate very closely. When I was a little boy I shot a “mossie” on a wire and an insulator was broken, I would have been subject to heavy penalties and also subject to the decision of one man, an attorney-general, as to whether I should go to gaol for five years or to be hanged, if this Bill had been law then. I am worried about this because it cuts across all ideas I have of justice and I got more worried this afternoon when the hon. member for Wynberg (Mr. Russell) said to the Minister: Following this telephone tapping at my house, I, an entirely innocent party, might have been slapped inside for five years minimum if I were not influential. I saw and heard the Minister say “What influence have you got?”. In other words, my hon. colleage, the member for Wynberg was told by the Minister that notwithstanding the fact that he was a Member of Parliament, a front-bencher

Order! The tapping of wires has nothing to do with this clause.

Oh yes, I am talking about the sentence that can be applied.

I must ask the hon. member to bring some new argument.

Yes, Mr. Chairman. I represent the constituency of Benoni and we in Benoni are vitally concerned with this question of sabotage, because of history. I must say at once that if somebody had said to me, at first glance “Are you going to support the anti-Sabotage Bill? …”

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the details of the clause.

Yes, Sir, this clause has to do with any water supply, the supply or distribution of light, power, fuel, foodstuffs or water, or of sanitory, medical or fire extinguishing services, and any postal, telephone or telegraph services. Now we in Benoni, 20 odd years ago had a post office blown up. At one stage, I must say, I felt …

Ask Moolman.

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, an horn, member there on the backbench said “Yes, by Jan Moolman”. The hon. member for Benoni was referring to the blowing up of a post office and an hon. member said “Yes, by Jan Moolman”. Mr. Chairman, I want you to ask the hon. member to withdraw and apologize. [Interjections.]

Order! Will the hon. member please put his point of order again?

There was a reference by the hon. member for Benoni to the blowing up of a post office and an hon. member opposite said quite distinctly, and I heard him “Ja, Jan Moolman”.

Has any hon. member accused the hon. member for East London (City) (Mr. Moolman) of having blown up a post office?

The hon. member seemed to point in my direction. I want to state that I have never mentioned Jan Moolman.

On a point of order, I distinctly heard …

On a point of order, the accusation against the hon. member there is not correct. I heard what was said.

On a point or order. Is the hon. member for Benoni entitled to refer to a member on this side of the House as “daardie vuilgoed”?

I withdraw that.

The hon. member must also apologize.

I am very sorry.

On a point of order, the hon. member for Transkeian Territories (Mr. Hughes) said that the hon. member over here told a lie.

I did not say that. I said that I heard those words, and the hon. member for Pretoria (District) (Mr. Schoonbee) said just now that he heard those words.

Order! The hon. member must name a specific member.

May I continue now? This is a very serious matter. I received quite a number of wires about this matter, and my constituency, Benoni, went through this trouble, years ago.

On a point of order, may an hon. member on the other side say that I have not got the guts to stand up and admit that I said that?

Order! Hon. members must not now get up one after the other raising points of order.

Mr. Chairman, most of these wires I have received have more than one signature, and this is from a constituency which has history behind it. I don’t know about other hon. members …

The hon. member must confine himself to the clause, not to Benoni.

I am trying to bring this in in support of my argument.

On a point of order, the hon. member is trying to show this Bill is going to affect his constituency.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a joke. I think the whole House is upset by the manner in which the gentlemen in that corner behave. I assure you, Mr. Chairman, I am trying to keep my argument within the limits of Clause 21. I am trying to tell this House, through you, Mr. Chairman, what happened under a similar set of circumstances, or not so similar, 20 years ago. Certain gentlemen perhaps have an intimate knowledge of what happened 20 years ago, and are trying to prevent me from speaking.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

Yes, Sir. I will come back to these wires. I have been asked by many of my constituents to oppose this Bill, and I am trying to do so in a reasonable way, but may I say, Sir, that this Minister is crazy. He told my honourable colleague …

Did the hon. member accuse the hon. the Minister of being crazy?

I withdraw that.

The hon. member should apologize.

I apologize. Let me say in regard to Clause 21 that it gives this Minister the right to commit anybody over the age of 14 to gaol without the right of appeal to the courts, and then the Minister tells my honourable colleague that he would not have in fluence to keep himself out of gaol.

The hon. Minister of Information got up here and spoke very glibly about saboteurs. This clause was to deal with saboteurs. I had hoped that the hon. the Minister would have answered my questions, because I am very interested to know what a saboteur is and I should very much like to know how the hon. the Minister is going to explain to the outside world what a saboteur is. His colleague, the hon. the Minister of Justice, has not attempted to do so. The hon. gentleman dealt with the United Party Bill that was put forward in the Select Committee in 1950, and I think what the hon. gentleman said should be answered. The hon. gentleman read from part of that Bill, but what he forgot was to mentioned that the crime was “high treason”, a crime known to the law, extremely well-defined, in English law as well, and “Communism” which was to be the subject of that offence was also extremely well-defined in that same Act. So that the situation that would arise would be that the accused would be charged upon an indictment and would be entitled to have the particulars.

All he would have to do was to go into the witness-box and give his evidence and tell the court that he did not intend to do that. If he could do that, he would be acquitted. Nothing unfair about that. The hon. the Minister of course did not appreciate that.

But the hon. gentleman then went further. He accused the hon. member for Germiston (District) of saying that he was not in favour of preparatory examinations. That is not what he said. He said that in certain circumstances, and he mentioned as an instance the treason trial, it might be undesirable to have a preparatory examination, and I might say that I quite agree with the hon. member for Germiston (District). What was the situation during the treason trial? That for almost two years there was a preparatory examination! The difference between that Act and this Bill is what was pointed out by my honourable friend, the member for Zululand, Mr. Cadman: The question of what is intention is to be put before the court. Here it is “objectively regarded”. The hon. the Minister wanted an example. I will give him one. Referring to the case of Regina v. Mdhletshe reported in 1957 (3) (page 291 of the S.A. Law Reports), the court there had to consider this question of statutory possession of goods, the contravention of Section 37 (1) of Act 62 of 1955 where the test was whether the accused, objectively regarded, had reasonable grounds for believing that the goods that he had taken were stolen, and the Judge-President said—

and he dealt with all the evidence to show that the accused was quite honest in buying the jerseys because he honestly believed that they were not stolen; he paid the market price for them. He was a Native and the Judge said—

“Reasonable grounds”, not whether he in fact believed it. That man was sentenced to compulsory flogging. That is exactly the situation that will arise under this Bill. I think that is very clear from the example I have given. I will give you another example. If anyone demonstrated the weakness of his case and the absurdity of the definition, then it was the Minister himself. He demonstrated this for all to see on the Order Paper, because one of his amendments is to exclude from this section the lawful actions of members of a trade union. This is what he proposes—

I think that demonstrates quite clearly that the hon. the Minister acknowledges that ordinary lawful actions can fall within the ambit of this clause. But because it is the trade union movement, the hon. the Minister does something about it, and I wish the hon. the Minister would show the same concern for every individual who falls within the ambit of this clause.

I do not propose to answer the hon. the Minister of Information. He raised the same point and read the same cuttings at the second reading debate, and I answered him fully. I wish to come to the merits of this question once again and I wish to say at once that in regard to the amendments put up by this side of the House, we are in complete agreement. But I wish to make it perfectly clear that the case that I put earlier, the case that was put in the first place by my honourable Leader as to the sabotage clause of the hon. the Minister, this side of the House regards that clause as totally unacceptable and it remains completely unshaken in that viewpoint. If the hon. the Minister of Information will look at one remark in the few words which were shortly reported he will find that I referred to sabotage “properly defined”, and I say at once that to define sabotage in the way the hon. the Minister has, he admits quite frankly to this Committee that within the ambit of his definition of sabotage are included many minor matters. The hon. Minister says these are so minor that no Attorney-General in his proper senses would prosecute for sabotage in the circumstances. The hon. Minister thereby admits that if an Attorney-General did prosecute on a minor matter for sobotage and he could prove the case, the court would have no alternative but would have to find the accused guilty as charged. And the Minister as the Minister of Justice should be the last man to suggest to this House, that side and this side, that they should accept a definition as loosely worded as that.

The question of the “onus” on the Minister too remains completely undischarged. The hon. the Minister’s clause, while it is true that the State has to prove certain facts, then shifts the onus and accused if he wants to be found not guilty as charged, he has to establish a host of matters as set out in sub-section (2) of the Minister(s definition. Against that the definition of sabotage as put forward by this side of the House has some history. It goes back to 1942, and I think hon. members will agree that once the War Measure No. 13 of 1942 was brought into effect on 3 February 1942, it immediately had the effect of stopping the very considerable sabotage that was taking place in this country at the time. I am sure the hon. the Minister will admit that. As someone put it, it was “’n afskrikmiddel It did actually stop sabotage very sharply to the good of South Africa and to the good of persons who may possibly have committed sabotage thereafter. We on this side of the House took this as a suitable definition of sabotage because it was one that was tried and which had not been found wanting. It is true that we have included in the definition, as was the case in the War Measure of 1942, only important and very serious crimes. Minor crimes were left to be dealt with by the ordinary courts, but very serious crimes were included and every one of the crimes fell within the definition as contained in the War Measure and my amendment also contains serious crimes and no person would be found guilty on such a definition except in respect of what was in fact very serious sabotage against the State. What is important too is that the discretion in regard to sentences is in the hands of the courts. We provide of course in our amendment that anyone who is guilty of sabotage shall be liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason. We thereby recognize the seriousness of these matters and where we are prepared to stand by the accepted definition, we believe that it would describe sabotage adequately. I don’t believe that the hon. the Minister’s definition is a satisfactory one and we don’t believe that it is one which this House should accept. We remain completely unconvinced. The hon. the Minister and the members on his side who supported him, like the hon. member for Standerton, for instance, have confirmed us in our view that the definition contained in this Bill is utterly unsatisfactory and should be replaced. I hope that even at this late stage the hon. the Minister will still agree to reconsider the matter in the light of the discussions which have taken place. He will probably be able then to find a much better definition—that is if he does not want to accept the definition which has been proposed from this side of the House.

We must realize that a new crime is being created here; it is a serious crime and it is a capital crime; it is a crime for which, according to the provisions of this Bill, there will be a minimum sentence of five years. We do not believe that that is the right way in which to deal with this matter. We believe that we, on this side, have completely disposed of the claim which has been made by member after member on the other side to the effect that this side of the House is not opposed to sabotage. On the contrary, we have shown that we are prepared to see sabotage dealt with the utmost rigour of the law, but it must then be on the basis of a definition which adequately describes a true crime of sabotage and not a loose definition and so tremendously wide as is the definition proposed by the hon. the Minister. He might catch within the net of sabotage persons who are guilty of minor crimes. That has been admitted by the hon. the Minister himself.

You are trying to wriggle out of it.

It is not necessary for us to do that; it is only necessary to stick to the things you believe and you will be all right. The hon. member can look after his own conscience; mine is clear. So, Mr. Chairman, in so far as this side of the House is concerned, we believe that the Minister is right in seeking to deal with sabotage but we disagree entirely with the method he is adopting for that purpose and we shall, obviously, oppose him to the full on his definition.

As regards the amendment of the hon. member for Zulu-land (Mr. Cadman), I agree whole-heartedly with the comment passed by the hon. member for Standerton by way of an interjection. I think that the insinuation which the hon. member made in his amendment is not worthy of him, nor is it worthy of our system of justice. His insinuation is namely that we shall try people who have been accused of sabotage in places to which the public will have no access and we shall therefore wangle matters and do as we please. That is his allegation in essence. But perhaps I must not hold it against the hon. member because he may not have been aware of the fact, though all lawyers know that in the Free State, there is a well-known decision, which lays down inter alia that one cannot take a case from a circuit court to Bloemfontein itself. This clause to which the hon. member has referred will inter alia make this possible. It probably never struck him that we had a similar problem with the old Synagogue in Pretoria where the treason trial was held. Consequently we have to provide for such cases and that is what we are doing here. The code further provides that all trials should be open to the public and in this clause nothing repeals the code concerned. I do, however, not hold it against the hon. member that he did not know this.

Another aspect to which I wish to refer is the one raised by the hon. member for Benoni (Mr. Ross). Coming from this hon. member I do not think any person in South Africa can take it up seriously. Other people who read Hansard do, however, not know the hon. member. Here I wish to appeal to the hon. member for Germiston (District), and I do so not for the sake of my party, but for the sake of South Africa. I ask the hon. member for Germiston (District) to repudiate unequivocally the submission which the hon. member for Benoni made and which I shall mention presently. The hon. member objected strongly to this clause and said that it gave the Minister the right—

These are the exact words used by the hon. member. And I now ask the hon. member for Germiston (District), and I ask him as a lawyer and a South African, to repudiate unequivocally this statement by the hon. member for Benoni. I ask him to repudiate it so that we can have it on record for foreign consumption. Does the hon. member for Germiston (District) agree with me that these were the words used by the hon. member for Benoni?

I shall check up on it.

Well, I wrote the words which he used down exactly as he said them. The hon. member for Germiston (District) once again referred to the fact that I admitted at the start of the debate on this Bill that my definition of “sabotage” was very wide. This is so; as a matter of fact I said so again to-night. I also indicated the safety measures which we have inserted in the Bill. Hon. members can accept it as such or reject it—it does not matter to me. To draw up a Bill is not within every person’s capabilities: it is not within mine nor within the capabilities of the hon. member for Germiston (District). People are appointed and trained to do so and whether we always agree with them or whether we do not, does not make any difference. But now hon. members opposite, notwithstanding the concessions which I have made, have tried to ridicule this definition and in the process to ridicule sabotage. They have also tried to ridicule the attitude of this side of the House in this respect. But let us now consider the definition proposed by the hon. member for Germiston (District). Allow me to refer to just one ridiculous point in his definition—I regret doing so because I have a great deal of respect for the hon. member for Germiston (District). The point, however, that I wish to make in doing so is to show that it is not within every man’s capabilities to draw up a Bill. Let us now see how the definition which he proposed, reads. The opening words are—

I checked up again during the lunch hour and found that anything which can explode, i.e. from a cracker to a bullet, is included under “an explosive”. Does the hon. member agree that this is so?

Yes.

The hon. member therefore concedes that it includes a cracker as well. He goes further and under (d) says—

Well, a doll’s house is also a “property” which could be injured; in other words, if a person injures a child’s doll’s house with a cracker, such a person should, according to the hon. member’s definition, be tried by a supreme court. A magistrate cannot try such a person because he has committed sabotage.

With what intention?

The only intention is to injure. That is all. I am pleased that the hon. member for Yeoville is also amazed that such an amendment can be submitted to this House! And not only must such a person be tried by a Judge of the Supreme Court but he also has to go through the whole process of a preparatory examination. Thereafter the Attorney-General cannot release the person because, according to the hon. member’s proposal, the person must first be tried by a Judge of the Supreme Court—and that only because he injured a doll’s house with a cracker!

Can hon. members now see to what absurdities the hon. member’s definition lends itself? The difference between the hon. member and myself is that I have admitted from the outset that my definition is worded widely; as a matter of fact I made it wide on purpose because I did not want to leave any loopholes. The hon. member is however, not prepared to say the same about his definition and I have even proved to the House to what absurdities his definition lends itself. If I can do this with his definition, what will the communists not do with it?

I regret that I am not able to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Durban (North). The hon. member for Houghton will not be surprised to learn that I cannot accept her definition either. Her aim is to strip this measure until nothing is left. When I compare the definition of the hon. member for Germiston (District) with mine, then I prefer my own.

Obviously, Sir, the term “explosive” in this definition must be sensibly interpreted. As it is used here, it clearly does not include a cracker, especially not in the sense seen by the Minister. We should leave it to the Attorney-General to deal with the matter in the ordinary course of the law. He is a sensible person. Furthermore, I am quite sure that no court would define the terms “explosive”, as used in this definition to include a “cracker”, and what is more, I think the Minister, being a lawyer, will accept that. There is the other point, namely that we have not allowed for a minimum sentence. It is true that a person found guilty under this definition, will be guilty of treason. That, however, is in accordance with a precedent which has been found to work satisfactorily in our country. Accordingly, I still prefer my definition to the one proposed by the hon. the Minister because mine, I think, is one which covers true sabotage only more in accord with justice.

I should now like to come to the reference made by the Minister to the hon. member for Benoni. If I had heard the hon. member using the words which the hon. the Minister has attributed to him, I would have been the first to say that such a statement in regard to this Bill is utterly unjustified. The hon. member for Benoni, whom I know to be a gentleman, has assured me … [Laughter.] … I resent the laughter on that side of the House, Sir. The hon. member for Benoni has a magnificent record in the affairs of this country and I, therefore, resent that sort of light-hearted laughter. In any event, the hon. member for Benoni assured me that these words which the hon. the Minister attributed to him, were not in his notes and that he had no intention of saying anything of the sort. He said that what he intended to say was that it was in the hands of the Attorney-General to decide whether a child of 14 years of age would have to be brought before the courts. Hansard, however, will show what the hon. member has said. I know him as an honourable gentleman and not for one moment do I believe that he would intentionally give utterance to the words which the Minister attributed to him. As a matter of fact, I would have done something about it myself had I understood him to say that. I hope the Minister will accept my assurance in this respect.

This clause, Sir, has now been very fully debated. It is quite clear that we are unable to shift the Minister from his definition. Consequently, in so far as we on this side of the House are concerned, being utterly opposed to it I can only express the hope that injustice will not be done in terms of that definition—that can so easily happen where there is so loosely worded a definition as the one contained in this Bill.

I move—

I regret that I am unable to accept the amendment as it is similar in substance to an amendment previously negatived by the Committee.

I move the amendment standing in my name—

I want to ask the hon. the Minister to allow this clause to stand over until later. I want to put it to him that whilst I will not at this stage move the amendment standing in my name, I want to draw his attention to what I regard as unnecessary wording in this clause. First of all, there is the exclusion of horn and hoof. I want to point out that over a period of many years, in regard to the various diseases that have come down the East Coast, the horn brand has been most useful to the Veterinary Department, in localizing stock and in the detection of the disease. It was most useful to those areas for the purpose of controlling the movement of stock. Most of that stock was branded with a broad arrow on the horn, but where the stock was hornless the brand was put on a particular hoof which was specified in the regulations. Then I want to deal with sub-sec. (1) (c), and that is the question of ear marks. The Minister excludes ear marks from the brands, but in paragraph (vi) he defines ear marks and says an ear mark means any mark made by cutting, cropping, punching or slitting the ear. Now all the Brands Acts that we have had in this country right from the 1880’s Law 18 of Natal and Law 13 of 1889 in Natal and all the Cape Acts are all being repealed, but in those particular laws and Acts you had that one protection against the cropping of ears. With the repeal of all these laws, the Minister is removing one of the safeguards that has been most important and useful to all farmers in South Africa, and that is that no more than a certain portion of the ear can be cropped.

“Stompoor.”

Yes. It is illegal to do it, but it is to be found in those laws and every farmer to-day has that protection. But if this goes through as it is, anybody can crop the ears, and whilst I will admit that most people do not know what is going on, where you have reserves adjacent to those progressive areas in the Border area, that stock is stolen and taken through to the various reserves and the ear marks are mutilated by cutting off certain protions of the ear. The cropping of the ear is the one protection those people have. Under this definition the Minister actually makes it possible now …

No.

Oh yes, I am prepared to argue the merits of that. There is the definition, that “ear mark” means any mark made by cutting, cropping, punching or slitting the ear. I refer to the cropping. I have gone to the trouble of consulting all the dictionaries I could find, and that is the true definition of the word, the removal of the ear. I leave it at that, because I am asking the Minister to leave this clause over. I want to put it to the Minister that the word “cancel” has no right to exist in the definition at all, because anybody who has cancelled a brand in this country in the past has been a criminal, and here it says, in regard to “cancel”, “in relation to a brand on any livestock means cancelled in the prescribed manner Now, why I am asking the Minister to leave this clause over is that in Clause 20 he can deal with all three of these items in one short clause, if he embodies in it a short clause under the penalties. Therefore, let us leave this clause over and let us deal with the rest of the clauses first, and let me move that amendment, because I can assure the hon. the Minister that it meets all the cases that are essential, particularly in our part of the country, and when I say our part of the country it is because those crimes do not take place in the rest of South Africa.

I do not agree with the hon. member for King William’s Town (Mr. Warren) that by laying down a certain definition here we shall necessarily validate certain actions, e.g. the cutting off of ears. We are dealing with a Brands Bill and all that will count as identification will be a registered brand and not a tattooed ear or something of this nature nor the ears of sheep or cattle which are cut off. It has nothing to do with this Bill. If the hon. member wants protection for his livestock, even on the borders of the Bantu areas, he must register a brand or a tattoo in a place where it can be registered for small stock. Then it will be the identification mark which will be valid under this Bill. But no matter how many marks his sheep have and even if they do not cut on their ears he will only be able to use it for his personal purposes after this Bill has been passed. We are purposely leaving all marks on the ears whether they are made by means of a clipper, or whether they are in the form of small holes or tattoos, out of this Bill, in order to allow farmers to use them freely for their own personal purposes without infringing provisions of this Bill.

Why do you define ear marks in a Brands Bill and then add the possibility of cutting off the whole ear, because that is part of the definition?

The reason why we define ear marks is to avoid confusion amongst the farmers when we talk about brands because they can decide to put a brand on the ear as well. Now we are defining the term widely so that any mark made on the ear will not fall for the purposes of this Bill, under its provisions.

At 10.25 p.m. the Chairman stated that, in accordance with Standing Order No. 26 (11, he would report progress and ask leave to sit again.