Mr. Speaker, when this debate was last adjourned. I was about to discuss the provisions of clause 14 relating to particulars which must be contained in advertisements. This is a provision which causes us some concern as it entitles the hon. the Minister to stipulate not only what may be contained in an advertisement but also what may not be contained in an advertisement. There is little doubt that this is a form of censorship. I think that we are already concerned about the fact that we have quite enough censorship in our country at the moment. Even the nature of pictures in an advertisement may be prescribed and directions may be given in regard not only to what may not be in an advertisement but what should be in an advertisement. Such directions could, if incorrectly used, turn our advertisements into a new type of Government Gazette which would certainly not make very attractive reading. We believe that once the law makes it an offence to publish falsities and gives the type of price protection provided for in clause 13, the form of an advertisement may be left to normal trade practices and the ordinary censorhip laws of the land. These provisions also create other difficulties. The provisions of subsection (3) of clause 14 provide that once an advertisement has been published it applies to all goods sold after the date of publication or display of such advertisements. This means that subject to the prosecution limitation of two years contained in clause 20, the advertisement will apply indefinitely. Supplies may become exhausted, a new supply may be of a different quality or prices may change, and a provision of this kind will create very serious problems for the distributors’ trade.

If I may, I should like now to turn my attention to clause 15. That there are undesirable trade practices which put the consumer at a disadvantage, goes without saying. A number of practices are, however, a matter of opinion. It depends upon the opinion of the people who apply their minds to it as to whether a particular practice is undesirable or not. It goes without doubt, of course, that in regard to other practices there will be little argument as to whether they are or are not undesirable. However, the hon. the Minister has listed some of these so-called undesirable practices and other hon. members have listed others. I should, however, like to deal with those which the hon. the Minister has given. For example, he referred to multilevel selling. He said that this had caused a degree of hardship. However, it must be pointed out that the degree of hardship in this case has been caused largely by the gullibility of individuals and, strangely enough, mostly in the upper income groups. These are people who, in fact, should know better when it comes to entering into contracts of this nature. The hon. the Minister also referred to the question of the sending of goods which had not been ordered. The law in this case is clear. There is no obligation on anybody to accept, pay for or even return goods that he has not ordered. Once the public becomes aware of this fact and goods are not returned, the practice will soon end. I can well imagine people sending out thousands of parcels not on a COD basis but on a basis that it is anticipated that people will accept. If people respond in no way whatsoever, this will put an end to that practice. It was interesting to learn from the recent Post Office debate that the COD business was being run at a loss by the Post Office. It would seem, therefore, that if this type of business is done on a COD basis, it is actually subsidizing what is an undesirable practice, a matter which I find difficult to understand. The hon. the Minister also referred to the question of offering discounts if other customers are introduced. This by itself is not a bad practice. It is true that it cannot go on for ever, if one has the cycles that are designed to do just that, but an ordinary discount or commission for introducing a customer in the ordinary course of events, even if it is not a person’s business, is in fact not in itself an undesirable practice. There was also reference to the door-to-door salesman, the person who was supposed to be obnoxious and unpleasant. I want to say that generally speaking I have no fault to find with the ordinary door-to-door salesman. The “smous” in our South African way of life has become something of an institution. This has been the case not just for a matter of years but in fact for centuries. I for one would not like to see him disappear. One thing that may well be necessary, however, is a cooling-off period in respect of contracts which are concluded outside of the normal fixed premises of the sellers if the contract price exceeds a certain amount. This provision exists in a number of other countries. It enables the housewife or the husband of the housewife who has been talked into buying, let us say, a set of encyclopaedias or a vacuum cleaner costing hundreds of rand which they cannot afford, the opportunity to repudiate the contract within a period of, let us say, three days, during which they have had time to think about the matter. Very often people are talked into accepting commitments on their doorsteps or in their homes by means of carefully prepared sales patterns which, in fact, they find very difficult to resist. The imposition of a cooling-off period of this nature would seem not to be one of the matters which may be prohibited by the hon. the Minister in terms of this section. In my view the law should be amended so as to allow the hon. the Minister to permit a cooling-off period; in other words, to change the law of contract in this regard. The clause as it stands in regard to trade practices goes very far indeed. The hon. the Minister can interfere in relationships between employers and employees. In fact, he can affect all sorts of relationships as well as the law of contract in many respects. As I have indicated, there may be differences of opinion as to which practices are desirable and which are not desirable and which cause difficulties to the trade and which do not cause difficulties.

Sir, I have some 36 amendments which I propose to move during the Committee Stage, and there are other members who have indicated to me that they have very many more, and we may well find during the Committee Stage that we have over 100 amendments to consider. If, in those circumstances, it were to be suggested that this piece of legislation should go to a Select Committee, we would certainly have no objection to it and we would welcome it.

Mr. Speaker, I propose during the course of my speech to refer to some of the remarks made by the hon. member who has just sat down and by the hon. member for Johannesburg North, who participated previously in this debate. In the first instance I would like to draw attention to the comment made by my colleague, the hon. member for Walmer, who was the second speaker on this side of the House on this particular Bill. The hon. member said: “I wonder if the hon. the Minister can indicate whether he has any intention of referring this Bill to a Select Committee”. The Minister said by way of interjection at that stage: “Go on with your argument; I am listening”. Sir, I reiterate the request for a Select Committee and I hope that the hon. the Minister is listening or was listening.

Sir, reference has been made to the amendments which it is our intention to move during the Committee Stage. I believe that it would only be courteous to the Minister if he were to be given the gist of the amendments which we in the United Party will table during the Committee Stage. I propose briefly, Sir, with your permission, to refer to them. Firstly, with regard to clause 1, we intend to move various amendments which are designed to improve or to supplement certain definitions. When we come to clause 2, in terms of which a Trade Practices Advisory Committee is being established, we intend to move an amendment designed to improve the constitution of this particular committee, because we believe that it should be very clearly set out to what extent there will be consumer representation or participation in this committee. We believe that this particular Bill is designed primarily to protect the consumers, and we do not want to see a body which will be overloaded in favour of the producers. Then there is another aspect—and I hope the Minister will indicate his attitude in his reply—and that is the question of non-White representation on the consumer advisory committee. Sir, I should say that of the 20 million odd consumers in South Africa, the non-White community represents a very large proportion. They are the people who are most open to exploitation and I suggest that it is vital that they should have some form of representation at the highest level so as to be able to put the position peculiar to them as a community.

When we come to clause 6 we will move an amendment designed to protect persons required to give information from disclosure of such information except in a prosecution in a court of law. In clause 7 we intend to move an amendment designed to limit the exercise of the powers of inspection to specific businesses and to specific alleged contraventions and to prescribe the manner in which inspections are conducted. Here I will quote examples later on, which I am sure will lend weight to my argument that some amendment is necessary with regard to the manner in which inspectors are instructed to behave when they conduct an inspection. We propose also to move amendments to limit the inconveniences which businesses may suffer as a result of the seizure of goods, books and documents. Sir, if the hon. the Minister refuses to eliminate clauses 10, 11 and 12, we will be forced to move various amendments to extend the exceptions to the trade coupons provisions so as to cover certain practical situations. In clause 16 we will move an amendment designed to allow the Trade Practices Advisory Committee to call witnesses and to cross-examine them, and also to extend the Minister’s powers so that he may, subject to safeguards, amend or withdraw notices published in terms of clauses 12, 14 and 15. Then, in clause 17 we will also move amendments designed to give persons affected by this clause the opportunity to make representations to the Trade Practices Advisory Committee, and in clause 20 we intend to move amendments designed to limit the period within which a prosecution must take place, to one year instead of two. Then, Sir, in addition, under the various clauses, we have in mind amendments to remove the Minister’s power to discriminate between individual businesses and persons, and finally we intend to move that the title of the Bill be changed to “Consumer Protection Bill”.

The hon. the Minister during the Second Reading debate tabled an amendment to clause 11. It is apparent that he and his department have had second thoughts about clause 11, and we see from the Order Paper this morning that they have given expression to these second thoughts by means of a further amendment. We in the United Party feel that this does not go all the way, although it meets a great number of our requirements, and we want to put it to the hon. the Minister that if he persists in retaining clauses 10, 11 and 12 in the Bill, we will have to support our amendment, but if he sees his way clear to delete those particular clauses, then I am instructed to say that we will withdraw our amendment.

You will have to vote on your amendments.

Of course.

We will abide by Mr. Speaker’s ruling in that regard. Sir, I want to come to the hon. member for Johannesburg North. The hon. member made some comments on this Bill and he referred, among other things, to the question of inspectors and indicated fairly strongly that he felt that the powers under this Bill, not only as far as inspectors were concerned, were rather extreme. I am sure that hon. member must have given this matter some consideration and study, and I would like to refer him to the Drugs Control Act, No. 101 of 1965, the Hazardous Substances Act, No. 15 of 1973, and the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, No. 54 of 1972. I can give him the relevant section if he wishes to have them. In each one of those Acts there are sections which deal specifically with the appointment of inspectors and the powers of inspectors. Sir, a very interesting fact which emerges from the remarks made by the hon. member for Johannesburg North in relation to what happened during the discussions on these three Bills when they came before Parliament, is that there was not a peep out of the Progressive Party at all, but now that the qualified franchise policy of the Progressive Party appears to be crumbling, they are seeking political diversions and they are overplaying the approach to the rule of law in a Bill designed to protect up to 20 million consumers. I believe, Sir, that the terms which the hon. member used, terms such as “This is bad legislation” and that “It is a ham-handed attempt to deal with a few people”, are very strong terms in the light of the previous approach adopted by the Progressive Party to legislation now on the Statute Book. I want to deal with some of this legislation.

May I ask the hon. member a question?

I am afraid not. My time is very full. If I have time at the end of my speech, I will allow the hon. member to put his question.

Sir, in introducing this Bill the hon. the Minister referred to certain other legislation. He referred to the Price Control Act, the Weights and Measures Act, the Sale of Land on Instalments Act, etc. I want to draw his attention to four other Acts, because I believe that we are now creating a situation which could lead to a complexity of administration and to difficulty in delegating authority, because now we have not only those Acts, but other Acts administered by different departments, which impinge to a certain extent on the intentions behind this Bill. I have referred already to three but I want to come back to the Fertilizer, Farm Feeds and Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act (Act 36 of 1947) which has been on the Statute Book for almost 30 years. It is being administered by the Department of Agriculture and contains rather broad regulation clauses. It says specifically in Regulation 23(k): “For preventing the use of false or misleading statements in advertisements of fertilizers, farm feed or remedies”. It is very interesting to consider briefly the activities of this particular department in the administration of this Act. No specific reference was made in the Act, in the original Act, to the appointment of inspectors but I know that inspectors of the Department of Agriculture have implemented the provisions of the Act. This particular Act is responsible for the registration of almost 4 000 remedies—stock remedies, agricultural remedies, fertilizers, etc. A specific requirement of the Act is that all advertisements must by law, by regulation, be subject to prepublication examination and approval; and it is interesting, according to my latest information, that the trouble in the implementation of this particular Act has been in respect of the question of misleading and false information, in the sense that the department may have issued warnings, in some cases two warnings, and in some cases even withdrawing registration, but have still found it necessary to subject the people who have gone beyond the scope of the Act to a court warning and penalties. I think that this puts in perspective the position in regard to leaving the control of advertising solely in the hands of voluntary bodies, and I hope to have time to say more about that later.

Another interesting thing is that in so far as the Drugs Control Act is concerned we have a provision in regard to the publication and distribution of false advertisements concerning drugs, with, the definition of “drug” being a very broad definition. Also in the Food-stuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act we have the question of advertising in terms of which it is an offence to publish a false or misleading advertisement of any food-stuff, cosmetic or disinfectant; and then in the Hazardous Substances Act also—and here I anticipate that there will be a broad scope—we have in the long title the words “to exercise control of substances which may cause injury or ill-health or death to human beings by reason of their toxic, corrosive of irritant nature”. Now, the three latter-mentioned Acts are administered by the Department of Health, with inspectors, and here we have another problem, that a certain type of advertisement will now, as I understand the situation, be controlled by the Department of Justice. I am referring particularly to the advertisement in regard to liquor, where it is made quite clear that the Department of Justice will be dealing with this, and I will be giving the Minister the reference in a moment. Sir, this is a vexed question which has existed for a long time. Twenty-eight years ago there was a Commission of Inquiry in regard to Undesirable Publications and in its report there was a special paragraph devoted to liquor advertisements. Dealing with the advertising restrictions which operate in the USA, it said that—

That was in 1957. In 1970 the predecessor to the hon. the Minister of Justice appointed a committee of inquiry from the National Liquor Board regarding the advertising of liquor, and part of its terms of reference according to the Gazette Notice as follows—

What is interesting to note is that after the introduction of the Trade Practices Bill on 11 September last year, the Minister of Justice, during the discussion of his Vote, made a statement in regard to the advertising of alcoholic liquor. He said that the investigations of the National Liquor Board had been completed and that, although the report was not public, he had accepted the recommendations, which were broadly that the National Liquor Board should liaise with the Advertising Standards Authority. But the Minister specifically referred to three types of advertisement. He said: “If adverts extoll the consumption of liquor or allow emphasis to fall on the scantily clad body of the female figure or contain obvious untruths, etc., I shall not hesitate to introduce a system of advance screening of all liquor advertising material." The Minister indicated that complaints would be directed to the National Liquor Board, and that there would then be liaison with the ASA. Mr. Speaker, I regret that I do not share the Minister’s confidence in this approach to the Advertising Standards Authority, and I believe my motives are sound. I realize and appreciate that it is a well-intentioned body, but I believe that its motivation is directed promotion-wise. It consists of nine constituent bodies not one of whom could in the vaguest sense be regarded as a consumer body. I believe these bodies are all concerned with advertising or promoting and not with the consumer sphere.

I should like to refer to the attitude of one of the constituent members of the ASA. I refer to the Society of Marketers. I had occasion to draw to the attention of the Society an advertisement which I felt was offensive in a certain way. I received the following reply—

Mr. Speaker, I accept the validity of that point of view, but I accept it with reservations in the case of the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act, No. 41 of 1971, because here, for the first time, we have an Act which specifies that an alcoholic liquor is regarded as a dependence-producing substance. Sir, let me make it perfectly clear; I am not suggesting the prohibition or banning of liquor advertisements. I agree that the manufacture is legal, but I believe that the methods of sales promotion should be strictly screened in the interests of our 20 million consumers and because so many of these advertising promotions are directed at the youth of our country. To ask a body such as the ASA to decide on this is, I believe, not fair to them nor in the interests of the consumers. Let me detail the membership, the constituent bodies, which make up the Advertising Standards Authority: the Association of Accredited Practitioners in Advertising; the South African Direct Mail Advertising Association; the Federation of Master Printers; Cinema (Pty.) Limited; The Newspaper Press Union of South Africa; the Society of Marketers; SABC, Radio; SABC, Television; and the National Sign and Display Manufacturers’ Association. I submit that under those circumstances the opinions and decisions of this body could be weighted against the consumers and need not be to their final benefit or interest. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether it is his intention that the Trade Practices Bill will include the advertising of alcoholic beverages or not. I submit that any advertisement which involves a dependence-producing substance should embody some warning against abuse and over-consumption. If the State lays down the conditions regarding the advertisement of a preparation to destroy cockroaches—it has been the position for nearly 30 years that such a preparation has to be approved as regards its formulation and its advertising, claims and is subject to pre-advertising control— then I submit that the State has a moral obligation, particularly to the youth of South Africa, to see that the youth is not exposed to advertising which could be detrimental to them. I believe that this Bill provides the hon. the Minister with the teeth which he needs, because I do not believe that voluntary methods have succeeded up to the present. I will be the first to concede that in any voluntary organization there are always black sheep who are looking for loopholes. The very method of discipline which was laid down by the ASA are not in my opinion, designed adequately to control these black sheep. We know that advertisements can be withdrawn and we know that there is a certain pre-censorship which they can apply and we know that in the final result they can suspend advertisements. But these sanctions can only be applied by an organization which relies on voluntary membership and in many instances an advertisement has to be screened through the sieve of more than nine constituent bodies before a decision can be arrived at. I want to give an example, and I want to hand the hon. the Minister a copy of the example to which I refer, so that he is fully au fait with what I am talking about. It is a full-page advertisement that appeared in the daily Press and was advertising a certain brand of carpet. A young lad of seven to ten years of age is depicted sitting on a carpet with a cigarette in his hand an ash-tray full of stompies at his feet and a box of matches. This is the slogan: “A Van Dyck carpet is something soft between you and a sore bottom, while you are trying to kick a habit”. I do not like to be thought of as a square or a prude but if you put that advertisement before young people, they would be much more interested in the young lad of seven or ten who is already smoking, has apparently consumed quite a number of cigarettes and who is now trying to kick a habit. They would not be interested in the product which this firm is trying to market. This is the advertisement to which I have referred earlier and this is what I got when I submitted it and a formal complaint was lodged. This is the reaction from the Newspaper Press Union—

The comment was—

That went through one of the nine constituent bodies of the sieve to get approval of advertisements. It went through—hook, line and sinker. I believe that that body fails to take into effect the ultimate possible effect that the advertisement could have on the thinking of our youth.

In a letter of complaint, I indicated that there was voluminous and incontrovertible evidence that cigarette smoking was a cause of lung cancer and I received the bland reply that “There are many medical men and scientists who are still not in agreement with this ban.” I think that these must be a small minority, because many deaths have been caused by lung cancer. If one considers the latest statistics which are available, one finds that there has been a significant and disturbing increase in the deaths due to lung cancer an increase which amounts to 80% for Whites, Colloureds and Indian races in South Africa. No figures for Bantu are available over the last 11 years.

The S.A. Society of Marketers, who are interested in marketing, takes the point of view that if the manufacture of any product is legal, that product should be allowed to be advertised within regulations of ASA but I believe that I am entitled to say that this works more in favour of the producer than the consumer.

I would like to quote another example, an example which deals with the interest of the seller which in this case obviously takes precedence over the interest of the consumer. In this case it was I believe, directed primarily at the non-White consumers. It concerns a certain saleshouse which issued a consumers certificate. A sophisticated receiver of such a certificate would be able to accept it for what it is worth, but to an unsophisticated, semiliterate person, it can convey a wrong impression. In appearance it was very similar to a cheque and it could cause confusion. Through the good offices of the S.A. Consumer Council, Director Mr. Eugene Roelofse, and here I want to pay particular tribute to the Director, I think that he does a mammoth job of work virtually on a shoestring budget, because he has a vast administration which he wishes to control and expand, this particular advertisement was submitted to the ASA. Here again is an example of the reaction of a body which is composed primarily of interested persons. The complaint pointed out that the customers’ certificates could cause confusion. The S.A. Consumer Council said—

The reply which came back from the ASA was that such cheques were not sent out to bad-risk customers and no confusion was created. I personally spoke to the receiver of one such cheque and this particular person was very confused. The interesting thing is that Mr. Roelofse took it further and wrote—

And then the ASA capitulated because their reply stated—

Mr. Roelofse said he would contest that. Is it any wonder, then, that the latest report of the South African Consumer Council states, inter alia—

This is the object, surely, of this Bill, i.e. to stop the public from being misled.

Speed glamourization is another aspect affecting life in general since it encourages the taking of risks, thereby constituting a threat to life. This is something which the ASA seems to be silent on in its code of conduct. Nine years ago, however, the 90 000 strong National Council of Women highlighted the glamourization of speed in advertising and I am told that meetings were planned with the NPU and others. Four years later the following were still appearing in the daily Press—

And also—

I do not believe that those advertisements are really acting in the interests of truth or in the interest of the consumers. This aspect has been highlighted by Dr. Hazel Rosenthal and I want to pay tribute to her. She has been a strong champion of instituting some type of control in this respect. She took the matter up with the Medical Association of South Africa roughly seven years ago. They agreed with her because in a letter from their associate secretary, Dr. Combrink, the matter of the glamourization of speed is referred to. It is stated that her letter had been referred to the committee of the Medical Council of South Africa which recommended—

I say that as far as I know the ASA does not refer to this particular aspect in their code. There is public reaction to this Bill, however, and I want to quote a member of a civic association. He said:

No control can be exercised in these cases. I quote further:

I believe that this Bill helps in that respect. It has been emphasized by previous speakers that a lot can be achieved by voluntary control, but what has been the experience of some other countries? Take England as an example. In 1924 there was an international convention, the intention being to try to affirm the principle of truth in advertising on a voluntary basis. As far as I am aware, for 44 years this particular approach was made to advertising. [Time expired.]

Mr. Speaker, we have the Trade Practices Bill before us and I want to deal with it by first asking a few direct questions. In my discussion of this Bill I am going to confine myself more specifically to the malpractices which the hon. the Minister pointed out to us in the Second Reading. The first question which I want to ask is: Is it morally justifiable to subject the millions of poor people in our country to an artificial stimulation of demand? Is that not an undesirable trade practice? Is it not a malpractice in commerce. The second question which I want to ask, is: Is it morally justifiable to allow more to be spent on advertising and packaging than on schools? Is it right that more is spent on advertising than on education? Is it right that in many countries more be spent on sales promotion than on health? The third question which I want to ask, is: Is it morally justifiable to impose speed limits and at the same time to allow advertisements to be published of powerful motor cars with blondes—whose physical attributes are displayed with all their curves and lines—on the motor cars’ bonnets? Or of motor cars on empty roads, of which it is said in the advertisement that their powerful engines can develop up to 400 h.p.? Is it justifiable to apply speed restrictions while this type of advertisement is allowed which is aimed at the young people who cause the largest percentage of the accidents on our roads? Advertisements of this nature have just one message and that is: “You have the wrong motor car; it is not fast and powerful enough,” while the traffic constable lies in wait behind a bush for this faster car with its powerful engine to exceed the speed limits. Listen to this advertisement which appeared in 1967 in America—

Is that not the height of irresponsibility?

It is a lovely car.

It is aimed at the young group of people and there is not a word about safety to be found in that advertisement. Is it morally justifiable that we allow advertisements to be aimed at sex? The bounds of ordinary decency are exceeded in advertisements as far as that is concerned. It is a malpractice. Listen to this example:

That is the main caption of an advertisement which advertises underwear. It is accompanied by a photograph. Then it is said in small print, so that one can hardly see it, what this actually means. Listen to this example:

“Intimate” is the name of the perfume which is being advertised here.

Does it work, Jan?

Mr. Speaker, I ask you, I ask this House I ask everyone, whether it is justifiable that we allow this in our country. Is it morally justifiable that children be exploited for advertising purposes? In another advertisement which I have here, they adopt the point of view that the teacher is scared of the parent, the parent of the child, but the child of no one. Throughout the purport of playing with dolls has been that it is taken from the world of fantasy. But now playing with dolls is linked to biological realities for a child. Naked girl dolls and naked boy dolls are dished up for the youth. I can quote many examples like this and I can talk for days about this subject. I can also mention dozens of books from which examples of this can be quoted.

This Trade Practices Bill is a measure which has very deep roots. It deals with the desire of the authorities to protect the consumer against unfair methods, exploitation and personal disadvantage. Trade practices form an important facet of the economic processes in our national structure. The relation between the State and the private citizen is directly at stake here. We can dig far and deep into the writings of the past to indicate how innumerable economic and financial thinkers and writers tried to find a plausible formula in terms of which the good prince, the ruler, and the economically active sectors could regulate their claims and obligations towards each other. Plato proposed in his laws that the good ruler, the good prince, should take all profits derived from trade for himself. The hand of Plato is not to be seen in this measure. Aristotle said that the individual’s happiness and interests were primary. He said that the State had no obligation other than an obligation towards the individual to protect him, to take care of him and to provide for his spiritual ministrations. In this Bill a very thin shadow of Aristotle’s thought is visible and noticeable. In the old feudal system of the Middle Ages, the so-called scholastics, writers and thinkers, brought high moral and sociological norms to the fore to which the ruler had to link his fiscal measures and actions in the economic sector. They did that within the framework of the prevalent theological concept of that time, but everything was aimed, also by the scholastics, at the public interest being protected and at the fact that it was a function of the State to see that it was in fact protected. Even in those times they struggled with the concept and the question of what a fair price was. They did not have an economic approach; it was chiefly sociological. This Bill has an economic as well as a sociological content.

After the classic period and with the development of the modern state in which trade practices were inextricably weaved and being weaved into the State’s complicated and intertwined economic processes, it was the Italian Carafa, who asked what the good prince the good ruler, must do to manipulate and control the economic processes and practices. This Bill is one of the pieces of legislation which includes trade practices as one of the economic processes in the good prince’s functional task in the public interest and in the interest of protection against exploitation and misrepresentation and deceit. This Bill before us confirms the desire of the authorities to keep an eye on the moral and the economic activities of our commercial sector.

Between the years 1700 and more or less 1780, in the period of the mercantilism, there was a group of writers which we can call the Cameralists. This was a group of German writers who emphasized pertinently in their thought and their writings that it was the function of the State to see particularly to the moral and the economic interests and the welfare of the people. Read the work and you will see that Conjusti’s shadow, too, is present in this piece of legislation. Basic to this Bill is the acceptance of the need to create a natural order in our economic structure. This natural order implies, in the first place, the right to have and enjoy the advantages of private ownership; secondly, to apply one’s initiative; and, thirdly, to appropriate and use as much freedom for the exercising of this right as is compatible with the interests and the freedom of the entire community. This function of the authorities to maintain the natural order, as it is built into this Bill, was also basic to the thoughts of the old physiocrats in the 18th century, Quesne, Turgot the Mirabeau. The intention of this Bill is basically integrated in Adam Smith’s view of the economic mechanism of his time and his “Wealth of Nations”. He also believed in the “natural order”. He said that individual entrepreneurs should be allowed to pursue their economic interests and that if they did not act unethically or unjustly, they would serve the interest of the community in that way. On page 165, we read this—

Mr. Speaker, natural freedom must come about within our economic structure. If there is natural freedom, then intervention by the State is not necessary; then there need not be an Act such as this; then the State need not intervene to protect the community against injustice and suppression by certain sectors of the community. Sir, this is the course taken by the intellectual struggle about the function of the authorities, about the relation between the authorities and the free subject and the exercising of his free economic initiative and his activities, from Adam Smith, whom I quoted just now, in 1776, right through Malthus, through John Stewart Mill, through Karl Marx, the communistic thinker, through Wagner, through Henry George, through Emil Sachs, to the great depression of 1929. Sir, then Keynes came to the fore with his new theory prior to 1936, and afterwards we have landed in the community which we call “the affiuent society”. This affluent society is the economic era in which we find ourselves at the moment. Sir, what does it consist of? It consists of a surfeit of the markets far beyond the biological needs. Fifty years ago we were interested in food, in clothes and in transport. Today, in this extravagant society there is an artificial creation of demand. It is a period in which advertisements rest on psychological analyses in depth. The Motivation Research in America, which has branches here in Johannesburg and which is spread all over the world with Dr. Dichter as its guiding spirit, is a powerful organization which does studies in depth as to how one may go about advertising and present advertisements to the public in the most psychological way. Sir, this brings us to a few interesting things which have been said about advertisements, and I want to mention some here. Bevan, the British Minister, said: “Advertising is an evil service.” King George VI said: “The advertising act is really a form of education.” Herbert Agar said—

To illustrate the tremendous power behind these advertisements and the way in which the advertisements are worded and placed, I want to read to you what Adlai Stevenson said in a speech—

In the advertisement there is a powerful force majeure which, especially with the advent of television, can totally condition and change people’s way of thinking, people’s tastes and needs and desires and which can make a deep impression on their values. Lenin said, “The right words are worth a hundred regiments.” Lord Hayward said, “Advertising must expect to be criticized. It is part of our daily life and because it is a very public act everyone is conscious of it.” Now I just want to read another two—

Yes, many of these hon. members must take note of this last quotation. Sir, advertisements are the greatest single evil in the field of malpractices in commerce. We are not the only ones who are going to act against them or keep an eye on them, as is done in this Bill. In 1967 the Appeal Court in the U.S.A. ordered a certain large company to distantiate itself from another large company which manufactured bleaches because, as was said in the judgment, Proctor and Gamble—that was a large company—could obtain such discounts on their advertising accounts as a result of the tremendous extent of their advertising, that they could control the advertising market, and consequently tell the world that the bleach which they advertised was the only effective bleach. The court held a different opinion on that. Advertisements which are uncontrolled and unrestrained are a waste of the country’s resources. It destroys the thrift of the people in an artificial way. It contributes to a higher cost structure because all advertisements do not hit the target and their costs are recovered from the consumer. It is also a terrible waste of one of our most valuable resources, viz. paper. Most of the advertisements are not informative, but persuasive through the power of money and without quality being the decisive norm. If advertising is left uncontrolled, it will eventually end in the hands of and be controlled by strong financial powers. It is essential, as is envisaged in this Act, that channels be created, that powers be conferred and delegated through which self-discipline can be made obligatory. If not, abuse, greed and profiteering will run riot in our commerce. In Canada, a Minister, one John Turner, has been appointed to guard, inter alia, against these malpractices in advertisements in commerce in Canada. What does this man say? I quote—

In Britain there is the British Commission on Monopolies. They took this matter up with the large soap companies and accused them of “overspending on advertising and passing the costs to the consumer”.

Sir, to my mind this Bill is a welcome measure. It is timely and necessary and it might lead to our being able to draft a code of honour for advertisements, just as in Britain, a real code of honour. Just as the Press has drafted a code of honour for itself, for what that might be worth—and I think that, in the course of time, something will be born from the Press’s code of honour; I am quite honest when I say that—a code of honour must be drafted in advertising as well. I should like to quote a few of the important points from the British code of honour which was drafted in 1962. In the first place they say: No advertisement may include statements or visual presentations which are offensive to the public. Sir, if ever something was necessary in our fatherland, then it is something of this sort. Secondly they say: No advertisement may exploit the fear complex in order to persuade the consumer to buy an article or a service. Three: No advertisement may exploit the supernatural. Four: No advertisement may claim that any ingredient of any product or the product itself is or contains a secret or special ingredient. Five: Statistical data and scientific formulae must be given in full in an advertisement and may not be misleading. Six: Testimonials must be genuine and produceable on demand. How many testimonials do we not read, Sir!

Salusa 45!

Seven: Price quotations must be genuine and reliable. Eight: Guarantees which are given in an advertisement must be immediately obtainable on demand. Sir, an hon. member has referred here to a certain advertisement. If we are to believe certain advertisements —and I also fell for this for a time, Sir … [Interjections.] Instead of becoming younger and acquiring greater virility, I remained what I was. [Interjections.] Nine Mail order advertisements must give the addresses correctly and the advertisers must be prepared to demonstrate, etc.

Sir, I want to conclude by saying that we must guard against the evil of home visits and personal visits. Gone are the days when those Dutchmen went around in the rural areas and sold us suit lengths. That material was worse than sackcloth. Sir. We bought it but never made clothes from it. We stored it and used it for horse blankets in the winter. Sir, I want to conclude by saying that this Bill which has long roots in history, deals with the perpetual question of the relation between the subject and the authorities, and also with the functions, duties and responsibilities of the authorities. This legislation also deals with these questions which can be addressed to the authorities: How must they protect, what must they protect and when must they protect? Here we have an attempt, in this Bill, at fulfilment by the authorities of that task and function to protect in a reasonable way, armed with the necessary data and not rushing in without data and without the facts. For this reason, provision is made for a Trade Practices Advisory Committee. I support this Bill very gladly.

Mr. Speaker, it is always a great pleasure to this House to be regaled by the philosophy which we have heard from the hon. member who has just sat down. It was interesting to follow him although one might not necessarily agree with the intensity of his point of view. He did, however, certainly endeavour to focus the attention of the House on what is the essential essence of this Bill.

That is the question of the protection of the consumer from the ravages of modern high-pressure and highly scientific forms of advertising, which has probably become one of the largest industries in the world today. At the same time, however, one should focus one’s attention on the very constructive speech which the hon. member for Berea made, which also highlighted this particular aspect and dealt with some very interesting features which the hon. member felt the hon, the Minister should direct his attention to in protecting the consumer public from the ravages of advertising. That is what I feel is really the essence of this Bill and that is why this side of the House—save in the case of a number of amendments which the hon. member for Constantia indicated in his opening address would be moved in due course— found this Bill to be acceptable, one which we welcome. It is, however, a matter for concern that, unfortunately, due to the title in particular as well as to certain clauses, an additional principle has been included.

The trade coupon system has virtually been transplanted from the present Act to this Bill and at the same time, the old Act is to be repealed. This, I think, is an unfortunate feature. I think it creates an inhibition on the purpose which the Bill is trying to serve. That creates an obstacle to our affording this Bill an easy passage through the House. Our Main objection results not from the contents of the Trade Coupon Act, which we feel is a debatable matter in any case—those provisions are presently enshrined in another Act and I feel they could well be left there …

Are you for or against the Trade Coupons Act?

Just let me finish my point. The fact that it is being incorporated in this Bill creates an inhibition on the effective administration and the effective operation of this particular Bill. First of all, it enshrines a system which, has been found to be virtually abrogated by disuse in respect of the attention which has been given to it by the operation of the law in this country. The two important cases to which reference was in fact made by the hon. member for Walmer were not mentioned in order to hold a brief—as has been insinuated—for any particular type of advertising or to hold a brief for any particular type of product, but rather to draw attention to the fact that the judges themselves, despite finding the accused guilty …

Have you read those cases?

Yes, and I will read you something in a moment. Despite their finding the accused guilty, they went further and gave their opinion as to what the value of the Trade Coupons Act in the modern day was. I will give you the first illustration immediately.

In the 1971 case—the hon. the Minister may remember it; he has read it—the question of mens rea was an important factor and the magistrate found in favour of the accused and acquitted them. The attorney-general appealed. The judges upheld the appeal and stated as follows—

I repeat: “the correct verdict and sentence”. This is the verdict, and I quote from the report itself on page 157—

Reference was made to the “correct verdict” and the “correct sentence”. Judges, after all must find a person guilty if he is technically guilty, but they are entitled to state their approval, their disapproval or their viewpoint of a particular Statute in the sentence which is passed if they feel it to be warranted in the circumstances. I maintain that we are living today in an entirely different society, from the point of view of marketing and the consumer, to that which existed in 1935 when the Trade Coupons Act was eventually passed in this House. Of course, I know which, party piloted that Bill through this House; it was the same party to which I belong at the moment, the United Party. I know that. That legislation, which I have read, was adopted to deal with a series of operations in the business world that prevailed at the time. Today, however, we have an entirely different community. Today we are living in a very highly sophisticated, keenly understanding consumer market. We have been through a war since those days, a war in which people experienced a lack of food, clothes, furniture, housing and the other necessities of life. They have been through the whole gamut of man’s requirements. We have already tried to deal with the question of providing the necessary protection at various stages to ensure that the consumer was not exploited and that advantage was not taken of him. The business community has, over the years, responded to that. That is why today the advertising industry has become virtually the biggest in the world. It has its own code which is not entirely what we want, and that is why this Bill has become necessary, just as the Marketing Act, the Price Control Act and the Monopolistic Regulations Act were necessary.

All of this legislation became necessary because of an over-exuberance on the part of an industry which was beginning to spread in such a remarkable fashion. At the same time a very good purpose has been served. It has been possible to provide tremendous competition which has helped to bring costs down for the consumer. It has also been possible for a larger variety of foodstuffs to be brought to the attention of the consumer, so much so that the consumer market has been increased tremendously, and this is a very pleasing feature I want the hon. the Minister to note. One has only to go into a store—I think it is wiser not to mention specific names—of a firm which operates in one of the suburbs of Cape Town on a Friday afternoon or a Saturday to see how a community, which at one time could not afford many of the foods and other products that are so necessary, its shopping. Because of an improvement in salaries, because of the keen competition and the price-cutting that community is able to have all the nutritional necessities of life. Advertising and marketing have brought that about. All our Statutes reflect the fact that our society functions on the basis of demand and supply. There are, however, certain protective steps to ensure that both supply and demand take place on a fair and adequate basis in respect of the community to whom the elected bodies of the country are responsible. Let me just point out the fact that we are living today in a highly effective, sophisticated and scientific market. We are living in the midst of manufacturers and distributors who are well aware of this fact. In promoting their products, particularly through advertising, in that awareness they endeavour to promote their products in such a way as to meet that particular market and prevailing demands.

We also have a consumer market which has learnt self-discipline over the years and which has had organizations established in order to help and guide it. I believe that with the proper consumer education which is taking place today, buying is being done wisely by this type of buyer, who has become a stable influence in the buying capacity of the community. I want to go further by saying that the African consumer market is expected to surge in value from R1 960 million per year to R4 590 million by 1985. For that reason I and my colleagues welcome steps that are taken to protect the vastly increasing and enormous consumer market against practices which I say are undesirable. These undesirable practices are due to many causes, perhaps over-exuberance or perhaps the age-old practice of taking advantage of one’s fellow-man. There are many causes for these practices which we find to be offensive and which we must do away with. In doing so, however, we do not want to inhibit the right of the consumer to enjoy the benefits which are offered. That is the crux of the matter. We do not want them to miss the opportunities which are given, whether or not they are absorbed in one way or another. Here I have something which must be a trade coupon because it says:

Then it goes on to infer that if you purchase the article you will save 7 cents. One might want to know how this money is made up. The manufacturer or the supplier …

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. member a question? Does he regard that as illegal in terms of his point of view?

It would be in terms of this legislation, but there is nothing wrong with it. It is a trade coupon which offers a benefit against the purchase of an article.

There is nothing wrong with a coupon.

Of course not. The point is that one might wonder how they can afford to reduce the price by 7 cents. Surely it must be made up somewhere, because there are costs involved, the profits of the manufacturer, the wholesaler and the distributor are involved. That is all part of advertising. Instead of being spent in the newspapers, on the radio or on pamphlets, it is spent on a direct benefit to the public. It establishes a market for something and once the market is established the price remains at a reasonable figure because the consumption thereof has increased, and production costs have decreased. I do not even have to go into the detail because it has been explained by other hon. members on this side of the House. Why should these benefits of gifts and of prize-winning not be passed on even if they are allied to the purchase of a particular article? There is nothing wrong with it because we are not living in the days of 1935. The public is not as easily fooled as it was then when it wanted to collect its picture postcards which were found in packets of cigarettes in order to have a complete picture to win a prize. Those days have gone and that form of advertising is almost a childish form of advertising by the standards of today. Those methods are not used and the public is an entirely different public to the public of those days. That is the main objection which we have against the insertion of these trade coupon provisions in this legislation. In my opinion it makes it an inhibited form of legislation. If we do have legislation, let us have clean, straight and clear-cut legislation which can help the consumer, and if we have to deal with trade coupons and an amelioration or a change to the Trade Coupons Act, let us deal with it in an amendment or by way of a committee which is appointed to deal with the ramifications of the Trade Coupons Act and not have it involved in what should be a straightforward measure. That is the main reason why we object to this particular Bill. It will prevent benefits from being passed on to the consumer. I do not think the public is going to accept that lightly. They will regard this as a step that is definitely inhibitive.

Let me go further and deal with one or two other interesting aspects. I want to reply briefly to some of my friends to the left of me. I want to say to them that I cannot at this stage understand how civil liberties or the rule of law gets involved in the context of this particular Bill. I have made clear what our attitude to the Bill is and what the reason is for our opposition. I am not here to defend either Government thinking or other thinking on the matter. I merely want to say that I cannot understand how civil liberties or the rule of law become involved in a context that is completely foreign to the connotation of those terms. Let me put it in another way. The removal of civil liberties involves denying a person his freedom, taking away his basic rights such as free speech and denying him his right of access to the courts of the land. To discuss this as an argument in respect of this Bill, is completely out of place as far as I am concerned. One of the aspects raised was the question of inspectors. In all the Acts we have dealt with which deal with commerce, markeing, price control and monopolistic conditions, this applies. In fact, let me just give my hon. friends to my left some idea of this. Section 5 of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act, for instance, deals with the right to require a person to submit to the Board of Trade and Industries a written return—

That is a very serious intrusion, but apparently it was accepted by all sides of this House, including the principal party on the left when this Act was passed. It was passed because it was part of the teeth in the operation of this legislation in order to circumvent this form of practice which was to the detriment of the consumer. That is the principle that was involved. The same thing applies to the Price Control Act. Sections 12 and 13 of that Act will be of interest to my hon. friends of the Progressive Party, where they deal with the seizing and taking possession of a person’s books, etc.

We are putting several amendments forward—some of them were read out by my friend, the hon. member for Berea—in order to ameliorate the extent of intrusion on the privacy of the citizen.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. member a question? Would the hon. member tell me whether in his opinion clauses 6, 7, 8, 16 and 17 do not interfere with the rights of the individual or the rule of law?

The rule of law does not apply in a case of this nature. The rule of law is something which enables a man to be judged by his peers in an open court of law. We are dealing here with a Bill which is brought before us in order to protect the community, the citizen, from being exploited. In order to protect him from being exploited, certain provisions have to be made, certain operational steps have to be taken and a certain machinery must be employed. That machinery may be harsh but it is necessary if exploitation is to be avoided. In the Criminal Code, for instance, one finds that people are subject to search warrants and arrest for a variety of reasons.

There is no warrant in this Bill.

There is no question of a warrant. As I have just told you, Sir, the same position obtains in respect of all these other Acts which the party of the hon. member who is questioning me, did not oppose. The reason is that the rule of law does not apply in these cases. Our object is to move amendments to prevent this measure allowing for too great an intrusion on the privacy of the citizen. For instance, we intend to move as an amendment to clause 6 by means of a further proviso at the end of subsection (1) that when a person is called upon for information, “no person need furnish any information which will incriminate him of an offence”. That is the first thing. Then we also add a new subsection to the end of clause 6 which reads—

These are amendments which we intend moving in order to ameliorate the harshness of unnecessary intrusion upon a man’s affairs.

As far as clause 7 is concerned, we intend in line 28, after the word “secretary”, and in order to ensure that these provisions should relate to something specific when a man is searched or called upon for something, to insert—

Let me give the hon. member the exact wording of that provision as we wish it amended. It will read—

That is how it will then read. I know that hon. members on my left think that I am perhaps trying to skate around this matter. I am not. I am very sincere in what I say. If we were to carry what they call the rule of law to the extent to which they wish to do so as far as these matters are concerned, we would really not be able to carry out the provisions of any such law satisfactorily. Our objective is to ensure that the intrusion is as minimal as possible. The fact that we must bear in mind is that this House has without any protest accepted a similar type of provision in every one of the Acts I have mentioned. If hon. members wish to, they may look them up for themselves.

We have a further amendment to this clause. In line 48, after “Act”, we wish to add certain words. Paragraph (c) of subsection (2) will then read—

1. (c) seize and retain any goods, books or other documents which may relate to any prosecution under this Act and which may be required as evidence: Provided the person from whom such goods, books or documents were seized, shall be accorded reasonable access to them to enable him to conduct his business.

This proviso was not in the previous Act. This is an improvement on the existing legislation to which no one has as yet taken any exception. In this respect, there is also the right to go to law at any time. There is no provision in any of these sections which prohibits a person’s going to court and seeking his normal rights there. I do not know what point of view hon. members on my left adopt, but I just want to say this. To endeavour by insinuation to infer that this side of the House, my party, is blind to the rule of law and civil liberties and is therefore prepared—as was said about the speech of the hon. member for Constantia—to just welcome this Bill holus bolus, is, I think, to be guilty of an unfair and possibly even mischievously malicious insinuation.

They also have the intelligence to know it.

You are very sensitive about it.

In this context it is completely non-existent.

I should like to deal with one further aspect of this Bill. The question was raised in regard to the consumer’s not being permitted to waive his right in terms of this Bill. Clause 21 (1) reads as follows—

1. (1) The waiver, either expressly or implied, by any consumer of any right which—

1. (a) is conferred upon him by this Act; or
2. (b) is conferred upon him by any provision of any other law, if such waiver will derogate from any provision of this Act, shall be null and void.

We have been criticized in this regard. We were also told that this was something which was also an invasion of the rights of the citizen. This very provision is contained in the Hire Purchase Act and the Sale of Land by Instalments Act. The object of this provision is that by no manner or means should the person who is protected be inveigled into waiving a right which has been established for his protection. Sir, one must bear in mind that we are dealing here with the principle of the Bill. We have stated that it is our intention to move certain amendments during the Committee Stage. We have drawn attention to the fact that we want the Trade Practices Committee to be broader-based; we want it to be made up of representatives of the various sections of the business community, of representatives of the consumers and the producers, etc., so that the committee will be more representative. We have an amendment, for instance, that the Trade Practices Committee should be able to hear evidence. We would like them to be able to take the initiative in these matters. We accept the basic principle of the Bill, which is to protect the consumer from misleading and false advertisements and misleading and false information. We only regret that this other aspect was introduced as a principle, because we believe that it will completely destroy the essence of this Bill or what should have been the essence of this Bill.

The hon. member for Carletonville made a touching plea here this afternoon. Unfortunately he is not here at the moment. It seemed to me as if he regarded the advertising industry as an evil as great as Communism, and I am sorry that he is not here. His arguments showed in effect that he really has a kind of Rip van Winkel attitude to new concepts in marketing. He does not like advertisements at all; he does not like packaging. He wants to buy his product the way he bought it when he was a little boy, 50 or 60 years ago.

Seventy years.

He is not interested in the development which has taken place in the advertising industry, and he is not interested in the development which has taken place in the packing industry. I think everyone in this House will agree with me that it is much easier today to choose what one wants to buy than it was 70 years ago. Where the hon. member for Carletonville alleged here that advertisements are such a great evil, I can only come to the conclusion that his object in doing so, to quote his own words, was “to blow your own trumpet or you haven’t a chance”.

†I believe that that is all the hon. member did here this afternoon.

Sir, the hon. member for Jeppe, who has just made his contribution to this debate, was at pains to point out that trade coupons do not really form an integral part of trade practices. We believe that trade practices should be dealt with completely separately and should not be linked with trade coupons. I want to make it quite clear that we do not say that there must not be a Trade Coupons Act. There is a Trade Coupons Act on the Statute Book. That Act was passed in 1935 and we say that it should be left alone; that the Government must not try to incorporate its provisions in this Bill, because whatever you do with the Trade Coupons Act you are going to inhibit recognized trade practices and, after all, trade practices are there for the benefit of the consumer. Quite a great deal of the legislation dealing with trade coupons is also for the benefit of the consumer. But it does not necessarily mean that the same principles as applied to the Trade Coupons Act of 1935 also apply in the trade practices. Therefore it would be far better not to have those provisions in the Trade Practices Bill. I, for one, can remember what it was like before the Trade Coupons Act was promulgated in 1935. I remember the cigarattes that were offered; I remember the quality of the cigarattes deteriorating month after month, and the coupons in the packets increasing in number. I remember the tremendous advertisement indicating what one could do with those coupons. I know, because I was very keen on collecting enough coupons in order to acquire a gold watch. There were any number of prizes of that nature. If you bought enough cigarettes, even if you did not smoke them. You could eventually find yourself the proud owner of a gold watch. Obviously there had to be some legislation at that time to prevent this, because these cigarettes, which were really quite fair in my early days at school, afterwards became the most shocking cigarettes, so much so that I could not smoke them any more. It is quite obvious to me that if the Trade Coupons Act had not been passed in 1935, I probably would have had a very severe smoker’s cough today. So I am very grateful indeed for the fact that the Trade Coupons Act was enacted in 1935. But that does not mean that the conditions which obtained in 1935 obtain today in the year 1975, 40 years later, and I think it would be a grave error if the hon. the Minister, despite the fact that we have asked him on several occasions to delete those portions of this Bill before us referring to the Trade Coupons Act, or re-enacting portions of that Act—, did not agree with us and did not excise these provisions, because if he leaves the Bill unamended in this respect I am afraid that what he hopes to achieve with, this Trade Practices Bill will not be possible, because he now inhibits what he wants to do in regard to trade practices by trade coupons; and by doing so, he in fact denies the consumers benefits which they would have had had he not re-enacted the Trade Coupons Act portions of these clauses in this Bill. I have heard it whispered that the hon. the Minister is weakening and I believe that the Minister is weakening. These onslaughts against him, the fact that we have appealed to him and that some of us have spoken rather roughly to him during the course of this debate, has had the effect of weakening his stamina in regard to his original intention. It has been whispered that he might be in such a weak state by now that he might agree at the end of this Second Reading debate to refer this Bill to a Select Committee. I sincerely hope that what I am about to say now, will have the effect of making him weaker still.

You know you have never had that effect before.

I am quite prepared to take a chance, Sir. The hon. the Minister says I have not had that chance or that opportunity before, but I am quite prepared to take a chance. One of the matters that worries me is that when this whole question of trade practices was reviewed in the United Kingdom, it was dealt with in quite a different fashion. It leads me to think that by lumping these provisions together in the Trade Practices Bill, we really have something even more than a hybrid. I think “hybrid” is perhaps too nice-sounding a word; therefore I would rather call it a “mongrel” measure. I believe this could have been avoided, that this mongrel measure could have been avoided, if a little attention had been given by the hon. the Minister to the sort of ways in which other countries have dealt with the matter. I have here on my desk three pieces of legislation passed in the United Kingdom, which purport to deal with the same subject matter as is being dealt with, or purported to be dealt with, in this single Trade Practices Bill before us. In chronological order, the first of these is the Misrepresentation Act of 1967. As this Act has a very short long title, I think I should just say that this piece of legislation deals more or less with the question of contract and misrepresentation. It says—

In other words, what is referred to here is misrepresentation and the fact of the contract having been performed. That was the first step and we can see that this is also one of the endeavours of this Bill which is before us. This Bill attempts to provide for the same situation I have just described in the case of the British Act. The next piece of legislation I want to refer to was passed the year after, in 1968. In that year the Trade Descriptions Act was passed in the United Kingdom. This Act has a long title which, I believe explains exactly what it is all about. It says—

Quite clearly that is another aspect which was dealt with in the United Kingdom by a separate Act. We are attempting to lump all these aspects together in our Trade Practices Bill. And then, finally, in 1973, the Fair Trading Act was passed in the United Kingdom. This Fair Trading Act contains the general principle which is now embodied in our Trade Practices Bill. Unfortunately, however, we have cluttered this up with the other aspects I have just mentioned. I quote from the long title of this Fair Trading Act—

I believe I have made the point that the hon. the Minister has been in too great a hurry. What he has tried to do here is to include in a short and as simple as possible Bill provisions which normally would have required a great deal of description, a great deal of investigation and a great deal of trial and error. Now the Minister says: “I am going to lump them all together. I am doing this because there are certain practices that are taking place in this country and I want to stop them. They may be illegal at present or they may not be illegal. I want to be perfectly certain that they are going to be illegal So, if there are trading practices today which are not illegal, then to be on the safe side I am rather going to make them illegal so that I can catch everybody in the net that I feel I should catch.” I think that is an unreasonable attitude. The attitude of the hon. the Minister should rather be that where there is proper trading, there should be no need to make any trading that is now taking place, illegal. Where there is proper trading, which is giving the consumer a benefit, the consumer should continue to have that benefit. It should not be doubtful as to whether the consumer can still have that benefit once this Bill has been placed on the Statute Book. I believe that there is a great deal of doubt as to whether some of the benefits which consumers now have or have had for some time in terms of the new system of marketing and advertising, will continue to be available to consumers after the passage of this Bill. This doubt lies in the question whether the advertisers or the sellers will be in a position to continue to give those benefits without overstepping the mark or breaking the law. I would say to the hon. the Minister that it is not too late to consider this once more, even though he has committed himself to a certain extent in his Second Reading speech, even though he has committed himself to a line of action and even though he has committed himself and the Government to a certain extent en the principles of the Bill as it is before us. There is obviously more than one principle. As I have outlined, there are at least three main principles which are involved in this Bill and there still probably are one or two others. Although the hon. the Minister has committed himself and the Government to that line of thinking, I do not think that it is too late. The hon. the Minister can say at this stage that he has listened to our arguments and that we may have a point. The hon. the Minister can then send the Bill to a Select Committee after the Second Reading so that we can go into the question to see whether it would not be better for us to have three separate Acts of Parliament to deal with this matter, or four for that matter.

There is another point and that is the question of the complexity of this law as it is now where you do not quite know whether you are dealing with criminal sanctions or whether you are dealing with civil remedies. There are these points. For instance, it is by no means clear whether when you have taken criminal action you are in fact entitling whoever has been hurt or injured by the steps which led to the criminal prosecution, to a civil claim for damages against the accused. This is by no means clear and yet I think it is a very important matter that should be cleared up. As it stands now, you can understand that the number of benefits which consumers are entitled to, are going to disappear for the reason that the suppliers of those benefits will not know whether they are going to have not only a criminal prosecution against them, but also an action for damages in a civil claim because they have been found guilty of a criminal contravention. I believe all these matters should be gone into very deeply.

We on this side of the House welcome the fact that we now have before us a Trade Practices Bill which is vastly better than the one which first came before us. If we look at the Order Paper and see the projected amendments which the hon. the Minister feels he can already inform us about at this stage, it seems to me there is a vast improvement and that a great number of the doubts and problems we have had have been dispelled. We come back, however, to one specific problem. In a Bill such as this, involving as many principles as it does, there is so much complexity and so much criss-crossing of civil remedies and criminal sanctions that the eventual Act is going to be very difficult to administer. In those circumstances, probably the Minister’s best way out is, to submit this Bill to a Select Committee and to give that Select Committee a fair opportunity of inquiring into all aspects. I would not like to see the hon. the Minister submitting this Bill to a Select Committee and instructing it to adhere to the four principles already enshrined in the Bill or not permitting the committee in any way to go beyond the ambit of those principles. If the hon. the Minister does that, I honestly feel that we would be wasting our time to a very large extent in submitting the Bill to a Select Committee. If, however, the hon. the Minister is completely open about the matter and allows the Select Committee unlimited scope, even allowing the committee to rewrite the whole of the Bill if it so desires, I believe he will be doing the country a great service. I do not believe there is any real difficulty in this respect in submitting the Bill to a Select Committee. If the hon. the Minister has any difficulty, perhaps he could deal with that in his reply to this debate. Perhaps we could then formulate some method whereby we would be able to inquire into the whole Bill in the same way as if it had been referred to a Select Committee before the Second Reading. I do hope the hon. the Minister is with me here because it would be a very great pity if this Bill could not be dealt with by such a Select Committee as if it were referred before the Second Reading, before any principle had been accepted. I am making rather an issue of this because at the conclusion of this debate the question is going to be put and I have a sneaking suspicion that the hon. the Minister is going to win.

Is that a gambling statement?

I believe that after the question has been put, unless the hon. the Minister can do something about the matter, the Select Committee is going to be bound by the vote taken at the end of the Second Reading. I do hope, therefore, that he is going to apply his mind very thoroughly to this issue. It would be a great pity if the committee were bound by decisions already taken. The present opportunity would be lost and we would not be able to inquire into this Bill de novo, clause by clause, rejecting or accepting points as they came up. I see my hon. Whip here shaking his head every time I mention this.

He has his doubts too.

Yes, I know. I personally also have grave doubts about the matter. That is why I am labouring the point. I have not gone into the mechanics, but I do believe that the matter could be dealt with by means of an instruction …

Withdraw it and reintroduce it.

… or perhaps the hon. the Minister would at this late stage withdraw the Bill and reintroduce it tomorrow. There ought to be ways of obviating any difficulties there may be. I am just mentioning all these aspects because time is running out. I assume that when I resume my seat the hon. the Minister is going to reply to this debate. By that time he will have had to make up his mind as to what he is going to do. I would be very grateful to him if he would consider whatever is possible and do whatever is necessary.

If he needs more time to consider, I’ll speak.

Well, there is a fair proposition.

Please save me from that!

In view of the fact that all aspects of this Bill and all the principles contained therein have been fully canvassed, I do not think it is necessary for me to recanvass any of the points. The only additional point I want to make is that I believe that whenever anything is to be done in terms of this Bill, there must be an opportunity for everybody who is affected to state his case. He should have the opportunity to question or to cross-examine anybody, any witness, who has information. Whenever steps are taken which are going to be detrimental to any person mentioned in this Bill or any person affected by this Bill, such person should have a hearing. It is certainly not clear from the provisions of this Bill that this will be the case. It may be that the hon. the Minister was thinking of introducing a regulations clause in order to make provision for that, but I feel that it should be incorporated in this Bill. The Bill should provide that everyone affected by any decision taken by anyone along the line of authority as stipulated in this Bill, should be given an opportunity to state his case, to cross-examine witnesses and to have a fair hearing.

I do not believe that there is anything further to be said on this measure apart from asking the hon. the Minister to give very careful attention to the appointment of a Select Committee, which I suspect he is going to appoint.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to preface my remarks by replying in brief to one point which was raised by the hon. member for Wynberg. I have listened to him very carefully and I could not understand how he and his colleague from Constantia could possibly be representing the opinion of one and the same party. The hon. member for Constantia, who is after all the main speaker on finance and economic affairs on that side of the House, said that had it not been for the fact that the Trade Coupons Act provisions had been incorporated into this Bill, he would have called this Bill model legislation. In other words, he was prepared to accept not only in principle, but also in detail—with a few exceptions—the Bill itself except those clausts which refer to trade coupons. I shall refer to that again.

*When I moved the Second Reading of this legislation I pointed out inter alia that, owing to the ingenuity of many businessmen, it had become necessary to have a protective measure, or further protective measure, to protect the general consumer public. I want to say at once that the businessmen against whom steps are most likely to be taken within the ambit of this legislation, will be a minority in the business world. I believe that the majority of the businessmen adhere to the ordinary business codes and codes of behaviour relating to the promotion of their business concern, and that these codes are able to withstand the test which the Bill imposes. It remains a fact that I have indicated that there are nevertheless people in the business community who, through certain advertising and promotion programmes and through other trade practices, act to the general detriment of the public and to the detriment of their own profession. In view of this it has become necessary to consider what steps ought to be taken. I went on to point out that in the private sector itself steps had already been taken on the part of the consumers, on the one hand, to protect the consumer public against practices which could be regarded as undesirable, such as advertisements that are misleading or fraudulent. This action on the part of the private sector was not confined to the consumer public; even businessmen convened among themselves to establish certain codes of behaviour. In other words, I think that what has happened in the private sector is sufficient indication that a need exists for action against certain practices and certain methods of promotion. It is also true that, by the nature of the case, the scope and effectiveness of the actions of the private sector are limited by the fact that it cannot enforce the actions it takes. Then the question arises, quite rightly I think, whether the Government, the State, does not also have a function to fulfil in this regard, namely to supplement those steps taken by the private sector and confer on them the sanction of law. I really do not think there is anyone who will differ with, me when I say that in this specific regard the State, the public sector also has responsibility of taking action. The fact remains that this specific legislation which this hon. House is now considering, is in fact one of a group of measures supplementing other measures which already exist and which protect the interests of the consumer.

I hasten to add that I do not consider this legislation to be a protective measure exclusively for the consumer; I also consider it to be a protective measure for a specific trade or profession. I want to suggest that this specific legislation has a protective component for those businessmen who allow themselves to be guided by those codes which one would like to have in the business world. Therefore I want to emphasize that, since it is my responsibility inter alia to give attention to the business world and its interests, all we are doing is not, with this legislation, to write a generally derogatory testimonial on the businessmen of our country, but in this way to exclude the small minority from their ranks. I think that, seen in this way, it is not a matter of our wanting to play off the interests of the businessmen as businessmen against the interests of the consumers as consumers, but that we want to protect the consumers against the small minority that has abused the rights of individuals—this is for the information of the hon. member for Johannesburg North—to the detriment of the general interest, which must after all be the final criterion. I have said that in spite of the steps which have already been taken by the private sector, and in spite of the existing legislation which is already on the Statute Book, the need has arisen for further legislation, and that need is the cause of the legislation which this House is now considering. It is not correct to maintain, as the hon. member for Wynberg did, that we wish to pilot this legislation through. Parliament in great haste. On the contrary, the fact of the matter is that this legislation has already appeared on the Order Paper of this House in another form. Therefore the process which preceded the introduction of this legislation in this specific form which we now have before us was a long one.

I should now like to come to the approach of the various parties. I want to say at once that it was very interesting to see that what the hon. members who belong to the various parties or groups on the opposite side actually tried to use this legislation for was to get at one another and to criticize or attack one another’s standpoints or actions. Although this was probably a very interesting exercise on their part, it contributed very little to this debate and to the constructive legislation before us. The hon. member for Jeppe went to great lengths to explain why they did not support what had been advocated by the hon. member for Johannesburg North and why they were not doing what the hon. member for Yeoville had done either. With exception of the arguments advanced by the hon. member for Constantia, the hon. member for Walmer and the hon. member for Berea, the other arguments were in fact aimed at justifying themselves, not in regard to the legislation but to the other groups, at justifying their own actions in this specific regard. In respect of the principle of this legislation, it is necessary to evaluate the standpoints of hon. members on the opposite side. I accept that when we do this, the arguments used by hon. members to support their standpoint must also serve to support the amendments which they proposed. I think hon. members will agree with me in this regard.

†Sir, if I have to make this evaluation, I should like to start with the hon. member for Constantia. The hon. member has moved an amendment and I shall have to read this amendment in order to make my point. The amendment reads—

In support of this amendment, the hon. member argued that there were good features about the Bill and there were bad features about it. He went on to say—I am just taking his general argument—that a bad feature of the Bill was the inclusion of the provisions of the old Trade Coupons Act. He said that he himself believed that the Trade Coupons Act served a very useful purpose. In fact, he went further. He said that he was quite prepared by means of a separate enactment to improve those provisions by, among other things, including services in that particular Act. In other words, the argument of the hon. member was that the provisions protecting the public were the good features of this Bill. He also went on to say that the Trade Coupons Act had good features as well and that he would have supported amendments to that Act had we dealt with that Act separately.

That is correct, but you are changing the meaning of it.

No, I am not. I shall come to that. His argument against the incorporation in this Bill of the provisions of the Trade Coupons Act was that we were extending the application of that Act because of the fact that we are widening the definitions in this Bill of “sale” and “advertising”. I think that the hon. member will agree with me that I have not quoted him incorrectly thus far. However, what did the hon. member for Walmer do? He argued from the premise that the Trade Coupons Act was an antiquated measure and that it had fallen away simply because of disuse.

In the context of this Bill.

No, Sir.

*The hon. member for Walmer must not tell me now that this is implicit in the meaning of this Bill. Both he and the hon. member for Jeppe argued that the provisions of the Trade Coupons Act dated from the ’twenties when other circumstances prevailed, and that as a result of the fact that this Act was no longer being used today, it had in fact fallen away through disuse. Let us be fair now. If the real objection of the hon. member for Constantia had resided or was implicit in the fact that he was opposed to the inclusion of the provisions of the Trade Coupons Act in this Bill, and had he supported the other protective measures appearing in the remainder of that legislation, he could easily have proposed by way of an amendment that the provisions he did not like should be deleted from the Bill. Surely he could then have supported the remainder of the Bill. If my argument is correct, then this question occurs to me: Why is this ambiguous attitude being adopted? I should like to furnish the reply to this question, which is in the first place that many of those hon. members represent very big capital and very big business interests in this country, but to enable them to sit where they are sitting today, even if it is in diminished numbers, they need the vote of the consumer, and for that reason they are trying to have the best of both worlds. On the one hand they have to protect the rights of the consumer, but on the other they must contrive to escape from a dilemma. [Interjection.] I am coming back to the hon. member for Walmer. They must, as I say, pay lip service to the protection of the Tights of the consumer, but they must nevertheless try to escape from their dilemma, and for that reason they are proposing that we should act in this specific manner. I repeat: If the hon. member for Constantia and his party associates were in earnest with their arguments in respect of the trade coupon legislation, they could have supported the remainder of the legislation and have moved amendments in respect of this portion. Sir, I go further. The hon. member for Constantia was followed by the hon. member for Walmer, who contradicted himself and the hon. member for Constantia. The first respect in which he contradicted himself, was that he did not share the view of the hon. member for Constantia on the necessity for or the desirability of the trade coupon legislation. He said that it had fallen away through disuse, and in this he was supported by the hon. member for Jeppe. To prove his case, he made two conflicting statements. Firstly he said that this legislation, except for those portions dealing with trade coupons was necessary because there was a large sector of the public which was not as sophisticated as other sectors, but then he went further and when he came to the provisions dealing with trade coupons he said that the community was very sophisticated; that what was valid in 1926 was no longer valid today, and that these provisions could therefore disappear. In this statement he was in turn followed by the hon. member for Yeoville. They quoted the Palmolive case—for what purpose? To allege, as a result of the penalty meted out in that case, that the judge did not regard the offence to be a serious one. As you know, Sir, jurists have a greater responsibility than other professions when they cite cases in a court, or anywhere else for that matter, for the concept of uberrima fides has to apply to them. What were the facts in this case which hon. members on the opposite side used to try to prove that the courts did not regard offences in terms of the trade coupon legislation in a serious light? In the first place they omitted to tell us that the light penalty imposed in this specific case, was fundamentally due to the fact that the person concerned had originally acted on legal advice. And this was the basis, that this person had not acted maliciously.

That is what I said.

No, it is no use the hon. member trying to justify himself now. The fact remains that the basis was, not the degree of the offence, not the regularity of the motives, or not that the Act should or need no longer exist, but in fact that this person, before he took the specific action, went to a lawyer and asked whether what he was doing was lawful or unlawful. He was advised that it was lawful. On those grounds the judge felt under the circumstances that it was not all that serious.

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, has the hon. the Minister the right, when one has mentioned some aspect of the case in which the judgment was given, to accuse a member of this side of the House of lacking uberrima fides?

I did not do that.

You made accusations.

I did not accuse the hon. member. I said it was an obligation which rests on our profession.

The hon. the Minister did not refer to the hon. member specifically.

I did not accuse the hon. member. He, and not I, must decide whether it is applicable to him. I am speaking for myself here. But let us come to the second amendment which we have before us, the amendment of the hon. member for Johannesburg North. Do you know, Sir, what he proposed? This—

†Now, Sir, let us assume for a moment that these are the true reasons why the hon. member opposes this Bill. Then he could surely easily have solved his problem by moving, or indicating that he would move, a curtailment of my power and that of the Secretary for Commerce. He could have taken measures to protect the people who would be affected by this Bill, in terns of the rules of procedure of this House. But he has not done that. The hon. member for Yeoville has indicated that he has amendments. He has indicated that the objections that he has to this Bill could be acommodated by amending the Bill. But I would suggest that because the hon. member for Johannesburg North has not followed that procedure, I must look for another reason for his opposing this Bill, and I think such a reason exists.

*But what surprises me is that those hon. members profess to be the apologists for the rights of the lesser privileged members of our society. They are the people who accuse us of withholding rights from other people while they, in terms of the image which they have created for themselves, are known as the people who protect the interests of others. But when those rights conflict in general with the actions of small minorities, what does the hon. member do then? What does the hon. member do when the rights of millions of consumers—many of them, in the words of the hon. member for Walmer, unsophisticated or not trained to the same extent as the hon. member for Johannesburg North—are threatened in terms of real things—not these things which are based on fiction, but real things, their basic rights? What does he do when these are set off against the rights of small minorities representing the major business interests of our country. Whose rights apply then: Those of these people for whom pose as apologists, or the major financial power whom they represent? I want to emphasize that I find it shocking that when we come to this House to adopt protective measures which are in the first place intended for the lesser developed groups in our society, or the less sophisticated people in our society, it is in fact those hon. members, who point accusing fingers at us, who do not want these protective measures adopted to protect these people. It is high time the public outside took cognizance of this ambiguity in their words and actions.

I want to point out a second aspect in regard to the speech made by the hon. member for Johannesburg North. He moved an amendment to legislation which is being introduced to adopt administrative measures so that malpractices may be eliminated, and in his amendment he implies that we are infringing the rule of law and the rights of individuals. In my opinion such an amendment to legislation of this nature is nothing but to make a farce, firstly of the definition of the rule of law and, secondly, of the rights of individuals. Does the consumer who is misled by fraudulent advertisements not have individual rights as well, and are the individual rights of the larger group of the population not more important than that of a small group that is exploiting others? No, Sir, when we debate legislation of this nature, legislation directly affecting these people, we should really not choose so blatantly to protect interests other than the interests of these people whom we wish to protect. The criterion is going to be whether we can succeed in doing this. The hon. member did not try to remove from this legislation the harm which he sees in it; he condemned the legislation per se.

I want to return to the individual arguments of hon. members, but before doing so I want to hasten to reassure the hon. member for Wynberg. I intend referring the legislation to a Select Committee, but I envisage doing this only after we have disposed of the Second Reading, after we have accepted the principles which are contained in the legislation therefore.

†The hon. member for Constantia has said that the faults that he finds with the rest of the Bill, which represents the good things which he lauds, are mostly in respect of the formulation of the provisions of the Bill. I believe that if we refer the Bill after Second Reading to a Select Committee, the necessary improvements in the drafting can be effected.

The hon. member maintains that “self specifically … includes, as part of a sale, advertising in general terms”, i.e. if I understand him correctly.

*According to the hon. member the existing Trade Coupons Act, 1935, prohibits the giving of a coupon with an actual sale. I want to refer to this Act as it reads at present and as it is being repeated in the Bill. The spirit of the Trade Coupons Act is in the first place to prohibit trade coupons, is it not?

In connection with a sale.

Yes, in connection with a sale, yes, but the point is that the law as such prohibits the giving of a trade coupon—that is the principle—except in certain circumstances. The point I am trying to make, and which I think the hon. member will appreciate, is that the general approach of the 1935 Act is to prohibit trade coupons connected with a sale.

Yes, connected with a sale.

The only coupons that are allowed in connection with a sale are those that conform to the exceptions to the general rule, to the general prohibition.

*Now I may point out that section 2(1)(d) of the Trade Coupons Act of 1935 also prohibits the selling, supplying or giving of a trade coupon to a person engaged in the sale of goods to be issued in connection with the sale of goods. The argument I want to settle with the hon. member is this: If the principle is correct that the giving of a trade coupon in regard to the sale of an article is permissible, the hon. member accepts this—how can he argue that the giving of a trade coupon, linked to an advertisement for sale purposes, should not be prohibited?

They are two different things.

I cannot understand the hon. member’s logic. He concedes that the giving of a trade coupon with a sale is and ought to be invalid, but he says this should not be the case with an advertisement for sale purposes. Therefore I cannot understand his logic in this regard. According to the hon. member the Bill as it now reads will prohibit the giving away of trade coupons through an advertisement or an advertising campaign. He also said that this prohibition would impede the advertising of goods or services over the radio. I believe that at most the hon. member may suggest that doubt exists—I want to concede this much to the hon. member—in regard to the permissibility in terms of the proposed legislation—I am not referring now to my amendment which appears on the Order Paper—of certain competitions. The amendment which I have placed on the Order Paper will in my opinion solve this problem. The hon. member is also objecting because prospective buyers are being denied the right to collect a benefit or advantage by means of a coupon at a supermarket. The hon. member for Jeppe mentioned an example. I want to say at once that such trade coupons are also prohibited by the existing Act, in those cases where the acquisition of a benefit or other advantage is linked to an actual sale as a discount. [Interjections.] We can argue about this until we are blue in the face, but it is a fact.

The hon. member pointed out—I concede that point to him—that there are certain competitions of which newspapers and periodicals avail themselves. In this case I think that the amendment will be able to accommodate the problem the hon. member has. In addition the hon. member referred to the proposed powers which the Minister is receiving in terms of clause 12. Although the Minister may inter alia prohibit the giving of a benefit with the advertising of goods for sale, the Minister shall in any event exercise the power in the way recommended by the advisory committee. The committee will therefore have to recommend that the offer of a benefit in an advertisement is undesirable before the Minister may take action in this specific regard. Incidentally, I do not agree that the powers which are being given to the Minister are too wide. On the contrary. I maintain that the powers are limited. The hon. member for Yeoville indicated that he thought certain of the powers should be widened. If I could hear what else the hon. member has to say in this regard, I could give consideration to it. The Minister’s actions are strictly within the framework of the advice which he receives from the committee, and he may not deviate from that.

On the contrary. If one were to look at clause 16, one would find that the Minister has to publish the advice together with the notice prohibiting the specific action, which then makes it clear to the general public that he has followed the advice of the committee. If we then consider the composition of the committee and the restriction—which is welcomed—on the number of people from the public sector who may serve on it, we must, after all, accept that all the discipline in the private sector will be represented on the committee, and that the advice with which the Minister will be provided will be private sector oriented. Another hon. member advocated that the committee should be consumer-oriented, but the fact remains that the Committee will at least be private sector orientated. I therefore want to contend that the prohibitions, the provisions which the hon. the Minister may lay down in terms of clause 12 of the Bill, may only be laid down on the advice of the committee. That advice may not be deviated from. The restrictions on the Minister are situated (a) in the composition of the committee which is to provide him with advice and (b) in the fact that he may not deviate substantially from the committee. As far as the giving away of trade coupons in an advertising campaign is concerned the hon. member stated that the words “in connection with the sale of any goods” should also include the concept of “in connection with an advertising campaign”. In my opinion this will not be the case, but I think that the Select Committee will be able to consider this specific aspect.

I come now to the hon. member for Walmer. I have already said that he not only contradicted himself, but the hon. member for Constantia as well.

That is of course incorrect.

However, he put certain questions to me to which I should very much like to reply. In the first place he asked me what bodies had been consulted before this legislation was introduced. I intend replying to him on this score. Let me say at once that not all the bodies agree on the form of the legislation. I am saying this in all fairness. I am saying this in all fairness. In fact, I do not think we will ever achieve complete unanimity on legislation of this nature. The bodies consulted were the following: The S.A. Co-ordinating Consumer Council, the Association of Law Societies, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Newspaper Press Union of South Africa, the Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa, the S.A. Society of Marketers, Ltd.—I conducted personal interviews with the latter —Assocom, the Grocery Manufacturers Association, the Radio Appliances and Television Association, the S.A. Handelsinstituut, Mr. F. C. Marcus, the Pharmacists Association of South Africa, P. W. Morkel of the firm Phil Morkel, and Tucsa. In other words, this was not an over-hasty measure—I am mentioning this for the information of the hon. member for Wynberg—but a measure which in my opinion was preceded by more consultation than any legislation introduced here. I realize that we are breaking new ground with this legislation, and I should like to give this hon. House the assurance that if it is demonstrated in practice that there are provisions in the legislation which are unreasonably restricting lawful and sound business activities, I shall bring it to this House myself for amendment. I do not want to suggest that we are achieving perfection with this legislation, but I do want to say that people who are better qualified to discuss the details of malpractices than we are, spent a great deal of time shaping this legislation into its present form for us. In addition the hon. member requested that we be very careful not to appoint people to the committee who have interests to represent. I hope I understood him correctly. In other words people should not be appointed to this committee who will have specific interests, instead of general interests, to promote. However, it will be difficult to appoint people to the committee who do not, in their private capacity, represent certain interests. However, I can guarantee one thing, which is that we must appoint people of very high integrity to the committee, people who are able to relegate their personal interests to the background and to put the general interest first. I hope the hon. member agrees with that. The point I want to make with reference to the arguments of the hon. member for Constantia, the hon. member for Walmer, the hon. member for Jeppe and the hon. member for Wynberg, is that I do not intend, for the reasons I have mentioned, deleting the sections relating to trade coupons. I am prepared—as I have indicated— to refer the legislation to a Select Committee after the Second Reading has been passed.

This brings me very briefly—since I am trying to deal with this matter in general rather than in detail—to the hon. member for Johannesburg North. I have already said that I do not agree with his motivation and that, similarly, I do not agree that his amendment, particularly in respect of the powers of the Minister and the Secretary is a well-founded one. I agree with him even less when he alleges that this legislation constitutes an infringement of the rule of law or of the rights of individuals, an infringement which in the latter case is not justifiable vis-à-vis the majority rights of the greater number of individuals. Inter alia the hon. member referred to the fact that the legislation discriminates with regard to goods, persons and areas. I want to say at once that this is an essential component of the legislation. It is frequently necessary to discriminate in order to achieve equality. The hon. member for Berea mentioned a good example of such discrimination in advertising, for he advocated that we should, in regard to liquor advertisements, take far more frequent and stringent action than in other cases. I can understand that a great many cases may arise where one will make another arrangement in respect of a certain product than in respect of other commodities. Often the action itself is not prohibited, but only a specific form of that action. I shall mention an example. The action of selling across the counter need not necessarily be prohibited, while a sale through the post may in fact be prohibited. Then one is discriminating between the two. I can give the hon. member examples ad nauseam of why it is necessary to discriminate in this specific regard.

The hon. member referred inter alia to the powers of inspectors and also to the indemnity provision against damages. I think that other hon. members have already replied to that, but if the hon. member were to glance at the relevant provisions in clauses 7 and 8 in this specific regard, he would find that in terms of clause 7 the Secretary issues instructions as to what shall be investigated. In clause 8 it is provided that the inspector shall investigate the business, and it is provided what he may disclose. He may disclose nothing except what is specified in the Bill. Surely this is very clear.

†I should like to refer the hon. member to clause 8, which reads—

1. (a) for the purpose of performing his duties or functions in terms of this Act; or
2. (b) when required by order of any competent court or in terms of any law;
3. (c) when authorized beforehand thereto by writing by the secretary or any person acting on behalf of and on the instructions of the business in question.

If he will now refer to clause 7, he will see there that—

1. (1) Any inspector furnished with inspection authority in writing by the secretary, may conduct investigations to gather such information as the secretary may desire or to determine whether the provisions of this Act are being or have been complied with …

In other words, the Secretary only has the authority to instruct an inspector to carry out such inspections as will prove whether the provisions of this Act are being or have been complied with.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

Let me just finish my argument first. The hon. member went further and asked about legal privileges. He asked whether the lawyer is protected. In fact, he suggested that the lawyer was not protected, but the privileges of the legal profession are not in any way interfered with. It is a common law obligation on him and similar provisions have been interpreted by the courts as not detracting at all from the privileges of the legal profession and their clients.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether he will ask his legal advisers, if he has not already done so, to confirm the legal interpretation he has given to the first three lines of clause 8, because this is where my interpretation differs from that of the hon. the Minister. These three lines are the ones by which the argument stands or falls.

In reply to that question I can say that I have consulted the legal advisers and that they confirm my own conclusions. I do not intend taking what the hon. member said any further, except to say that we have made the provisions to which he referred as restrictive as possible.

I would like to refer now to the provision indemnifying the inspector against a claim for damages. This indemnification only applies to him in the performance of his duties and not when he acts with, malice or injurious intent. In that case he is not protected.

What about negligence?

In that case he is protected. As other hon. members have indicated, this provision, using similar terminology, applies in other legislation of this nature. Were it not for this provision, the object of this legislation would be defeated completely. Therefore I do not propose to go further with the hon. member for Johannesburg North.

*The hon. member for Yeoville raised various arguments. In view of the fact that I am going to refer this legislation to a Select Committee, I do not want to react in detail again to his arguments. I hope he will understand this. I want to say to him at once that by the nature of the case differences of opinion exist as to what are and are not undesirable trade practices. Naturally differences of opinion will also exist between he and I in regard to the benefits which I mentioned. For that reason I am not going to say that my opinion is decisive and his not. For that very reason I want to ask experts, who can reach, a consensus within the various disciplines, what trade practices ought in their opinion to be prohibited. I think that hon. members will understand my decision in this regard. This applies equally to the advertising industry. The hon. member says he likes door-to-door salesmen, and the hon. member for Carletonville says he does not like them at all. Apparently the hon. member for Yeoville is able to withstand such sales methods. He even succeeds in doing this in politics! I can understand that a difference of opinion could exist. That is the point I want to make.

†I come now to the hon. member for Berea.

May I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

Certainly.

In relation to the provisions of clause 14, which deals with the question of advertising, does the hon. the Minister have in mind to use the provisions of this clause to ban almost completely advertisements relating to liquor and cigarettes?

No, I do not have that in mind.

Why not?

I shall explain in due course. I sympathize with, the sentiments expressed by the hon. member for Berea in regard to, among other things, the advertising of liquor.

*I am fully aware that here are people who object to a Springbok athlete or rugby player always being associated in the mind of a child with beer or liquor. Many strong arguments could probably be advanced in favour of that specific standpoint. However, we must see what this legislation is dealing with. In the first place this legislation is dealing with advertisements which are misleading or fraudulent; i.e. advertisements containing elements of fraud. I am not saying that we cannot adopt other measures to give implementation to the sentiments subscribed to by the hon. member. I received the advertisement he sent me of the young seven-year-old boy sitting on a Van Dyck carpet, smoking a cigarette. It could just as well have been the hon. member for Wynberg. It seems to me as if he could have been seven years old when the legislation in regard to trade coupons came into operation.

He has not grown any older since then. [Interjections.]

The hon. member asked me whether I intended giving consideration to giving some of our coloured population groups representation on the Advisory Committee. The reply to that is “yes”. They are involved in this. They ought to have representation on that Committee. The hon. member also referred to the inspectors, and as far as I was able to ascertain, tried to justify his position vis-à-vis the arguments of the hon. member for Yeoville.

May I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

Certainly.

Could the hon. the Minister indicate whether it is his intention that the advertising of alcoholic beverages will now fall under this Bill and not under the arrangement which the hon. the Minister of Justice has at present?

I have not read the particular provisions of the other Act, and I think that at this stage it would be wrong for me to give the hon. member a direct answer. I shall, however, consider the position and reply in due course.

There is no Act involved.

I thought the hon. member said in terms of the Act?

No, there is no Act.

Well, then, in that case all advertising that is not covered by any other Act, will fall under the purview of this Bill.

*The hon. member also quoted interesting examples of other legislation and the provisions contained therein. I just want to give him this general assurance: We are going into the advertising and promotion mediums very closely, to ensure that the consumer public is not exploited. Hon. members will understand that although I sympathize with all sentiments, including the sentiments of the hon. member for Carletonville, I have to consider the object of this legislation in constrast to other legislation which may possibly deal with other facets.

I come now to the hon. member for Carletonville. I want to thank him for a very interesting contribution. This afternoon was apparently, as far as he was concerned, an occasion for confessions. I am referring here to the method which he employed to increase his virility and which did not work. That may perhaps explain why he is so strongly opposed to advertising. I want to say at once that if I had had a similar experience it would perhaps have evoked from me the same strong reaction as it did from him. Sir, the hon. member put certain questions, and I assume that he meant me to reply to them. I should very much like to reply to a few of the questions he put. It is not a problem to reply to them. The problem is whether I can make provision for them in the legislation we are now considering. I think the hon. member will understand this. The hon. member asked me whether it is morally justifiable to stimulate an artificial demand among millions of poor people through advertising. This legislation is intended at least to protect the public against false or misleading advertising. The hon. member referred, inter alia, to advertisements which were detrimental to the moral norms of the public; on that score I can agree with him, but I cannot accommodate it within this legislation, as the hon. member will understand. There are many things which he said on which I am able to agree with him, but within the ambit of the legislation as it stands, I unfortunately cannot take this matter any further.

†Then I come to the hon. member for Jeppe, who referred to the cases mentioned by the hon. member for Walmer, I have already dealt with that. But the hon. member went further and made a plea that I should excise the provisions of the Trade Coupons Act from this Bill, and so did the hon. member for Wynberg. They thought that this would be an improvement. I think we must agree to disagree on this particular aspect.

*The hon. member for Wynberg quoted the United Kingdom legislation to me. Without detracting from the effectiveness of that legislation, I want to say at once that it does not, as far as I know, cover this aspect of trade coupons. I may be wrong.

Sir, in conclusion I just want to thank the hon. members for Paarl, Wonderboom and Klerksdorp very sincerely for their contributions. It made my task much easier. I also want to thank all the other hon. members who participated in the debate very sincerely, whether I agreed with their views or not.

Question put: That all the words after “That” stand part of the Question,

Upon which the House divided:

Tellers: J. M. Henning, N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda and W. L. van der Merwe.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Question affirmed and amendments moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter, Mr. G. H. Waddell and Mr. H. H. Schwarz dropped.

Bill accordingly read a Second Time.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, in the first place I want to reply to a few points raised by the hon. member for Durban North in connection with the form in which the Bill was submitted to this House. I agree with the criticism which has been levelled by the hon. member that discussion has been made very difficult because clause 3 consists of a great many substantive and independently proposed sections. In my humble opinion his criticism is valid. However, the department has acted in all good faith and was apparently under the impression that because it was only a matter of re-writing the sections of the existing Act, they would not elicit a great deal of discussion. Apparently they underestimated the virility of Parliament, and the result was that there was so much chopping and changing in the debate that it was almost impossible to conduct a disciplined debate. I want to apologize to those hon. members who have participated in the debate for any inconvenience caused to them because of this, and I shall ask my department to inform the legal draftsmen that this kind of grouping should preferably be avoided in future to make it easier for us to conduct a debate.

I now come to the hon. member for Jeppe, who moved as an amendment that a description of the offence be added at the end of subsection (2) of the proposed section 44. In support of his argument the hon. member quoted certain dicta of Mr. Justice Tindall. I want to express my appreciation to the hon. member for the thorough study he has made of this section and give him the assurance that I have given very serious consideration to his amendment. After consideration I have, however, decided that I am unable to accept the amendment. As I read the section, the article has to be identified. The identification of the article is the most important aspect of the warrant. The article may be identified in two ways. In the first place, it may be identified directly and by name and, in the second place, it may be identified by means of a reference to an offence. Therefore, if the warrant does not refer directly to a specific article which has to be seized, it may be laid down in the warrant that an article may be seized which relates to, for example, a theft. If the article is identified directly, a reference to the offence in the warrant would, of course, be superfluous. I think the hon. member will concede my point. This has been stated in the court cases which the hon. member referred to. I quote the following passage from the Cine Film case, which was mentioned by the hon. member—

I also want to quote the following words from the case—

This is the most important aspect of this proposed section. I quote further—

This quotation comes from Pullen N.O., Bartman N.O., & Orr v. Waja, 1929 T.P.D., 838. The argument of the hon. member to the effect that he is of the opinion that the person who is going to be searched will be happier if mention is made of the offence, is, in my humble opinion, not a valid argument, because this is basically covered by the proposed new section 43. I am referring now to the specific argument advanced by the hon. member to the effect that one would find it more satisfactory if one knew to which offence such a warrant referred. However, one should bear in mind the wording of the new section 43, which reads as follows—

1. (a) which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offence, whether within the Republic or elsewhere;
2. (b) which may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission of an offence, whether within the Republic or elsewhere; or
3. (c) which is intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to be intended to be used in the commission of an offence.

The proposed new section 44(1) reads as follows—

1. (a) by a magistrate or justice, if it appears to such magistrate or justice from information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that any such article is in the possession or under the control of any person or upon or at any premises within his area of jurisdiction; or
2. (b) by a judge or judicial officer presiding at criminal proceedings if it appears to such judge or judicial officer that any such article in the possession or under the control of any person or upon or at any premises is required in evidence at such proceedings.

What my counter-argument amounts to is that when a search warrant is, in fact, issued I know that it has been issued by a judicial officer on the basis of information furnished under oath, and in this way, I, as a person would be satisfied with the fact that a warrant has been issued to search for a certain article. I also want to quote to the hon. member a passage from the case South African Police v. South African Associated Newspapers, which was reported in 1966. I should like to quote what is stated on pages 511G and 512D. In the first place, I refer to page 511G, where the learned judge had this to say—

The point which is made here, is that this search warrant is issued by a responsible person who has been placed in the position to investigate whether or not there are good grounds for the suspicions of the policeman concerned. Consequently it is not necessary to refer to an offence in the warrant, because the onus is placed on the judicial officer to ascertain whether this specific section relates to some offence or other. When such an officer is satisfied, why should the hon. member and I not be satisfied too? I now want to set out to the hon. member further problems which will arise if I accept his amendment. I quote from the Cine Film case, from which he also quoted. I want to quote what the hon. Mr. Justice Galgut said on page 585 before the appeal.

However, I first want to furnish again the facts of the case. The Police received a warrant to seize a set of films. At that stage it was almost impossible to say precisely in terms of which section these films should be seized. I now quote the words of Mr. Justice Galgut—

These grounds are laid down in terms of the Act. I proceed—

In my humble opinion this passage indicates that it is not always possible to stipulate the offence precisely in a search warrant. That specific article, for which the search is conducted, could be an article which relates to different kinds of offences. Therefore, it is not always possible to stipulate in a search warrant that a specific offence is involved in the case. I want to emphasize that the most important aspect of this whole matter is the article itself. By way of summary, I want to quote to my hon. friend again a passage in connection with the Cine Film case. I am now referring to the Appeal Court case. I am referring to page 260H of the Law Report of the Appeal Court case—

What has happened here, was that the basis of their attack was the objection to the issuing of the warrant. I quote further—

In other words, it is quite clearly indicated in this Appeal Court case that a person who feels himself aggrieved by the issuing of a search warrant, has the right to go to court in any event to dispute the issuing of such warrant. He has the right to do so. When one considers every aspect involved in this matter, what would one achieve by specifying the article as well as the offence? In the first place, one is not always able to put one’s finger on the offence. All the presiding officer has to do, is to consider all the possibilities. After he has considered all the possibilities, he should be in a position to say that it is reasonable to believe that there might be an offence and that the article which is being searched for could quite possibly be the article which could prove this offence. If this is his approach he has to issue the warrant. I want to repeat that I found this a very interesting discussion, but I am of the opinion that we would be placing too many restrictions on the person who has to issue the warrant if we were also to compel him to indicate the offence in the warrant.

I now want to refer to the amendments moved by the hon. member for Houghton. The first amendment asked for by the hon. member reads as follows, and I quote—

†I do not see the hon. member for Houghton here this afternoon. Apparently she is still busy with her conference in which she is deciding whether or not to join forces with other parties. In the circumstances she probably finds such a conference of more importance than the amendments which she has moved. If one looks at subsection (1) of the section in question, one finds that it relates to the search for an article in possession of a person or upon certain premises. It need not specifically be a particular person. The article may be on certain premises. If that is so, it is impossible to identify the person before the time. The hon. member wants us to put in an amendment to the effect that before the execution of the warrant takes place, they must hand a copy of the warrant “to any person whose rights in respect of any search or article seized under the warrant have been affected”. If the search warrant is for a certain object on certain premises, how can the Police possibly know before the time whose rights are affected by the seizure of such an article? As the hon. members who have done their homework will know, people whose rights have been affected can come back later and demand that the search warrant be handed over to them in terms of this section. That can then be done. If the person says that he has a certain right and that an article which belongs to him has been taken, the Police officer then says that he has a search warrant and that he had the right to take that article. It is, however, quite impossible, in terms of the amendment moved by the hon. member, for the Police to find out whose rights will be affected when they have to search premises and at what stage those rights will be affected. For that reason I am not prepared to accept the first amendment of the hon. member for Houghton. The second amendment reads as follows—

At least the hon. member for Houghton has done her homework in that she has gone back to the old Act; she has taken the exact wording of the old Act. That is exactly why we are here amending the old Act, to get rid of that which no longer applies. If one looks at the amendment as it stands one finds that it contains the words: “Provided that any such search shall as far as possible …” If I may say so with great respect, the words “as far as possible” and “in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants” are actually so vague, as we say in the law, as to be embarrassing. What does “as far as possible” mean? At what stage will the policeman say that he did so “as far as possible”? Who can deny it when he says that it was not possible? Secondly, who are “respectable inhabitants”? Where must the policeman find respectable inhabitants? If I were to follow the view of the hon. member for Houghton, the only respectable inhabitant would be members of the Progressive Party. If I were to follow the view of the United Party, the only respectable inhabitants would be the members of the United Party.

If I were to follow my own view, the only respectable inhabitants would be members of my party. I say this to illustrate to the hon. member how many difficulties one can have with this particular amendment. Unfortunately, too, I have to tell the hon. member for Houghton that my view is shared by the General Bar Council of South Africa. This was actually changed on the request of the General Bar Council. Unfortunately the hon. member for Houghton did not do her homework well enough to find this out. If the hon. member had asked me, I would have told her that the General Bar Council of South Africa had specially requested me to remove this particular portion of the old Act and to change it to what we have in this Bill which is before the House.

May I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

I wonder whether the hon. member would not rather take the opportunity of making his speech after I have finished with mine.

I can only speak after the hon. the Minister has answered my question.

Have you had your three turns to speak?

I have one more to go.

You still have one more? Are you going to use it or not? We are still busy with clause 3 in any case.

The question arises out of what the hon. the Minister has just said a minute ago. Did I hear correctly when he said that the Bar Council had requested this particular section?

No, the portion of the section to which this amendment refers. The hon. member for Houghton has moved an amendment which is actually contained in the present Act.

Did you say the General Bar Council had requested that this portion of the section be removed?

That is correct. The General Bar Council requested that this particular portion, which is now contained in the hon. member for Houghton’s amendment, should be deleted from the present Act.

The third amendment of the hon. member for Houghton reads as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I should like to refer the Committee to the provisions of the proposed section 50B. It reads as follows—

In other words, the very thing that the hon. member is asking for—that we should make this subject to the provisions of the proposed section 50B—is already there. There is therefore no sense in asking for something that is already in the Bill. This is her difficulty.

Amendment No. (4) of the hon. member reads as follows—

1. (b) Any person who wrongfully or maliciously or without reasonable cause exercises the powers of search conferred by this section, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred rand and shall in addition to such penalty be liable to pay to the person lawfully in occupation of the premises when the same was searched, such sum by way of damages as the court may award.

Mr. Chairman, in my respectful view this is quite unnecessary. In actual fact the hon. member for Houghton is trying to curtail the rights of the public. She is seeking here to make this kind of offence subject to a fine of R100. In actual fact, if a warrant is defective and a person is searched, that is tantamount to an assault on him. Similarly, if premises are searched with a defective warrant, it is tantamount to trespassing on those premises. The common law rights in this regard therefore stand. Therefore, this is quite unnecessary.

Amendment No. (5) of the hon. member for Houghton reads as follows—

1. (5) On page 6, in line 49, after “such”, where it occurs for the first time, to insert “reasonable”.

The provisions of the Bill contained in the proposed clause 48 which the hon. member is seeking to amend read, inter alia, from line 45 as follows—

1. (i) of carrying out such investigations and of taking such steps as such policeman may consider necessary for the preservation of the internal security…

The hon. member now wants to say “of carrying out such reasonable investigations” and so forth. I wonder if the hon. member for Sea Point knew what he was talking about when he vigorously nodded his head in the affirmative? Let me tell him why. If one inserts the word “reasonable” after the word “such”, one is putting in an objective test. Am I right?

You are on the wrong line.

No, I am not.

Yes, you are. It is proposed to be inserted in the next line.

Yes, that is correct. The hon. member for Houghton wants the provision to read: “such reasonable steps”. The point I want to make is that if one inserts the word “reasonable” before the word “steps”, one is inserting an objective test which has been tested by the courts on umpteen occasions. The court has always to test whether it is reasonable or not. That is an objective test. However, in that same line you have the words “such policeman may consider necessary” and this is a subjective test. Apparently the hon. member for Houghton has no complaint about the subjective test. The policeman as such can take any steps which he, the policeman, considers necessary. That is completely subjective. All he has to do is to go to court and say that he thought such steps were necessary and nobody could fault him on that. However, the steps have to be reasonable steps. The court will then say that that is an objective test. One cannot therefore have an objective test which a court can test as far as the “reasonable” steps are concerned, and then in the same line have a provision where a policeman can take such steps as he considers to be necessary. One cannot have something which the court can test and then in the same breath leave it to the policeman to decide. The latter is a subjective test. That is why I say that I cannot accept her amendment.

Then I come to the sixth amendment of the hon. member for Houghton—

The proposed amendment is already covered by the provisions of subsection (1) of section 50A.

*In amendment No. (7) the hon. member for Houghton suggests that a period of 30 days is too short; she suggests that it should be 60 days. Sir, this is a matter of opinion, and my opinion is that a period of 30 days is a reasonable period for a person, after receiving a notice by registered post to the effect that his rights have been affected, to demand the return of the article concerned. If a person receives a registered letter telling him to inform us within 30 days that the article concerned belongs to him, and if he does not respond within 30 days, I think the State has every right to confiscate such article. Therefore I am not able to accept this amendment either.

I then want to refer to amendment No. (8) by the hon. member for Houghton, as follows—

Sir, the State cannot be expected to have to pay more than it has, in fact, received. In any case, who is going to determine the market value?

There are sworn appraisers.

Articles of this nature are usually sold by way of public auction. This is the best method of determining what the market value is. The State will usually be enriched to the extent of the market value of the article. For that reason the proposed amendment cannot be supported. The hon. member cannot expect the State to pay more for an article than what it could get for it, because that, in fact, is the market value.

It may have no relation to the worth at all.

Amendment No. (9) of the hon. member for Houghton reads as follows—

The words which, according to the amendment, have to be deleted may be superfluous since it is stated earlier in the same paragraph that “the seller be paid out of the proceeds of the sale …”. The hon. member for Houghton should have requested that the words “out of the proceeds of the sale” be deleted as well, because if only the proposed words were deleted, we could come back and say that the consideration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. However, it is the intention to make it quite clear that the seller is not allowed to recover more, for example, from public funds than the proceeds of the sale. The proposed amendment will not take the matter any further and it is therefore suggested that the provision remains unchanged. Amendment No. (10), moved by the hon. member, reads as follows—

This amendment relates to the section which provides that where an offence was committed in a country outside the Republic and an article found in our country is required to prove the offence in such a country, we may surrender to such country such article on application. What the hon. member now wants, is that this should not be an offence in that country, but an offence in the Republic of South Africa. Surely, Sir, this cannot be the case. Every country has its own offences. This offence may or may not be an offence in the Republic. It may be an offence in terms of the common law, but it may also be a statutory offence. Why should we keep in our possession an article when such article has to be surrendered in terms of an international agreement? Therefore I am unable to accept this amendment of the hon. member either.

I now want to deal with the amendment moved by the hon. member for East London City.

Are you going to accept it?

No, unfortunately I am unable to accept it. I know the hon. member should have liked me to accept the amendment, but there is no reason to lay down restrictions concerning offences when we are only concerned with search warrants. Neither does it matter what the nature of the offence is. Any offence justifies a search warrant at least. It need not be the more serious offences mentioned by the hon. member; it may be any offence, and for that reason I am unable to accept this amendment.

As far as the hon. member for Sandton is concerned, he asked me to accept the following amendment—

The hon. member took those words from the old Act as well. Is that correct? Thereupon the hon. member remarked rather derogatorily that it is the tendency of this Government always to facilitate matters for the Police. But the hon. member knows that this is not the case. The hon. member knows that when a policeman knocks on the door and people are trafficking with drugs—dagga or tablets or whatever it may be—it is the easiest thing in the world for those people to get rid of those drugs first. The drugs may simply be thrown into a toilet. Why should this policeman first have to wait until someone tells him he is not allowed to come in, and then enter? Sir, the Americans have exactly the same arrangement. In America it is called the “no knock rule”, for the simple reason that offenders tend to get rid of illegal objects immediately as soon as there is a knock on the door. If the Police were to be tied down, as the hon. member for Sandton wants done, I can assure him even at this stage that we shall never be able to enter into a place where, for example, drug-trafficking is taking place. I now want to tell the hon. member that this is not simply being done because the Government always want to give the Police an advantage, but because this Government wants to fight crime. This is the real reason and the hon. member for Sandton does not want to assist us to do so. In any case, the wording he proposes is so vague that it really amounts to what is already contained in the Act.

I do not think there are any other amendments I still have to deal with.

I am sorry the hon. the Minister has decided not to accept any of the amendments proposed to this clause. Particularly those proposed by the hon. member for Jeppe and those proposed by the hon. member for East London City would, I think, help the position in so far as law enforcement is concerned and in so far as the duties of the Police are concerned. But before I deal with those, let me say at once that we are very pleased with the hon. the Minister’s rather generous and open admission that the manner of legislating as presented in this clause is undesirable. It is most refreshing to have such a statement from an hon. the Minister and we are pleased that he will see to it that this does not happen again.

The amendment moved by the hon. member for Jeppe has quite simply as its objective that the nature of the offence should be mentioned in a search warrant. This does not come just from us, as the hon. the Minister is aware, but from judgments in the Appellate Division and from a judge with the stature of Mr. Justice Tindall. Indeed, in more modern times in the Cine Films case, we find such a request. I think that what one must appreciate is that what the judge said was not that he wanted to set aside the warrant on the basis that it did not mention the offence …

But it has that effect.

Yes.

If such a provision is included, it will become an absolute necessity.

The judge said that if he could, he would do that. In the Cine Films case at page 587, marginal note E, where he talked about the decision in the case of The Minister of Justice and Others V. Desai (1948 (3) S.A.L.R. at p. 395) an Appellate Division case, the judge said—

Perhaps the crux of the matter is contained in the next statement which appears in that judgment—

I think that is perhaps the most important aspect of all in relation to this amendment. The hon. the Minister has said that it is issued by a judicial officer on information given to him on oath. Of course, this is right. He has also pointed out that the person concerned has a right to go to court if his rights have, in fact, been infringed. However, I think this is precisely the reason why it is desirable that this should be in the warrant, because if it is in the warrant, one is better able to test the reasonableness of the decision to exercise the warrant and the reasonableness of the reasons for giving the warrant. In other words, whatever rights are, in fact, infringed can be better determined and the rights of the person whose rights are infringed can be better protected if this is there.

There is another reason which I think the hon. the Minister should have regard to. The Police are obliged to exercise these warrants. The Police do so on information. I think it would help the Police in their task if, in fact, they were able to inform the persons concerned. This is not just my view; it is also the view of the Supreme Court because in the passage I have quoted it is stated that providing the reason for the encroachment on the person’s rights tends not only to allay resentment but to prevent obstruction of the Police, the Police require the public’s co-operation. In fact, the Police would not be able to fulfil their functions without the co-operation of the public. This is in a very delicate field, a field where a person’s private property is affected, where his home is affected and where he is likely to have more resentment and likely to react more violently, if I may put it that way, against an intrusion upon his privacy at home than in almost any other sphere that I can imagine. I think that if the amendment were accepted, it would help the Police in those many cases where they are obliged to search houses of private people, many of whom are often not themselves involved in the commission of an offence, but on whose property or in whose house, for one reason or another, there happens to be a document or something else which might afford evidence in a prosecution in respect of an offence committed by somebody else.

I now want to deal with the amendment moved by the hon. member for East London City. The hon. the Minister said there was no reason for limiting the offences in respect of which a search could be made without a warrant. Perhaps the hon. the Minister should put it somewhat differently. Should he not rather tell us whether in fact he has an offence in mind which is not covered by the offences mentioned in the First Schedule? Obviously he does not want to have the power to search, without a warrant in respect of trivial statutory offences. If the amendment of the hon. member were accepted those trivial statutory offences would be excluded. Indeed, the hon. member for East London City, on the last occasion when we discussed this Bill, set out the various offences in the First Schedule. The offences cover a tremendously wide range. There is a general provision here covering offences “the punishment of which may be a period of imprisonment exceeding six months without the option of a fine”. In other words, the ability to search without a warrant would certainly cover offences under the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances Act and all other offences of a serious nature. It is a most serious invasion of anyone’s privacy, in any event, to be searched or to have his house searched. Without a warrant we feel the right should not exist unless it is in respect of an offence which is not a trivial one. I hope the hon. the Minister will indicate to us which offences he feels are not covered by the First Schedule and why he is not prepared to accept the amendment, because we cannot think of any offences serious enough to warrant a search without a warrant which are not in fact contained in the First Schedule. However, we are open to persuasion if the hon. the Minister can tell us which offences he has in mind.

Mr. Chairman, I listened to the hon. the Minister’s reply to the amendments moved by the hon. member for Houghton, who is absent today, and I would like to come back to her fifth amendment in which she asks for the insertion of the word “reasonable” after “such” and before “steps” in the new section 48(1)(i). As I understood it, the hon. the Minister rejects this amendment because he says that there is a conflict between an objective assessment or definition on the one hand and a subjective one contained in the subsequent words “as such policeman may consider necessary …” on the other. What the hon. the Minister did not reject was introduction of the idea that the steps must be reasonable. There is reference right throughout the section to reasonableness, for example the words “reasonable grounds” in line 33, “reasonable time” in line 46, etc. There is, therefore, a restriction on the action which can be taken, it being limited to being reasonable. Yet, when it comes to the steps an individual policeman may take, there is no qualification whatsoever. The only qualification is “steps such policeman may consider necessary”, but there is no substantive limitation on the steps that he may take. It is left in his discretion although the magistrate has to have reasonable grounds and the warrant must be for a reasonable time. Yet when it comes to the steps taken by a policeman, and the hon. the Minister must admit that the policeman could be unreasonable, there is no qualification. Surely it is the man who in the end takes the final action who should be subject to a certain limitation. Yet this provision is totally unqualified and leaves it purely to the discretion of the policeman, who can therefore be totally unreasonable. We suggest that he may well be. The hon. the Minister says there is a conflict in the hon. member’s amendment between the objective “reasonable” and the subjective “may consider necessary”. I want to put it to the hon. the Minister, however, that in the previous sentence he is involved in exactly the same clash as he suggests the hon. member for Houghton is becoming involved in by virtue of this amendment. In line 45 it is stated that a warrant may be issued authorizing a policeman to enter the premises in question at any reasonable time. The concept “at any reasonable time” is an objective assessment. Who determines the time, however? The relevant passage could well read “any reasonable time which he may consider necessary”. Clearly there is always a correlation in respect of the objective “reasonable” and the subjective “which he considers necessary”. The hon. member for Vereeniging is shaking his head, but let me ask him who determines the reasonable time? The reasonable time is determined by the magistrate according to what he considers necessary.

He applies an objective test.

Exactly in the same way the policeman who can act, while using his discretion, has to apply that discretion and satisfy himself that the steps he is taking are reasonable. We think that it is important to qualify the action of the policeman and therefore to have the word “reasonable”. In view of the fact, too, that in the previous sentence exactly the same set of conditions applies, we do not believe that the hon. the Minister has persuaded us that this amendment should not be accepted.

Mr. Chairman, I just wish to address myself very briefly to the hon. the Minister. He did mention in his speech that it was not always possible to determine the nature of the offence. That is what I understood the hon. the Minister to say. I would like to ask him a question, however, relating to the existing Act If he looks at section 42 of the Act which he quoted at length when making this statement he will find that in subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c) there is reference to “any offence”. Section 42(1)(a) reads as follows:

Section 42(1)(b) and (c) also refer to “any offence”. It is possible that under that existing section a magistrate or a justice may issue a warrant without specifying the specific offence. If the hon. the Minister looks at the amendment before us, however, i.e. the proposed new section 43(a), (b) and (c), he will find reference to “an offence”. That being so, I believe that it is incumbent upon the magistrate or justice, or the judge or judicial officer, when deciding to issue a warrant, to specify “an offence”. In other words, the matter has been taken just a little bit further than in the existing Act. Now it is necessary for the magistrate, the justice, the judge or the judicial officer to stipulate the offence. Therefore it will be possible to determine the nature of the offence. I just want to mention a case to the hon. the Minister. I refer to the case of Maharaj v. the Minister of Justice and Others, which was reported in Prentice-Hall (1947 1 H4). One of the reasons given by the judge in relation to this case is as follows:

The difficulties which face judicial officers in interpreting whether a warrant was correctly issued or not are whether its terms were too wide or not. The fact that the reference to the crime in a search warrant narrows the possibility of the warrant being too wide and was shown to us on the authority of Pullen’s case. The hon. the Minister referred to this case as being Barman’s case and he gave the reference namely 1929 T.P.D., page 838. So this proposition actually follows the case which the hon. the Minister mentioned. In other words, it appears quite clear that our courts have had difficulties all along the line with the question of identifying in the warrant—in considering whether it is too wide or not too wide—the actual crime for which the warrant was issued. We maintain that under the wording of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the new section 43, it will be necessary for the judicial officer to find a specific crime and for that crime to be related in the warrant itself particularly, as it is necessary to inform the occupier of the purpose of the search by reference in the warrant to the crime in respect of which the goods are required.

Mr. Chairman, I want to refer specifically to amendment No. (8) of the hon. member for Houghton as it appears on the Order Paper. I cannot understand the hon. the Minister’s argument when he says that it is very difficult to establish the market value of property. There are such people as sworn appraisers and others who can give a valuation on just about anything. It is our feeling that if something is erroneously forfeited and this forfeiture is set aside, but in the meantime the State has disposed of the vehicle, to use an example, at an auction—perhaps at a ridiculously low price which bears no relation to the real value—the person to whom it belonged could suffer a great deal because of inefficiency in the sale thereof. Many times there are bargains at these auction sales. A vehicle can be sold at an auction sale for a ridiculously low price. This should be the responsibility of the State rather than the responsibility of the individual who has had his property forfeited in error. I want to ask the hon. the Minister to think again about the question of forfeiture. If you take an extreme or ridiculous case, a vehicle could go for R5 at an auction. This then would be the extent to which the State is being enriched by the sale of that vehicle. The only redress the owner of that vehicle would have would be to the extent of R5, whereas it could well be a vehicle worth R200 or R300. Therefore I ask the hon. the Minister to think about that again.

Mr. Chairman, first I want to refer to the remarks made by the hon. member for Durban North. He said that in order to test the reasonableness of the warrant it would be better if the crime were mentioned. My problem is not that the reasonableness of the warrant can be tested. If the crime be made an essentialia of the warrant and the crime is wrongly indicated in the warrant, by mistake or for whatever reason—there could be a whole series of crimes—then that would render the warrant defective. Then the person in question who had acted on the basis of the warrant would have acted incorrectly. If a warrant is issued in as careful a fashion as is laid down by this Bill, my standpoint is that the crime need not be mentioned. In this regard I want to reply here and now to the hon. member for East London City. To be specific, it still remains “a crime”. Therefore there may be a series of possibilities which are taken into account by the magistrate but which are very difficult to pin down precisely in a document. The magistrate—I assume that the magistrate will be careful—will, of course, take this into account before issuing the warrant. If the magistrate is careful, I think that it is unnecessary to state the crime or offence in the warrant, because there is a possibility that this could render the warrant invalid. If, for example, the magistrate were to make a mistake and describe one possible crime and it was subsequently found that the person concerned was guilty of another crime, a crime similar to, but nevertheless not the same as, the crime mentioned, it would be said that the policeman concerned had acted under a defective warrant and that is not fair to the investigating officer. That is the problem in this regard.

As regards the amendment moved by the hon. member for East London City, the hon. member for Durban North asked me whether I could think of any crimes which did not fall under the First Schedule. I am really not prepared at this stage to try to think of all possible offences which justify an investigation. Afterall, whether it is an offence falling under the first schedule, which lists the serious offences, or whether it is an ordinary offence, all offences have to be investigated. If, then there may be articles that would assist in proving the crime, the investigating officer is entitled to a warrant. This does not per se constitute infringement of a person’s rights because the Police are investigating a crime. Surely that is primary, not so? I say, therefore, that it is not for me to quote possible crimes here and by doing so, pin myself down. I am stating the principle in general. If an offence takes place, it must be investigated, and if there is an article involved in that offence, the Police are entitled to search for that article.

Now I come to the hon. member for Sea Point, who is again crossing swords with me concerning the word “reasonable”. He referred to other examples of the use of “reasonable” in the present Bill. For example he referred to lines 45 and 46 on page 6 of the Bill. I quote—

That “reasonable time” has nothing to do with the policeman.

Of course.

Just give me a chance to substantiate my statement. The “reasonable time” to which reference is made, has as such nothing to do with the policeman because it refers to an objective test. Later on they can test and ask “did this policeman act at a reasonable time?: It is the magistrate, or whoever it may be, who will have to determine what a “reasonable time” is, in a case of this nature. For what purpose would the police officer be able to enter the premises concerned “at a reasonable time”? I quote—

Please note—

In other words, one cannot give the police officer the right to take all the steps he considers necessary and then expect the court to decide whether those steps were in fact reasonable. I assume that they will be reasonable steps. The court cannot subsequently test them and ask whether they were reasonable steps or not. In other words, the steps taken by the policeman are steps which, he considers necessary for a specific purpose. This is a subjective test which he himself has to apply. After all, he cannot be burdened by being expected to confine himself strictly to being “reasonable”. Such an anomaly cannot be incorporated in this Bill. That is my difficulty.

As far as the hon. member for Orange Grove is concerned, he spoke about “erroneous forfeiture”. There may be a third interested party. Therefore, this does not always apply to a person who loses his property by accident. It can have regard to an article that was used to commit the crime. For example, it could happen that a person who bought diamonds illegally could use a car which he had acquired by hire purchase to escape from the Police. That car may be seized because the diamonds were transported in it. There is a third person who has rights. One can never expect of the State to pay out more to that third person than the amount by which it has been enriched. That is all that this Bill provides. We give to the third person the amount by which the State has been enriched. One can never claim more from the State than the amount by which the State itself has been enriched. This is really not an unfair provision.

Amendment moved by Mr. H. Miller put and the Committee divided:

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, J. P. C. le Roux, A. van Breda and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Amendment (1) moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. H. G. H. Bell negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendments (2) and (3) moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Progressive Party dissenting).

Amendments (4) and (5) moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Party dissenting).

Amendments moved by Mr. D. J. Dalling negatived.

Amendments (6) and (7) moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Party dissenting).

Amendments (8). (9) and (10) moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Progressive Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 4:

Mr. Chairman, this clause provides for certain presumptions to operate in relation to measuring instruments, especially measuring instruments for measuring the speed of vehicles on the open road, i.e. traffic devices, and also in respect of syringes and other receptacles used as evidence in court, and in respect of the blood samples which are taken of people who are charged with driving either under the influence of alcohol or with more than the statutory amount of alcohol in their blood. Now, I have on the Order Paper five amendments in respect of this clause. Amendments Nos. 1. 3, 4 and 5 are really one and the same amendment. The effect of those amendments is to provide for cases where evidence is admitted by affidavit, i.e. where the witness deposing to the facts relating to the measuring instruments or the syringe, is not required to be present in court but can give evidence as to the effectiveness of the measuring instruments, the trapping device or the syringe, by lodging with the court an affidavit. There are many provisions of a similar nature in section 239 of the Act, the section which this clause seeks to amend by inserting a new subsection (5A). If one looks at the original Act in this regard, one sees that there are all sorts of matters in respect of which evidence may be produced by affidavit without the necessity of calling the witness concerned. One finds that it relates to documents in respect of banking affairs and affairs of the Railways, such as the production of consignment notes and matters of that sort which are of a technical nature and which we agree are matters in respect of which it is not necessary to call the official concerned merely to give technical evidence. Such provisions exist already in relation to medical evidence in connection with bacteriology, physics, chemistry and even in respect of autopsies in many cases and also in respect of the weight or value of precious metals and stones, and so forth. One can go through the various subsections of section 239 which provide for this procedure and one will find that in every case the giving of evidence by affidavit is in each of those subsections made specifically subject to the provisions of subsection (6) which provides—

In other words, what these four amendments propose is that the same provision should apply in respect of trapping devices and in respect of the taking of blood from persons for the purpose of evidence. If it is to apply in all the other cases, then quite obviously it should apply here as well, even more so because the question one is concerned with here is the prosecution in respect of speeding offences where these instruments are used. It is common knowledge that the courts have not been at one in regard to the interpretation of and the attitudes adopted towards these trapping devices. The offence of speeding today is an extremely serious one in that the fines are extraordinarily high even for a minor infringement of the speeding regulations.

I know that the clause makes provision that the hon. the Minister may prescribe certain conditions which have to be complied with by the trapping devices before they can be used as instruments the evidence of which can be used as evidence in court. However, one does not know quite what the hon. the Minister is going to provide in those conditions. They are not set out in the Bill. For that reason, as well as all the other reasons, we feel that the magistrate should have the power, if necessary, to call the person concerned to give oral evidence. One of the difficulties is that if there is no such provision the accused is left entirely at the mercy of the operator of a machine. The accused cannot cross-examine a machine and therefore the accused is put in an impossible position because he is not in a position to rebut anything. He neither has knowledge of how the machine works nor is it in his possession.

The way we read the law is that if, in fact, in every other subsection of section 239 there is a specific provision that affidavits may be adduced as evidence subject to subsection (6) and it is not put in the new subsection (5A) to be inserted, then it is our view—we can argue the law in the matter but I do not think it is necessary— that a court would interpret this provision as not being subject to the provisions of subsection (6) because the legislature did not intend to include the provisions of subsection (6) in relation to subsection (5A). However, I shall not deal with this matter any further at this stage unless there is some argument as to whether that is in fact the way statutes should be, have been and will be interpreted. The hon. the Minister’s argument was that because he puts it immediately before subsection (6) the words “the court in which any such affidavit is adduced” obviously applies to the preceding subsection. If that is so, it applies also to all the subsections and if it applies to all the subsections, the provision in all the other subsections, that it should be subject to the provisions of subsection (6), is unnecessary. The hon. member for Vereeniging and the hon. the Minister nod their heads. However, it is not what they or this Committee think, but how the court is obliged to interpret it. The court is not able to look at Hansard when it interprets this Bill if it becomes law in its present form. It is going to assume as well that the legislature knew what it was doing when it put in “subject to the provisions of subsection (6)” in all the other subsections and also that the legislature knew that that was there in all the other subsections and deliberately left it out in respect of this subsection. This is what we understand the proper interpretation of this will be if this amendment of mine is not accepted. It is exactly the same as that contained in all the other subsections I therefore move the amendments standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 18, in line 56, after “prove”, to insert “but subject to the provisions of subsection (6),”;
2. (2) on page 20, in line 1, after “question”, to insert “on the day in question”:
3. (3) on page 20, in line 2, after “question,”, to insert “but subject to the provisions of subsection (6),”;
4. (4) on page 20, in line 26, after “shall”, to insert “, subject to the provisions of subsection (6),”; and
5. (5) on page 20, in line 42, after “question,”, to insert “but subject to the provisions of subsection (6),”.

Amendment No. (2) proposes to insert the words ‘on the day in question’ after the word “question” in the proposed new section 239(5A)(b). The object of this amendment is to ensure that if there is to be evidence adduced by affidavit that the machine in question was working and was measuring properly, that affidavit should say that the machine was working properly on the day in question. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member expounded a very logical argument, but I think that his premise was wrong and that consequently he came to the wrong conclusion. He is correct when he states that it is not this Committee that will decide in a court case, but the court. But what will the question before the court be if it were to have to decide on the specific problem raised by the hon. member, namely whether subsection (6), as it appears on the Statute Book at present, also has regard to the insertion in terms of clause 4, or not? The first question the hon. member must ask himself when he wants to put himself in the court’s position is whether the existing reference to subsection (6) in section 239 is necessary or not. At each of the subsections (1) to (5), there is a reference to subsection (6) in the words “subject to the provisions of subsection (6)”. My first question is whether it is at all necessary to refer to subsection (6). Our argument is that this is not necessary, that these words are tautological and therefore superfluous. When we look at subsection (6) itself, we see the words “the court in which any such affidavit …”. Which affidavit? One of the affidavits mentioned above. Surely it could not be any other affidavit. Clause 4 of the Bill now inserts another subsection before subsection 6. Therefore, the words “any such affidavit” in subsection (6) will automatically also refer to the subsection inserted in terms of this clause. The hon. member may feel that the court may come to the conclusion that because all the others refer specifically to subsection (6), while this subsection inserted in terms of clause 4 does not refer to it, this House specifically intended subsection (6) not to be applicable to the insertion.

It creates uncertainty.

Yes, if one has not gone into the matter thoroughly, it does cause one uncertainty. However, I want to expound the legal position by referring to a judgment in the case of Rex v. Herman (1936 A.D., page 168). This issue is dealt with there. In the words of L. C. Steyn in his authoritative text book Uitleg van Wette, the matter is put as follows (translation)—

And in this instance this has been established, viz. that all these references to subsection (6) are superfluous. I quote further (translation)—

In that case Justice of Appeal De Villiers expressed it as follows: “Redundant words do not affect the meaning of non-redundant words.” Now, these words are redundant and cannot, therefore, affect the meaning of the subsection which is being inserted by clause 4 of the Bill before us. The reference to subsection (6) in the existing Act is therefore tautological and unnecessary. Subsection (6) refers to every affidavit mentioned in the section itself. I want to refer once again to L. C. Steyn,’s Uitleg van Wette on page 51 of which the unius inclusio est alterius exclusio rule, the rule that the inclusion of the one involves the exclusion of the other, is dealt with. Here, too, the learned author states (translation)—

In other words, it is superfluous. As soon as it is evident that that is the position, one cannot refer to the superfluous words to indicate that a different meaning must be attached to the words that are now being inserted. As regards the other amendment moved by the hon. member, I should like to draw attention to the fact that it constitutes an out and out anticipation of the conditions which the hon. the Minister is going to lay down. He wants it to be provided that the conditions will be complied with on a specific day.

However, on the basis of the scientific advice which the Minister is going to take, one of those conditions may perhaps be that the machine should be tested once a month. The words which lay down a specific day would then create an impossible situation for the hon. the Minister. I think he should have contented himself with making representations to the effect that the hon. the Minister should introduce regularity into the conditions he lays down. That is what they are really concerned about. They want the machine to be tested regularly; they want the evidence submitted in this regard to be fresh and steps to be taken regularly and repeatedly to ensure, virtually from day to day, that the machine is in order. The hon. the Minister has not yet laid down the conditions. He cannot lay down the conditions yet, because the machines still have to be tested scientifically. Consequently, the situation which the Minister faces is such that at this stage he is unable to give any consideration whatever to this amendment.

Business interrupted in terms of Standing Order No. 23.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.