Clause 13 seems to supplant Section 118 of the Post Office Act. On a perusal of the Post Office Act, it does not appear to be as simple a matter as may be inferred from a reading of this clause alone, because there are certain very material differences about which I should like to ask the hon. the Minister certain questions. There is a provision in Section 118 of the Post Office Act in terms of which the detention of a telegram or a postal article can only be undertaken on the written request of any public prosecutor. If that telegram, package or letter is so detained, “the Postmaster-General shall if authorized thereto by the Minister of Justice cause that postal article or telegram to be handed over to the said public prosecutor”. In other words, it is perfectly clear that within the post office itself no one has the authority—of his own volition—to detain a telegram or a postal article.

Furthermore, the individual is protected in that respect despite the fact that in Section 115 of the Post Office Act it is laid down that no legal proceedings can be instituted against the Government or against the Postmaster-General for any default, delay, etc. In other words, the addressee of a postal article or telegram cannot take legal proceedings against the Postmaster-General because of a normal delay in the transmission of the article as between the sender and the addressee. That is the position under the Post Office Act. But a completely different situation will arise under Clause 13 which, the Minister says, is in substitution of Section 118 of the Post Office Act. Apart from the fact that the article which may reasonably be suspected of containing something which will afford evidence of the commission of an offence may be found not to contain anything of the sort, it “shall” be detained by the officer in charge of any post office or telegraph office in which it is or through which it passes. It “shall” be detained by the officer. Sir, not on the written authority of somebody who has any legal reason for wanting that package detained, and not at the instance of the Minister of Justice. The salient difference, therefore, is that of his own volition a postal official, even a junior postal official, can detain a piece of mail or a telegram. Furthermore, Sir, the Postmaster-General, after the detention of that package by an official of the post office, may bring the detention of such telegram or package to the notice of the Attorney-General. He is not obliged to do so.

Before I take the matter any further, I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he does not agree that, whether or not there is an emergency in South Africa, the transmission of articles through the mail is such a common place in our society, or any other, that nothing should be done which would interfere with that transmission unless there is a very good reason for it. If something has to be done, it should be done on the authority of a person who is competent to judge and competent to issue the instruction, which in turn can, and probably will, be carried out by a junior official. It seems to me that beyond the limitations of the Post Office Act as it stands at present, there is a very strong possibility of an almost complete postal censorship being set up because of the activities of the officials of the Post Office Department, for no good reason or for a very good reason—without any motivation from the Minister of Justice, from the Attorney-General concerned or from a public prosecutor. I say, with great respect to the hon. the Minister, that this does require some explanation, and I shall wait for his opinion.

This clause is perfectly clear and is intended to be understood and to be implemented exactly as it stands here. If there is any person who has any doubt about the words “reasonably suspected of containing” my reply is that that is the precise wording of the original Section 118 which all hon. members accept and which have also appeared in our Post Office Act over the years. I quote from Act No. 44 of 1958, which consolidates our postal laws—

may be demanded by the Attorney-General, on the instructions of the Minister from the Postmaster-General and that article must then be handed over to him. That is the position as the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) indicated. If hon. members listened to my second-reading speech they will know what the problems are in connection with the sending of telegrams from Maseru, telegrams which are sent openly through our telegraph service. I also reminded hon. members that communist literature was also being transmitted. I explained my problem to hon. members—that the Attorney-General cannot take action until he has obtained information from outside. We are approaching the stage where it will be necessary for the initiative to be taken not only by the Attorney-General but also by every postmaster. It will not be taken by any cleric but only by the person who is in charge of a post office. I think that we are fully justified in asking that these senior officials should not only take the initiative but should also accept the obligation to disclose these offences. If hon. members tell me now that this is a far-reaching provision, I want once again to repeat my invitation that it will be a very good thing for hon. members to read the British Post Office Act in connection with that point. Hon. members are aware of the fact that in Britain there are no State post offices as we have them here but in spite of that the Home Secretary may at any time demand any postal article or any type of postal article in general from the private post offices and he can give certain instructions to the post offices in that connection. If, therefore, the Times wants to attack me again in regard to this Bill, the Times should first of all put its own house in order as far as the Post Office Act is concerned and it should also put its own house in order as far as the 1922 Act that I quoted in my second-reading speech is concerned, I am not interested, the Government is not interested, nobody is interested in anyone’s private correspondence but we are interested in the fact that State machinery and the post office in particular are being used by these people to further their activities. We are not going to be a party to this and we are not prepared to be a party to it. Hon. members opposite and the hon. member for Hospital can raise as many bogies as they like and mention as many possibilities and probabilities as they like. They know what will happen in practice. A fuss may possibly be made about this—we have often experienced it in this House—but we will never have a fuss in the future again because it will be implemented just as the provisions of other laws have been implemented in the past.

The hon. Minister spent his time in justifying the right of the State to detain subversive literature. Our objection is not against that. The Minister stated his case in the second reading and we heard what he had to say about the telegrams that were being received in this country and about literature being sent through the post, and we wish to deal with that as well. What worries us is that in terms of the wording of this clause it is not quite clear what happens to the letters which are not handed over to the Attorney-General.

Exactly the same as what is happening now.

What happens now is that the Postmaster-General does nothing until he gets a request from the public prosecutor or the Attorney-General to detain certain letters and to hand them over to him, but under this provision the position is different. I want to say to the hon. Minister that although an official is in charge of an office, he may not be a senior official, because you have got some very small post offices in the country districts …

It will be the senior in that office.

Yes, but you get post offices with one official only. You even get some private post offices. I know of cases in the Transkei where traders act as post officials. I forget the term they use in those cases, but I think they are postal agencies. So it is not always a senior official who is going to act. It is all right in big post offices where the postmaster is a senior official, but you get small offices and postal agencies, and in terms of this clause they now detain a letter, quite different from the existing law where the Attorney-General or the prosecutor says: “We want you to detain a letter; we know it is there.” So then he detains the letter and hands it over to the Attorney-General or the prosecutor. But in terms of this clause the official now will detain if he suspects. Admittedly, he cannot open it, but he will detain because he suspects, and I take it then he will bring it to the notice of the Postmaster-General, and the Postmaster-General may bring the detention of such postal article to the notice of the Attorney-General. He need not do so, he “may”. What happens if the Postmaster-General does not give it to the Attorney-General? The position is altered now. He has still got that letter, it has not been taken from him. And what worries us is that there seems to be no provision for action and that is why we ask the hon. Minister to explain the position to us. There seems to be no obligation on the Postmaster-General to deliver the letter to the addressee.

That is done ipso facto.

But there must be some time limit for action. Suppose some official, not necessarily a senior official, suspects there is something wrong with a letter or a newspaper and he keeps it in his office, and say he keeps it for a week or so. There must be some time limit placed on action to be taken by the Postmaster-General or by the official with regard to the letter which is being detained and which is not being handed over to the Attorney-General or to the public prosecutor. That is what we want the hon. Minister to explain to us. There may be something in the Postal Act, but we would like to have certainty about that, certainty as to any duty on the official in such a case where it is not handed over to the Attorney-General, to do something at once to see that the addressee gets the letter within a reasonable time.

There is a very good reason why it should not be made compulsory and why it reads “may” and not “shall”. The original intention of the Department was to make this provision compulsory and not permissive, in other words to make it compulsory for such postal article to be handed over, and the provision was framed in that way. It was then submitted to the Department of Posts and Telegraphs and that Department objected to the compulsion, stating that the provision should be permission. The reason given by the Postmaster-General for his attitude—and I am sure that hon. members will appreciate it—was that he was not prepared to agree to the word “shall” because he could then be accused of applying censorship in the Post Office. If he was obliged to hand over any such article, he could possibly be accused of applying censorship. He wanted to be able to refuse the request of the Attorney-General if it appeared necessary to do so. If he had the right to refuse then he could not be accused of not having any discretion in connection with the matter and it could not be said that he was merely the “stooge” of the Attorney-General or of the Department of Justice. It was because of these psychological reasons in the background that the word “may” was inserted and not the word “shall”. The Post Office regulations do of course make provision whereby if such article is not handed over it must be delivered. In the present circumstances one can detain and investigate any postal article, but once the investigations have been completed that article must be sent on. If it finds its way to the Attorney-General no new situation arises because the Attorney-General is already in that position. If those articles eventually do find their way to the Attorney-General, the procedure in regard to them is the same as that provided for in the old Act.

We on this side wholeheartedly agree that the Post Office must not be abused by any unlawful organizations. There have been cases in the past where this has happened and any measure to prevent this sort of thing will be supported by this side of the House. There is, however, one point in connection with the clause that I would like to raise. The original Post Office Act was so framed, I think, with the intention of giving only a legal official the right to interfere at all with the conveyance of mail. The Post Office itself was unable to take such action. I admit that the hon. the Minister has experienced difficulty under the old Post Office Act and that is why a change is being brought about in this clause.

Officials could also take action even under the old Post Office Act.

Yes, but then a further letter had to be forthcoming from the Attorney-General before those articles could be dealt with.

No. If you send me an abusive telegram the Postmaster will simply not deliver it.

Yes, but it was not possible to act as stringently as the hon. the Minister now proposes to do. I admit that wider powers are imperative in this connection. But there is just this consideration: I wonder whether the hon. the Minister will not consider making the provision more specific so that it will refer more particularly to postal articles that are printed or that are aimed at promoting the interests of an unlawful organization? He can make the provisions as wide as he wants as far as unlawful organizations are concerned.

Any offence.

I want to explain to the hon. the Minister what I mean. In the Crimes Act of Australia there is reference to postal articles that are printed or published by, forthcoming from, or aimed at the promotion of, an unlawful organization. There the words “unlawful organization” are specifically mentioned and it may perhaps be better in this case to mention the words “unlawful organization” specifically.

May I ask the hon. member a question? Let us imagine for a moment that the Post Office handles a particular item of mail and it is obvious from such mail that A is instructing B to rob a bank at such and such a place. What must be done with that article? Under the present Post Office Act it must be allowed to go through.

I appreciate the hon. the Minister’s difficulty but I think that under the present Post Office Act an article of that nature will also be detained.

Only on the grounds of obscenity.

That is not as I understand the position to be, Mr. Chairman. Furthermore, the hon. the Minister referred to the British Post Office Act. I have read the British Post Office Act and I have not been able to find a specific provision whereby the Home Secretary is permitted to detain postal articles. That provision may perhaps be contained in another law.

I will get it for you.

As the hon. Minister did yesterday in quite another context, I think he did me and other members on this side of the House an injustice by saying that we raise this matter in order, as he put it, “om spoke op te ja”. It has been made perfectly clear by me and other speakers that we agree entirely that there should be some procedure, and perhaps a procedure that goes beyond the present provision in the Post Office Act, to facilitate the detention of mail which is suspected of being of some assistance in the committing of an offence, etc. But I put it to the hon. the Minister that I assume that he did not want to go beyond the needs of the case, and as Clause 13 stands now, he is in fact going beyond the needs of the case. The hon. Minister said that as the position obtains now, a package having been detained is sent on after a certain time. That is true, because there is a clause here which says (Section 96 of the Post Office Act)—

“Otherwise than in the pursuance of his duties.” Now, the postal official acting in terms of Clause 13 of this Bill would be acting in “pursuance of his duty”, and does not fall within the ambit of Section 96 of the Post Office Act which is the sanction against the postal official unreasonably detaining mail. For that reason, and for the reason mentioned by the hon. member for Transkeian Territories (Mr. Hughes) that not all the post offices are run by postmasters and senior officials, I think this clause goes too far. The post office in the area where I live at the present time has a postmistress who comprises the entire staff—she is the senior, the junior, the office-boy, everything, and whether this good lady will have the judgment that is required I am not in a position to say, but the fact is that as the clause stands, a person being a postal official can without any good reason detain a package, a telegram or letter indefinitely, which I think is not the Minister’s intention, and which does interfere seriously with the transmission of the mail. If the hon. Minister merely wants the power he seeks in this clause, and does not want to impede the flow of mail through the country unnecessarily. I think the amendment I intend to move will solve the problem, because it puts a period to the detention which any postal official can impose on a telegram or postal article, without taking the action which the hon. Minister wants that official to take, namely, to hand it over for prosecution, etc., to the Attorney-General. I therefore move—

Provided that if such postal article or telegram is not handed over to any Attorney-General or public prosecutor within 30 days of its detention by the officer in charge of the post office or telegraph office concerned, it shall forthwith be delivered to the person to whom it is addressed.

The regulations make provision for that.

That is my difficulty. I cannot find a regulation that makes provision for that. There is a regulation, Section 96, in the Post Office Act, which I have just read, which makes it an offence to delay and detain articles other than in the pursuance of the duty of the official concerned, but that does not cover my point. In terms of Clause 13 of this Bill, the person concerned would be acting in pursuance of his or her duty if he or she could say “I reasonably suspected that that package or that letter or that telegram came within the ambit of this clause”. I do not want to dilate on the matter. This is a practical matter and a very important one for the ordinary person and for the ordinary use of the mail. The hon, Minister spoke about the South African Communist being a periodical which he cited the other day and which he said passes freely through the mails. I want to put it to him that anybody, whether as a practical joke, or maliciously, could send him or me or anybody else a copy of the South African Communist which we have never seen in our lives, and from that date on the Postmistress of Clovelly, for example, would say “I can reasonably suspect every piece of mail that comes to that person because he has just received a brown-paper package which contained the South African Communist. From that day on his mail might be detained for a long time, whereas the matter would be quite innocent. Therefore, I put this limitation on the whole procedure, and the Minister. I am sure, will agree that from the day that the postal official concerned scans the telegram or the piece of mail or package, and says “I reasonably suspect that this is something that should receive the attention of the Attomev-General or the public prosecutor”, within 30 days, surely, that telegram or package can either be handed to the prosecutor or the Attorney-General, or be sent forward in me ordinary way. For that reason I ask the hon. Minister to consider this amendment to be a reasonable one.

I think that it will be very wrong on our part to fix a maximum period in this Bill during which a postal article of this nature has to be delivered to an addressee. The fact remains that because of the vast distances in South Africa one cannot compare the position in Johannesburg, for example, with that of a small place in the north-west or South West Africa. If the amendment is adopted and the Post Office has the right to detain a postal article of this nature for 30 days during which time they will have to decide whether to hand it over to the Attorney-General or not, we will have the position that postal articles which could be delivered at a much earlier stage, perhaps within a day—in Johannesburg, for example, the Attorney-General or the head of the Post Office can decide within a day or two—will then be detained for a much longer period because the amendment states that the person in charge of the post office or telegraph office concerned will have the right to detain such postal articles for 30 days. The tendency will then be not to deal urgently with a matter of that nature as the post office would like to do, but the tendency will be to say: “Well, we have the right to detain it for 30 days.” A week or two or three will go by and the postal article will be delayed longer than would otherwise have been the case. If no maximum period is fixed the tendency will always be to send that postal article further on its way as soon as possible. The hon member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) must surely understand that when he fixes a maximum period that a maximum period will at the same time tend to become the minimum period. This amendment therefore will create precisely the undesirable state of affairs which the hon. member for Hospital seeks to avoid with his amendment.

In reply to the hon. member for Orange Grove (Mr. E. G. Malan) I regret to say that I made a mistake. The provisions to which I referred are not contained in the British Post Office Act but in the Official Secrets Act which refers to the Post Office Act. I want to direct the attention of the hon. member to Sections 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act. In Section 4 it is provided—

That is all: there is no other qualification at all. It merely has to appear to him that such a course is necessary in the public interest—

You see therefore that this provision is much wider than the provision that we are asking for here. But in Section 5 it goes even further. I have read it through very quickly and it appears to me that these provisions are even wider, and that the most important point is this—

These provisions give that police officer considerable powers in that connection. In other words, our Post Office Act does not go nearly as far as the Official Secrets Act does in regard to the British Post Office Act.

As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Hospital is concerned, I do not have the slightest doubt that the purpose for which the hon. member moved his amendment has already been covered, apart from the argument raised by the hon. member for Middelland (Mr. van der Merwe). It is an offence for any post office official to detain postal articles. I have not the slightest doubt that in practice there will be no unnecessary delaying of postal articles but that this clause as it stands will give the Attorney-General the necessary powers to bring criminals to book more easily. Because that is the position, I am not prepared to accept the hon. member’s amendment.

I think this should be said: The hon. Minister refers to the Official Secrets Act to reinforce his argument, and he has the advantage of me that he has the Act before him. But where he says that the Act lays down that “as soon as may be” the piece of mail, the telegram is to be handed over to the chief officer of police for the district concerned, then that, in contrast with the clause as it stands now, completely proves my argument.

But I told you that the Postmaster-General does not want to make it obligatory because then it can be said that there is censorship, and he does not want to create that impression.

I accept that, but to say at the same time that a piece of mail can be detained for an indefinite period, without good reason …

I did not say that. The regulations provide that he must advise the Postmaster-General immediately and then the whole machinery is set in motion.

Sir, I say with great respect to the hon. Minister that at the present time the only sanction against the unreasonable detention of a piece of mail in the Post Office Act is …

Section 96.

I quoted that. Section 96 says “any officer who otherwise than in pursuance of his duty….” Now here, in Clause 13, the hon. the Minister lays a duty on him to do the very thing which under the present Act …

To detain, but not to open.

I am not talking of “opening”; I never used the word “opening” in the two speeches I made. I am concerned with the detention of a package or telegram, not the opening, and what I want to say to the hon. the Minister is this—that when the British Official Secrets Act refers to the Home Secretary, and he then equates that person, who after all must be some person of experience and status …

Secretary of State.

I am sorry, “Secretary of State”, and he equates that person with my mythical character, the postmistress of Clovelly, then I think he is being unreasonable, because here nobody has to tell the postmistress of Clovelly, “you should, or you may or you must detain this piece of mail”. In Clause 13 it says explicitly that it shall be detained by the officer in charge of any post office or telegraph office without any reference to a Secretary of State or to a Minister of Justice….

They have that right at the moment.

No, Sir, with respect, I do not want to read Section 118 all over again, but they have that right at the moment only when they are motivated thereto, in terms of Section 118 of the Post Office Act, by the written request of any public prosecutor. Surely there is a difference.

This refers to obscenity …

We are talking about things now which have nothing to do with obscenity. Now I put it to him that if he genuinely wants to achieve his object, which is to facilitate the possession of a packet or a letter which will assist in the prosecution and which is necessary, if he wants no more than that, he should agree to my amendment.

I want to point out to the hon. member for Middelland that in his very opening sentence he made it perfectly clear that either he had misunderstood my purpose, or he was sidestepping my argument, because I did not say in my amendment or in my argument that that package or piece of mail or telegram should be detained for 30 days. I said that we should give the persons concerned, in the Post Office or outside, a maximum period by which the matter must either be dealt with as contemplated here, for the purpose of a prosecution, or must be sent to the addressee. I say this again, with respect to the hon. the Minister— that I am sure that as this clause stands, if a postmistress somewhere wishes to detain a package, perhaps for personal reasons—for example she does not like you …

She cannot do that. Read 97.

In pursuance of her duty she has only got to say “I reasonably suspect this piece of mail”, and nowhere does it say that she must send it off within a certain time either to the Attorney-General or to the addressee.

The regulations say that she must advise the Postmaster-General.

I cannot explain to the Minister all over again. We are not arguing about the need to retain pieces of mail in certain circumstances, but to try and limit the period in such a way that no unreasonable suspicion by a person in the service of the Postal Department can cause someone’s mail to be held up for malicious or whimsical reasons, or even political reasons. You can make of any small post office a “dead letter” office where your mail may lie and “moulder in the grave” if the postmistress has a reasonable suspicion. My amendment will preclude that situation, and if the Minister does not want more than the power he says he seeks, he will accept this ammendment.

Amendment put and negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to.

On Clause 14,

This clause introduces four new sub-sections and three of these will enable the State to equate with the P.A.C. or the A.N.C. some organization of a different name. I make no comment on these; but I want to deal with sub-section (d), which deals with the aspect of the courts in considering the validity of anything done under sub-sections (a), (b) and (c). Now (d) will mean that no court will have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of any proclamation issued under this claues. Normally a court would have that right, and it is an important right. It would be entitled to pronounce a proclamation invalid, inter alia, on two important grounds, firstly that it was arbitrary, or secondly that it was male fide. Arbitrariness means that the person issuing the proclamation did not apply his mind to the question, and male fide means that although the person applied his mind to the question he nevertheless dishonestly says in the proclamation that the position is different. Those are very far-reaching changes. I suggest that a case certainly has been made out for changes. We know that the Snyman Report and the various killings and incidents we have had are reasons for it. A further good reason for it is the threat we have of overseas powers joining with dissatisfied elements in the country to bring the State to a downfall. I am impressed, too, by the fact that Patrick Duncan said openly in London recently that the intention was that there should be an Algerian-type war here. All those facts move me and this side of the House to say that certain changes are justified and I cannot think of anyone who does not agree …

Do you appreciate that this is a recommendation by Mr. Justice Snyman and that he has studied this part of it?

I did not know that. I suppose the Minister is referring to the letter he wrote subsequently to the report. I certainly did not understand him to go so far. But I will say that this serious situation moves us to support far-reaching changes, including the change in the law regarding preparatory examinations. Though we have felt it necessary, albeit reluctantly, to concede these extra powers, it is most important that one should not go a yard further than is necessary. I think one has to weigh, in considering whether a particular provision is necessary, all the facts of the situation. We have to weigh the advantages against the disadvantages it could have both internally among the people who support law and order, and indeed among our friends overseas.

Now one trusts that the Minister will certainly bring his mind to bear upon this problem when issuing a proclamation and that there wil be no possibility of the Minister dishonestly putting something in the proclamation that is not true. But then I ask the Minister whether he really wants to put a provision on the Statute Book which is capable of misconstruction. Therefore I sincerely hope that the Minister will feel that the value of this power to him and to the country is as nothing beside the harm it may do to him personally and to anyone concerned with the issuing of a proclamation. Accordingly, if I am in order, I would like to move the amendment standing in my name—

Unfortunately I cannot accept the amendment as it will destroy the principle of the Bill as read a second time.

On a point of order, this is a sub-section of a clause. Surely we can move to delete one sub-section, because it does not affect the other subsections.

No, I am afraid the hon. member is wrong. This clause contains two principles. The one is that the President may declare by proclamation certain things, and the other is that the courts will not be allowed to attack such a proclamation.

Surely we can vote to delete the second principle, while accepting the first one?

Hon. members may vote against the whole clause, and with the leave of the Committee the Opposition may move that the sub-clauses be put separately.

I honestly cannot understand the attitude of the hon. member. If he had been a layman I would have forgiven him, but he is a jurist and an able one at that. But what does the hon. member do? He cannot plead not guilty when I make the accusation against him that if you, Sir, had not ruled his amendment out of order, and if he had persuaded me to adopt it, it would have nullified the effect of the whole clause completely, and the hon. member knows that as well as I do. He would have nullified the clause in such a way that it would not even have been necessary for the Committee to adopt it. Then we would have been far worse off than we are now. The hon. member knows that if this provision is not inserted the whole clause will be worthless. He has read the Snyman Report, and I understand from hon. members opposite—they must please tell me if they have changed their minds—that they accept that report. The report states that this principle must be adopted and I submitted the legislation to Mr. Justice Snyman who made a thorough study of it. In his letter he recommends that the clauses which contain his recommendations—and this is one of them …

Not paragraph (d).

Of course. Can the hon. member split up the clause into various parts? It is permissible to do so in order to help the Opposition, with the consent of the Committee, so I understand, and we do not object to that because one wants to assist the Opposition in this difficult predicament. But hon. members—and the hon. member for Pinelands is one of them—are now acting in such a way that it will not surprise me at all if we have a suggestion one day that this House should be enlarged so that some members can have two benches to sit on, on one of which is written “national” and on the other “liberal” because hon. members continually change their minds when it suits them. But the point is, and this is what I have against the hon. member … [Interjections.] The hon. member for Drakensberg (Mrs. S. M. van Niekerk) can always enter the debate if she wants to do so. She can ask her Whip to be relieved of the obligation simply to sit there mumbling. But the hon. member for Pinelands knows what will happen if this provision is not included. Certain cases have been postponed pending the passing of this legislation. We make no secret of that fact, nor does Mr. Justice Snyman. That is why he said that his recommendation should be made retrospective. We have postponed certain cases with the specific object of making it unnecessary for us to prove that Poqo is the P.A.C.. so that the court will have to accept that as a fact when the State President issues such a proclamation, and hon. members opposite support that. But if we do not have this provision, what will happen? None of those cases will be able to come before the court because hon. members know these people just as well as I do. An application will be made to court to cast doubt on this matter and to get a ruling from the court that Poqo is not the same as the P.A.C.

But you can continue with the case.

No, I cannot. An interdict will be sought against me and the court will have to grant it. Does the hon. member not understand that? Let me tell him what will happen, and if I cannot convince him then the hon. member for Durban (North) and the hon. member for Zululand must please try to convince him. We are not dealing here with an Act of Parliament but with a proclamation; that proclamation can be attacked in court, and it will be so attacked, in an effort to show that that proclamation is ultra vires or has been issued mala fide, and what will the result then be? An application will first be made to the Cape court. It will take time to deal with it because they will use all the delaying tactics that they know so well, but eventually judgment will be given against them. Then they will appeal to Bloemfontein and months will elapse before they lose their case there as well, but that will not worry them.

But after all they are still in gaol.

Oh. then the hon. member has no objection to their being in gaol! I cannot understand that attitude. [Interjections.] We cannot continue with a case once an interdict has been obtained and as long as the case dealing with the proclamation remains undecided, we cannot continue with it. I would prefer not to have this clause at all rather than to delete this sub-section. But why should we argue about this clause in view of the fact that it was submitted to the commissioner, a leading Judge, and that he approved of it? Why should we see imaginary dangers in this provision?

We have a duty as well as the Judge.

We all have a duty but why should we be worried about the court if a Judge of that court says that this provision is in order? If hon. members do not want to accept the Snyman Report, let them say so. I know that the hon. member for Houghton does not want to accept it and I appreciate her honesty but do not let us say that we accept it one moment and they say the next moment that we do not accept it. Either we accept it or we do not accept it.

My objections are as follows. First of all. this Bill is being rushed through Parliament within a few days because of the desperate urgency to get this measure through. I have the Snyman Report here which I have read with. I suppose, as much attention as anybody else, and I see it is dated 6 March. It is now 26 April. Why, if there was such desperate urgency, did the Minister wait from 6 March to 23 April before presenting the Bill to the House? If the State was in such a desperate emergency that this Bill had to be rushed through Parliament, that we were given one day to study this Bill. I would suggest that the Easter recess should rather have been delayed. Why the sudden rush now?

The other thing is that the Minister says you either accept the Snyman Report or you do not. There are only two recommendations in the report, couched in very general terms. The one relates to the difficulties of the Attorneys-General about Pocio being the same as the P.A C. and the other is in regard to the membership of Pogo. It does not say anything about summary trials or special courts “at any place”.

You evidently conveniently forget that I submitted the Bill to the Judge.

I did not conveniently forget it. but the Opposition conveniently forgets it. It was only in the Minister’s speech the other day that we heard that Judge Snyman did not only make these two little recommendations. but that he supported the whole of this Bill. Now the Opposition is opposing the major clause which the Minister tells us Judge Snyman approved of. Is that right?

The hon. member must not misunderstand me. The Bill was submitted to Judge Snyman and in the covering letter I read out I told him that it contained his recommendations as well as other matters, and I asked him for his comments only on those matters on which he had made recommendations, and I asked him whether the drafting of the Bill was in order in so far as those matters were concerned. He wrote back and said yes, and this happens to be one of his recommendations. In regard to the other matters, he made certain observations in general, but naturally it would not have been in order for me to ask for his comment or his approval of that. Whatever comment he made was made of his own free will.

But nevertheless the Minister conveyed the impression that he agreed with it.

Yes, as far as the letter goes.

But none of it was adversely commented on by the Judge.

No. I can give you a copy of the letter if you like.

The Snyman Report is treated with holy reverence, and to criticize it is irreverent. But that certainly differs from the attitude adopted by the Government a few years ago in regard to a report by three Judges, who were much more eminent than Judge Snyman. namely Judges Greenberg, Roper and Centlivres, on the riots in Johannesburg some years ago.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

I am not satisfied with the Minister’s explanation of Clause 14 and I will not vote for it, but I want to move as an amendment—

Sub-section (a) does away with the time period placed on the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, which the Government introduced, and it accented an amendment from the Opposition making this time period essential, so that it had to come back to Parliament for review year after year. It was on that basis that the Opposition announced its agreement with the measure. Now we have this Unlawful Organizations Act being made a permanent part of our legislation. Yesterday the hon. member for Durban (North) was very proud of the amendment he got accepted to Clause 4, because it changed the whole complexion of the matter (he said) and it now has to come back to the House to be repeatedly approved every year. Now we see the fate of this sort of thing. Accept this sort of Draconian legislation on this flimsy excuse that as long as an amendment is accepted that the House has to approve of it year after year, everything is fine. To me this is entrenching in our permanent legislation the Unlawful Organizations Act. which I opposed when it was introduced. and to be logical I must vote against it again now.

Before putting this amendment, I will have to consider it.

The hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) has indicated that she will vote against this clause. I do not know how far the hon. member wishes to go in being persuaded as to whether or not this clause is necessary. I do not think that this House has very much choice in the matter. I do not think one could ask for a better judge of a particular position than a Judge of the Supreme Court, who is impartial and seized of information which very few people in the circumstances are seized of.

And I am seized of a pain.

Yes, it must be some sort of malady which has taken from her all her good sense, and which has taken her feet about a mile off the ground. Here we have a recommendation that it is impossible to deal with an organization like Poqo under the existing law, and indeed that has been the experience. If the hon. member for Houghton had taken the trouble to look through the newspaper reports in respect of these matters, she would have found that for more than a year they have been trying to tie up Poqo with the P.A.C., and that was their difficulty, and what happened after a year? Paarl was just one example of what happened, and the Bashee River incident. It is quite possible that these things could have been prevented if that organization had been nipped in the bud in the beginning. [Interjection.] The hon. member for Houghton says we will see what happens this time next year. I am not concerned with next year. I am concerned with now, and that is what this House is concerned with, this urgent situation. I think we would be failing in our duty to South Africa if we did not support this clause upon the recommendation urgently brought to the notice of the country by the commissioner. The hon. member for Houghton has not yet advanced a reason why she is opposed to this clause. We raised the matter in regard to one paragraph which we wanted the Minister to explain, but we must support the principle of the clause because we have to deal with the situation as it has been brought to our attention by an independent person especially seized of the difficulties which exist. The hon. member for Houghton, in her little playings here with politics, is not fighting this difficulty in this country; she is just trying to embarrass the Opposition. I want to assure the hon. member that she is not embarrassing us at all. and when we cross over when she calls a division on this clause …

You are going to love it.

We do not say that we love any of these things, but there we have a report and we are responsible. We are not embarrassed by the fact that we have to vote for this clause while the hon. member for Houghton does not. If anything I think I feel rather embarrassed for the hon. member that she is a member of this House and can be as irresponsible in this respect as she has demonstrated.

I have now had an opportunity to consider the amendment moved by the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman) but inasmuch as it is destructive of the principle of the Bill as read a second time, I am unable to accept it.

Very well, Sir, I will just vote against the clause then. Sir, I am not even going to bother with the hon. member on my right. I do not think I have to worry about his criticism of me or my behaviour or anything else. Perhaps the hon. member will learn in time. I want the hon. the Minister to explain to me in simple language which will be understandable to a poor simpleton like myself, unlike the hon. member for Durban (North) (Mr. M. L. Mitchell), exactly why in terms of sub-section (2) Poqo cannot be declared to be an unlawful organization.

I can declare it to be an unlawful organization.

Well, why does the Minister not do so?

The hon. member does not understand the position. It is not a question of declaring Poqo to be an unlawful organization. It is a question of equating the two organizations in terms of the Snyman Report.

Once you can declare it an unlawful organization, why do you have to equate it?

The moment I do that there is a void from 8 June 1960 to the date on which you declare Poqo an unlawful organization. Then it is not an offence to have belonged to Poqo until such time as you have declared it an unlawful organization, and that is the whole point. We now want to equate the two, and Mr. Justice Snyman advisedly asked us to make this clause retrospective and that is what we are doing here at the moment.

You are going a lot further than that.

Clause, as printed, put and a division was called.

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Mrs. Suzman) voted against the clause, as printed, the Deputy-Chairman declared it agreed to.

On Clause 15,

This clause amends Section 2 of the Unlawful Organizations Act and it extends very widely the ambit of this section. I want to know exactly how the ihon. the Minister is going to define “objects similar to the objects such organization”, because I do not know what the objects necessarily are. Some of them may be things which many people will agree with, couched in general terms—things such as the removal of job reservation and the removal of pass laws. These are also the objects of organizations whose other objects one may not agree with.

Fortunately the reply is very simple. It will not be my function to define it at all. It will be the function of the courts to define it. As I explained to hon. members at the second reading, Nokwe and others were charged before a regional court; they were found guilty in terms of that section; they went on appeal to the Transvaal courts and the Transvaal court found that although the organization was similar to the A.N.C., in terms of the wording of that section they were not guilty of any transgression of the section. It is to give effect to that judgment of the Transvaal court, which is a technical matter, that these words are being added. If and when anybody is charged in future it will be for the courts to interpret that section in the light of the judgment in Regina v. Nokwe and others.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 17,

In the course of his report Mr. Justice Snyman made mention of the difficulty that the State has had in getting certain information because of the activities of the organization with which they were dealing. The recommendations made by him do not cover any suggestion of steps of the sort set out in Clause 17. Nevertheless in reply to a letter from the Minister, Mr. Justice Snyman has written a letter in which he is very half-hearted indeed over Clause 17. He says—

Ten laaste merk ek dat u in artikel 17 voorsiening maak vir die aanhouding van sekere persone vir hoogstens 90 dae vir ondervraging. Dit is natuurlik ’n beginsel wat indruis teen die beginsels van ons gemene reg en in afwyking van so ’n beginsel kan nooit in normale tye onderskryf word nie.

Then he goes on to quote ex-Chief Justice H. de Villiers …

Quote the whole paragraph.

With pleasure, if the Minister wishes me to do so. I wanted to save time. Perhaps the Minister will allow me another 10 minutes. He goes on to say—

Die vraag ontstaan egter of met inagneming van die omstandighede soos in my ondersoek geopenbaar en die koue oorlog hier en in die wêreld, die huidige tyd as normaal beskou kan word. Ek huiwer dus om kommentaar oor die saak te lewer maar onderskryf in die verband die Stelling van oud-regter H. de Villiers dat die veiligheid…

“Van die Staat”.

No, that is not stated here—

The same as I was.

The Minister himself has put it forward with great diffidence and it seemed to us that he himself felt that he was asking for something which almost frightened him when he thought about it seriously. Sir, the interesting thing about this clause is that it is to be used not only to obtain evidence or to obtain what might amount to confession of offences which have already been committed but also of offences intended to be committed or which some person or persons might have intended to commit but did not commit. In other words, the hon. the Minister is asking for these enormous powers in respect of two classes of cases which I think I am correct in saying certainly as to one, was not a crime under our criminal law and as to the second one, may or may not be, depending upon the stage of preparation which had been reached in respect of the intention to commit the crime. Intention to commit a crime is no offence; there has to be preparation before that can be established. In other words, we are here in a position where we are asking for powers almost unheard of in any civilized country in respect of three classes of cases, one of which is certainly not an offence and one of which may or may not be an offence whereas the third would be. The only justification for this provision that I could find seems to be the sort of attitude that because we are dealing with people who impose secrecy upon their members by means of torture and by means of violence and by means of murder, the only way in which we can get information is by using the same methods against them. In other words, we are being asked to make the most terrible confession, namely that we cannot protect witnesses or informers who have made information available to the police. Sir, that is a very sad day for South Africa and a very sad state of affairs for the Minister of Justice to have to admit to this House because it is tantamount to saying that where the man has given the State assistance in finding out who has been responsible for a crime, the State cannot thereafter protect him. I wonder whether the Minister realizes the implications of a statement of that kind, because if that is so, then I wonder if a case is not made out for declaring a state of emergency in South Africa, saying that he cannot protect these people and because he cannot protect them he is going to place himself in a position where he can use these methods against this organization.

Protect which people?

People who give evidence as witnesses in a trial in respect of the crimes set out in this clause.

Clause 17 does not deal with that.

Of course it does. It says—

The whole purpose is to get information.

Quite. The one may be a witness and the other may be the suspect.

Yes.

In other words, because the Minister cannot protect a man whom he wants to use as a witness, whom he believes has information …

No, it is a question of a man refusing to disclose what he knows.

It is a question of a man refusing to disclose what you think he knows, perhaps on reasonable grounds, but if you are going to use that evidence, can you protect him afterwards?

Yes.

The Minister says “yes” somewhat half-heartedly and somewhat doubtfully.

No. Why do you say that?

Because it seems to me that the only justification which the Minister can advance for this clause is that the methods used by these organizations are so terroristic, so fierce in respect of their own members, that the Minister has to have a greater incentive to persuade them to make information available to him.

You can put it that way.

Yes, I put it that way and I put it that way deliberately because it seems to me that the intention of this clause is to meet third degree with third degree or something worse. Sir, before one can evaluate this clause I think it is very necessary for us to understand what powers the authorities already have at the present time. In respect of a suspect, he is charged with some crime or other; he is brought before the court and remanded, and while he is under remand he can be interrogated. The Minister knows very well that suspects are often remanded from time to time while the police are seeking further evidence and that they have the right to interrogate those people. But, of course, the suspect has the right to legal assistance. Then there are the people whom the police have reasons to believe have information, whom they want as witnesses. They are covered by Section 83 of the Act of 1955 which says—

It goes on to provide that if he fails to give the evidence the magistrate can lock him up for periods of eight days at a time until he satisfies the magistrate.

And if he says he does not know then there is nothing you can do about it.

If he says that he does not know the magistrate can still lock him up if he believes on reasonable grounds that he does know.

And if he still refuses?

You can lock him up again. Are you in any better position if he still refuses after 90 days except to lock him up again? Sir, I wonder whether the Minister cannot tackle this problem with which he is faced in terms of that legislation rather than in terms of the provision which he has before the Committee at the moment. That could be amended to be used in the case of suspected offences or preparations for an offence, but it would be under proper control and the hon. the Minister would know that on each occasion the accused came before a magistrate and that there was no question of the police being in sole control of him.

If Section 83, which has always existed in our law, is the remedy as you suggest, can you advance any reason why, the previous Government acted under a proclamation which is in all respects similar to this clause, up to 1947?

I can give very many reasons. The hon. the Minister has one experience of what happened during the war years. I have others, and I believe that that is what that proclamation was necessary for and was used for.

Up till 1947.

I know. I know the whole story. The war measures stayed in operation longer than they should have done, but what about it?

But it was used in actual practice.

Yes, it might have been. It was probably forgotten about, but they did away with it; they would not have it as a permanent part of our law.

We are not having i,t as a permanent part of our law either.

Where does it say that in the clause? It says that the State President may suspend it from time to time.

And bring it in whenever it may be necessary.

It is still a permanent part of the law; of course it is. The State President has that right at any time. He has not got to come back to Parliament and ask for it.

It is permanent in the sense that the emergency regulations were permanent—in that sense and in that sense only.

It is much more permanent than the regulations were. The regulations were brought into force for a time and then suspended. They were brought into force for a particular purpose. Here you are making something a permanent part of the law, which the State President can suspend from time to time. The two cases are not parallel at all. [Time limit.]

I would have replied at this stage to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition but it is obvious that he has not completed his argument and I should like to give him the opportunity to do so.

In wartime we were faced with a situation where people were prepared to offer their lives, and offer them willingly, for causes for which they stood, and the sort of pressures which are now being brought to bear upon people to speak, are a very mild proposition compared with the sort of things that we used in wartime, and I think the hon. Minister knows that. The two cases are not comparable in any way. Sir, here the procedure proposed by the hon. the Minister is extreme. It is a sort of procedure that we do not find in any civilized country at the present time.

Except in Britain.

I am afraid I do not know of it in Britain. I have never known it applied in Britain, and in all my studies of criminal law in Britain I have never known it to apply.

The 1922 Act is still on their Statute Book.

The 1922 Act was passed to deal with the Sinn Fein rebellion which was one of the most terrible rebellions that ever took place. The hon. the Minister ought to read the history of it.

Why was it still used in practice in 1961? People were still locked up under it.

I cannot accept that it was used in practice until 1961. I believe it was on the Statute Book …

I am giving you that as a fact.

It was only in 1961 or 1962 that Sinn Fein made peace with the British Government; the hon. the Minister knows that.

I am telling you as a fact that it was used up to 1961 in actual practice.

Well, if the Minister says that I have to accept it.

I will show you documentary proof.

I would be very interested to see it, but I can see no justification for it in the circumstances which exist at the present time. Here you have provision made for 90 days’ solitary confinement which can be repeated for further periods of 90 days, with no limitation. In other words, the unfortunate individual is held incommunicado for 90 days and if he has not answered at the end of 90 days he can be put away again. Sir, I can see no justification in the present situation for an action of this kind. The hon. the Minister has been a practising lawyer as I have. I think we have all had experience of the sort of things which have happened in police cells and which are alleged to happen in police cells but are not proved. I think the Minister agrees with me that the police have the ability to make a period of incarceration under interrogation very interesting indeed for the prisoner, and I wonder if hon. members opposite, other than the Minister and myself, have an idea of what this can mean to the individual who is held and of the sort of treatment to which he can be subjected. Then I want to ask something else: What is the value of a confession obtained under circumstances of this kind?

We are not after a confession.

The Minister is after information to convict a man but not a confession.

Yes.

It may amount to the same thing very often. People are prepared to give all sorts of information. I have seen men broken down before; I think the Minister has too. I have seen them broken down here and in other places and I know what the results are. I know how they try to stand by their stories for fear of what may happen to them again. The clause also provides that no court shall have the authority to release such a person. Why, if that is so, have we got this provision, “if a police officer believes on reasonable ground”? Who is going to decide whether those grounds are reasonable or not? Only a court of law can decide whether they are reasonable. Does this exclude the court altogether, or can a case be brought before the court to find out whether the police officer’s grounds are reasonable or not, and the court can declare that they are not reasonable but it cannot release the prisoner. Why put in “upon reasonable grounds” or is it just white-washing the situation? Why not say that a police officer may at any time for any reason incarcerate an individual who he thinks has information? It need not be reasonable grounds at all. That is white-washing it. No one can test the reasonable grounds. That is white-washing it. The only man who has the right to release the prisoner is the Minister, and who is going to bring information before the Minister as to whether those grounds are reasonable or not? Sir, a provision of this kind is a complete negation of all the principles on which our criminal law is based. Here you have a man who can be locked up for 90 days, who may be entirely unconnected with the crime, but who has, in the opinion of the police, certain evidence. He is kept there for 90 days and subjected to all sorts of interesting experiences. Perhaps he never had information at all. And then? Take the case of a suspect. The whole principle of our law is that a man shall not be forced to confess. If he makes a confession we will not use it; we will just use the facts to which he confesses and establish them in another way. In other words, you are undermining the whole principle of the freedom of confession. The Minister knows that there were times when torture was an accepted weapon of the authorities of any country.

Surely you are not insinuating anything.

I am not insinuating anything. Let the Minister listen for a moment. He knows very well that torture was an accepted weapon of the authorities in the maintenance of law and order. He knows that it was abandoned because of the uselessness of the statements made by the victims and their readiness very often to confess to anything provided the torture was severe enough. I am not suggesting physical torture; what I am suggesting is that the incarceration of a man without evidence, a man who may not have any information, a man who is merely suspected and may be innocent, for periods of 90 days may amount to a form of mental torture, because he always has the hope that at the end he may come out, and when he comes out he gets another 90 days. I wonder if the Minister knows the effect that incarceration in solitary confinement can have on people. There are some people— apparently the Minister is one—who are not much affected by it. I have known men who were not affected by it. I have known men who were reduced to a state, mentally, as a result of that confinement, which was very serious indeed.

I have seen that myself.

Why did the Geneva Convention lay down limits to the period of incarceration under solitary confinement, in wartime for prisoners?

In the cooler for 30 days.

That is right. That was laid down under the Geneva Convention. They made that the limit. You could not take a man out and put him in again without giving him a period outside.

What they did to us was to keep you awaiting trial for 24 days and then keep you in the cooler for 30 days.

Yes, but the Minister was not a prisoner-of-war. He did not fall under the Geneva Convention.

The same conditions and regulations applied.

With respect, they may have been made to apply by the Government. I was not here so I am not arguing on that score, but if the Minister was treated under the Geneva Convention, then that was a concession, because it need not be applied to people other than prisoners-of-war.

Sir, I do not feel that the Minister has made out a case for this. I feel that it undermines all the principles or our criminal law. I think it is a retrograde step. I think the effect upon the country is going to be bad, and I think the effect on the outside world is going to be catastrophic. We already have a bad name. We have a bad name for many of the things which this Government has done which they felt were justified. The Government can argue as much as it likes that our conditions are not understood; they can argue as they will that people overseas do not know what is going on here, but the fact of the matter is that this is going to have a disastrous effect. [Time limit.]

This clause says that—

He may in the same way arrest any person, as my hon. leader has pointed out, who, in his opinion, is in possession of information relating to such offence or intended offence. The arrested person may then be detained in custody for interrogation at any place the officer thinks fit until the person has. in the opinion of the Commissioner of Police, replied satisfactorily to all questions. No person, except with the Minister’s permission, will have access to this detained person; no court will have jurisdiction to order his release. No person, it says, shall be detained for more than 90 days on that particular occasion when he is arrested. He can, however, as has been pointed out, be recommitted any number of times for a further period of 90 days.

To me these words I have read out spell tyranny and despotism. This, in plain English, says “South Africa will be a police state” as indeed it will if this clause is accepted. I think it is impossible to tolerate this clause. It gives powers to the police to give third degree for three months and then perhaps even longer. I believe that it must be regarded as a barbarous innovation and I say that I condemn it wholeheartedly.

One of the official organs of the Nationalists, the Burger, is correct when it talks about “formidable powers being granted to answer the challenge of subversion and revolution”. Yet we are told by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Justice that this land is tranquil and peaceful and safe. The Burger differs and must have had this clause particularly in mind when their editor called this Bill “a chill reminder that we were already in the midst of harder and more severe times” and that “we have to fight back with measures such as have seldom been necessary in the past in times of peace and then only sporadically”. They are now to become a permanent part of our law. The Prime Minister and the hon. the Minister says “peace reigns”. The Burger says “we are in a state of seige that may last many years”. That is why, it says, the Government needs what they call “frightening administrative powers which could lend themselves to serious abuse”. That is also what my Leader has said. We as parliamentarians, we as people who believe in the rule of law, should never subject the citizens of this country to anything that can lend itself to serious abuse without adequate correction and without adequate check and without adequate safeguards. The Burger feels, as I do, what it calls, “an instinctive aversion to these radical proposals”. This clause is the most obnoxious I have ever come across in any law in all my 20 years in Parliament.

Except that you enjoyed it when it was applied in your time.

Never! I was one of the few who protested in Parliament and out of Parliament against my own party, because I believed that such powers should never be given to any Minister without adequate safeguards. To me this clause is abhorrent; it is obnoxious to all who cherish the liberty of the subject, to all who hate the idea of arbitrary arrests, to all who believe that the test of civilization is the fair administration of justice to all. Arbitrary powers always corrupt and they corrupt not only those who suffer from them but also those who practise them. If you break down the rule of law; it you breach the principle of habeas corpus which we should always uphold; if you break it even temporarily, in any way, there should always be guarantees to see that those who are placed in a position of arbitrary authority, should be liable to speedy and stern correction if there is any abuse of power. If you break down the rule of law the inevitable result must be cruelty and despotism and, in the end, chaos. There are no safeguards or checks against abuse in this Bill.

I think there is one important thing we should remember. This legislation, this clause, is going to be applied in South West Africa which is mandated territory. That is something which we should think of very seriously, Sir. We should remember that there is a case pending at present against us in which we rely on the rule of law as the last bastion to protect our just and legal rights. And we are now, in our own country, abusing and ignoring the rule of law; we are going against its very finest principles. What hope have we to expect people overseas, our friends who have always protected our interests, to do anything else but to despise us. What great harm we are doing to our cause overseas! What harm we are doing to our cause in that court in which we will plead our legal and just rights, as we hoped, with success. Our safety may be grievously imperilled unless the rule of law is honoured and maintained. Yet we ourselves set an example by doing something which every single civilized country abhors and to which we on this side and I personally cannot possibly ever subscribe.

I want to say immediately that it is not my intention to reply to the speech of the hon. member who has just sat down. I think that I should say nothing about that speech except that, as usual, the hon. member was reckless in casting suspicion upon South Africa and more so in connection with South West Africa.

Deliberately reckless.

Deliberately reckless, because the hon. member ought to know …

[Inaudible.]

On a point of order, is the hon. member for Ventersdorp (Mr. Greyling) allowed to use the word “saboteur” in this House?

In this case, yes.

Order! Did the hon. member for Ventersdorp use that expression?

Yes, Mr. Chairman, but I shall withdraw it so that the debate may proceed.

I must honestly say, Mr. Chairman, that when I think of South West Africa and about the hon. member for Wynberg (Mr. Russell) then I am greatly tempted to use that word and I would use it if it were parliamentary. The hon. member ought to know that this particular clause does not apply to South West Africa. Why does he say that it does?

I believed they were.

No, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member does not have the least right to say that that is what he believed. If there was any uncertainty on his part he should have asked hon. members on his side of the House who know more about the matter whether those provisions were of application. The South West Africa question is such a delicate matter that no one on this side or on that side has any right to aggravate the matter any further unless he is absolutely sure of his facts. But the hon. member does not care in the least whether his facts are correct or not.

[Inaudible.]

I am telling the hon. member that it does not refer to South West Africa. There is no provision in this Bill to make it of application to South West Africa. The hon. member knows that before legislation can be applied to South West Africa a provision must be embodied in the legislation to that effect and it is not embodied in this legislation. The hon. member does not care in the least what happens to South West Africa or to South Africa. He merely makes the insinuation here to draw the attention of the world to it. The world is not going to believe me; the world is not going to believe the Bill; no, the world is going to believe Hamilton Russell. A cable will be sent to-morrow to the effect that Hamilton Russell has said that this Bill will be of application to South West Africa. Is the hon. member not ashamed of himself at all? Is he not at all ashamed of his lack of allegiance to South Africa and his unpatriotism? Does the hon. member not care what happens to South Africa? Has he no roots here? Are his roots not embedded in our soil just as ours are? Must South Africa be thrown to the dogs just as long as the liberalism and race hatred shown by that hon. member hold sway in South Africa? [Interjection.]

On a point of order, is the hon. member for Ventersdorp entitled to say, “He is a traitor”?

He is quite entitled to say it although it is not a parliamentary expression.

Order! Did the hon. member for Ventersdorp say that?

I said that he was a traitor to the good faith of our country.

The hon. member must withdraw that remark.

I withdraw it.

Order! The hon. member must stand up when withdrawing a remark.

I withdraw it, Mr. Chairman.

I must honestly say, Mr. Chairman, that if that hon. member were a member of my party I would renounce him; I would refuse under the circumstances to be a member of the same party as that to which he belonged; I would refuse to sit in the same caucus with him; I would refuse to be seen in the same company with him. That is all I have to say to the hon. member.

I want to direct my remarks now to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition who approached this aspect of the matter in a very reasonable manner, which I appreciate. I do not want to reply to all his arguments. I just want to lay a foundation for the arguments that may be raised later. I want to give the hon. the Leader of the Opposition a confidential document dealing with the British Act of 1922. I just want to quote one section from that document—

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition will remember that it was a permissive Act which suspended the entire system of justice and in terms of which there could be government by regulation. That Act is still in force; it is still on the British Statute Book. I am not giving these facts for the information of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition but actually for the information of the London Times. This Act was applied up to 1961. I quote from the document that I want to entrust to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition—

This was in 1922, as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition stated—

This is quite a normal procedure—

I will give this document to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. There is one other thing that I want to tell the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. He warned against the abuse of the provisions of Clause 17. I do not resent this fact; I would have resented it if he had not issued this warning. I do not resent his warning because anyone who tries to deny that this clause can lead to misuse is a fool. I am painfully aware of this fact, not only in regard to what I myself have seen happening but for other reasons as well. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that he had seen human beings being broken. It is not a very nice thing to see a human being being broken. I have seen it and he has seen it. The man seeking these powers must take responsibility for them. They can make or break him and I am painfully aware of that fact. Nothing broke a former Minister of Justice under another Government as much as these regulations did—broke him to such an extent that his name stank in South Africa. I do not intend to allow that to happen to me. That is why when I accept responsibility for asking for this regulation, I fully realize what the results may be for me as an individual and for this Government; I fully appreciate all the consequences that may flow from this. I realize that it will be my specific duty, my responsibility, to ensure that these powers are not abused. What is more, I realize that I still have to be responsible to this House; I shall have to be able to tell this House with a clear conscience at all times that this regulation has been applied without its having being abused. I cannot say any more than this to hon. members; I do not want to go further than this.

But I want to tell hon. members that we are now entering a new phase in the struggle against these subversive elements. I have reason to believe that we are not very far from the stage, depending upon circumstances which are unknown and therefore unpredictable, when we may perhaps be able to lay our hands on the people who are primarily responsible for this position that has been created in South Africa. Up to the present we have only captured the minions although we have arrested some of the less important leaders; we have even arrested some of the important figures in this movement. But we have not been able to arrest the nucleus of leaders, the group that is behind this whole movement, the people who are responsible for all that is happening in South Africa. I am being very honest and frank in this regard.

I am aware of the fact that there may possibly be people somewhere who can lead us to those people. But Section 83—as has been proved clearly in the past—is unfortunately not strong enough to bring that about. The Government wants to lay its hands on those people. Not only do we want to lay our hands on them but in the interests of South Africa and in the interests of us all we must lay our hands on them. I hesitate for the reasons that I have given to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition to ask for these powers. One does learn something from experience, Mr. Chairman. I have also learnt from my experience. There were times during the past months when I was grateful for what I had experienced. One draws on one’s past experience. That experience compels me to say that if this clause can be put into operation we may succeed in our purpose and we may perhaps save ourselves—and when I speak about “ourselves” I mean all the inhabitants of South Africa, White and non-White, no matter to what party they may belong—much nameless misery, a great deal of sorrow, if we can get to the root of the matter and solve this problem. Hon. members must please not ask me to say more than this; I am not able to say more than this at this stage. I do not even want hon. members to take my word for this. All I ask is that they give me the benefit of any doubt that may exist in this regard.

Let me make this very clear. In my opinion and after a hurried study by me in the short time available I believed that this Bill would apply to South West Africa. I honestly believed that. I am still not sure what the legal position is …

Naturally not, because you are not prepared to accept my word.

The Minister has told me that it does not apply and I accept that.

Why do you say you still believe it does?

I said I was not sure of what the position is myself. The Minister has, however, given me an assurance, and his knowledge is obviously greater than mine on the subject. He drafted the Bill with legal assistance and I accept that it does not apply to South West Africa. Therefore I say to this House and to the world that any argument I may have used in this respect, any argument that hinges on the statement that it will be applied to the mandated territory of South West Africa, I withdraw unequivocally. I am sorry I used that wrong argument to make one point. That is unqualified and I am glad the Committee has given me a chance to correct it immediately.

Let me say this, however, that it does not diminish by one iota my very strong objection to this clause. I believe it will be used inside and outside our land to stoke the fires of hate and antagonism which other countries feel against us, in particular those Western democracies on whom we depend, should the worst come to the worst in connection with South West Africa, to help our cause …

Order! The principle was discussed at the second reading; the hon. member must come back to the clause.

Sir, a clause in a Bill which authorizes the summary arrest by the police of individuals, to be incarcerated for the extraction of information continuously for 90 days or until they give satisfactory replies to interrogation is abhorrent. It is foreign to the rule of law which is honoured by all the countries whose friendship we value—the United States of America, Great Britain and France. These countries which could through their right of veto help us on serious international occasions, might well be turned away from us and our interests by the fact that we ourselves have shown an utter disregard for the canons of justice and the rule of law. I say that the withdrawal I have made does not alter my own feelings one jot towards this iniquitous clause nor does it alter the fact that it will be very dangerous to our future relations with other nations if we accede to this harsh and objectionable measure.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry but I am not at all impressed by the apology made by the hon. member for Wynberg (Mr. Russell). He knows just as well as any one of us how delicate the position is in connection with South West Africa. He does not even go to the trouble of first finding out what the position is before he makes those accusations. Does he remember the article that he wrote in the Cape Times about South West Africa? That could form the most damning evidence possible against South Africa if it were true. What he has done to-day has merely been a continuation of what he did in the Cape Times by writing that shocking and shameful article about South West Africa in connection with the so-called crimes that are being committed there by this Government.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

I will come back to the clause, Mr. Chairman, but I just want to say that throughout the years that I have been connected with Parliament both as a member of this House and in the Press Gallery …

On a point of order, you have ruled, Mr. Chairman, that the hon. member must come back to the clause. [Interjections.]

Order!

In all these years no member of the United Party or of any other party has shown less patriotism towards South Africa than that hon. member. I think that everyone in this House, even his own supporters, hold that opinion of him.

One thing is very clear and that is what has been said by the hon. the Minister—that the United Party supports the principle of this Bill not out of principle but out of opportunism. They have agreed that we should have a watch-dog but now that we have that watch-dog, they are trying to draw its teeth. They want to have a watch-dog which cannot bite at all. I want to base my argument on the attitude of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. He said that this type of measure was quite correct in time of war and in time of crisis. We know that in time of crisis we have to give these powers to the Minister. Will any hon. member say that as far as our internal security is concerned the position during the last war was worse than the position that we are experiencing to-day? Will they tell us that they have not read what Mr. Justice Snyman said in his reply to the hon. the Minister’s letter? Let me read it for hon. members [Translation]—

This is a time of cold war. Everyone knows that. It is just as serious a period as far as our internal security is concerned as was the case during the war. Those hon. members are in full agreement that those powers would be justified during a time of war. Their attitude is that when they are in power they are entitled to give their Minister more powers than they are prepared to give to this Minister. What are they prepared to do? They are prepared to give a Minister unlimited powers in time of crisis, powers which permit him to act even without parliamentary sanction.

I have here an article which appeared recently in the Cape Argus written by the hon. member for Yeoville (Mr. S. J. M. Steyn). What does he advocate? He says that the Minister must not ask Parliament for these powers; he says that if the Minister deems it necessary, he must make use of those powers whether he has parliamentary approval or not. He must do what General Smuts did in 1922. He mentions the example here and states—

“Rule of law”! General Smuts did not detain people for 90 days and seek parliamentary approval for doing so in advance. There was a localized strike on the Witwatersrand; there was no general crisis in the country, and what did General Smuts do? He did not detain those people for 90 days. He imprisoned them without trial. He then took them from the gaol and deported them without trial.

Was that not done under martial law?

Martial law or not, he did it without having the least right to do it. Now the hon. member for Yeoville says that the Minister must not seek parliamentary approval; he must act like General Smuts acted. He must do so whether Parliament gives its approval or not and he must ask Parliament for indemnity afterwards.

This clause deals with the detention of persons for 90 days. The hon. member for Yeoville, the deputy leader of that party, is prepared to grant them for greater rights.

For interrogation?

I say that their attitude in principle is that in a time of crisis one can give far greater powers to a Minister. Their argument is that this provision is too severe, that it can be abused far too much, but I say that the attitude of this party is that when there is a crisis one must not only give the Minister greater powers but one must also give the Minister the assurance that he can do just what he wants to do: Detain them for 90 days; detain them for 120 days; detain them in gaol; deport them; do just what you want to do for the security of the country. Is that not what the hon. member for Yeoville advocates in his article? They were prepared to assume those powers themselves but they do not want to give those powers to this Minister of Justice. The whole thing amounts to this, that they are continually saying that they accept the Snyman Report, but they then surely accept the fact that the position in this country at the moment makes it necessary to give the Minister extraordinary powers. But now they come along and say that the position in the country is not serious and that there is no justification for these powers. Their attitude is quite clear to me. The hon. the Minister stated clearly why he wanted these powers and he told us precisely what he was going to do with them. Hon. members opposite now object to his being given those powers and they can only object if they do not believe that there is a serious position in the country. They can only object if they have not accepted the Snyman Report. When they say that they accept that report and they vote for the second reading, it is quite clear that the only reason why they do so is that it is politically convenient for them to do so. I say that the attitude adopted by those hon. members is a shocking one. On each occasion that the hon. the Minister has asked for additional powers we have experienced the same complaint from hon. members opposite that those powers can be abused. We have now heard this again from the hon. member for Wynberg who has said that these powers can be abused. They have said this over the years in regard to all the powers that have been asked for. The hon. the Minister challenged them to mention one case where this Minister of Justice or a former Minister of Justice had abused any of those powers. They have not been able to mention one case. They mentioned one case recently and that was in connection with Patrick Duncan, but there is not one single member sitting on that side of the House who can say that that power was abused in the case of Patrick Duncan. But they continue to make us suspect in the eyes of the world. The hon. member for Wynberg is now going to tell the world all the possible and impossible results that can flow from these powers being abused. That is how he brings discredit upon South Africa. If a madman were to have these powers, he would of course be able to do anything. The hon. member for Wynberg has told the world that this is now the position in South Africa. He has also said that our good name will be dragged through the mud even further. What an unreasonable attitude to adopt in respect of one’s own country! What an unreasonable attitude it is to adopt while those hon. members agree with us that the position in South Africa is very serious!

I am sorry that the spirit revealed by the Opposition has been to tell the Minister: “Strengthen your hand; do not go too far but you can rely on the Opposition in your efforts to combat sabotage in South Africa, in trying to overcome this dangerous position; in your efforts to do so you can rely upon us”, while to-day they adopt an attitude which is not at all in conformity with the attitude that they first adopted. I am afraid that they are doing themselves a very great injustice. That would not hurt me so much but the fact is that they are also doing South Africa a very great injustice.

It is a long time since I have heard the hon. member for Vereeniging speak as irresponsibly as he has just spoken now.

You are talking nonsense.

Well, the hon. member for Vereeniging is the last person who should talk to this side of the House as us being opportunists. The hon. member for Durban (Point) (Mr. Raw) has called him a political grasshopper, and let me tell him that we have not been opportunistic in our attitude towards this Bill, and let no one else on that side ever refer to our attitude as opportunistic. We have supported the hon. Minister where he has a case, and he knows it very well, and I think everyone on that side of the House should appreciate that where a case has been made out we have supported him. What case has been made out in this regard? The hon. member for Vereeniging glibly talks about the Snyman Commission Report and then the cold war. There is nothing in the Snyman Commission Report which warrants a clause like this.

I am talking about the letter.

I am talking about the Snyman Commission Report. That is what we support. The hon. member for Vereeniging wants to do what everyone else on that side apparently wants to do—just give the Minister all the powers he wants, without any case being made out for these powers, extraordinary powers in time of crisis, and then—the hon. member will correct me if I misquote him—he said “daar is nie ’n noodtoestand in hierdie land nie”. This is what he said. There is no emergency in this country. I cannot follow the hon. member’s argument. In my short time in this House, the most remarkable thing that I have ever seen was when the hon. Minister of Justice stood up and asked for a power like this without being able to tell the House why he wants it. This is the Minister of Justice who said when he introduced the Bill that he had qualms about it. To-day he said that it pains him to do this, for the various reasons that there are; apart from the effect it might have on the hon. Minister’s political career, it pains him personally as a lawyer and as a Minister of Justice. In those circumstances surely some case can be made out for this! If the hon. Minister of Justice is so pained about this, why is this clause so drastic, so Draconian? Why is there no reference to the courts? Far from that, the courts are entirely excluded.

I thought I made that perfectly clear.

You take the two different people who are going to be dealt with under this clause. There is the suspect who could be an accused person. My hon. Leader has dealt with this. The point he makes is a very valid one, and the hon. Minister knows it. If this undermines the whole principle of our system of justice, of which we had every reason to be extremely proud, is it worth the results that it is going to achieve? Are we going to turn ourselves into a right-wing totalitarian country in order to combat a left-wing totalitarian threat? Are we going to have a right-wing totalitarian legal system to meet a left-wing totalitarian threat? I do not think so. If the hon. Minister could justify this, we would be able to consider it, but the hon. Minister has come here and has asked us for blanket consent. Under those circumstances can any reasonable man be a party to a clause like this, especially when the hon. Minister cannot explain it? The court is specifically excluded. No matter what happens, this is entirely in the hands of the police. I am not casting any aspersions on the police, but what happens to a man in the 90 days? What usually happens to a man when he is held for interrogation? And why is the period 90 days? Surely we are entitled to some explanation of that? Why is it 90 days? My hon. Leader referred to the section known to newspapermen where people can be brought for interrogation before a magistrate and if they do not answer satisfactorily, they can be put into gaol for eight days at a time, and so on, and so on. But, Sir. they always appear before a magistrate somewhere. And there is a very good reason for it. Why are cases remanded in our courts for 14 days at a maximum and then the accused has to be brought into the court? Why were those laws framed in 1917 and even before, and why have we kept them up to this day? For very good reasons. So that the accused will be brought before a court, and if anything has happened to him in that time, then it will be shown to the world. Mr. Chairman, the effect of this clause upon every individual, any individual, is to put him entirely in the hands of the Police Force. Not in the hands of the hon. Minister. He is not going to be in a position to know what happens in every single case. And when the hon. Minister gives his undertaking. no one will seriously dispute that the hon. Minister does not want this to work; as he has pointed out, he has a lot at stake if it does not work. But the hon. Minister is not going to be in a position to be able to look at every single case. It will be impossible for the hon. Minister to do so. Let me put a pertinent question: What will happen if a person who it is thought might be able to give evidence is beaten up? What will happen to him? Who will ever know about it? I am not saying that it is going to happen, but I think that the provisions of our law already are all directed towards this not going undetected. There is the hon. Minister of Information. How is he going to explain this clause? The hon. Minister of Justice cannot explain it to us in this House. How is the hon. Minister of Information going to explain this to the outside world? And he will have an awful lot of explaining to do! But we cannot vote for something we do not know about and as it now stands, it is completely and utterly objectionable to anyone in this House, including the hon. Minister, and I think the hon. member for Vereeniging. It ought to be at any rate. Does the hon. member for Vereeniging like this clause? Is it objectionable to him?

Yes, but there are other things far more objectionable.

The hon. member for Vereeniging can give no reasons as to why he is going to support this clause. Is there anyone on that side of the House who can explain this?

Do you agree with the hon. member for Yeoville that the hon. Minister should act without authority from this Parliament?

What the hon. member for Vereeniging thinks the hon. member for Yeoville and what the hon. member for Yeoville in fact said, may as far as I am concerned be two completely different things. But I am not going to enter into a discussion about something else. I am talking about this clause. The hon. Minister of Justice has said that he is not going to talk about this clause. The powers herein contained, without an explanation, can lead all reasonable men to no other conclusion but that South Africa has become in effect a police state. Are we a police state? I do not believe it.

But you said so last year.

If the hon. Minister of Information can show me where I said that, I will probably apologize to him. I never said that.

I was saying before the suspension of business that this clause as it stands finds no acceptance at all on this side of the House. My hon. Leader when he spoke to this clause referred to Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and I said that that was wellknown as a section especially to newspapermen as a section in respect of which it is possible that someone is suspected of having any evidence in respect of any offence that he can be brought before the magistrate and if he does not provide the information that is required, refused to give up the information, he can then be committed to gaol for a period of eight days. At the expiry of eight days he will then be returned to the magistrate who will then again interrogate him and if he still refuses to provide the information, he can again be committed for another eight days, and this could go on ad infinitum. This is a provision in our law already. I think it would meet the case the hon. the Minister has in mind because the inquiry can be held at any place and it can be held without the public having access. In other words it could be held in a gaol. It can be held privately. But, Sir, it has the great advantage that those factors which I say are completely anathema in respect of this clause, to everybody, I think, in this House, will be obviated inasmuch as he will be brought before a judicial officer once every eight or nine days. So I want to move an amendment—

which will then provide that people could be arrested if suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed “or having intended to commit an offence under the Suppression of Communism Act, or under that Act as applied by the Unlawful Organizations Act or of sabotage, or persons who are in possession of information relating to the commission of any such offence, or the intention to commit such an offence”. The persons in respect of whom this provision is to be applied would not be changed at all, but the rest of the provisions would be deleted, and the provisions of Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955, should thereafter be applied so that from then on such a person could be interrogated privately but would every eight days have to come before a judicial officer. I therefore move—

I regret that I cannot accept the amendment as it seeks to introduce a principle not contemplated by the Bill as read a second time.

In those circumstances. Mr. Chairman, and because I believe that this clause as it stands, should be subject to some further consideration which is by the rules precluded, and specially in view of the hon. Minister’s attitude towards this Clause 2, that he himself is not happy about it, I move—

Upon which the Committee divided:

AYES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

NOES—69: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Knobel, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Maree, W. A.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Nel, J. A. F.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser, P. C.: Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath. J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk, G. H.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Motion accordingly negatived.

This clause is of course one of the major clauses in the Bill. There is little I need add to the criticism of it voiced by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, the hon. member for Wynberg and others. It is because I agree with them so wholeheartedly that I voted against the second reading, because I belive that this clause and Clause 4 are the most important clauses in the Bill. They undermine the whole rule of law and that is repugnant to me. This clause provides for the suspension of one of the most ancient writs of law, habeas corpus. It means that a person may be taken time and time again for a period of 90 days for interrogation at the behest of any police officer who has some suspicion that the person might have some information which can be of assistance to the police. The Leader of the Opposition has already expressed his fears and I also have doubts as to the results of such interrogation. I want to say that police brutality is by no means a monopoly in South Africa and I think it would be stupid to deny that it does go on here because we have had enough replies given in this House to questions dealing with assaults on prisoners to know that that is the case. [Interjections.] Police brutality is found all over the world and it is ridiculous for hon. members to tell me that I should be ashamed of myself. But in a multi-racial country one should be particularly on one’s guard against giving powers to the police, particularly where the members of the other races are voiceless as far as their political rights are concerned. I want to ask the Minister whether it has not struck him as significant that he should have been so very upset when the hon. member for Wynberg raised the issue, incorrectly, it so happens, in relation to the application of this clause to South West Africa. I am not denying that what the Minister said was correct, but what interests me is his reaction. If this is such a delicate matter that it puts the Minister into a ferment of anxiety, at the thought that anyone overseas could imagine that such a clause should be extended to South West Africa, does he not realize that that is an admission that he realizes just how bad this clause is? If it is bad for South West, it is bad for South Africa.

You are being mischievous, because you know the difficulties in regard to South West.

If it is a delicate matter to be raised in the councils of the world in reference to South West Africa, it is a delicate matter to be raised there against South Africa too, and already there are reactions at UN against this Bill.

Why do you not rather go to Ghana?

I will not need to go to Ghana, because the same preventive detention they have there, will operate here shortly. [Interjections.]

Sir, cannot we have order? We cannot hear what is going on, in spite of your repeated requests for order.

Order! Hon. members should obey the ruling of the Chair and keep quiet.

I want to continue with this theme, in spite of the threats emanating from the opposite side. I want to ask a few questions in regard to this clause, against which I will vote anyway. What provision will be made for the next-of-kin of these people who disappear for 90 days for purposes of interrogation? How is anyone to know who has been taken, how long they will be kept, and where, and what information will be given to the next-of-kin? Will anyone in higher authority immediately be notified about it? There is nothing in the clause to say that this will be so. All we know is that some police officer may decide that somebody has information which he wants to get out of him, and he can detain the man for 90 days. What provision is made for officers to notify their seniors? Will we be given the information about the number of people so held, will the names be tabled, and will the Press have access to those names, or will we get the same sort of reaction I got when I asked how many people had disappeared in the Transkei under Proclamation No. 400? This is just as drastic as Proclamation No. 400. There is no access to the courts or to any legal adviser. If this is not the sort of law which is introduced in a totalitarian country, I have yet to be shown another which shows a closer resemblance to it. I have put some specific questions to the Minister, who has disappeared, though I am sure not for 90 days, and I hope the Minister will give a reply to these questions.

I would ask the Minister to give the House more information as to why the powers which already exist in the law, in Section 83, for the purpose of conducting interrogations are insufficient. I know that he has already addressed the House in reply to my leader on this point. I will say this, that the Minister has in other regards, given the House a great deal of information as to his difficulties. As was pointed out by the hon. member for Durban (North), it is so much easier for the House to understand the situation it is dealing with if we are told what the difficulties are. I ask the Minister again why Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Act is insufficient, when you have power in that section to bring a person before the magistrate, to interrogate him, and if he does not reply he can be committed to prison for eight days at a time, for as long as you like. Why is that not sufficient in these circumstances?

To realize the stringency of this provision, one must understand what can flow from a bona fide error of judgment. I am not referring to male fides, or the misuse of power by the police. I merely base my case on a bona fide error of judgment by the police.

You need not make that point. I am perfectly aware of it.

The Minister may be aware of it, but I would like to repeat it for the sake of other hon. members. It is not only a question of the individual who might suffer injury or assault while being detained, although that is a factor, but one merely has to assume that there is a bona fide error of judgment, and as the result a man’s freedom is curtailed for as long as it suits that officer. That, in itself, is enough to make one think again. To be able to deprive a man of all freedom of movement and of any access to anyone is a serious matter when it may be discovered later that it was all as the result of a genuine error of judgment. The Minister says he appreicates that, but of course the situation becomes so much more objectionable if one deals with the abuses which can and do creep into even the best disciplined organization. Those things can happen, and with the best will in the world on the part of the Minister and of the senior police officers such abuses may creep in. Our Police Force is no better or worse in that regard than any other force in the world, and these things may happen unbeknown to the Minister and the senior officers. Bearing in mind all that, and as the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban (North) has been refused, I would like to move the following amendment—

I am unable to accept these amendments, because in substance they are similar to an amendment already ruled out of order.

May I say that the amendment which was refused went much further. It affected not only the officer carrying out the interrogation, but the powers under which the interrogation could be held and the person holding it. My amendment merely deals with the person who shall conduct the inquiry.

The hon. member is trying to introduce a new principle.

We are dealing with a clause which covers a wide field. It begins by saying who may detain the person concerned, then it gives the grounds upon which the person may be detained, and then it describes the sort of person who may be detained, and then it says that he may be detained for the purpose of interrogation, and then it says that he shall be interrogated until a certain individual is satisfied, but he does not say who will carry out the interrogation. One assumes it will be a police officer, because it is the police who detain him, but there is nothing to stop the Minister under the clause as it stands from appointing a magistrate to do that job. What I am asking is that there will not be a discretion for him to appoint a magistrate to do the interrogation, but that it shall be a magistrate. I submit, with respect, that in that regard I am not changing the principle. It merely specifies the officer who shall carry out the interrogation, and I move accordingly.

Interrogation by a police officer is a principle of this Bill, and the hon. member is introducing a new principle.

On a point of order, the section says that a commissioned officer may arrest the man. The person arrested is then detained for questioning by someone—we do not know who—until the Commissioner of Police is satisfied, no doubt through a report by the interrogating officer, whoever he may be. Will you please tell us where in this clause the principle of interrogation by a police officer is contained?

I have considered the amendment, and I repeat that it introduces a new principle, namely interrogation by a magistrate. I have given my ruling, and I stand by it.

On a point of order, there is nothing in the clause to show that the interrogation shall be done by a police officer. It only says that a police officer can arrest and can detain.

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to argue with the Chair. I have given my ruling.

Then I must ask for Mr. Speaker’s ruling on the point.

Will the hon. member move accordingly?

Yes, I move—

That the Chairman report progress in order to obtain Mr. Speaker’s ruling on the point raised, and ask leave to sit again today.

Upon which the Committee divided:

AYES—44: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.: Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.: Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff;, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Holland M. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H. Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; van Niekerk, S. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

NOES—71: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; Dönges, T. E.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Knobel, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Maree, W. A.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto. J. C.; Pelser, P. C.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R. Sauer, P. O.: Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.: Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.: van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg. M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Wyk. G. H.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.: Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel. J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Motion accordingly negatived.

I believe that when the Minister rose this morning to justify the retention of this clause he spoke with conviction and that with the knowledge he has of the matter dealt with in this Bill he is convinced that he has good reason to insert this clause in the Bill but the fact remains that this clause places a very heavy responsibility on the Minister. It is a far-reaching encroachment on the ordinary rights of individuals; we cannot get away from that. I think when such far-reaching powers are given to a single person or to police officers, you have to consider carefully the abuses which may take place or how the original object you had in mind can be departed from. I want to give an example of something I personally experienced a few months ago. I had a servant who came from the platteland. After a few months he fell into bad company. One Sunday morning it appeared as though he had gone to bed very late the previous night and he boldly told me that he had been to a party of the Liberal Party where there were Whites, Coloureds and Bantu, that there was plenty of liquor and that the police arrived on the scene.

Where was that?

Here in Cape Town. It was a Liberal Party party.

A party of the hon. member for Houghton (Mrs. Suzman).

No, she belongs to the Progressive Party.

She is worse than the Liberal Party.

He boldly told me that the police arrived there and asked him for his name and address, that he told them that he was in the employ of a Member of Parliament and that they immediately let him go. I told him immediately that if that were to happen again I would immediately dismiss him which I did a few weeks later. What I have in mind here is this: Supposing he was in somebody else’s employ and he found himself in such circumstances and that under the influence of the spirit prevailing at the party and of the people with whom he was associating there, he said certain things about his employer. Does the danger not exist that a person who lacks the necessary experience, a person who does not appreciate what the consequences of his actions may be, may perhaps act injudiciously? I want to put this to the Minister: A commandant is in charge of every police district, irrespective of his rank and every police station has a telephone. When it is necessary to take action such as envisaged in this clause …

Only a lieutenant can act.

That is quite right. I fully understand that. It may be that the station commander at a station is not a lieutenant in which case he has to communicate with a lieutenant if such action has to be taken. He himself cannot act. What I should like to see is that it should not be possible for the lieutenant to act and that the decision should not rest with the lieutenant but that the decision to act in this way should rest with the district commandant of that police district.

It can be a lieutenant who is acting in that district.

What the Minister says is quite correct; he knows his Department. I have been at police districts where a lieutenant is in charge or where a lieutenant is acting but then it is a senior lieutenant, somebody who has more or less reached the stage where his next appointment will be that of commandant of a police district. As I have said, telephonic communication will in any case play a part, because where the station commander is not a lieutenant he will have to communicate with a lieutenant. There will be no difficulty, therefore, to communicate with the district commandant who will have to satisfy himself that such action is justified. I also think that where such action is taken, the Minister or the person authorized to act on his behalf in his office must immediately be notified of such action.

That happens as a matter of routine.

I think it will be good to provide for that in the Act. That will reassure many people. I think I know what the Minister has in mind. It is stated here that if such a person is detained it will be necessary for him to obtain the permission of the Minister to get legal advice. I know the panel consists of a whole list of advocates and attorneys and where this sort of case has come before a court it has been the same legal firm and the same advocate who have defended those people. Limitations have already been placed on many of them in terms of legislation which is already on the Statute Book.

In conformity with the arguments I have advanced I wish to move the following amendment—

1. (3) Any officer as aforesaid shall immediately inform the Minister upon arresting any such person.

I hope the hon. the Minister will see his way clear to accept this amendment because apart from the fact that it places the responsibility of making a decision on the shoulders of a more responsible officer, a more experienced officer, it will be embodied in the Act that the Minister should immediately be informed so that he will know about it; that the danger will not exist that the person will be detained and that it will not be weeks before his application reaches the Minister.

It seems to me that there are two ways whereby one can limit the rigour of this clause. The one is by causing the inquiry to be conducted by a judicial officer of some kind or another. That would be a measure of protection against possible abuse. If that effort on the part of this side of the House to limit the rigour of this clause fails, then it occurs to me that there is another method whereby the rigours of the clause can be limited, and that is if one provides for someone to have sight of the person detained; to provide some link, no matter how small and brief it may be, between that individual and the outside world. To that end it seems to me that the least one can do is to provide for access to a person by his doctor and legal adviser. It is difficult to conceive that any abuse in the eyes of the administration can creep in from a visit under control, as it would be, by a detainee’s lawyer or doctor. After all, consider the circumstances under which those visits would be made. They would be made in the place where the person is detained—probably in a gaol or police cell. They could be made in the presence of a police officer, but there would be that link between the individual and the outside world, between the individual and his family. He would be able to obtain advice from an independent source and his family could be reassured that although having been detained, possibly for a long time, he is still in good health and has not been ill treated in any way. Sir, this is a small thing in a clause of this nature but it does improve the clause to a slight extent. I move therefore—

It is unprecedented surely for anyone to be detained under provisions of this kind and to have no access whatever to the outside world nor for those near and dear to him to have access to him. As I said when I spoke earlier in this debate, the hon. the Minister, in spite of what he said to my leader, has not given the House reasons as to why he need go this far in this legislation, and I would ask him again to take this committee into his confidence and to explain why the existing powers are inadequate, why they fall down to meet the situation which he believes it is necessary to meet. If he were to do that, it would make the task of this committee so much easier.

The hon. member moves that two types of persons should have access to the detainee, firstly a medical practitioner. That is provided for in the regulations and it is consequently not necessary to provide for that in this measure. In the second place the hon. member asks that a legal representative, in other words, somebody who is on the roll at the moment, should be able to talk to him. The hon. member moves that knowing full well that we have already discussed that matter and that I adopted a very firm attitude. I am sorry that I have to say this of his and my colleagues but we all know that there are some legal representatives to whom I have in the past refused permission to contact restricted persons. We discussed that principle very fully and the hon. member knows it. In spite of that the hon. member moves that any legal representative should be allowed to see those people. I am going to mention certain names here and I am not apologizing for doing so. We have to be realistic and practical, Sir. If the people whom I have in mind and whom he has in mind are detained they are not going to ask to see the hon. member or the hon. member for Durban (North) (Mr. M. L. Mitchell). They are going to ask for Arenstein or for Sing or for Fehler. If they get into trouble here in Cape Town they are not going to ask for the hon. member for Pinelands (Mr. Thompson); nor are they going to ask for Sen. Pilkington-Jordan. They are only going to ask for certain specific people. If they get into trouble in Johannesburg they are not going to ask for those hon. members who are lawyers or advocates or for other lawyers or advocates; there is a certain specific panel of people for whom they will ask. They are going to ask for Wolpe and for Slovo and for Braham Fisher and others. I am perfectly honest with hon. members. If the Committee forces me, and from the nature of things I am in the hands of the Committee, to accept the amendment and let those people have access to those detainees I do not even want to detain them; in that case I shall be defeating the whole object of this clause and for that reason I am sorry I cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member. I do not want to hide those people and that is why I want to say very clearly that I am quite prepared to accept an amendment, if it should be moved, that these people should periodically be visited by a magistrate if hon. members are afraid that I shall tamper with them or hurt them. I am quite prepared to consider such an amendment and even if such an amendment is not moved across the floor of the House, I shall in any case give instructions administratively compelling magistrates to visit these people periodically. Depending on the time available, I may, if such an amendment is not moved, even move that in the Other Place. I regret, however, that in the circumstances I cannot accept this amendment.

The Minister in dealing with the amendment moved by the hon. member for Zululand (Mr. Cadman) has said that he will accept an amendment making it obligatory for a magistrate or additional magistrate to visit a detainee once a week. The Minister, of course, knew that I was going to move this amendment, because he has already had a copy of the amendment to consider.

That is why I said it.

In the circumstances I move—

The Minister has indicated, quite rightly, that he will accept that amendment but he still refuses to allow the detainee to have his own medical practitioner or his legal adviser. I submit that the fact that in terms of the prison regulations a doctor visits the jail—I do not know how often; I believe it is once a week— is not sufficient. After all, the detainee may be suffering from some peculiar malady and his own medical practitioner who knows the history of the man knows what is wrong with him. It may not be just the ordinary type of illness from which he is suffering—influenza or something of that nature. The Minister himself has said that he has seen men break down in solitary confinement. He has seen men interned during the war. He admits that it is a terrible thing to experience and bearing all that in mind, I submit that surely the least that can be done is to allow the detainee to see his own medical practitioner if he wants to do so. After all, the Minister has not told us why the detainee should not be allowed to see his own medical practitioner. He has told us why he cannot see his own lawyer. I submit that he will not have the same trouble with medical practitioners which he expects to have with certain lawyers. As far as lawyers are concerned, I submit that because the Minister does not want certain lawyers to see detainees is no reason for making it a general rule that they shall see no lawyers. The Minister has the power to prevent certain lawyers from seeing these people and he has already done that. He mentioned the name of Mr. Arenstein; I do not want to mention names. I do not want to go into the other names which he mentioned and discuss the rights or wrongs of the attitude of those other lawyers, because I do not know what the Minister knows about them, but I will just deal with one case which he mentioned, that of Mr. Arenstein. He has already barred Mr. Arenstein; he can debar him from seeing certain people as he has in fact already done, but I submit it is quite wrong for a Minister to lay down as a general principle that he will allow no lawyer to see these detainees because it appears that certain lawyers may influence these detainees in a way contrary to the wishes of the Minister. It is not necessary for them to get Mr. Arenstein or any of these other lawyers mentioned by the Minister. Recently there was a case in Umtata where two people were detained and the Minister could certainly have no objection to the lawyers who were briefed in Umtata to go and see these two people, and yet they were not allowed to see any lawyer. The lawyers had to see the police. Everything was done through the police. I hope the Minister will reconsider this question of allowing legal advisers and medical practitioners to see these detainees, because the Minister has not given adequate reasons why the medical practitioner at any rate should not be allowed to see these detainees. The medical practitioner is not going to give the detainee legal advice.

I have already indicated that I shall accept it if such an amendment is moved. Hon. members have informed me about it but because the other amendments moved had already been put, I did not know whether the amendment would be moved. I am very pleased that it has been moved because I gladly accept it. The hon. member told me that he was going to move such an amendment. It is not an idea, therefore, which has emanated from me; it emanates from the hon. member. The question of medical practitioners visiting all detainees is in the hands of the medical practitioners of the Department of Social Welfare through their district surgeons or their full-time officials. If it should be necessary for such people to see their private medical practitioners I shall not hesitate for a moment to give the necessary permission and instructions. I want to assure the hon. member that as far as this aspect of the matter is concerned I can speak from experience to some extent. I shall not allow those people to undergo what I had to undergo. Under the most difficult circumstances I was not allowed to see a dentist. I shall not let that happen to these people. I readily give that assurance to the hon. member. As far as refusing to allow lawyers to see the detainees I just want to say this: I was a lawyer in those days. I know exactly what the effect of these regulations is. I was not even allowed to discuss pending court cases which I was handling with my partner. I know, therefore the disruption it can cause and I shall consequently issue the necessary instructions. I know exactly what the responsibility is which I am taking upon my shoulders in this connection and I do not want those reproaches to be levelled at me and that is why I shall see to it—I am prepared to stake my reputation on this—that these things do not happen. But if I open the door as hon. members want me to open it, the horse will be out of the stable before it can be of any service to me. The hon. member for Zululand says that I have not adequately motivated my allegation that Section 83 did not give me sufficient power. Can you motivate your experience, Sir, or can you only relate it to somebody else? I did that this morning. Let me just put this question to the hon. member who was a young boy in those days. I want to tell him in advance that he will be in a dilemma, irrespective of what his reply is going to be. Section 83 is either not the answer—and I maintain it is not—or if it is the answer, as he says it is, my question to him is this: Were people only detained in those days in order to torture them, if Section 83 is the answer? The question is very clear. The hon. member for Zululand says it is not necessary to detain people for such a long time—note well, Sir, I am limiting the period to 90 days. It was absolutely unlimited in those days. I say it must be a lieutenant; it was any police official in those days; I say it must be the Commissioner of Police; that is a safety valve. That safety valve did not exist in those days. Let us accept that the principle is exactly the same as it was in those days. The idea was exactly the same in those days as it is to-day; it is exactly the same. There is no difference as far as the idea is concerned. If Section 83 is the answer to-day it should also have been the answer at that time.

Did it exist at that time?

The relevant section has been in our law since before the rinderpest. To be quite honest it was applied in the case of a young lady, Elsa Nel, a case which was given great prominence in the newspapers. The hon. member can take it from me that that section has been in our laws since before the rinderpest.

My argument is this: If that was the answer—where the idea was the same as to-day— why was it not applied? In that case there are only two answers: It was either not the answer—in which the argument of the hon. member falls away—or if it was the answer at that time hon. members owe me a reply as to why people were detained at that time while the answer was there but was not used. Must we, in the interests of hon. members, simply draw a veil over it and forget about it?

I am grateful to the hon. member for Transkeian Territories for his amendment. I gladly accept that amendment but I regret I cannot accept the other amendments.

Having regard to the repeated harking back to those good old days in which the Minister has indulged since he introduced this Bill—the days which taught him something, as he says, the days when he was unfortunately withdrawn from circulation—I am inclined to believe once and for all that the Minister cannot wait to get this legislation on the Statute Book for purely personal reasons; he is almost obsessed, Sir, with this driving power to get this Bill through quickly…

That is a malicious lie; and you know it.

It may be “a malicious lie”, but I do not …

Order! The hon. the Minister must withdraw that the member knows it is a lie.

Mr. Chairman, am I obliged to withdraw it?

The hon. the Minister must withdraw it.

Mr. Chairman, may I address you on this point? The hon. member has made a very personal and offensive (kwetsende) remark about me. I shall withdraw it, Mr. Chairman; but I raise this point of order that you compel the hon. member to apologize to me for the offensive remark he has made.

The hon. the Minister must withdraw it unconditionally.

I obey your ruling, Sir. Will the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) repeat what he said.

I said that having regard to the number of times the hon. the Minister has harked back to those good old days—I am trying to remember my exact words—when he was unfortunately withdrawn from circulation, I am inclined to believe that there is a personal frustration which is the motive …

That was not what you said.

Wait a moment; I am trying to recall what I said. I am prepared to stand or fall by whatever it is. But I am repeating quite clearly that there is a personal reason for this obsession that drives him to put this legislation on the Statute Book as soon as possible. I said he could not wait to get it on the Statute Book. That is what I believe I said. What is wrong with that? The Minister has been telling us about those days; I knew nothing about them, personally. He has introduced them a score of times, if he reads his Hansard. There must therefore be some reason why he relates that to this legislation. I am sorry if I said anything which the Minister does not like.

I want to tell you another thing, Sir, which the Minister said in the course of this debate which he will not deny. He said this—

Ek het dit nie gesê nie.

Die Minister van Justisie: Dit is vir my baie duidelik dat die Opposisie nie inligtingsoek nie; hulle wil nou net tyd mors. Ek wil niks verder daaroor sê nie behalwe om vir die Opposisie te sê dat ek nie oor tyd verleë is nie; hoegenaamd nie. As ons dan tyd moet mors ten opsigte van hierdie aspek—ek het my kant van die Komitee weerhou om aan die debat deel te neem—dan is dit hulle saak.

Order! The hon. member must return to the clause.

Very well, Sir. I have a reason for what I say in this House, or anywhere else. The Minister is charging this side of the House with, what he calls, delaying tactics. When he says that I have given the lead to this party, he flatters me considerably. By saying that I have given the lead to this party, as witness the Sunday Express he was not telling this Committee what the Sunday Express printed. He was not telling them at all. Here I have the article; I am not going to read it. But what I said in the Press was that it would be possible for the Minister to push the Bill through both Houses in the 10 days available. That was my estimate.

Order! The hon. member must now return to Clause 17.

I think this is relevant to Clause 17 . .

Order!

I shall not quibble. The hon. the Minister told us a few minutes ago how he would use this power. May I put it this way: He virtually cooed like a sucking dove when he talked about the way he would use this power. He has consistently tried to demonstrate his personal courage by insisting that he and he alone will carry this responsibility of confining anybody. That was what the hon. the Minister told us. He does not want anybody to share in this responsibility though this is the greatest burden anybody can possibly carry. He, the Minister, who has the greatest measure of courage, is the only one who should be burdened with it. That is the burden of 20 statements he has made. And that is worthy of examination. Even a courageous man must realize that under this Bill, regardless of whether the Minister, in a rush of generosity, is prepared to let a magistrate see the person concerned once a week, or his doctor or his legal adviser, he is confining somebody who may be suspected, according to what may be the view of a minor police official, of having information, not of having committed an offence.

I think in the light of what has happened in other countries, even here, the Minister must realize what this can mean to certain groups of professional men and in certain vocations. A newspaperman, for example, might quite fortuitously hear of something which could conceivably be related to the commission of an offence. And if a police officer with the rank of lieutenant and upwards desires to do so, he can immediately commit him for 90 days. What good does it do if a magistrate sees him once a week? What good does it do if his grandfather sees him once a week? If that police officer can hold him for 90 days until he gets, what he calls a “satisfactory” answer? I ask the hon. the Minister to put himself in that position. He has boasted of his personal courage. Supposing that man does not know anything about the matter, but the police officer says he believes that he does, and he says: “What I call a satisfactory answer is that you say that you do know.” That is an impossible position, Sir. [Interjections.] All the wise guys sit on that side, Sir, and I am happy not to be there. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you something, and it is this: One of the things that makes them terribly sensitive in this House, in fact, one of the surest ways of bringing down on one’s head the wrath of the Minister and anybody else on that side of the House, is the very suggestion that South Africa is a police state. I am not going to say that South Africa is a police state. But I wish the hon. the Minister will explain to me what the difference is between a police state and a state in which a policeman, a lieutenant, can pick anybody off the street and say “You come with me”…

Anybody?

Under certain legislation. I said a policeman with the rank of lieutenant upwards. I realize it is a commissioned officer. Unlike some of those hon. gentlemen who say “nonsense”, I have read this Bill, unfortunately, six times. He can say to that man: “You come with me and you will stay here for 90 days, at least, until I get a satisfactory answer from you.” In other words, what is the difference between a state where a police official, not even the Minister of Justice acting indirectly or the Deputy Commissioner for the particular command, can commit a man to a place of incarceration for 90 days and recommit him at the end of that period, and what you would call a police state? Can somebody on that side of the House tell me? Can one of the interjectors in the north-east corner tell me? They know everything. They must tell me so that I can dispel the fears of many people outside of this House, and the fears of some of the people in this House.

In the limited time that I have, I want to deal with the issue of what happened during the war. First of all, Sir, there was a war on, whether those gentlemen want to admit it or not. History records there was a war on, in fact, the greatest war in the world. History does not record or will not record at any future stage that there was a war on in South Africa at this stage. Assuming there is a war on—which hon. members opposite do not even believe, because the Prime Minister says there is peace and order, and how can you have peace and order during a war—how can you argue that the legislation which may have been applied 20 years ago must be applied to South Africa to-day merely because it was applied 20 years ago? What kind of logic is there in that argument? We have just been told about something which happened before the “rinderpest”. Do you always want to go back 20, 30 or 50 years ago? With great respect to the Minister: I do not stand back for anybody in this country in admiration for his personal courage, but courage has nothing to do with liberty of the individual. I want to remind the hon. the Minister that apart from those few hundred people who may or who may not be affected by this clause, there are 16,000,000 people in South Africa who have nothing to do with this clause, and never will have. The liberty of the individual is far greater than the personal courage of any one of us.

Mr. Chairman, if you were to consider the effects of this particular clause of the Bill, I think you would rightly come to the conclusion that the Minister should give every possible consideration to such amendments as have been moved and such amendments that may be moved from this side, for the very reason that he says he realizes the terrible responsibility that this puts on his shoulders. For that reason, Sir, he should say: “If you can find a way of assuring me that those people who can reasonably be involved as regards the possession of information and the commission of an offence under these laws can be questioned, etc. I shall give way with my Clause 17.” If he does that, then a different situation might possibly arise. But with every amendment, except one so far, the Minister has said in effect: “I cannot accept that; I want to carry this on my own shoulders.” Let me say in conclusion that I hope the Minister will explain, although he has been good enough to accept this one amendment, what the function of the magistrate … [Time limit.]

The hon. member who has just sat down has made a very serious accusation against the hon. the Minister, an accusation which borders on meanness. His accusation was that the Minister wanted this clause to be accepted and that he wanted to put this Bill through, not because he was dealing with saboteurs, not because he was dealing with people who were undermining the authority in the country, but because of personal reasons of revenge. He says the Minister is continually telling us what happened to him during the war …

Did he not do that?

He did do so and I shall tell you in a minute why he did it; and that is what cannot penetrate that thick skull of yours. The hon. member for Hospital says that the hon. the Minister wants this legislation to go through for personal reasons simply because the Minister has told us what happened to him during the war.

I did not say that.

What did the hon. member say then? He said quite clearly that the Minister wanted this legislation to be accepted for personal reasons. That was what he said. That is an accusation which you can only expect from that type of member, Sir. It is very clear why the Minister told us what happened to him during the war. He told us that because a condition prevailed at the time which the then Government regarded as a crisis. The then Government then thought that there were people who wanted to overthrow the Government by force. [Interjections.] I say, in the opinion of the then Government. It is possible that the Minister wanted to do so; I do not know; possibly he did not want to do so.

He denies it.

Very well, but in the opinion of the then Government the Minister wanted to do exactly what Sobukwe wants to do to-day.

I say it is scandalous.

I do not want to argue with that hon. member; he simply has not got the brains. Let me say it again clearly: The reason why the Minister has referred to that is because of the way the then Government acted. In the opinion of the then Government this Minister wanted to overthrow the Government by force. I am not saying that was the case; I say in their opinion.

It was not possibly so; it was so.

You are talking nonsense; that is not true.

On a point of order, is the hon. member for Vereeniging entitled t© allege that it is possible that the Minister at some time or other wanted to act forcibly against the Government?

Order! That is not a point of order.

That is precisely what the position was. Because the then Government regarded the Minister as a danger to internal order the Government took certain steps and what were those steps: Those steps were to lock him up for an unlimited time without trial; without laying a charge against him. If the then Government argued at the time that that was the way they should treat such people, and if hon. members approve of it that that was the way in which the then Government should have acted with the hon. the Minister and other White people, why do they refuse to approve of it that that should happen to Sobukwe? Why do they refuse to approve of it that that should happen to Mandela? As long as they were their political opponents they were quite prepared to give all those powers to Jan Smuts. Now that it is Sobukwe and that type of person they refuse to give those powers to this Minister. That was the only reason why the Minister referred to what had happened to him during the war. The Opposition are adopting this illogical attitude: If they think our internal security is in danger they are prepared to give all the powers. The hon. member for Yeoville even went so far as to say that the Minister should not ask for these powers; he should do what General Smuts did namely he should do what he likes. He must lock up people and ban them from the country and the only thing he should then do is to ask Parliament for indemnification. That is how they want to deal with a crisis. That is how they want to deal with people who want to overthrow the Government by force. Now that the Minister is asking for far less powers they are making all this fuss; now they are trying to create all this suspicion against the country. We have the evidence, evidence which they have accepted, and that is the evidence of Judge Snyman to the effect that the position is serious. The hon. member for Durban (North) (Mr. M. L. Mitchell) asked me whether a state of emergency existed. Of course there is not a state of emergency. What did Judge Snyman say? He said that there were certain people in the country, the Poqo movement and other movements, which were trying hard to create a state of emergency and that if the Minister did not act they would create that stage of emergency. The Opposition has no ground whatsoever, therefore, to oppose this clause.

I want to return to the hon. member for Hospital. He has denied what he said to the Sunday Express and that he insinuated that they would make it as difficult as they possibly could to ensure that Sobukwe came out of gaol.

On a point of order! Mr. Chairman, you refused to allow me to quote from the Sunday Express.

I allowed the hon. member to say something about it.

I just want to read what the hon. member said and he said it in connection with Sobukwe—

That is a warning to the Minister; he must not think that he can detain Sobukwe “because we can find all sorts of objections”.

Before I call upon the hon. member for Zululand (Mr. Cadman) to address the Committee, I just wish to point out that I have allowed a very wide discussion on this clause, but hon. members must now advance new arguments.

The hon. the Minister, in reply to the point which I raised the last time I spoke, made play of the fact that there were certain legal practitioners who, according to his information, held views which were undesirable and conducted themselves in a manner which was undesirable. I have not the information which the hon. the Minister has in that regard. One hears stories, Sir, but I do not believe that one can rely simply on stories. Even accepting what the hon. the Minister says in that regard, it is difficult to see how, when one or other of these people, such as a doctor of a lawyer, is visiting a prisoner in a room together with a warden or a police constable and a conversation takes place in the presence of such a person, any damage can be done. It is very difficult to see that. To meet the situation which the hon. the Minister finds objectionable in that regard I wish to move a further amendment.

With leave of the Committee, the amendment proposed by Mr. Cadman was withdrawn.

I then move—

The effect of this amendment is as follows, that the detained person will have a right to see his doctor or his lawyer provided the doctor or lawyer is not a person restricted under one or other piece of legislation such as the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Suppression of Communism Act or any similar Act. It would specifically rule out the type of legal adviser to whom the Minister has an objection.

I have no doubt that when the hon. the Minister says that he has experienced the discomfort of not being able to see medical and legal advisers and that for that reason he will not allow it to take place under his administration, he means every word that he says. But, Sir, the hon. the Minister is the head of a vast organization. He cannot possibly know what is going on at all levels of that organization. It simply cannot be done. With all the experience that he has had, with all the good will in the world, he cannot ensure that what he desires should be done, will be done. That can only be safeguarded if the detained person has a right to see the persons of his choice with the limitation that he may not see banned persons. That is what it amounts to. So I do ask the hon. the Minister to accept this amendment because I believe that it removes the difficulty which he formerly had. It gives a right to a detained person to see his doctor or his lawyer provided neither of those people is a banned person.

The hon. the Minister must realize, as he probably does, that you arc not dealing here with people who have committed an offence necessarily; you are dealing with people whom an official believes has knowledge; he has done nothing wrong; but whom an official believes has knowledge which may assist in the solving of a crime. Surely that man has a right to be entitled to see the persons I have mentioned, not that a privilege be granted him, not that regulations be made to accommodate him in that regard but that he has a right to see these people. Not only for the purpose that the relations, the wife and family of the person that may be detained, will be informed, but I can also not stress sufficiently that the person who may be detained may well have done nothing wrong at all. In those cicumstances surely there can be no objection to his seeing a doctor or a lawyer, provided that those persons are not banned, etc.

Before you sit down will you reply to my question?

In regard to Section 83? I will be delighted to reply to that. The hon. Minister’s reply was that Section 83 has been in the Act since 1917. Quite correct. He continued that the United Party Government during the war found that that was inadequate. Otherwise why would they have taken the additional powers which they did under the Emergency legislation? The Minister said that I was a small boy at the time. That is not quite correct, but we will let that pass. But what does the Minister’s answer amount to? It amounts to this: The United Party Government was not satisfied with Section 83. They took additional powers. But the hon. Minister does not say why Section 83 was inadquate then and why it is inadequate now. His answer amounts to this that because the United Party Government 20 years ago took powers that were more than they needed, therefore he must take unnecessary powers now.

Just tell me this: Do you think those powers were adequate at the time?

I believe that Section 83 is adequate for the situation which we know now. I do not know what the difficulties were that faced a wartime government. I have not read the legislation of that time and I do not know the facts of that time, I have no knowledge of events at that time. But I will say this, that so far as I can judge: If the United Party Government then faced a situation such as the Minister faces now, then Section 83 would have been sufficient. But I must say this also that I believe, and I think it is accepted all round, that in time of war, as was then the case, problems cropped up far in excess of the problems with which we are faced now. It is accepted that we are not in a state of war. We have what is called a cold war. There are difficulties which require emergency legislation of some sort or another. But I present this squarely to the hon. Minister: He has not yet, in all fairness, told the House why Section 83 is not sufficient. He has quoted an example of where a previous government took further powers. But that may have been quite unnecessary. And certainly on the knowledge of the facts which we have now, and the knowledge which we have of the provisions of Section 83, it seems on what the Minister has told us, that those powers are at the present time perfectly sufficient, and I say again that the hon. Minister has not answered the question as to why those powers are not sufficient now.

I told you twice.

No, the hon. Minister has not. He has referred merely to the fact that another government took additional powers, but he has not said why those powers were not sufficient. [Time limit.]

Following briefly on the line of the hon. member for Zululand (Mr. Cadman), I do not believe that the United Party in wartime took a power equivalent to Clause 17. If I am wrong, I hope the hon. Minister will tell me.

If you don’t believe that, you won’t believe anything.

I don’t believe that. I am sure the hon. Minister would have cited it if that had been the case. And I would like to say in addition that the side governing to-day opposed, as far as I know, almost all of those powers that were then sought, whatever they were. It would be better if we had an admission from the other side that some of the powers which were taken, which I do not believe were anything like as far-reaching as these, were in fact needed.

You better ask your cousin.

I also want to move an amendment to Clause 17—

1. (5) No confession obtained from any person pursuant to the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be admissible in evidence against him.

The amendment would prevent evidence obtained by questioning under this section to be used against a person interrogated should a trial of that person follow. That would give effect to the present position in regard to any questioning that may take place under our criminal code, because where in fact answers are elicited by question and answer, the courts will disallow that as evidence. We have got to ask whether there is any need for the change that is sought in this present position? In the first place I quote the fact that the powers under Section 83 are still there. But in addition the hon. Minister when he brought forward his arguments for justifying this particular clause made it clear what his purpose was, namely to obtain evidence from the lower ranks of subversive bodies in order to enable him to track down the higher ranks. Consequently there would be no need to use the evidence that he obtained from the lower ranks against such lower ranks, but only against the higher ranks. If the hon. Minister accepts the amendment of mine, it will leave him with the power which he has sought to justify and for which he has made a certain case, but it would eliminate the side-effect which he did not suggest was necessary, and which I suggest therefore he could dispense with. Consequently I move the amendment to that effect.

I want to move as an amendment—

1. (4) The provisions of this section shall only be brought into operation by the State President by proclamation in the Gazette if he is satisfied that the security of the State requires such action on his part, and shall continue in operation only for as long as the State President deems it necessary for the purpose of maintaining the security of the State: Provided that when the State President is satisfied that the provisions of this section are no longer required to maintain the security of the State he shall suspend the operation of any proclamation issued under this sub-section.

I am asking that that sub-section be substituted for the present sub-section (4) which merely provides that the State President may from time to time by proclamation in the Gazette suspend the operation of the provisions in sub-section (1) for a definite or indefinite period. Sub-section (1) is the particular sub-section in this clause which we are dealing with, the power of a commissioned officer of police to take a person into custody, to hold him for 90 days, in communicado, and to question him, until he answers to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the S.A. Police. Now the hon. Minister in dealing with this particular matter said in reply to a question put by my Leader that he did not propose that this legislation should be permanent legislation. He was dealing with Clause 17 when he said that. He did not anticipate it being permanent legislation and that the State President could issue a proclamation suspending it from time to time and it could also be reimposed. But it was not to be permanent legislation. My amendment seeks merely to make clear what may be assumed from subsection (4) as printed, but may I say in that regard that I realize that when the state feels that it is threatened, any state, it will take extraordinary powers from time to time. I recognize that, and as to how far those powers should go may well be a matter of sincere argument. It is not a matter of throwing bricks at each other, but it could be a matter of sincere argument. The one side may say “That is as far as you should go”, and the other side may say “That is not far enough, we think you should go thus far”. That I accept. The point I want to make here is that that can be a legitimate cause of discussion and difference of opinion because the state is acting bona fide in regard to the safety of the state. Those are the words that I want to emphasize “safety of the state”. So in this amendment I lay emphasis on that particular point that the State President— I take it that he would be advised by the Executive Council, or the Minister concerned—nevertheless would apply his mind to the precise position as to whether the safety of the state was still endangered, and if he felt that the safety of the state was no longer endangered, he would withdraw by proclamation this particular Clause 17 that we are dealing with, and so long as the safety of the state was no longer endangered it would remain in abeyance, retaining the right, presumably, for a repro-clamation to take place if and when circum-stances should arise again when he felt that the state was in danger.

The hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel) used certain words to which the hon. Minister of Justice raised objection. I have had the opportunity of reconsidering those words, and I find that the hon. member has imputed an unworthy motive to the hon. Minister, and I must ask him to withdraw those words and apologize.

Sir, I want to say that I had no intention of imputing any motive to the hon. Minister. I only considered that the hon. Minister could not be objective about this Bill.

Order! The hon. member is now repeating his remarks.

I therefore—with respect, Sir—withdraw any such imputation, but by way of explanation, Sir, I want to say that it is not my habit to be discourteous to anybody, in or out of this House. I was merely trying to bring the Minister to an objective consideration of this legislation.

The hon. member should withdraw and apologize.

Yes, Sir, I withdraw and I apologize.

I know the attitude of the hon. member for South Coast and nothing would have given me greater pleasure than to accept an amendment from him of the nature moved by him. But with great respect, Sir, I submit that it is not necessary to accept the hon. member’s amendment because that is already contained in the Bill.

No.

Without the slightest doubt the essence of what the hon. member wants us to accept now is contained in sub-section (4) of Clause 17. What does the hon. member’s amendment say? It says that this clause shall only be brought into operation by the State President by proclamation in the Gazette if he is satisfied that the security of the State requires such action on his part. In other words, the hon. member now visualizes and wants us to accept this Bill but to post-pone it to a date to be announced by the State President.

This clause.

Yes, this clause. The hon. member knows that constitutionally the State President can only act on the advice of the Cabinet, of the Executive and this is an Executive measure. It is not my measure, it is a Cabinet measure. In other words, looking at it from whatever angle one likes, whether one agrees with it or not makes no difference at all to the principle, namely, that the Cabinet under existing circumstances feels, rightly or wrongly that the security of the State requires such action. If the Cabinet was not satisfied about that, this Bill would not have come before the House because it is a Cabinet measure. So there the hon. member for South Coast and I are in full agreement, and this Bill naturally, can only become law if and when the State President approves of it. In other words, the only difference now between the hon. member for South Coast and myself is that he wants the Cabinet in another document, not in the Bill, to advise the State President that the security of the State demands that this measure should be applied, instead of letting Parliament say that to the State President and the State President then signing the Bill.

Where does Parliament say that?

By passing the Bill. Parliament says that there is such a state. The Cabinet has already decided, and the Cabinet’s decision if the Bill is passed is endorsed by Parliament, and the State President signs the Bill. So there is no disagreement between the hon. member and myself whatsoever as far as the first part of his amendment is concerned.

Then as far as the second part is concerned, “provided that when the State President is satisfied that the provisions of this section are no longer required to maintain the security of the State, he shall suspend the operation of any proclamation issued under this sub-section.” That is exactly what the sub-section says: The State President may from time to time by proclamation in the Gazette suspend the operation of the provisions of sub-section (1) for a definite or indefinite period. In other words, frankly as I see it, if it were not for that provision, I would accept the hon. member’s amendment because I know what his attitude is. But I say that sub-section (4) says exactly, although not in so many words, but in essence and in principle, what the hon. member’s amendment tries to imply, and therefore if I do not accept the hon. member’s amendment, it is not because I disagree with him at all; I think he is perfectly right, but I say that it is already contained in sub-section (4).

As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Pinelands (Mr. Thompson) is concerned, viz. “that no confession obtained from any person pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1), shall be admitted in evidence against him”, I think the hon. member is conversant with the law regarding confessions, and I have every reason to think that it is perfectly clear that we can safely leave that for the courts to decide if and when it ever crops up. I do not think his amendment is necessary at all. This is a matter not for the Minister to decide or anybody else, but only for the courts whether or not any confession is admissible, and under those circumstances, I think it best to leave well alone and to leave it to the courts to decide.

The hon. Minister has not replied to the questions I put to him earlier on. I wanted to know what provision there is going to be for the next of kin or some responsible person attached to anyone who is detained for interrogation to be notified of his arrest and where the person is being held, what provision there is for the arrest and detention and the place of detention to be notified immediately to the higher authorities by the police officer who arrests such a person, and whether or not the names of persons so taken will be made available either to this House and through this House to the Press and the public, or in some other way?

In principle we discussed this matter yesterday. A man is arrested in the ordinary course to-day, in all countries of the world, and there is no extra provision for letting their next of kin know, there is nothing in law to say that you must let them know.

But under ordinary circumstances within 48 hours after they have been arrested they must be charged, but here a man can be detained for 90 days. And he has no access to lawyers.

The hon. member knows what the position is. Can she visualize any case where a man will be arrested without anybody knowing about it?

Yes, it happened in the recent emergency.

If she can think of such precedents, then I can give the hon. member the assurance that I will give instructions that the next of kin, if they can be found, be told of his arrest and where he is held in custody. As far as the second question of the hon. member is concerned, if it is in the interests of the safety of the State to let the newspapers know, I will certainly do so; if it is not in the interest of the State to tell the newspapers at a particular time, I shall naturally not tell them. But let me say that as I know newspapers and as the hon. members know them, they will practically know of the arrest before I do.

There was a third question I put, viz., whether a police officer arresting a person will notify somebody in higher authority of that happening?

No arrest will be made under the circumstances, and that is a standing police order, without informing Head Office, and especially in this case, where the Commissioner has to decide, it stands to reason that Head Office will be informed, and the hon. member can take it from me—and I have experience of this for about 18 months—that Head Office is informed every day of what happens in every area of a district command.

I would rather have it in the law.

The standing orders form part of the Police Act. The standing orders are promulgated in terms of the Police Act.

I hesitate to participate in an argument between the hon. member for Houghton and the hon. Minister, but it does seem there have been cases when the next of kin have not known, particularly during the emergency, and I think not so long ago there was the case of a man alleged to have been kidnapped in Basutoland, and who was lost from the point of view of all countries for a considerable time, rightly or wrongly. I think perhaps the hon. the Minister might give this matter further consideration.

I want to speak first of all to the amendment put by the hon. member for South Coast. The hon. Minister has suggested that there is no difference between the Minister’s point of view and the point of view of the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell). I beg to differ, Sir. I think the question is: Which is the rule and which is the exception. Under the Minister’s legislation the exception is that this clause will not be in operaton; under the amendment of the hon. member for South Coast the exception is that it will be in operation. That is a very fundamental difference from the point of view of the permanent law of our country. The Minister earlier on was at issue with me on what was a part of the permanent law of our country and what was not. Here the Minister makes it a part of the permanent law unless suspended by the State President in exceptoinal cases. The hon. member for South Coast wants to make it something that is only applied in exceptional cases. Quite frankly in the interest of the good name of this country—and if the hon. Minister feels that there is no difference really between them (I think there is)—I think he would be well advised to reconsider the amendment of the hon. member for South Coast. The big difference is between what is the normal law of the country and what will be applied in exceptional circumstances.

Looking at it from a practical point of view, is it not rather an academic difference?

No, it is not academic. Here Parliament is being asked to decide on very inadequate evidence from the hon. Minister that exceptional measures must be applied, not even recommended by the Commission. But the hon. Minister is prepared to take powers to advise the State President to suspend it from time to time. We wish to advise the State President that if he is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, then for a short period he can apply this law, but we expect him immediately these circumstances change to suspend its operaton and that then we should get back to normal law.

Surely the State President only acts on the advice of the Cabinet. It is purely academic.

No, it is not. I do not know how I can put it to the Minister more plainly; one is the general rule of law and the other is the exception. The general rule is that there should not be powers of this kind, that they should only be applied in exceptional circumstances. That is what the hon. member for South Coast wants. What the Minister wants is that these rules should be applied as a general rule and they should only be suspended in exceptional circumstances. What he is saying to the world is that only in exceptional circumstances the law would not be applied. Surely that is not the impression he want to create or we want to see created.

The second point I want to raise concerns this question of confessions. The hon. Minister here also took the line that that was a purely academic argument and I was inclined to agree with him, but fortuitously, I was browsing through one of the measures the Minister has introduced into this House but which we have not yet had before us, the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill, Bill No. 68 of 1963, and I refer the hon. Minister to Clause 26 and when I read that in view of what we are doing here, then, Mr. Chairman, I get frightened, because here is what this clause says—

That does not affect the confession rule at all.

Mr. Chairman, a statement could be a confession. A statement could be incriminating, even though it does not amount to a full confession.

This deals only with confessions.

Yes, I accept that, but we are worried because of the situation that may arise under this new legislation, read with the old legislation, quite apart from our worries under the old legislation. To come back to the amendment itself, I would like to ask the hon. Minister to consider that again. He has had some of the experiences I have had and he knows the dangers of accepting anything which is made by way of confession under circumstances of that kind. He has told us to-day that he did not want confessions. What he wanted were the facts. Well, Sir, if he is genuine in that (I think he is), if that is really what he wants, namely information and not confessions, then surely, he can accept this amendment without in any way damaging his Bill, or limiting the scope of what he wants. But it will give this security that when under pressure of that kind an accused person, or a suspect, makes what amounts to a confession, it cannot be used against him. That is a real safeguard. I think it is something worthwhile considering and it is something that the hon. Minister should consider in relation to this clause. You see. Sir, we don’t like this clause and we made no bones about it. The Minister knows it, but at the same time in the interest of the country, we have tried to offer him amendments, we have tried to promote constructive discussions on this clause in an attempt to see if we could do away with its worst features even though it may not be acceptable to us in principle. I believe here is one of those respects in which the Minister could ameliorate the possible dangerous effects of this clause, in a manner which might do much to set the public mind at rest, to set public opinion at rest, both here and overseas. I should like the Minister to consider that carefully. If he says he is not asking for confessions but only for information, then surely he can rule that no confession made by a man who is under detention in this way should be admissible in any court.

If the hon. the Leader of the Opposition will excuse me I just want to come back for a moment to the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Gorshel). Over all the years that I have been a member of this House nobody has ever doubted my personal integrity. I have called for the Hansard of the hon. member for Hospital and in spite of the hon. member’s denial that he said what I maintained he said—and I may say that as long as I remain a member of this House this will be the only occasion on which I shall ask for the hon. member’s attention; I shall never do it again—this is what he said—

Read on.

I shall—

The hon. member is the first and only man to doubt my personal integrity. I would have respected him if the hon. member had admitted having said this but he did not do so. I want to make it perfectly clear simply for the sake of the record—so that it can be recorded in Hansard—that I have no personal motives in connection with this matter and I take it that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition will accept my statement on behalf of his party. As far as the hon. member for Hospital is concerned, he should not make accusations of that nature against anyone. That hon. member ought to regard the mere fact that he sits in this House as such a great privilege that he should never again make accusations against anyone.

As far as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is concerned, I cannot agree with him that the proposed legislation to which he referred affects the matter in any way. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition is aware of the fact that the intention of this legislation is to bring the position into conformity with the position on the Continent and in Britain. This set of rules, the Judges’ rules, which do not have the force of law, have never been approved of by Parliament. They do not exist on the Continent of Europe, in Britain or in America. This is the only country where they exist.

As I understand the position, the reason is that the Judges have found from their ripe experience that there is a possibility of misuse if those rules are not followed and that is why these rules were drawn up by the Joint Bench of South Africa.

That is an experience which is not shared by any other country, but I think that we are rather anticipating this matter by arguing about its background. I want to confine myself to simply stating the case. I am pleased that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition agrees with me that although we have the same position in Britain that we will now have here if this legislation is passed—and our law of evidence in respect of confessions is the same as the British law of evidence …

Not entirely. There are certain differences.

But they are not differences in principle. We are compelled to follow the law of evidence followed in Britain. At the request of the Law Revision Committee, through the Chief Justice, we are putting an end to that state of affairs because it is not in conformity with our status. But up to the present we have been compelled to follow the British law of evidence. That being the position, there is no substance in the argument of either the hon. the Leader of the Opposition or of the hon. member for Pinelands (Mr. Thompson) because if this is not a real problem in Britain, then it cannot constitute a problem here.

But our circumstances are different.

The composition of over population is different but a principle is not affected by the composition of the population. The courts will not admit any confession if there is the slightest suggestion that that confession was obtained by means of threats or violence. In that case no problem can arise. If the accused says: “I did not make that confession voluntarily; these people detained me for 90 days and bullied me into making it”, do hon. members think for one moment that the court will admit that confession? Certainly not. Then there is no problem at all. Because I do not see the dangers that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition sees, I am unfortunately unable to accept the amendment.

Then there is the amendment of the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell). I am prepared to keep an open mind in this regard and to reconsider it if great value is attached to it. I cannot accept it now and I cannot promise to accept it but because I respect the hon. member I am prepared to consider it. I still maintain that it is purely academic because the fact remains that the Government feels that the present position is one which justifies this course. That is why we are starting the ball rolling by way of an Act of Parliament. But like the hon. member the Government is also aware of the fact that a time may come when we may want to remove this Act from the Statute Book to show that it is not a permanent part of our legislation, and that is why provision is being made for it to be deproclaimed and if a similar position arises at some later stage, then it can again be proclaimed. We shall understand one another better once that is conceded. Let us imagine that the position changes and that the Act is deproclaimed and that another position arises which compels us to proclaim the Act once again, then the hon. member for South Coast and I will be in exactly the same position; we shall then start at the same place—in other words the State President will issue a proclamation to the effect that a state of emergency exists—because there will not have been one for some time—and these regulations will then have to be put into operation again. Then we shall start where the hon. member wants me to start now.

No, the one is the exception and the other is the rule.

No, I cannot see it that way and therefore I cannot accept the amendment. But because it comes from the hon. member for South Coast I do not lightly reject it and that is why I will reconsider it. If there is any substance in it I may do something about it but I cannot make any promises.

I should like to deal firstly with the amendment of the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell). I appreciate the Minister’s undertaking that he will reconsider his attitude to that amendment and I deal with it merely to refer to some of the points raised by the Minister in order to assist him in seeing the matter in the light in which we on this side of the House are trying to put it to him.

I think the difference between our point of view and that of the Minister is this: As the clause stands at present …

What section are you referring to?

I am referring to the whole of Clause 17. The amendment provides that the clause shall come into operation only when proclaimed by the State President, whereas sub-section (4) as it reads at present says that the State President may from time to time suspend its operation. The difference is this: If the clause is passed as it stands, with the present sub-section (4), the other subsections (1) to (3) will become part of the permanent law of the land and the operation of those sub-sections will continue as part of the permanent law of the land until suspended. If our amendment is accepted, the effect will be that sub-sections (1) to (3) will not come into operation and therefore will not become the law of the land until proclaimed by the State President in the Gazette. There is also another difference which is important, namely, that in terms of (4) as it reads now the State President is not obliged to suspend the operation of the clause. It says he may do so, whereas in terms of our amendment he is obliged to suspend the proclamation under certain circumstances, namely, if he is satisfied that the security of the State no longer requires it.

That is purely for constitutional reasons.

From the practical point of view, the Minister may rightly say that it is purely for constitutional reasons, but quite apart from that consideration, there is the other consideration mentioned by the hon. member for South Coast and by my hon. leader, viz. the attitude of the public and of the outside world to this clause. I suggest that anything which may remove the emphasis from this clause becoming part of the permanent law of the land would assist in allaying the objections which people have to this clause. I do not need to emphasize this. The Minister has himself conceded that it is a very drastic clause. I hope the Minister will not take it amiss of me if I suggest that under those circumstances, when one is dealing with such a drastic provision, I would have thought that the approach towards amendments should be to accept such amendments as lessen the drastic nature of the clause or the outlook towards this clause provided that the teeth of the clause are not removed and that the object which the Minister wishes to achieve remains. I believe that by accepting the amendment of the hon. member for South Coast the Minister will not in any way tie his hands, while providing reasonable safeguards. While I am on my feet, I wish to move a further amendment—

1. (5) The provisions of this section shall lapse on 30 June 1964.

I do not wish to say much about it. It is similar to the amendment which the Minister accepted in regard to Clause 4, save that in regard to that amendment there was the further condition that the operation of the clause may from time to time by resolution of the House of Assembly be extended for a period not exceeding 12 months. This amendment is moved in this form because of the fact that this clause is so drastic. If this is going to be part of the law of the land, it ought to be for a limited period only.

Up to now this Bill has been discussed mostly by the legal men on this side of the House, and they did so very ably. I want to put another aspect to the Minister in all sincerity. We may accept the Bill as being fairly divided into two sections, on the one hand the clause we are dealing with now and certain other measures of that nature, and on the other the portions of the Bill which embody the recommendations of Judge Snyman. It is clear that in that last aspect there may be differences of opinion as to the particular methods adopted, but we are in agreement as to the necessity for those clauses. But Clause 17 falls outside the scope of the recommendations of Judge Snyman. The Minister, however, feels that powers of this nature are necessary in the circumstances. Sir, I want to make this suggestion. We have spent quite a lot of time debating whether or not there can be any relaxation of this Clause 17 and I believe that the House would make much more progress towards giving the Minister the authority he needs (vide the Commission’s Interim Report), if it were not for this Clause 17. I want to make what might be an unusual suggestion. You, Sir, with the knowledge at your disposal, feel that it is imperative for the safety of the country that a measure of this sort should go on to the Statute Book as soon as possible. My leader has made it clear that, with the exceptions I have mentioned, we are prepared to support the Minister. An unusual situation exists in the country and I think sometimes unusual difficulties can be resolved by unusual methods. I want to suggest to the Minister to give serious consideration to the withdrawal of Clause 17 from this Bill, and to let us deal with the rest of the Bill, which gives the Minister the bulk of the powers he wants. Then if the Minister feels that Clause 17 is also vital for the successful carrying out of his functions, let him introduce that particular cause in the form of a separate Bill. At the moment that clause undoubtedly stands in the way of the passing of the Bill. I make that suggestion as one who has only one motive, and that is for us to do the best we can for our country. All of us have inherited a certain respect for the law and you cannot uproot those things in five minutes. Whilst this particular clause may be necessary, it is so fundamentally different, so foreign to what we have always accepted as being one of the basic principles of the law of the land that it is unacceptable to us. I ask the Minister to give consideration to this suggestion I have made.

I do not for one moment doubt the sincerity of the hon. member, and if this particular clause happened to be the first clause of a long Bill there would have been substance in his suggestion that I should reconsider it. But this happens to be the second-last clause of the Bill, and we have devoted practically the whole day to discussing this particular clause and, candidly, I see no point in taking it out now that we have practically arrived at the end of the discussion of the Bill, and then to have the whole discussion over again later. I want the hon. member to accept that I am equally sincere, but after all I can judge best as far as this problem is concerned because it is my baby and I have to work with it every day. So I can best judge whether in the circumstances it is necessary to have this clause, and the hon. member knows what I said about this clause myself. I need the clause at this stage, and I deliberately say it—at this stage. It may not be necessary to have it next year, but I give the hon. member my personal assurance that it is necessary now. This is the psychological moment to have this power, as I see my problem, and that is why I incorporated it into the Bill, well knowing that if I had only come with the recommendations of the Snyman Commission the Bill would have had an easy passage and would probably have been passed by now. But I had to risk it because I have to have these powers now. Therefore I am afraid I cannot take it any further. I can only give the hon. member the assurance that that is the position.

I merely want to ask the Minister to reply to the amendment I moved to the effect that there would be access to a legal adviser and a medical doctor.

I have pointed out to the hon. member that that principle was accepted by Parliament last year, and I therefore could not understand why in spite of that the hon. member moved that amendment again. He knows as well as I do that whereas his amendment now says that restricted persons cannot have access to this particular individual, there are others who are not necessarily restricted. Unfortunately the position is that we cannot allow people who cannot be trusted to have access to such a person.

What could happen?

All sorts of things could happen.

Just give us an example.

Information could very easily be passed and if the hon. member does not believe me he can ask his Leader who will tell him how information can be passed under those circumstances.

He could not get a lawyer in Germany.

In spite of the fact that he could not get a lawyer he still passed information. If he did that without a lawyer, what would he have done with a lawyer? Sir, that is the reason. It would defeat the whole object of this clause.

Surely the Minister will agree that the object of this clause is not to prevent information passing; it is to extract information from the individuals themselves.

Not only to extract it. Cannot the hon. member for one moment imagine himself in that position?

No.

I am not talking about the hon. member for Wynberg (Mr. Russell). I know he cannot imagine himself in any position.

Coming from you I regard that as a compliment.

Passing information is as important as getting information.

They are not being detained to prevent them from passing information. It cannot be done.

Supposing you detained a man and questioned him; naturally when questioning him you must give him certain information, by implication if not directly. If you ask him a question concerning this book, for example, naturally at some stage or other he must know that this book is in question. You cannot ask him questions about the book without mentioning a book or books. Supposing he has an accomplice outside and he passes on the message to that accomplice, “Beware of this, that, or the other thing”. You would thereby be destroying the very evidence that you are trying to collect. I do not know whether I am making myself clear, but you can destroy the very thing that you do not want to have destroyed under any circumstances, by the mere passing of information, and that is the sole reason for this provision. Not only in this country but in Britain—and I repeat in Britain—that is the sole reason why people were held in communicado in Britain in spite of the fact that the Times pretends not to know anything about it. That is the reason why in this country on more than one occasion in the past people were held in communicado. Sir, I make no bones about it: I am not trying to steal a march on hon. members. I am putting my cards on the table. I want this information under the existing circumstances and judging from the experience of everybody concerned with this issue, this is the best way under the existing circumstances. I am sorry therefore that, apart from the amendments that I have accepted, I cannot accept the other amendments moved by hon. members.

There are one or two questions I would like to ask the Minister in regard to people who will be detained under this measure if it becomes law. The Minister has already indicated, and I am very happy to hear it, that the next-of-kin will be advised if a man is detained under this section. That is an important statement and we welcome it. What I want to know from the hon. the Minister is what is going to happen to the families of these people if they are married and what is going to happen to the pay which they would have received during the period of detention if they had not been detained? What provision will be made to ensure that the man’s job will not be in jeopardy? What provision will be made to ensure that he will not be ejected from his house if he cagnot pay his rental? In other words, what compensation will there be for this man if it is proved to the Minister that he is in genuine employment; that he has been deprived of the opportunity of earning a livelihood? How is his family going to live? Will the Government see to it that his employer pays him or will the Government pay him?

You cannot expect the employer to do that.

The point is that these people are not criminals in the ordinary sense of the word; they are people who may be able to help the police to catch the principals.

If they want to help me they will not be detained.

It may take a little time. The man may be afraid; there may be threats from outside.

He may have no information at all.

The man may say that he has no information at all, but the police may arrest him and say, “You do have information.” The Minister must surely admit that it is possible that it may take quite a while. What is going to happen in the meantime to this person’s family, to his job and to his home if he cannot pay his rent, because he is not in fact a criminal in the ordinary sense of the word. The Minister should see to it that these people are not prejudiced and that their families do not suffer as a result of his detention, even if it takes a week or two before they are prepared to talk.

In regard to the points raised by the hon. member for Boland (Mr. Barnett) at the time of the emergency in 1960 I happened to be as the hon. member knows, Deputy Minister of Social Welfare. Certain regulations were then promulgated by me to meet the conditions that then existed and to make provision for all sorts of possibilities and probabilities, and those regulations still exist to-day and will naturally be invoked to assist in matters of this kind. That does not deal with the man’s job, but these regulations will cover the question of maintenance.

I am sorry to hear that the hon. the Minister is not going to accept further amendments. I take it that also applies to the amendment which I moved.

Will you please read it out?

It was an amendment to introduce a new sub-section reading, “The provisions of this section shall lapse on the 30th June 1964”.

I am sorry. I should have replied to that. The reason why I cannot accept that amendment is because in essence provision is made in subsection (4) that this particular section may lapse before that date. I think it would certainly be in conflict with the amendment of the hon. member for South Coast (Mr. D. E. Mitchell) should I consider accepting that amendment. But I am faced with a further difficulty. I am not making a point of it; I merely want to point out in passing that the Opposition has made it difficult for me, even if it was possible (and it is not possible) to accept that amendment because I accepted a similar amendment from the Opposition to Clause 4 and then the Opposition voted against the clause, as amended at their request. That makes it rather awkward for me, but apart from that it is not necessary in the circumstances to accept the hon. member’s amendment because this section will lapse as soon as there is no need for it.

Amendment in line 68, proposed by Mr. Holland, put and negatived.

Amendment in line 10, page 12, proposed by Mr. Cadman, put and the Committee divided:

AYES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopweell and T. G. Hughes.

NOES—66: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; Du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; Le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse. J. H.; von Moltke. J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Amendment proposed by Mr. Hughes put and agreed to and the remaining amendment proposed by Mr. Holland put and negatived.

Question put that sub-section (4), proposed to be omitted, stand part of the Clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

AYES—67: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. L; Cruywagen, W. A.; Du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; Le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J.P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

NOES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.: Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney. H. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F. Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

Question accordingly affirmed and the amendment proposed by Mr. D. E. Mitchell dropped.

Amendment proposed by Mr. Thompson put and the Committee divided:

AYES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.: Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W; Hourquebie, R. G L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E. Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

NOES—67: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Botha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; Du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; Le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.: Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; Van den Berg, G. P.; Van den Berg, M. J.; Van der Merwe, P. S.; Van der Spuy, J. P.; Van der Walt, B. J.; Van der Wath, J. G. H.; Van Niekerk, G. L. H.; Van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; Van Staden, J. W.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de le R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; Von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Amendment proposed by Mr. Hourquebie put and the Committee divided:

AYES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

NOES—67: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Smit, H. H.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la. R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

AYES—67: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J. C.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee, P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra, E. C. A.; Jonker, A. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser, P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

NOES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshel, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield, G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford. A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes. Clause, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

On Clause 18,

I just want to ask the hon. the Minister if I am correct when I say that this clause goes further than the war-time regulations about which he has been telling us a great deal, regarding places or areas. I want to know if that is so. As I understand it a person could, as a defence against a charge of being on a protected area, say that he was unaware of the fact that such an area was a protected area. I see no provision in this particular clause for that. I should also like the hon. the Minister to tell us whether he does not think he goes a little far in his indemnity in sub-section (8).

Unfortunately I cannot tell the hon. member whether this is similar to the war measures. I did not check whether there was such a war measure. So I have no idea. I can only tell the hon. member that in essence this is similar to the Rhodesian Act which was passed some months or weeks ago.

May I ask the hon. Minister a question? What sort of place does the hon. Minister envisage?

Such places like Modderfontein, petrol storage depots, etc., etc.; particularly places which are important from the economic point of view.

I move as an unopposed motion—

I second.

Agreed to.

In Clause 4,

I moved an amendment during the Committee Stage which I want to move now in a slightly different form in pursuance of the objections of the hon. the Minister which I think are fairly well-founded. The amendment that I now want to move as an unopposed motion—

I moved a similar amendment during the Committee Stage and although the hon. the Minister said that he could understand the motive behind the amendment and was favourably disposed towards it he also said that there were certain practical difficulties. One of the difficulties he mentioned was the fact that he would have to discuss the matter with the Bench to ascertain whether a Judge would be available for this purpose. I am now making it possible for him to appoint an ex-judge and so that difficulty falls away.

I do not think it is necessary for me to take up too much of the time of the House in regard to this amendment. It is quite clear that we want to give the hon. the Minister the power that he is asking for; he retains all the powers that are asked for in the original Bill.

How do you think that the Minister will be able to follow that procedure before Friday?

The hon. the Minister will have no trouble if he has someone in mind, and I understand that he has. If the Minister wants to detain that person for a longer period, I think it will be easy for him to find some way to detain that person from next Friday until this committee is appointed. I think that the hon. the Minister will agree that there are ways in which he can detain such a person, in any case, for a reasonable period. I think the hon. the Minister of Transport must accept the fact that the hon. the Minister of Justice knows more about these matters than the hon. the Minister of Transport. I think that the hon. the Minister of Justice will find some way of detaining that person.

Mr. Speaker, the responsibility for imprisoning a person for practically his entire life, without trial, is a tremendous responsibility for one Minister to bear. I do not think that this Minister or any other Minister will abuse these very far-reaching powers that can have such far-reaching results. This amendment is not intended to hamper the hon. the Minister in maintaining the security of the State. I want hon. members to understand well that this is an honest effort to assist the hon. the Minister but nevertheless to ensure that at the same time the matter is not left to the judgment of one single person. As the hon. the Minister said, it is true that in any case he always acts on the advice of his Department. But, Sir, human beings are fallible. The Minister is fallible. Let me indicate how easily things go wrong within a Department. A little while ago the hon. the Minister named a person a communist, a person who had never been a communist; in reality he was a member of the Nationalist Party. And what was more, that person was already dead!

Nonsense.

Does the hon. the Minister say now that it is nonsense that he named a dead person as a communist?

That person died while the list was being drawn up.

But when the list was published for the first time, that person was no longer alive. It is possible that that sort of thing can happen. I am not blaming the hon. the Minister personally. I say again that this is a tremendous responsibility for only one Minister to bear. I want to make it easier for him and that is why I am moving this amendment. It does not deprive him of any of his powers. Why does the hon. the Minister now want to adopt the attitude that we are trying to hamper him through the medium of this amendment? Actually we want to help him. We must at least show the world that he is not a Minister who assumes powers by means of which he can detain a person for his entire lifetime simply upon his own judgment. Even if he does not agree with the committee he still has the right to imprison that person for life. All that he then has to do is to tell this House: “The committee did not agree with me but nevertheless I considered it to be in the interests of the security of the State to imprison that person for life.”

Mr. Speaker, I am sure that you will appreciate the reasonableness of this amendment. Even the hon. the Minister appreciated its reasonableness although he did have some practical objections to it. To my mind his most important objection was the fact that he had not consulted the Bench. That difficulty has now been eliminated.

I second.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member for the reasons that I have already given him and in particular for the reason given by the hon. the Minister of Transport. It is not my intention to repeat the arguments that I used during the Committee Stage.

May I ask a question? Does the hon. the Minister have the power at the moment in terms of this legislation to detain the person of whom he is obviously thinking longer than the day on which that person has to be released?

The answer is “No”.

Amendment put and the House divided:

AYES—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bronkhorst, H. J.; Cadman, R. M.; Connan, J. M.; Dodds, P. R.; Durrant, R. B.; Eaton, N. G.; Emdin, S.; Field, A. N.; Gay, L. C.; Gorshell, A.; Graaff, de V.; Henwood, B. H.; Hickman, T.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Lewis, H.; Malan, E. G.; Miller, H.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Odell, H. G. O.; Oldfield. G. N.; Plewman, R. P.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Ross, D. G.; Russell, J. H.; Steenkamp, L. S.; Suzman, H.; Taurog, L. B.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Warren, C. M.; Waterson, S. F.; Wood, L. F.;

Tellers: A. Hopewell and T. G. Hughes.

NOES—67: Bekker, H. T. van G.; Bekker, M. J. H.; Bootha, L. J.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Cloete, J. H.; Coetzee, B.; Coetzee. P. J.; Cruywagen, W. A.; du Plessis, H. R. H.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Haak, J. F. W.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Hiemstra. E. C. A.; Jonker. A. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Labuschagne, J. S.; le Roux, P. M. K.; Loots, J. J.; Louw, E. H.; Malan, A. I.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Maree, G. de K.; Martins, H. E.; Meyer, T.; Mostert, D. J. J.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Niemand, F. J.; Otto, J. C.; Pelser. P. C.; Potgieter. J. E.; Rall, J. J.; Rall, J. W.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Sauer, P. O.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman. B. J.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Serfontein, J. J.; Stander, A. H.; Steyn, F. S.; Steyn, J. H.; van den Berg, G. P.; van den Berg, M. J.; van der Merwe, P. S.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van der Wath, J. G. H.; van Niekerk, G. L. H.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Visse, J. H.; von Moltke, J. von S.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Amendment in Clause 4, made in Committee of the Whole House, put and agreed to.

In Clause 5,

I want to move as an unopposed motion—amendment—

My amendment is simply that the accused should not have to prove his innocence beyond any reasonable doubt. The onus is not on him to prove it, but on a balance of probability. I believe that that is the position in which the hon. Minister and the House felt right to put the accused in a case under the Sabotage Act, and that the difficulties of proof here are no greater, no smaller. And therefore I suggest that this would be an appropriate amendment to accept here.

The two are totally different.

With respect, I think the difficulties of proof or ease of proof are very much the same. Otherwise I think that it will be the first occasion where we would have gone so far in our law as to place the onus as high as this. I accordingly move.

I second.

The reply that I want to give the hon. member once again is the reply that I gave him during the second reading debate through the medium of the letter from Mr. Justice Snyman [Translation.]—

He goes on to say [Translation]—

That is what Mr. Justice Snyman has to say and that is precisely what is envisaged in this clause.

Amendment put and negatived.

Amendment in Clause 8 put and agreed to.

In Clause 17,

I move the following amendment—

The effect of the amendment will be that the same class of persons can be detained for interrogation as is presently the position. They can be detained by the police, but from then on the provisions of the law already existing in relation to interrogations will have effect. The effect of this clause is merely to provide that interrogations will be safeguarded nevertheless if my amendment is accepted, and I want to say if this amendment is not accepted, the hon. Minister of Justice will be responsible—and I use a phrase that is frequently used by him—that South Africa will stink in the nostrils of the world.

This amendment will put this power on a basis acceptable in the Western World. I want to remind the hon. the Minister of Lands who was the first to shout very loudly at the time in Committee when a similar amendment was moved and rejected and leave was asked to have an instruction; and I would like to remind him of what he said about democracy. He was one of the stars of the Sabotage Film too, and the Minister said that it was a very fine instrument, a delicate instrument which had to be very finely played, and one had to know how to play it. I want to say that this is not the way he played that instrument, this is not the instrument he used, this is not the instrument he used to play that instrument, this is not the strumming he used to get any tones out of that instrument inasmuch as it is a democracy. Sir, I think not only will it play discords, but it will break the very cords which will make the noise of democracy in that instrument.

The effect of this is that a person who is mentioned in the clause as it stands and detained by a police officer, brought before the court, the magistrate, and dealt with under that section, provides that if he does not give the answers which I required of him in the interrogatory, he can be put in gaol for eight days at a time indefinitely until he answers the questions satisfactorily. If that is not what the hon. Minister wants, then I am afraid my suspicions in relations to this clause are even greater than they were before. If the hon. Minister won’t accept this, then the hon. Minister has not told this House why he wants this clause, and no one in this House, I believe, should vote for this clause if the hon. Minister cannot say to this House why it is he wants them kept in communicado in a manner which, as I say, will create in the eyes of the world the worst possible image that South Africa can have.

I second.

I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment as it seeks to introduce a new principle not contemplated by the Bill as read a second time.

I move as a further unopposed motion—

We are dealing here with a clause which provides for interrogation, and the question arises as to who is best qualified in the interests both of the hon. the Minister and the police to conduct the interrogation. Now one of the tasks which is placed upon the police is to provide evidence which will solve the commission of an offence and bring the offender to justice. That is one of their tasks, and in circumstances such as pertain in South Africa at present, that is very often a particularly difficult task. Another of the duties of the police in cirsumstances such as presently pertain entails their dealing with difficult, violent and rough behaviour on the part of unlawful elements. Because of that from the nature of their task and its difficulties they must as human beings tend to develop a certain immunity to rough behaviour, they must tend to develop a certain immunity towards robust behaviour; otherwise they could not do the task properly in which they are employed.

Are you making an insinuation?

I am insinuating nothing. I am saying that any of us placed in their position would develop a similar immunity to robust behaviour: otherwise we could not do it either. It stems from the difficulties of their task and naturally they must develop an immunity of one or other sort. Bearing in mind that they have to carry out their duty under such difficult circumstances it is certainly in the interest both of themselves and of the Minister and the public that if at all possible, somebody other than a person drawn from that body should undertake the work of interrogation. The amendment which I propose moving, Sir, provides for a magistrate, appointed by the Minister, to carry out the interrogation and to determine when the interrogation shall cease. The point which I should like to make in this regard to the Minister is that in that way he will achieve his objects under this clause and at the same time any dangers which might be inherent, not on account of any wrong motives but in the nature of things, in such an interrogation being carried out by a member of the police will be obviated through it being conducted by a magistrate. At the same time the Minister will achieve the same result.

I second.

I am afraid that I cannot put the amendment as the clause implies that interrogation of persons detained shall be at the instance of the police. As the amendments introduce a new principle not contemplated by the Bill as read a second time. viz. that interrogation shall be by a magistrate, I cannot accept the amendments.

I wish to raise a point of order, Sir, but before doing that, I shall be pleased if you will indicate what the new principle is which this amendment introduces into the Bill.

The principle which was adopted in this connection by the second reading was that interrogation shall be conducted by the South African Police.

Reading this clause, one sees first of all that a commissioned officer is given the power to arrest and detain a person. The detainee can then be held in custody for interrogation in connection with the commission or the intention to commit such an offence dealt with here. Now, Sir, there is nothing in this clause saying who shall do the interrogation and. therefore, there is nothing to indicate that such interrogation shall be conducted by a police officer. Therefore no principle has been embodied in this clause to the effect that only a police officer shall do the interrogation. Consequently, I ask you to allow this amendment which will have the effect of stating in the clause who shall do the interrogation. I admit that sub-section (2) provides—

This means that some other person can, with the approval of the Minister or of a commissioned officer, have access to the person detained and if a magistrate is to be the interrogating officer, he would have had permission to have access to the detainees. I want to stress the fact that in the whole of the clause there is nothing saying that only a commissioned officer shall have the right to interrogate. Consequently, it cannot be said that any such principle is being enshrined here, because, as I said, there is no provision in this clause to the affect that a commissioned officer only shall have access to the detainees for the purpose of interrogation.

I should like to follow up further what the hon. member for Transkeian Territories has said. Supposing it is desired to use an expert on explosives, for example, to acquire information from the detainee by means of interrogation. As a matter of fact, it might be an expert on any subject who is required to obtain information from the detainee. Now, such expert may not be a commissioned officer of the police. Is this clause intended to limit any interrogation to such a commissioned officer only? The police may, after all, require experts in any particular field to obtain information. In order, therefore, to allow of this being done, I support the argument advanced by the hon. member for Transkeian Territories.

Mr. Speaker, the interrogation mentioned in this clause undoubtedly deals with the investigation of a crime and that is why only the person who is entrusted with the investigation of that crime can do the interrogating. If this function is delegated to some other person, one must face the fact that that person will not have the knowledge necessary to enable him to ask the questions that should be asked. In my opinion, the whole object of the clause will be defeated if the persons engaged in the investigation do not also do the interrogating.

That has nothing to do with the point of order, Mr. Speaker.

I should like to follow up the argument of the hon. member for Pinelands. I support him where he points out that the help of experts might be needed to obtain the truth from detainees by interrogation …

Order! The hon. member is not dealing with the point of order now but with the subject matter of the clause. He is arguing in favour of the amendment. As far as the point of order which was raised by the hon. member for Transkeian Territories, is concerned, I have listened to and have considered what other hon. members have had to say in this regard, but I am afraid I am still of the same opinion, namely that the amendment introduces a new principle which was not contemnlated at the second reading of the Bill. The work of interrogation is the responsibility of the Commissioner of the South African Police. If he desires any expert advice, it is for him to call such expert advice. Consequently, I am unable to accept the amendment.