Mr. Chairman, this clause transfers the assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of the Armaments Board to the corporation. During the Second Reading debate we questioned the fact that in the process of this transfer the control of Parliament over the operations of the old Armaments Board would be removed by removing the audit of the Auditor-General of those books. The hon. the Minister replied that this would in fact not be the case and explained that the Auditor-General would still be auditing the accounts of the Special Defence Fund. I do not want to repeat the arguments which we used at Second Reading, but I then quoted the report of the Auditor-General on the last financial year with regard to the Special Defence Fund, a report which came to one sentence certifying that the provisions of the Act have been adhered to. In point of fact, as I understand it, there is no audit of that fund. It is a question of compliance with the provisions of section 5 relating to the fund. I also quoted from the previous year’s Auditor-General’s report—we have not yet received the report on last year—on the Armaments Board to indicate the wide scope and the vast amounts of money which even then, in 1974-’75, were involved. It amounted to some R500 million. Since then the Defence Vote has gone up by almost double and thus even larger amounts of money are involved. The hon. the Minister, however, stands firm by the fact that because the Auditor-General will control the Special Defence Account, he will therefore have effective control over expenditure.

Firstly, we do not accept that this is a full answer and a satisfactory explanation of the situation which will arise. I want to put it clearly and specifically to the hon. the Minister and I want to ask him whether this means that the Auditor-General will now have access to the details of the Special Defence Account or whether he will only have to certify that the necessary certificates have been signed. This is vital. Unless the Auditor-General is now going to have access to the accounts and be able to check on them, it is totally meaningless to say that Parliament will still have control over the money it spends. I think it is important—and Parliament should consider it important—that this aspect must be cleared up.

Apart from the acquisition and procurement aspect which is covered by the Special Defence Account, there is the question of administration, buildings and all the other aspects concerned. I want to know whether Parliament will have any account of this expenditure placed before it for scrutiny. The answer is “no”, because we do not have any access to any accounts of the Armaments Corporation. The hon. the Minister has explained why, and I accept that. I do not question that. We are not asking that secret information, which could harm the country, be laid upon the Table. The case we have put forward relates to a completely different picture. We are not referring to the question of armaments production and details of what we are producing. It is a question of whether there is adequate financial control over the money which this House votes in trust. A blank cheque is given to the hon. the Minister to spend on the acquisition or procurement of armaments, and we believe that it should be possible to audit, through the Auditor-General, the accounts which are not related to secret strategic or security purchases or manufacturers. There is a lot of other money involved here which has nothing to do with the security or safety of South Africa. Let me refer, for example, to the housing subsidiary of Atlas. The question of who gets a house and what is paid for a property and what the property is sold for, are matters which have nothing whatsoever to do with the security or the safety of South Africa. We are not going to ask what Atlas is spending or what it is making. That would be irresponsible. There are, however, many aspects that have nothing whatsoever to do with security. That is why we believe that the Auditor-General should continue to have a finger on the pulse of what is going on. Unless the hon. the Minister can satisfy us to a greater extent than he managed to do in his reply to the Second Reading, it is going to be difficult for us to agree to the transfer, without qualification, of all the assets, rights, liabilities and obligations without at the same time transferring the control of Parliament in the form of the control of these accounts by the Auditor-General. If the Minister will even give the assurance that the Auditor-General will have access to the Special Defence Account, at least we will have some satisfaction that Parliament, through that officer, an officer of Parliament, will have some control. I must say, however, that I still believe it would be better if a committee equivalent to the Select Committee on Railways and Harbours or the Select Committee on Public Accounts were appointed so that this expenditure could be dealt with, not as a question of policy or by revealing secrets, but as a question of financial control over what last year was R1 350 million and which this year can be expected to be a great deal more.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Durban Point intimated that if the hon. the Minister gave him the assurance that the Auditor-General would still have access to the Special Defence Account, as he had in the past in the case of the Armaments Board, he would be happy. That was what I understood him to say.

No, that is not what I said.

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is, whether the hon. member is happy about it or not, that the provisions of section 5 of Act 6 of 1974 remain unchanged. That particular Act has been amended several times. Indeed, it was amended by the Finance Act of 1975 and 1976. Section 8 of the Finance Act of 1975 provided that the Chief of the South African Defence Force remains the accounting official in regard to this account. That situation remains unchanged. Therefore, this implies to me that, as far as the acquisition and purchasing function of the Armaments Corporation is concerned, the Chief of the S.A. Defence Force remains the accounting official. Clause 5 of the Bill leaves that position unchanged; this section was discussed once again yesterday.

Read it again.

He must therefore tell us that he is not satisfied with the application of the section. He must also tell us that he was not satisfied with the application of the section in the past. Furthermore he must tell us why he did not object in the past to the audit of the Auditor-General of the Special Defence Account, when the Armaments Board, together with the Department of Defence still drew funds from that account for purchases. The hon. member must tell us why he did not object in the past. Therefore there are two points: The first is that to date he has not objected to what happened in the past, and the second is that he did not come and debate the question of the application of section 5 with us, because the hon. the Minister assured him that the dispensation which will prevail in regard to the Armaments Corporation will be the same as that in regard to the Armaments Board. Therefore the hon. member for Durban Point must tell us clearly and plainly what his objection is as to appropriateness. When he argues on this aspect, he must tell us in particular why he supported the words “having regard to the special nature of the account”. Why did he not question these words then? By supporting those words he admitted by implication that special factors can exist which will determine what degree of submission there should be and what not. Why did the hon. member not also question the words where provision is made for the hon. the Minister of Defence to issue a certificate in this connection and whether or not it will be acceptable to the Auditor-General? Why did the hon. member not debate it in the past? In the past the hon. member considered the situation to be confidential when the hon. the Minister of Defence considered it to be so. In the past the hon. member recognized the special nature of the account, but now, when another body takes over precisely the same functions, the hon. member questions it. That is why we cannot support the arguments of the hon. member for Durban Point.

Order! I want to point out to hon. members that the main principle of this Bill is the take-over of the assets by the corporation and that it was approved as such during the Second Reading. Therefore I cannot allow this principle to be discussed again, I can only allow the details to be discussed.

Mr. Chairman, I shall not discuss the principle but I merely want to discuss the control over the money after the Board has been taken over. The hon. member has now placed his finger on the exact spot. The Special Defence Account is subject to a certificate from the Minister.

†Let us be clear about this Mr. Chairman. When we accepted, as we still accept, the special position of the Special Defence Account we accepted that there were aspects which could not be publicized. We also expected that there would be aspects which would be dealt with by a certificate. I want to put it to the hon. the Minister: How much of that account is now not covered by a certificate, or is the whole account in practice covered by a certificate? That is the issue, i.e. How much of it is not covered? We understood that the certificate would deal with special sensitive issues and with special, sensitive fields which could not be disclosed. When one reads the report of the Auditor-General, one finds that nothing is dealt with whatsoever. Nothing at all is dealt with, not one single figure or aspect; there is simply a certificate to the effect that the provisions have been complied with in terms of a certificate furnished to him. So his control disappeared, but there was always the fact that the Armaments Board, which did the purchasing, which called for tenders, which had machinery for receiving, considering and accepting tenders and which had control over the conditions of procurement and supply, i.e. the machinery for purchase, was audited by the Controller and Auditor-General, now the Auditor-General. So Parliament still had its control, even though in practice it did not have control over the Special Defence Account. It did, however, still have its control through the Armaments Board. What this Bill is doing, on the other hand, is removing the control over the Armaments Board which is the purchasing machinery. All we are asking is that the control which the Auditor-General had over the mechanism of purchase should either be retained by providing that the procurement activities of the new corporation be subject to audit or that the Auditor-General should have some control, even through a private auditor, or that the Auditor-General be given access to the Special Defence Account.

This is the clear alternative we are asking for. There should either be one or the other. What this Bill is doing, however, is removing both, because in practice the Special Defence Account does not allow for control over detail by the Auditor-General. It is merely a question of a certificate he has to accept. The board which does the purchasing therefore now has no control. Since we would perhaps, in time, be dealing with amounts in the region of R2 000 million per year—perhaps even this year, who knows?—we feel that with a figure of that magnitude the official servant of Parliament should have access to that account. We would be quite happy if the hon. the Minister made it confidential access or if he appointed a Select Committee to which reports would be submitted in confidence, with no official report made public. Such a committee would be an organ of Parliament comprised of members of Parliament who would then have an opportunity to satisfy themselves, and so satisfy the country, that complete, proper and adequate control was being exercised. I say this because one of the tasks of the Auditor-General is to report on inadequacy of control, on fruitless expenditure, unauthorized expenditure and matters of that nature. At the moment the board can incur any amount of unauthorized expenditure and the auditor could report this, but the only people who would have knowledge of that would be the board, which received the auditor’s report, and the hon. the Minister himself. I accept the fact that the hon. the Minister would act on such a report, but he would act as the Minister in private, while Parliament, the voice of the taxpayer of South Africa, would have no knowledge of it. This is why we are asking—and let me add a third alternative—for either maintenance of control over the new corporation by the Auditor-General, or access to the Special Defence Account without closing the door by certificate, or a Select Committee to which reports can be made in private, in closed session, so that the representatives of the taxpayers in this Parliament will have access to knowledge and to assurances that the money is being spent as it should be spent in the interests of South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I think I should briefly state what our attitude to this is. Firstly, we believe that in whatever circumstances money is voted by Parliament, either the responsible Minister must account to Parliament for this or he must be satisfied that there is some other form of accountability to Parliament. Normally the Auditor-General is the one who is responsible to report to Parliament and it is for the Select Committee on Public Accounts to go through his reports. That is the normal procedure. However, we recognize that in the case of defence expenditure, it being a sensitive area, there is little doubt that one cannot follow the normal rules. We accept that. However, there is a case to be made out for a request that some information should be given where that information is not of a confidential nature. In the case where it is of a confidential nature, if such information can be given to a Select Committee of Parliament without jeopardizing the national security—I am sure that that can be done—I believe it should be done. We believe that this again shows that, as we have stated in the past, what is required is a standing committee of Parliament on matters of defence. Such a committee could not only deal with matters of this nature, but could also receive information on matters of a sensitive nature, so as to ensure that there is no question of the national security being jeopardized. We cannot vote against this clause. We believe that the principle contained in this clause is one we must accept. However, at the same time we offer the hon. the Minister these proposals for his consideration so that at some appropriate time a mechanism may be introduced that will satisfy the public that Parliamentarians are acting as watch-dogs in respect of State expenditure on defence.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that hon. members in this House differ at all as to the principle that there should be absolute supervision of the expenditure of every cent which Parliament allocates for defence. The only point in request of which we differ is the method to be used in this connection. The Chief of the S.A. Defence Force is the accounting officer of the Special Defence Account, and he appears before the Select Committee on Public Accounts. As the accounting officer, he will be responsible for all the money allocated from the Special Defence Account, as well as all money which is allocated within the context of the Defence Force. Is this clear? I think we agree on this. As regards these moneys, the Auditor-General will have access to the particulars of how it is spent. His powers are not being reduced here. After the discussions held with the Auditor-General, I can say that he is satisfied with this state of affairs. But I am not going to hide behind him. I personally am also satisfied. I would not have accepted it as such if I was not satisfied that it would be properly audited. No responsible person can want to work with such large sums without satisfying himself that this trust money of the State is properly audited and that particulars of how it is being used, are available. I repeat: There is no curtailing of the powers of the Auditor-General in regard to that money.

By means of a certificate.

No, not by means of a certificate. The Auditor-General is properly informed. Even when the Minister issues a certificate to the Auditor-General, those amounts are still audited. There is no money which is spent on defence which is not properly audited. Will the hon. member please accept this. Not a cent which is spent on defence, is not properly audited. The fact that the Minister issues a certificate, simply means that this information will not be made public.

Will it be audited by the Auditor-General or by a private accountant?

It will be audited to the satisfaction of the Auditor-General. He cannot do everything himself. Let me give an example, and this is a case which the hon. member has not even thought of yet. I am referring to the secret funds for defence which are voted here every year. Those amounts are audited to his satisfaction, and only then is a certificate issued to the Auditor-General. That is why it is not made public. However, this is not to say that the secret funds are not audited. This is absolutely beyond any doubt and I want the country to know this. We are dealing with a sensitive matter here and if we start creating doubt, even by suggestions which we make, we can do enormous damage to our country. I do not know why the hon. member for Green Point is laughing.

No, it is about something else.

Oh!

You are over-sensitive.

Of course I am sensitive about it! I am over-sensitive about it, and my department knows that. There is no other field where greater villainy can take place than in the field of armaments. After all, this is well-known. Therefore in South Africa’s circumstances we have to be over-sensitive. Once again I want to give the assurance here today that every cent spent in regard to defence, is properly audited and those amounts for which a certificate is issued, are properly, satisfactorily, audited.

In the third place: The powers of the Auditor-General are not being curtailed by this clause. The Auditor-General has satisfied himself that this is not the case. I made sure of this, because as the hon. member says, I am over-sensitive in this regard.

Now we come to Armscor. Armscor is not getting any additional powers, powers it did not have before. It is not getting any additional responsibilities. It is only getting additional obligations.

And funds.

Funds which will be audited. Flowever, there is the double advantage here that we still have public auditors, who are people of status and who are appointed annually and present a report to the board of Armscor, the Minister and the Chief of the Defence Force.

What I am prepared to do to prove that I want to accommodate hon. members as much as possible, is to have a certified report drawn up for laying on the table when I receive the report from Armscor, without these particular aspects to which we all know that I cannot refer, namely State security. I shall try and work out a way of doing this in the future. Indeed, after consultation it seems that it may be possible for us to do something like this. However, I should like there to be no doubt in Parliament about the control which is exercised and we must not create an impression of doubt. I do just want to add that there are indeed very sensitive areas and once we start meddling in these matters before Select Committees, we will lose the co-operation of people who are co-operating with us today. I say this to this House with all the responsibility at my command. If a Select Committee is appointed to meddle in these things and they know that the Press can put pressure on them to reveal those things in the House, we will have bodies who are still co-operating with South Africa in this sphere today, who will co-operate no longer. The fact that South Africa is to be trusted with many of these transactions, means that we have the co-operation of many important bodies. I shall leave it at that. However, I am prepared to make as much available to parliament as I possibly can. I hope that this will satisfy the hon. member.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. the Minister has taken a step in the right direction by his undertaking that accounts—excluding, of course, sensitive matters—will be tabled in this House. What is even more important, I believe, is his unequivocal assurance that no door will be closed to the Auditor-General. That, I believe, is fundamental. In the past there were doors which could be closed by certificate. The hon. the Minister’s assurance that no doors will be closed, that the Auditor-General will have complete audit access to any moneys voted by this Parliament, is, I believe, an important statement, a statement of policy which we are prepared to accept, and therefore we shall not oppose the clause.

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately the hon. member for Durban Point uttered a sentence which I cannot allow to go unchallenged. He said that in the past there were doors that were closed to the Auditor-General, doors which could be closed by means of a certificate. This is not correct. The Auditor-General has been informed as to why a certificate was issued. This is a fact.

The reason, but not the particulars.

No, but he must be given the reasons. He must know why the use of certain sums of money has to be covered by a certificate, and then he must be satisfied that steps are taken to audit it. I want this to be accepted beyond all doubt.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 6:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment which appears in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 8, in line 8, to omit “subsidiary” and to substitute “wholly owned subsidiary”.

Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to what I said during Second Reading. The hon. the Minister then indicated that, firstly, there were no subsidiary companies which were not wholly owned, and that, therefore, there was no intention to get guarantees in respect of subsidiaries which were not wholly-owned subsidiaries. However, the issue may well arise that subsidiaries can come into existence, subsidiaries which are not wholly owned, and I believe that the signature of the State should only be available for the State debts. That is why I, with respect, pursue this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, there is one other matter which I would like to raise on this clause. That is with reference to the following wording—

1. (2) The Minister [may in consultation with] or, at his request, the Minister of Finance may, oñ behalf of the [Government] State, …

Mr. Chairman, the words—

are being deleted, and it is now going to be

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the hon. the Minister why the consultation with the hon. the Minister of Finance is being deleted. This is a question of a financial obligation of the State. If, for example, the hon. the Minister binds himself as a guarantor for R100 million for a subsidiary company, and the State has to pay, I believe that the State, the Department of Finance, must obviously know that this is being done. I would assume that they would be informed. Secondly, it is a matter for the hon. the Minister of Finance to decide whether the State is able to furnish such a guarantee, bearing in mind its commitments. Mr. Chairman, I am not assuming for one moment that we are not able to bear this sort of guarantee, but the logic of dealing with the hon. the Minister of finance is so obvious to me that the deletion of this provision does, to my mind, require some explanation.

Mr. Chairman, as far as the words proposed to be deleted are concerned, I can only say that I believe they are unnecessary, because under the Special Defence Account the hon. the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Defence, the Secretary of Finance, the Chief of the Defence Force and the chairman of the Armaments Corporation constitute a committee, an enabling committee, and are in close co-operation and consultation with each other from day to day.

*I think the words are superfluous. However, it does not matter to me whether or not they appear in the clause, because in practice this is the position in any event. The fact that we are making provision for the Minister of Finance to give the guarantees under given circumstances, proves that we shall know in what cases the Minister of Finance is to give the guarantees and in what cases the Minister of Defence is to give them. This is the answer. They are in consultation with each other from day to day in the enabling committee. There is also continuous representation on the part of the Treasury in the joint planning of the utilization of money.

†As far as the amendment is concerned, I would like to refer the hon. member to the definition in section 1 of the Armaments Development and Production Act—

1. (a) ’n maatskappy waarvan alle uitgereikte aandele gehou word deur die korporasie en sy genomineerdes of deur daardie genomineerdes; of
2. (b) ’n maatskappy waarvan alle uitgereikte aandele gehou word deur ’n in paragraaf (a) bedoelde filiaalmaatskappy en sy genomineerdes of deur daardie genomineerdes …

I think it is unnecessary because it is being dealt with in the definition.

Mr. Chairman, may I just react briefly on this point. Firstly, as far as the second point is concerned, I agree that there is a degree of cover in respect of this matter, but I would have been happier if we had specifically made provision for it. However, I am satisfied with the explanations that have been given and with leave of the Committee I would like to withdraw my amendment.

As far as the first matter is concerned, I am more concerned, because I still cannot quite understand why, if there is consultation taking place—and I have no reason to doubt that there is, because it is so logical that there should be consultation …

I have no objection if the hon. member moves that we do not …

Then it would require two amendments, because I do not think that the Minister of Finance can sign a guarantee without consulting with the Minister of Defence either. It works both ways, so that you need to make provision that the Minister may sign in consultation with or at his request the Minister of Finance may sign on his behalf. I think there will be no difficulty if we leave it in that form. In other words, I then move the following amendments—

1. (2) On page 8, in lines 3 and 4, to omit “or, at his request,” and to substitute “may in consultation with”;
2. (3) on page 8, in line 4, to omit “may”;

I have no objection.

Amendment (1), with leave, withdrawn.

Amendments (2) and (3) agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported with amendments.

Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 2, in line 9, after “service” to insert:

1. (2) on page 2, in lines 17 to 19, to omit “and ‘operations in defence of the Republic’ shall have a corresponding meaning;”

I do not believe it is necessary to explain these amendments or deal with them. They merely concern the question of language usage and clarity.

Mr. Chairman, I have already admitted that I am not as much of a linguist as is the hon. member. Nevertheless I accept his amendment.

Amendments agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 2:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I want briefly again to motivate the reason for this amendment. In terms of the proposed change to the Defence Act, the situation is that on a true reading of this it is possible for a serviceman to be required to do an almost unlimited number of periods of service, 95 to be exact, and they could be of six months’ duration. The submission which I make is that if a serviceman is required to do his service, i.e. the ordinary shorter periods of service referred to in paragraph (b), and that period is extended in terms of section 92ter(2), then he should at least get a credit of 19 days during the 95 days which he is required to serve. In my view that would be fair. If we do not do this, we will not spread the burden evenly, and we might be calling up the same people continuously. The periods of service should be distributed evenly. In my view young men are willing to play their part in the defence of South Africa and are prepared to do their job, but I believe the burden should be shared equally amongst those who are able to perform it. It must not continuously be imposed on the same people because it might, in particular instances, be convenient to do so.

Mr. Chairman, I do not share the doubts of the hon. member for Yeoville as to the basic common sense of those in charge of the Defence Force. I cannot for a moment believe that the S.A.D.F. would ever consider calling up a man for one day, extending it to six months and then calling him up again. I think that is really more laughable than serious. I do feel, however, that an amendment to the effect that when a person is called up, for instance, for 15 days and that is extended to three months, it will count as his full 19 days, would give clarity. I can see no harm in the amendment, although I can see no need for it either. As I have said, I have greater confidence than that in those who handle the calling up of our men. Although I would not go so far as to say that the amendment is meaningless, it is unnecessary. On the other hand, one cannot oppose the sense of what it aims at. I am quite sure that that is the intention of the department.

Mr. Chairman, I am in agreement with the hon. member for Durban Point on this matter. I do not see how the hon. member for Yeoville can imagine that the Defence Force will call up a person for 95 consecutive periods of six months. Mr. Chairman, that gives one a total of 47½ years. It is ludicrous even to raise a matter like that. The amendments contained in this clause and in the clause which is to come are quite clear, i.e. that the aggregate may not exceed 95 days. I therefore cannot see why the hon. member for Yeoville sees this terrible spectre. We in these benches cannot support his amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to cause any doubt in peoples’ minds, but I cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville because I am not convinced that it has been correctly formulated. I think it puts us back where we started, and under those circumstances I want to ask the hon. member to leave the matter to us. We shall speak to the law advisers about this, and if necessary, the necessary amendment can be effected in the Other Place. The intention is as I explained it, and as other hon. members, including the hon. member for Yeoville, understand it. I agree that one will not be able to apply in practice what perhaps seems theoretically possible in this case, but the maximum is being determined. This is a measure which seeks to enable the Defence Force to make far more effective use of manpower in practice. I think that in their own interests they will not commit absurdities. As I said, I shall get the law advisers to look at this once again. If it should then appear that an amendment is necessary, I will have it done. However, I am not prepared to do so today, because I have not had enough time to convince myself of this.

In the second place I want to say, as I said during the Second Reading debate yesterday as well, that we are looking at the whole question of national service. This legislation will probably be a very temporary measure, until we come to Parliament with a more comprehensive treatment of national service and military service. Until then we need this measure. I think the hon. member must give me the opportunity of discussing the matter properly with the law advisers.

Mr. Chairman, I should firstly like to deal with the two other Opposition speakers, because I think the Minister was more understanding of what the problem is than they were. The hon. member for Albany especially must listen carefully, because he has obviously not read this legislation. I am referring to the fact that it is possible to have one’s service extended by periods of six months at a time. If one is on service, in terms of this provision, one can then have one’s period of service extended by six months. The 95 days that we are talking about here could therefore be completed in one period of service, if the hon. member for Albany were correct. That is of course not the position, because if one is on service and one has one’s period extended, that extended period of service does not count for the 95 days. That is really what it is all about.

Have you given a thought to the amount of administrative work that the Defence Force would create for themselves?

No, I do not think there will be more work than there is now. Let me put the point very simply: The moment that you extend the period under section 92 ter (2) you give the soldier credit for his camp. Instead of giving him credit for one camp now, you give him credit for 19 days. There is no more administrative work involved than there is at the present moment. The hon. member for Durban Point says that nobody is going to be called up 95 times. Of course not! However, what I have tried to point out is that it is theoretically possible to be called up 95 times and no lawyer disagrees with this interpretation. It is a completely valid one. I am not saying that a man will be called up 95 times, because he will by then be an old man, but he is going to be called up far more times than is equitable in the circumstances. This is the problem, because there is already a heavy burden being placed on the Citizen Force units in particular. They are being called up virtually every year …

Have the same men in any unit been called up twice for three months?

Yes. Furthermore, units are already now being given notice of their call-up during this year, although they were called up last year. It is already happening now and they are going for the second time. We in these benches have no objection to people playing their part in the defence of South Africa, but the burden must be spread fairly and justly. This is what it is all about. I appreciate the hon. the Minister’s approach, because he has said that he would look at it again, but this is extremely important from the point of view of the state of mind of the serving soldier, who wants to know that the burden is being shared fairly, and that this is not going to be imposed upon him. This does not affect the very object the hon. the Minister has in mind. I understand the difficulty if, having called up a man, it counts as a camp although he has only been there for three days and his service is not extended. This aspect is covered in this legislation. It also enables the hon. the Minister to call up people in terms of this provision in such a way that if a serviceman gets 19 days’ credit, he can call him up six times for six months at a time. I think that is a fair service. If there is an emergency in South Africa, there is still another provision in terms of which there can be a proclamation and a person can be made to serve six months at a time almost indefinitely until his period of service is over. Therefore there is adequate protection, and whereas I appreciate the approach of the hon. the Minister, I regret that I wish to proceed with this amendment on this occasion.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, but I cannot accept the amendment.

Amendment put and the Committee divided:

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda and C. V. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 3:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment which appears in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I shall not repeat the arguments I raised in connection with my identical amendment to clause 2. Let me just put the following to the hon. the Minister. Even though the force of votes defeated my amendment to clause 2, I still wish to ask him to give some consideration to this and, if he should come to the conclusion that my amendment is right, to effect an amendment in the Other Place.

Mr. Chairman, as the hon. member has said, this amendment is identical to the amendment he proposed to clause 2. In the case of the amendment to clause 2, I indicated in my speech that, although we thought the amendment unnecessary, we could not vote against it because by voting against it we would be implying that we wanted unlimited call-ups and extensions. Therefore we supported the amendment. However, we cannot support it in respect of clause 3. What the hon. member for Yeoville is now suggesting is that, although the House has now rejected a limitation on the Citizen Force there should be a limitation on commandos. In other words, he is discriminating against the Citizen Force in favour of the commandos by moving this amendment to this clause.

Tortuous reasoning.

If this amendment were accepted, the commandos would be protected against this imaginary danger while the Citizen Force would not be so protected. Therefore, if this amendment is to be voted on, we shall vote against it because we do not believe in discriminating against the one and favouring the other. We believe they should be treated exactly the same. Although we voted for the amendment moved to clause 2, we still do not mistrust the Registering Officer or the Supreme Command of the Army implied in calling for a division on a matter of this nature. However, the division having been called for, it would equally have been illogical in the case of clause 2 to vote against a safeguard which, I believe, it is the intention certainly of the Supreme Command and also of the Minister, to apply in practice. Therefore one cannot vote against it. In this instance we will vote against the amendment on the grounds of discrimination.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, this is perhaps the most tortuous argument I have yet heard in the House.

It is logical.

Sir, it is typical of that hon. member. We have been told, firstly, that this amendment is unnecessary. If it is unnecessary according to the hon. member for Durban Point, then there is, in fact, no discrimination, because the same principle will be applied to the Citizen Force even without this amendment. Therefore by his own words he destroys his own argument.

If that is not tortuous I wonder what is!

The second point is a very simple one: Either one believes that something needs to be done and one adheres to it consistently, or one decides to waive the one or the other.

Even it if means discrimination?

To us the principle is there that there should be this limitation. We are told that it will be applied even though there is not a statutory provision to that effect. We think the statutory provision should be there as a safeguard to ensure that there is in fact an equal distribution of the burden. If that applies to the Citizen Force, it also applies to the commandos, and it would be illogical not to move the identical amendment in respect of both.

Even if it means discrimination?

The hon. member for Durban Point is discriminating; he is vacillating and is making an utter fool of himself.

Order! The hon. member must withdraw that.

Sir, I withdraw the words “that he is making a fool of himself”. With great respect, if it applies to the Citizen Force, it applies to the commandos. We shall be consistent and I pursue the amendment. The hon. member can perhaps now give vent to his desires and go and sit on the other side when we vote.

Mr. Chairman, the logic of the hon. member for Yeoville’s argument is quite correct. We shall not waste the time of the Committee by holding a long discussion and shall again vote against the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I find myself in the pleasant position of thinking that the hon. member for Durban Point has put a very logical argument to the Committee. It is a question of one for you, one for me. In all seriousness, the hon. member for Durban Point is quite correct, because if one supposes that the NP were to decide not to throw out the amendment for some reason, one would have a situation in which the arrangements for the Citizen Force would differ from those for the commandos. Therefore the hon. member for Durban Point is quite correct—shall we say, for a change.

Mr. Chairman, for the same reasons which I have been explaining since yesterday, I cannot accept the amendment. I also just want to point out that it is quite right that we cannot make a distinction between the treatment and training of members of the Citizen Force and the commandos. It would be totally illogical to accept this amendment.

Amendment put and the Committee divided:

Amendment declared negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 4:

Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask a question. This refers only to contracts with the Government where persons are serving in the Permanent Force. I would like to check with the hon. the Minister that there are no circumstances where a person is serving a contract under a different department which in fact exempts him from military training and which would, therefore, not bring him under this clause.

Mr. Chairman, it only refers to those to whom we grant bursaries to qualify as medical doctors and as engineers, in co-operation with certain universities.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 7:

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: On clause 7, we have on the Order Paper two amendments which seek to omit words which are part of the principal Act. In this respect I want to refer to rule 64 of the Standing Orders, which reads as follows—

In view of the fact that the amendment, which is introduced by clause 7 of this amending Bill, is a consequential amendment to an amendment to the Act introduced last year— in fact, an amendment which was brought in paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (i) of section (1) of the Defence Act (Act 1 of 1976)—I submit that if there were to be any relevance in argument at the Committee Stage to words appearing in the principal Act, that should have taken place at the Committee Stage when the first amendment was introduced to the Defence Act in 1976. Mr. Chairman, I ask your ruling on this, because there seems to be some difference of opinion as to whether the amendments appearing on the Order Paper are relevant to the amendments proposed in the Bill. My submission is that those amendments were originally introduced to the Act in 1976, and that the arguments should have taken place then.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May I draw your attention to the fact that in the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, the words proposed to be omitted, being “establish and do”, form part of the amendment in that they are repeated in the second-last and last lines—

for the doing of …

In other words, the amendment does not, except in the sense of grammatical correctness, change in any way the original Act. It is simply an extension, an addition, to the proposed amendment, and an addition to the Bill. This simply qualifies the amendment and does not in any way change the sense or the meaning of the original Act which is here being amended.

Mr. Chairman, on a point or order: With reference to the point of order of the hon. member for Albany, I want to point out that no amendments have as yet been moved, and therefore the amendments are not yet before the House. Therefore the point of order is of no substance. The mere fact that an amendment is on the Order Paper does not actually mean that it is going to be moved. Therefore the present submission is out of the order until the amendments are moved.

Secondly, as far as my amendment is concerned, there is an error in the amendment as it is printed on the Order Paper. The amendment as I handed it in—and I will hand you a copy, Sir—does not involve the deletion of the word “establish”. What has obviously happened is that the word “establish”, which I let in at the beginning is exactly the same way as the hon. member for Durban Point did in his, was eventually put in at the end when printed on the Order Paper. The amendment which I propose to move will be without that in any case.

Order! I just want to bring it to the attention of the hon. member for Albany that the objection which he raised in regard to the amendments, was considered when the amendments were placed on the Order Paper, and since they are indeed relevant to the clause, it was decided to allow them. If any doubt should still exist as to whether the amendments may in fact be moved, I shall allow the hon. members who have to move the amendments the benefit of the doubt.

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to move either the amendment which appears on the Order Paper or the amendment which I have here and which is to the same effect, except that in the one case the word “establish” is at the beginning and in the other case is at the end. If you want me to move the one on the Order Paper and it is in order, I will move it, but if you think it is not in order, I have got another one. [Interjections.] You may not like my grammar; my principles you will always like. [Interjections.]

May I address you on clause 7, Sir? I want to draw attention to the fact that, firstly, there is already very substantial legislation in South Africa which relates to censorship in one form or another. To add to the volume of censorship legislation is, I believe, in the present circumstances not in the interests of the country. I believe that for that reason alone this provision should be rejected. The second reason is that if one takes the wording, it says that “the State President may … for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic …” Let us take it no further than that, let us take that on its own. That situation exists at the present moment, because the activities of our Defence Force at the present moment are designed to deal also with the prevention of disorder. Therefore this can be brought in and made operative at this moment of time. The question that one must ask the Minister is whether he thinks that the circumstances which exist at present in South Africa—not tomorrow, but today—warrant the introduction of such a drastic provision in respect of censorship. It is no use saying “Things may become bad”. The simple situation is that we are now going as far as to say that the activities of our Defence Force at the present moment, which is involved in the prevention of internal disorder and in the prevention or suppression of terrorism, warrant the introduction of such a drastic provision as this. With great respect, Sir, I do not believe the situation in South Africa has deteriorated so much or is, at this moment of time, so bad that we need such far-reaching provisions as this particular provision.

There is another factor which we should bear in mind, and that is that the public must always be in a position to judge whether the actions of the Government are right or wrong. They must be able to form value judgments on what is happening in South Africa. The effect of this provision, in fact, is to impose restrictions on the ability of the people of South Africa to form value judgments in respect of the actions of this Government. Another aspect is that there is such a thing as privacy of communication. Where there is communication which is harmful to the State in circumstances where action needs to be taken, we will support that, but where there is unnecessary inroads upon privacy of communication we will not support it. If, for example, in this kind of circumstances there should exist a censorship over a letter or listening in to telephone conversations when we are not really in a state where the whole of the security of our country is being jeopardized, it would, to my mind, be an inroad into the privacy and fundamental liberty of the individual, a liberty which involves, firstly, the individual’s privacy and, secondly, the individual’s right to be informed in order to make value judgments. Therefore we are not in favour of this provision, and accordingly I move the following amendments—

1. (1) On page 6, in line 30, after the first “or” to insert “, after proclamation,”;
2. (2) on page 6, in line 32, to omit “establish” and to substitute:

If such a provision has to be introduced, which we believe is not necessary at the moment, then the public must know that it is coming into force. There must be an overt act on the part of the State, in terms of which the public are informed that these provisions are being brought into force. The regulations that should be made, should define exactly what is happening and where the restrictions are, so that the public know that they are not going too far. For that reason I move these amendments, in terms of which we say firstly that there must be a proclamation. There is some dispute as to whether the State President can or cannot act without a proclamation, and therefore we want to put it beyond doubt and to have it as a proclamation. Secondly, we want regulations, orders and instructions to be made public in the same way as they are in respect of other provisions, which we have already dealt with during this debate.

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that his amendment on the Order Paper has been worded in such a way as to make the English and the Afrikaans versions correspond. Therefore there is no error in the amendment as it now stands on the Order Paper.

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendment—

I gave notice of this amendment in the Second Reading. It may appear to be the same as that moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, but it is in fact different. At Second Reading I indicated that we believed that there could be circumstances in which this power was necessary. We believe, however, that it is equally necessary that when the power is used, it should be made known to the people that this power is being exercised. I think the essential difference between the hon. member for Yeoville and ourselves is that he refers to the situation in South Africa at this present moment not requiring or justifying the powers of censorship granted in clause 7. He and his party have supported the powers in clause 5 referring to the security of harbours and airports. In clause 6 he has supported the right to commandeer buildings, premises, vehicles, aircraft, vessels, machinery, equipment, animals, food-stuffs, forage, fuels, oil and any other materials, articles or things necessary for the mobilization or maintenance of the S.A. Defence Force. He is prepared to make provision for a situation in which all those things can be done, because he accepts, as we accept, that a situation could well arise where it may be necessary to do those things. Similarly, he supported, in respect of clause 8, which we will come to, the power to control transportation, and in clause 9 the power to evacuate people or to bring people together under compulsion. These are all empowering provisions which exist in the present legislation in respect of war. One can use flowery phrases about the freedom of the individual, the right to communicate, and all the rest, but we accept that in time of war such powers may have to give way to the interests of the State. What this Bill is doing is to substitute for “time of war” the concept of an undeclared war which entails armed violence, insurrection, terrorism—a principle which this House accepted last year. We on this side of the House accept that those powers are necessary where such a situation exists. When such a situation exists, there is not time to call Parliament together to give the necessary powers to the forces to deal with a terrorist uprising, for example. We believe that the Defence Force must have at its disposal the tools with which to deal with any situation which may reasonably be expected to arise. In times of conflagration, armed uprising and armed disorder, one of these tools has to be control of the media. That is the purpose of this clause. Censorship in the sense of newspaper control is controlled by section 118 of the principal Act, and has nothing to do with this clause at all. This is a censorship clause and can be applied in certain circumstances.

Clause 5 specifies that where such power is exercised by the State President it “may be made known in such manner as he deems most suitable in the circumstances”. In other words, it is then publicized in such manner as the State President deems suitable, when he acts in the protection of harbours and airports. Similarly, we believe that this provision is an emotive one and it is best that the emotive content be recognized. There should, in this clause, also be provision either for proclamation, which would be the normal manner of doing it, or, where that is not possible in the circumstances, for the State President, in such manner as he deems most suitable in the circumstances, to prescribe regulations to establish and provide for the doing of all the things concerned here. That is the difference between my amendment and that of the hon. member for Yeoville, which deals only with the insertion of “after proclamation”. We recognize that there could be circumstances where a proclamation could take 12 hours to be published in the Government Gazette, whereas it might be necessary to act immediately. Such circumstances have in fact already arisen last year, in regard to a report where an interdict was attempted and failed. We recognize that these circumstances can happen and that in such circumstances it might be necessary to act either by announcement over the radio or by other means, provided that it is made public and that the people know that the power is being exercised. I will not discuss the amendment I have moved in principle, because it was dealt with during the Second Reading.

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member if he will agree to use the word “expdient” instead of “suitable”.

Yes, the word should be “expedient”. The amendment then reads as follows—

Mr. Chairman, as the hon. member for Yeoville has indicated, we are not happy with this clause at all. Basically it seeks to give powers to the State President to impose war-time censorship on a peacetime South Africa. This is basically what it is all about. The hon. member for Durban Point tried to relate or to equate clause 7 with clauses 5, 6, 8 and 9. As far as clauses 6, 8 and 9 are concerned there is a very fundamental difference because these clauses give the State President the power to commandeer or to control transport or to evacuate not only in time of war but also for the prevention and suppression of internal disorder. The provisions contained in clauses 6, 8 and 9 were not only applicable to war-time conditions but were always, in terms of the parent Act, relevant in order to deal with the prevention and suppression of internal disorder. All that has been added to those clauses is the question of terrorism, and I think there is a knife-edge difference in South Africa today between the definition of terrorism and of internal disorder. There is accordingly no parallel between clause 7 and clauses 6, 8 and 9. As far as clause 5 is concerned, there is a parallel as far as the conditions are concerned, but here one is dealing specifically with security matters. One is dealing with harbours, airports, vessels and aircraft. There is a different meaning and style between clauses which allow one to deal with security matters and the whole question of censorship. If this clause is accepted, we will be extending war-time censorship to peace-time South Africa. The hon. member and the Minister might say that we are in a state of War. The Minister has said outside this House that we are already in a total state of war. All I can say to the hon. the Minister is that if that is his argument, then of course no legislation is necessary. If he believes that we are in a state of war and he can satisfy the State President that we are in a state of war, then he does not need this legislation in any case. We cannot accept that his “state of war” syndrome, which is used casually and is used from public platforms, can form the basis for continuing and permanent legislation in South Africa. I say this because there is a totality about a state of war. I therefore think that the hon. the Minister in particular, because he is the Minister of Defence, should be more careful in his use of this phrase. When he stands up, as he did, I think, in November last year and say that we are already in a state of war, he should realize the seriousness of what he is saying, not just in terms of generalities, but also in terms of the impact this has on legislation.

Open your eyes and look around you.

In the situation of a state of war there is a totality which involves the suspension of ordinary laws and the ordinary legal process. There is also the acceptance of the concept of transferring absolute power to the State, even to the detriment of the rights of the individual. There is the concept, in a state of war, of giving rights to the executive in order to direct the total national effort towards prosecuting the war. However, I do not think the hon. the Minister can suggest that this is the kind of situation we have in South Africa at the moment. I want to put it to him that there are four situations, outside of a state of war situation, in which we are now seeking the right to impose censorship. First of all, there is the question of fulfilling treaty obligations, because that becomes one of the elements of the definition of the defence of South Africa. We need to know from the hon. the Minister, because the public is entitled to know, what agreements South Africa has. The hon. the Minister is seeking power to impose censorship when the South African Defence Force acts in compliance with agreements we have with other countries. I therefore think the hon. the Minister must tell us right now …

Which clause are you discussing now?

I am speaking to clause 7. The phrase “in time of war” is being deleted and substituted by “operations in the defence of the Republic”. However, the paragraph (b) section of the definition of “service in defence of the Republic” deals with the fulfilment of agreements; so what agreements do we have? Secondly, defence of the Republic also includes the prevention and suppression of armed conflict outside our borders. I consequently want to know the following from the hon. the Minister: If this clause had been in operation during the Angolan escapade, would he have been able, in terms of this clause, to suppress news and information coming into or going out of South Africa as far as the activities in Angola were concerned? This is a very clear-cut question. Is it the intention to suppress news and information or to impose censorship on information coming into or going out of South Africa in connection with the kind of escapade the hon. the Minister involved our forces in in Angola late in 1975?

Do you call those efforts an escapade?

I said it was his escapade. I am not suggesting it was the troops’ escapade. It was the escapade in which he involved the South African forces. I want to know whether that kind of situation would be covered? Are we to understand that if the Angolan situation had developed when this legislation was in force, he would have been able to impose censorship about matters relating to Angola?

Thirdly, there is the question of the South African forces used in the combating of terrorism. It is said daily that in South West Africa our forces are, at this moment, engaged in combating terrorism. I therefore want to know from the hon. the Minister whether this means that right now, in terms of this provision, it would be possible for the State President to impose censorship on South Africa because our troops are engaged in combating terrorism in South West Africa? Fourthly, there is the question of the suppression of internal disorder. If the commandos or the troops had been called out—and they were called out in 1961 in a state of emergency—in order to suppress any unrest that had taken place in recent times, would that have been an occasion on which the State President could have imposed total censorship on South Africa? Here we are not dealing with a theoretical situation in the future. I have mentioned three situations that have existed from 1975 till now and, as I understand it, the hon. the Minister is coming to the House and saying that in the circumstances prevalent in 1975, and in the circumstances existing today, because of our commitment to fight terrorism in South West Africa, if the commandos or troops should be used at any stage to deal with unrest in South Africa, the State President would be empowered to impose censorship in South Africa. This clause does not limit censorship to military situations. Section 3(2) of the Official Secrets Act deals completely with the question of disclosure of military information, police information or security information. This clause is not limited to security information. It involves a total ban, a total censorship. It is not qualified to the effect that it is limited to military information or to any area of South Africa, nor is it qualified to the effect that that information must be clearly related to the particular unrest or the particular act of terrorism. It is merely an enabling measure which says: If we are combating terrorism, if the SADF is used anywhere to deal with internal unrest, if we are suppressing uprisings or combating armed conflicts outside of our borders, the State President is empowered to impose a complete censorship on all of South Africa. Unless the hon. the Minister can disabuse us and say that that is not the intention, but that the intention is only to deal with security matters in relation to the area where the unrest or terrorism is being experienced, we on this side of the House can most certainly not support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sea Point illustrated here how a clause which repeats a principle which already appears in the Principal Act, can be used as a platform to blacken South Africa’s name in the outside world.

To sow suspicion.

He illustrated how the PRP has perfected that tactic and made an art of it, indeed they have perfected it in such a way that they have probably already informed their correspondents in various countries abroad about their standpoint.

That is a rotten thing to say.

They are protecting the leftist elements.

I say this because the hon. member for Sea Point adopted an extremely irresponsible standpoint here. It was an extension of the hon. member for Yeoville’s standpoint.

Let us deal with this matter step by step. In reply to the hon. member for Durban Point, the hon. member for Yeoville said that they supported clause 6, for example, because, inter alia, it only dealt with the prevention or suppression of terrorism. Now I infer that he does not mind the State President taking those drastic powers in order to prevent or suppress terrorism.

†I want to ask that gentleman a question. Would he have objected if clause 7 had referred only to the suppression of terrorism as a reason for the State President to have taken these powers?

There is a big difference between commandeering property and censorship. Do you not understand that?

Mr. Chairman, that is how the hon. member argued. I am using his own argument.

There is internal disorder already.

I am using the hon. member’s own argument. He said that he did not object to the serious steps which the State President may take in terms of clause 6 because this had already been included in previous legislation. Had we taken the same powers in clause 7, would he have objected to that? Apparently not. It is very clear that the hon. member is becoming entangled in his own argument.

To return to the question of Angola and the imposing of censorship in this connection, I want to tell the hon. member that he is missing the point completely. It was section 118 which was applied to ensure that the information on Angola would not be made public. It was the powers which the Minister has in terms of that section, which were applied, and that section is not relevant here at all. What is the hon. member talking about?

That is the whole point.

We agree with you. Why do you want this, then?

I want to ask the hon. member: If he would have no objection if it were stated that the State President may apply censorship in time of war, would he object to it if his party accepted that conventional wars are no longer declared? Would the hon. member agree that it is a consequential amendment? Why is he silent now? Does he accept that conventional wars are no longer declared?

There is nothing about a declaration of war.

All we are doing is to bring the factual situation which is prevailing in the world today into line with practice. What it actually amounts to is that the powers which the State President takes are far less drastic than what was contemplated before. At no stage when we were discussing the Defence Act did the hon. member say that we should eliminate this censorship. The hon. member accepted it. However, he has now tried to create a platform. We hold this against the hon. member for Durban Point. The hon. member for Yeoville is a lawyer and he knows that this measure contains no new principle. He has actually moved an amendment, and is using it to say that the Government is now taking drastic powers. I want to ask the hon. member now—it sounds strange to ask this of a person like the hon. member—whether he is not ashamed of himself for actually professing this standpoint on the basis of an acceptance that it is a new principle?

In conclusion I say that the hon. the Minister did indeed give the hon. member for Durban Point a proper indication in some way or other that the State President will have to give an indication that these powers are being taken. It seems to me that if this should happen by way of proclamation, it would be in order. If the hon. member for Yeoville could have adopted that standpoint, it would have been that of a reasonable man. I think that we all feel very happy that the hon. the Minister has given an indication that he accepts the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Bloemfontein West is really so confused that I cannot follow him. I cannot deal with him and I shall have to leave him to those whom he has attacked to discuss it with him. However, I want to look at some of the practical implications of this clause, namely the censorship of newspapers as is proposed. I want to explain in the course of my speech why I oppose it. There are some very important practical implications to which I hope the hon. the Minister will listen. I oppose this clause primarily for two reasons. The first is that the additional powers which are now being sought—in other words, to impose censorship on newspapers, not only in time of war, but what-is referred to as “during operations in defence of the Republic or for the prevention or suppression of terrorism or for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic”—are unnecessary. Secondly, I oppose it because Press censorship of the nature which is proposed in terms of this legislation is often not only counter-productive, but it is in fact also dangerous to the safety and security of the State. I hope to be able to show why. I believe that the additional censorship powers for which the hon. the Minister is asking are unnecessary because the Defence Act …

Order! I wish to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that the principle contained in the amendment has been accepted at Second Reading.

Mr. Chairman, I accept your ruling, but may I not explain why I oppose the additional powers that are being asked for?

That has already been done by the leader of that party. The hon. member may only discuss the details. He may not discuss the principle any further.

Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss. I want your guidance in this matter, but I want to try to explain why I believe that the additional powers which are being asked for are firstly impractical and secondly, dangerous. If you are not going to allow me to discuss those points I shall have to resume my seat. I want to discuss censorship and this clause concerns nothing but censorship.

The hon. member’s leader has already put that point of view and it is customary to allow the leaders of the various parties to put their objection and then other hon. members must abide by S.O. No. 63 and only discuss details.

The hon. member for Durban Point has said that this does not apply to newspapers. Is that true?

To publication in newspapers.

In newspapers?

Yes. I said section 118 determines publication.

Mr. Chairman, if I cannot discuss my objections to censorship there is nothing further I can say.

Mr. Chairman, I shall not allow myself to be sidetracked by the hon. member for Sea Point into starting a debate, for which he is apparently itching, on this occasion. However, I am quite prepared to discuss Angola with him at the proper time. I think he ought to put his head in a bag and stone himself as a result of what has now been revealed about Angola. I think that the hon. member for Sea Point is the one who should be ashamed of himself. He should be ashamed of himself over this, just as he should also be ashamed of himself over other matters. Therefore he need not drag Angola into this. Nor shall I allow myself to be sidetracked into talking about Angola. I shall discuss Angola with him at the proper time. He need have no fear of that. I shall raise the matter myself. The hon. member will not have to wait for it.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May an hon. member say “the Minister misled the House”? The hon. member for Orange Grove said it.

Order! An hon. member may not say that the hon. the Minister deliberately misled the House. Did the hon. member say it was deliberately misleading?

Mr. Chairman, allow me to elucidate …

Order! Did the hon. member say that the hon. the Minister deliberately misled the House?

Mr. Chairman, what I said was that when the hon. the Minister produced the recent information which he did on Angola, he proved that on a previous occasion he must have misled the House by creating the impression that he had not been involved in Angola.

The hon. member is therefore insinuating that the hon. the Minister misled the House?

Mr. Chairman, I did not insinuate that. The hon. the Minister said on that occasion that we were not involved in the civil war in Angola.

Order! The hon. member may not insinuate that the hon. the Minister deliberately misled the House. The hon. member must therefore withdraw it.

Mr. Chairman, I did not say that the hon. the Minister had done it knowingly. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister may continue.

The hon. member for Orange Grove, who has just been trying to make himself objectionable, need not expect me to deal with him on the matter either. I shall speak about it at the right moment. Today is not the right time for it. We shall discuss Angola. The hon. member for Orange Grove …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May the hon. the Minister of Justice say that I am a coward?

Mr. Chairman, I said that I think he is a coward. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister may not say that he thinks another hon. member is a coward.

Mr. Chairman, I said that in my opinion the hon. member is a coward. I did not say that he is a coward. I said that I think he is a coward. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister must withdraw those words.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw them. [Interjections.]

The hon. the Minister of Defence may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I say once again that the hon. member for Sea Point with his notorious swimming baths, and the hon. member for Orange Grove with his partiality to what seems to be misleading, need not wait for the matter of Angola to be raised. I shall speak about it at an appropriate time. I am not as rash as they are being now and therefore I am not going to react to the hon. member for Sea Point. What he said, clearly proves that he does not know what he is talking about. The hon. member for Parktown obviously did not know what was going on either. I think he still does not know. One can only sympathize with him because most of the time he does not know what is going on, except when he speaks about the Day of the Covenant. [Interjections.]

Does this concern clause 7? [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, with regard to this clause I want to point out that the principle is contained in the Bill that, when the Defence Force is used in order to deal with a state of war, the State President has certain powers. Furthermore, in its wisdom and in view of prevailing world circumstances, this Parliament has depicted other circumstances in which the Defence Force may be used, inter alia, to combat terrorism and to discharge obligations arising from an agreement with a friendly country, as well as in the suppression of internal unrest. All we are asking now, is for the State President to have the same powers as he has in regard to that one specific matter. Therefore the Act must be tightened up in such a way that he will have the necessary powers under all circumstances in which the Defence Force may be used. This is how simple the entire matter is.

I accepted the hon. member for Durban Point’s amendment because I believe that the State President must make his intention to act in this way public. The action of the State President usually flows from a decision on the part of the Government. When the State President is advised by the Government of the day, he acts according to specific directions. I agree with the hon. member for Durban Point that the State President should then announce, either by way of proclamation or an announcement in the Press or whatever, even by means of television, one of our new media, that he intends to take action. In my opinion the circumstances are now covered by the amendment which the hon. member for Durban Point moved. However, I must point out that this would have happened in any event, because the State President does not whisper; if he wants to say something, he makes it public. For the sake of good order I accept the hon. member for Durban Point’s amendment as he subsequently amended it.

As far as the objection of hon. members on the PRP side is concerned, I am not shocked by their attitude, because their objection is completely on a par with the attitude they constantly adopt when South Africa’s security is at stake. On this occasion they are merely showing once again that they profess one thing with their mouths and do something else in practice. I shall leave it at that.

Mr. Chairman, with respect to the hon. the Minister, I do not think he achieves a purpose by using a smear tactic in respect of the hon. members who sit in these benches, because, with great respect, I think that we will put our loyalty to South Africa on to the scale before a higher authority one day and then judgment will be made as to who did the right thing for South Africa. With great respect, this continuous smear tactic which emanates from hon. members on that side, does no credit to them and does no good to South Africa. I want to say something else to the hon. the Minister. I think both he and his colleagues—here I include the hon. member for Bloemfontein West—must just bear in mind the harm that they are causing South Africa by continually telling the world that we are at war and that we have all these terrible things happening to us. In doing so they are scaring off the investment confidence of South Africans and they are also scaring off investment from overseas. They are therefore doing harm to South Africa. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member should confine himself to the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am replying to what was said about our being in a state of war.

Yes, but the hon. member should not carry it too far.

No, Sir, I am not carrying it too far.

The hon. member should confine himself to the clause.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Bloemfontein West talked about South Africa being at war.

I did not say that.

How many times has it not been said? Has the hon. the Minister not said it? He talked about war, about all sorts of war.

Order! The hon. the Minister merely replied to speeches made from the other side. The hon. member should not now continue in the same vein.

Sir, I respect your ruling. I am only replying to the hon. the Minister. I think he is doing harm to South Africa.

Order! The hon. member must discuss the clause.

Sir, I want to deal with aspects of the clause with which, with respect, the hon. the Minister has not dealt. The one issue which is quite apparent, from a reading of the clause, is that at the present moment action is being taken for the prevention of internal disorder in South Africa. I ask the hon. the Minister if that is right. Is it not right? Is he not taking action to prevent internal disorder? He must be doing so. Sir, we get no answers. The answer is there, it must be done. If it is not being done, I would imagine that nobody is doing his job. I know that the Defence Force is doing its job. Therefore, if that is a fact, the circumstances exist at this moment of time for bringing these provisions into effect.

We have had a great deal of talk about Angola and all sorts of other things. I do not want to get involved in a debate about Angola, but with great respect I say that the very reference to section 118 proves that one does not need these extra provisions at present, because section 118(2) specifically deals with secret and confidential information relating to the defence of the Republic. What else do we need? The defence of the Republic involves not only external aggression, but also other matters which relate to the defence of the Republic, as defined. Therefore I think a case has not been made out for the additional powers which are being sought.

I should like to deal again with the hon. member for Durban Point. He says this does not apply to the Press. The way I read this section, it refers to any “written or printed matter”. Well, a newspaper is printed matter and there is therefore no doubt that it applies to that. There is no doubt that it could be applied to this. I believe that when section 101 was enacted, it was not intended to apply to the Press, because if one reads the whole of it, it deals with matters relating to the postal authorities and further deals with matters of all kinds and actually contains a reference to all printed matter. All “printed matter” certainly includes newspapers.

Finally I want to say that in view of the hon. the Minister having accepted the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point, I do not propose to proceed with mine. I believe that it is substantially, though not identically, the same as his. I therefore ask leave to withdraw the two amendments on this clause that stand in my name on the Order Paper.

Mr. Chairman, I want to come back to the hon. the Minister, because behind the Angola information …

Order! I have already ruled that the principle contained in this clause has been accepted at the Second Reading. I shall allow the hon. member, as leader of his party, to put his point of view once again, but I cannot allow him to discuss the principle any further.

I do not want to discuss the principle, Sir, but want to get some clarity between ourselves and the hon. the Minister.

Order! The hon. member must please confine himself to the contents of this clause and not discuss any other matter.

Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to the fact that the words “in time of war” are being deleted and the words “during operations in defence of the Republic” are being added. The definition of “operations in defence of the Republic” involves a state of war and the suppressing of armed combat in other parts of the world. I am dealing with the question of South African troops being used to suppress armed conflict outside South Africa, as I believe happened in Angola, as the hon. the Minister will concede. All I want to know is whether that would create a condition in which the State President could impose censorship in South Africa. We raise this, because under section 118 of the Defence Act, one cannot in any case communicate information regarding the South African forces or their deployment. In terms of the Official Secrets Act one cannot impart any information which may be damaging to the security or to military or police operations. Clearly this particular provision does not deal with military or specific security matters, but is a blanket censorship which the State President can normally impose in a time of total war. All we want from the hon. the Minister is some clarity, as the hon. member for Yeoville also sought. Would it include such circumstances as those in Angola in 1975? We want to know from the hon. the Minister whether that could have been one of the conditions, a situation in which the State President can act in terms of these provisions? Can the hon. the Minister tell us that?

Secondly, I want to put it again: It is said that our troops are engaged in anti-terrorist activities in the operational area in South West Africa.

I must assume that that means that at a given moment in time, if this legislation is passed, the State President could proclaim total censorship in South Africa even when, as the hon. member for Yeoville has indicated, our troops are being used, not in the suppression of internal disorder, but in the prevention of internal disorder. We want the hon. the Minister to say “yes” or “no”, If this legislation is passed, will it mean that right here and now the State President will be in a position to impose total censorship on South Africa? We raise the matter because this censorship is not only related to military matters. The question of military and security matters are dealt with specifically in section 118 of the Defence Act and in section 3 of the Official Secrets Act. We want some clarity in this regard. The hon. the Minister has introduced the legislation and we have been given three simple illustrations. We should now like to know from the hon. the Minister if a situation is being created, by passing the legislation, which would allow censorship, which is normally only able to be imposed in the time of war, to be imposed also at a time such as South Africa finds itself in at present.

Mr. Chairman, last night the House adopted the principle contained in this clause. What it amounts to, is that the State president will have the same rights and powers when terrorism is being suppressed, when he has to suppress internal unrest through military forces, or when he will have to honour an agreement according to the provisions of the existing legislation. Therefore, it is the same as in time of war. The fact that we are providing for this, goes to show that we do not want to say every time that it is a war. Therefore, it is exactly the opposite of what the hon. member for Yeoville is accusing us of. The hon. member only wants to provide for conditions of war. He wants one to declare war; only then one may use all these powers and in the meantime the communists and the terrorists can annihilate us. According to him it is not allowed for provision to be made for that and powers may not be granted to the State President. That is the reply. In the second place, the leader of the hon. member for Yeoville wants to know whether we would have used legislation such as this under the circumstances which had prevailed in Angola.

The reply to that is “yes”. The lives of soldiers have to be protected. The matters for which provision is being made here, are, in the first place, intended not to let the enemy know what our Defence Force is doing. This is what the provision For is aimed at. This is the difference in principle between us. We want the State President to have the same powers when he fights communism as when we are involved in a war. In the second place we want the State President to protect the troops against people which may endanger their lives and people who vote against that, vote on the side of our enemies.

Mr. Chairman, to make the allegation that people who vote in this particular manner, vote on the side of the enemy, is, to my mind, a scandalous allegation, because the truth is that in terms of section 118 of the Act, the hon. the Minister has got the power, the hon. the Minister has exercised the power and …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. the Minister entitled to say that if hon. members of this House vote against this clause, they are voting on the side of the enemy? In terms of an earlier ruling from the Chair, I am putting this as a point of order to you, Sir.

Order! I do not think any hon. member is deliberately being accused of disloyalty.

Mr. Chairman, you should listen very carefully now, to what I am saying. Anyone who does not vote for the safeguarding of troops when they are fighting against the enemy, anyone who does not vote for the safeguarding of troops of our Defence Force when they are fighting against communist terrorists, anyone who does not vote for the protection of troops when internal unrest has to be oppressed …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I was busy making a speech when I was interrupted by a point of order. The hon. the Minister cannot make another speech now. I want to finish my speech.

Order! I was under the impression that the hon. member for Yeoville has already resumed his seat. [Interjections.] The hon. member may now proceed.

Mr. Chairman, have you ruled on my point of order? [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister was advancing a political argument and was really dealing with a hypothetical case.

Mr. Chairman, I want to come back to this allegation because I think it is very important that we see it in its correct context. The greatest weapon that one can give to the communists against our troops is when one tries to impose measures which are unnecessary. Every textbook which deals with the tactics of the communists, refers to the fact that they want one to take this kind of measure; they want you to do it and want to create a situation. Therefore, if anybody is helping communism now it is the hon. the Minister.

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that I have already asked hon. members to accept that certain principles, the principles contained in this clause, have been accepted at the Second Reading. The hon. member may discuss the details thereof, but he is not allowed to discuss the principle any further.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister makes an attack on this side of the House and we cannot reply …

Order! I am now asking the hon. member for the last time to discuss the details of the clause and not the principle.

I than want to deal again with what the hon. the Minister has said when he dealt with the issue, namely that these particular provisions were needed to fight terrorism. But that is where he is wrong. He is, with respect, Sir, wrong when he says that I am in favour of a declaration of war so that these powers can be exercised. The truth is that there is adequate provision for dealing with the control of information which could endanger the security of the State, which could endanger the lives of soldiers, which could endanger the operations of the Defence Force without encroaching on the right of people to have information in order to form value judgments. That is the real crux of the matter. What he wants to do is to create a situation where the Government has the power and that the people have not the information to form a value judgment. We are not talking about imperilling troops. We are as much in favour as anyone in the House, of taking every step to make sure that our soldiers are not imperilled, but we are also in favour of the people being in a position to know the facts and to form value judgments.

Mr. Chairman, as the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point explains, the State President can now take steps not only in the case of a declared war. He can also take steps when the State has to combat terrorism by means of its Defence Force, i.e. when it is involved in an unconventional war. Furthermore he can take steps when he has to act in the interests of the protection of a country with which he has an agreement and also when he has to take action to maintain internal order by means of its Defence Force. Then, in terms of the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point, which I have accepted, the State President can take steps. These are steps which he can take in times of war. Now he can also do so under these circumstances in order to protect soldiers’ lives against subversion which may come their way from subversive communist elements and terrorists and “night adders” that prowl around at night, and their friends, too. The only power which is here being given to the State President is to be able to exercise the power he has in times of war, in other circumstances too, when he has to protect the lives of the soldiers of the Defence Force.

Amendments moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz, with leave, withdrawn.

Amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided.

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Dr. A. L. Boraine, Messrs. D. J. Dalling, R. M. de Villiers, C. W. Eglin, R. J. Lorimer, S. A. Pitman, H. H. Schwarz, Dr. F. van Z. Slabbert, Mrs. H. Suzman, and Messrs. H. E. J. van Rensburg and G. H. Waddell) appeared on one side,

Clause, as amended, declared agreed to. Clause 10:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

This clause amends section 103ter of the principal Act, and in our respectful submission there should be an inquest if it does not prejudice the State. In the circumstances I have moved what I consider to be a more than reasonable amendment, which is to insert the proviso—

In those circumstances I do not believe that anyone could suggest that this amendment should not be accepted. The State here receives every protection, and whatever our views on section 103 ter may have been—we are not debating that now—in these circumstances there should be no objection to this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that I cannot accept this amendment. The amendment to clause 10 is being moved at the request of the Secretary for Justice, who, in collaboration, I take it, with the Attorney-General concerned, gave a very good reason for it to be put as it is put here. The whole purpose of the clause will be defeated if I accept the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville. For this reason I cannot accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to explain this case. The position is that any death which takes place within the borders of our country the cause of which is not clear, must automatically be followed by an inquest. When our troops are involved on our northern borders in particular, in Ovambo, for example, it is practically impossible for the police to make inquiries. If someone is killed or found dead in an area where the army is operating, a full police enquiry must first be held and the result submitted to a magistrate so that an inquest can take place. It is just impracticable. It seems to me that clause 10 covers the case of someone being found dead in an area where the army is operating. The Minister can stipulate that the inquest be suspended and that certain information in this regard be sent back to South Africa. This is briefly the position. It is a practical measure which is applicable in areas where the troops are in action.

Mr. Chairman, if this provision was merely restricted to the problem the hon. the Minister referred to, that would be fine. Unfortunately it goes a little further. With great respect, the situation as I see it is that in terms of the law as it stands at present, if there is no prosecution and a death has been caused by unnatural circumstances, an inquest should take place. Because one is entitled, in terms of section 103ter, to stop such action, it means that there has to be an inquest in every case. I concede that the hon. the Minister of Justice has that logical problem in these circumstances. However, I want to refer to the case where the next of kin of a person, who died in particular circumstances, do not in fact know how he died and therefore ask for an inquest and, as I have indicated in my amendment, there is no reason why the Minister cannot certify that the national interest would be jeopardized. It is not even the courts that will decide; it is merely the Minister. I do not think I could possibly have gone further than that in order to make it clear that if the national interest should be jeopardized the Minister can certify accordingly. In normal circumstances I would prefer to see the courts or somebody else deciding, but because of the nature of and problems relating to section 103ter and because of what I know of the views of the Minister, we bent over backwards to draw up an amendment in terms of which he could in fact decide whether such an action would be in the national interest or not. How can one deprive the next of kin of a person, who has been killed, of the opportunity of knowing how that person has died when the national interest is not affected and when, in these particular circumstances, there is no prejudice involved? I concede the point that it may be inconvenient to have an inquest, but it was more than inconvenient to have been killed. I think it is in the public interest that in cases where the national interest is not jeopardized, an inquest should be held. I therefore persist with my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, when one looks at this clause, one inevitably notices that it only applies to section 5 of the Inquests Act. When one looks at the wording of that section, one notes that if criminal proceedings are not instituted in connection with a death—this is a case where there is a death, but no criminal proceedings at all are instituted—the matter is referred to a magistrate, who has to decide whether anything further should be done. All that will happen now in terms of the Bill, in regard to the operational area where there are no magistrates available, nor are there always policemen to draw up the reports, is that the discretion is placed in the hands of the Minister to settle the matter to his satisfaction. After all, we have military police and Advocates-general who can investigate the case. It is provided that certain information must be given. When we look at section 16 of the Inquests Act, we see that in the case of the Bill, precisely the same information must be given in terms of the proposed subsection (8)(b). The Minister has to issue a certain certificate. What is this certificate in fact? This certificate states that an act has been done in good faith by the State President, the Minister, a member of the Defence Force in that he was commanded to do something. It is impossible in practice, in these circumstances where terrorists are active, to follow the normal procedure at all. Therefore, all that is being provided for here, is that the Minister must nevertheless provide certain information in these circumstances. He must also go further and certify that certain acts in fact took place. In my honest opinion, the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, is actually an amendment of the Inquests Act. This is what it really amounts to. It has nothing to do with section 5 which is under discussion now in this case. Therefore I think that one definitely cannot support his amendment.

Amendment put and the Committee divided.

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Dr. A. L. Boraine, Messrs. D. J. Dalling, R. M. de Villiers, C. W. Eglin, R. J. Lorimer, S. A. Pitman, H. H. Schwarz, Dr. F. van Z. Slabbert, Mrs. H. Suzman, and Messrs. H. E. J. van Rensburg and G. H. Waddell) appeared on one side,

Amendment declared negatived.

Clause agreed to (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause 12:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment which appears in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I want to motivate this briefly. The changes which are being made make it no longer necessary to define an area in the Gazette or in a manner which the hon. the Minister considers sufficient in the circumstances. I find the argument which the hon. the Minister advanced for defining an area in the Gazette, a valid one. In other words, I can understand his problem in respect of not wishing to publish in the Gazette for all and sundry, including the enemies of the country, to read exactly where this type of area is situated. On the other hand, in so far as people who transgress innocently are concerned, this creates a very serious problem. The problem is that when one photographs something which is not obviously a military area, such as a camp or barracks or a dockyard, or something which is obviously a military thing, then, unless it is designated that this is in fact a military area, a problem will be created for the public at large.

Mr. Chairman, I gave examples during Second Reading, pointing out that someone might be taking a photograph of flora or fauna in that particular area, and without knowing it, that person may be finding himself in a designated military area. One may even do this in respect of all sorts of other things, when one is quite innocent. I believe that one should not have an area affected if one does not designate that particular area. That, I believe, is a protection which the public needs.

Mr. Chairman, I regret that I cannot accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, because it negatives the whole clause. I do not understand how that hon. member expects us to demarcate the affected areas. By doing that, we will negative the whole intention as incorporated in this clause.

*I shall try to explain to the hon. member what will now happen in practice. With regard to clearly demarcated military areas, there are certain features which people who are at all in their right minds will not be able to overlook. However, as the hon. member has said, there may be cases where it is difficult to determine whether military activity is taking place and whether it is in a military area. In terms of this clause, we shall have the authority and the right to have a soldier or someone taking part in the operation inform such a person that he is in a military area or that military movements are taking place in the area and that he should not enter the area. That will be normal practice. Then if there are mischievous people in such an area trying to take photos, make sketches or anything of that nature, it will be possible to take action against them. It will be implemented in a sensible way because the S.A. Defence Force tries to win friends wherever it can. It will, therefore, be administered in that spirit. I therefore do not think it fair of the hon. member to make this suggestion because this defeats the purpose of the whole clause.

Mr. Chairman, I can see the problem that has been raised by the hon. member for Yeoville, but I have difficulty with the form in which he tries to meet it. There are problem areas, areas that give no indication to the casual passer-by that they have anything to do with defence. I take, for instance, a range. It could be a bombing range, an artillery range or any other range. Let us assume it is water. That is where my difficulty comes in with the wording, because, with due respect, I do not see how you can delineate a stretch of water unless you put buoys out to mark out its boundaries. Equally, many of those areas are only used on certain occasions, perhaps once or twice a year. I can see the difficulty which has been raised by the hon. member for Yeoville, but equally I can see, as does the hon. the Minister, the difficulty of clearly demarcating all such areas. It is difficult to think of exactly how one can do it, but there should be some sort of safeguard which could be introduced which, although it will not be a demarcation, clearly exposing what one may not want to have exposed, will, at the same time, prevent an innocent person from committing an offence. However sympathetic the SADF may be in regard to such a person, you cannot make a law and then say that because it is a bad law you will not prosecute, but be sympathetic. I wonder if there could not perhaps be introduced into this a proviso—I have not got the wording for it; it will have to be done in another place—whereby provision can be made, in respect of an area which is not obviously a military or defence area, for warning in some way a person who may be taking photographs. As the Minister has said, a soldier could go to such a person and say that there is a military exercise on the go and that he should not take photos. However, as it reads now, an innocent fisherman, for instance, on St. Lucia Lake could be doing no harm, but without knowing it, he could be committing an offence. He could be miles away from any military installation.

The other problem—it is not a serious problem, but it is a matter which I think one should raise in Committee—is that every soldier wants to take home a snapshot of his pals, group and so on. In terms of this clause, as it reads now, he will not be allowed to have a camera in camp, because there is no provision for an exemption to this. There is no proviso which says: “Unless authorized thereto by an officer designated for the purpose.” So technically no Pressman can ever enter military premises or barracks and take a photo, even with the permission of the Minister himself, because although he may have permission to go there, he will be contravening paragraph (b), because he has a camera or other apparatus in his possession. I can find no proviso whereby permission can be given. I wonder whether the hon. the Minister or his staff would not have a look at this clause, to see if these two things could be dealt with. Firstly, if in the case where it is not obviously a military area, some form of warning could be issued before prosecution and secondly if some proviso could be inserted whereby a commanding officer or designated officer could give permission for the carrying of a camera in approved circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, the difficulty raised by the hon. member for Durban Point is, in my opinion, covered fully by the preamble to the section which states very clearly—

This is also clearly covered by subsections (a) and (b). Consequently I cannot understand the problem of the hon. member for Durban Point. Exceptions can certainly be made. Authority can be granted by the Minister or, if he has delegated his authority, an officer may give permission in such a case for photographs to be taken.

Must the hon. the Minister, then, sign every time?

Permission need not necessarily be given by the hon. the Minister, but in general by way of delegation. I do not think there is any difficulty here. I think it is vital that this clause be inserted. It is clear that for security reasons we can today no longer advertise where military installations and military areas are in our country. What is more: Why would it be published in the Gazette? For this reason I believe in this instance that the Opposition must rely on the reasonableness of the Government and the military officials. Unnecessary action will not be taken against people in this instance if we know that the person concerned got caught in a trap innocently. I want to go so far as to say that the film will be removed from his camera and the camera will be given back to him, after which he will be allowed to go. I really do not think that we need get too technical about these minor matters. I also believe that under the present circumstances it is an essential clause for security reasons. We must insert it and retain it, because we must not advertise where our military areas and installations are situated.

Mr. Chairman, may I point out to the hon. member for Durban Point that the hon. member for Aliwal is quite right in stating that provision has already been made for that in the proviso. The Minister can and will delegate the powers, because surely it is quite impossible for the Minister personally to be everywhere where the Defence Force is. The proposed section 119(2) provides to a large extent that if a person has taken a photograph in all innocence and is caught, it is for the Chief of the Defence Force to decide whether to confiscate or return it. I take it that if a photo is taken of a tree, for example, and the photographer was unaware that it was a military area, he will return it to him. Any reasonable person would do so. Most Chiefs of the Defence Force that I have known, have been reasonable people. I think that the proposed new subsection (2) of section 119 makes provision for the very point raised by the hon. member.

Mr. Chairman, the difficulty one has is that here the net is being cast so wide that, unfortunately, innocent members of the public can be caught in it. The difficulty which the hon. the Minister should appreciate is that the person with evil intent, the person who is taking photographs of military installations in order to assist the enemy, will not openly be taking photographs; he will be creeping round the corner with miniature cameras and goodness knows what. The man who is going to be caught in this is the innocent fellow who takes his photographs innocently.

I have just explained what any reasonable man will do in such a case.

With respect, Sir, it is again a question of administrative discretion. It is not a question of the courts deciding, it is a question of discretion. For example, at every passing-out parade where youngsters get their commissions or stripes, proud parents come to the scene with cameras. Surely, in respect of such cases there has to be a blanket permission. When photographs are taken, for example of parades that take place in the streets, military equipment is photographed. We are casting a very wide net, in which the innocent members of the public will be caught, while the evildoers act in a different way. That is the dilemma of this wide net.

The other problem is that we actually have a section in which mens rea is not an essential ingredient of the offence. In other words, there need be no evil intent. All that has to happen, is that you can be taking a photograph, as innocent as a lamb, in the wrong place. If you carry a camera into the wrong place, you will be committing an offence and subjecting yourself to the confiscation of your camera. I do not see the difficulty in demarcating an area, because it is very easy to put up signs and it is very easy to warn people. I would say that in 99,9% of the cases there is no difficulty in demarcating an area. I see the necessity of protecting military installations in this form and I have no difficulty with that principle whatsoever. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, although every reasonable amendment would be acceptable, the innocent should also be protected.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Yeoville must have had a big fisherman somewhere in his ancestry, because his point about the casting of the net to catch innocent people, I really cannot understand. The hon. member for Yeoville raised the question about the innocent person that will be caught when taking a photograph. I do not know why the matter is now suddenly raised, when the Act is being amended, because paragraph (b) of section 119(1), before being amended, read as follows—

That is how it read. What has now been added is merely a description of what a military area is, and therefore I can see no difference in its application of it, except that the area is now not defined in the Gazette. The hon. member for Yeoville said that he no longer required it to be published in the Government Gazette, but at the same time he said that he wanted the area to be demarcated as such. He has, however, not indicated to the House how this area may be demarcated. As the hon. the Minister has indicated in his reply so far, there are some military areas which we do not wish to demarcate. We in these benches support the clause wholeheartedly.

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I cannot agree with the case put up by the member for Aliwal. He is quite right as far as subsection (1)(b) is concerned because this provides that the Minister can delegate authority to anybody in charge of a camp to allow cameras to be taken in. That, of course, is quite right. That also applies to subsection (2). As far as subsection (1)(a) is concerned, the Minister does not give authority for anybody to take photographs of a military camp, dockyard, installation or other premises or any land or area of water used for military or defence purposes or which is under military control, because the Minister or his authority may not be present when the photograph is taken or when the sketch is made, because it is not a defined area. The hon. member for Albany says that there is really no change, but in terms of the law, as it now stands, the area has not been defined by publication in the Gazette. I accept that notice or warning is desirable. Take St. Lucia. I am told that there is a range there, but how would anybody on the lake or the pastures know that there is a range? Surely it would be quite simple for the hon. the Minister to demarcate the area by putting up a notice. He does not have to say what it is, he merely has to state that the area is under military control. The public will then know that one must not take a photograph of it. One need not say what it is, for instance an ammunition dump or anything like that. Where the area is not defined, by a fence or otherwise, some warning should be given to the public. The hon. the Minister says that the person who trespasses unwittingly will be warned, but there may not be anybody to warn him at that time. I ask the hon. the Minister whether, if he cannot accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, he will not give some consideration to bringing about an amendment in the Other Place in order to meet our complaint in some way or another.

Mr. Chairman, notices would totally defeat the purpose of this clause. They are virtually an invitation to say: “Here is a military area and these are military installations.” What does such a person do then? He becomes curious. It is an issue of where there is smoke there is fire, and then he looks for the fire. I also want to reply to the hon. member for Yeoville. He referred to photographs of parades. I challenge him to show me where in this clause anything is said about a military parade. The clause only relates to military areas, barracks, etc. However, nothing is said about a parade taking place, and consequently there is nothing preventing the hon. member from taking a photograph of that.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Griqualand East has mentioned the question of ranges. When a range is in use, whether it is a land-based range or in the sea, it is clearly demarcated and notices are inserted in the local Press. Sometimes there are announcements also over the radio, particularly when it is a sea range and shipping has to keep out of the area. This is normal procedure, it is normal procedure under the Defence Act. The hon. member for Durban Point was right when he said that people did not take notice of the notices in the Press and announcement over the radio two years ago in regard to the range somewhere in False Bay and they had to leave the area pretty fast. The ranges are, however, demarcated when they are in use. I know that the ranges in my constituency are demarcated clearly and there are people at the gates who prevent people from going in. What other demarcation does one need for a range when it is in use?

Do you agree with us?

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Yeoville is so concerned about the few people or cameras or films that will come into conflict with, or be lost due to, the implementation of this clause. However, it would be better for this country were a thousand films to be needlessly lost due to the implementation of this clause, than for one person to be allowed to take a photograph which could be used by the enemies of South Africa. That is why we cannot even begin to consider deleting this clause and by so doing put the security of the Republic at risk.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to draw out the discussion unnecessarily, but I do just want to mention an example. Some time ago we had a large air display at Waterkloof. There were thousands upon thousands of people present.

All with cameras!

Yes, everyone arrived there with cameras. What we want to do, therefore, is to be able to tell people that they can take photographs at certain places but not at other places. We then leave it to the commanding officers to furnish the people with the necessary guidance. It is our experience that people co-operate very well on such occasions. However, there are certain sensitive areas where one does not want photographs to be taken. Then, too, there are of course other places which one does not want to proclaim as a military area by proclamation in the Gazette. That is our problem.

I accept that.

Good. This is a matter of growing importance in some areas, but I cannot imagine that anyone would take a person into custody or confiscate his equipment if he had taken a photo at an ordinary shooting range, in a little place like Laingsburg, for example. Surely that is not at issue. However, when an exercise takes place in an area in respect of which the Defence Force feels that people should perhaps not know in advance that such exercises are taking place, then in my opinion they can send someone under the new subsection (2) to prohibit people from taking photographs there. If the person concerned is sensible, he will not do so, and if he is acting with bad intent, his equipment may be confiscated by a member of the Defence Force. In other words, this provision is flexible, and under these circumstances hon. members must permit us to see how it works. The hon. member for Griqualand East asked me to take another look at the matter. I promise him that I shall ask the law advisers to discuss the matter again before the measure goes to the Other Place, on condition that we do not water down the restrictions now being imposed.

Mr. Chairman, with that undertaking in mind, we shall not ask for a division on the amendment.

Amendment negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Mr. Speaker, when the House adjourned yesterday I was dealing with the fact that servicemen doing service—and I am speaking in particular of those doing service on the border—should not be exposed to the danger of having civil legal proceedings brought against them while they are actually doing service. I made the point that this should not only apply to contractual matters, but also to matters of a different nature, for example actions arising from dealing. That covers the provisions in the proposed new section 2(1 )(a) and (b). If that principle is then accepted, it would, of course, be necessary to limit the proviso in the proposed new section 2(2) to some other form and to have a further amendment in that regard. However, if one looks at subsection (2)(a), the one matter which is significant is that, if a person receives his full salary or wages, he does not get any moratorium. If his employer pays him R1 less, however, he may be in a quite different position. In other words, that R1 can make all the difference. I can also happen that a soldier is promoted in the course of doing his service. In that case his situation changes overnight because the moment he gets his promotion, he will find that he is no longer protected. That is a problem which I think will have to be looked at again, both from the point of view of the creditor and from the point of view of the serving soldier.

Then I should like to deal with subsection 2(b)(ii), which reads—

I think this should apply not only to the citizen but also to the spouse of the citizen, because household necessaries in fact create a liability for the husband even if they are not bought at his special instance.

Then there is the problem that arises in respect of board or lodging, as is contained in subparagraph (iii). Exactly the same applies here: This should refer not only to the citizen’s board or lodging but also to that of his spouse. In subparagraph (iv), which deals with hire-purchase agreements, it is stated that if a citizen has failed to inform the other party to the agreement of his particular service conditions, he can be held responsible. I think it should be stipulated that he must have failed to inform them in writing, so that it cannot be alleged that that failure to inform the other party did not take place because that could give rise to a credibility issue between the creditor and the debtor as to whether in fact such notification had been given. I believe this subparagraph should be amended to the effect that such notification should be in writing.

I now wish to turn to paragraph (c). I believe that subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (c) should not simply refer to paragraph (b) in toto but should refer specifically to paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(iii) which relate to the rent of any dwelling-house, etc., and to board or lodging. Those are the matters relevant to paragraph (c)(ii) and I think that that provision should be altered accordingly.

The point concerning civil imprisonment, referred to in paragraph (c)(iii), has already been made and I need not repeat it. There is one final point I should like to raise. It has been said that the rate of interest applicable will now be 10% instead of 6%. I personally believe it is wrong to have a fixed rate of interest inserted in the Bill because conditions in respect of interest rates vary. I believe the hon. the Minister should have the right to alter the rate of interest without having to refer to Parliament first, because it may well be that in the future a rate of interest of 10% may be quite the wrong rate of interest to charge.

These are merely technical matters—this whole piece of legislation is really a technical matter. We have no objection to the principle of the Bill which fundamentally aims to protect serving soldiers from problems that arise while they are away on service as a result of which they are unable to attend to those problems. Therefore we shall support the Second Reading of the Bill.

Mr. Speaker, the principle that one who is serving in the Citizen Force or the commandos in defence of our country, should enjoy protection against civil proceedings instituted against him, is a principle with which no fault can be found and we wholeheartedly agree with it. We are also pleased that the Opposition parties support it. It is right and fair that this should be so. The fact that the Moratorium Act is being extended to include the police force as well, is fair and is also welcomed because in the times we are living in, police service is just as important as service in the Citizen Force or the commandos. On the other hand, however, the interests of our businessmen, for example the owners of flats, must be protected too. They, too, have certain obligations and therefore their interests cannot be ignored. If we do not protect them, I am afraid that we will find that in order to protect themselves they will discriminate against young people who are called up for national service. It may then happen, for example, that young people who fall into this category will find it difficult to obtain accommodation, because the people will be afraid to rent flats to these people or provide them with lodgings. Therefore there must be a balance between the steps taken to protect the interests of the person who is doing national service and those towards whom they have undertaken obligations. Of course it is not so easy to find this balance. However, I think that with this Bill we have come a long way towards finding that balance and the Bill can therefore be supported wholeheartedly.

The hon. member for Yeoville raised the point that no action whatsoever ought to be taken or permitted against a soldier who is doing border duty. This is a good idea, but once again one must look at it carefully because there is another side to the matter as well. There of course are also people in the business world who provide the young people with accommodation, as I said a moment ago. Now I want to ask the hon. member for Yeoville: Would he be prepared to provide accommodation for a man like this who was going to do border-duty for three months, six months or even longer, without making him pay immediately, or allowing him to pay at a later stage? If the person concerned does not pay him immediately for that period, will he be prepared to grant an extension for the payment for that period, while such a soldier is receiving his full salary as well as allowances in the meantime? It seems unfair to me, from the point of view of the person who provided the accommodation. Therefore I think that we must find the correct balance here, too, and that we should not be quite so concerned, because the soldier is not wholly without assistance in this case. The Act provides, inter alia, that the court has a discretion in all cases of this nature and that it can suspend any proceedings instituted against a soldier, if for example it is of the opinion that the soldier has not been treated correctly or fairly. I am convinced that the courts will not allow action to be taken against these people if they are not absolutely satisfied that the people had the opportunity to defend themselves and to put their case in court. If the soldier cannot do so, an extension will be granted until such time as he can.

However, I also read the following amazing thing in the unrevised speech of the hon. member for Yeoville, which he delivered on this point yesterday. Amongst other things he says—

Now, I wonder why the hon. member says something like this and then asks the hon. the Minister to take note of it. One is a little concerned as to whether he perhaps in sinuated here that the hon. the Minister did not provide correct information to the House in this regard.

You were not listening.

The hon. member may just as well tell us what he had in mind when he made that remark.

With these few words I should like to support the Bill wholeheartedly.

Mr. Speaker, I merely rise to lend our support to the Bill. We agree with the provisions contained therein and we think it is beneficial to the serving man.

Mr. Speaker, I thank hon. members for the approach they have displayed. I have something of a problem. For years we have tried to improve the Moratorium Act and attempts have been made in the House several times. If I remember correctly, the Moratorium Act came before a Select Committee which tried to improve it at one stage. In regard to the particular aspects which we are now dealing with in the Moratorium Bill, we have always been faced with the difficulty that an agreement could not be reached with a large number of the employers’ organizations. As a result of special steps taken by us, discussions were held last year with the South African Employers’ Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs. Discussions were also held with the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. Once the Bill had been formulated, it was made available to them once again and arising out of this we received correspondence in which they expressed their satisfaction with this formulation. Now I find myself in some difficulty. Up to this stage we have not been able to make any progress with regard to certain aspects of the Moratorium Bill due to the opposition we came up against. We have now eliminated that opposition by negotiation, and I do not believe that Parliament should now take it upon itself to undo an agreement reached between the people who are really affected. It seems to me as if anything of that kind would be foolish. It is an improvement and it complies with …

I agree!

It is an improvement. The hon. member for Yeoville concedes that. I believe that we all agree that it is an improvement. It is not the ideal situation, but to tamper with this matter now would mean that we should have to start negotiations all over again. I want to ask hon. member, since this is an improvement to the moratorium legislation—together with the other amendments which are now being effected, amendments which also cover the police and others, to wait and see how the legislation will work in the new circumstances. If it then becomes apparent that there are problems, we will go back to the employers and negotiate with them once again. So far they have been determined not to give in at all in regard to this aspect. Now we have achieved something, and I believe that, since we have achieved this improvement by means of an agreement, we must not try and change it, but should give it legal effect.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a Second Time.

Mr. Speaker, during the Second Reading debate, the hon. the Minister made certain references, and I wish to refer to the remarks he made in which he implied that this Bill would be a preliminary to the final consolidating Bill which he hoped to introduce—the final consolidating Bill to the 1928 Act. The hon. member for East London City, when he spoke following on the hon. the Minister’s speech, indicated his disappointment with what appeared to him to be numerous aspects—I think he quoted a number of 35 aspects—which were not actually dealt with in this Bill, but which had been under discussion, and many aspects of which were embodied in the initial Bill in 1928.

There were aspects which were of interest and of concern, both to members of the public, and to organizations. I submit that there were aspects which were not dealt with in this Bill. The hon. the Minister indicated that he had had consultations with various bodies; he specifically mentioned them and it is recorded in Hansard. He said he had had consultations with liquor interests, hotel associations, the Law Society, and he also indicated that, in so far as consumers were concerned, there had been no objections. My question to the hon. the Minister is whether the various churches were consulted. Did they offer their comments? What about the temperance associations? What about Sancadd itself, the S.A. National Council for Alcoholism and Drug Addiction? What about welfare organizations in general? I know reference was made in the hon. the Minister’s speech to the fact that he had consulted with the S.A. Indian Council. But that was in connection with one aspect of the Bill, regarding the availability of liquor at election time. It would seem to me that whatever consultation may have taken place with religious organizations, was not as far-reaching as it should have been. I want to quote from an article which appeared in The Tribune for 1976 of the S.A. Temperance Alliance. It is headed: “Alcoholism Investigation” and quotes part of the reply received when the alliance submitted representations about the amendment of the Liquor Act. In the letter which the hon. the Minister wrote to the alliance it is said—

I hope that when the hon. the Minister replies, he will indicate the extent of the “deep study and thorough investigation” which took place in that particular aspect of alcoholism and the consumption of liquor.

Another aspect which is not dealt with in this Bill, but which was apparently the subject of correspondence with the Minister—I will refer to it just now— concerns that of advertising. We know that in section 117 of the original Act No. 30 of 1928, provision is made for advertising. I know too—I recollect it very clearly—that in 1974 the hon. the Minister, when he introduced his Vote during the Committee Stage of the budget debate, indicated that he had accepted four norms by which he would judge advertisements in respect of alcoholic beverages. To me those norms appear to be reasonable, but it does not seem to me as if that particular system introduced by the Minister has fulfilled any positive useful purpose, because when I addressed a question to the hon. the Minister in 1976, he indicated that he had received only two complaints at that stage in respect of liquor advertisements. When one thinks—and these figures come from Sancadd itselves—that R9 million was spent in 1975 by the marketers of alcoholic beverages, then the system introduced by the hon. the Minister does not seem to have evoked the response or achieved the result which is desired. I want to refer to a letter which was sent to me, a copy of a letter sent to the Secretary for Justice in March 1976 in which the Christian citizenship department of the Methodist Church of South Africa made five suggestions to the hon. the Minister in regard to the Bill which was at that time a subject of consideration. The first suggestion was this—

I heard of an American visitor to South Africa recently who went to a cinema and was staggered and shocked by the type of advertising which appeared on the cinema screen, promoting a well-known brand of cane spirit.

The fourth point in the letter to the hon. the Minister to which I would like to refer reads—

This is a strange world we live in. I have here regulations concerning the marking of containers and the advertising of fertilizer. I believe these regulations in effect also apply to stock remedies, agricultural remedies, etc. When it comes to the marking of containers for a fertilizer, it is essential to list the composition of the elements of the fertilizer. I see nothing in this Bill in response to the request that the alcoholic content should be listed on the labels of alcoholic drinks.

Also interesting is that when it comes to advertising, six conditions are laid down in this recent Government Gazette, No. 5309 of 8 October 1976, and the final condition is this—

Mr. Speaker, in all seriousness, if it is necessary to have such restrictions with regard to the advertising of fertilizer, it is surely necessary to consider the manner in which alcohol is being advertised and promoted. I am not suggesting the prohibition of alcohol, but I am suggesting that in the case of medicines and foodstuffs certain controls exist which are patently absent when it comes to the use, abuse and the disposal of alcohol. I want briefly to refer to the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, No. 101 of 1965. Section 18 of that Act lays down conditions concerning both the labelling and the advertising of medicines. The Act also contains eight schedules which lay down very severe control over certain drugs which are considered harmful. As far as the marketing of any prescription drug is concerned, I would say that without exception every pamphlet concerning a prescription drug clearly contains the contra indications or any warnings. Even as far as the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act of 1972 is concerned, there is a prohibition on the sale, manufacture or importation of certain products in the case of foodstuffs, cosmetics and disinfectants.

I am not suggesting prohibition, but in all seriousness I suggest that alcoholism and the excessive consumption of liquor are a greater menace to South Africa than drug abuse. The South African Temperance Alliance claims that there are 350 000 alcoholics in South Africa, excluding Bantu. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he is prepared to stand aloof and allow this number to increase. I also want to point to the Department of Social Welfare. They are responsible for rehabilitation centres. The latest figures given to me at the beginning of this year show that of the over 1 000 inmates sent to rehabilitation centres during the previous year, more than 99% were committed for alcoholism and less than 1% for drug dependence. I had this brought home to me very realistically only this last weekend. I was telephoned by a woman and asked if I would accompany her to Werkgenot, the latest squatter camp beyond Modderdam. I went there and I saw the squalor and the shacks among the sand hills, and one of the first things that struck me was the sound of music. It came from portable transistor radios. The people were listening to Radio Bantu. I thought it was a good thing that in this area of squalid desolation they at least had Radio Bantu to which they could listen for entertainment. Then my mind was brought back to reality, for Radio Bantu is a commercial service, and I heard for myself that it advertises alcoholic beverages. It was not long before I saw what effect that advertising could have. It was a Saturday afternoon. The men were at home with nothing to do. There was no relaxation and no recreation for them. They were either standing or sitting around in groups. There were many empty cartons of Bantu beer, as well as many bottles of beer of a kind which members in this House are accustomed to consume. There was also, in the particular shack that I was directed to, an empty bottle of a well-known make of brandy on the table, and under the bed were six empty quarts of a well-known brew of beer. I believe these people have very little to live for. They listen to the radio; they are influenced by the advertising which is given over the radio, and I believe that we as legislators in South Africa have á duty to see that the State itself does not participate in such form of advertising. If free enterprise wishes to do so, I believe it should be done on a prescribed basis. To me it is unforgivable that the State itself should condone State sponsored organizations such as the SABC and the SATV allowing such practices to continue.

I ask the hon. the Minister if he will not give serious consideration to the matter in view of the fact that we are going to have commercialized television shortly. As I understand it, there is a suggestion that at least wine and beer will be promoted on the television commercial section. In passing I want to mention that when it comes to a comparison between drink and drugs, I did not detect one sniff of dagga in the whole of my visit to that squalid place, and I know what dagga smells like.

How do you know the smell of dagga?

I have some experience of the smell of dagga, but only the smell. Therefore, I appeal earnestly to the hon. the Minister for more effective control over advertising in order to limit the abuse and over-indulgence of liquor and to use his influence to ensure that no advertising of liquor is propagated on the SABC or on the SATV. We would not be unique in this position. There are other countries in the world which exercise such control, so we would be following their example. Another thing I should like to submit to the hon. the Minister is that even in this country, in terms of Act No. 41 of 1971, the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act, alcohol is defined as a dependence-producing substance. Therefore, I believe that the combating of the abuse of liquor should be a major commitment of all of us and that the hon. the Minister of Justice should play his part in any legislation to which he puts his pen in the final instance.

Another matter which I want to bring to the hon. the Minister’s attention is in connection with inspections. In clause 108 on page 166 of the Bill, provision is made for the designation of certain inspectors. The hon. the Minister indicated in his Second Reading speech that these inspectors would, in part, supplement or replace the functions hitherto carried out by the S.A. Police. These people will be designated and it states clearly that they “shall, on demand” exhibit a certificate of their appointment whenever they carry out duties as described under the Act. During the Committee Stage this side of the House will move an amendment which does not affect the rights of the inspector, but in my opinion, protects the public and publicans from any possible form of abuse, from the threat of fraud and from the threat of intimidation, because a man may demand his rights and demand that the inspector shows his bona fides and produces his certificate. This action, harmless in itself, may create a breakdown in the relations between the inspector and the person being inspected. I want to point out to the hon. the Minister that this system of laying down that an inspector shall identify himself before he carries out his duties, has been proven to operate successfully in South Africa for a number of years. I can give a few examples to prove to the hon. the Minister that there are other departments which have accepted and which operate on this basis. The Plant Improvement Act, the Abattoir Industry Act, the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act, the Hazardous Substances Act and the Dental Mechanicians Act all contain such provisions. There are others as well, and I appeal to the hon. the Minister, on the basis of the fact that this is not a new suggestion which is unproved and untried, to give serious consideration to the amendment which has been put on the Order Paper in the name of my hon. colleague, the member for East London City.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened to the hon. member for Berea, and it is very clear that he considers the question of alcoholism in a very serious light. I want to tell him that this side of the House is no less concerned about the incidence of alcoholism. It is an evil, and it must be combated. The best way to combat it would, of course, be to exercise adequate control, at least as far as the provision of liquor is concerned. This is what we are occupied with at the moment, namely, with defining the Act in such a way that we are selling a commodity, a commodity which, in reality, is in general demand, but which can also be abused. Consequently, I think that it is a good thing that we have this particular Act, for since the Act was placed on the Statute Book for the first time in 1927, many changes have occurred in our society. The hon. member said that the composition of fertilizer is indicated on the bags. This is correct, because, as the hon. members know, one finds fertilizer of differing, chemical compositions and combinations, and a farmer would like to know what he is buying. The position with alcohol, however, is somewhat different. If a person buys alcohol, he knows that the contents of that bottle contain alcohol and he will realize that there is a certain prescribed cubic measure of alcohol for certain types of liquor. Consequently, I cannot fully agree with the hon. member when he draws a comparison between fertilizer and liquor. As far as the squatters’ camps are concerned, I must agree …

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. member how the average citizen is supposed to know what “Happy Cow” or “Kansas City” or “Monte Carlo Baby Duck” stand for?

The hon. member seems to know more about it than I do. I do not know what they contain. However, I do want to say that the average man does not simply pour anything down his throat. He will not drink anything that he is not familiar with. Tastes develop, and one becomes familiar with what one drinks. That hon. member will possibly not know this and I shall therefore give him the benefit of the doubt as to whether he knows that a man develops a taste for what he drinks. However, I believe that this is normally the case.

But let me return to the squatters’ camps. I want to agree with the hon. member for Berea, that one comes across tremendous abuse of liquor particularly in squatters’ camps. This is one evil which I want to mention. One can only combat that evil by removing squatters’ camps and by establishing areas which one can control properly.

I have now strayed from the Bill a little, and I should like to return to it. We have here a Bill which is bulky and comprehensive and which testifies to the sophistication of society’s demands and of the tastes which have developed. We all know that liquor is a normal consumer item in our society, but I believe that in this amendment we must weigh the conviviality which can be generated by liquor against the disadvantages which are associated with it. In other words, we must attempt to maintain a balance between the provision and the sale of liquor and we must also comply with the demands of an upright community as far as its proper use is concerned. I now want to consider a few aspects of this legislation which, in my opinion, are good, and I then want to attempt to reply to certain questions. We observe from the third schedule of the legislation that the licence fees which must be paid by liquor suppliers, have almost doubled since 1963. In other words, more money is being demanded and a person will therefore protect his greater financial interests more effectively by acting more responsibly within the stipulations of the law. In that sense, better control is, of course, being implemented in a way which, in reality, is not being directly enforced by the legislation. However, the person will have to keep within the framework of the legislation to a greater extent, because his interest in it in the form of the annual licence fees is greater. On the other hand, this measure also has an advantage in the sense that the licences will from now on be granted automatically unless some or other offence is committed which makes it necessary for the licence to be suspended. In compensation for the higher licence fees, longer opening hours have been granted in certain cases and we also note that the period of prescription has been extended which will result in fewer bad debts for the person running the business. Consequently, there are checks and balances from start to finish because something is given here and something is taken there to ensure that we are able to exercise better control.

When one considers the spirit of the amendment Bill, one sees that liquor, in reality, is being made more accessible to the other race groups, the other peoples in this country, with the necessary protection and control, of course. This is being done precisely because our other population groups, the Coloured peoples in this country, have become more sophisticated under the policy of the NP and have developed specific tastes which they, as citizens and inhabitants, also have the right to satisfy. So we find that Asiatics and Coloureds may sell liquor under a defined authority and that the hon. Minister may authorize any person to sell drink to any Bantu, as defined under conditions. In this respect, the courtesy is thus being extended to the other population groups in this country with the necessary control—and I must stress this—in order to prevent alcoholism and cases of abuse, as far as is humanly possible by way of legislation. Of course, there are certain aspects of control which are being retained and which can in no way be departed from. I do not want to repeat this point too many times, but I want to say that election days will have to remain closed days. There is another side to this, however, and that is that we rate the stature and the importance of the representative bodies of the Coloureds and Asiatics, highly. It is not simply a question of a prohibition; it is also an indication of our opinion of the stature of these bodies. However, it does not detract from the provision of liquor as such, except in cases where it is absolutely necessary.

There is a second aspect which I should like to mention. The 56 licencing boards are being done away with and time-saving will result. There will be different sitting times in each province, and there will be advantages in the sense that no time will be wasted on renewals and local interest will begin to play an ever diminishing role.

I now turn to the third point which I want to mention. A new application for a licence will be considered at an open sitting of the board. What is very important for the lawyers, is that a record of the proceedings will be kept. Just as important for the protection of the person who is applying for a licence, is the fact that reasons must now be furnished if there is an adjudication in connection with any point of law, or if any rights are suspended. In my opinion, this is, in fact, as far as one can take the “rule of law”. Of course, there is also an appeal to the Minister in certain circumstances, as well as review by the Supreme Court, wherever necessary.

The hon. member for Durban Point had certain problems with special meetings which were either prohibited or permitted. I want to point out to him, however, that the procedure in respect of the problems which he mentioned, is as follows. If one makes an application for a special meeting under clause 14(1 )(a), it is naturally left to the discretion of the chairman to refuse that application for a special meeting. However, there cannot be a court order which compels him to convene a meeting because revision may only be asked for if a person is dissatisfied with the “proceedings” which took place. Consequently, where there was no hearing, there were naturally no “proceedings”, and there is no reason whatsoever for any review. Therefore, the spirit of the legislation is in no way ambiguous; it is clear and consistent. There is nothing in respect of that aspect which is inconsistent.

The hon. member for Walmer discussed an “automatic right of appeal”, if I remember rightly. In my opinion, however, those hon. gentlemen are making a basic mistake. Their mistake lies in the fact that they accept that one is entitled to be awarded a liquor licence. In no way is a person entitled to it. It is a concession on the part of the State. It is comparable to a licence to drive a motor vehicle, or to a firearms licence.

I did not say an “automatic right of appeal”.

Then I must have misunderstood you.

*In any event, the fact of the matter remains the same. One must approach the legislation as a whole with consideration for the fact that it is a concession to obtain a liquor licence and that there is no obligation on the part of the State to provide it.

A very important concession in this regard is that there may be rejection of an application as a result of deficiencies in applications. How often has it not happened in practice that a person takes out a lease which he must pay off monthly. However, when it comes to the hearing of the application, there is a minor technical error, and the whole application, which involves great financial loss, must be rejected at that stage and not given a hearing. One could continue in this way to mention points of improvement which the legislation introduces in order to comply more fully with the requirements which we as a community expect from it. However, I think we have mentioned enough examples—and I think that all the hon. members will agree with me—to indicate that this is good legislation. There is no doubt that it is bulky, but that was necessary at this juncture. For this reason, I should very much like to support the improvements and the changes in this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member, who has just resumed his seat, correctly said that in the provision of liquor regard must be had to the reasonable requirements of a civilized community. Perhaps this is an opportune hour of the day to raise with the hon. the Minister a matter in respect of which I believe that the Bill before us is not fulfilling that particular need. In terms of clause 102 of the Bill, which amends section 114bis of the principal Act, the existing requirements of the holder of a wine and malt licence and now of a wine-house licence remain unchanged. It is required of such a licenceholder that he should not only stock but also prominently display wines from eight different producers or manufacturers and malt liquor from seven brewers, which I believe is the total number of brewers in operation in the Republic. In 1975, when this amendment to the Liquor Act was first introduced by the hon. the Minister, the motivation for this was that wine lists have become standardized with very few variations and that only a limited number of the 400 proprietary brands of South African wines were being made available to the public in hotels and restaurants. It was felt that only products of a certain manufacturer were carried with the result that, although there were no longer tie-agreements, there was the semblance of a monopoly as far as those particular outlets were concerned.

These considerations may well be valid for the higher-graded hotels, but I think that the validity of this can be queried in respect of restaurants, particularly the smaller restaurants. One can imagine a small restaurant applying for a wine and malt licence for the convenience of its customers, its patrons, from the civilized section of the community and then finding that it has to provide storage for the variety of wines and malt liquors which it has to carry. One can imagine the refrigeration space required. If a restaurant has to carry eight different proprietary brands of white wine, one imagines the refrigeration space required would have to be extensive to keep the necessary number of bottles on ice to meet the demands of the customers or patrons. There is also the question of increased staff and, generally, of the increased costs involved in running such an organization. I believe that under the present system the small restaurants—I am not talking about the small café-type restaurant—the restaurants which serve a reasonable variety of food of a reasonable standard and at reasonable prices in these times, find it extremely difficult to cope because the customers of such restaurants invariably bring their own wine or liquor with them. I still have to find the host of a small party who can accurately gauge what the requirements will be for the ensuing dinner party he is having in a restaurant. He has usually brought either too much or too little, and if there is too little this causes great embarrassment to the proprietor who is then cajoled into lending a bottle so that the party can end in the proper spirit.

I believe that this could all be rectified and I believe that the time has come for our laws to be amended to provide for a licence in terms of which the proprietor is entitled to serve a range of house wines. That is to say, he should be entitled to serve a dry and off-dry white wine and a red wine, which will not be sold as proprietary brands but by the glass or by the carafé. I think that throughout the Western World one is able to buy wine on this basis. In my opinion this would have a twofold advantage. Certainly, it would be an advantage to the producer who could then supply wine in a cask or some other container which could conveniently be stored by the proprietor. As regards the patron, it would relieve the problem of his having to buy and bring his own wine to the restaurant he intends visiting. Therefore the benefit to the patron would be one of convenience. I believe it would also be a benefit to the patron in that the cost of buying wine on that basis would be considerably lower than the cost involved in buying proprietary brands and perhaps purchasing more than is required. I would urge the hon. the Minister to give consideration to this. It is a matter which, I believe, could be considered by the Select Committee, should this Bill be referred to a Select Committee. If this system could be introduced, it would, as I have said, be to the advantage of both the producer and the general public who patronize this type of restaurant.

Mr. Speaker, there are just three matters which I should like to raise and to which I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention in connection with this Bill. The first concerns clause 88 on page 136 of the Bill. That clause amends section l00sex of the principal Act. At present the principal Act provides that special authority can be granted to Coloured or Indian people in an association of not less than 20 members. I have had a lot of very earnest representations from Indian hoteliers in particular and from legal practitioners in regard to the proposed amendment to this provision. It is now proposed that the stipulation that an association should comprise at least 20 members should fall away. The result of this is that a very small on-consumption business can now be granted an on-sales and off-sales privilege. A one-man business can now get such a privilege. As I understand the original provision, the reason for incorporating it was to enable Indians to trade with their own people on the expectation that premises would eventually be converted into hotels. In this way an association of not less than 20 members could put up a block of flats which could eventually be converted into an hotel. In terms of the amendment, which does away with the condition that a minimum of 20 people should be involved, it is possible to open a small tea-room for example, and to get on-consumption authority and then to get off-sales privileges. This is not fatuous; it in fact happens quite regularly in Durban. I have made enquiries and learnt that there have been 16 special authorities granted in terms of section l00sex. I have the relevant names here, but I do not intend to read them all out at this stage. These restaurants—Hill-top, Regal, Aquarius, Silver Streams, and others—are restaurants which have on-sale and off-sale facilities; they are near to hotels and have made a serious inroad into the business of Indian hotels in Natal. The position then is that Indian hoteliers who spend R½ million putting up hotels—there have been a number in that area recently such as Asoka Hotel, etc.—immediately face competition from people with very small businesses and people whose capital outlay was infinitesimal. In addition, these are people who never intend to put up any kind of hotel. So my suggestion is—and I earnestly request the hon. the Minister to give it his serious consideration—is that what should happen is that Indians, at any rate, in regard to section l00sex, or the amending clause 88, should be left entirely out of the clause. My suggestion is that they should be in exactly the same position as any White person applying for a licence under section 31 of the Act.

The second matter to which I would like to refer is clause 70, on page 114 of the Bill. In terms of this clause, which amends the original section 81, only White hotels can become known—and I use a colloquial phrase—multi-racial hotels. It is only White hotels that can cater for Whites and non-Whites if they satisfy certain requirements. Indian and Asian hotels cannot apply to become multi-racial hotels. In Natal, the province from which I come, practitioners and Indians have brought to my attention that in the past the position was that Indian hotels, for example in Pietermaritzburg, used to apply to the magistrate or to the National Liquor Board for permission to allow Whites on occasions on their premises, for instance at Christmas time when Indians working in the shoe-industry in Pietermaritzburg would want to entertain the White directors. They would be granted permission to do so. As the law now stands, they are unable to do that. Pietermaritzburg now has a multi-racial hotel—Capital Towers—and they have been told that Indian hotels will no longer be allowed to have Whites on their premises at any time. I therefore ask the hon. the Minister to reconsider that provision and to give his consideration to the term multi-racial hotel applying to hotels not only in White areas.

The third point that I want to raise is with regard to clause 12, which inserts, inter alia, the new section 24. In terms of this, when the Liquor Board dismisses an application for a licence or dismisses an application for a written authority, it is not required to give reasons, except on questions of law or except when it cancels, withdraws or suspends a licence. It does not have to give any reasons for rejecting an initial application. I want to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the fact that section 31 has been amended so that it now provides that the Minister can refuse a licence for any reason which, in his opinion, is proper to take into account. That is an amendment which extends the grounds for the Minister being allowed to refuse licences. It widens the power of the Minister in that he can now reject it for any reason whatsoever, whereas before the reasons were set out.

Not for any reason. Just read that again.

I pointed out a few minutes ago that it was for any reasons which it was proper for him to take into account.

That is different.

With respect, that means any reason whatsoever which the Minister regards as being proper to take into account. I am not criticizing that provision; all I am saying in that connection is that it extends the ambit of the reasons for which he can refuse an application. Now the point is that the applicant does not know why his licence has been refused. I want to point out to the hon. the Minister that I happened to be looking through two Bills which have been introduced by the Minister of Agriculture, Bills which are to be discussed in this House during the next few weeks. In those Bills the Minister has amended the law the other way. He is amending the law to provide that where applications are refused, reasons should be given. That is all I want the hon. the Minister of Justice to do in this case. It is onerous upon an applicant, because one must remember that when one applies for a liquor licence it is not like before a civil court; one does not get the matter decided, it is not res judicata. Once a matter is res judicata in a civil court, it is over. However, what applicants for liquor licences do—and I personally have had plenty of experience appearing for applicants—is that they apply, they do not get the reasons if they are refused and they go on and on applying because they do not know why their applications have been refused. It very often happens that they spend a fortune on applications, or they spend a fortune on their premises in an effort to get a liquor licence, without knowing what the reason is for the refusal. The tendency has been in the past to give reasons where it was a technical reason or a formal reason, but not when it was a substantial reason. I recall a case where we went on review to the Supreme Court. In that case a reason was given, because we had gone on review, and the reason was that a certain portion of the building did not have the measurements set out on the plan. It was then pointed out that it was not part of the building at all, but was a counter. Eventually we succeeded. But we were lucky to get reasons in that case. I am just giving an example of how necessary the giving of reasons are.

Finally, the hon. the Minister will be aware of the A1 ice-cream case against the Pretoria North town council. In that case the court held that where reasons were not given, it gave rise to an inference that the board was arbitrary. This case was cited in Behr v. Oberholzer Liquor Licencing Board and I suggest that what we are doing here is enshrining that principle. We are saying that reasons are not necessary and it gives rise to some sort of suggestion of arbitrariness. I suggest that in the absence of reasons there is an element of a lack of bona fides.