National Assembly - 10 May 2000
WEDNESDAY, 10 MAY 2000 __
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
____
The House met at 15:10.
The Speaker took the Chair and requested members to observe a moment of silence for prayers or meditation.
ANNOUNCEMENTS, TABLINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS - see col 000.
ALLOCATION OF SPEAKING TIMES
(Draft Resolution)
The CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY: Madam Speaker, I move the draft resolution printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows:
That, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 106, the following times be allocated to parties for comment on the statement by the President on the Democratic Republic of Congo:
President: 20 minutes; African National Congress: 5 minutes; Democratic
Party: 4 minutes; Inkatha Freedom Party: 4 minutes; New National Party:
3 minutes; United Democratic Movement: 3 minutes; all other parties: 2
minutes each.
Agreed to.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
(Statement)
The PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC: Madam Speaker, hon members, I hope this will not take 20 minutes. I do not think it requires 20 minutes.
As hon members are aware, we have been involved with the issue of the Congo from the time that an armed uprising began in that country, aimed at that time against President Mobutu and his government. What we sought to achieve, at that time, was as smooth and as nondestructive a process of change in the Congo as was possible.
We continued to be involved with this issue when the current military conflict began. Our Foreign Minister and Defence Minister, at the time, went to the Congo to discuss with President Kabila and his government our view that it was necessary to intervene to stop the outbreak of the war. However, by that time it was clear that some troops had already been deployed in the Congo and that war could, indeed, not be stopped then.
We continued with our engagement with regard to this matter to seek a negotiated resolution of the conflict. As a consequence of that, extensive work was carried out. Many bilateral meetings were held with everybody who was engaged in that conflict to encourage the adoption of a peace plan, which was ultimately adopted in Lusaka in July 1999. Hon members will remember that even after the adoption of that plan, and its signature by the heads of states in Lusaka, there was still an outstanding problem: not all of the rebel organisations had signed. Therefore there was the problem that the plan could not be implemented, because not all the belligerents had signed it.
Once again we were asked to intervene to help to resolve this matter. Again, hon members will remember the period when our Foreign Minister had to fly to Kisangani, Goma, Rwanda and other places, in order to secure the signatures and adherence of all the rebel groups to the Lusaka agreement, which was achieved. In consequence of that, we committed ourselves to the implementation of the peace plan and to contribute whatever we could, as a country, to ensure that what was agreed to in Lusaka by everybody was, indeed, implemented this time. Again, I think hon members will remember that the peace plan was also witnessed and supported by SADC, the Organisation for African Unity and the United Nations. Because we were not belligerents, we were not signatories to this agreement.
Since it was signed, we have continuously been engaged in a process of encouraging all of the signatories to the agreement, in fact, to implement the agreement, as a consequence of which, when it was clear by the end of last year that there were problems in this regard, once more we approached all of the belligerents and the organisations that had witnessed and supported this, that is the UN, the OAU and SADC, with a proposal that they needed to get together, among other things, to review the timeframes which had been agreed in July 1999. Clearly, we had exceeded the deadlines that had been set in that agreement. As a consequence of our representation a meeting of the belligerents did indeed take place and they have shifted those timeframes.
The matter of our own contribution to the implementation of this agreement remained, of course, and no movement could take place with regard to that matter until, indeed, the agreement itself was implemented. At the recent meeting of the African countries and the EU in Cairo, President Kabila approached us and asked us to intervene, because once more this process was not moving as fast as it should have. He asked us to intervene in this matter to try to assist in expediting the implementation of the agreement; hence the meeting that took place in Algiers, since we had agreed that it would be useful if we could get the chairperson of the OAU, the President of Algeria, as well as other people, including the Secretary-General of the OAU, the special representative to the Congo of the UN Secretary-General, the chairpersons of Ecowas and SADC, President Obasanjo of Nigeria and ourselves, and President Kabila of course.
We therefore met in Algiers, reviewed the matter of the implementation of the agreement, looked at the obstacles with regard to the implementation of the agreement and came to a variety of decisions. The secretary-general’s representative at the meeting pointed out that what was required in terms of UN monitors was a group of four battalions that needed to be deployed. This immediately indicated that some technical work would need to be done to enable that deployment to take place. In that context we said that we had indicated our own readiness to contribute to the implementation of that plan, and therefore would be ready to make a contribution with regard to that particular matter.
We have since received, from the Secretary-General of the UN, the details of the kind of force that they would need, which would deal with matters such as logistics and communication, which, as I said, would then enable these four battalions to be deployed. We are working on that particular matter, together with the UN, and therefore will supply these troops which are not part of the four battalions that will be deployed, but more of a headquarters group that will enable the support to the UN to ensure that those infantry groups that will be playing the role of monitor are able to function properly. As I said, we are working on that particular matter now with the UN to ensure that we are able to move forward that process of the implementation of the UN plan with regard to the military matters of the Lusaka agreement, the elements of that agreement which deal with the military.
Of course, we are also in contact with President Masire of Botswana, who was chosen to facilitate the internal political discussions in the Congo. Problems have arisen with regard to that too. That matter was again discussed in Algeria, in the presence of President Masire, and some decisions were taken to expedite that particular question. We are convinced that it will be possible to move this process forward, indeed to achieve the objectives that were visualised in the Lusaka agreement concerning the military and political objectives.
We have remained disengaged with the issue of the Democratic Republic of Congo because we believe that it is a strategically important African country from many points of view. It has one of the largest concentrations of people on the continent. Everybody is very familiar with the resources this country has and the potential that it has for development, impacting positively, both on its own people and more widely on the African continent. It also shares borders with nine African countries and it is therefore quite clear that peace and development in the Democratic Republic of Congo would have a positive impact on a large part of our continent.
As I was saying, we are convinced that it is possible to move forward more speedily with the implementation of the Lusaka agreement. We will contribute in the manner that I have indicated, of course, coming back to Parliament to fulfil the obligations with regard to the deployment of our forces outside.
The last thing I would like to say in this context is that, of course, the operation will be financed by the United Nations. I hope all of us as South Africans would want to support this because, as will become clear as we discuss other matters this afternoon, this issue of peace and stability, democracy and development in the Congo is very, very directly relevant to our own success with regard to the achievement of those objectives. [Applause.]
The LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION: Madam Speaker, Mr President, it is quite clear that South Africa finds itself in a very rough neighbourhood, with crises in the Congo, which the President has spelt out this afternoon, civil war in Angola, instability in Zimbabwe and unease in Namibia.
However, in respect of the Congo, unlike in Zimbabwe, I believe that the South African Government has a clear, correct and consistent policy. In the Congo we are on the right side as well, because we are on the side of peace and the furtherance of democracy. As Foreign Affairs Minister Zuma has said on many occasions, we should not seek political solutions via military means. I am sure that is the correct approach.
Only this week, in respect of United Nations’ missions in peacekeeping, the experience of the United Nations’ assistance mission in Sierra Leone is instructive. There 500 United Nations peacekeepers have been taken hostage by so-called loyalist rebels. This obviously illustrates the extreme danger of joining a mission to the DRC, even in the very conditional circumstances which the President has outlined.
In the case of the Congo - and I think perhaps the most important element there is the human misery that has been suffered by the population for many years - one has a vast country, harsh climate, poor infrastructure and a history of hostility and belligerence. This indeed could be one of the toughest support missions for peacekeeping ever undertaken by the United Nations. It may also be, in the words of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, and I quote:
… the United Nations’ last chance to prove it can get peacekeeping right.
The DP will support the deployment of the SANDF in the peace-support operations in the DRC, subject to very stringent conditions, and it would be very helpful if the President or the Government could respond to this at some stage in the future. Firstly, regarding a clearly defined mission, South African troops should only be used to protect and advance UN observers. The President has spoken about the initial mission which will be a headquarters group. It will obviously develop from there.
We obviously accept his reassurance that Parliament will be consulted every step of the way, and we can engage further at that time. But whatever we do and however strong or weak our involvement might be, we obviously need a clear entry and exit timeframe. We need resources, training and a budget - even if one is supported by the United Nations - which is going to allow us to complete this mission, whatever its extent might be, in a reasonable fashion. We obviously need the consent of the signatories to the Lusaka ceasefire agreement - which is obviously assumed in his statement - and reasonable assurances for the safety of members of the SANDF.
In other words, I do not believe we should go for a blank cheque. It should be crossed and not negotiable on South Africa’s extent of commitment and the clarity of our objectives in the Democratic Republic of Congo. If any kind of sustained conflict occurs between the United Nations troops and even our support group and the belligerents in the Congo, we should effect an immediate withdrawal of our troops, because the alternative would then be a prolonged and intractable involvement in what could become a Vietnam- style conflict.
Therefore we do not support the possibility of South African troops being sucked into a full-scale, phase-three, peace-enforcement role. The ceasefire agreement that the President alluded to, signed in Lusaka in July 1999, envisages peace-enforcement operations to include tracking down and disarming armed groups, screening mass killers and handing over suspected war criminals to the international crimes tribunal in Rwanda. This could, indeed, be a very extensive mission and we are looking forward to hearing further particulars of South Africa’s involvement.
The MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES: Madam Speaker, Mr President, Deputy President, Ministers and hon members, Howard Wolpe, the United States special envoy to the Great Lakes region, said this about the crisis in that region, which also includes the Democratic Republic of Congo. I quote:
The most widespread interstate war in modern African history has significant consequences, not only for the 50 million Congolese, but for the peoples of all nine countries on the Democratic Republic of Congo’s periphery. From the perspective of the United States, resolution of the conflict in the DRC is essential if the vision of an African political and economic renewal, articulated by South African President Mbeki and embraced by President Clinton, is to be realised. The argument here is for the implementation of the core elements of the Lusaka agreement, which we continue to support, and we believe that these elements are fundamental to a lasting resolution of the conflict in the DRC and its neighbours.
The Lusaka accord, firstly, seeks to affirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of all the surrounding states - a view shared by all Lusaka signatories, as this provision eventually wants to see the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congolese soil. Secondly, the Lusaka agreement seeks a dual approach to end the conflict in the DRC and the region, that is a neutral facilitation of inclusive inter-Congolese political negotiations and a multilateral interstate political intervention.
Thirdly, the Lusaka accord seeks a centre-periphery approach to the Great Lakes question. In this way, it is able to commit its signatories to co- operate in addressing the common security concerns, not only of the DRC, but also those that underlie the Great Lakes crisis. Fourthly and lastly, the Lusaka agreement imposes the ceasefire agreement which must commit its signatories to work jointly to address other regional problems such as the activities identified with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
These principles, in their accepted elaborate form, should provide a strong guidance to any pending United Nations intervention in the DRC. For this reason, the IFP supports the decision to involve South Africa in the UN plan in the manner outlined by the President this afternoon.
Mr M C J VAN SCHALKWYK: Madam Speaker, there are two ways for troop involvement in an attempt to settle a military conflict like that in the DRC. In terms of Chapter 7 of the UN charter, it can be active military operations with everything that that entails. In terms of Chapter 6, military involvement can only be in a supporting and monitoring role, excluding active military operations. The first option was already described by our own head of the Defence Force as ``a crazy notion’’. We concur with that view.
The second option, a supporting and monitoring role, is something that should be considered under certain circumstances. Firstly, the will to make peace must be present. There is, at the moment, no such will in the DRC - quite the opposite. Secondly, it must be clear who will fund the operation. We have learned the hard way in South Africa - the Minister of Defence can testify to that - that we are picking up the tab of other military operations done in the name of other organisations and where the South African military was involved. We appreciate the assurance that the President gave this afternoon.
Thirdly, there must be a clear timeframe for the withdrawal of the other foreign troops fighting their own wars in the Congo. Some foreign armies in the Congo seem to lack that commitment. Fourthly, we must know exactly when our troops will withdraw - either when they have fulfilled their duty or when the risks become too high for them and they are drawn into military conflict.
It seems to me that the Lusaka accord is not a proper basis for the involvement of a supporting military force, because of the following reasons. Clause 22 of the Lusaka accord makes provision for active military operation and the disarming of participating armies. This will inevitably mean, no matter what we say now, that we may be drawn into active military operations and conflict. On top of that, not all the armed groups involved in the war in the DRC are party to the Lusaka accord.
Unless these issues are resolved - and the President has given assurances with regard to some of them - it is ill-advised to send our troops to the DRC. I call on the President - we trust him and the country puts its trust in him - to make sure that our troops do not become the victims of military adventures. [Applause.]
Mr B H HOLOMISA: Madam Speaker, hon President, Deputy President and hon members, the UDM can only support our troops’ involvement in peacekeeping after the following conditions have been satisfied. First, the Algerian summit was not representative because not all the parties to the conflict were represented, and therefore the resolutions of that summit do not carry the mandate of all the belligerents. [Interjections.] Therefore, in the implementation of the UN and Lusaka resolutions, it is necessary for the Security Council team touring Africa to seriously consider convening a fully representative summit in order to legitimise the resolutions on a peacekeeping force, and that a cessation of hostilities is addressed at such a summit.
Weapons of South African origin, which were sold to Uganda and Rwanda - confirmed from this podium by the Government’s representative - and which are presently deployed in the DRC, and the South African personnel called mercenaries operating them, must be withdrawn forthwith. Thirdly … [Interjections.] It is your Government which sold the weapons to them! [Interjections.] The money in the possession of Minister Terror Lekota - which he admitted in this House last month to having received from some of the belligerents for the purchase of weapons - must be handed over to the UN Security Council. The aforegoing would restore our credibility and enhance our competence to participate in a peacekeeping endeavour.
The UDM undertakes to verify with other stakeholders their position in these discussions in order to facilitate consistency. We would suggest that other political parties in this House do the same.
Finally, Government and this House have a moral and legal obligation to make sure that our troops are aware of the facts in the areas of their intended operation, and take the necessary safeguards for their protection.
Amalungu evile. Akunjalo? [Kwaqhwatywa.] [Members have heard. Is it not so? [Applause.]
Adv Z L MADASA: Madam Speaker, Mr President, there is no DRC conflict. [Interjections.] The DRC conflict is …
The SPEAKER: Order!
Adv Z L MADASA: Mr President, I repeat that there is no DRC conflict. [Interjections.] The DRC conflict is a regional conflict. When SADC members are in conflict then the whole region is at war. Now, slowly but surely we are becoming directly involved, initially by sending a peacekeeping force. Will it help us to send peacekeepers, whilst Presidents Nujoma, Dos Santos and Mugabe are on the offensive? The truth is that while we may prefer peace in the region, the SADC partners prefer war.
Through the actions of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, SADC members are acting differently to what they say and to their undertakings. Without a uniform approach to the regional conflict, we are in trouble. The recent announcement by President Nujoma that Namibia is setting up bases inside Angola to crush Unita once and for all, does not help to solve the situation either. We cannot send peace forces when others are sending offensive forces. We are going to kill each other.
Through SADC we must advocate a strong parliamentary democracy. We must condemn publicly leaders who engage national forces in pursuit of personal gain or selfish ambition. We must advocate peace until everyone in the region is convinced that peace is the only way. The war talk must stop. Everyone in the region must talk peace. Until this is done, sending a peacekeeping force is an imprudent and futile exercise at this stage. There is no peace to be kept in the region. [Applause.]
Genl C L VILJOEN: Mevrou die Speaker en agb President, ons is van Afrika, ons is vir Afrika en ons gee om vir Afrika, en nou stuur ons troepe na Afrika. Ek is nie daaroor bekommerd nie, want ek praat nie oor die onttrekking voordat ons ingegaan het nie. Die vraag is wat ons daar gaan doen. Dit is baie belangrik dat die militêre doel duidelik is.
Die militêre oplossing is nie dié oplossing nie. Hopelik kan tyd, stabiliteit en verantwoordelikheid daarmee gekoop word, maar dan moet daar na my mening baie meer as vier bataljons troepe gestuur word. Sonder die werklike politieke oplossing, sal die militêre poging geldmors wees.
Dit was my voorreg om onlangs in Burundi te wees as lid van ‘n Suid- Afrikaanse span. Daar, en ook in Rwanda, het ek kans gehad om gedagtes te wissel met ander Afrika-persoonlikhede. Afrika het ‘n probleem. Opgesom is dit die volgende: eerstens ly Afrika aan postkoloniale meerderheidsinfeksie; tweedens is Afrika onvolwasse sover dit grondwetlike sake en veelpartypolitiek betref; derdens sluk Afrika swaar aan die Westminsterstelsel wat hy uit die Weste gekopieer het.
Daar is nie net ‘n DRK-probleem in daardie gebied nie. Die DRK-probleem is een manifestasie van ‘n groot streekprobleem. Die oplossing van die een probleem sonder die oplossing van die ander sal nie vir ons die finale oplossing bied nie.
Meerderheidsdominasie in Afrika ly tot onderdrukking. Daar was reeds etniese suiwering in Rwanda en Burundi met die uitwissing van minderhede en in Zimbabwe met die uitdrywing van minderhede. As die militêre poging dus eindig in groter meerderheidsdominasie, of eindig sonder die praktiese akkommodasie van minderhede, dan is dit net ‘n kwessie van tyd voor die Kongo weer brand.
Suid-Afrika moet dus volgens die VF - en dit is ‘n vereiste wat ons stel - saam met die SAOG ‘n inisiatief onderneem - selfs ‘n OEA-inisiatief - om veel meer as individuele brandpunte aan te pak, maar moet eerder ook werk aan die riglyne vir minimum standaarde vir demokrasie in Afrika, veral demokrasie ten opsigte van meerderheids- en minderheidsverantwoordelikhede en -verhoudings.
As dit op die kontinent slaag, het ons ‘n moontlikheid van sukses. As dit nie slaag nie, is ek bevrees, sal ons vind dat selfs die versending van troepe na daardie gebied ons uiteindelik gaan dwing om daardie troepe terug te bring. [Tyd verstreke.] (Translation of Afrikaans speech follows.)
[Gen C L VILJOEN: Madam Speaker and hon President, we are from Africa, we are for Africa and we care about Africa, and now we are sending troops to Africa. I am not concerned about that, because I am not talking about the withdrawal before we have gone in there. The question is what we are going to do there. It is very important that the military goal is clear.
The military solution is not the solution to this problem. Hopefully time, stability and responsibility can be bought with that, but then, in my opinion, much more than four battalions of troops should be sent there. Without the real political solution the military effort will be a waste of money.
Recently I had the privilege to be in Burundi as a member of a South African team. There, as well as in Rwanda, I had a chance to exchange ideas with other Africa personalities. Africa has a problem. Summarised it is the following: Firstly, Africa is suffering from postcolonial majority infection; secondly, Africa is immature regarding constitutional matters and multiparty politics; thirdly, Africa is having trouble dealing with the Westminster system which it adopted from the West.
There is not only a DRC problem in that area. The DRC problem is one manifestation of a greater regional problem. The solution to the one problem without the solution to the other will not present us with the final solution.
Majority domination in Africa leads to oppression. We have already had ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Burundi, with the elimination of minorities and in Zimbabwe with the expulsion of minorities. If the military effort therefore ends in greater majority domination, or ends without the practical accommodation of minorities, then it is only a matter of time before the Congo starts burning again.
South Africa should therefore, according to the FF - and this is a prerequisite we are stating - undertake an initiative, together with SADC - even an OAU initiative - to tackle far more than individual focal points, but should rather also work on the guidelines for minimum standards for democracy in Africa, especially democracy in respect of majority and minority responsibilities and relationships.
If this succeeds on the continent, we have a possibility of a success. If it does not succeed, I am afraid we will find that even the sending of troops to those areas will force us eventually to bring those troops back. [Time expired.]]
Mr P H K DITSHETELO: Madam Speaker, Mr President, it is commendable that the leaders of the Great Lakes have allowed common sense and logic to prevail, with dialogue being the best policy to settle political differences in the DRC. We have seen through experience that war cannot achieve desired political objectives, especially if it involves people and governments faced with common problems. The signing of the peace agreement by warring factions in the DRC is a positive step in the right direction, but it is not a sufficient condition to guarantee a long enough peace in the DRC.
Sierra Leone is a classic example. The rebels have taken up arms in defiance of the 1999 peace agreement. It is our sincere hope that this situation will not repeat itself in the DRC. If the situation escalates, South Africa may be called upon to partake in operations to attain a ceasefire and peace agreement. Unless South Africa is clearly designated by the UN and accepted by the conflicting parties as their peacemaker of choice, and most other actors respect this role, South Africa will be hesitant to intervene. The decision to intervene and the nature of the intervention will ultimately lie with the Department of Foreign Affairs. The inherent dangers of entering such a volatile situation should not be undermined.
This is where renaissance peacekeeping, as it was termed by President Thabo Mbeki in his address to Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, comes to the fore. The essence of this type of peacekeeping is the creation of a national peace mission, composed of all those currently engaged in the intervention, to lead a peace operation under the leadership of a neutral and foreign state.
Therefore it is our submission that South Africa’s involvement in the DRC should be underpinned by its commitment to facilitating the implementation of the peace accord as agreed upon, and to finding the everlasting solution to the problem. In order to achieve our mission, we should do the following: assist the DRC by monitoring peace initiatives and assist in the rebuilding of the DRC. [Time expired.]
Dr M S MOGOBA: Madam Speaker, hon President, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania supports South Africa’s intervention and involvement in the pathetic and senseless war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. [Interjections.] The late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere said in this very House that South Africa was not an island in Africa.
Our support for the President, however, should be qualified. We believe that we should be part of a joint peacekeeping force, involving the participants in the war and other countries in Africa, and that we should be part of a policy to strengthen the OAU in order to concentrate on unity, peace and development. Expensive meetings and fellowship are not a priority for Africa at this time. However, the UN should foot the bill for this peace mission.
We should avoid being seen as a referee or a big brother. This might encourage senselessness and delinquency on the part of the smaller brothers. We have our own urgent needs and national priorities. We may look like a First World country, but on average we are still a Third World country.
Africa has long been acknowledged as the cradle of humanity, but it also has the dubious distinction of showing the worst manifestations of ubuntu. We seem like a cursed continent which has been bleeding continually through the period of the tribal wars, followed by bloodier wars of colonialism, apartheid and liberation. We have produced and exported slaves, more than any other continent in the world. I always observe that the winners of an athletics meeting - runner ending first, second, third and fourth - are from different countries, but are all African. This mostly results from the slave trade. The misery of Africa should stop now, in our lifetime. [Time expired.]
Dr A I VAN NIEKERK: Mevrou die Speaker en agb President, die FA steun Suid- Afrika se betrokkenheid by ander lande op diplomatieke gebied om verandering te bewerkstellig en demokrasie te vestig. Militêre betrokkenheid is egter iets anders, en kan alleen gesteun word as dit aan basiese vereistes voldoen en van korte duur is. Suid-Afrika moet dit kan bekostig, en kan nie toelaat dat hy só ingesuig word in die konflik dat dit die beskikbare fondse vir die opheffing van Suid-Afrika se eie inwoners sal benadeel nie.
Daar moet ook ‘n wil in die land wees om die konflik op te los. Die blote aanwesigheid van vredesmagte bring nie oplossings nie. Hulle enigste funksie is om die strydende partye uitmekaar te probeer hou en so aan dié partye ‘n kans te gee om rondom die vredestafel ‘n oplossing te beding. Daar moet ‘n tydsduur aan vredesmagte se aanwesigheid in daardie land gekoppel wees.
Indien daar nie ‘n kans vir vrede is nie, word vredesmagte se aanwesigheid ‘n verleentheid en ‘n eskalerende ekonomiese las. Die onvermoë van vredesmagte in Sierra Leone om vrede te bewerkstellig tussen strydende partye wat nie die wil het om vrede te maak nie, moet vir ons as ‘n waarskuwing dien.
Die vraag waaroor ons duidelikheid moet verkry, is of daar in die Kongo waarlik die wil tot vrede is, en of daar nie dalk ‘n verskuilde motief van sekere faksies is om van magte uit ander lande gebruik te maak om eensydige oorheersing te bevorder nie. Die betrokkenheid van Zimbabwe, Uganda en Namibië by die Kongo in dié verband moet vir ons as ‘n verdere waarskuwing dien. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[Dr A I VAN NIEKERK: Madam Speaker and hon President, the FA supports South Africa’s involvement in other countries on a diplomatic level in order to effect change and establish democracy. Military involvement, however, is something different, and can only be supported if it meets basic requirements and is of short duration. South Africa must be able to afford it, and cannot allow itself to be sucked into the conflict to such an extent that it has an adverse effect on the funds available for the upliftment of South Africa’s own inhabitants. There should also be a desire in that country to resolve the conflict. The mere presence of peacekeeping forces does not bring solutions. Their only function is to try to keep the warring factions apart, and in this way give them a chance to sit down and negotiate a peaceful solution. There must be a time-frame that is linked to the presence of the peacekeeping forces in that country.
If there is no likelihood of peace, the presence of peacekeeping forces becomes an embarrassment and an escalating economic burden. The inability of peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone to bring about peace between warring factions which do not have the will to make peace, should serve as a warning to us.
The question on which we must gain clarity, is whether there really is the will to make peace in the Congo, and whether there may not be a hidden motive among certain factions to make use of forces from other countries to promote unilateral domination. In this respect the involvement of Zimbabwe, Uganda and Namibia in the Congo should serve as a further warning to us.]
If the purpose of the South African Government’s involvement is to act purely as a peacekeeping force under the above-mentioned prerequisites, then the FA will support the action. Our President must, however, give us the assurance that this is the aim and mission of South Africa’s involvement, and the conditions for the return of these troops must be set out clearly and unambiguously.
South Africa has a role to play in Africa. Wars are the worst enemy of development, and as long as South Africa has the interests of the peoples of Africa at heart and not the interests of its dictators, Africa will benefit.
Miss S RAJBALLY: Madam Speaker, President, Deputy President, Ministers, hon members, South Africa is a leading nation in Africa, and her participation in international peacekeeping has developed beyond the mere monitoring of cease-fires. In one holistic mission plan, the pressure is on South Africa to address a conflict system in the Democratic Republic of Congo in its totality.
The maintenance of modern peacekeeping in the DRC demands the implementation of various disciplines such as humanitarian relief, human rights monitoring and education, the protection of refugees, peace- building, the support for voluntary disarmament and demobilisation, national reconciliation, rebuilding of the judicial system, training a new police force, and so on. These complex processes are costly and take time.
South Africa is a prominent democratic country that has to play her rightful role in international peacekeeping. She therefore needs the experience, capacity and resources to carry out a complicated peacekeeping mission in the DRC. It is important for South Africa to be clear about what she can and cannot achieve. Together with the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the international community in general, South Africa can use her political influence to reconcile the DRC and, to a certain extent, determine the success of a cease-fire agreement.
If the DRC’s political parties want peace desperately, almost any institution in the world can monitor and verify the implementation of cease- fire agreements. The bottom line is that peace is in the hands of the Congolese people and those who live on the borders of the DRC. If they procrastinate implementing peace, no institution in the world can force them not to.
The MF supports the decision to send a peacekeeping force to the DRC. [Applause.]
Mnr C AUCAMP: Mevrou die Speaker, mnr die President, Suid-Afrika is integrerend deel van Afrika en die leidende staat in die subkontinent. Die DRK se probleme werp ‘n refleksie op Suid-Afrika en kan ook toenemend hierheen oorspoel. Betrokkenheid by die DRK, besef ons, is ongelukkig, maar dit is onvermydelik, ook binne die opset van die SAOG, waarvan die DRK ‘n lid is.
Dit is duidelik uit die President se verklaring dat die Regering geleer het uit die Lesotho-fiasko, en in die geval van die DRK met veel meer versigtigheid en diplomatieke korrektheid optree, hierdie keer binne die raamwerk van bestaande internasionale strukture soos die VN en die SAOG.
Wat ons onvermydelike deelname aan die VN-vredesmag betref, wil ek graag die volgende waarskuwings rig. Laurent Kabila het ondemokraties deur ‘n rebellie aan die bewind gekom en staan op geen hoër grond as die onderskeie rebellemagte nie. Begunstiging van Kabila moet ten alle koste vermy word, en dit moet duidelik deurgestuur word aan Zimbabwe, Namibië en andere. Die Lusaka-skietstilstand wat deur die vredesmag gemoniteer moet word, word telkens verbreek, en indien ‘n hernieude verbintenis tot die skietstilstand nie verkry word nie, is daar geen vrede om te moniteer nie. Betrokkenheid by so ‘n gewapende stryd kan baie gevaarlik wees. Die uitgestrektheid en die topografie van hierdie groot land maak dit fisiek onmoontlik vir ‘n mag van 5 000 om effektief te wees. Ons moenie ons jong mans soos lammers ter slagting laat lei nie. In dié verband moet die bloedneus wat die VN- vredesmag in Sierra Leone kry as ‘n waarskuwing dien.
‘n Vredesmag sonder ‘n politieke oplossing is soos ‘n hond wat ‘n kar jaag en nie weet wat om met hom te maak as hy hom vang nie. Die politieke oplossing vir die DRK is die opdeel in ‘n konfederasie van outonome, selfregerende gebiede. Dit moet die prioriteit wees. Die kunsmatige eenheidstaat sal nie ‘n oplossing wees nie.
In dié verband, ten slotte, kan Suid-Afrika veel leer uit die mislukkings van die DRK om ‘n bedeling daar te stel wat die diversiteit van die bevolking nie net in slagspreuke op landswapens plaas nie, maar in die realiteit van ‘n grondwetlike bestel verdiskonteer wat vir almal, ook hier, vrede sal gee. (Translation of Afrikaans speech follows.)
[Mr C AUCAMP: Madam Speaker, Mr President, South Africa is an integral part of Africa and the leading state on the subcontinent. The problems of the DRC are a reflection on South Africa and can also increasingly spill over in this direction. Involvement with the DRC, we realise, is unfortunate, but it is unavoidable, also within the context of SADC, of which the DRC is a member.
It is clear from the statement made by the President that the Government has learned from the Lesotho fiasco, and they are behaving far more carefully and diplomatically correctly, this time within the framework of existing international structures such as the UN and SADC.
Concerning our unavoidable participation in the UN peacekeeping force, I would like to issue the following warnings. Laurent Kabila came to power undemocratically through a rebellion and is no more legitimate than the various rebel forces. The favouring of Kabila must at all costs be avoided, and this must be made clear to Zimbabwe, Namibia and others.
The Lusaka cease-fire which must be monitored by the peacekeeping force is constantly being violated, and if a renewed commitment to the ceasefire is not obtained, there is no peace to monitor. Involvement in such an armed struggle can be very dangerous. The vastness and the topography of this large country make it physically impossible for a force of 5 000 to be effective. We should not let our young men be led like lambs to the slaughter. In this regard the setback which the UN peacekeeping force is experiencing in Sierra Leone should serve as a warning.
A peacekeeping force without a political solution is like a dog which chases a car and does not know what to do with it when it catches it. The political solution for the DRC is to divide it into a confederation of autonomous, self-governing regions. This must be the priority. The artificial unitary state will not be a solution.
Finally, in this regard, South Africa can learn a great deal from the failure of the DRC to establish a dispensation which does not merely express the diversity of the population in a motto on a coat of arms, but in reality negotiates a constitutional dispensation which will bring peace for everyone, even here.] Mr J N MASHIMBYE: Madam Speaker, hon President, hon Deputy President, members of Cabinet, colleagues, in the recent past in this Chamber we had an opportunity to discuss South Africa’s role in regional and international conflicts. In that discussion we made an assertion that now, more than ever before, South Africa has the means to contribute to peace and conflict resolution - a noble cause that we cannot turn our backs on.
We, as South Africans, are a people who will never forget where we come from. We come from a past marked by a protracted struggle against apartheid’s oppression and dehumanisation. As we refused to be dehumanised, we committed ourselves to freedom, peace, and justice for every citizen of the planet. We were imbued with this sense of justice when, amongst other things, the international community stood up to assist the anti-apartheid struggle in this country. We all incurred a debt to the world community.
Consistent with our values now and in the past, South Africa has committed itself to a process of making peace a permanent feature of our continent. Experience has taught us that to create peace, we cannot assume the right to decide the destinies of other nations alone.
Our efforts at conflict-resolution, conflict-prevention or peacekeeping must be done, as has been the case, under the mantle of SADC, the OAU and the United Nations. We must commend the ANC-led Government for the statesmanlike and meticulous leading role which South Africa has played and is playing in the region and the continent.
The decision to initially send our troops to the DRC to play a noncombative role is evidence of the sober approach by the Government of not becoming party to a senseless sacrifice of troops, solely in order to prove a moral point. We have always emphasised that a lot would depend on how the international community, and especially the parties to the DRC conflict, come to grips with pushing the peace process forward.
There had to be an indication that parties to the conflict are genuine in their desire for peace, before the troops of the SA National Defence Force could be committed to the fray. As a result of all the work done by our Government and our former President in the Great Lakes region, members of the SA National Defence Force who stand ready to be deployed to the Congo, do so in the knowledge that they have been extensively prepared and trained for their mission, and that conditions in the Democratic Republic of Congo favour them to both make a positive contribution and to do so with maximum regard for their own safety.
I am pleased to note that, in spite of some wayward opinions, nobody in this House will do anything to treat the deployment of our troops as a political football. To do so, as some have done recently with regard to the Zimbabwean matter, will only help them to live up to their mettle, as Oliver Tambo would describe them, of self-seeking individuals of no consequence.
I want to say to the hon the President, the commander-in-chief of our armed forces, that I am honoured and privileged to report to him that our armed forces are ready and waiting for the next order. [Applause.]
Debate concluded.
The SPEAKER: Order! Hon members, the next item on the Order Paper is questions to the President. This matter is another important aspect of our new system of question time. We want to express our appreciation to the President for having agreed to come to the National Assembly and respond to questions regularly. It is a welcome development for our new democracy.
QUESTIONS AND REPLIES - see that book.
NOTICES OF MOTION
Prof B TUROK: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes -
(a) that the SA Chamber of Business and United States government
have expressed support for the quiet diplomacy of our President
on the Zimbabwean crisis; and
(b) the statement by the Sacob chief executive officer, Kevin
Wakeford, namely: ``We firmly believe that President Mbeki will
achieve the desired result of stabilising the Zimbabwean crisis
in the short-term run-up to elections, and thereafter the
situation is expected to normalise''; and
(2) reaffirms its support for the manner in which the President is handling the crisis.
[Applause.]
Mr R J HEINE: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the DP:
That the House -
(1) notes the bizarre situation in South Africa in which Cosatu, the ANC’s partner in government, stages a strike which is opposed by the ANC Government and its Ministers but supported by the ANC as a political party;
(2) wonders whether there is any other democratic country in the world where a government and political party have attempted to have their cake and eat it to the extent that the ANC does;
(3) resolves -
(a) to enquire from Cosatu how many jobs it has created since the
establishment of its fund for job creation; and
(b) to bring to its attention that strike action of this nature is
totally unproductive and will destroy jobs rather than create
them; and
(4) holds the ANC Government and Cosatu responsible for the damage done to the South African economy.
[Applause.]
Mr M F CASSIM: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the IFP:
That the House -
(1) notes that -
(a) the Minister of Education has announced the Government's
intention to introduce a third language in the school
curriculum; and
(b) the IFP welcomes this development, being in line with its own
policy to allow a dominant indigenous language in a region to be
one of the languages taught to schoolchildren;
(2) calls on the Minister to give support to this policy expression by allocating adequate human and material resources so that a third language is acquired by new learners under congenial circumstances and for the inherent value which resides in that language; and
(3) requests the Government to desist from using any punitive measures in support of this very desirable and necessary development.
Ms G L MAHLANGU: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC: That the House -
(1) notes that South Africa has adopted a new symbol of our national identity, namely our new coat of arms;
(2) recognises that the coat of arms must evoke an intense spirit of an inclusive national identity, which exemplifies the extraordinary creativity of our people through the ages, and inspire our united and diverse nation; and
(3) calls on all South Africans to embrace this coat of arms and to own it as a common possession representing the aspirations of a winning nation that is conscious of the challenges that lie ahead.
[Applause.]
Adv A H GAUM: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the New NP:
That the House -
(1) regrets the irresponsibility displayed by Sadtu by rejecting Minister Asmal’s plea that it should not participate in Cosatu’s futile strike against unemployment today, but rather show its solidarity in a manner that suits the teaching profession;
(2) congratulates the ANC on its U-turn as far as the striking of teachers is concerned and its decision to support Minister Asmal’s call on teachers not to strike;
(3) commends the SAOU and Naptosa for its responsible decision not to participate in the strike;
(4) notes that this strike harms investment confidence and worsens the problem of unemployment rather than contributes to solving it;
(5) die Nuwe NP se beroep steun dat onderwysers nie toegelaat moet word om deel te neem aan solidariteitstakings soos dié nie; en
(6) met minister Asmal saamstem dat die gevolge van Sadou se optrede leerders sal benadeel, die teikens vir die verligting van die onderwyskrisis in gevaar sal stel, en in die proses werkloosheid sal verhoog deur opleiding vir die arbeidsmark te kniehalter. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[(5) supports the New NP’s call that teachers should not be allowed to take part in solidarity strikes such as this one; and
(6) agrees with Minister Asmal that the results of Sadtu’s action will be detrimental to learners, will endanger the targets for the alleviation of the education crisis, and in the process will increase unemployment by hampering training for the labour market.]
Chief N Z MTIRARA: Madam Speaker, I give notice that at the next sitting of the House I shall move:
That the House -
(1) notes with grave concern the pronouncements made by the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa at the official opening of the National House of Traditional Leaders on 8 May 2000 on the role to be played by the traditional leaders during this period of transformation;
(2) is appalled and concerned about the statements made by the Deputy President about the role which should be played by traditional leaders in the development of their areas;
(3) expresses alarm and concern that the Deputy President has urged the traditional leaders to play an active role in the development of their areas ahead of enabling national legislation that should provide for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities, as required by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa;
(4) expresses its shock and dismay on the division and cutting across of areas of jurisdiction of traditional leaders and disregard for their authority by the Demarcation Board, which will make traditional leaders irrelevant in their role pertaining to the development of their areas and matters affecting their communities …
[Time expired.]
Mr S B NTULI: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes -
(a) the continued refusal by some farm owners to bury deceased
farmworkers and their families on their farms; and
(b) the negative behaviour by some white farmers such as poisoning
grazing pastures for livestock of black farmers; and
(2) calls on all farmers to condemn this destructive behaviour, as such behaviour is criminal and detrimental to building a new nation.
[Applause.] Mrs P DE LILLE: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the PAC:
That the House -
(1) commends President Thabo Mbeki on his balanced position on the Zimbabwean crisis;
(2) deplores the highly emotional reaction of some people whose aim seems to be to try to demonise President Robert Mugabe;
(3) reiterates the view that the South African land question is a time bomb which it would be unwise and dangerous to ignore; and
(4) calls on President Mbeki urgently to call an all-party South African summit on equitable land distribution to which all significant role- players and interested groups are invited.
Mr G G OLIPHANT: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes -
(a) that although today's national strike by Cosatu went ahead, the
federation and business have committed themselves to addressing
the causes of the strike; and
(b) that the strike was called after the National Economic,
Development and Labour Council parties had failed to address
issues such as the need for economic growth and the alleviation
of unemployment and poverty;
(2) recognises this commitment to resolve the causes of the strike as a positive development; and
(3) calls on Cosatu and business to continue positively engaging each other in order to find solutions to alleviate unemployment and poverty.
[Interjections.] [Applause.]
Mr T D LEE: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the DP:
That the House notes that -
(1) the redeployment efforts of Deputy President Zuma have failed as it has again been necessary for the ANC NEC to intervene and subvert the democratic process in their structures in Gauteng and Free State; and
(2) while the ANC is in disarray in two important provinces, the DP continues making progress, attracting increasing support from former ANC members such as prominent Eastern Cape councillor Desmond Draai who resigned from the ANC to join the DP, stating some of his reasons as -
(a) the ANC's policy of appointing unqualified and inexperienced
people to posts;
(b) poor service delivery by the ANC Government; and
(c) weak ANC leadership.
[Applause.]
Mrs J CHALMERS: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes that the Minister for Welfare and Population Development, the hon Zola Skweyiya, has begun a sweeping overhaul of the Welfare department in preparing it to deal with the effects of globalisation on the poor;
(2) recognises that this plan is critical if South Africa is to provide proper social protection in a globalising world;
(3) notes that the department has developed a strategic programme with concrete objectives, timeframes and resource allocations; and
(4) calls on the Minister and his department to continue with their efforts to produce a caring society where ordinary people are put first.
Dr P J RABIE: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the New NP:
That the House -
(1) notes with alarm the recent report by the Auditor-General, Mr Shauket Fakie, that the national accounts of the SA Revenue Service are in such a state of disarray that he was not willing to sign them;
(2) calls upon the Minister of Finance to investigate the fact that the cash accounting records differed from the debtor records by more than R413 million;
(3) finds it of particular concern that the inspector’s report found that proper books and records had not been maintained and that according to the cash accounts, taxpayers had probably paid more of their hard- earned money than they should have had proper records been kept;
(4) finds it perturbing that the Auditor-General questioned whether, given that more than a third of debts have been outstanding for more than nine months, the SA Revenue Service’s provision for bad doubtful debts, which amounted to R2,62 billion, was adequate; and
(5) is of the opinion that it is in the national interest that the necessary corrective steps be taken immediately.
[Time expired.]
Dr G W KOORNHOF: Madam Speaker, I give notice that at the next sitting of the House I will move on behalf of the UDM:
That the House -
(1) finds it unfortunate that the national strike today will have a negative impact on the economy, measured by lost production, reduced productivity and the impact on investment sentiments;
(2) notes, however, that the circumstances leading to this strike go back to 1995 when Cosatu discussed their views with Government, amongst other stakeholders, and Government then embarked on a road of jobless economic growth, leaving no option for Cosatu but to take this road of a national strike;
(3) calls on the Government to embark on an economic policy that will create a climate for job creation opportunities in all sectors of our economy, both in the formal and informal side of our society; and
(4) recognises that this implies that the Government must again make known their position regarding the implementation of the Gear policy.
Mr S K LOUW: Madam Speaker, I give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes the achievement of Eskom’s electrification target, symbolically called the ``2 million switch’’ in Elandsfontein, Graskop, a small rural village in Mpumalanga;
(2) recognises that the electrification programme is part of the ANC Government’s attempts to improve the quality of people’s lives; and
(3) calls on the Minister and her department to continue with their excellent work to improve the lives of rural communities by providing affordable and reliable electricity.
[Applause.]
Adv P S SWART: Mevrou die Speaker, ek gee hiermee kennis dat ek op die volgende sittingsdag namens die DP sal voorstel:
Dat die Huis -
(1) daarvan kennis neem dat -
(a) daar 7 000 vakatures in die Polisiediens bestaan, volgens die
Polisie se eie aanduidings; en
(b) die vul van hierdie vakatures by polisiestasies met rekrute van
goeie gehalte 'n aansienlike bydrae sal lewer tot die bekamping
van misdaad in ons land; en
(2) derhalwe die Regering versoek om so gou doenlik die 7 000 aanstellings te doen. (Translation of Afrikaans notice of motion follows.)
[Adv P S SWART: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day I shall move on behalf of the DP:
That the House -
(1) notes that -
(a) there are 7 000 vacancies in the Police Service according to the
Police's own indications; and
(b) filling these vacancies at police stations with recruits of a
high standard will make a significant contribution to the
combating of crime in our country; and
(2) therefore requests the Government to make these 7 000 appointments as soon as possible.]
The House adjourned at 18:16.
__________
ANNOUNCEMENTS, TABLINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS
TABLINGS:
National Assembly and National Council of Provinces:
Papers:
- The Minister of Home Affairs:
Report of the Independent Electoral Commission on the National and
Provincial Elections of 2 June 1999 [RP 83-2000].
- The Minister for Provincial and Local Government:
Reasons for declaring a state of disaster in the Magisterial Districts
of Phutaditjhaba Transitional Local Council, Qwaqwa Rural Council and
Maluti Transitional Rural Council in the Free State Province submitted
to Parliament in terms of section 2(4) of the Civil Protection Act,
1977 (Act No 67 of 1997).
- The Minister of Safety and Security:
Regulation Number R.389 published in the Government Gazette Number
21088 dated 14 April 2000, the South African Police Service Employment
Regulations made in terms of section 24(1) of the South African Police
Service Act, 1995 (Act No 68 of 1995).