THURSDAY, 1 NOVEMBER 2001 __

                PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
                                ____

The House met at 14:04.

The Chairperson of Committees took the Chair and requested members to observe a moment of silence for prayers or meditation.

ANNOUNCEMENTS, TABLINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS - see col 000.

                             NEW MEMBER

                           (Announcement)

The Chairperson of Committees announced that the vacancy caused by the resignation of Mr D M Nkosi had been filled, in accordance with item 6(3) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution, 1996, by the nomination of Ms M R Morutoa with effect from 1 November 2001. OATH

Ms M R Morutoa made and subscribed the oath in the Speaker’s Office today.

QUESTIONS AND REPLIES - see that book.

            BIRTHS AND DEATHS REGISTRATION AMENDMENT BILL

                       (Second Reading debate)

The MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS: Chairperson, hon members, it gives me great pleasure to introduce the Births and Deaths Registration Amendment Bill

1. This, I need hardly emphasise, is a vital piece of legislation which is not only progressive in nature, but fundamental in its compliance with the values enshrined in our Constitution, namely, quality and individual freedom to choose. Many a time it is easy to speak of these values, but giving effect to them is a giant step in the right direction in ensuring that ours is a democracy not only in word, but also in substance.

This Bill brings the age of majority in line with what the Constitution provides as it is the supreme law of the land to which all other laws should be subject. In the interests of the country’s fledgling democracy, the Bill also takes a great step in the right direction by levelling the playing field with regard to equality and freedom, regardless of one’s marital status.

In terms of this Bill, gone are the days when divorced women, with sole custody and guardianship of their minor children had to resort to the courts to change the surnames of their children in their sole custody and guardianship according to their wishes. The general legal principles, in line with equity, equality and freedom of choice, are thus being reinforced in this Bill.

The fact that parents will be allowed to register their children under either one of their surnames, or under both surnames joined together as a double-barrelled surname is clearly not a prescription or even the establishing of a new trend, but an indication of the respect engendered and enjoined by the values of freedom of choice enshrined in our Constitution. In this rainbow nation, various people, parents, families and couples have different wishes, lifestyle preferences and even idiosyncrasies. These must be respected and accommodated in a more practical way. This is exactly what this Bill does. [Applause.]

Debate concluded.

Bill read a second time.

    CONSIDERATION OF REPORT OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND
   CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT ON JUDICIAL OFFICERS AMENDMENT BILL

Order disposed of without debate.

Report adopted.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AMENDMENT BILL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA SECOND AMENDMENT BILL JUDGES’ REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT BILL

                       (Second Reading debate)

The MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Mr Chairperson, along with the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill, this debate concerns the first Constitution-amending Bills that I have the pleasure to introduce wearing the cloak of the Minister responsible for constitutional development.

I need not belabour the point that amendments to the Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, need to comply with very specific procedural requirements, such as are set out in section 74 of the Constitution itself. Those requirements are aimed at enhancing the democratic principles underlying our Constitution by ensuring that proposed amendments are thoroughly canvassed among all interested parties and role-players and that the maximum degree of consensus is achieved regarding changes to our Constitution.

I am raising this principle at the very outset, because as the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development set about their business of considering the proposed amendments, it became clear that, notwithstanding the fact that both Bills had been published in the Gazette for public comment well within the prescribed timeframes for introduction, some aspects thereof still required further consultation with many key role- players. It was accordingly decided that those matters should be referred back to the line-function departments for further discussions with the interested parties, and that such amendments as may be required would then be resubmitted to Parliament for consideration. I think that this approach which has been followed by the portfolio committee and this House underscores our total commitment to upholding the democratic values underlying the Constitution, thus further enhancing the stature of this institution.

The amendments to the Constitution are contained in two Bills and, for the sake of convenience, I will refer to them as the first Constitution- amending Bill and the second Constitution-amending Bill respectively. The reason we are dealing with two Constitution-amending Bills simultaneously is that the first Constitution-amending Bill is required to be passed by the National Assembly whilst the second Constitution-amending Bill must be passed by both the National Assembly and the NCOP. The first Constitution- amending Bill deals with matters pertaining to the judiciary, the appointment of Deputy Ministers and the borrowing powers of local governance, while the second Constitution-amending Bill deals with financial provisions exclusively.

As the amendments pertaining to the judiciary are closely related to the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill, allow me to deal with the provisions relating to Deputy Ministers and financial matters. In terms of section 91(3) of the Constitution, the President of the Republic may select any number of Ministers from among the members of the National Assembly and may select no more than two Ministers from outside the Assembly. In terms of section 93, Deputy Ministers may, however, be appointed from among the members of the National Assembly only.

The effect of the requirement in section 93 that Deputy Ministers must be appointed from among the members of the National Assembly is that if the President appoints a Deputy Minister from a party that has very few members of Parliament, that party’s effective participation in the ordinary business of Parliament might be severely compromised. Clause 5 of the first Constitution-amending Bill is consequently aimed at bringing section 93 into line with section 91(3) by making provision for the appointment of not more than two Deputy Ministers from outside the National Assembly. The amendments contained in clauses 3 and 4, amending sections 54 and 58 of the Constitution, are consequential to clause 5 and relate to the accountability and privileges of non-Assembly Deputy Ministers.

The national Treasury has been involved in a process of reviewing national legislation and financial matters. That review has revealed a range of difficulties, both legal and practical, in the implementation of the financial legislative regime contemplated in the Constitution. Section 216(1) of the Constitution for example requires that national legislation must establish a national Treasury and prescribe measures to ensure both transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government.

Parliament complied with that constitutional mandate in respect of the national and provincial spheres of government by enacting the Public Finance Management Act in 1999. In respect of the local sphere of government, Cabinet has approved the introduction of the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Bill, which, like the Public Finance Management Act, will ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of municipalities are managed efficiently and effectively.

The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Bill, amongst other things, regulates municipal borrowing and makes it possible for municipalities to have access to long-term borrowing at an affordable rate. These important and necessary changes, however, require that the Constitution be amended to allow for the enactment of legislative measures and mechanisms for effectively dealing with financial emergencies in municipalities and to regulate municipal borrowing. As earlier announced by the Minister of Finance, the constitutional amendments to allow for the enactment of legislative measures and mechanisms for dealing with financial emergencies in municipalities have been postponed to the beginning of next year in order to allow for further consultation.

I would be remiss in my duty to this august House if, Madam Speaker, I were to omit to mention that the new section 230A, set out in the first Constitution-amending Bill, brings about a significant, albeit necessary, change to our constitutional scheme. It makes provision for a municipal council to bind itself and a future council in the exercise of its legislative authority, if that is necessary ``to secure loans or investments for the municipality’’. This amendment is informed by, amongst other things, the Constitutional Court’s decision in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johnnesburg TMC, in which the Constitutional Court’s President, Justice Chaskalson, said:

It seems plain that when a legislature, whether national, provincial or local, exercises the power to raise taxes or rates, or determines appropriations to be made out of public funds, it is exercising a power that under our Constitution is a power peculiar to elected legislative bodies. It is a power that is exercised by democratically elected representatives after due deliberation.

In order for a municipal council to raise affordable long-term loans, they may be required to make collateral promises regarding, amongst other things, how it will exercise its power to raise taxes or rates. Such promises may have the effect of fettering the manner in which a municipal council and its successor in title will exercise the power to enact a budget.

It has been considered necessary constitutionally to empower municipal councils to fetter the exercise of their legislative and executive authority, for the purpose of raising loans or investments, because in Southern Metropolitan Substructure v Thompson the Witwatersrand High Court has, per Acting Judge Pretorius, stated the principle against the fettering of executive action by contract as follows:

A local authority may not, by contract, fetter itself so as to disable itself from exercising its discretion as required by law. Its paramount duty is to preserve its own freedom to decide in every case as the public interest requires at the time.

Given that the law, like society, is dynamic, the review of national legislation on financial matters has, as indicated above, revealed that in some instances there may have been confusion in the conclusions we had earlier made when, as elected representatives of our people, we drafted the Constitution. For example, we provided in section 220 of the Constitution for the establishment of the Financial and Fiscal Commission to make recommendations to Parliament, provincial legislatures and any other authorities provided for in legislation.

While we provided that this important body would make recommendations, and not decisions, on financial and fiscal matters, and that it would be independent, impartial and subject only to the Constitution and the law, we structured it as if it were a financial and fiscal bargaining forum with representatives of each province and local government. Besides the fact that the FFC’s composition, on the FFC’s own admission, is cumbersome and has resulted in many vacancies, it also goes against the fundamental tenets of this body as being independent, also of provinces, impartial and subject to the Constitution and the law.

The FFC should not be subject to mandates given by the national Government, provinces and local government. The amendment of section 221 will rectify this anomaly, and result in an effective membership of only nine people. Provision is made for the enactment of national legislation to regulate the participation of premiers and organised local government in the appointment of FFC members. There is, of course, a consequential amendment to section 163 to deal with organised local government’s participation in the FFC.

The legislative review undertaken by the national Treasury has emphasised the need for a comprehensive, transparent, coherent and accountable budget process. To ensure this, it is proposed that, firstly, sections 77 and 120 of the Constitution should be amended to extend the definition of a money Bill to include Bills which abolish or reduce or grant exemptions from taxes, levies, duties or surcharges. Secondly, section 73 is amended to add the Division of Revenue Bill envisaged in section 214 to the list of legislation to be introduced in the National Assembly by the Minister of Finance.

With regard to the judiciary, firstly, provision is made for the Office of the President of the Constitutional Court to become that of the Chief Justice of South Africa. This necessitates a number of consequential amendments, including the conversion of the offices of Deputy President of the Constitutional Court'' toDeputy Chief Justice’’, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal to President of the Supreme Court of Appeal’’ and Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal'' to Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal’’.

Secondly, section 176 of the Constitution is amended in order to enable the legislature to extend the term of office of Constitutional Court judges by means of an Act of Parliament. At present, section 176 provides that Constitutional Court judges hold office for a nonrenewable term of 12 years, and must retire at the age of 70, whereas other judges hold office until they are discharged from active service in terms of an Act of Parliament.

Since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation and the establishment of the Constitutional Court, there has been uncertainty as to which court is the highest or apex court in the Republic, and, likewise, which office is the highest judicial office in the Republic. The amendment seeks to deal with this.

The Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill, 2001, was originally introduced into Parliament as the Judicial Officers Amendment Bill. Due to a number of reasons, the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development decided to deal with only those provisions contained in the Bill which pertained to judges’ remuneration and conditions of employment which cannot be held in abeyance until the 2002 session of Parliament.

In this process, the committee also gave impetus to the initiative of rationalising the laws of the former Republic of South Africa and its homelands relating to our superior courts. This rationalisation process will continue next year. I may mention for the information of hon members, that some time ago I appointed a task team under the able chairpersonship of the Honourable Justice Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court, who will, once the Bills under discussion are promulgated, become the Chief Justice of South Africa.

The purpose of this task team is to make recommendations pertaining to the process of rationalisation and transformation of the court structures, including recommendations relating to draft legislation, where appropriate. This task team works according to an agenda to achieve the necessary reforms to our court structures.

The first item on its agenda, namely to make provision for the head of the Constitutional Court to become Chief Justice, assisted by a Deputy Chief Justice, and for the head of the Supreme Court of Appeal to become the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, assisted by a Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, has now been achieved. I will come back to this item if time allows me. The task team has further formulated a six- stage approach to be followed in achieving our final goal, namely the complete transformation and reform of our court structures and the production of one single judiciary for the Republic of South Africa.

Hon members will remember the protagonists for life tenure argued that this

• the approach that we have now changed - would be in the best interests of the Constitutional Court as an institution, while the antagonists argued that the Constitutional Court, with all its powers, was, from the outset, intended to be presided over by judges with a limited or rather a fixed tenure of office, in a court almost set apart from the ordinary courts of the land. The Bill, as I have said, does exactly what these protagonists and antagonists were wanting to achieve or to maintain.

Let us have a closer look at some of the key provisions of the Bill, which give rise to this happy medium. Oh, I see that the light is flickering. Therefore, we may not be able to do some of these things. But with the time left, may I thank the portfolio committee, and the other portfolio committees that were involved in this exercise, for dealing with these Bills in the manner that they did, and may I commend all three Bills to this House. [Applause.]

Adv J H DE LANGE: Chairperson, hon Minister, other hon Ministers, hon members, ladies and gentlemen, I rise on behalf of the ANC in unconditional support of these three Bills. It has been a very interesting week. I am surprised that member is still talking so much. They used to say one week was a long time in politics, but I think in South Africa we have confounded even that theory it seems that one hour or one day is a long time in politics. So it has been an interesting week, and I am in a jovial mood.

As members know, there are five Bills that the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development has passed and we have done so unanimously. Two of them will be dealt with tomorrow and the other three we are dealing with together today. I want to emphasise that all five of these Bills have been unanimously passed by the parties in the committee. This is, of course, apart from the constitutional amendments where the IFP is not necessarily opposed to the content of the amendment but in principle they are not dealing with or voting on any constitutional matters at this stage.

It is really a proud moment to say that this has happened in the committee. We have really become a team in the committee. At one stage we only had a pack of forwards, a fly half and a scrum half; we now even have a backline and we are operating like a good team. I hope we do not play like the Sharks played the other day, but rather like Western Province. But we have a very good team, at least, that will be able to do so and take our work forward.

Let me say a few thank yous. Firstly I want to thank our Minister again for the way that he has conducted and overseen the passing of these five pieces of legislation. As usual, he has guided us with a very steady hand, yet he has also given us a lot of flexibility to deal with the matters. I also want to thank the other two Ministers, the Minister of Finance, Mr Manuel, and also the Minister for Provincial and Local Government, Mr Mufamadi for the help that they have given us with the constitutional amendments regarding those matters that we have dealt with from their departments.

And then I say a big thank you to the other two portfolio committees, particularly Ms Barbara Hogan and Mr Yunus Carrim, the chairpersons, and those members of the committees who attended our meetings to help us pass these constitutional amendments. We thank them very much. We learned much from them during those meetings.

Then to my long suffering committee. I want to thank everyone in the committee for the long hours we have sat with these matters. I want to start with the opposition. Dr Delport, Mrs Camerer, Mr Mzizi, Mr Swart and all the others - we cannot do the work that we do without you. Then to my crowd on this side, thank you very much for the support, the hard work and the guidance.

Then to the departments. Thank you for some excellent work in respect of all three departments for some excellent. There was Mr Momoniat and Adv Nkahla from the Department of Finance, Messrs De Lange, Basset and Rudman from Justice, and from local Government the director-general Mr Zam Titus, and others. I thank them very much for the excellent work they performed. And then to the staff of the committee, to Adv Zenzile and Ms Hertzenberg, thank you very much. They are a wonderful asset of the committee.

Let me now deal with the Bills a bit. I want to deal with two aspects, firstly, a procedural matter and then some substantive issues. As the Minister has pointed out, during our deliberations around the constitutional amendments the issue of consultation became a very vexed question, and we had some irate submissions and inputs during the public hearings.

As the Minister has pointed out, we noted that the legal requirements for consultation had been properly complied with, by Government, in terms of the Constitution. The problem was that before these amendments were published, it would seem that in some instances there was no consultation on these constitutional amendments, in other instances there was limited consultation with small groups of persons.

Within the committee - I am talking here on behalf of all three committees and all the parties - there was a very strong feeling that it was very important that when we bring constitutional amendments to this Parliament, there has to be a process whereby these issues are taken to the broader society, through the media and other means, to allow that hegemony, even consensus, is reached around the amendments before they come to Parliament. Otherwise we get very irate submissions sometimes about very incorrect points, abuse and even personal attacks on individual persons, which I think in the main is totally uncalled for.

There definitely have been some shortcomings in these consultation processes, and we have urged the departments to make sure that this does not happen again. However, on the other hand, we must also mention that the people that make submissions to this Parliament should also make sure that they follow the right procedures. Sometimes there is consultation and the other party does not keep its side of the bargain. In those instances we should equally say that civil society and those that do make submissions should also get their house in order. There were also some shortcomings in this regard.

Let me deal with some of the substantive issues. I will first deal with some of the justice issues. The first issue, as the Minister has pointed out, is that, as hon members know, we in this country have two courts that stand at the apex of our courts system. The Constitutional Court is the highest court in our country on constitutional matters, and on matters other than constitutional matters, the Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court.

Therefore, there has been an anomaly in our system, where we have had two heads at the top of the justice system. Since last year, at and after the justice colloquium, a lot of discussion has taken place around this matter, and there is broad consensus, if not absolute consensus, in our society that we should really rationalise this situation so that we have one definite head of our court system. That is what has happened now.

The President of the Constitutional Court now becomes the Chief Justice of South Africa. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal now becomes the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. And, of course, the Chief Justice of South Africa will now also hold the position of the chairperson of the Judicial Service Commission. We now have a very definite line of seniority in our court system. We do not any longer have this split system as far as the leaders of the judiciary are concerned. This proposal was passed unanimously, including in respect of all the submissions received.

The second issue was the tenure of Constitutional Court judges. The proposal was to remove the issue of tenure from the Constitution, and, therefore, that Constitutional Court judges be treated exactly the same as other judges. And basically that would mean that they remain in office for 15 years active service, or at least until they are 70 years old.

The Constitutional Court judges supported this proposal and so did some of the judges in the Supreme Court of Appeal. But there was also widespread resistance to this proposal. We realised very early on that we would have to find a compromise to accommodate both sides of the divide within the legal fraternity.

It was very clear that the legal fraternity was, at the very least, very badly split on this issue. The committee, very early on, decided that we would need a compromise in terms of which we would try and meet some of the arguments from both sides of the spectrum within the legal profession, as well as a political compromise that all parties could support. It was very important that the message from this Parliament was that we put forward a united view on the tenure of constitutional court judges.

I am very happy to announce that we were able, as the committee, to find such a compromise. Basically, what we did is the following. We have not removed the term of office of Constitutional Court judges from the Constitution, but have left it there. However, we have included the words, ``except where an Act of Parliament particularly extends the term of office’’. We have done that particularly because of the fears that an Act of Parliament would be able to reduce the tenure. We have made sure that an Act of Parliament would only be able to extend the tenure.

Therefore, firstly, we have made an appropriate constitutional amendment in this regard. Secondly we have taken all the principles that apply to judges’ salaries and their condition of employment and have extended them equally to Constitutional Court judges whilst retaining the term of office. We have done this through clause 3(2) in the new Judges’ Remuneration conditions of Employment Bill reiterating that the term of office is 12 years for a Constitutional Court judge or 70 years of age, whichever occurs first, where upon they are discharged. But we have provided two exceptions that apply.

The first exception that we have created is that if a judge has served his or her 12-year term of office and, at that stage, he or she has not yet completed a 15-year term of active service as a judge on the Bench, then they would remain on until they have served for 15 years.

The second exception that we have provided, in order to make the rules the same for Constitutional Court judges and other judges, is that when a Constitutional Court judge reaches 70 years of age, and he or she has not yet fulfilled 15 year of active service as a judge, then equally, they can stay on until they are 75 years old or until they have completed a 15 years stint as an active judge, and then they would have to be discharged from active service.

So, what we have done is that we have now also extended to Constitutional Court judges the two principles applicable to judges, namely, that they have to complete 15 years of active service before they are discharged from service, or that they can stay on for longer after they reach 70 years until they are 75 years of age. Furthermore, we have also provided, in clause 4(4) of the Bill, that a Constitutional Court judge who had previously been appointed as a judge may voluntarily decide to stay on and go back to where he or she acted as a judge previously and fulfil a further period of active service there once they leave the Constitutional Court, but of course, only if they are still eligible in terms of the rest of the Act to serve as a judge.

We have equally provided that a Constitutional Court judge who was not a judge previously can apply to the Judicial Service Commission after they have been discharged as a Constitutional Court judge and be appointed as a judge elsewhere; again, on condition that they are still eligible to be a judge. We have then provided certain provisions to make sure that these judges, who go back to the Bench once they have been discharged as Constitutional Court judges, will not receive a double salary for doing so.

We have further provided for one instance where the Constitutional Court’s judges can resign. That is the instance where they have served 12 years or have reached 70 years of age, whichever comes first. In that instance, they can resign as Constitutional Court judges if permitted, in terms of the Act. But there is a penalty involved. The penalty is that in future their so-called pension or their salary upon discharge would not include the inflation-beater provision. It would not apply in that instance. So, there is a penalty or a sanction involved for not staying on for the whole period that a Constitutional court judge has to serve.

There are also other aspects of the Bill that we have changed, and harmonised. I am not going to go into detail in respect thereof. I would just like to say that we have also rationalised, for the first time, that this Bill will apply to all judges. Whether they were appointed previously as judges in the so-called RSA or whether they were appointed in the previous Bantustans, all of that has now been harmonised into one Act. In order to do that, we also had to make certain transitional arrangements to make sure that they fit smoothly into the new system.

There is also one other important factor dealt with in this Bill. It has been found that an inflation-beater had not applied to those judges who are of a rather senior age, and who actually had gone on pension under the Previous Pensions Act and not under the Judges’ Remuneration Act. We now find that many of those judges really live in dire circumstances in terms of the salaries that they receive. We have now made provision in this Act that their salaries be dealt with differently and that the inflation-beater will apply equally to them. We hope that this will solve a very acute problem, namely that some of our older judges have fallen upon hard times in this instance.

I would just like to say one thing about the financial matters we have dealt with in the constitutional amendments: There was also an enormous ruckus and uproar about certain so-called interventionist clauses that had been dealt with as a constitutional amendment. As the House knows, clauses 100 and 139 of the Constitution are what we call interventionist clauses, in so far as they allow one level of government to intervene in another level of government if that level of government is not fulfilling certain executive obligations. There were certain amendments that I am not going to go into detail about that were proposed in terms of these interventionist clauses, and this generated a lot of resistance from certain inputs and submissions in the committee. Secondly, there is also a provision in the Constitution that provides for a third interventionist mechanism. What was being provided for was an enabling clause in this Constitutional amendment in terms of which a mechanism was provided for to allow Government to deal with financial crises at local government level.

We looked at this matter carefully and there was a lot of resistance to it. In the end, we found that once we looked at the legislation Finance was wanting to introduce in this regard, clearly the intervention that was being asked for was quite fundamental in terms of intervening in local government. We very clearly saw that the enabling clause was not going to do the trick for the department, and that what one in fact needed was what we call a trumping clause, which will allow this interventionist clause to be able to trump other aspects of the Constitution with which it was in conflict.

For all these reasons - all three of these interventionist matters, namely both the introduction of the one new mechanism and the amendment of the other two mechanisms - it was decided by the two relevant departments to withdraw these matters with the intention of definitely introducing them during the coming year, as this would enable further consultation and deliberations on the matter and specifically enable us to amend the enabling clause to a trumping clause. In the end, that was the best way to deal with the matter.

Secondly, there was also a new borrowing clause introduced into the Constitution because, as the House knows, section 230 of the Constitution already provides that municipalities may borrow money as long they comply with national legislation. However, a legal opinion was obtained by the Department of Finance clearly indicating that the problem was that they interpreted section 230 to mean that the legislative powers of a municipality could be bound when making these loans. If that is the case, the binding of the legislative powers is usually given as collateral when one signs these loans, because, in all probability, loans were not going to be easily given, particularly to smaller municipalities.

We then had to amend the Constitution accordingly to provide not only the power to make loans, but also the power for the municipal council, in fact, to executively and legislatively bind future councils and the municipality. We had to do that by rationalising these two issues into a new clause, which is now clause 230A.

Regarding the other financial provisions, as the House knows there were certain amendments that were suggested to the Financial and Fiscal Commission, in particular, that its size should be reduced. This was agreed to, but it was felt that where provinces previously had some say in these matters was this was now completely taken away. So we have provided that national legislation can be passed to make sure that provincial and local government have a role to play during the nomination process before the executive make these appointments. I hope that gives hon members some idea of what we have tried to do here. As we have said, these two constitutional amendments are closely linked.

I just want to point out in the end that the Judicial Officers Amendment Bill, as the Minister has pointed out, was introduced in Parliament and deals with judicial officer who have a lot of important matters affecting judicial officers. This Bill was introduced very late and therefore there are various matters, for example how we deal with judicial officers who have same sex partners, how we deal with the qualifications of magistrates how we deal with a particular mechanism to decide the salaries of magistrates and judges, that we are referring to the next parliamentary session, and we will deal with those matters that we have not dealt with them.

I thank the House very much for listening to me, and I thank hon members for their support for these Bills. [Applause.]

Dr J T DELPORT: Chairperson, the hon Johnny de Lange referred to what was happening on the political front. He also stated that he was in a jovial mood. I want to share a secret with hon members. It is because earlier in the week I could assure him that he had no chance of losing his beloved opposition in his committee. [Interjections.]

I am going to confine my contribution today to two issues only: First of all the composition of the Financial and Fiscal Commission, which we are changing, and secondly, the amendments affecting the Constitutional Court.

Die aantal lede van die Finansiële en Fiskale Kommissie word verminder van twee-en-twintig tot nege. In beginsel is ons ten gunste van die vermindering van die getalle van lomp en groot komitees, rade en kommissies. Dit is onnodig dat ons so ‘n groot kommissie het.

Ons het egter ‘n bekommernis. In die huidige samestelling word spesifiek voorsiening gemaak vir nege persone wat per provinsie na die belange van die provinsie omsien. Dit verval. Dit word verminder na drie lede wat deur die President vanuit ‘n poel aangestel sal word. Verder word ook die totale getal lede wat die President sal aanstel van nege na twee verminder.

Ons wil ‘n beroep doen op die agb President - en ons is oortuig daarvan dat hy hieraan gehoor sal gee - om ‘n goed gebalanseerde kommissie aan te stel, wat behoorlik na die belange wat aan daardie kommissie opgedra word, sal omsien. Ons het vertroue dat hy dit sal doen.

Ek wil nou aandag gee aan die wysigings wat aangebring word aan die Konstitusionele Hof, in besonder die wysigings ten opsigte van die regters. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)

[The number of members of the Financial and Fiscal Commission is being reduced from twenty-two to nine. In principle we are in favour of a reduction in the number of members of cumbersome and large committees, councils and commissions. It is unnecessary to have such a large commission.

We have a concern, however. In the present composition specific provision is made for nine persons per province to take care of the interests of the province. This falls away. This is being reduced to three members who will be appointed by the President from a pool. Furthermore the total number of members to be appointed by the President is being reduced from nine to two.

We want to appeal to the hon the President - and we are convinced that he will listen to this - to appoint a well-balanced commission that will take proper care of the interests that the commission will be entrusted with. We have every confidence that he will do so.

I would now like to devote attention to the amendments that are being made to the Constitutional Court, in particular the amendments in respect of the judges.]

The original proposal that the term of office of Constitutional Court judges be equated to that of other judges was controversial. It even caused members of the judiciary to take up different positions. The different terms of office that have existed up to now have been highlighted by the hon Mr De Lange. The portfolio committee has reached consensus to retain the 12-year nonrenewable term and the 70-year age limit, but also introduced the opportunity for Constitutional Court judges to stay on until the age of 75 in order to complete a 15-year term on the Bench, which may of course include previous service in the High Court. All differences in relation to gratuities and other benefits could thereby be eliminated.

Daar is argumente ten gunste van kort termyne vir Konstitusionele Hof regters. Laat ons kortliks daarna kyk. In die eerste instansie word gesê dat ons in beginsel nie moet torring aan ‘n grondwet nie. Natuurlik nie, maar waarna ons moet oplet, is om nie aan beginsels te verander nie. Wat is die beginsel wat by die Konstitusionele Hof ter sprake is? Dit is die beskerming, die absolute beskerming van sy rol en van sy onafhanklikheid. Dít is die beginsel wat ons moet beskerm. Of ‘n regter dan nou vir sewe jaar, soos dit aanvanklik was, of vir 12 jaar, tot hy 70 is, of tot hy 75 is, aangestel word, kan nie hierdie beginsel aantas nie. Hierdie beginsel kan aangetas word deur die integriteit van die regters, nie deur hul ouderdom of hoe lank hul dien nie. Tweedens word gesê dat die Konstitusionele Hof se uitsprake politieke impak het, en niemand behoort so baie mag vir lank te hê nie. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraph follows.)

[There are arguments in favour of short terms for judges of the Constitutional Court. Let us look at this briefly. In the first place it is being said that in principle we should not tamper with a constitution. Of course not, but what we have to be attentive to is not to change principles. What is the principle at issue in respect of the Constitutional Court? It is the protection, the absolute protection of its role and of its independence. This is the principle that we must protect. Whether a judge is appointed for seven years, as was initially the case, or for twelve years, until he is 70, or until he is 75, cannot affect this principle. This principle can be affected by the integrity of the judges, not by their age or the length of their service. Secondly, it is being said that the findings of the Constitutional Court have political impact, and not one should have so much power for too long.] But the simple fact is that the Constitutional Court delivers judgments in bulk. All the judges sit and eight of the 12 judges are required for a quorum. This provision immediately minimises the possibility of politically loaded judgments. One judge, even a number of judges, cannot easily steer judgments in a particular political direction. It was also said that a long term may lead to stagnation.

Al wat ek kan vra, is: watter verskil is daar met ons gewone hof van appèl? Dáár word ook met regsbeginsels gewerk en tog het daar oor baie jare ‘n stadige groei plaasgevind met konsepte, fundamentele benaderings, allengs en stadig, maar daar is tog verskuiwe. Dan word daar gesê dat die gevaar van ‘n verpolitiseerde Konstitusionele Hof tog vermy moet word. Dus word geargumenteer dat termyne korter moet wees. Ek wil radikaal daarvan verskil. Dit moenie ‘n politiek-gelade hof wees nie, en hoe korter die termyn, hoe makliker vir die regering van die dag om kans te hê om sy regbank te laai. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)

[All I can ask is: what difference is there to our ordinary court of appeal? These legal principles are also dealt with and yet over many years a gradual growth occurred, with concepts, fundamental, approaches, slowly but surely, but there were changes. Then it is said that the danger of a politicised Constitutional Court must be avoided. It is therefore argued that terms must be shorter. I want to disagree totally with this. It must not be a politically loaded court, and the shorter the term the easier it would be for the government of the day to have an opportunity to load its Bench.]

But let me state the reason we really support this amendment. The concept of a constitutional state, that is, a state where the sovereignty of Parliament is curtailed by the principle that the court may adjudicate on the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament, was accepted during the Kempton Park negotiations. At issue was whether this authority would be vested in the then Supreme Court of Appeal or in a new separate constitutional court.

The decision was in favour of a separate constitutional court. The main reason was that the then existing Supreme Court did not reflect the diversity of our new order. In terms of the 1994 Constitution, the term of office of judges is seven years. But, members should remember that the Constitutional Court was not entrenched in the constitutional principles as a separate court. However, our final Constitution did make provision for a Constitutional Court and extended the term to what it is now.

Since its inception and to the present day, the Constitutional Court has firmly established itself locally and internationally. A set of principles rapidly developed, and the jurisprudence, based on constitutionality, has and is taking shape. In terms of our present Constitution, all courts can pronounce on the validity of Acts of Parliament, subject, however, to confirmation by the Constitutional Court. This in itself is indicative of how the concept of constitutionality has already permeated our jurisprudence. In fact, it is safe to say that the Bill of Rights, as an inherent part of our Constitution, has become a guiding star in the interpretation and application of our Acts of Parliament. Secondly, the question of constitutionality features prominently in the portfolio committee and in Parliament.

All of this occurred in a remarkably short space of time and speaks volumes for the integrity of our Constitutional Court. It may well be that we shall reach a stage in future when this theoretical basis for the development of our law becomes so ingrained that the court of appeal could appropriately deal with questions of constitutionality. However, for the moment we may rest assured that the Constitutional Court is successfully transforming a legal system that was once based on parliamentary sovereignty to a system based on constitutional sovereignty.

In conclusion, may I thank the chairperson of the portfolio committee, committee members and staff for the way in which we operated this year. The committee sat for no fewer than 390,5 hours this year. We worked to reach consensus in almost all cases and we were able, in almost all instances, to reach such consensus. Our chairperson, the hon Johnny de Lange, deserves praise for his approach in this regard.

Mr G SOLOMON: Chairperson, unlike Dr Delport, I am going to deal with only one issue.

As ‘n mens deurmekaar raak met twee dinge, dan werk dinge somtyds nie uit nie. [Tussenwerpsels.] [If one deals with two issues at once, things sometimes do not work out. [Interjections.]]

Those of us who listened to Question 356, asked by Dr Mulder, and who also listened to the eloquent reply by the Deputy Minister, would have some idea as to the amendment which I am going to talk about.

This amending Bill also deals with an amendment to section 230 of the Constitution. This section deals with the borrowing powers of municipalities. The amendment contained in clause 17 of the Bill allows municipalities to raise loans for capital and current expenditure, and empowers them to bind themselves and future municipalities, in the exercise of their executive and legislative authority, to the loan or investment. Loans for current expenditure may be raised only when necessary for bridging purposes during a fiscal year.

What is the rationale behind this amendment? Local government in South Africa has gone through some profound changes since the new dispensation and particularly after the 2000 local government elections. Besides the implications of the shifting of boundaries and the amalgamations to form 284 new municipalities, the role of municipalities has become more crucial in creating a better life for all in South Africa. In fact, I believe that the growing tip of the democratic process is at the local government level. It is at this level where the democratic process succeeds or fails.

Many national and provincial departments are also considering which of the functions are best performed at local level. These include housing delivery, primary health care and the district health system, water and municipal policing. It is therefore envisaged that municipalities will be playing an increasingly important role in service delivery in order to face the challenges of eradicating poverty and improving the social and economical conditions of ordinary working-class people in South Africa, both rural and urban.

The Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement of the Minister of Finance is particularly encouraging and reassuring in this regard. The Minister conceded that local government faces significant challenges after amalgamating various local authorities into the new councils with new boundaries. The Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement agrees that the major fiscal challenge, particularly to small rural municipalities, is to support their new role through effective revenue mechanisms, as set out in the policy document of the national Treasury:

A large shift in resources to local government strengthens Government’s commitment to expand the delivery of basic municipal infrastructure and to fund free basic services.

This, however, is not coming without the normal very important and responsible conditions from the Minister, as set out in the policy document:

To this end, national Government is expanding its monitoring of developmental outcomes at local level through the introduction of new budget formats and improved reporting requirements that will ensure that municipalities report regularly on income and expenditure, as well as on the outputs of their programmes.

I have also spoken to ANC councillors. They welcome the amendment, but insist on close co-operation between the national Treasury and municipalities in terms of monitoring particularly the operating budgets of municipalities. The operating budgets of municipalities were exceptionally high in the past. In the case of the Cape Town City Council it was 58% when the ANC took over the council and we brought it down to 38%.

What the department is saying to municipalities is that it will assist them to improve financial management locally, but they must spend within their budgets and collect revenues due, with due regard to the circumstances of the poorest of the poor. In practice, we find that major urban municipalities have good and distinct revenue-generating powers and are only marginally dependent on transfers from national Government. Many rural and smaller urban municipalities, however, have much weaker fiscal capacity and depend considerably on transfers from national Government. They might find themselves, therefore, with cash-flow problems, particularly towards the end of the fiscal year.

When they looked at section 230 of the Constitution, the committee, together with the Department of Finance and other role-players, agreed that in order to establish a comprehensive fiscal policy framework for local government the contradictions between the constitutional and legal parameters, principles of public finance and the goals of local government policy must be resolved. In other words, the borrowing framework must not only restore capital market access to municipalities, but must also provide certainty regarding the rights of the borrower and the lender.

This amendment, together with the ongoing budget and finance management reforms, will place local government in a better position to face the new challenges of delivery of more and better quality services to all South Africans on a sustained basis. This will enable municipalities to play their proper role envisaged in the new local government dispensation, namely to tackle the challenge of poverty and improve the social and economic conditions of, particularly, all working-class South Africans, both urban and rural.

The ANC supports this Bill. [Applause.]

Mr M A MZIZI: Chairperson, hon Minister and members, when one is faced with an uphill task, one should always seek advice.

The three Bills that we are debating today, affect the Constitution. The amendment of the Constitution is something that does not occur every year. This is right. One does not easily tinker with the Constitution. One is in fact duty-bound to protect, safeguard and stand behind it. The first Constitution-amending Bill comes five years after the Constitution was approved. After a great deal of soul-searching and after many months of deep thinking, certain changes are being effected.

The IFP wishes that this occasion could have been take to seize the bull by the horns to accommodate traditional leaders. Unfortunately, we are not doing that. We are changing the title of the President of the Constitutional Court, providing for the office of the Deputy Chief Justice, etc. Today, we are also dealing with financial emergencies in municipalities and matters connected therewith. All of these matters are weighty and need attention.

Siyamcela uNgqongqoshe ukuthi ake acabangisise ngale mithetho eshiyekile laphayana kumThethosisekelo. Lokhu kwenza umthwalo wethu ube lukhuni futhi kube lukhuni ukuthi siye phambili. [We appeal to the hon the Minister to think deeply about the laws that were omitted from the Constitution. This makes things difficult for us, even to go forward.]

At the same time, we could have looked at Chapters 7 and 12 of the Constitution with a view to resolving a long-standing matter regarding the role of traditional leaders in relation to the municipalities. It has been suggested to our IFP justice study group that legislation would be enough to deal with a matter that concerns many in our constituencies. If that is so, where is the draft copy of such legislation? Even a rough draft would show us that the deadlock was being resolved.

The first Constitution-amending Bill deals with the concerns of judges and the Government in respect of financial emergencies in municipalities. It does not deal with the concerns of our main constituencies. There is no other development to show that the problem is about to be resolved to the satisfaction of all. For that reason, and that reason alone, we withhold our support for the Bill. It is our expectation that in the interests of co- operative governance, we will reach out to one another and resolve these outstanding matters. For similar reasons, we also withhold our support for the second Constitution-amending Bill. This Bill deals extensively with fiscal matters at provincial and municipality level. Once again, an opportunity is being missed here. Some of the poorest and most disadvantaged people in our country reside in traditional areas. They need to benefit from the municipal expenditure without sacrificing the communal and cultural systems to which they belong.

Provision could have been made in this Bill to accommodate them and that did not happen. The IFP would like to see equal development on every square inch of our national territory. The new dispensation must not leave the soil where our people’s cultural and ancestral roots grow deep without nourishment. It must not do that. In withholding our support, we are expressing the very deep-felt anxiety among the leadership of traditional societies and saying that we should not strip them of their powers or withhold development funds from them. They are crying out to be accommodated, and accommodated they should be.

Finally, I come to Bill 72 of 2001 which has now been renamed and renumbered as Bill 83 of 2001, the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill. This is a Bill which goes to the heart of the principle for which we are arguing. Let us find an accommodation that is in the best interests of our country and those who lead and protect it. Our new democracy is inclusive and it should accommodate all segments of our society. One segment has not been accommodated. In support of the request for accommodation, we withhold our support for all three Bills.

Siyamcela-ke umhlonishwa uNgqongqoshe. Okuhle ukuthi uma umhlonishwa uNgqongqoshe engase akuthathe lokhu akubukisise kahle, uzothola ukuthi nale mikhukhu egcwele lapha emadolobheni kungenxa yokuthi abantu bayasuka emakhosini lena ezindaweni zabo beze emadolobheni ngoba phela kukhona omasipala futhi bazothola okungcono. Asingalahli amakhosi okuyiwona esiwabiza ngokuthi, ``they are the pioneers’’, ababengama-politicians akuqala. Sinaleli lizwe esinalo nje yingoba kwakukhona lawo makhosi. Amanye amakhosi alifela leli lizwe, amanye amakhosi ayijele. Ngisho inkosi yami nje yaKwaZulu uma amalungu engaya laphaya kuleli jele nje elingaphandle kwePhalamende, angathola ukuthi eyami inkosi yake yaba kulelo jele.

Ake sibheke indaba yamakhosi, mayingabi inhlekisa. Angikhulumi ngamakhosi aKwaZulu, abanye bangase bacabange ukuthi ngikhuluma ngamakhosi aKwaZulu kuphela. Amakhosi agcwele izwe lonke. Uma ngabe laba bantu bengakholelwa emakhosini, kulaba abafunda amaBhayibheli mabahambe bayofunda abaseRoma 13:1-5, bazokuzwa-ke ukuthi amakhosi lawa okukhulunywa ngawo ayini. Amakhosi ayekhona kudalo. Asikho isizwe esingenabo ubukhosi. ONgqongqoshe make balubukeze lolu daba, balufakele izibuko. Sengigadle zephuka, angehlele ngezansi. (Translation of Zulu paragraphs follows.)

[We therefore put our request the hon the Minister. What is good about this is that if he considers this seriously he will notice that these shacks surrounding our cities are caused by people moving from the areas of amakhosi to the cities, where there are municipalities that will treat them better. We should not abandon the amakhosi, whom we call the pioneers, or first politicians. We have this country today because of amakhosi. Some amakhosi died for this country and others went to jail. Even my Zulu King, if members could visit the prison outside Parliament, will find that my king was once arrested and put there.

Let us look at the issue of amakhosi. It should not be a joke. I am not talking about the amakhosi of the Zulu people only. Others may think that I am referring to them only. Amakhosi are all over the country. If these people do not believe in amakhosi, they must read Romans 13: 1-5, and they will know who the amakhosi are that we are talking about. Amakhosi were even there in the past. Every nation has its own kingdom. Ministers have to reconsider this issue. They have to look at it carefully, and I would like to stop here.]

Mrs S M CAMERER: Chairperson, I would like to agree with other speakers that in recent days the studious, collegial and co-operative atmosphere in the Portfolio Committee on Justice has really provided a pleasant refuge from the political turmoil outside.

The final form of the two Constitution-amending Bills currently before this House illustrates the important role that should be played by opposition parties, whether in co-operative or adversary mode, in holding the Government to account and persuading the governing party to abandon ill- considered and unwise action which would have set an appalling precedent for constitutional change. When in July Minister Maduna originally published these Bills which suggested radical changes, particularly to the relationship between national, provincial and local government, and which had the effect of weakening provincial powers, there was an outcry. The New NP and the Western Cape government led the way but we were soon joined by none other than Cosatu, organised local government including Salga, a multitude of NGOs, academics, masses of judges and a host of provincial governments, several of whom are run by the ANC.

An ANC Minister knows that he is in trouble when his legislative proposals attract comments such as this one from the ANC-controlled North West provincial government, and I quote:

We reject the proposed constitutional amendments, not only due to their dubious content, which would affect the very core of the existence of the co-operative system of governance, but also because there had been no consultation with provincial governments in relation to these amendments.

To be fair to Minister Maduna, in subsequent correspondence, made available to the portfolio committee, between Minister Manuel and Minister Mufamadi, these two Ministers did shoulder responsibility for most of the proposed changes.

Very wisely, the chairman of our committee, the hon Johnny de Lange, then set to work to build consensus around the proposed amendments which were broadly acceptable, while the rest were rejected. He deserves our congratulations. We in the New NP fully support his approach that, where constitutional amendments are passed, these should preferably be passed on the basis of the widest possible consensus. We can now support these Bills. We would also like to thank the officials for their hard work in getting these Bills into shape.

There were three main problems with the first Constitution-amending Bill. Firstly, it introduced inappropriate provisions to deal with financial emergencies in municipalities. These were the brainchild, apparently, of Treasury officials, and they were told, in no uncertain terms, to go away and think again. Secondly, there was a provision allowing the President to appoint two Deputy Ministers from outside Parliament, without spelling out the rights and obligations of these Deputy Ministers and their accountability, and this is now being rectified.

Thirdly, and most problematically, the proposed legislation introduced changes to the constitutionally entrenched tenure of Constitutional Court judges, putting their tenure on a par with other High Court judges who are governed by ordinary legislation. This proposal has wisely been rejected. The Bench was divided on the issue, with the majority condemning the proposal.

We in the New NP believe it is most important that the tenure of judges of our High Court be guaranteed in the Constitution, with the added protection from political interference this gives. Although all courts have constitutional jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court is in a different league, in that it is able to pronounce on the constitutionality of legislation and, if necessary, to overturn it.

The problems which Constitutional Court judges experience with their conditions of service, which were behind the original proposal, have been addressed, firstly, through a compromise amendment to the Constitution, allowing a modest extension of the tenure, in line with conditions available to other judges in terms of an Act of Parliament. This has now been finalised and, as the hon De Lange told us in great detail, as he had 20 minutes to speak about it, does not detract from the constitutionally entrenched tenure.

Detailed provisions relating to the conditions of service and remuneration of all judges and Constitutional Court judges have now been included in the new Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill, which puts the judges on a par in terms of their conditions of service. This solution to what was naughtily called the ``Chaskalson amendment’’, because of Judge Chaskalson’s impending retirement at the age of 70, we believe is satisfactory.

The other mainly technical provisions in this Bill relate to a decision universally supported in the legal fraternity and judicial circles, that the President of the Constitutional Court should be the Chief Justice. We support that as well, and trust that the incumbent Judge Chaskalson will now be in a position to fill the post of Chief Justice because of these amendments. We would support his appointment, if it is made, as Chief Justice. He is without doubt our pre-eminent judge and will bring honour to the post.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Bill has now been pruned of all its most controversial provisions aimed at allowing direct intervention by national Government and local government, thus bypassing provincial powers, basically because of the collective outrage of organised local government at the proposals. Let us hope that local government will continue to be listened to.

The only controversial provision left is that of changing the composition of the Financial and Fiscal Commission by eliminating the representation of each province and reducing the commission from 22 to nine members for so- called practical considerations''. Although the chairperson of the commission, Murphy Morobe, acknowledged in his submission to the portfolio committee that the reduction in the number of commissioners would indeed result in undermining the constitutional principle of representivity, he nevertheless argued for the reduction because of practical considerations’’. The portfolio committee agreed to the New NP’s proposal of at least increasing the number of provincial representations from two to three to give a greater chance for opposition representation and also to involve the premiers of provinces in both the compilation of the list of candidates and the final choice of provincial representatives. However, we cannot support a provision which does not allow each province to be represented on the commission.

We support the Bill as a whole, but we must note our objection to this clause. [Applause.]

Mr J T MASEKA: Chairperson, hon members, the UDM understands the principle that the Constitution is the supreme law of the country, and should not be lightly tampered with by amending it at the whim of any political party which wishes to advance a particular agenda such as consolidating its political position. Such a practice would erode the democratic character of the Constitution and negatively impact on the transformation process.

The amendment of the Constitution of South Africa regarding the President and Deputy President of the Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the Chief and Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal is long overdue. This amendment will clear up the confusion about the junior and senior judge and the two courts. This amendment provides for the appointment of the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court.

The tenure of Constitutional Court judges is amended by empowering Parliament to pass the Act which expressly extends the term of office. Clause 7 of the Bill makes provision for a Deputy Minister appointed from outside the Assembly to be accountable to Parliament.

Section 230 is amended by adding section 230A, which provides that a council or municipality may, within a framework prescribed by national legislation, bind itself and future councils in the exercise of its executive and legislative authority to the extent necessary in order to secure loans or investments for the municipality. This is a necessary amendment, as it makes it possible for a council or municipality to render services which they could not render without a loan.

The (Judges) Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill provides for the remuneration and conditions of employment of judges of the Constitutional Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court, to the extent that their terms of office, salaries, allowances and gratuities after they retire from active service are covered in this Bill.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Bill is important as it makes provision for national supervision of local administrations if a municipality fails to comply with an obligation in terms of legislation or the Constitution, and to extend the principle that provinces’ equitable shares of the revenue raised nationally are direct charges against the national revenue fund to local governments’ equitable shares.

The UDM supports the Bills. [Applause.]

Ms L MABE: Chairperson, I am not surprised that the hon Sheila Camerer was very happy on the day when some of the premiers differed on constitutional amendments. It was the first time I saw her in such a happy mood. But what is interesting is that those premiers are still ANC members, and they will still support the ANC Government. The hon Delport has indicated that the courts should not be politicised. I really do not understand why people should continue to say that the courts should not politicised, because we have a powerful Bill of Rights and it will protect whoever thinks that the Constitutional Court’s judges may be politicised.

I heard the hon Mzizi saying that the traditional leaders have problems in terms of the amendments to the Constitution, and that they had not been catered for. I believe that the member knows very well that there is a process which the Government is engaged in to ensure that those traditional leaders will be catered for, because the Constitution of this country ensures that traditional leaders have their rights in the governance of this country.

I thought that the hon Mr Mzizi would remember that yesterday, in the debate, the President indicated that Government is committed to the African Renaissance. And I do not understand how, if the Government is committed to the African Renaissance, it is possible that the same Government could ignore the role which has to be played by traditional leaders. With regard to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Bill, I will refer to the amendments which deal with the judiciary and Deputy Ministers. With regard to the judiciary, a justice colloquium was held in October 2000, where the participants from all branches of the legal fraternity reached consensus that there should be one court system with different levels of courts.

There was also an agreement that the President of the Constitutional Court should be the Chief Justice. The amendments are a step towards forming a single court system, as the legacy of the previous dispensation still exists in the judicial system. Therefore, it is important to transform our justice system to comply with constitutional requirements, and this cannot be achieved overnight.

With regard to the first Constitution-amending Bill, which we are debating, clause 15 brings about minor changes, as has already been indicated by the previous speaker, as well as the chairperson of the portfolio committee. The whole section still remains intact and there should be no fear or unease in the minds of people that there have been drastic changes to that section. Section 176 of the Constitution states that a Constitutional Court judge is appointed for a nonrenewable term of 12 years, and must retire at the age of 70. Therefore, there is no security of tenure for these Constitutional Court judges. One must note the great disparity between the benefits of judges of the Constitutional Court and those of other courts in that other judges do not have a nonrenewable term of 12 years, but their security of tenure is entrenched in the Constitution.

The Constitution is the supreme law of the country. Consequently, the Constitutional Court is the highest court in the country and its judges must therefore have security of tenure, just like other judges, in order to attract capacity and potential to this court. The Constitution must provide security of tenure to these judges because they must hold office until they are discharged from active service and they do not retire. We must remember that judges other than Constitutional Court judges hold office until they are discharged. They do not retire from the justice system or from their duties.

The amendment to section 176 states that Constitutional Court judges will hold office for a nonrenewable term of office of 12 years or until they attain the age of 70 years, whichever occurs first, except, as the hon chairperson of the portfolio committee has indicated, where an Act of Parliament extends the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge. Thus, if a 12-year term of office expires and the judge has not reached the age of 70, he or she may continue service in another court for up to 15 years.

However, one must also remember that there is a saying which goes ``once a judge always a judge’’. It would be frustrating to young Constitutional Court judges who have completed a 12-year term of office to receive a monthly salary from the Government whilst performing no service to the state, whereas these judges could continue serving for a few extra years so that they may be useful to the country. It would be a waste of human resources for a judge to retire at the age of 52 years, as a result of being a judge in the Constitutional Court. This would be an unfortunate situation.

The Bill also seeks to ensure that Constitutional Court judges maintain their judicial independence in a climate of security of tenure. However, the big question is: What will the future financial implications be if many Constitutional Court judges retire at the end of a 12-year term of office, even before they reach the age of 60? Because this would mean that we would have many judges who would be earning a salary at the end of the month, but who would be doing nothing for the state. That would be an unfortunate situation.

The Bill also addresses the current problem where the Chief Justice is not a Constitutional Court judge and cannot exercise any jurisdiction over judges of that court. It also clears up the problem in the legal system with regard to the question as to which office constitutes the head of the judiciary in the country. The Bill states that the Chief Justice will be the head of the judiciary and the Constitutional Court. The present Chief Justice will become the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. These amendments are therefore a step towards the rationalisation of the courts and the judicial system, which is a long route and one this department must undertake.

With regard to Deputy Ministers, section 91 (3)(c) of the Constitution states that the President may select no more than two Ministers from outside the Assembly. Clause 7 of the Bill brings section 93, which deals with Deputy Ministers, in line with section 91(3)(c). The amendment states that the President may appoint any number of Deputy Ministers from among the members of the National Assembly and, at the same time, no more than two Deputy Ministers from outside the Assembly, to assist members of the Cabinet.

The amendments therefore bring more skills into Parliament. A new clause, section 93(2), states:

Deputy Ministers appointed in terms of subsection (1)(b) are accountable to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.

Section 92(2) states:

Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.

Thus, Ministers appointed from outside the Assembly are accountable to Parliament. The same must apply to Deputy Ministers appointed from outside the Assembly.

Currently, section 54 gives Cabinet members who are not members of the National Assembly the right to attend and speak in the Assembly, but not to vote. The amendment of this section extends this right to Deputy Ministers appointed in a similar manner, and the amendment to section 58 is technical as it gives Deputy Ministers the privileges accorded to Cabinet members and members of the National Assembly in the Constitution. [Time expired.] [Applause.]

The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: Order! May I solicit the assistance of the Whips in ensuring that we have better order?

Mr S N SWART: Chairperson, hon Minister, I would particularly like to thank the Hon Gwen Mahlangu for coming to listen to my speech, and I trust that she has some good news about the asbestos case.

The constitutional amendment which undoubtedly elicited the most public debate related to the life tenure of the Constitutional Court judges. Whilst a compromise has been reached, the comments by the Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial division, Judge Ngoepe are worth repeating:

It has always been accepted that the Constitutional Court wields immense political power. Very importantly, as the apex Court, it has the final say on issues placed before it. As it has the last word on the interpretation and application of the Constitution, its pronouncements influence the nation’s political course. Also, as its definitions and understanding of the values enshrined in the Constitution constitute a bench mark, its pronouncements materially influence the nation’s moral course.

An illustration of the exercise of this moral and political power can be found in a 1999 judgment which declared section 25 (5) of the Aliens Control Act to be unconstitutional. The subsection omitted to give persons who are partners in same-sex life partnerships the benefits it extends to married spouses under this section. For the very first time, and in order to remedy what it found to be a constitutional defect in this Act, the Constitutional Court decided to add words to legislation. The words added were ``partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership’’. This clearly illustrates the political and moral power that the Constitutional Court wields and begs the question as to why the Court, in that instance, did not merely allow Parliament to remedy this legislation, as it normally does when legislation is found to be unconstitutional.

Whilst the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have the final say in their own spheres, they differ fundamentally in the way they operate. Constitutional Court judges sit en banque, and should these judges have been granted life tenure, the possibility of a different set of judges reconsidering their previous decision on any issue would be well high impossible. This is unlike the Supreme Court of Appeal which does not sit en banque, and can and has reconsidered its previous judgments. As Judge President Ngoepe went on to say:

This would be highly undesirable in a court with a final say on inter alia political and moral issues. It is important to bear in mind that the reconsideration of a previous decision by a completely different set of minds is a necessary mechanism of self-control for a court whose decisions are not appealable.

The ACDP was thus opposed to the life tenure for Constitutional Court judges and welcomed the reversion to the limited tenure provisions contained in section 176 of the Constitution. As far as the financial amendments are concerned, we agreed that it was necessary that the Minister of Finance should have control over the proliferation of levies emanating from departments desirous of increasing their financial powers and we support this amendment.

Having considered the various amendments, the ACDP also welcomes the reconsideration of clauses relating to local government intervention. We support the amendments to the Constitution and the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill.

In conclusion, we would like to add to what the previous speaker said in commending our chairman the hon Johnny de Lange, for the gracious, gentlemanly and genteel manner in which he chaired the committee, particularly in dealing with us as opposition members, and for binding us together as a team. [Applause.]

The DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON OF COMMITTEES: Order! Hon members, the noise level is unacceptably high. You cannot converse in a manner meant to disrupt the right of the speaker at the podium to be heard. You may make conversation, but in subdued tones. Please assist the Chair in keeping and maintaining the decorum of the House.

Mr P H K DITSHETELO: Chairperson, the first Constitution-amending Bill is critical, because it will enable different organs of state to operate constitutionally, as the existing Act did not cater for certain aspects as required by the same Constitution.

We know already that there was an outcry, and rightfully so, when the Deputy Minister of Education was appointed. The Constitution did not cater for this appointment. The Act had far-reaching implications as it tested the legislature’s ability to make rules and monitor their implementation, so as to ascertain whether we flout the same rules we make.

The action to appoint the Deputy Minister was done with good intentions, I would like to believe, but the procedures adopted to appoint him were unconstitutional. We also welcome the approach to amend the Constitution to enable local authorities to deliver so as to empower a municipal council to bind itself in the exercise of legislative authority. It is also a well- known fact that some of our municipalities are not financially viable and may need special measures, created by Parliament, to deal with their financial needs.

The amendment to change the title of President of the Constitutional Court'' toChief Justice’’ also addresses the confusion in jurisdiction regarding who should preside over the election of political office-bearers. This amendment would also address this constitutional challenge.

We support these amendments with a view to preventing our organs of states from operating ultra vires. It is not only relevant, but crucial that our men and women … [Time expired.]

Dr M S MOGOBA: Chairperson, apologies to Miss Rajbally. The PAC supports this amendment. One of the amendments we wish to comment on concerns the appointment of Deputy Ministers. We support this change as the limitations on the President in these appointments were never clear to us in the first place. We would still question why the number of appointments is limited to two.

If, in the future, the President seriously wished to appoint more Deputy Ministers under this section, it would mean a new amendment would be required. It is a bad constitution that responds to a single situation or individual such as, for instance, the Sobukwe laws of 1964 and 1970.

The amendments affecting the Chief Justice bring about some definite improvements, resulting in one judge becoming the head of the whole judicial system. The old system of two parallel systems under two presiding officers is thus corrected. The duties of the Chief Justice are clearly outlined. The retirement age for judges of the Constitutional Court is also brought in line with that of other judges. This is also supported, provided the amendment is not being made for one judge only, as stated above.

The PAC supports the above amendments, but we wish to add that it is a pity that the amendment of section 25 was not included in these amendments. Several parties and members have assured us that the two-thirds majority required for this amendment could be easily obtained. This amendment was urgently required to strengthen the arm of the Government in making land available for the previously disadvantaged communities.

A new democratic South Africa is meaningless, unless the majority of the citizens of this country obtain land that is desperately needed for housing, agriculture, recreation, business, mining, etc. After sunset it has become very dark, and we patiently and hopefully await sunrise.

Miss S RAJBALLY: Chairperson, the amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, made in this Constitution-amending Bill, deal with the improvement of an organ of state, namely the judiciary, the appointment of Deputy Ministers and local government.

Compiling the Constitution of South Africa was a joint, timeous and stressful process, and adjustments are expected that would inculcate the improvement of its content. The adjustment made with regard to the office of authority within the judiciary is noted. However, the extension of the term of office of Constitutional Court judges has raised eyebrows, as regards what mechanism has been put in place to ensure that the independence granted to this body remains intact.

The second Constitution-amending Bill, appears adequately to address issues that caused practical difficulties in the implementation of the Constitution.

It is felt that the decision by the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development to create a separate Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill, has certainly avoided the introduction of a Bill that is cluttered and cumbersome in terms of amending legislation, as would have been the case if it was included within the Judicial Officers Amendment Bill. The Bill appears to attend to the remuneration and conditions of employment of judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court.

All three Bills, discussed in this debate, appear to introduce positive changes and adjustments and, if incorporated effectively, will serve to correct that which needed to be amended.

Noting the amendments made to the Constitution, the MF continues to support the supremacy of its authority and upholds all duties to the Constitution as the supreme law of the state. The MF supports the two amending Bills pertaining to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as well as the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill. [Applause.]

Mr C AUCAMP: Chairperson, of course the AEB welcomes the ruling that two Deputy Ministers may be appointed from outside the National Assembly. This amendment will make it possible for the AEB to appoint another MP the day its leader is appointed as Deputy Minister. [Laughter.] Well, if one could appoint a Botha what is wrong with an Aucamp? [Laughter.] The AEB supports both the Constitution-amending Bills and the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill.

Let me make a few remarks. Firstly, the provision for appointing two Deputy Ministers from outside the National Assembly provides for more inclusive government, but it also provides an extra benefit, if I understand it correctly, in that it will enable the President to appoint a specialist in a particular field, if needed.

Tweedens, die bepaling dat die President van die Konstitusionele Hof die Hoofregter van Suid-Afrika word, is in orde. Hoewel die Appèlhof en die Konstitusionele Hof op afsonderlike terreine werksaam is, is dit tóg so dat die Konstitusionele Hof die finale eindpunt van die regsproses is. Verder is dit ook ‘n simboliese bevestiging van die feit dat Suid-Afrika ‘n regstaat is met konstitusionele en nie parlementêre soewereiniteit nie.

‘n Termyn van 12 jaar, of in party gevalle 15 jaar, vir ‘n regter van die Konstitusionele Hof, is ook positief. Konstitusionele sake is ‘n gespesialiseerde terrein, en die vrug van hierdie spesialisasie kan verlore gaan as die termyn te kort is. Ook is ons oortuig dat die langer termyn van regters in die Konstitusionele Hof eerder die onafhanklikheid van die regbank teenoor regeringsinmenging sal versterk, as in die geval van korter termyne waar die aanstellingsgeleenthede veel meer sal wees.

Die AEB steun die verkleining van die Finansiële en Fiskale Kommissie van 22 na 9 lede, want 22 lede is amper ‘n sinode. Lomp en oorlaaide kommissies is kontra-produktief en vaartbelyning moet die wagwoord wees.] (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)

[Secondly, the provision that the President of the Constitutional Court becomes the Chief Justice of South Africa is in order. Although the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court operate in separate spheres, it is still a fact that the Constitutional Court is the final point of the legal process. It is furthermore also a symbolic confirmation of the fact that South Africa is a constitutional state with constitutional and not parliamentary sovereignty.

A term of 12 years, or in some instances 15 years, for a judge of the Constitutional Court is also positive. Constitutional matters are of a specialised nature, and the fruits of this specialisation can be lost if the term is too short. We are also convinced that the longer terms of judges in the Constitutional Court will rather strengthen the independence of the judiciary against government interference, as opposed to shorter terms where there will be far more appointment opportunities.

The AEB supports the reduction in the size of the Financial and Fiscal Commission from 22 members to 9, because 22 members is virtually a synod. Unwieldy and overloaded commissions are counter-productive and streamlining should be the watchword.]

The AEB also supports the empowering of local governments to borrow long- term funds, as long as the accompanying legislation ensures that sound fiscal principles are applied, and we appreciate the omission of the intended restriction of the powers of local governments.

Finally, let us not regard these constitutional changes as the final ones. Constitutional developments addressing the position of traditional leaders and more effectively accommodating, the progressive nature of this constituency, still have to be made … [Time expired.]

The DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON OF COMMITTEES: Order! When the hon member is appointed Deputy Minister, he will have the extra speaking time. [Laughter.] Ms N MAHLAWE: Chairperson, I have been called upon to speak on the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill, and I am going to do exactly that and nothing else. The hon the Minister and the hon chairperson of the portfolio committee have already made reference to the amendments in this particular Bill, and I am not going to repeat them.

The Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill provides for the remuneration and conditions of employment of judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts and matters connected therewith. It seeks to repeal the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act of 1989, and introduce legislation regulating the remuneration and conditions of employment of all judges in South Africa.

It also seeks to make the head of the Constitutional Court the Chief Justice of South Africa, in line with the proposed amendments, and to include the offices of the Deputy Chief Justice and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the legislation regulating the remuneration and conditions of employment of all judges.

The Bill provides for transitional arrangements so as to recognise the active service performed by judges of the former TBVC states, that is Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, to place these judges on a par with all the other judges of South Africa and to amend the legislation in respect of widows of judges who receive a pension.

I shall now look into some substantive issues. Clause 2 of the Bill contains the following provisions relating to the annual salary of Constitutional Court judges and other judges. It provides for an allowance of R3 500 per annum to a Constitutional Court judge, in addition to an annual salary which is paid at a rate determined by the President by proclamation in the Gazette. Such an allowance is not taxable unless Parliament expressly provides otherwise. The annual salary and allowance shall be paid as a direct charge against the National Revenue Fund. The proclamation may be issued with effect from a date which may not be earlier than one year prior to the date of the proclamation, and a copy of such a proclamation shall be submitted to Parliament within 14 days after publication thereof.

As regards the discharge of Constitutional Court judges and other judges from active service, the Bill provides that a judge shall be discharged from active service on the date on which he or she attains the age of 70 years, if he or she has completed a period of active service of not less than 10 years. If on that date, he or she has not completed 10 years’ active service, he or she shall be discharged on the date immediately following the day on which he or she completes a period of 10 years’ active service.

If a judge has attained the age of 65 years and has performed 15 years’ active service and informs the Minister that he or she no longer wishes to perform active service, such judge shall be discharged by the President from active service. If a judge is incapable of performing his or her official duties due to a permanent infirmity of mind or body, he or she may be discharged by the President.

Clause 3(1) deals with the discharge of Constitutional Court judges. A Constitutional Court judge who holds office in terms of section 176(1) of the Constitution, must be discharged from active service on the date on which he or she attains the age of 70 years or has completed a 12 year term of office as a Constitutional Court judge. He or she may also be discharged on the grounds of permanent infirmity of mind or body or if he or she requests such a discharge, and the President will discharge him if he deems it fit to do so.

Clause 5 of the Bill deals with the salary payable to Constitutional Court judges or judges after discharge from active service and states that after discharge from active service such a judge shall be paid a salary in accordance with the formula A/B x C. A represents the annual salary applicable to the highest office held by the Constitutional Court judge or judge concerned, B represents 15 and C represents the period in years of active service of the said judge.

Clause 6 of the Bill provides that a Constitutional Court judge or judge should be paid a gratuity after discharge from active service, in addition to any salary payable to him or her.

Clause 7 refers to the performance of service by Constitutional Court judges and judges after they have been discharged from active service. A Constitutional Court judge or judge who has not attained 75 years of age must be available to perform service for a period which, in aggregate, amounts to three months a year. If he or she has attained 75 years of age, he or she may perform service on a voluntary basis.

Clause 9 provides for the surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court judge or other judge who dies while performing active service. She or he shall receive an amount equal to two thirds of the salary which was payable to that particular Constitutional Court judge or other judge. If a gratuity would have been paid or payable to that particular judge who was discharged from active services, such gratuity shall be payable to the surviving spouse, and this is in addition to any other amounts payable to the spouse.

A motor vehicle owned by the state may be made available to a Constitutional Court judge or other judge who holds office in a permanent or acting capacity for use in the course of his or her official functions as well as for his or her private purposes.

Finally, this Bill makes transitional arrangements for a judge in active service, in terms of Act 27 of 1989 of Bophuthatswana and Decree 19 of 1990 of the former Transkei. These judges also have to be put on a par with all judges in South Africa. [Applause.]

The MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Chairperson, allow me first and foremost to thank all the hon members and all the parties that participated in this debate. I am personally very happy that we have concluded the debate in the way we did. I have no doubt that almost all parties represented here are going to vote in favour of these three Bills.

The position of the IFP is unfortunate and regrettable, because there is a process that Cabinet has embarked upon to address the question that hon member Mzizi has quite legitimately raised. I personally have no doubt that the process may be too slow, too complex, too cumbersome. Nonetheless, there is this process that is attempting to address the problem that the hon member has legitimately identified.

We would, indeed, have been happier if the IFP, this time around, associated itself with these Bills, because, as will be remembered as regards an earlier occasion, the IFP took a similar stance with regard to constitutional development in this country.

A few remarks have been made which I think do warrant some response. The first issue was that the Constitutional Court wields tremendous political power. It does not. All our higher courts, as a result of a deliberate choice that we made as the people of the Republic of South Africa, wield the awesome power of judicial review. However, none of our courts are thus transformed into a site of political power. They remain very much courts of law, and that includes the Constitutional Court. So, no one is right, not even a judge president, in suggesting that the Constitutional Court, by virtue of being a constitutional court, is a political court. We do not have political courts.

The only time this country had a political court was when the NP of old decided to empower Parliament to do judicial work in the 1950s, in response to the constitutional crisis around the coloured vote. We do not have that in this country.

It has been suggested that the president of Azapo was appointed as a Deputy Minister unconstitutionally. No, that was not the case. The President acted in terms of section 93 of the Constitution, which allows him to appoint any member of the National Assembly as a Deputy Minister if he so chooses. So there is nothing unconstitutional about that. We are not, in other words, addressing an issue of unconstitutionality by the amendment that affects Deputy Ministers.

It has also been asked why only two Ministers. I want to say that this is in line with the choice that we made when we enacted the provision of section 91(3)(c) of the Constitution, which allows the President to appoint no more than two Ministers of Cabinet from outside this Assembly. So, indeed, the amendment that this House has adopted is intended to bring the appointment of Deputy Ministers in line with that position.

Lastly, a suggestion has been made that we have to examine section 25, viz the property clause in the Constitution, with regard to the issue of land. I do no think that this is necessary, because that is not where the problem lies. The property clause does not disempower us if we want to address the issue of land. We can expropriate any property we so choose, but the problem, I suspect, and personally believe, lies elsewhere.

There is no need for us to tamper with the property clause unless, of course, we deliberately choose to cause economic instability unnecessarily

• cutting off our noses in order to spite our beautiful faces. [Applause.]

Debate concluded.

Question put: That the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Bill [B 68B - 2001] be read a second time.

As there was no objection, the Speaker announced that, for the Bill to be passed, a supporting vote of at least two thirds of the members of the National Assembly was required.

Members were therefore requested to register their names in support of the Bill.

AYES - 279: Abram, S; Ainslie, A R; Andrew, K M; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Aucamp, C; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Borman, G M; Botha, N G W; Buthelezi, M N; Cachalia, I M; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chiwayo, L L; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Coetzee-Kasper, M P; Cronin, J P; Cupido, P W; Cwele, S C; Da Camara, M L; De Lange, J H; Delport, J T; Diale, L N; Dithebe, S L; Ditshetelo, P H K; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Doidge, G Q M; Dowry, J J; Du Toit, D C; Duma, N M; Durand, J; Dyani, M M Z; Ebrahim, E I; Ellis, M J; Erwin, A; Fankomo, F C; Farrow, S B; Fihla, N B; Fraser-Moleketi, G J; Frolick, C T; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gibson, D H M; Gillwald, C E; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Gore, V C; Govender, P; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hangana, N E; Heine, R J; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Hogan, B A; Holomisa, S P; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kalyan, S V; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kasrils, R; Kati, J Z; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Koornhof, G W; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Lee, T D; Lekgoro, M K; Lekgoro, M M S; Lishivha, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Lowe, C M; Lyle, A G; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Mabudafhasi, T R; Madlala-Routledge, N C; Maduna, P M; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Magwanishe, G; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Mahomed, F; Maimane, D S; Maine, M S; Makanda, W G; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Maluleke, D K; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maphoto, L I; Mapisa-Nqakula, N N Martins, B A D; Masala, M M; Maseka, J T; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbadi, L M; Mbete, B; Mbombo, N D; Mfundisi, I S; Mguni, B A; Mlambo-Ngcuka, P G; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Mngomezulu, G P; Mnumzana, S K; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mogoba, M S; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Mongwaketse, S J; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpahlwa, M; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mtsweni, N S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncube, B; Ndou, R S; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Nene, N M; Newhoudt- Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngubeni, J M; Ngwane, L B; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Njobe, M A A; Nkomo, A S; Nobunga, B J; Nonkonyana, M; Nqakula, C; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, M B; Ntuli, R S; Ntuli, S B; Nzimande, L P M; Odendaal, W A; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Oosthuizen, G C; Pahad, A G H; Pahad, E G; Phala, M J; Pheko, S E M; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Radebe, B A; Radebe, J T; Rajbally, S; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Scott, M I; Sekgobela, P S; Semple, J A; September, C C; September, R K; Shilubana, T P; Shope, N R; Sigcau, S N; Sigabi, B N; Sigwela, E M; Sikakane, M R; Simmons, S; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Skweyiya, Z S T; Smith, V G; Smuts, M; Solo, B M; Solomon, G; Sonjica, B P; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Thabethe, E; Tinto, B; Tolo, L J; Tshivhase, T J; Tshwete, S V; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Annelizé); Van Wyk, J F; Van Wyk, N; Waters, M; Xingwana, L M T; Zita, L; Zondo, R P.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Bill [B 68B - 2001] accordingly agreed to in terms of section 74(3)(a) of the Constitution.

Bill read a second time.

Question put: That the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Bill [B 78B - 2001] be read a second time.

As there was no objection, the Speaker announced that, for the Bill to be passed, a supporting vote of at least two thirds of the members of the National Assembly was required.

Members were therefore requested to register their names in support of the Bill.

AYES - 274: Abram, S; Ainslie, A R; Andrew, K M; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Aucamp, C; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Borman, G M; Botha, N G W; Buthelezi, M N; Cachalia, I M; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chiwayo, L L; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Coetzee-Kasper, M P; Cronin, J P; Cupido, P W; Cwele, S C; Da Camara, M L; De Lange, J H; Delport, J T; Diale, L N; Dithebe, S L; Ditshetelo, P H K; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Doidge, G Q M; Dowry, J J; Du Toit, D C; Duma, N M; Durand, J; Dyani, M M Z; Ebrahim, E I; Eglin, C W; Ellis, M J; Erwin, A; Fankomo, F C; Farrow, S B; Fihla, N B; Frolick, C T; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gibson, D H M; Gillwald, C E; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Gore, V C; Govender, P; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hangana, N E; Heine, R J; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Hogan, B A; Holomisa, S P; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kalyan, S V; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kasrils, R; Kati, J Z; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Lee, T D; Lekgoro, M K; Lekgoro, M M S; Leshivha, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Lowe, C M; Lyle, A G; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Mabudafhasi, T R; Madlala-Routledge, N C; Maduna, P M; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Magwanishe, G; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Mahomed, F; Maimane, D S; Maine, M S; Makanda, W G; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Maluleke, D K; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maphoto, L I; Mapisa-Nqakula, N N; Martins, B A D; Masala, M M; Maseka, J T; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbadi, L M; Mbombo, N D; Mfundisi, I S; Mguni, B A; Mlambo-Ngcuka, P G; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Mngomezulu, G P; Mnumzana, S K; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mogoba, M S; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Mongwaketse, S J; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpahlwa, M; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mtsweni, N S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncube, B; Ndou, R S; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Nene, N M; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngubeni, J M; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Njobe, M A A; Nkomo, A S; Nobunga, B J; Nonkonyana, M; Nqakula, C; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, M B; Ntuli, R S; Ntuli, S B; Nzimande, L P M; Odendaal, W A; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Oosthuizen, G C; Pahad, E G; Phala, M J; Pheko, S E M; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Radebe, B A; Rajbally, S; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Scott, M I; Sekgobela, P S; Semple, J A; September, C C; September, R K; Shilubana, T P; Shope, N R; Sigabi, B N; Sigcau, S N; Sigwela, E M; Sikakane, M R; Simmons, S; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Skweyiya, Z S T; Smith, V G; Smuts, M; Solo, B M; Solomon, G; Sonjica, B P; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Thabethe, E; Tinto, B; Tolo, L J; Tshivhase, T J; Tshwete, S V; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Annelizé); Van Wyk, J F; Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zita, L; Zondo, R P.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Bill [B 78B - 2001] accordingly agreed to in terms of section 74(3)(a) of the Constitution.

Bill read a second time.

Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Bill [B 83 - 2001] (introduced as Judicial Officers Amendment Bill [B 72 - 2001] read a second time.

                          NOTICES OF MOTION

Mr N M NENE: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:

That the House -

(1) notes the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement delivered in this House on Tuesday, 30 October 2001;

(2) recognises that this statement sets fiscal policy firmly on a growth path;

(3) welcomes the increased spending on social spending, in particular the large increases in funding to combat the HIV/Aids epidemic over the next three years;

(4) further welcomes the reduction of personal taxes for the coming year; and

(5) congratulates the Minister of Finance, Mr Manuel, on the exemplary management of the economy which has resulted in consistent growth, ever lower inflation rates, increasingly efficient revenue collection and resistance to global economic shocks.

Mrs P W CUPIDO: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:

That the House -

(1) notes the impossible position in which the Premier of the Western Cape, Gerald Morkel, was placed by the New NP leader’s betrayal of opposition voters;

(2) recognises that Mr Morkel has had to choose between the wishes of his voters and the authority of the party bosses;

(3) acknowledges that by choosing the voters Mr Morkel risks losing his job; and (4) commends him for making that tough choice and staying true to the mandate given to him by the people of the Western Cape.

[Interjections.] [Applause.]

Mr J H SLABBERT: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the IFP:

That the House -

(1) notes with great sadness that 10 people, including two children, were killed and 19 seriously injured when the bus in which they were travelling overturned near Machadodorp, Mpumalanga, on Friday, 26 October 2001;

(2) conveys its deepest sympathies and condolences to the families of the deceased, and prays for the full recovery of the injured; and

(3) urges all motorists to take care while on the road, especially with the holiday season fast approaching. Mr L M KGWELE: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:

That the House -

(1) notes -

   (a)  with appreciation, the publication of the Draft Revised National
       Curriculum Statement by the Minister of Education;


   (b)  that  an  extensive  consultation  process  has  been  followed,
       including public comment and hearings, in order to ensure  broad
       participation in the review process; and


   (c)   that  despite  unfounded  objections  from  some  narrow-minded
       elements who still resist change,  the  Draft  Curriculum  seeks
       responsibly and with great care to inculcate  knowledge,  skills
       and values in our young people  preparing  for  adulthood  in  a
       democratic society; and

(2) therefore congratulates the Minister of Education and his dedicated team on their endeavour to make our curriculum relevant for the 21st century, and urges them to hold fast in their important task.

[Applause.]

Mr J DURAND: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:

That the House -

(1) notes that -

   (a)  the DA lost its court case against  the  Johannesburg  Executive
       Mayor;


   (b)   this  exercise  places  a  severe  financial  burden   on   the
       financially embarrassed DA; and


   (c)  vast sums of donor funds have been wasted in order to enable  DA
       leaders to sit  in  mayoral  committees  with  the  ANC  in  the
       Johannesburg Metro; and   (2) further notes the DA's hypocritical stance, in that  in  the  Western
   Cape they  are  not  interested  in  becoming  part  of  co-operative
   governance in the interest of all people of  South  Africa,  but  are
   rather  spreading  disinformation  which  creates  confusion  amongst
   councillors who must serve the people.

Ms A VAN WYK: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the UDM: That the House -

(1) expresses the view that judicial procedure cannot and should not be compromised if justice is to be done, as nearly happened when the Scorpions and the National Intelligence Agency installed hidden cameras in a Pagad case courtroom;

(2) notes that this highlights the lack of co-ordination between departments in the criminal justice system;

(3) calls on the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development to ensure that the Scorpions do not act as a law unto themselves, and that they respect the Constitution and laws of the country; and

(4) calls on the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and the Minister of Safety and Security urgently to implement co- ordinated plans to deal with the complex issue of organised crime and urban terror, for it is clear that as long as they proceed without a proper strategy and co-ordinated management, the criminals will escape justice.

Mrs B M NTULI: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC: That the House -

(1) notes with concern the increase in incidents of child rape:

   (a)  the gang rape of a nine-month-old child by six men;


   (b)  a grandfather who raped his infant granddaughter in Kimberley;
   (c)  the report of another child rape incident in the Free State; and


   (d)  a dozen other unreported incidents;

(2) further notes that the ANC Women’s League plans to hold a march to highlight the problem of child abuse and child rape;

(3) believes that child abuse and child rape constitute barbaric, deviant behaviour which must be met by the full wrath of the law;

(4) condemns child abuse and child rape; and

(5) calls on the communities to mobilise and to co-operate with police to eradicate this evil from our communities.

[Applause.]

Mr L M GREEN: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:

That the House -

(1) notes -

   (a)  that yesterday the leader  of  the  ACDP,  Rev  K  R  J  Meshoe,
       pertinently put particular questions to the hon President of the
       Republic during the debate on the new partnership  for  Africa's
       development;


   (b)  that regrettably the  hon  the  President  did  not  answer  the
       questions directly, particularly those pertaining to the cost of
       the peacekeeping operation in Burundi, notwithstanding the  fact
       that the information was at his disposal, as is indicated in the
       President's letter contained in today's Announcements,  Tablings
       and Committee Reports;


   (c)  that the Deputy President in his response to a similar  question
       by the UDM on 17 October 2001, stated: ``There is absolutely  no
       cost''; and


   (d)   with  concern  that,  according  to  the  Presidential   letter
       submitted to the Speaker, the cost will be R1,5 billion and that
       at this stage there is no guarantee of donor funding,  with  the
       result that the South African taxpayer might have  to  foot  the
       bill;

(2) notwithstanding the above, supports the call of the Minister of Defence to church congregations to pray for the safety of the troops, particularly in view of the fact that no cease-fire has been signed and that their lives are at risk because of the poor logistical back- up …

[Time expired.]

Mnr P J GROENEWALD: Mev die Speaker, hiermee gee ek kennis dat ek tydens die volgende sitting sal voorstel:

Dat die Huis kennis neem dat -

(1) die huidige interne gevegte in die DA en die Nuwe NP die geloofwaardigheid van politici by die kiesers benadeel en hulle negatief beïnvloed teenoor alle politieke partye;

(2) hierdie gevoel onder kiesers kan veroorsaak dat kiesers apaties word teenoor politiek en aanleiding kan gee daartoe dat hulle besluit om nie deel te neem aan toekomstige verkiesings nie;

(3) die Vryheidsfront ‘n beroep doen op kiesers om nie die roete van onbetrokkenheid te volg nie, maar eerder betrokke te bly en daarmee seggenskap te behou in die bepaling van hulle toekoms in hierdie land; en

(4) die VF ‘n party is wat konsekwent optree, gegrond is op vaste beginsels en ingestel is op politieke oplossings wat tot voordeel van alle kiesers in Suid-Afrika sal wees, en daarom ‘n beroep doen op kiesers om die VF te steun in hul poging om hierdie wen-wen-oplossing te verwesenlik. (Translation of Afrikaans notice of motion follows.)

[Mr P J GROENEWALD: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that during the next sitting I shall move:

That the House notes that -

(1) the current internal struggles within the DA and the New NP are harmful to politicians’ credibility with voters, making them negatively disposed towards all political parties;

(2) this feeling among voters may make them apathetic towards politics and may prompt their decision not to participate in future elections; (3) the FF appeals to voters not to follow the route of apathy but rather to remain involved, thereby retaining a say in the determining of their future in this country; and

(4) the FF is a party which acts consistently, based on sound principles and attuned to political solutions that will be advantageous to all South Africa’s voters, and therefore appeals to voters to support the FF in their effort to achieve this win-win solution.]

Ms S B NQODI: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:

That the House -

(1) notes that the New Partnership for Africa’s Development received widespread support during the debate that took place in the House yesterday, 31 October 2001;

(2) believes that the overwhelming support this plan received, reflects the success of the ANC-led Government in mobilising all stakeholders in our society to embrace the needs and interests of the continent and to work towards its revival; and

(3) commends the Government and President Thabo Mbeki, together with his counterparts in other African countries, for working on the elaborate plan which will make this century an African century.

Mrs G M BORMAN: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move: That the House -

(1) notes that the majority of DA councillors have pledged their support to the DA and to fulfilling the mandate they received from the voters;

(2) expresses its appreciation for the commitment of these councillors to do their work and deliver services to all the people;

(3) believes that the ANC’s intolerance of opposition is a danger signal for healthy multiparty democracy; and

(4) commends those councillors who continue to put the interests of the people first.

[Applause.]

Mr M F CASSIM: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:

That the House, whereas -

(1) the advent of democracy in South Africa created a constitutional dispensation within which women could for the first time aspire to the highest positions in the country in all spheres of human endeavour, and play pivotal roles in all these areas, to unlock the full potential of the nation and to serve with distinction the cause and future of democracy and humanity; and

(2) the large-scale entrance of women into politics, business and the professions, amongst other activities, is a clear and distinctive signal that ours is indeed an open and all-embracing democracy with in-built provisions for stability and sustainability,

therefore resolves to pay great and rousing tribute to all the women in our country who through their vision, position and commitment give us the promise and the certainty that South Africa’s democracy is indeed builton a solid foundation that will sustain it and support it far into the future.

[Applause.] Mr B MTHEMBU: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:

That the House -

(1) notes that the Physical Science paper was leaked in Gauteng;

(2) further notes that -

   (a)  two matric pupils have been barred from writing examinations and
       could face criminal prosecution; and


   (b)  the problem of leakage has been confined to Gauteng;

(3) commends the Government on taking stringent security measures to ensure that the results are credible; and

(4) calls on all the communities to co-operate with the Department of Education and law-enforcement officers to expose the perpetrators of this corruption. Mnr S SIMMONS: Mev die Speaker, ek gee kennis dat ek tydens die volgende sitting van die Raad sal voorstel:

Dat die Huis -

(1) kennis neem van Nobel-pryswenner F W de Klerk se verklaring dat die inisiatiewe van Marthinus van Schalkwyk vir die vestiging van ‘n meer inklusiewe model van regering verwelkom word;

(2) voorts kennis neem dat die DA se lot dié van ‘n krimpende minderheidsparty sonder invloed sal word, soos mnr Ian Smith se party na Zimbabwe se onafhanklikwording; (3) erken dat die land ‘n spesiale samewerkingsmodel op die drie regeringsvlakke benodig om goeie regering te bevorder;

(4) van mening is dat die volgende beginsels in die proses ingebou word:

   (a)  elke deelnemende party se identiteit  en  outonomie  moet  erken
       word;
   (b)  die vertrekpunt moet wees om 'n  ooreenkoms  te  bereik  oor  'n
       bindende beleidsraamwerk;


   (c)  deelnemende partye het die reg om in die openbaar te verskil oor
       sake waaroor konsensus nie bereik kon word nie; en


   (d)  enige samewerkingsmodel moet so inklusief as moontlik wees; en

(5) ‘n beroep op alle Suid-Afrikaners doen om hulle ondersteuning aan die nuwe inisiatief van Marthinus van Schalkwyk te gee. (Translation of Afrikaans notice of motion follows.)

[Mr S SIMMONS: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:

That the House -

(1) notes a statement by Nobel Prize winner F W de Klerk welcoming the initiatives by Marthinus van Schalkwyk towards the establishment of a more inclusive model of government; (2) further notes that the DA is destined to become a shrinking minority party devoid of influence, such as Mr Ian Smith’s party after Zimbabwe’s independence;

(3) acknowledges that the country needs a special model of co-operation in all three tiers of government in order to promote good governance;

(4) is op the opinion that the following principles should be incorporated in this process:

   (a)  the identity and autonomy of each participating  party  must  be
       recognised;


   (b)  the point of departure should be to reach consensus on a binding
       policy framework;


   (c)  participating parties have the right  to  differ  in  public  on
       matters regarding which consensus could not be reached; and


   (d)  any model of co-operation should be as  inclusive  as  possible;
       and

(5) appeals to all South Africans to lend their support to the new initiative by Marthinus van Schalkwyk.]

                   DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO BURUNDI

                         (Draft Resolution)

The ACTING CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY: Madam Speaker, I move without notice:

That the House -

(1) notes that SANDF troops have been deployed to Burundi to assist in the securing of the transitional government;

(2) recognises the contribution these troops will make in the transition to peace and stability in the region; and

(3) wishes the troops every success in their mission and a safe return on completion of their duties.

Agreed to. Mr M T GONIWE: Madam Speaker, on a point of order: Given the explanation with regard to Burundi, would you afford the hon Mr Green the opportunity to withdraw his confusing motion?

The SPEAKER: Order! If Mr Green wishes to say anything he will indicate that to me. He does not need someone else to indicate it. [Interjections.]

Mr L M GREEN: Madam Speaker, may I address you on that point?

The SPEAKER: Order! On which point, the one made by Mr Goniwe?

Mr L M GREEN: Yes, Madam Speaker.

The SPEAKER: Order! No, because I have just told him it is irrelevant. [Interjections.]

Mr A C NEL: Madam Speaker, to the extent that Mr Green implied that either the President or the Deputy President misled the House, do you not think that it might be in order that he withdraws his motion. The SPEAKER: Order! Hon members, I will look at the motion. I read from the ATC. I do not wish to enter into a debate about what notices of motion say. I simply wanted to clarify, in the interests of informing the public, what was actually published, which is the correct record of the information sent by the President to the House.

The House adjourned at 18:48. ____

            ANNOUNCEMENTS, TABLINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS

ANNOUNCEMENTS:

National Assembly and National Council of Provinces:

1. The Speaker and the Chairperson:

 Assent by the President of the Republic in  respect  of  the  following
 Bills:


 (i)    Higher Education Amendment Bill [B 61B - 2001] - Act  No  23  of
       2001 (assented to and signed by President on 30  October  2001);
       and
 (ii)   National Health Laboratory Service Amendment Bill [B 56 -  2001]
       - Act No 24 of 2001 (assented to and signed by President  on  30
       October 2001).

National Assembly:

1. The Speaker:

 Bill passed by National Assembly on 1 November 2001: To be submitted to
 President of the Republic for assent:


 (i)    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment  Bill  [B
     68B - 2001] (National Assembly - sec 74).

1. The Speaker:

 The vacancy which occurred owing to Mr D M Nkosi vacating his seat with
 effect from 1 November  2001,  has  been  filled  with  effect  from  1
 November 2001 by the nomination of Ms M R Morutoa.

COMMITTEE REPORTS:

National Assembly:

1. Report of the Portfolio Committee on Arts, Culture, Science and Technology on the Cultural Laws Amendment Bill [B 45B - 2000] (National Assembly - sec 75), dated 1 November 2001:

   The Portfolio Committee on Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, having considered the Cultural Laws Amendment Bill [B 45B - 2000] (National Assembly - sec 75) and a proposed amendment of the National Council of Provinces (Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports, p 1062), referred to the Committee, reports that it does not support the proposed amendment, and recommends that the Bill be passed without further amendment.

 Report to be considered.