National Assembly - 13 August 2002
TUESDAY, 13 AUGUST 2002 __
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
____
The House met at 14:04.
The Speaker took the Chair and requested members to observe a moment of silence for prayers or meditation.
ANNOUNCEMENTS, TABLINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS - see col 000.
NOTICES OF MOTION
Ms H M MPAKA: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes that a protest march organised by youth organisations linked to the Inkatha Freedom Party, the United Democratic Movement and the Pan Africanist Congress on 5 August 2002 in Johannesburg ended with looting of shops and street vendors in the city centre;
(2) further notes a reported incident of a woman who was dragged out of her car and raped near Nancefield train station by a group of men who were attending this march;
(3) condemns these criminal acts; and
(4) calls on -
(a) the leadership of the IFP, UDM and PAC to inculcate in their
members a culture of responsible citizenry and peaceful
political protest; and
(b) the people to work with the police in ensuring that justice
takes its cause.
[Applause.]
Mr E K MOORCROFT: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:
That the House -
(1) expresses its disbelief at the fact that President Mbeki continues worrying about fixing the problems of the Middle East and other hotspots in Africa and the world while ignoring the human tragedy in Zimbabwe;
(2) acknowledges that Mr Robert Mugabe’s policy regarding white farmers is racist and that every commercial farmer who leaves, leaves behind hundreds of fellow Zimbabweans without work and thousands without food; and
(3) recognises that, cumulatively, millions of Zimbabweans are likely to die of starvation and that their fate will have been determined by Mr Mugabe and his silent friends like President Mbeki.
[Applause.]
Mr E T FERREIRA: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the IFP:
That the House -
(1) notes that Cape Town police have put out an all points alert'' for
ThandoAyanda’’ Maloti, whom they have described as the most wanted
man in the Western Cape;
(2) further notes that Maloti and his gang can allegedly be linked to several armed robberies and a spate of attacks on policemen; and
(3) urges the community to assist the police with information that could lead to the arrest of Maloti and his gang.
Mr M S BOOI: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House - (1) notes that -
(a) ANC MPs, MPLs and volunteers distributed one million oranges and
almost one million litres of milk to flood victims in the
township areas of Gugulethu, Khayelitsha, Crossroads and KTC;
and
(b) this initiative is part of efforts by the ANC to alleviate some
of the hardships experienced by the people in the townships; and
(2) commends these volunteers for the sterling work they have done in making life manageable to victims of floods in the informal settlements of the Western Cape.
[Applause.]
Mr C M MORKEL: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the New NP:
That the House -
(1) notes the unheroic action of a South African spectator, who tackled the international rugby referee, Dave McHugh, during the match between New Zealand and South Africa on Saturday;
(2) further notes that -
(a) there is a growing tendency among spectators to behave poorly,
not only at international sporting events, but also at local
sporting events - especially rugby and soccer matches;
(b) the New NP condemns this type of behaviour and believes it can
be prevented by increasing security and by implementing better
measures to put a stop to alcohol abuse at sporting events; and
(c) isolated incidents like these reflect badly on South African
spectators who are true to the spirit of sport and who do
justice to our sportsmen and sportswomen.
Mrs N C NKABINDE: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that I will move on behalf of the UDM at the next sitting of the House:
That the House -
(1) concurs that it is the responsibility of each and every South African to contribute towards the fight against HIV/Aids;
(2) in light of the massive economic impact that HIV/Aids will have, welcomes the efforts of a growing number of South African employers, De Beers being the latest, that are actively addressing the pandemic, even to the extent of subsidising Aids treatment for their employees;
(3) salutes all those South Africans and private companies who have committed themselves to actively participate in the fight against the HIV/Aids pandemic; and
(4) calls on Government, as the largest employer, to do the honourable and morally correct thing by following suit and providing its employees with the necessary assistance and treatment for HIV/Aids.
Mr A MLANGENI: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes that -
(a) the President of Cuba, Comrade Fidel Castro, turned 76 today on
13 August 2002;
(b) Comrade Castro has dedicated his life to fighting capitalist
exploitation;
(c) the people of Cuba under the leadership of Comrade ...
[Interjections.] Shut up, please man!
The SPEAKER:Order!
Mr A MLANGENI: Just shut up! Sorry, Madam Speaker. The SPEAKER: You are losing time, hon member.
Mr A MLANGENI:
(c) the people of Cuba under the leadership of Comrade Fidel Castro
have made immeasurable sacrifices in the struggles for
liberation and economic emancipation in Africa; and
(d) they have played a central role in defending the gains of the
revolution of the people of Angola; and
(2) salutes Comrade Castro on his 76th birthday, and on behalf of the people of South Africa says: Long live Comrade Fidel! Long live the people of Cuba! Long live!
[Applause.]
The SPEAKER: Order! The PAC, do you have a Notice of Motion?
Mr J P I BLANCHÉ: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that I shall move that this House … [Interjections.]
The SPEAKER: Order! Just a moment, I called the PAC. [Interjections.] Next week is crossing-the-floor time, not now.
Mr J P I BLANCHÉ: They apparently are not in the House any more, Madam.
The SPEAKER: No they are, please proceed.
Dr S E M PHEKO: There is a bit of noise, Madam, we could not hear.
I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:
That the House -
(1) notes that the PAC is disturbed at the media reports that our country has been selling major weapons, including attack helicopters, to countries such as Rwanda, India, Pakistan and Angola; (2) observes that these countries have been at war for many years and that the arms they are purchasing are not for self-defence alone;
(3) affirms that -
(a) our country as a member of the United Nations is obliged to
preserve peace in the world; and
(b) South Africa as chairperson of the newly formed African Union,
which is charged with promoting peace, stability and security in
Africa, contradicts the AU policy and South Africa's own foreign
policy by selling arms to warring nations; and
(4) demands that if the reports about sales of arms are true, these sales be ended forthwith before they tarnish the image of the country irreparably.
The SPEAKER: Hon members, I believe that Cabinet time is on Wednesdays and Cabinet Ministers should not be conducting their meetings in this House. [Interjections.] Neither should hon members. You may now speak, on behalf of your own party.
Mr J P I BLANCHÉ: Thank you, Madam Speaker.
I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:
That the House -
(1) condemns the heartless, unconstitutional, undemocratic and racist actions of President Robert Mugabe in his persistent demand that white farmers leave the land that they legitimately own;
(2) recognises that his actions contribute to increasing political and economic instability in the Southern African region, condemning millions to death by starvation; and
(3) calls on President Mbeki not to leave it to the Commonwealth and to the European Union to do what South Africa and the African Union should be doing in condemning Mr Mugabe and his despotic actions.
[Applause.]
Mr B MTHEMBU: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes that -
(a) black members of the Democratic Alliance in Standerton,
Mpumalanga, claimed that they have been sidelined by their white
colleagues in Mpumalanga; and
(b) their white colleagues told their black counterparts they have
their own executive committee in town and instructed them to
form their own executive in the nearby township;
(2) believes that this reflects racial divisions and racist practices within the Democratic Alliance; and
(3) calls on the Leader of the Democratic Alliance, hon Tony Leon, to work towards eradicating the evil of racism within the ranks of the DA.
[Applause.]
Mr R JANKIELSOHN: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move:
That the House -
(1) notes that -
(a) a deposit slip was sent to the municipal manager of Nketoana
Council confirming that money was paid into the ANC's bank
account by a company involved in various projects in the Eastern
Free State;
(b) this is irregular since municipal managers should be impartial
and nonpartisan; and
(c) this transaction raises questions around the corrupt use of
municipal contracts to generate funds for the ANC; and
(2) therefore calls on the ANC to explain what this money was for and why the municipal manager was involved in this transaction.
Mr M S SIBIYA: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the IFP:
That the House -
(1) notes that according to the Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT) pet poisoning, especially of dogs, is linked to organised crime;
(2) further notes that criminals break into houses after they have poisoned and killed the dogs;
(3) acknowledges that the EWT will ask pet owners to take part in a national campaign to determine the scope of the problem; and (4) urges all pet owners to co-operate with the EWT in their campaign to fight crime.
Ms D M MOROBI: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House shall move on behalf of the ANC:
That the House -
(1) notes that the Scorpions unit arrested:
(a) the Van Dyk family from Vereeniging and laid fraud charges over
a pyramid scheme that handled R980 million on 23 July 2002;
(b) members of the Diablo 164 Trade Investment which defrauded
members of the public of more than R9 million; and
(c) a man who allegedly posed as an advocate to milk ``investors''
in the Eastern and Western Cape of at least R3 million in a
predawn raid on 7 August 2002;
(2) commends the work done by the Scorpions unit; and
(3) calls on the people of South Africa to work tirelessly towards moral regeneration in our society.
[Applause.]
Dr B L GELDENHUYS: Geagte Speaker, ek gee hiermee kennis dat ek op die volgende sittingsdag van die Huis sal voorstel namens die Nuwe NP:
Dat die Huis -
(1) kennis neem van die jongste onthullings voor die Desai-kommissie, naamlik dat die Leier van die Opposisie na bewering een van die trustees van ‘n buitelandse trust sou word, waardeur geld van oorsese skenkers vir die DA na Suid-Afrika gebring sou word [Tussenwerpsels.];
(2) meen dit is na aanleiding van hierdie bekendmaking noodsaaklik dat die Leier van die Opposisie nou oop kaarte speel en die mense van Suid-Afrika in sy vertroue neem met betrekking tot die befondingskandaal van die DA; en
(3) glo dat die agb Leon as Leier van die Opposisie en die DP/DA moet bedank totdat hierdie aangeleentheid opgeklaar is. (Translation of Afrikaans notice of motion follows.)
[Dr B L GELDENHUYS: Hon Speaker, I hereby give notice that on the next sitting day of the House I shall move on behalf of the New NP:
That the House -
(1) notes the latest revelations before the Desai commission, namely that the Leader of the Opposition was allegedly to have become one of the trustees of an offshore trust, by way of which money for the DA from overseas donors would be brought to South Africa;
(2) is of the opinion that, following this disclosure, it is essential that the Leader of the Opposition now puts his cards on the table and takes the people of South Africa into his confidence with regard to the funding scandal of the DA; and
(3) believes that the hon Leon should resign as Leader of the Opposition and the DP/DA until this matter has been resolved.
[Applause.]]
Mr D G MKONO: Madam Speaker, I hereby give notice that I shall move on behalf of the UDM at the next sitting of the House:
That the House -
(1) notes that Transnet has been in the spotlight regarding corporate governance since the Coleman Andrew saga broke;
(2) acknowledges that it is the South African taxpayers and citizens at whose expense corporate governance breaches occur;
(3) in light of the above condemns the light punishment that was meted out to senior Spoornet officials Messrs Jakavula and Vilakazi, who have been demoted even though Transnet’s CEO has acknowledged that they committed ``dismissible offences’’; and
(4) urges the Government to ensure that corruption is punished without fear or favour, to send out the message loud and clear that no matter what your position in society, deceit and dishonesty will not be tolerated.
[Applause.]
CELEBRATIONS OF WOMEN'S DAY
(Draft Resolution)
The CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY: Madam Speaker, I hereby move without notice: That the House -
That the House -
(1) notes that - (a) National Women’s Day was celebrated through the reburial of the remains of Sarah Baartman in Hankey, Eastern Cape; and
(b) the other key highlights of these celebrations were a march to
the Union Buildings by women and various rallies in other areas
to highlight women's issues;
(2) believes that -
(a) the significance of these and many other celebrations
highlighted the hardships that women had to suffer as a result
of colonialism, racim and sexism; and
(b) the celebrations of National Women's Day also highlighted the
Government's political programme of working towards the
restoration of the dignity of women, and in so doing, executing
an important task of working towards the realisation of the
emancipation of women as part of a broader struggle to roll back
the frontiers of poverty; and (3) commends those patriots, men and women of our country, who attended
the National Women's Day activities throughout the country and thus
showed their unwavering commitment to women's emancipation.
Motion agreed to.
CONGRATULATIONS TO OUR ATHLETES
(Draft Resolution)
The CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY: Madam Speaker, I hereby move without notice: That the House -
That the House -
(1) notes that -
(a) South African athletes won most of the gold medals during the
13th African Athletics Championships, which ended on Saturday,
10 August, in Tunis, Tunisia;
(b) this success follows immediately on the best performance by our
athletics team in the Commonwealth Games held recently in
Manchester, England;
(c) Gold medallists like Mbulelo Malaudzi, Shaun Bownes and others
recently gave memorable performances during the Commonwealth
Games; and
(d) the achievements of the heroic swimmers Natalie du Toit; and
(2) congratulates our athletics team on their recent victories; and
(3) commends Athletics South Africa for a job well done.
Motion agreed to.
DEBATE ON COMMITTEE REPORTS ON JOINT INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO THE
STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
The SPEAKER: Hon members, before the debate commences, I wish to remind all of you that there are specific fraud cases that are currently before the courts referring to the procurement of the arms. Members are reminded that you should not refer in the debate to the merits or detail of any of those cases.
Ms T R MODISE: Madam Speaker, hon members, ladies and gentlemen. When the reports were before the committee, the committee looked at them and made our reports. Allow me just to then take a few minutes to go back. When the then Minister of Defence, Mr Joe Modise, approached Parliament in 1995 for its approval to acquire Spanish ships, Parliament refused. It refused because it said that it did not understand why South Africa should be acquiring ships without any plan, without the people of South Africa having expressed themselves on the needs of the Defence Force. This started us on the road to the writing of the White Paper on Defence and eventually onto the Defence Review process.
Let me quickly go back to the issues we agreed to as this House, when we were adopting the White Paper on Defence in 1996. We agreed that security shall now - and I stress now - be so primarily through the efforts to meet political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa’s people and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security in Southern Africa.
We also agreed that South Africa would pursue peaceful relations with other states and seek a high level of political, economic and military co- operation within Southern Africa. We agreed that the SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation function and be fully subordinate to Parliament and the executive. We agreed on force levels, armaments and military expenditure and that these shall be determined by defence policy derived from the analysis of the internal and external environment. We also agreed that the SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force capable of executing its tasks efficiently and effectively.
Finally, we agreed that the SANDF shall respect human rights and the democratic processes and operate within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic law, international laws and conventions. These principles we agreed to when we adopted the White Paper. These principles were reviewed and elaborated on two years later when as this House again we adopted the comprehensive Defence Review. This process was a deliberate break with the apartheid past, with the ethos of the past and with the old military culture. Women, pacifists, rural and urban people, industrialists, experts, illiterates, churchgoers, the executive and Parliament had debated, had consulted and had spoken about what South Africa’s defence needs should be.
The White Paper had thus determined the roles, the functions, the posture, the doctrine, the design, the equipment and the budgetary implications of the South Africa Defence Force. Parliament, through its defence committees, had received an audit and had inspected some of the equipment which the SANDF had. Parliament, through its defence committees, had debated and agreed upon the size, the posture and the equipment. We had agreed on the right to self-defence and deterrence. We had agreed that we would not be threatening to our neighbours, but that we would also have the right to pre- emptive action, should the need arise. We had agreed that, where possible, our mobile and offensive forces would be drawn away from the borders and deeper into our countries so that we would not seem to be threatening to our neighbours. We agreed that such moves would contribute towards confidence building. We never said that South Africa would not equip herself for effective, defensive and pre-emptive roles. We also acknowledge that our region has not been known for everlasting peace. We accepted that we had no choice but to be part of the regional, humanitarian and disaster management. We agreed that South Africa needed to develop and maintain core defense capabilities, even though we had no enemy in the foreseeable future. The events of September 11 clearly show that we were not wrong when we anticipated, and I quote from page 15 of the Defence Review, ``that future enemies will have sophisticated weapons and systems’’. When South Africa therefore adopted the defence design and posture, it would have been very irresponsible of the executive not to equip as per the envisaged tasks as outlined in chapter 8 of the Defence Review.
Should Parliament have taken a closer interest in the acquisition process? With hindsight, yes. At the time, Parliament had satisfied itself that there was a need to equip the Defence Force. It had debated on the types of equipment. It had been assured of the structures which would carry this out. It had been assured that Armscor and the Department of Trade and Industry had the required experience and expertise. It had been assured that the policy was adequate and existed. It had been assured that special structures had been put in place. As the joint investigations team’s report now shows, this acquisition was the first that South Africa was entering into since the democratic elections in 1994, and the policies and structures which were obtained were not adequate to carry out this matter. We need to go back to this.
We need to look at upgrading policy as per our recommendations. We need to make sure that in the future the inadequate control which has been revealed by this report does not come back to us. We need to make sure that the paper trail within the Department of Defence and Armscor is visible and can be followed through. We need to make sure that the task group which has been tasked with the restructuring of Armscor completes its job and I am sure that by the end of this week, when the portfolio committee and the joint standing committee get their report, we shall be briefed on this. We need to make sure that we limit the roles and positions of influence any individual can hold within any procurement process. This is in the interest of the process itself and the individuals concerned. The issues relating to conflict of interest must be dealt with decisively within the Public Service in general.
We must congratulate those departments that have begun to tackle this matter. We must recommend that strong sanctions be carried out against persons found to have been engaged in any unprofessional activity. All allegations, all inappropriate actions must be investigated and appropriate action must be carried out. We have raised our queries around the security clearance and made recommendations in this regard. We are also hoping that as we get a briefing from the department, the issues around the Gripen versus the Cheetah and the issues around the advisability of the operational budget of the SA Airforce shall be revisited. Capacity must also be built within Parliament to determine issues of this nature. Oversight must be understood as a tool to entrench democracy and it must not be seen as an irritant, or as a competition of Parliament versus the executive. The flow of information must be qualitative to enable Parliament to play its monitoring role and to be truly representative of the people.
Public hearings enable us to collect and to consult and to be mandated by the people and this must be better resourced. Public hearings also give us the chance to clarify and to listen. The committees of Parliament must be resourced to carry out its work. Parliament should have had sight of the acquisition policy and procedures. Parliament should be able to obtain comprehensive briefings on the price structures so that it can satisfy itself that what is being acquired is affordable and absolutely necessary. MPs must, however, also take matters of security seriously. The Constitution allows for sufficient transparency, which means that we have no right to seek the media limelight at the expense of the security of this country. Something called patriotism must begin to say something in each and every one’s breast.
Parliament must follow up and show that what recommendations the different committees put forward are followed through. The joint standing committee must begin to exercise the powers to identify policy gaps and to recommend such policy alternatives where necessary. We must reiterate our belief that security includes the safety of the person, of the state, of shelter, of breathable air, potable water, of the soil and of the environment. We accept that South Africa has not been different from most countries in that our defence budget has consistently been decreasing. We must also make the point that the money for the naval and airforce acquisitions cannot simply be seen as an increase in the defence budget but that we must actually be realistic and understand that it is money simply flowing through this defence account.
Yes, we need more hospitals. Yes, we need more schools and more houses. Yes, we need more jobs and we need to secure the gains of the revolution and therefore we must make sure that when we call for the cancellation of the trenches, we must be realistic. When one does that, one is compromising one of the basic things which people in South Africa fought for. We must be sure that we are ready for a September 11-type attack. [Interjections.] We must be sure that we have the right equipment and the right training for our people.
At the end I must say that there are too many findings in the report and it found that there was no evidence of any improper or unlawful conduct by the Government. It finds that there were improprieties. It finds that certain conduct of officials was questionable. It makes recommendations on how to deal with these matters. There are matters where investigations are continuing and there are these matters where arrests have been made.
I want to thank the Public Protector, the Auditor-General, the National Prosecutor for they have done a job for South Africa. We must thank them and we must make sure that the recommendations before us are carried out, and where these are inadequate, proper recommendations and mechanisms are set in place to make sure that never, ever again would we spend time to look back at what we could have avoided. [Applause.]
Ms R TALJAARD: Madam Speaker and hon members, this debate is not about personalities and, to an extent, it is not about corvettes, Gripens and other military hardware. It is about the integrity of our institutions and the failures of our democracy. It is about all of us and whether we can fulfil the promise to monitor what the executive does and investigate and correct that which in any democracy goes wrong.
Democracy is not about flawless government. All governments make mistakes. Democracy is about investigating, exposing and correcting flaws. The JIT report failed to deal with the issues raised in Scopa’s fourteenth report and refute the concerns it expressed. Having different parliamentary committees examining the report diluted the role of Scopa, the only committee to have had access to privileged documentation and Cabinet minutes. The reports bear testimony to the fact that our constitutional checks and balances failed to expose and investigate the flaws. The battle for truth and democracy had to be carried out on behalf of all members by a handful of courageous and principled people who, in the end, were all defeated and forced to resign. Our resignation was the symbolic defeat of Parliament’s own power to rise to the challenge of holding this executive to account.
South Africa’s parliamentary democracy was put to the test in probing this deal. It was put to the test in demanding from the executive the responsibility due to Parliament for its actions and decisions. It was put to the test for its spending priorities in arming for imaginary wars while the wars on poverty, Aids and hunger are being lost. [Interjections.] It put to the test the moral trade-offs Government made and continues to make in saving the local defence industry at the cost and expense of social delivery. It put to the test the values and ethics of bearers of high offices and public servants. This Government failed these tests.
It failed the test of transparency. It failed the test of constitutionally demanded accountability, but most important of all and most tragic, it failed the test of integrity. [Interjections.] This left damaged institutions, damaged individuals and shattered public trust in the wake of the ANC Government’s arrogance and impunity. [Interjections.]
From the beginning of the arms investigation the preoccupation of the ANC was twofold: an exoneration of the executive of any corruption charges which it misguidedly believed the Standing Committee on Public Accounts had levelled against it and ensuring the contractual validity of the agreements, including the IP agreements, would not be called into question by any investigating body, but more particularly the Heath Special Investigating Unit. The position of the President in his national address, the Deputy President in his all but hysterical letter to the standing committee, four Ministers in their press briefing in January and their subsequent appearance before Parliament, the ANC’s Scopa members and, interestingly, the JIT report’s conclusions all emphasise Cabinet exoneration, firstly, and contractual validity, secondly - a very similar song-sheet indeed. Too similar perhaps to be coincidence.
In Government’s response to the JIT report it chose to home in on the following contestable finding: No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the Government. The irregularities and improprieties point to the conduct of certain officials of the Government departments involved and cannot be ascribed to the President or the Minister’s committee or Cabinet. There are therefore no grounds to suggest that the Government’s contracting position was flawed. [Interjections.]
AN HON MEMBER: What happened to Harksen’s money?
Ms R TALJAARD: This attempt at a stark distinction between a government and its public servants will make the compilers of the Scott Report on arms deals appear completely amateurish.
It became evident that the public would be thrown sacrificial lambs who got cars or Cabinet documents. The big issues would remain unaddressed, unprobed and uninvestigated. The ink barely dried on the contracts in December 1999 when political manipulations began curtailing the relentless pursuit of truth. The special audit of the arms deal in 2000 by the Auditor- General was subjected to an audit steering committee comprising some of the key individuals under investigation.
In Scopa the ANC blocked the committee from continuing with its own probe as envisaged both in the 14th report and constitutionally permitted under sections 55 and 56 of the Constitution. Meetings took place between the executive and the Auditor-General before and during this investigation that would seem, apart from the obvious and patently clearly political questions, madness in the context of Enron-dicta on the advisable arm’s length relationship between auditor and auditee.
Similarly, in the private sector with the private auditing firm that was involved in this deal at a subcontracting level, the similar question and context of conflict of interest arises with an auditing firm that was investigating some of the very companies that it audits. These meetings between the executive and the Auditor-General raised pertinent questions about the independence of this probe. These questions arose again when the executive had the opportunity to sanitise the final report of the JIT under draconian remnants of executive control lodged at the heart of the Auditor- General’s Act in section 4(6) of the Act.
Madam Speaker, let us not forget that even on the question of your role and the role of your unprecedented press statement in this sordid saga this House was divided with only the majority party expressing support in a motion of confidence debate. But what happens in a new democracy when political manipulations and agendas stifle the pursuit of truth? Conspiracies of complicit silence rob public representatives and key institutions, tasked with protecting public trust and constitutional democracy, of their integrity, their worth and their credibility.
This is the truth that has emerged from the arms deal saga that cannot be hidden. South Africa has damaged institutions. This is the legacy of the JIT report and the profoundly lacking committee reports we finally debate today. It is nothing more than a sad footnote to what should have been a profound encounter with accountable governance for this second democratically elected Government and the second democratically elected Parliament. Instead, the case of the arms deal shows an arrogant and unaccountable government, making bad decisions that display a shocking disregard for the real needs of the people.
The nature and contours of the global arms industry are vividly captured in Anthony Sampson’s immortal book The Arms Bazaar. Since its publication in 1977 the industry has remained very similar, with intricate webs of arms suppliers, governments arms dealers, influenced peddlers, arms brokers and the murky world of bribes, commissions and party funding the hallmark.
Examples abound. In France the fall of Minister Dumas linked to Thompson- CSF’s orders for frigates for Taiwan. In Germany Karlheinz Schreiber and the Thyssen’s tanks scandal which nearly toppled the CDU government of Helmut Kohl. In Britain BAE systems’ Al Yamamah contract and the countertrade deal and offsets in Saudi Arabia, which brought into question the credibility and integrity of minister Jonathan Aitken and Mark Thatcher. And, I might add, the NAO report on Al Yamamah has still not been debated in the British parliament and this is cold comfort to the people in this parliament.
Hon members may have noticed that these three companies also happen to be our suppliers in this arms deal. [Interjections.] As Dwight D. Eisenhower eloquently captured it:
Under the spur of profit potential, powerful lobbies spring up to argue for even larger ammunitions expenditures. And the web of special interest grows.
In South Africa’s arms deal, as has been the case in so many before it, opportunities for acquisitions we could not afford and did not immediately require were seized upon by zealous arms suppliers with officials of dubious integrity noticing get-rich-quick schemes linked to this procurement. Whether these schemes took the form of rushing out of Cabinet or indeed the IONT into a related industry accepting a luxury car, accepting a gift or another benefit or accepting or paying a commission, the JIT report failed to reveal the full picture of what transpired in this deal or, at worst, mildly rebuke the transgresses as it did the former minister of defence, Minister Joe Modise.
To believe that, somehow, we would be immune from the hallmarks of this globally maligned industry beggars belief. To believe that ours was the first global virginal arms deal equally smacks of at best unforgivable naivety or, at worst, gross arrogance and political manipulation. In this deal ANC Inc. and the MK Inc. succumbed to the profligacy of self- enrichment above ethical conduct. In a world littered with brokers where commissions, fees and party payments are the common currency of the trade, is a staggering omission, apart from its other glaring shortcomings, for the JIT report not to have probed any party donations to the ANC, and to not even have posed the question as to whether South Africa had to pay any commissions or fees to arms brokers. This is the oil that greases the global arms industry. Anybody who does not believe this and does not read the literature of the industry is naive.
Instead of probing it and scrutinising any role it may have played in securing prime or subcontracts, our JIT failed to answer these pertinent questions. Issue by issue Scopa’s much maligned 14th report, while insulted and rebuffed by the JIT, has been all but completely vindicated by Transparency International UK’s recent comprehensive study on the global arms trade. In their report they list key areas of concern, including the delivery and monitoring of offsets in the context of commercial confidentiality. The loading of price to cater for offset guarantees, the vagaries of secrecy and commercial confidentiality in the industry, the need to limit discretion of single individuals and a host of further vindications. Paragraph by paragraph their concerns form a perfect match with Scopa’s 14th report and what it sought to probe and the issues that were left untouched or glossed over by a very weak JIT report.
The history of South Africa’s strategic defence procurement, is the history of an unsound, highly contestable and irresponsible decision-making process for equipment the country cannot afford in a context where the basic needs of the Defence Force, and indeed our people, are not being met, and the role of the SANDF is changing with the peacekeeping trust. It is the history of a process that exposes the lack of executive accountability to Parliament. It is the legacy of prioritising the wrong, nonexistent enemies and wars when the war on poverty, Aids and hunger is and should be our highest priority if not our national emergency. We cannot fight poverty and Aids with corvettes, submarines, helicopters and fighter planes. [Interjections.] Madam Speaker and colleagues, this is my heartfelt wish at the conclusion of this very sad debate: May Parliament recover from the arms deal … [Interjections.] … and may we never again bow the knee to the dictates of the executive. We owe the people who elected us more than kowtowing to our political masters and not abiding by our elected and our electoral mandate. It is already happening in the defection case. Let us not repeat what we did in this deal.
Mr G SOLOMON: Madam Speaker, we need to remind the hon Taljaard that the Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages, was undertaken by institutions no less than the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the National Director of Public Prosecutions. [Interjections.]
It is also important to state here that the whole process of an investigation was triggered by the proactive initiative of the Defence Audit Centre in the Office of the Auditor-General, with the agreement of the Minister of Defence, when it identified the procurement of strategic defence packages as a higher risk area from an audit point of view and decided on the need to perform a special review of the procurement process.
In this debate, to put it mildly, I wish to deal with the unbecoming way in which the opposition related to the three institutions which dealt with the investigation. The Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the National Director of Public Prosecution are amongst the impressive institutions created to strengthen constitutional democracy in our country. Their track records speak for themselves and we can genuinely be proud of them. It is not necessary for me to elevate these institutions. The Constitution itself clearly documents the elevated status of these institutions. And I quote:
These institutions are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers without fear, favour or prejudice. Other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect these institutions to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions. No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of these institutions. The challenge that faced these institutions in this investigation impacted directly on the reason for their existence, namely to be impartial, objective, independent in the interest of South Africa and its people. I am sure there is none in this House or in this country, including the media, who can question the integrity, courage and uncompromising standard of intellectual competence of any of these institutions as far as investigations are concerned. In fact, no one from the opposition has challenged any of their recommendations.
The problem that individuals from the opposition faced was that the results of the investigation did not confirm their perceptions, prejudices and self- interests or whatever they conjured up in their minds. They were hoping that something seriously would be wrong with the process and they were disappointed.
The results of our personal or party-political thoughts, influenced by our prejudices and petty self-interest, can never be the unique content of the truth. That is why we have judicial processes underpinned by the rule of law entrenched in our Constitution. South Africa is not the only country in the world that has constitutional obligations and national and international commitments that might warrant the procurement of arms. But, indeed, it is certainly one of the few, if not the only country in the world that is so open, transparent and accountable about the process, despite the international practice of secrecy on matters of arms procurement. [Interjections.] For this, we should applaud this Government led by the ANC. [Applause.]
A fundamental question needs to be asked in this debate today. The question is how do we, as Parliament, relate to the Chapter 9 institutions and particularly, in this regard, to those institutions that tabled the duly signed Joint Report to the House on 14th November 2001. Instead of allowing the three institutional structures to exercise their constitutional functions without interference, opposition parties embarked upon a discourse which was clearly sensational and sinister, casting aspersions on the integrity of these Chapter 9 institutions as well as the Cabinet of this Government. This was duly taken up by the media for which it was obviously intended, accusing the Cabinet of blowing billions on fighter jets, helicopters, ships and submarines and that the Department of Trade and Industry perpetrated a lie about significant socio-economic benefits.
The worst part of this disgusting discourse was the scurrilous attack on the Chapter 9 institutions and the confused and contradictory positions held by opposition members. On the one hand, the opposition parties slammed the hon Selby Baqwa for denying television rights to broadcast the hearings live in order to protect witnesses.
The SPEAKER: Order! Hon member, please take a seat. I just wish to make a comment. I want to draw the hon member’s attention and all members in the House to Rule 66 which makes it very clear that no member shall reflect upon the competence or honour of a judge or a superior court or the holder of an office whose removal from such office is dependent upon a decision of this House, except upon a substantive motion in this House alleging facts and so on.
Now I am drawing attention to this not because of what has already been said, though it was on the border, but to avoid us going in that direction. We are not going to debate the integrity of any of those institutions. So please, I appeal to both sides of the House that by putting that on the agenda, members are provoking a debate of this kind. So, I would ask members not to attack the institutions and not to put that issue on the table because by so doing, members would be provocative. I really wish that this debate should deal with the substance rather than dealing with the particular institutions.
If there are any members on either side who have problems with the office holders, would those members please follow this rule and place a substantive motion before the House. This is an appeal and I do not wish to stop the debate if we go in that direction. In my view there is no debate, hon Asmal, so we will now proceed.
Are you rising a point of order Mr Asmal?
The MINISTER OF EDUCATION: Is it possible for you, Madam Speaker, to identify these scurrilous remarks that were made?
The SPEAKER: Order! If the hon member could identify any scurrilous or any other comments, I will deal with the rules …
The MINISTER OF EDUCATION: Inaudible.
The SPEAKER: Order! Hon member, take your seat please. Hon members please let the debate proceed. I had to intervene, because I believed that we were getting to a point which would have been harmful to the debate. So please proceed, Mr Solomon.
Mr G SOLOMON: As I was saying, on the one hand opposition parties slammed the hon Selby Baqwa for denying television rights to broadcast the hearings live in order to protect witnesses. [Interjections.] On the other hand, the hon Patricia De Lille of the PAC, refused to attend the hearings because lives are at stake and people could be killed for incriminating others involved in the arms deal. The high court subsequently upheld the wise decision of the hon Selby Baqwa.
The PAC insisted that it wanted a full investigation, free of interference from the ANC and the executive. In the same breath, the hon Reverend Mogoba challenged the National Director of Public Prosecutions to be responsible and reveal to the nation the investigation into certain people whose names they know. The hon Taljaard accused the National Director of Public Prosecutions of strong-arm tactics when he exercised his powers of subpoena vested in him by the Constitution and the law. The UDM leader, the hon Bantu Holomisa, accused the National Director of Public Prosecutions of intimidation and even made the unintelligent suggestion that cars should be impounded without due process and the rule of law.
The FA however, was more intelligent and level-headed about the matter. It stressed the need to modernise outdated and obsolete equipment in the SANDF in order to meet national obligations to guard our coastline, protect our fishing waters and patrol our borders. If the costs justify this, then the FA is happy. These are just some of the points of the unbecoming discourse around the Chapter 9 institutions involved in the investigations. This clearly undermines the integrity of these institutions and their functions. It is my view that this debate is overstated. The opposition is scraping the bottom of the barrel. Only repetitive dregs are surfacing, serving no purpose except party-political ends.
It is now time to stop and carry on with more important functions of this Government. [Applause.]
Dr G G WOODS: Madam Speaker, yes, there is a predominant question which lies behind any discussion concerning the strategic arms package. Why has this Parliament so passively allowed Government to commit R60 billion of the public’s money to military hardware, when the sufferings of millions of people - sick, poor and hungry people - intensifies in South Africa. It is with this predicament in mind that I direct my attention to the committee reports, which are the issue of this debate.
The insubstantial quality of these committee reports is the final confirmation of the purposeful failure of this Parliament to conduct oversight over one of the largest and most controversial spending exercises ever by our South African Government.
The seriousness of this failure rivals even the shameful extremes of the arms deal itself. And it is with this in mind that I will today place a number of contentious and irresponsible actions on Hansard records, which will help to explain the subversion of the investigation which took place, and help to explain the appalling quality of the Joint Investigating Team’s, the JIT’s, report.
And, as can be noted from the accounts which I have already published on these and other arms deal-related matters, I am able to authenticate every issue I raised against the body of evidence which includes correspondence, verbatim transcriptions, minutes, press reports and signed affidavits.
I do acknowledge, however, that for the seven committees that were instructed into the investigation-related processes at the very last minute, their only sin was to allow themselves to be used as part of the greater scheme to negate proper interrogation of the JIT’s work. But for the remaining committee, Scopa, there is no such excuse. Its grovelling report, from today, will serve as a permanent record of its cowardly betrayal of the public whose interest it is supposed to serve. [Interjections.]
After Scopa had studied the Auditor-General’s initial review of the arms deal back in 2000, it then held hearings with the Department of Defence and the other departments, and undertook further investigations into particular issues itself and then produced its 14th report to Parliament, and Parliament adopted that report at the beginning of November 2000.
The report identified a number of concerns for further investigation and recommended that not only would Scopa continue with its own investigations, but that a joint investigation also be undertaken by the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Public Protector, the Auditor- General and the Heath Special Investigation Unit. Everything seemed to be in place for Scopa and the four agencies to do what they were obliged to do
- to establish that public funds were being efficiently and honestly spent.
But what immediately became clear was an antagonism towards the investigation from amongst the executive. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development called it an ``unnecessary fishing expedition’’. The Minister in the Office of the President questioned the loyalty of the ANC members in Scopa for having supported the investigation.
In their press statement of 12 January, the Ministers of Trade and Industry, of Finance and of Public Enterprises insultingly referred to Scopa and Parliament’s 14th report and its reason for the investigations as ``cursory, ill-informed, unable to understand elementary issues, exceedingly misleading, stretching credulity’’, and so on. The Deputy President, in his hostile and intimidatory letter to me of 19 January 2001, claimed that Scopa was accusing the Government of being prone to fraud, corruption and dishonesty. Of course, we had the Chief Whip of the Majority Party claiming that Scopa’s report, which had called for the investigation, had been sneaked past the ANC hierarchy and, of course, he blamed the hon Andrew Feinstein.
Alongside all these moves were the moves to weaken the investigation. First was the move to exclude the Special Investigation Unit - SIU. The Ministry for Justice and Constitutional Development began with an anti-Heath position in December 2000, followed by the abruptly changed views of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Public Protector. This is all on record, as I might remind hon members - their views towards the SIU’s participation.
Within days, there was the Speaker’s astonishing press statement on 27 December, where she contrived Scopa’s 14th report to say that it did not want the SIU involved. And again, within days, there was the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development using her interpretation, when writing to the President, recommending the SIU’s exclusion.
These developments, together with political instruction from the whippery, saw the ANC’s members in Scopa do a complete about-turn on the SIU issue, notwithstanding the irrefutability of their original position. The hon Johnny de Lange tried to help by producing a paper on the unsuitability of the SIU, but in so doing, he directly contradicted the explanation he gave to this House on 29 October 1996 where he explained the uniquely special and powerful investigative powers of the SIU which, incidentally, concurs with the independent legal opinion which was received by Scopa.
Then, after the Auditor-General, together with the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the Public Protector, held an inappropriate meeting with the President and the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, the Auditor-General too realigned his view and, on national television, said the investigating team could do without the SIU. This notwithstanding his earlier letter to the Chairperson of Scopa, saying the team requires the special skills and experience of the SIU and urging me to write to the President for the SIU’s involvement.
Then eventually, in his own televised broadcast, the President advised of his decision to exclude the SIU, amongst other things citing his reliance on the report of the two-man team he had had look into the matter. As we know, a few weeks later, in Business Day, they published a copy of the two- man team report, the Khan and Lubbe report, to the President, saying that Khan and Lubbe had in fact urged the President to include the SIU as an imperative.
The elimination of the SIU would seem to have cost the investigation dearly. This included the evidence of the would-be whistle-blowers from the Department of Defence and within the arms industry to advise Andrew Feinstein and myself, amongst others, of their wish to present significant evidence but only to the SIU. In at least two cases, the SIU’s special tribunal arrangements could have conducted informative civil processes.
The investigation was further weakened when the ANC members prevented Scopa from undertaking the investigation it had promised Parliament. Every initiative I and other opposition members took to do this work was blocked by them. I then requested information from the Department of Trade and Industry and Defence, in my capacity as a member of Parliament. Of course, they refused me.
Now, also essential to the investigation was regular communication between Scopa and the JIT. Notwithstanding having assured the Speaker on 15 December 2000 that Scopa had no intention of overstepping its legal boundary and having agreed to seek expert assurance on the matter, she, in her 27 December press statement inferred that Scopa was intending to instruct the JIT.
A few weeks later, she called the hon Geoff Doidge and myself into a meeting she was having with the heads of the JIT and asked me for my understanding of the JIT-Scopa communication arrangements. I did this by putting forward the legal opinion given by Prof. Fink Haysom. As no one at the meeting would respond to my explanation, my suspicion caused me to write to the Speaker, after the meeting, and ask her if she supported my explanation. She never replied to my letter.
Other than a meeting early in 2001 with the Auditor-General’s staff, there was no communication at all between Scopa and the JIT. All attempts to have discussions were either rejected by the ANC component or evaded by the JIT, leaving Scopa never knowing what the investigation it had requested was or was not covering.
Because of his centrality to the process, I need to comment on the puzzling actions of the Auditor-General beyond his change of mind about the SIU. I will do this without suggesting or inferring any dishonesty on his part. I will simply list factual instances, which are already in the public domain, which are very relevant to the accountability process which we are alluding to today.
Firstly, the meetings he held with the President, in particular, the members of the executive, were inappropriate because of their role in the special Cabinet subcommittee which was central to the arms deal.
Then there was the Auditor-General’s removal of the investigation’s two most qualified officials after they had expressed concern about a weakened investigation. Then he banned communication between his investigation staff and members of Scopa. He acceded to the politically motivated wish for no interim accountability to Parliament. Then, in June, he advised that the JIT report would be ready for Parliament in August. He confirmed this again in July, but it never came in August. In fact, it never came in September.
Then, in early October, he told Scopa that his team were having to work night and day in order to finish the report before Parliament closed in November. He never did explain why the JIT has suddenly come to need that extraordinary extra amount of time. We then learnt through Mail and Guardian that the delay coincided with the secret release of the draft of the report to members of the executive - this under the pretext of an old apartheid law which P W Botha used to protect his clandestine arms dealings, a law which is patently not in keeping with our new Constitution. [Interjections.]
Now, at more or less the same time, there were alleged leaks from within the JIT in the newspapers claiming that members of the executive and Mr Chippy Shaik’s attorney had demanded substantial changes to the report. These stories appeared to arouse the suspicions to the point where, under the Promotion of Access to Information Act, at least one outside party is demanding to see the drafts which were quietly given to the executive.
This in turn seems to have led the Auditor-General to now be fighting wars on two fronts. One by engaging lawyers to try and prevent the public from seeing the drafts in question - why? The other is using tough measures to prevent leaks from members of the JIT. It is said that he has warned staff of jail sentences sentences from under a provision of the National Director of Public Prosecutions Act. And, as we also know, he has subjected a number of senior team members to lie-detector tests. There are a number of other related issues which I could refer to.
All that I have alluded to this afternoon shows that we are left not knowing the full extent of the corrupted process. But, what we do know is that the process has produced a seriously deficient report in which the JIT ignored most of the issues listed in Scopa’s 14th report. We also know that, after 12 months of very costly work, the JIT was not able to produce any new findings. The report’s bulk is the recording and cataloguing of documents, procedures and historical perspectives.
There is almost no forensic level or other form of analysis towards establishing missing explanations in the report. Most questions are simply avoided. Against this, may I remind hon members of my widely publicised critique of the JIT’s work. This critique, which exposes more than 50 significant shortcomings, remains unchallenged, and is soon to be added to by some telling observations made by members of the forensic investigation community.
Everything about the arms deal and the strategic package is deplorable: The quality of its transaction; the quality of investigation into those transactions, the actions of those that undermined the investigation; the failure of this Parliament to defend the public interest and our parliamentary democracy and, most of all, the huge and painful sacrifices - the demands of the country’s people.
The only redeeming prospect is that, slowly but surely, some of us are succeeding in having history accurately record what has happened. This emerging truth will ultimately punish those who have betrayed this Parliament and the people it represents. [Applause.]
Mr B W KANNEMEYER: Madam Speaker, I believe that no matter how hard one believes in something, or how committed one is to a particular cause, there must be moral and ethical guidelines that must dictate the extremes to which one would go to defend what one believes in.
To start my contribution to this debate I would like to say that when the chairperson, or the previous chairperson, of Scopa refers to the unsubstantial quality of the committee reports, he should also inform this House that during the two-day session of interaction with the heads of the different institutions - the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the National Director of Public Prosecutions - he chose to sit silent during the two-day session and not ask one single question. [Applause.] He preferred to raise his issues in the public media where they would not be subject to question and to cross-examination.
Likewise, with regard to hon Taljaard and the DP in general, at the first hearing into the special review of the arms procurement process, which was held on 10 October 2000, of a total of 3 000 lines of evidence the total sum of the DP’s contribution to that debate was nine lines - 0,03% of the total evidence in the debate which started this whole process. And that was done by Mr Graham McIntosh, and when the DP realised that this was juicy and sexy, it was the first party to remove two members of its party from Scopa and replace them with the so-called hon Ms Taljaard - firebrand, double-barrelled Master’s degree … [Interjections.] [Applause.]
The SPEAKER: Order! Order, hon members.
Mr D H M GIBSON: Madam Speaker, there are only hon members;, there are not ``so-called’’ hon members.
Mr B W KANNEMEYER: … the hon Taljaard, with her so-called double- barrelled degrees to come and give new fight and fire to Scopa. [Interjections.]
Having said that, let me proceed to my contribution. As indicated by Comrade Modise, the strategic arms package was indeed about the obligation of the executive to defend the country, its borders and its assets, and was done in a parliamentary, agreed-to defence review. The exercise of reviewing the strategic defence procurement package process, on the other hand, was then essentially about the constitutional obligation of oversight and accountability that indeed this Parliament is tasked with.
A lot has been said about the investigation into the strategic defence procurement package, but the reality is that much of what has been said and written was done in the context of extreme political posturing from most sides of the political spectrum, and informed in some instances by genuinely concerned individuals, but unfortunately on the other hand tainted by the dubious interests of varying lobbyists and probably even losing bidders.
We must admit that it is exactly the open, free and transparent environment brought about by an ANC-led Government that allowed whistle-blowers the space to come forward and raise the type of concerns which they could and, in fact, did raise. However, the simple submission of information by any whistle-blower does not in itself amount to guilt or fact. Therefore, the way in which the Government then responded to this information is an important lesson and fact which the opposition chooses to ignore or to accept.
And the fact is that it was the Minister of Defence who called upon the Auditor-General to produce a special review on the strategic defence procurement package and process. And it was this subsequent report of the Auditor-General that provided the basis for Scopa, Parliament and, subsequently, the joint investigating team, or JIT, to consider concerns raised in connection with the arms package.
Turning to the 14th report of the public accounts committee, a lot of criticism has been levelled against this committee and later against the ANC component of it. Let me consider a number of questions in that regard.
Did Scopa have the right to produce its 14th report and raise the type of questions and concerns that it did? I am saying, indeed, we had the right. And the special report of the Auditor-General was referred to Scopa in terms of Parliament’s Rules and procedures and, clearly, Scopa therefore had the responsibility to consider findings of the Auditor-General’s special review, as well as submissions made.
Whilst at this stage admitting to some shortcomings in our own process, I remain convinced that Scopa, and the ANC component in it, were not at fault in reporting our findings to the National Assembly at the time. It is, however, said with a clear understanding and appreciation that ours was only a report to the National Assembly and the National Assembly had the responsibility to accept, reject or amend any or all of the recommendations contained in that specific report. The National Assembly, in accepting that report, became then the institution that made the recommendation to the executive for an independent, expert forensic investigation.
Madam Speaker, it is in this regard, then, that your interaction, the interaction of the Deputy President and indeed of the executive, in terms of the report, was placed in a particular context. Once the committee’s report is adopted by the National Assembly, in my limited understanding, that report does become the responsibility of the National Assembly. The Speaker then has the responsibility to take that report forward. Therefore, when Scopa or, in this case, our chairperson at the time, proceeded to interact directly with the President or the executive, that should have been the role and the prerogative of the Speaker. Because the 14th report of Scopa was adopted by the National Assembly, indeed then also as indicated by a letter of the Speaker later, the Deputy President’s intervention should also have been addressed to the Office of the Speaker.
However, having said that, there can be no denying the right of the Deputy President as leader of Government business to interact with the legislature. If any committee - and in this case, Scopa - makes the type of serious allegations that we have made, against anyone affected by such allegations, we cannot deny the right of those so affected to respond. And therefore, indeed, even though we may not like what the executive has said in response to our report, no one can deny the executive the right to reply.
Was the decision by the National Assembly then to have a joint investigation into the arms procurement process the correct one? Madam Speaker, I would suggest that undoubtedly it was, and whether we agree or do not agree with the findings of the Auditor-General in his special review, that report together with other information - substantiated or not
- warranted further investigation to either substantiate the allegations or to clear those who stood accused in the light of those allegations.
Therefore, as Scopa’s 14th report indicates, the purpose of the joint
investigation was to prove or disprove the allegations. This is the part
that the opposition does not want to accept: the report clearly said to
prove or disprove'' - there was no assumption that the statements that were
made were going to be found to be true -all the allegations which cause
damage to the perceptions of Government’’. The decision to have this
investigation was therefore both the correct one and indeed a necessary
one, as it further demonstrated this Government’s commitment to clean,
transparent and good governance.
I think the critical question that the opposition has tried to present to the public is whether the report of the joint investigating team was a cover-up. [Interjections.]
Would the hon member like to say that on record? From the very onset of … [Interjections.] I didn’t think so.
From the very onset of the joint investigation it became clear that certain parties and individuals were only going to be happy with a report that would implicate Government in some or other way in corruption. This is underscored by pronouncements before and by the fact that within less than half an hour after the report being made public most opposition parties, none of whom would at that time have had sufficient time to study the findings and recommendations of the report, came out and condemned the report as a cover-up.
To substantiate its claims of a cover-up, it even went further to suggest or to attack the integrity and quality of work of the three agencies. This is terribly sad, and indeed very unfortunate for our young democracy if one is going to have the type of opposition that is only going to support findings and verdicts of our independent institutions when they give the type of verdicts that they want, and undermine the integrity of those very same institutions when they give verdicts that are not to their liking. [Interjections.] [Applause.]
Only the most cynical amongst us can believe that the JIT report was a cover-up. I am saying that because for anyone to believe that the joint investigation was a cover-up, you have to believe the following. The Office of the Public Protector, the Office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, as well as the Office of the Auditor-General and all those employed in these offices are corrupt, and were and still are in collusion with the so-called alleged corrupt individuals. Now even the most unpatriotic amongst us would take this as a little far-fetched.
Without going into the detail of the JIT report, let me reflect on some of the key findings of the report. Even in recognising that the entire process of the arms deal was not perfect, everyone must agree that this arms procurement probably rates amongst the most transparent arms procurement processes in recent and past international arms trade deals. [Interjections.] Hon Pierre Gerber tells me that under the apartheid government, the way it worked was that one would just wake up one morning and find a couple of new helicopters on one’s doorstep. There was absolutely no transparency.
In dealing with one two perceptions, I quote from the JIT report:
No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the Government. The irregularities …
There is a light flashing. I think that means I am close to finishing.
… The irregularities and improprieties referred to in the findings as contained in this report, point to the conduct of Government and certain officials of Government departments involved and cannot, in our view, be ascribed to the President or the Ministers’ Committee or Cabinet. There are therefore no grounds to suggest that the Government’s contracting position is flawed.
This is a direct quotation from the joint investigating team report and, whilst clearly exonerating the President and the executive, it is not a blanket whitewash of the entire process. There are areas specifically indicated in Chapters 14.1, where there are specific shortcomings and findings, and in 14.2 recommendations are made to address the shortcomings identified.
In concluding, there are a number of lessons that we need to take from this process. Some of those are that a lack of proper systems, checks and balances indeed will make our task difficult and even worse. Deviations from laid-down procedures, although difficult to avoid, will always raise questions and problems. Therefore, given the fact that we are sitting with the experience that we have had, and the fact that we are sitting with an opposition that is hellbent on playing a destructive role, the oversight and accountability obligation rests particularly heavy on the shoulders of the ANC to even provide leadership in that regard.
For the opposition, I think it is important that they start realising that oversight and accountability, even though sexy and juicy, are not only about political opportunism. They actually require a certain amount of moral integrity. In fact, the lure of media coverage and the excitement of radio and television sound bites can never and should never be the driver of any oversight and accountability exercise. To make the parliamentary committee system work, there is an obligation on the opposition to put in a much greater effort to seek consensus. There is no way and no democracy that can provide for a minority veto. It is time that the DP learn a very simple lesson of democracy, and that is that in the event of a lack of consensus, the majority shall prevail. [Applause.]
Mr A BLAAS: Madam Speaker, at the outset it must be stated that although the joint investigation report on the arms procurement package lacks specific recommendations and clear answers in certain areas, it cannot be summarily discarded as a whitewash. It is explicit about areas and departments in which controls were nonexistent and checks and balances were ignored.
The oversight role of Parliament needs to be rethought. It is much more than the role of opposition parties criticising Government’s policies. Parliament, inclusive of all parties, has a constitutional obligation to scrutinise legislation and policy to ensure proper delivery and good governance. The strong party system makes it difficult to separate party- political roles from parliamentary roles. Although Chapter 9 institutions were involved, the focus of parliamentary oversight in the case of the arms deal shifted to political infighting.
Ministerial accountability and ministerial responsibility need to be addressed as well. The joint investigating team used a conservative approach by exonerating Government from all improper and unlawful conduct. The team did not indicate what Government’s responsibility was with reference to officials who engaged in improper and unlawful actions. Ministers have a constitutional obligation to explain and account to Parliament and the public for departmental actions.
The report indicated a wide spectrum of deficiencies in procedures and processes that needed to be addressed. The respective portfolio committees, and Scopa specifically, will have to ensure close control to ensure efficient oversight in the implementation of the recommendations as set out in the report.
Stemming from the discussions so far, there are some unanswered questions. To be able to ensure thorough transparency, it is considered essential that answers to these questions be given. It is unfortunate that Scopa’s recommendations indicated no further interaction with the ministerial committee.
Sommige van die tergende vrae wat onbeantwoord bly, is die volgende: hoekom is die kontrakte vir die korvette toegeken voordat die bekostigbaarheidstudies voltooi was? Wie het hierdie opdrag gegee? Die verslag swyg hieroor. Ons betaal te veel vir die Britse Hawk-vegvliegtuie. Hoekom?
Die verslag stel dit dat die Regering se kontrakposisie nie onder verdenking is nie. Is die stelling nie dalk voortydig nie? Die verslag dui op verskeie ongerymdhede en wanpraktyke wat met die toekenning van subkontrakte plaasgevind het. Individuele optredes is ook onder verdenking en prosedures en direktiewe is nie nagekom nie. Daar bestaan dus ‘n redelike moontlikheid dat ongerymdhede en wanpraktyke by die toekenning van die hoofkontrakte kon voorkom. Is so ‘n vrywaring dan in hierdie stadium geregverdig?
Die vraag of daar werklik parlementêre magtiging was om met die volle bestek van die aankoop voort te gaan spook ook steeds. Nieteenstaande die feit dat die Verdedigingsoorsig ‘n visie vir magspeile en uitrusting stel, bly dit steeds onderhewig aan hersiening en kan dit nie as ‘n volmag beskou word nie. Bekostigbaarheid en ander behoeftes moet in aanmerking geneem word. Daar word dus geredeneer dat verdere parlementêre magtiging ook nodig was. Al was dit ‘n politieke besluit, behoort verduidelikings hiervoor gegee te word.
Dit is maar ‘n paar kwelvrae wat in die lug bly hang en nie deur die verslag gehanteer word nie.
Enige wapentransaksie van dié omvang, bloot in die lig van die waarde en bestek hiervan, is blootgestel aan kritiek. Ons het foute gemaak en ons het lesse geleer. In die gees van ‘n werklike demokrasie moet absolute deursigtigheid gehandhaaf word. Stelsels en beheermeganismes, tesame met verantwoordelikhede en aanspreeklikhede deur die rolspelers, moet in plek wees. Geen regering kan sulke omstredenheid soos ons hier ervaar het, bekostig nie, maar in die finale instansie gaan die toets egter wees of die wapentuig wat ons aangekoop het rand vir rand vir Suid-Afrika waarde bied. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[Some of the challenging questions that remain unanswered, are the following: Why were the contracts for the corvettes awarded before the feasibility studies were completed? Who gave that instruction? The report is silent on this issue. We are paying too much for the British Hawk fighter aircraft. Why?
The report states that the Government’s contractual position is not under suspicion. Is this statement not perhaps premature? The report points to several irregularities and malpractices that occurred in the awarding of subcontracts. Individual actions are also under suspicion and procedures and directives were not adhered to. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that irregularities and malpractices could have occurred in the awarding of the major contracts. Is such an indemnity justified at this stage?
In addition there still looms the spectre of the question as to whether there truly was a parliamentary mandate to continue with the full scope of the purchase. Notwithstanding the fact that the Defence Review states vision for force levels and equipment, this remains subject to review and cannot be considered to be a mandate.
Affordability and other requirements must be taken into consideration. Therefore, it is argued that further parliamentary authorisation was also necessary. Even if it was a political decision, certain explanations should be given for this.
These are but a few of the worrying questions that remain pending and that are not dealt with by the report.
Any arms transaction of this magnitude, merely considering the value and scope thereof, is subject to criticism. We have made some mistakes and we have learnt some lessons. In the spirit of true democracy absolute transparency must be maintained. Systems and control mechanisms, together with the responsibilities and accountability of role-players, must be in place. No government can afford controversy such as we have experienced here, but in the final analysis the test will be whether, rand for rand, the arms that we have purchased provide value to South Africa.]
Dr G W KOORNHOF: Madam Speaker and hon members, it is shocking to note that nowhere in the arms deal negotiations have opportunity costs for the deal been determined. After months of investigation, numerous reports and debates in this Parliament, what do we have? A lot of talk and a lot of documents but a total lack of confidence in the process. We are faced with a farcical attempt by Government which claims that nothing is wrong, all is well. Are we to believe this?
After thoroughly reading the joint investigation report again, it is clear that it is a carefully worded document. It fails to cut to the bone on crucial issues, for instance, industrial offsets, hidden costs and ministerial accountability. Furthermore, by its own admission it cannot be regarded as a complete investigation.
On page 11 of the report it states: ``Areas of a criminal and sensitive nature were considered inappropriate to be included in this report.’’ The result was a documentation of only a chronological sequence of events relating to the arms deal. A few findings and recommendations were added as lessons learnt. No wonder that people have lost faith in the investigation process and that there is a constant questioning of issues such as value for money regarding the promised industrial offsets, creative accounting, the all-inclusive cost of the arms deal to the taxpayer and the promised 65 000 to-be-created jobs.
The fact that there are so many unanswered questions about the arms deal, three years after the signing of the contract, is a clear indication that something major went wrong with this procurement process. Yet, nobody has been successfully prosecuted to date and nobody is behind bars. The truth is that the public lost confidence in the process when calls for a judicial commission of inquiry were rejected and when the Heath Special Investigation Unit was stopped from participating in this investigation.
The subsequent interference by the executive, the unwarranted attacks on Parliament, the ANC’s bad behaviour in the Public Accounts Committee and the involvement of the presiding officer, all work together to cast a huge shadow of doubt onto this investigation.
How does one reconcile the finding of the joint investigation report that senior government official Mr Chippy Shaik was guilty of despicable behaviour, but the chief of the SANDF holds a farewell function for Mr Shaik and the official monthly magazine of the SANDF states, last month, ``Man of distinctions leaves the department.’’ Are we asked to believe that the politicians did not know and are culpable? Who are we to believe? The SANDF or the joint investigation report?
When qualified officials’ advice is ignored and the Cabinet instead approves of a vastly more expensive deal, the report finds that the politicians did not do anything wrong. But when corruption occurs it is attributed to the officials. As the politicians make the officials, they are fall guys for gross mismanagement, we are still expected to believe that the integrity of the arms deal is intact despite the proof that the politicians did not exercise proper control over the process.
During December 2001, no less than eight portfolio committees tabled reports on the joint investigation report. It is now eight months later, and very little if anything has become of the recommendations mode by these committees. A few examples: Have the two defence committees compiled an implementation framework? Have amendments been introduced to the Public Finance Management Act? What happened to the full progress report promised for earlier this year regarding the NIP projects, broken down project by project with the benefits to be derived from each project also disaggregated into clear categories - investment, export earnings, direct and indirect jobs? Has Scopa honoured its commitment to interact with the relevant departments and parastatals to monitor proper implementation of recommendations made in the joint investigation report? As long as recommendations of portfolio committees are not implemented, we are making a mockery of the oversight role of Parliament and then we have become victims of the executive’s/majority party manipulation. This threatens our democracy.
Due to the reasons mentioned above, the UDM has decided, as a manner of protest, not to support any of the eight portfolio committee reports before this House today. [Applause.]
The MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY: Madam Speaker, this matter has been debated in this House before and, as we have seen, it was very widely commented on in many different areas. As Government, we have to be realistic and accept that those who are opposed to the purchase of the arms, and those who see it as their sole purpose in life to oppose anything this Government does, will try to ensure that we will have no closure on this matter.
What I find somewhat distasteful, Madam Speaker, although I accept the Chair’s ruling that we should not comment on the constitutional structures, is just the fact that certain individual members somehow seem to see themselves as paragons of virtue. What they cannot seem to accept is that fact is not what I say is right.
I also find it extremely distasteful that persons make a long string of allegations here in the House, but are not prepared to subject themselves to the scrutiny of the investigation. I think this is sad but, more than that, I think it is indicative of the complete disregard for what we are trying to achieve as a nation with our constitutional structures. It is a very sad day when we experience the events that we did by certain speakers earlier today, and I sincerely hope that their parties will reflect on the wisdom of such actions.
This strategic arms procurement has been subject to close scrutiny by this Parliament and by the institutions and structures of both Parliament and the Constitution. What we have to accept, as I have indicated, is that there are many zealots out there who will not accept anything unless it coincides with their views. I will not seek to respond to such positions in this matter.
However, Government has respected and will continue to respect the rights of many persons who express reservations on this defence procurement. It was, and it is, a major decision that utilises considerable resources. If we look more sensibly, other than the populist appeals, at what has been said by many members here, that we are doing away with all the social expenditures for arms, then that is not the case. The evidence is against that, but we are deeply conscious of the fact that when one makes choices like this - and we made a choice and this House debated that choice, that we would re-equip our Defence Force - I believe that the majority of persons in this House would support that decision. When we made that decision, we knew we were making choices, but what has become clear in the time since making that decision and in subsequent events, is that we have not detracted from our social expenditure obligations.
We have been able to meet those obligations and can continue to meet those obligations. I therefore think this is fairly cheap politics, to try and claim that we are ignoring and denying our social responsibilities in favour of a defence force. All governments - and there is only one that I am aware of that will eschew any defence force whatsoever - have to make a choice between spending on defence and social expenditure. I believe that the evidence shows this; the budget reviews are extensive and detailed, the expenditure reviews are extensive and detailed. No-one can claim that they do not have enough information to know whether we do or do not meet our social expenditure obligations. We quite clearly do.
As stated time and again, and I wish to state this again on behalf of the Government and my colleagues in the Cabinet, Government welcomes and continues to welcome the oversight of Parliament and it must exercise its responsibilities and its obligations. We also welcome the fact that three essential agencies of our new democracy - and this is why it is so distasteful when they are treated in the manner that they are - undertook extensive investigations. That investigation, as has been indicated by previous speakers from the ANC, weighed the evidence and made a finding. The fact that particular party members and individuals, whose particular views have not been borne out and whose political ambitions have possibly come short, do not like that, cannot be cause to attack our constitutional structures. We must desist from this kind of activity. That is disrespect for our future.
Let me address a point raised by the very last speaker, the hon Koornhof. Have we acted on the recommendations made by the findings? And here I wish to speak for the DTI as one of the major departments with responsibilities for a particular and important component of this total package. We have undertaken what we were asked to do. We were asked to ascertain once again whether the performance guarantees would, in fact, be effective. We have done that.
We have taken further legal advice. We have given that legal advice to the Auditor-General and gone into it in some detail. The further legal advice supports the findings of the joint study in that these contractual obligations in the form of performance guarantees are as effective as we can get and are most certainly in line with best practice internationally. We have asked the Auditor-General during the course of his annual audit, and the A-G specifically had full access to the National Industrial Participation Programme in March this year. We believed it to be a very thorough investigation of what our capacities and procedures were.
I wish to place on record our thanks to the office of the Auditor-General. He found, in general, that our procedures were in conformance with our obligations to monitor this process. He made certain procedural recommendations as to what we should do. We also brought in a further outside accounting firm and asked them to make further procedures and we have also introduced a range of administrative measures - new databases, new manuals of procedure, new manuals that define conflict of interest, and we accept that we had to improve our records of decision-making. We have done that.
We have upgraded the division dealing with this matter to a Chief Directorate. The Auditor-General, I think, has also expressed his view that this is acceptable. He has thanked us for the information we have given him and we will continue to give him that information. The NIPP, the National Industrial Participation Programme, will also be subject to regular audits by the Auditor-General’s office.
The Auditor-General asked us to motivate what the logic was of substituting one project with another. Our argument is essentially that there is a considerable timespan between proposals being made for projects and then being realised. Fundamentally, it is in our interests of maintaining the viability and economic sustainability of these projects to ensure that we adjust to changes, to market conditions, and therefore we believe substitutability to be an important process. However, that substitutability does not reduce the obligations that the suppliers have, and our intention in allowing for these substitutions is to improve the quality of projects that we achieve through the NIPP.
Contrary to the last speaker’s view, we have reported, namely in March of this year. We gave a progress report on the National Industrial Participation Programme. As that report indicated, we are well ahead of schedule in terms of the benchmarks. The first major benchmark is 2004, but we are currently well ahead of schedule. These contracts began in 2000 and we began in the first period to define the projects, negotiate some very extensive and detailed projects, and they began to become operational. And, as we reported in that report in March, many of them are currently operational. During the course of this year others will become operational.
We believe that the range and quality of projects that have come in do meet our objective. That objective is to use any major purchase by the public sector to support and strengthen the industrialisation process in South Africa and strengthen its manufacturing capacity. When we look at the range of investment projects that have come in, we believe that we are meeting this obligation.
Now, it has been argued recently, using inaccurate and contradictory information, that many of these projects may have come anyway. Yes, it may also rain tomorrow. People not familiar with the competitiveness of international investment decisions, I think, may feel that investment comes easily. Investment does not come easily and from our point of view we would value far more highly projects that actually take place than projects that may have taken place.
A recent example was the gold projects around Harmony in the Free State. It really puzzles me and I see it as somewhat of a specious argument that we would have exported the gold anyway. The point that we are making with those projects is precisely that we are not just exporting gold, we are exporting beneficiated and processed gold. The project has a number of components to it. One of those is a facility to manufacture better quality gold in Harmony and therefore to make that available to the jewellery industry.
The other aspect, then, is the jewellery industry, where we have brought in investors who have access to major markets in the US and elsewhere, to come in and begin manufacturing the process. The other aspects of the project are new technology, introduced by Mintec, which allows two very important processes to take place. One concerns chemical products associated with gold production and the other is 99.9% refined gold that can be used for a range of electronic and jewellery purposes.
Finally, we have the jewellery training school, which we believe to be a major step forward for an area like Welkom, which has been subject to considerable economic decline as a result of the mining industry. Now, to say that we would have exported the gold anyway and discount the sum up to $9 million US of investment over the coming years really is a specious argument, which misses the point as to what it is we are trying to achieve with these projects.
The point that we once again wish to make very strongly is that there are two processes involved in this strategic defence procurement. The one process is a decision to re-equip the SA National Defence Force, to maintain its integrity as a defence force - and my colleague will deal more with this. We did that within what we felt would be affordable figures for this economy. Those figures, the estimates, the amount of money we have drawn down on the foreign loans, all of these figures are in the expenditure review and the budget review. So I am not going to re-enter this whole issue of what the costs are. The costs are visible to all as they proceed and unfold. Everyone can make their own calculation and see what is happening. Everyone can see that, contrary to the predictions, the budget position is not worse and that it has improved.
So, the risk factors that were rightly considered at the time thus far are not eventuating. It was for this reason, that these risks were not there, that we agreed to the second tranche, but we can monitor these risks as we go along. So, the dire predictions of what would happen to our budget have not happened.
However, that decision to re-equip the SA National Defence Force was taken, like any other decision by any public sector entity, where the procurement will result in more than $10 million US imported content. It immediately becomes liable to the NIPP, where they must meet a minimum of 30% of that imported content through a range of specified obligations in the domestic economy. We believe that the NIPP, both its defence component and its civilian component, are meeting the objectives that we originally set.
Much has been made of the fact that these were foreign purchases. I think that anyone who examines the impact on the South African defence industry of these purchases will see that it has been massively positive. Without these projects that have come through by way of the procurement, our defence industry would most certainly have been in much more dire straits. There are many people who would have welcomed that, but I think that the majority of South Africans would accept that we need both a defence force and a defence industry.
Allegations have been made in my own department against a particular individual. We processed those allegations through due process. We did it following the guidelines and prescriptions of the Public Service Act and we carried out that investigation. A finding was made against the individual - not a finding of corruption but one of misconduct. The individual exercised his right of appeal to myself as Minister. I considered the matter once again and I upheld the original decision. The individual then quite rightly, because he is a young person with a future, exercised further rights about a week or two ago. He went for a process of conciliation. That process failed and during the course of this month an arbitration process will take place.
The point I want to make here is that whistle-blowing and allegations, as was said by the hon Kannemeyer, are one thing. Due process and finding a person guilty of any misconduct or criminal conduct must then be followed. We cannot, just because it suits our political purpose or our own predispositions about our opposition to arms, make any wild allegation we want to. We cannot come here, having had an exhaustive process of investigation with findings made that are public, and then string together a whole lot of other innuendo’s and insinuations about the arms industry and things that are outstanding. Really, as leaders of our people, should we not conduct ourselves with more dignity and circumspection?
If allegations are made and are investigated, then the due process of law, or of administrative procedure in the case of my department, must continue. Surely, no matter who we are, as members of Parliament and leaders we should respect those processes. I do not think we should get up and abuse Parliament by making all sorts of accusations against all sorts of companies as to how rotten and corrupt they are, etc. If we are going to do that, we may as well accuse every major corporation in South Africa of corruption as well. [Interjections.]
An HON MEMBER: Don’t be naive.
The MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY: For a young person like that hon member to call me naive is just a little bit thick at times, actually. [Laughter.] Where was that hon member when I was learning? [Interjections.]
As I have said, regrettably and for reasons that have little to do with the facts, but more with particular emotive feelings or particular individual sadness that someone’s facts were not listened to because maybe they were not facts, this matter is unlikely to lie down. I am sure it will continue to be raised, because it looks like it is convenient.
However, the truth of the matter is that, contrary to the continued attempts to be negative and destructive, I believe both this Parliament and the agencies of our Constitution have come through well. They have drawn our attention to matters where we were clearly in the wrong, they have drawn our attention to shortcomings in our procedures and they have made it clear that we must, in future, conduct ourselves even more professionally than we attempted to do on this occasion.
That seems to me, for a new democracy coming out of some very opaque and dark times - and I do not recall the DA ever disputing any arms purchases as the DP, but still - coming out of those times, I think we have done very well. The Government continues to accept the oversight to exercise. We have reported and if we do not implement the recommendations that are made, then these hon members will hold us to account.
South Africa does need a defence force, we needed to re-equip it, and in the process of re-equipping it we used the leverage that this gave us to strengthen South Africa’s industrial economy, which has to be to the benefit of our people. [Applause.] Adv Z L MADASA: Madam Speaker, whilst there is no smoke without a fire, concerns about the arms deal are now clearly water under the bridge. This is a bitter pill that we must swallow. It is now clear that the Government views the arms deal as a closed matter. This does not preclude people with tangible evidence of corruption in this regard from bringing such evidence to light.
If one is to look into the future, as I suggest, I think lessons to be learnt from this exercise are that we must strengthen Parliament’s oversight role. Chapter 9 institutions, especially, must be strengthened. Parliament must ensure that these institutions are truly independent in a discernible manner.
We must exercise greater circumspection when we pass laws in this House, especially as far as the prevention of corruption and fraud is concerned. The alleged approval by the Cabinet of the concept of an inspectorate to oversee future arms exports is welcomed. The Department of Defence, on its part, must urgently implement all Scopa recommendations made to it. The new acquisition officer will do well to take note of this. The nonfunctioning of the audit committee since May 2001 in the department is a case in point.
Although it is difficult to find fault in law with the report of the investigators into the arms deal, their conclusions leave a bitter taste in one’s mouth. I cannot forget the statement of the Public Protector on that occasion when he said there was no evidence of wrongdoing by any person; that where it existed, it was not sufficient to warrant prosecution. This is one of those cases in which a judge would say that he or she was not satisfied that the accused had told the whole truth, but that there was no evidence of guilt and that therefore the accused was discharged. That is the arms deal. [Applause.]
Mnr P J GROENEWALD: Mevrou die Speaker, die debat gaan nie vandag daaroor of Suid-Afrika nuwe wapens moet aankoop aldan nie. Die aankopeprogram is goedgekeur deur hierdie Parlement, deur al die politieke partye, maar dit gaan oor die proses wat gevolg is met die aankoop van hierdie wapens.
Die eerste bevinding van die ondersoek deur die Openbare Beskermer, die
Ouditeur-Generaal en die Nasionale Direkteur van Openbare Vervolging is dat
geen bewyse gevind kon word van onbehoorlike of onwettige optrede of gedrag
van die Regering nie. Soos die Engelse spreekwoord sê: We have satisfied
our masters; they are off the hook. In dieselfde bevinding word dit
duidelik gestel dat enige onreëlmatighede en onbehoorlike optredes
toegeskryf word aan sekere amptenare. In Engels noem 'n mens dit eintlik
blameshifting’’.
Met die beperkte tyd tot my beskikking verwys ek net na die korvetteprogram. Die verslag bevind in paragraaf 14.1.10 dat, met die uitsondering van Bazan, nie een van die tenderaars betrokke by die korvet- aankope voldoen het aan die minimum evaluasiekriteria ten opsigte van finansies, tegniese vereistes en die verdedigingsnywerheidsdeelname nie. Bazan het net die finansiële evaluasie nie geslaag nie. Die verslag meld dat ten spyte van die nie-voldoening aan die vereistes, die aanbiedings van die tenderaars ‘n tweede rondte geëvalueer is. Die verslag meld dat geen bewys van die magtiging van sodanige besluit gedurende die forensiese ondersoek gevind is nie. By navraag aan die mede- voorsitter van SOFCOM mnr Shaik hieromtrent, sê hy dat hy nie bewus was daarvan dat nie aan die vereistes voldoen was nie. Die verslag meld verder eerstens dat Bazan die enigste tenderaar was wat aan al die kritieke minimum kriteria ten opsigte van tegniese en verdedigingsnywerheids deelname voldoen het. Tweedens het die Bazan die hoogste punte behaal wat betref militêre waardes en verdedigingsnywerheidsdeelname. In die derde plek het Bazan die hoogste persentasie - die DIP, soos hulle sê, en NIP - in verhouding tot die kontrakprys behaal. En in die vierde plek het Bazan die laagste prys van al vier die tenderaars aangebied.
Maar GFC word genomineer as gekose tenderaar op grond van hulle NIP aanbod, ten spyte daarvan dat daar onsekerheid bestaan oor die bereiking van die aanbod. Daar is geen twyfel nie dat as skoon administrasie, objektiewe beoordeling, voldoening aan vereistes en optrede in die beste belang van die Weermag gegeld het, Bazan die kontrak moes kry. In die lig van die feit dat GFC die kontrak gekry het teen die agtergrond van voorafgaande, kan niemand verkwalik word nie as daar gesê word dit lyk na onbehoorlike bevoordeling onder die tafel deur en blatante korrupsie.
Die Vryheidsfront se standpunt is dat dit tyd geword het dat Ministers
aanspreeklikheid begin aanvaar vir wat hulle amptenare doen. Hierdie
blame-shifting'' moet gestaak word. Die verantwoordelike Ministers
behoort te bedank, want hulle het nié hulle werk behoorlik gedoen nie, en
sonder meer voorleggings aanvaar sonder om hulle behoorlik op die hoogte
van kriteria en vereistes te bring. Dit is die spreekwoordelike drie apies
van die Regering wat sê:Ek sien niks, ek hoor niks, en ek sê niks nie’’.
[Tussenwerpsels.] (Translation of Afrikaans speech follows.)
[Mr P J GROENEWALD: Madam Speaker, this debate is not about whether South Africa should buy new arms or not. The programme of acquisition was agreed to by this Parliament, by all the political parties, but this is about the process that was followed with the acquisition of these arms.
In the investigation by the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the National Director of Public Prosecution the first finding was that no proof could be found of improper or illegal actions or conduct by the Government. As the English saying goes: ``We have satisfied our masters; they are off the hook’’. In the same finding it was clearly stated that any irregularities and conduct unbecoming can be imputed to certain officials. In English one actually calls that blame-shifting.
In the limited time at my disposal I must refer to the corvette programme. In paragraph 14.1.10 the report finds that, with the exception of Bazan, not one of the tenderers involved with the corvette acquisition actually measured up to the minimum evaluation criteria in respect of finance, technical requirements and participation in the defence industry. Bazan did not pass the financial evaluation. The report mentions that, despite noncompliance with requirements, the presentations by the tenderers were evaluated for a second round. The report mentions that no proof of the authorisation for such a decision could be found during the forensic investigation. Upon enquiry the co-chairperson of Sofcom, Mr Shaik, said in this regard that he was unaware of the requirements not having been met.
The report also mentions, firstly, that Bazan was the only tenderer to meet all the critical minimum criteria in respect of technical and defence industry participation. Secondly, Bazan achieved the highest score as regards military values and defence industry participation. Thirdly, Bazan achieved the highest percentage - the DIP, as they say, and the NIP - in relation to the contract price. In the fourth place, Bazan had submitted the lowest price of the four tenderers.
However, GFC was nominated on the basis of their NIP offer, despite the uncertainty regarding the viability of that offer. There is no doubt that if clean administration, objective evaluation, compliance with requirements and conduct in the best interests of the Defence Force had held good, Bazan should have been awarded the contract. In light of the fact that GFC was awarded the contract against this background, nobody can be taken amiss for saying that this appears to be improper, under the table favouring and blatant corruption.
The position of the FF is that it is high time for Ministers to start taking responsibility for what their officials are doing. This blame- shifting must be stopped. The Ministers responsible should resign, because they did not do their work properly by simply accepting submissions without acquainting themselves with the criteria and requirements involved. The proverbial three monkeys of the Government are saying: ``Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil’’. [Interjections.]]
Mrs P DE LILLE: Madam Speaker, I want to thank the hon Raenette Taljaard and Gavin Woods for just refreshing our memories about the arms deal saga and I want to agree with every word they said.
Section 217 of the Constitution requires that all procurement processes must be done in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. The arms deal does not comply with most of these requirements, especially cost-effectiveness and transparency.
Government has misled this country. Government promised South Africa in 1999 that they were going to invest R29 billion and, in return, would receive R110 billion in investment and create 64 000 jobs. Why do I say Government has misled this country? The R29 billion has now increased to R53 billion, the R110 billion has decreased to R104 billion and the jobs from Coega have evaporated into a condom factory. [Laughter.]
Why are we here today? Why are we only debating this publicly today? If we are serious about our democracy and corruption by senior officials in Government this report should have been prioritised by Parliament. Are we building a positive image for our country? No, we are not!
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 55(2), as well as section 92(2) of the Constitution refer to accountability and oversight. With the arms deal we are experiencing a fusion of the executive and Parliament along party- political lines. This is in violation of the separation of powers. Thank God that we still have an independent judiciary! We place our faith in this country in the independent judiciary and not in the executive or Parliament. So far Government has lost almost all constitutional challenges and I am sure that they are also going to lose the crossing of the floor challenge.
The violation of the separation of powers is illustrated today. In today’s debate of 165 minutes the ANC has been allocated 64 minutes. Forty minutes have been allocated to Ministers to come and lecture us in Parliament, instead of Parliament asking the Ministers to come and account and answer questions. [Interjections.] [Applause.] Parliament must reflect on this report today - no lectures from Ministers! [Interjections.]
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order!
Mrs P DE LILLE: This makes a mockery of the oversight of Parliament. The executive can control members of the ruling party, but we in the opposition will not keep quiet. [Interjections.]
Parliament has become the lapdog of the executive, not the watchdog! [Applause.]
Dr R H DAVIES: Madam Speaker, the subject of this debate this afternoon is a series of reports by committees of this Parliament engaged in oversight about an important transaction in this democratic Government. I am going to speak largely to the report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry which looked at industrial participation dimensions. The portfolio committee has, in fact, tabled two reports on the IP dimensions of this transaction. In addition to the report on the Order Paper today we have also published a report in the ATC on the 20 March last year on the job estimates arising from certain queries put to us by Scopa in its 14th report.
I also want to confirm, for Dr Koornhof’s benefit, that the committee did, in fact, receive a more detailed report which we asked for from the department. This was tabled in a portfolio committee meeting in March this year and I have it with me now. Perhaps the hon member wants to get it and he will not vote against our report when it comes to voting.
There is a good deal of confusion about the industrial participation component and some of it was displayed in the remarks of Patricia De Lille just now. I think I therefore need to clarify a few points. The first point which I think she has missed is that the case for or against the defence programme rests fundamentally on its merits as a programme for equipping the Defence Force to meet the country’s needs in the context we find ourselves in.
The industrial participation, the NIPs and the DIPs, may arise as a secondary reconsideration. Government policy requires any procurement abroad valued at $10 million or more to be subject to industrial participation negotiations, which seek to use the procurement to secure investment benefits for the country.
The second point of confusion, I think, is about the basis on which the job estimates were calculated. As we pointed out in the report we tabled last year, there never were going to be 65 000 jobs created in the NIP and the DIP projects. If this was understood as 65 000 jobs existing all at one time in the various project programmes provided for under the DIPs and the NIPs, then anyone who thought in this way simply did not understand the basis of the calculation. The 65 000, in fact, refers to direct jobs that will be created both in the construction and the implementation phase of the projects and also the indirect jobs that will be created in the upstream and downstream sectors of our economy as a result of the impact of these projects.
The direct jobs will consist of jobs both in the construction and the projects per se. It will, therefore, be both temporary and permanent. It will be created along a 15-year time span that will therefore not all exist at one time. For example, the construction jobs will end, once the plants are built, and before most of the project jobs will be created.
In the report we submitted last year, our committee recommended that for purposes of monitoring and oversight the focus should be on the estimates of the direct jobs which will tackle some 15 000 over the period to 2013. Likewise, there was never going to be investment of R100 billion in this economy. That total refers to credits which will be awarded to obligators which will consist of both investments and exports.
As our report that we heard in March clearly indicated, the investment obligations of the five defence contracting companies are, in fact, around $3,8 billion while the export obligations are in the region of 9,5 billion. The IP obligators all have to discharge these obligations over a period of time and milestones at three, five and seven year intervals have been agreed with these obligators. The first such milestone is due to be reached in the year 2003-04, and I think when some of these details are understood it becomes possible for us to establish some serious criteria to monitor the extent to which the IP programmes are or are not on track. Let me state at this point as our committee’s reports have repeatedly made clear. We agree that the IP obligations are an important part of the value for money of this strategic defence procurement programme and it is clearly in the interest of our country to ensure that they are carried out and that the obligators do not resort to the penalty clauses for nonimplementation by the obligators.
In our reports this is the picture we have received. Last year we were told that 13 of the the total of 70 projects have commenced and at around 2 000 direct jobs have been created or sustained as a result, compared to a total of 15 000 direct jobs that is estimated will be created over a contract period. I do not think that is one minor condom factory, that is quite a few jobs and compared to the milestones it indicates progress.
Earlier this year we were told that projects approved by the Department of Trade and Industry which were active were expected to generate credits in terms of investment and export earnings of $6 billion compared to the target for the first milestone in 2003-04 of 3,98 billion. Recent press reports have questioned the basis on which some of these credits have been awarded and the validity of some of these projects and the substitution that has taken place on some of the original projects. Minister Erwin addressed some of these matters earlier and I am sure that these are issues which, as part of our oversight work in the committee, we would want to go through in more detail later on.
But what I want to state here very clearly this afternoon is that no serious evidence has been placed before the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, even though we have opened up to public hearings and we have heard from a variety of views which have pointed to the IP programmes being in any way a scam or a sham or a mere delusion of the public of South Africa. Those who have made such charges, and we have such people before us, have all been against the arms procurement per se. They have also generally argued, as Ms Taljaard did earlier on, largely by reference to other experiences or to allegations about inherent corruption in the arms industry per se. No serious evidence has been presented to our committee which has presented a case which has contradicted the basic picture which is that the milestones are, broadly speaking, being complied with and at this early stage, the IP programmes are on track.
More importantly, the IP dimension was subject to thorough investigation by the investigating agencies. The main recommendation of Chapter 12 which we were asked to look into was that legal opinion be obtained. We have heard from the Minister just now that that legal opinion has, in fact, been obtained. Swift action was also taken against an official in the department who is alleged to have been involved in misconduct. All other cases are now subject to appeal.
Beyond this our report actually argued that the real issue is not necessarily fundamentally only a question of legal contracts. Ensuring effective implementation of IP projects both those related to the strategic defence procurement and those arising from other procurements is a function of much more than controls in contracts. It also depends, and perhaps is even more critically dependent on follow-up actions by Government and the DTI in particular, interacting with contractors and creating the conditions for the IP projects to go ahead. This includes working together with contractors to identify locations for projects to generate infrastructure services and to provide other services on a similar basis as those provided to other investors. In other words, all of this relates to broader issues of investment policy and industrial strategy.
Let me say that the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry remains committed to maintaining oversight over these IP projects. We do consider that these are important programmes and we will continue to interact with the department. Where there are genuine cases of real serious evidence of problems we will take them up and if necessary we will refer them to other agencies to investigate. I think that at this point, though, the report that we have to give is that these projects are broadly on track and I, therefore, commend our report and I hope that Dr Koornhof will vote for it as well. [Applause.]
Adv H C SCHMIDT: Madam Speaker, our view in respect of the Government’s dealings in the arms deal is simply this: It is a disgrace! It is a disgrace due to a lack of accountability of the executive to Parliament; unashamed intimidation of members of Scopa; a reckless disregard for the recommendations by the various committees as to the joint investigative report; as well as a total lack of transparency displayed by the Government in respect of its dealings in the arms deal. The DA regards today’s debate as an attempt to whitewash any further discussion of this topic as well as a blatant attempt to limit any further damage to the executive. The lack of transparency is clearly indicated by the fact that the public today does not know what the total cost of the arms deal will be. Apparently, it will be double the R57,4 billion made public.
Let me illustrate to hon members a few of the consequences of this highly undesirable deal. First, there was the resignation of the hon Mr Gavin Woods as chairperson of Scopa. Second, his detailed study of the procurement, citing more than 50 irregularities, is a clear indication of the Government’s bungling in this matter. Third, the resignation of the ANC’s chief whip Mr Tony Yengeni and his subsequent prosecution in a court of law for allegedly receiving 47% discount on a luxury Mercedes Benz 4x4, hence the reference to all ANC leaders as wabenzis!
Fourth, the resignation of former arms acquisition chief Chippy Shaik came about in April this year after disciplinary steps had been taken for disclosing confidential information. Fifth, his brother Shabir Shaik is also on trial at present for the possession of confidential Cabinet documents, including minutes concerning the arms deal. Sixth, an investigation was launched into the financial affairs of the former Minister of Defence, Mr Joe Modise. Seventh, a court case has been instituted against the Government by Dr Richard Young from the company C2I2 relating to the corvette deal.
Eighth, another case against Government has been instituted by the Economic Alliance for Arms Reduction in order to have the arms deal cancelled. This is done on the basis that, owing to the lack of financial prudence and other social contractual obligations, Government is not in a position to financially afford the arms deal. Ninth, we had the resignation of the well- respected ANC member of Scopa Mr Andrew Feinstein, and his resignation from Parliament, after internal party pressure became unbearable.
Tenth, the arms deal, totalling 41% of the total budget of the Department of Defence, has led to a critical shortage of funds with regard to its operating expenses. Not only is the reserve force in a state of near collapse, but it is also taking its toll on the regular forces. Eleventh, strong and damning criticism is to be found in the joint investigative report itself. The Joint Investigating Team found that contract bidders were allowed to supply further information after offers had been submitted, a deviation from proper procurement practice. Furthermore, variancies from standard procurement practices were reported in a special review of the Auditor- General. On page 62 of the report it is stated that neither the Hawk nor Gripen systems as offered by BAE during its formal response to the acquisition satisfied the full requirement specifications. Both aircraft systems were by far the most expensive options in their respective classes.
Even worse, according to page 69 of the report, the aircraft systems on offer in the British proposal did not comply with the defined operational and logistical requirements of either the fighter or fighter trainer programmes. In terms of the department’s own standards, thus, totally unsuitable aircraft were purchased. With regard to the decision by the executive to proceed with the special defence procurement on the basis of industrial participation, page 99 of the report contains the next meaningful paragraph:
… it was the contention of the committee that industrial participation can never be used to justify a decision to purchase any equipment.
The following paragraph, however, was contained in a memorandum dated 7 September 1998 and addressed to the Chief of Acquisitions by the former Secretary of Defence:
… the Hawk is not the best option from a military point of view. The fact that its acquisition cost would solicit substantially more industrial participation apparently carries the day.
The lack of logic of this decision is quite clear. In most other countries this issue would probably have brought the Government to its knees.
Mr P J GOMOMO: Madam Speaker, when the Auditor-General established in 1998 that the defence procurement process was a high risk area that warranted a review, this House did not hesitate to facilitate that such a review be conducted, and it has been as a result of processes emanating therefrom that we are debating the report today of the three agencies commissioned to further probe the matter.
I want to stress, right at this point, that the very fact that this House resolved to approve such an investigation is an indication that we are committed to transparency and public accountability as pillars of democracy. Those who are making arguments in this manner which are contrary, know that they have either been part of, or worked with the apartheid regime that treated defence-related issues as secret services to be manipulated and to perpetuate the status quo then. They know that it is a major leap forward for us firstly to have dealt with the Defence Review and, subsequently, the procurement process review in the manner that we did.
We know it is a fact that those people are not proud about the revelations of the past as reality digs through the pile of their wrongdoing which would otherwise have been concealed in the secret documents of the apartheid-era manipulation, as they know that such secrets would explain exactly what they are. Today they are opening their big mouths and want to manufacture serious offences against those who commissioned the investigation into the arms procurement package. They are looking for loopholes, regarding the dealings of a complex procurement process like this, to suggest that the ANC Government is corrupt. What do they know about corruption to start with?
As the leading party of this House and the champion of democratic internationalism, the ANC is not afraid of being scrutinised in this operation. We are here to explain that to this House and the broader public. In fact, the debate on this issue is not about whether or not there has been corruption in the manner Government dealt with the arms procurement process, as that has been cleared by the three agencies. However, those people who today want to pose as people’s champions are taking advantage of the challenges that are confronting this country and are dealing with those issues in such an opportunistic manner so as to score cheap political points. They know that they have destroyed the economy of this country and that it will take time to rebuild it to be able to create jobs for all, and yet they suggest that the arms deal is an obstacle.
In dealing with the irregularities identified in the selection of subcontractors the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration associated itself with the recommendation of the three agencies and put a rider that, as they are being implemented, care should be taken that there is no conflict with the existing policies as failure to do that could easily lead to duplication, and could easily be construed as suggesting that the ANC Government does not have policies to deal with issues of conflict of interest and related instances.
On the basis of the understanding that we have a code of conduct in place, in terms of which public servants know what is expected of them to do and not to do in the the course of doing their duties. We suggested in our report the fact that the Department of Defence should work closely with that of Public Service and Administration in dealing, particularly, with personnel auditing. We were doing so simply to ensure a co-ordinated approach in the implementation of the existing policies. We know that despite all the clarifications we can give to this House and the public, and also the fact that we allowed the law to take its course on those individuals whose conduct in the process warranted such moves, there will always remain those people who will still want to argue that we have not done enough.
The findings of the recommendations of the three agencies came as a shock to those individuals, and some parties in this House, in that the agencies could not find corruption on the part of the Government, hence they view the arms deal as an obstacle. Of course, we should not be understood to be suggesting that the probe was not necessary. We should also not be understood to be suggesting that the findings and recommendations of the three agencies can simply be brushed aside as useless, hence the decision by the public service portfolio committee that they should be implemented.
In fact, as responsible members of this House and as the public would expect us to be, we all should be asking the executive how far they have gone in the implementation of the recommendations of the various committees of this House since the tabling of the report of the three agencies. I think it is a belated argument for any one of us to participate in the debate in a manner that suggests that it was not necessary to initiate this procurement.
We want to put on record that this House and the public should note and realise that issues of defence are as important as it is necessary to take them into serious consideration and that the arms procurement, which we are debating today, is one of the steps our Government saw necessary to take. It should also be noted that the decision to purchase arms is not the only issue Government is doing. Our service delivery record speaks for itself and we should all be proud about that and not take advantage of challenges, but we should rather bring together our efforts to address.
Of course, we are not claiming complacency in the policies we have. To start with, we are proud to say that the challenges that confront all of us today are those of policy implementation. So issues such as technical omissions in the process of policy implementation should not compromise our good policies and turn our service delivery record into a circus. To this end we welcome the anticorruption strategy in the Public Service and the anticorruption Bill which is being considered by this House. We are doing all this because we are committed to transparency, clean governance as well as public accountability, and we shall continue to do so whether those who are selective about their support are with us or against.
Ingangabiyiyo inxina, kodwa ingeyiyo xibhiya nje ngamasi. Siyi-ANC kwicandelo endijongene nalo, sithi siyaneliseka yile ngxelo neziphakamiso zayo. [Kwaqhwatywa.] [As the ANC and the department for which I work, we welcome and support this report and recommendations thereof. [Applause.]]
Dr P J RABIE: Madam Speaker, South Africa can be categorised as an emerging market. Our currency has been very volatile over the past 12 months. The Myburgh investigation regarding exchange control allegations cost the taxpayer approximately R15 million. What is significant, however, is that the Reserve Bank and other role-players were cleared of transgressing exchange control allegations. I agree that allegations regarding monitoring of exchange control must be investigated, but it was a very, very expensive exercise. It was transparent, however.
When we come to the present arms procurement deal, a number of factors cannot be divorced from the arms procurement deal as such. First and foremost, South Africa is a country with an alarming incidence of Aids. Secondly, poverty and unemployment of 35% is serious cause for concern. It was reported in the press that the army has only a handful of operating tanks and that a third proportion of our military personnel can be categorised as overweight and unfit.
When the very expensive procurement deal was agreed upon in 1999, it started as a South African Marshall Plan. It was mentioned that foreign arm firms involved like the likes of BAE systems, the manufacturers of the Hawk fighter, would pour cash into civilian investment. Regrettably, not many of those proposals have materialised. BAE has bought into Denel but the question remains: Do we really need a variety of very sophisticated arms?
Allow me to refer to David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor, who wrote on 17 July 2002 that a cheaper Italian MB 339 fighter plane was recommended by South African senior officials because the cost of the Hawk would be twice that of the MB 339 fighter plane. The reason given was that the acquisition costs of the Hawk would solicit more industrial participation from BAE.
Industrial participation and foreign direct investment is of national importance - BAE undertook a £270 million scheme to make power station parts and a £93 million titanium plant. According to my information, none of these undertakings have materialised.
According to The Guardian, BAE has been granted 11 years during the delivery life of the arms contract to make good all its Hawk promises. It is of the utmost importance that foreign arms firms reciprocate with direct foreign investment that will create sustained employment opportunities.
As a regional power and founding member of Nepad, South Africa needs a strong and able defence force to protect our boundaries and territorial coastal areas.
Vroeër in my toespraak het ek melding gemaak van die Myburgh Kommissie van Ondersoek rakende valutatransaksies. Toenemende globalisasie vereis dat alle saketransaksies op ‘n deursigtige wyse geskied.
‘n Ontstellende veranderlike rakende die wapenaankope is dat daar ernstige bewerings gemaak word teen ‘n aantal individue wat hulle sou skuldig gemaak het aan onaanvaarbare internasionale besigheidstransaksies. Dit is gebiedend noodsaaklik dat alle bewerings getoets word, want die stabiliteit van ons geldeenheid en ons langtermyn ekonomiese voortuitgang is nou gekoppel aan internasionaal aanvaarbare etiese besigheidspraktyke. Buitelandse beleggingsvertroue kan maklik geskaad word indien makrososioekonomiese faktore soos privatisering van staatsbates, ‘n vrye en regverdige regbank en individuele menseregte nie aangespreek word nie. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
Earlier in my speech I made mention of the Myburgh Commission of Inquiry into foreign exchange transactions. Increasing globalisation requires that all business transactions take place in a transparent manner.
A disturbing variable concerning the arms purchases is the fact that serious allegations are being made against a number of individuals who are ostensibly guilty of performing unacceptable international business transactions. It is absolutely vital that all of the allegations be tested, because the stability of our monetary unit and our long-term economic prosperity are closely linked to internationally acceptable ethical business practices. Foreign investor confidence can easily be harmed if macro-socioeconomic factors such as privatisation of state assets, a free and fair judiciary and individual human rights are not addressed.]
Mr K A MOLOTO: Madam Speaker, in the course of our deliberations on this report in the Portfolio Committee on Finance interesting recommendations and findings came out that will be useful to spell out.
According to the joint investigation report, the costs of the strategic defence package presented before Cabinet on 18 November 1998 amounted to R29,7 billion. The report also indicated that this amount excluded financing costs, amounting to 49% of the procurement costs. According to the report, these figures did not include items such as freight insurance, taxes, project management costs, financing costs and loan premiums.
On 18 November 1998 the Cabinet then established the International Offers Negotiating Team - the IONT - with the brief to negotiate an achievable funding arrangement and an affordable package with the identified preferred suppliers. The IONT was constituted by appointed members from the Departments of Finance, of Defence, and of Trade and Industry, and from Armscor. An affordability team, which is part of the IONT, was established after the Ministers’ committee meeting in March 1999. The affordability team engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the economic, fiscal and financial impact of the procurements on the country. It used the macroeconomic model of the Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosh to test and develop alternative scenarios for consideration by the Ministers’ committee.
On 31 August 1999, an affordability report was compiled by the affordability team. They reported that the total cost of the package, at an estimated forward exchange rate, was R36,4 billion. The report further stated that the full cost was now significantly higher than the original amount presented to Cabinet.
According to the report, one of the most significant increases was the rise in the purchase of the Lead-In Fighter Trainer, referred to as Lift, and the Advanced Light Aircraft, referred to as Alfa. The price rose from R15,6 billion to R19,6 billion, R4 billion more than the R15,6 billion approved by the Cabinet on 18 November 1998.
On 25 November 1999, Cabinet approved an amount of R30,2 billion for the entire package exclusive of financing costs. The contracts were signed on 3 December 1999. Certain cost-containing changes were effected that differed from the original decision of Cabinet on 25 November 1999. These changes came as a result of the affordability report. Some of the important changes included the following.
The number of light utility helicopters was reduced from 40 to 30. This resulted in a decrease in cost from R2,4 billion to R1,9 billion. The implementation cost of R176,3 million for light utility helicopters would have to be included into the normal SA Air Force operating budget, as this amount was excluded in the presentation to Cabinet on 15 September 1999.
There was the omission of the purchase of maritime helicopters estimated by the affordability team. It appears from an answer given by the Minister of Defence in Parliament that the SANDF would buy these helicopters and that delivery would be at the same time as the corvettes. It appears that the cost of the maritime helicopters will be carried by the budget of the SANDF, outside the amount agreed to by the Cabinet that is attributed to the special defence account.
The purchases of Lift and Alfa were separated into three phases called tranches. There is an option to cancel or acquire tranche 2 in 2003, and tranche 3 in 2005. This decision was made because of the unpredictability of the foreign exchange rates and economic growth over a 10 to 15-year period. This approach affords Government the opportunity to revisit the issue of affordability of the total fighter aircraft requirement at a later stage if economic conditions deteriorate.
However, the comments of the Chief of the Air Force need to be taken seriously. The Chief of the Air Force stated that there was a risk in reducing the number of aircraft available to train pilots. It was indicated that the dual-seater Gripen does not have the full operational capacity of the single-seater and that it does not have the same deterrent value. It was also indicated that without the delivery of the second and third tranches, the operational fighter capability of the SANDF would be severely limited after 2010. The decision by Government to reduce the number of aircraft despite the statements by the Chief of the SA Air Force indicating that this reduction may impact on the strength of the Air Force, is a clear indication of Government commitment to balance the demands of a modern defence force with affordability constraints.
Some of the essential functionalities of the aircraft in the Lift and Alfa packages were removed during the negotiation phase, and their cost will have to be accommodated outside the Cabinet-approved package, as these costs were not submitted to Cabinet. The Chief of the Air Force indicated that ``the Lift and Alfa aircraft are a system in terms of the total systems management approach. This means that any scenario that does not include all the components of the system cannot be supported.’’
The joint investigating team estimates that the inclusion of these functionalities would amount to R1,1 billion. It is uncertain whether these functionalities are to be reincorporated or not. These costs will have to be carried …
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order, hon members! Would you please lower your voices so that we can hear the speaker.
Mr K A MOLOTO: These costs will have to be carried outside the strategic defence account.
The leases of the simulator equipment of the Hawk and Gripen were transferred from Tranches 2 and 3 to a full purchase agreement in Tranche
- The costs of the Hawk and Gripen in Tranche 1 are therefore respectively 35% and 34% higher than the average cost. This would represent an implicit cost of about R1,7 billion should Government exercise its option to cancel. This effectively means that cancellation has its own costs.
In view of the fact that certain cost-containing measures had to be introduced once the affordability report found that not all costs had been submitted to Cabinet in November 1998, and that some of these costs might have to be funded outside of the package finally approved by Cabinet in 1999, the JIT made two key recommendations which are fully endorsed by the committee.
Recommendation 1 states, and I quote:
Detailed and accurate information, including all possible costs, should be submitted to Cabinet. All currency risk implications regarding international armaments acquisitions should be disclosed to Cabinet. Such information is necessary to ensure that essential functionalities are not removed from aircraft during negotiations due to budget constrains.
Recommendation 2 states, and I quote:
Proper consultation and an impact study should be done before equipment types or functionalities are reduced.
The committee further recommends that amendments be introduced to the Public Finance Management Act that ensure not only that the cost implications of legislation brought before Cabinet and Parliament be fully spelt out, but that the affordability of all major purchases by Government, including all financing costs and the potential risks, be made known prior to any formal decisions being taken. The role of Parliament in this case needs to be clearly specified.
Furthermore, the committee recommends that affordability reports be finalised prior to the finalisation of purchase negotiations. The committee also wishes to endorse the following further recommendations of the JIT.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order! Hon members, if we all speak aloud it clearly becomes too noisy. Could you rather whisper. I am not saying that you must not continue to talk to each another, but whisper, please. Please proceed, hon member.
Mr K A MOLOTO: The recommendations are as follows, and I quote:
It should be prescribed that all procurement processes, including negotiations with preferred bidders, are properly documented to ensure a proper audit trail.
The recommendations go further to state that:
The Department of Finance should take steps to ensure that good procurement practices are adhered to and that compliance with the prescribed tender procedures is strictly controlled.
In addition, the committee also endorses the recommendation of the JIT in paragraph 3.4, which states, inter alia, that: ``The staff of DoD and Armscor involved in procurement should be properly trained to ensure that they assimilate and fully understand the policy with the view to its effective implementation.’’
Paragraph 8.13.3 states that: ``An approved negotiation strategy and terms of reference should be in place prior to the commencement of negotiations.’’
The committee is aware that Government is preparing to overhaul its entire procurement policies and recommends that the shortcomings of this particular arms procurement process be fully identified and analysed with a view to rectifying them in the reforms that are to be adopted.
Finally, from my macro point of view, the committee takes note of the statements made by the Director-General of Finance to the effect that, although the loans are mainly in foreign currency denominations, the total foreign debt exposure of South Africa is still very low and does not exceed 10% of total debt. Therefore, there is hardly any risk of severe foreign debt exposure. Secondly, the projected fiscal deficit of 2,6% is still scheduled to remain on track at the same level.
The committee notes that there are a number of provisions for the regular update … [Time expired.] [Applause.]
The MINISTER OF DEFENCE: Madam Speaker, I think it is perhaps historic that a debate of this nature is taking place in our national Parliament, in the wake of the launch of the African Union. Precisely because that event presents this country with significant challenges in the period that lies ahead.
In July of this year Mr Graham Hosken wrote in the Daily News:
Heavily armed pirates targeting cargo ships along the African coast are raking in billions of dollars in trade on the international black market. Last year, 97 ships were attacked on Africa’s coastline, more than half of the vessels attacked throughout the world. Most of the attacks occur either in waters above Angola or Mozambique. There have been very few pirate attacks in South African waters because of the strong presence of the country’s navy and water and border police.
The South African coastline is approximately 2 800km long; it is our longest frontier. Our exclusive economic zone reaches out at 370km to sea; this is the area the SA Navy is expected to defend. The huge volume of trade coming through our ports is central to our economy. In terms of tonnage more than 95% of South Africa’s imports and exports and over 80% in terms of monitory value pass through the country’s ports. In peace time the SA Navy’s primary function is to ensure that its seaborne trade is protected.
I make that point in order to underline the fact that defence is a necessary and unavoidable expenditure. Every nation rich and poor, industrialised and nonindustrialised must set aside a portion of its budget for defence purposes; it is needed for a country’s survival. Defence expenditure falls into the same category as safety and security and correctional services. Governments have to set aside a portion of their budgets to deal with those that transgress the law, to house those who have been found guilty by the courts. It has to set aside money for feeding them, for clothing them, health, etc. But there are no countertrades for housing these prisoners, for feeding them and all of that. Defence falls in the same category.
Our executive of course acted very wisely, that in acquiring the strategic defence packages, it used that opportunity as well to benefit the economy. Many countries without the capabilities South Africa has would have had no choice but simply to spend the amount of money, purely for the sake of survival. So defence packages were a bonus for this nation because of the wisdom of its executive, endorsed by its legislature, this Parliament. [Interjections.]
It is therefore a distortion to try and twist the issue of the strategic defence packages into the issue of offsets. Whether there was someone to invest in our economy or not we would still have had to purchase equipment to defend our country. We would do that. [Applause.]
Now having made that point, I wish to proceed. The events leading up to the joint investigation, have been well covered by previous speakers in this House this afternoon. And I do not wish to belabour the issue, but let me highlight a few points in this regard. The principle of transparency in government and more specifically of transparency in acquisition of armaments for the safety of the country was introduced by this Government, not the previous government, but this one. The transparency which made the process of this arms acquisition, that transparency was also a creative initiative of this Government.
For the first time even our white counterparts, who were supposed to enjoy democratic rights before this Government came to power, could not have been in a position to even say the things they say today. The process leading to the review of the acquisition of these armaments that we are talking about today, was initiated by the collaboration between the Ministry and the Office of the Auditor-General. It was not the opposition that was responsible and that did these things, it was the executive.
And I think it is important to keep that in mind, because an impression is unwittingly being created that this is a Government that does not want to be accountable; that is hiding something. In fact, this is the Government that has invited South Africans for the time in the history of this country to please look at what we are doing, say your say and where we are wrong correct us. This is the Government that has done that. [Applause.]
Up to this point the recommendations from the Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages have been processed by the department and each and everyone of the recommendations have either been acted upon or are being acted upon now. The reports by the two defence committees are important and I would like to talk to their recommendations. I will take them as they have been listed.
The chairperson of the portfolio committee has spoken eloquently on the role of Parliament and oversight of the executive. Without this kind of debate and tension between the executive and the legislature there will be no living Parliament and no real oversight. I want to make it very clear that the role of Parliament is taken very seriously by the executive and the Department of Defence, and we value it highly. As such, the recommendations now follows.
Firstly, this role should be strengthened through the institution of standard operating procedures between the relevant parliamentary committee on defence and the Ministry regarding the management of any acquisition process has been taken on board. Tighter procedures have been drafted by the department and we are working towards standard operating procedures as suggested. Those also will be made available to the legislature to scrutinise when the right moment comes.
Secondly, the processes around security clearances within Armscor and the department have already been tightened up. Thirdly, control over internal documentation and record keeping has also been tightened up in line with the recommendations by Parliament. Fourthly, in relation to acquisition policy, a new draft policy has been finalised; if adopted this will mean some realignment of the new Armscor Act. In addition on acquisition policy, the committees note that foreign defence capabilities were privileged over domestic capabilities and this is not in line with the recommendations of the Defence Review, which stated that procurement should as far as possible attempt to make use of local defence industrial capabilities.
It should be noted that the global trend is that of moving towards mergers and partnerships within the international defence industry. Whilst we encourage our local defence industries to develop - and, mark you, they have really advanced since we started - increasingly we are entering into partnerships with other countries. Given the unfortunate history of our country in which we were isolated, if we are going to be competitive on the international market, we also need some strong partners and also a balance between what was ordered and what is needed to produce a success must be kept in mind.
Sixthly, Parliament is concerned that there was no sufficient feedback to Parliament on the drafting of the Armscor Act. We have given Parliament so far two information briefs on this issue. A final draft is presently being tabled in Cabinet and if accepted will be tabled in Parliament. The delay in the finalisation of this Bill has centred on the final determination of the classification of the public entity. This is in relation to the Public Finance Management Act and the issue has to be resolved between the Department of Defence and the National Treasury. We are sorting that issue out and we will be coming back to the House with regard to that.
Seventhly, the committee has raised the question of the future of the Cheetahs in the light of the acquisition of the Gripens. The operability of the Cheetahs expires in the year 2012, whereupon they will be used for training purposes and then we will phase them out. Eighthly, the implications for the SA Air Force operational budget and the impact on the total budget of the SA National Defence Force would be scheduled for discussion with the committees.
Ninethly, the plethora of structures cited by the committees are cumbersome. We are trying to streamline those structures. We are working on that. At the same time we do have to take account of a hierarchy and a process of decision-making. Tenthly, conflict of interest has been adequately discussed; it needs to be recorded that standard procedures have now been institutionalised and that the Department of Public Services and Administration is putting legislation into place on this issue. The point is that the Government is responding to what is clearly a problem. It is sensitive to criticism and witnesses that are highlighted. But at the same time it is continuing the process of putting in place new systems to strengthen our young democracy. People must understand we did not inherit a democratic state. We are putting in place a democratic state and processes. [Applause.]
In the eleventh place, the committee recommended that the ranking of the post of Chief of Acquisition should be upgraded. The post has been advertised and filled as of 1 August this year at the level of a deputy director-general, and I have the privilege of introducing Mr Ramofolo - please, sir, if you may rise - who is now sitting here with the officials in the House. [Applause.]
Lastly, the committee has recommended investigation into a senior official, whose professional behaviour was queried in the report. This is underway and where the law has been broken we have started the process of talking the matter to court and the law must take its course.
The acquisition of the strategic defence packages will enable the SA National Defence Force to better carry out its ordered tasks. Our democracy will best be protected by regional stability and growth, especially in the wake of the launch of the African Union.
The fortunes of our nation are as much dependent on the successful implementation of the Nepad programmes as those of other African nations. Therefore, in the wake of the launch of the African Union, the ensuing quest and search for peace through peacekeeping, peace support, peace creation and enforcement on the continent will necessitate an unstinting involvement of our nation both at diplomatic and defence levels. That unavoidably is the responsibility which history has placed on our nation’s shoulders. We must ready ourselves to fulfil that task.
Consequently when it comes to defence, whether in the ruling party or the opposition, we must stand as one, bearing in mind that the responsibility of the country is the collective responsibility of all of us. It cannot be that at times we discourage defence expenditure and when the following day international obligations demands South Africa’s participation, we expect a National Defence Force that is sufficiently equipped and ready to respond to ordered missions. I repeat, the SA National Defence Force is ready today to fulfil all the ordered obligations both at home and abroad. [Applause.] But after the receipt of the strategic defence packages the SA National Defence Force will be ready to meet all the escalating ordered missions and tasks by the President, the executive and the members. [Applause.]
Debate concluded. REPORT OF JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE - JOINT INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Question put: That the Report be adopted.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 209: Ainslie, A R; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Bakker, D M; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Beukman, F; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Buthelezi, M N; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Didiza, A T; Dithebe, S L; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Dowry, J J; Durand, J; Erwin, A; Fazzie, M H; Fihla, N B; Fraser-Moleketi, G J; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gogotya, N J; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Greyling, C H F; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Le Roux, J W; Lekgoro, M K; Lekota, M G P; Lishiva, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Luthuli, A N; Mabandla, B S; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Maimane, D S; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Mathibela, N F; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbombo, N D; Mbulawa-Hans, B G; Mguni, B A; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Moropa, R M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mufamadi, F S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncinane, I Z; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngculu, L V J; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Nobunga, B J; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, J T; Ntuli, M B; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Omar, A M; Oosthuizen, G C; Phadagi, M G; Phala, M J; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Rabie, P J; Radebe, B A; Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Reid, L R R; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Schoeman, R S; Scott, M I; Seeco, M A; Sekgobela, P S; September, C C; September, R K; Shabangu, S; Sikakane, M R; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Solomon, G; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Tinto, B; Thabethe, E; Tshabalala-Msimang, M E; Tsheole, N M; Tshivhase, T J; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Uys, P; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Anna); Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zondo, R P.
NOES - 53: Abrahams, T; Abram, S; Andrew, K M; Aucamp, C; Bell, B G; Blanche, J P I; Borman, G M; Botha, A J; Clelland-Stokes, N J; Da Camara, M L; De Lille, P; Dudley, C; Eglin, C W; Farrow, S B; Gibson, D H M; Gore, V C; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Heine, R J; Jankielsohn, R; Kalyan, S V; Koornhof, G W; Lee, T D; Lowe, C M; Madasa, Z L; Makanda, W G; Maluleke, D K; Mbadi, L M; McIntosh, G B D; Middleton, N S; Mkono, D G; Mogoba, M S; Moorcroft, E K; Mulder, P W A; Nkabinde, N C; Ntuli, R S; Opperman, S E; Ramodike, M N; Roopnarain, U; Schalkwyk, P J; Schmidt, H C; Selfe, J; Semple, J A; Smuts, M; Sono, B N; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Taljaard, R; Van Wyk, A (Annelize); Waters, M; Woods, G G.
ABSTENTIONS - 13: Bekker, H J; Biyela, B P; Cassim, M F; Ferreira, E T; Mars, I; Mpontshane, A M; Mzizi, M A; Ngubane, H; Rabinowitz, R; Seaton, S A; Slabbert, J H; Smith, P F; Vos, S C.
Mrs S A SEATON: Madam Speaker, on a point of order: I believe that the IFP abstained. I do not know why the abstentions were not recorded.
The SPEAKER: Order! For some reason the abstentions were not recorded. It will be put on record that the IFP abstained.
Question agreed to. Report accordingly adopted.
REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND MEMBERS' INTERESTS - JOINT
INVESTIGATION INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Report adopted.
REPORT OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE - JOINT INVESTIGATION INTO
STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Question put that the Report be adopted.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 211: Ainslie, A R; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Bakker, D M; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Beukman, F; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Buthelezi, M N; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Didiza, A T; Dithebe, S L; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Dowry, J J; Durand, J; Erwin, A; Fazzie, M H; Fihla, N B; Fraser-Moleketi, G J; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gogotya, N J; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Greyling, C H F; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Le Roux, J W; Lekgoro, M K; Lekota, M G P; Lishiva, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Luthuli, A N; Mabandla, B S; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Maimane, D S; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Mathibela, N F; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbete, B; Mbombo, N D; Mbulawa-Hans, B G; Mguni, B A; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Moropa, R M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mufamadi, F S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncinane, I Z; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngculu, L V J; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Nobunga, B J; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, J T; Ntuli, M B; Nzimande, L P M; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Omar, A M; Oosthuizen, G C; Phadagi, M G; Phala, M J; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Rabie, P J; Radebe, B A; Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Ramgobin, M; Reid, L R R; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Schoeman, R S; Scott, M I; Seeco, M A; Sekgobela, P S; September, C C; September, R K; Shabangu, S; Sikakane, M R; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Solomon, G; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Thabethe, E; Tinto, B; Tshabalala-Msimang, M E; Tsheole, N M; Tshivhase, T J; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Uys, P; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Anna); Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zondo, R P.
NOES - 51: Abrahams, T; Abram, S; Andrew, K M; Aucamp, C; Bell, B G; Blanche, J P I; Borman, G M; Botha, A J; Clelland-Stokes, N J; Da Camara, M L; De Lille, P; Dudley, C; Eglin, C W; Farrow, S B; Gibson, D H M; Gore, V C; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Heine, R J; Jankielsohn, R; Kalyan, S V; Koornhof, G W; Lee, T D; Lowe, C M; Madasa, Z L; Makanda, W G; Maluleke, D K; Mbadi, L M; McIntosh, G B D; Mkono, D G; Mogoba, M S; Moorcroft, E K; Mulder, P W A; Nkabinde, N C; Ntuli, R S; Opperman, S E; Ramodike, M N; Schalkwyk, P J; Schmidt, H C; Selfe, J; Semple, J A; Smuts, M; Sono, B N; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Taljaard, R; Van Wyk, A (Annelize); Waters, M; Woods, G G.
ABSTENTIONS - 15: Bekker, H J; Biyela, B P; Cassim, M F; Ferreira, E T; Mars, I; Middleton, N S; Mpontshane, A M; Mzizi, M A; Ngubane, H; Rabinowitz, R; Roopnarain, U; Seaton, S A; Slabbert, J H; Smith, P F; Vos, S C.
Question agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.
REPORT OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON FINANCE - JOINT INVESTIGATION INTO
STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Report adopted.
REPORT OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY - JOINT INVESTIGATION INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Question put that the Report be adopted.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 210: Ainslie, A R; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Bakker, D M; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Beukman, F; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Buthelezi, M N; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Didiza, A T; Dithebe, S L; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Dowry, J J; Durand, J; Erwin, A; Fazzie, M H; Fihla, N B; Fraser-Moleketi, G J; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gogotya, N J; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Greyling, C H F; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Le Roux, J W; Lekgoro, M K; Lekota, M G P; Lishiva, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Luthuli, A N; Mabandla, B S; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Magashule, E S; Magubane, N E; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Maimane, D S; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Mathibela, N F; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbete, B; Mbombo, N D; Mbulawa-Hans, B G; Mguni, B A; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Moropa, R M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mufamadi, F S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncinane, I Z; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngculu, L V J; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Nobunga, B J; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, J T; Ntuli, M B; Nzimande, L P M; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Omar, A M; Oosthuizen, G C; Phadagi, M G; Phala, M J; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Rabie, P J; Radebe, B A; Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Reid, L R R; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Schoeman, R S; Scott, M I; Seeco, M A; Sekgobela, P S; September, C C; September, R K; Shabangu, S; Sikakane, M R; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Solomon, G; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Thabethe, E; Tinto, B; Tshabalala-Msimang, M E; Tsheole, N M; Tshivhase, T J; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Uys, P; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Anna); Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zondo, R P.
NOES - 50: Abrahams, T; Abram, S; Andrew, K M; Bell, B G; Blanche, J P I; Borman, G M; Botha, A J; Clelland-Stokes, N J; Da Camara, M L; De Lille, P; Dudley, C; Eglin, C W; Farrow, S B; Gibson, D H M; Gore, V C; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Heine, R J; Jankielsohn, R; Kalyan, S V; Koornhof, G W; Lee, T D; Lowe, C M; Madasa, Z L; Makanda, W G; Maluleke, D K; Mbadi, L M; McIntosh, G B D; Mkono, D G; Mogoba, M S; Moorcroft, E K; Mulder, P W A; Nkabinde, N C; Ntuli, R S; Opperman, S E; Ramodike, M N; Schalkwyk, P J; Schmidt, H C; Selfe, J; Semple, J A; Smuts, M; Sono, B N; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Taljaard, R; Van Wyk, A (Annelize); Waters, M; Woods, G G.
ABSTENTIONS - 16: Aucamp, C; Bekker, H J; Biyela, B P; Cassim, M F; Ferreira, E T; Mars, I; Middleton, N S; Mpontshane, A M; Mzizi, M A; Ngubane, H; Rabinowitz, R; Roopnarain, U; Seaton, S A; Slabbert, J H; Smith, P F; Vos, S C. Question agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.
REPORT OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION - JOINT INVESTIGATION INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Question put that the Report be adopted.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 211: Ainslie, A R; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Bakker, D M; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Beukman, F; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Buthelezi, M N; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Didiza, A T; Dithebe, S L; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Dowry, J J; Durand, J; Erwin, A; Fazzie, M H; Fihla, N B; Fraser-Moleketi, G J; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gogotya, N J; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Greyling, C H F; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Le Roux, J W; Lekgoro, M K; Lekota, M G P; Lishiva, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Luthuli, A N; Mabandla, B S; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Maimane, D S; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Mathibela, N F; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbete, B; Mbombo, N D; Mbulawa-Hans, B G; Mguni, B A; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Moropa, R M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mufamadi, F S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncinane, I Z; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngculu, L V J; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Nobunga, B J; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, J T; Ntuli, M B; Nzimande, L P M; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Omar, A M; Oosthuizen, G C; Phadagi, M G; Phala, M J; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Rabie, P J; Radebe, B A; Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Reid, L R R; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Schoeman, R S; Scott, M I; Seeco, M A; Sekgobela, P S; September, C C; September, R K; Shabangu, S; Sikakane, M R; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Solomon, G; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Thabete, E; Tinto, B; Tshabalala-Msimang, M E; Tsheole, N M; Tshivhase, T J; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Uys, P; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Anna); Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zondo, R P.
NOES - 50: Abrahams, T; Abram, S; Andrew, K M; Bell, B G; Blanche, J P I; Borman, G M; Botha, A J; Clelland-Stokes, N J; Da Camara, M L; De Lille, P; Dudley, C; Eglin, C W; Farrow, S B; Gibson, D H M; Gore, V C; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Heine, R J; Jankielsohn, R; Kalyan, S V; Koornhof, G W; Lee, T D; Lowe, C M; Madasa, Z L; Makanda, W G; Maluleke, D K; Mbadi, L M; McIntosh, G B D; Mkono, D G; Mogoba, M S; Moorcroft, E K; Mulder, P W A; Nkabinde, N C; Ntuli, R S; Opperman, S E; Ramodike, M N; Schalkwyk, P J; Schmidt, H C; Selfe, J; Semple, J A; Smuts, M; Sono, B N; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Taljaard, R; Van Wyk, A (Annelize); Waters, M; Woods, G G.
ABSTENTIONS - 16: Aucamp, C; Bekker, H J; Biyela, B P; Cassim, M F; Ferreira, E T; Mars, I; Middleton, N S; Mpontshane, A M; Mzizi, M A; Ngubane, H; Rabinowitz, R; Roopnarain, U; Seaton, S A; Slabbert, J H; Smith, P F; Vos, S C.
Question agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.
REPORT OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT - JOINT INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Report adopted.
INTERIM REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS - JOINT
INVESTIGATION INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Interim Report)
Question put that the Report be adopted.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 217: Abram, S; Ainslie, A R; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Bakker, D M; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Beukman, F; Bhengu, F; Blaas, A; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Buthelezi, M N; Camerer, S M; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chohan- Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Didiza, A T; Dithebe, S L; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Dowry, J J; Durand, J; Erwin, A; Fazzie, M H; Fihla, N B; Fraser- Moleketi, G J; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; Geldenhuys, B L; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gogotya, N J; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Greyling, C H F; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Le Roux, J W; Lekgoro, M K; Lekota, M G P; Lishiva, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Luthuli, A N; Mabandla, B S; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Maimane, D S; Makanda, W G; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Mathibela, N F; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbadi, L M; Mbete, B; Mbombo, N D; Mbulawa-Hans, B G; Mguni, B A; Mkono, D G; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morkel, C M; Morobi, D M; Moropa, R M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi- Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mufamadi, F S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncinane, I Z; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nel, A H; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngculu, L V J; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Niemann, J J; Nkabinde, N C; Nobunga, B J; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, J T; Ntuli, M B; Nzimande, L P M; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Omar, A M; Oosthuizen, G C; Phadagi, M G; Phala, M J; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Rabie, P J; Radebe, B A; Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramgobin, M; Ramodike, M N; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Reid, L R R; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schippers, J; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Schoeman, R S; Scott, M I; Seeco, M A; Sekgobela, P S; September, C C; September, R K; Shabangu, S; Sikakane, M R; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Solomon, G; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Thabethe, E; Tinto, B; Tshabalala-Msimang, M E; Tsheole, N M; Tshivhase, T J; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Uys, P; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Anna); Van Wyk, A (Annelize); Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zondo, R P.
NOES - 55: Abrahams, T; Andrew, K M; Aucamp, C; Bekker, H J; Bell, B G; Biyela, B P; Blanche, J P I; Borman, G M; Botha, A J; Clelland-Stokes, N J; Da Camara, M L; De Lille, P; Dudley, C; Eglin, C W; Farrow, S B; Ferreira, E T; Gibson, D H M; Gore, V C; Green, L M; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Heine, R J; Jankielsohn, R; Kalyan, S V; Koornhof, G W; Lee, T D; Lowe, C M; Madasa, Z L; Maluleke, D K; McIntosh, G B D; Middleton, N S; Mogoba, M S; Moorcroft, E K; Mulder, P W A; Mzizi, M A; Ngubane, H; Ntuli, R S; Opperman, S E; Rabinowitz, R; Roopnarain, U; Schalkwyk, P J; Schmidt, H C; Selfe, J; Semple, J A; Slabbert, J H; Smith, P F; Smuts, M; Sono, B N; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Taljaard, R; Vos, S C; Waters, M; Woods, G G.
ABSTENTIONS - 4: Cassim, M F; Mars, I; Mpontshane, A M; Seaton, S A.
Question agreed to. Report accordingly adopted.
FIFTEENTH REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS - JOINT
INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PACKAGES
(Decision of Question on Adoption of Report)
Question put that the Report be adopted.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 193: Ainslie, A R; Arendse, J D; Asmal, A K; Baloyi, M R; Baloyi, S F; Benjamin, J; Bhengu, F; Bloem, D V; Bogopane, H I; Booi, M S; Buthelezi, M N; Carrim, Y I; Chalmers, J; Chauke, H P; Chiba, L; Chikane, M M; Chohan-Kota, F I; Cindi, N V; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Didiza, A T; Dithebe, S L; Dlali, D M; Dlamini, B O; Erwin, A; Fazzie, M H; Fihla, N B; Fraser-Moleketi, G J; Gandhi, E; Gcina, C I; George, M E; Gerber, P A; Gogotya, N J; Gomomo, P J; Goniwe, M T; Goosen, A D; Gumede, D M; Gxowa, N B; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C; Hlaneki, C J M; Hlangwana, N L; Jassat, E E; Jeffery, J H; Joemat, R R; Jordan, Z P; Kalako, M U; Kannemeyer, B W; Kasienyane, O R; Kekana, N N; Kgarimetsa, J J; Kgauwe, Q J; Kgwele, L M; Komphela, B M; Kota, Z A; Kotwal, Z; Lamani, N E; Landers, L T; Lekgoro, M K; Lekota, M G P; Lishiva, T E; Lobe, M C; Lockey, D; Louw, J T; Louw, S K; Luthuli, A N; Mabandla, B S; Mabe, L; Mabena, D C; Magashule, E S; Magazi, M N; Magubane, N E; Mahlangu, G L; Mahlangu, M J; Mahlawe, N; Maimane, D S; Makasi, X C; Malebana, H F; Maloney, L; Malumise, M M; Manuel, T A; Maphalala, M A; Maserumule, F T; Mashimbye, J N; Masithela, N H; Masutha, M T; Mathebe, P M; Mathibela, N F; Matsepe-Casaburri, I F; Maunye, M M; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, A M; Mbete, B; Mbombo, N D; Mbulawa- Hans, B G; Mguni, B A; Mlangeni, A; Mnandi, P N; Modise, T R; Modisenyane, L J; Moeketse, K M; Mofokeng, T R; Mohamed, I J; Mohlala, R J B; Mokoena, D A; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B G; Moloi, J; Moloto, K A; Montsitsi, S D; Moonsamy, K; Moosa, M V; Morobi, D M; Moropa, R M; Morutoa, M R; Morwamoche, K W; Moss, M I; Mothoagae, P K; Motubatse, S D; Mpaka, H M; Mshudulu, S A; Mthembi-Mahanyele, S D; Mthembu, B; Mufamadi, F S; Mutsila, I; Mzondeki, M J G; Nair, B; Nash, J H; Ncinane, I Z; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngaleka, N E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngculu, L V J; Ngwenya, M L; Nhleko, N P; Nhlengethwa, D G; Nobunga, B J; Nqodi, S B; Ntombela, S H; Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, J T; Ntuli, M B; Nzimande, L P M; Olifant, D A A; Oliphant, G G; Omar, A M; Oosthuizen, G C; Phadagi, M G; Phala, M J; Phohlela, S; Pieterse, R D; Radebe, B A; Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C M P; Rasmeni, S M; Reid, L R R; Ripinga, S S; Saloojee, E; Schneeman, G D; Schoeman, E A; Scott, M I; Seeco, M A; Sekgobela, P S; September, C C; September, R K; Shabangu, S; Sikakane, M R; Sithole, D J; Skhosana, W M; Solomon, G; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Thabethe, E; Tinto, B; Tshabalala- Msimang, M E; Tsheole, N M; Tshivhase, T J; Turok, B; Twala, N M; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Wyk, N; Xingwana, L M T; Zondo, R P.
NOES - 80: Abrahams, T; Abram, S; Andrew, K M; Aucamp, C; Bakker, D M; Bekker, H J; Bell, B G; Beukman, F; Biyela, B P; Blaas, A; Blanche, J P I; Borman, G M; Botha, A J; Camerer, S M; Clelland-Stokes, N J; Da Camara, M L; De Lille, P; Dowry, J J; Dudley, C; Durand, J; Eglin, C W; Farrow, S B; Ferreira, E T; Geldenhuys, B L; Gibson, D H M; Gore, V C; Green, L M; Greyling, C H F; Grobler, G A J; Groenewald, P J; Heine, R J; Jankielsohn, R; Kalyan, S V; Koornhof, G W; Le Roux, J W; Lee, T D; Lowe, C M; Madasa, Z L; Makanda, W G; Maluleke, D K; Mbadi, L M; McIntosh, G B D; Middleton, N S; Mkono, D G; Mogoba, M S; Morkel, C M; Moorcroft, E K; Mulder, P W A; Mzizi, M A; Nel, A H; Ngubane, H; Niemann, J J; Nkabinde, N C; Ntuli, R S; Opperman, S E; Rabie, P J; Rabinowitz, R; Ramodike, M N; Roopnarain, U; Schalkwyk, P J; Schippers, J; Schmidt, H C; Schoeman, R S; Selfe, J; Semple, J A; Slabbert, J H; Smith, P F; Smuts, M; Sono, B N; Southgate, R M; Swart, P S; Swart, S N; Taljaard, R; Uys, P; Van Jaarsveld, A Z A; Van Wyk, A (Anna); Van Wyk, A (Annelize); Vos, S C; Waters, M; Woods, G G.
ABSTENTIONS - 4: Cassim, M F; Mars, I; Mpontshane, A M; Seaton, S A.
Question agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.
The SPEAKER: Order! Hon members, before the House adjourns, I do want to make a few comments. The views that have been expressed in the committee reports will obviously be conveyed as usual to the executive. But we are coming to the end of what has been a painful period, in my view, of debates in this Parliament. I think that we all need to reflect at the end of this, devoid of party politics, and see what the lessons are that we as Parliament are going to learn from this, whichever they are.
Some of these issues will be raised at the Rules Committee that will be meeting, but I think that each of us has to do that. We have to systematically address the issues, whether we agree with them or not, even if we do not agree with a particular problem and when we put it aside. It is incumbent on us to address this and improve whatever systems we have. We will await the reports from the executive as well and will take the process further. I hope in a way that does not lead to debates not on the issues, but on allegations about party-political affiliations.
It is incumbent on us as Parliament to address the issues before us. This is the hope I express to hon members that we do need to take forward from now onwards.
The House adjourned at 17:20. ____
ANNOUNCEMENTS, TABLINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS
ANNOUNCEMENTS:
National Assembly and National Council of Provinces:
- The Speaker and the Chairperson:
(1) The Minister of Defence on 26 July 2002 submitted a draft of the
Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Bill, 2002, as well as the
memorandum explaining the objects of the proposed legislation, to
the Speaker and the Chairperson in terms of Joint Rule 159. The
draft has been referred to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and
the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs by the
Speaker and the Chairperson, respectively, in accordance with
Joint Rule 159 (2).
(2) The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development on 31
July 2002 submitted a draft of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Amendment Bill, 2002, as well
as the memorandum explaining the objects of the proposed
legislation, to the Speaker and the Chairperson in terms of Joint
Rule 159. The draft has been referred to the Portfolio Committee
on Justice and Constitutional Development and the Select Committee
on Security and Constitutional Affairs by the Speaker and the
Chairperson, respectively, in accordance with Joint Rule 159 (2).
(3) The Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs on 7 August 2002
submitted drafts of the Agricultural Debt Management Amendment
Bill, 2002 and the Deeds Registries Amendment Bill, 2002, as well
as the memorandums explaining the objects of the proposed
legislation, to the Speaker and the Chairperson in terms of Joint
Rule 159. The drafts have been referred to the Portfolio Committee
on Agriculture and Land Affairs and the Select Committee on Land
and Environmental Affairs by the Speaker and the Chairperson,
respectively, in accordance with Joint Rule 159(2).
(4) The Minister of Safety and Security on 8 August 2002 submitted a
draft of the Explosives Bill, 2002 as well as the memorandum
explaining the objects of the proposed legislation, to the Speaker
and the Chairperson in terms of Joint Rule 159. The draft has been
referred to the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security and the
Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs by the
Speaker and the Chairperson, respectively, in accordance with
Joint Rule 159(2).
(5) The following Bill was introduced by the Minister of Trade and
Industry in the National Assembly on 12 August 2002 and referred
to the Joint Tagging Mechanism (JTM) for classification in terms
of Joint Rule 160:
(i) Corporate Laws Amendment Bill [B 32 - 2002] (National
Assembly - sec 75) [Explanatory summary of Bill and prior
notice of its introduction published in Government Gazette No
23573 of 28 June 2002.]
The Bill has been referred to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and
Industry of the National Assembly.
In terms of Joint Rule 154 written views on the classification of
the Bill may be submitted to the JTM within three parliamentary
working days.
TABLINGS:
National Assembly and National Council of Provinces:
Papers:
- The Minister of Finance:
Government Notice No 1038 published in the Government Gazette No 23690
dated 30 July 2002, Statements of the National and Provincial
Government's Revenue, Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 30 June
2002, made in terms of section 32 of the Public Finance Management Act,
1999 (Act No 1 of 1999) and section 19 of the Division of Revenue Act,
2002 (Act No 5 of 2002).
- The Minister of Safety and Security:
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and
the Government of the Republic of Portugal on Police Cooperation,
tabled in terms of section 231(3) of the Constitution, 1996.