I move—

More than two members having objected, Bill to be read a third time on 22 February.

There is just one point that occurs to me here, and I should like to have some clarification from the hon. the Minister. There is a substitution here of Section 20 for Section 19, and Section 19 of the original Act provides for voluntary engagements. I would like to know what it exactly means. Surely it does not mean that citizens who have applied for a voluntary engagement in the Citizen Force will not be subject to the same provisions as those who volunteer for whole-time service? It may at first sight appear that it was an oversight when the Act was originally passed in 1957, but on second consideration the thought occurs to me that it may well be that we should include both Sections 19 and 20.

It is quite clear that Section 90 refers to voluntary service. It says quite clearly that “any citizen liable to render service in the defence of the Union, other than a citizen liable to be enrolled for training in terms of Chapter VIII, may apply to serve in the Citizen Force and may be engaged for such service under such conditions as may be prescribed”. Section 20 is something quite different. It provides for voluntary whole-time service, and as the Act read, it wrongly referred to Section 19 and Section 20, and therefore this amendment must be made. It refers to the wrong section.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 10,

In this clause, as I indicated during the second reading debate, we felt that the limitation laid down by sub-section (5) of the clause that—

was putting the applicant in an untenable position, in as much as it is practically impossible to prove a wilful act or omission in a case of this nature. The section itself deals with the question of the protection of military installations, defence installations, including forts, harbours, railways, batteries, etc., against trespass, and in general where it applies to fixed establishments which themselves are enclosed by proper fences, there probably will be very little difficulty, but the section as it is will also apply to a very large number of other military installations not so well defined by any means—installations which, by virtue of their nature, are such that the public have fairly free access to them—and we felt that if the officer in command had failed to put up these notices, or the necessary warning, in whatever form it has to be issued according to this particular section, it would be very hard on the individuals who have become accustomed to the use of these and who may suffer severe damage as a result of the failure of that particular officer in carrying out what is his undoubted duty. His duty is to take such measures as he considers necessary for the efficient protection of any such camp, barracks, dockyards, premises, land, or area, and shall in connection with any measures so taken cause such notices to be published, or such warning notices to be erected, as he may in each particular case consider necessary. Now if somebody omits to erect such warning notices, it may involve, for instance, an area set out as a minefield, serious loss of life, and we feel it would be next door to impossible for the individual to prove wilful action or omission. I therefore want to move an amendment there—

The clause if accepted as amended would then read—

It would then put the onus on the aggrieved individual of having to prove his case that there has been negligence. It would put him at least in the same position as any other citizen involved in a matter of this sort. The individual concerned who may be affected, or the members of his estate if there happens to be a fatal accident, had no say in the allocation of the area in this respect. In the case of another clause with which we shall deal later, the individual himself had the choice as to whether he uses the particular vehicle or not, but in this case the individual has no say in the matter at all.

I cannot visualize an occasion where the Government will be liable or can be kept liable where no notices have been put up. That must be done, because that is part and parcel of the law as it is. But I am prepared to accept this amendment in the good expectation that the hon. member will not come along with the same amendment to Clause 25.

Amendment put and agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and agreed to.

On Clause 11,

I should like to ask the hon. the Minister whether he can indicate, because he did not deal with this aspect in his second reading speech, why he only selects part of the Citizen Force for the uses as outlined in the earlier clauses whereby the Permanent Force can be used for the suppression of internal disorders. Why does he draw a distinction only between those men who are doing whole-time full service in the Citizen Force against those who are only doing temporary service?

Section 90 of the principal Act is being amended here by inserting after the word “may” the words “and the whole or any portion or member of the Citizen Force appointed or engaged for temporary, whole-time service in terms of Section 20“. Section 90 of the principal Act deals with the employment of the Permanent Force and says that—

What we want to add here is again the whole-time members. The members of the Citizen Force are not included here, but only members of the whole-time force, of the Permanent Force.

Section 20 refers to the Citizen Force.

Yes, it says that any officer or other citizen who is liable to render service in the defence of the Union may apply to be appointed to the Citizen Force for temporary whole-time service, and may be so appointed or accepted subject to conditions which may be prescribed. This clause affects those citizens who are liable to whole-time service.

May I clarify the position. The point I am trying to get clear—and I am sorry if I did not make it quite clear to the hon. the Minister—in terms of Clause 19 is that the Permanent Force can be used for the purposes outlined in Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 lays down that the Permanent Force can be used on service for the prevention or suppression of internal disorders in the Union. The section that we are now amending deals only with citizens who are liable for service, who have volunteered for whole-time service in the Citizen Force. The hon. the Minister is making that portion of the Citizen Force liable for the same conditions of service as the Permanent Force. He draws a distinction between those doing whole-time service in the Citizen Force and those doing part-time service in the Citizen Force, and I would like to know the reason for that distinction.

The difference is that the provisions of Clause 11 ensure that a member of the Citizen Force who renders voluntary whole-time service will, in case of war or internal disorder, immediately be available for service in that capacity.

I agree that the provision is clear, but the hon. the Minister still does not answer my point: Why is the distinction being drawn between, on the one hand, a part of the Citizen Force comprising those men who have volunteered for whole-time service and, on the other hand, those men doing part-time service in the Citizen Force? If this provision were to be accepted by the Committee the man doing the whole-time service would immediately be liable for service in the suppression of internal disorders, but the man doing part-time service before the Minister can use them, have to be mobilized. I would like to know why that distinction is being made.

The member who serves whole-time is in almost every instance a key man, and if trouble should arise that man must immediately be employed. Time will not allow us to wait four days before mobilizing him. Such a person serves whole-time because in almost every case he is a key man, and for that reason he must be able to serve immediately, and there is no time to wait for the mobilization period of four days before his services are utilized.

Clause put and agreed to.

On Clause 16,

This clause and the following two clauses contain certain provisions which were dealt with in the course of the second reading debate yesterday, and which are regarded as objectionable. I want to draw attention, for a moment, to Clause 16 and the drastic additional powers which it confers upon the Minister of Defence at a time when the country is not in a state of war or at a time when an emergency has not been proclaimed, either under the Public Safety Act or, as in the case of Pondoland, in terms of certain legislation and earlier proclamations.

This clause is designed to effect an amendment to Section 100 of the principal Act. Section 100 deals with commandeering. I need not go over the vast powers which are given for commandeering, but it does deal with commandeering in time of war or internal disorder. It reads—

certain things to be done which amount to commandeering on a vast scale. The case that I tried to make yesterday—and I hope I did make it—was this: The hon. the Minister has very wide powers indeed which he may exercise in time of war. It is also now possible for any Government, in terms of the Public Safety Act, to exercise unrestricted powers during a statutory emergency, where an emergency has been proclaimed. Therefore, having these powers, it seems to be unreasonable—unless the Minister or the Government can make an unanswerable case—to clothe the Government with further powers which can be exercised in times of peace. It may be said that the existing Act already refers to internal disorder. What does one mean by internal disorder? Surely internal disorder connotes a state of affairs where there is already disorder, breaches of the law or threatened breaches of the law of such a nature that some action has to be taken. It might be said that there was a situation of that sort a year ago in Cape Town when there was a march on Cape Town by some 20,000 Bantu, and precautions had to be taken. In my view, when that happened there had been a violation of an instruction not to march in procession. There was already a breach of law and a state of disorder, and action was taken to deal with that at that time. The Defence Force, in addition to the Police Force, was perfectly capable of meeting that situation. But it may be that circumstances may arise in which more drastic action has to be taken. In my view, if such a situation has arisen then a state of emergency has arisen and it would be competent for the Government to declare such a state of emergency.

The hon. the Minister of Defence may say: “But how can I wait until the proclamation is signed by the Governor-General; how can I wait until the proclamation is printed and served?” My answer to him is that it is competent, in terms of the Public Safety Act, to proclaim a state of emergency retrospectively. Speaking from memory I think that it can be retrospective to four days prior to the actual issue of the proclamation. So that in my view the hon. the Minister is already armed with the necessary powers which he may have to exercise in case of an emergency.

I now want to ask the hon. the Minister this: What are these emergencies? What is this internal disorder that he is contemplating? In the Bill he talks about “during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Union”. And that is a phrase that runs through the next two clauses. It is true, I repeat, that the phrase “internal disorder” is used in Section 100 of the principal Act.

A very wide one.

Well, if it is very wide then I would suggest that it is unnecessary to supplement it, to clothe the Minister with additional powers. There must be some reason; obviously the Minister should not come to this House to ask for extra powers unless there is some reason for that. I want to say that I think the hon. the Minister should take this Committee into his confidence and tell us the sort of internal disorder that is contemplated.

What is the position to-day? We have a Police Force and that Police Force, in my view, is perfectly competent—as it should be and as I believe it to be—to deal with what one might call normal peace time disorders. It has the power to call upon crowds to disperse. Crowds can be dispersed by various means. Gatherings can be banned under one or other pieces of legislation such as, for instance, the Riotous Assemblies Act. The Police Force, time and again, have had to take action to maintain the peace. Therefore it must be a very exceptional occasion when the Defence Force is to be brought in to supplement the work of the police. I think the hon. the Minister owes it to this House and to this country to tell us in what circumstances he would regard it as necessary to invoke these powers.

I am addressing my argument in respect of all these clauses, although the particular clause under discussion deals with the question of commandeering. [Interjections.]

[Inaudible.]

Of course, if there could be something to deal with the hon. bucolic member for Cradock (Mr. G. F. H. Bekker), then I might waive some of my scruples and allow all sorts, including him, to be concentrated in the sort of place where he should be concentrated. But, in fact, we already have powers on the Statute Book to deal with him, under the powers given to the Minister of Health.

The Mental Disorders Bill?

This is internal disorders. However, I am dealing with a serious matter. I want to suggest to the hon. the Minister that in doing this he is creating a precedent and assuming powers which he himself may not abuse—and I am not suggesting that he will— but powers of such a wide nature as really to make it possible for a Minister of Defence so inclined to set up a military oligarchy in this country, and so to keep a Government in force and in power by that means. The Minister shakes his head, but these powers can be exercised at any time. If a Minister or a Government wishes to suppress a particular movement in the country which they may regard as inimical to their interests, such as a political movement, it would be possible in terms of the wide powers sought to be assumed under Clauses 16, 17 and 18 of this Bill, to do so under the cloak that it is being done for the prevention of internal disorder in this country.

The crux of our objection to this and to the succeeding two clauses is the fact that emergency powers are assumed without a statutory state of emergency, either under the Public Safety Act or some similar legislation. I repeat again that I completely accept the doctrine that the safety of the State is the supreme law and that it is the duty of the Government to maintain the integrity of the State and the safety of the individual. [Time limit.]

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) in the remarks which he has just made, and to move an amendment as follows—

It is not certain what, exactly, the words “internal disorder” in the existing section were meant to convey. That term is not defined in the Act. Nevertheless, we feel, as the hon. member for Salt River has said, that these powers should not be exercised except in times of war or actual disorder where a state of emergency has been proclaimed in terms of the Public Safety Act. We are therefore moving that these words “internal disorder” should be deleted, but in addition to the words which the hon. the Minister has proposed, reading “during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder” we believe the phrase “during a proclaimed state of emergency” should be inserted.

I am glad of the opportunity for continuing as my time was interrupted by the rules. The effect of this amendment which has been moved by the hon. member for East London (North) (Mr. van Ryneveld) will be to ensure that these wide and drastic powers of commandeering may be exercised by the Minister either when we are in a state of war or for the purpose of preventing or suppressing internal disorder in the Union during a proclaimed state of emergency. In other words, we insist that in the interests of democracy and in the Government’s own interests, if the Government wants to remove any suspicion about some future attempt to have rule by a military oligarchy, it would be wise to confine these powers to a time when the country is under a proclaimed state of emergency. Because to allow otherwise is to give a free hand to any Government at any time to exercise these tremendously wide powers without having taken the step of telling the country—and telling the world, indeed —that we are in an emergency. It means that a quiet and insidious process can go on from time to time, in terms of which the Defence Force is going to be used as a supernumary of the Police Force in order to crush what the Government may regard as elements inimical to them in the political world.

How are you going to draw the line between acts which are subversive of the State, which really amount to treason, and words, deeds, or acts which may be regarded by the Government in power as antagonistic to their own ideologies and their own policies but which, in this modern world are perfectly competent? I am not talking about communist doctrines. It is common cause on all sides of this House that communist doctrines should be barred. It is common cause that Communism should be stamped out where it rears its ugly head. I do not go into the question as to why there should be Communism here, but it is here as it is elsewhere in Africa. I am dealing with the danger, the moral peril of clothing a Government—any Government— with wide powers such as these which can be exercised when, ostensibly, we are in the piping days of peace but when, in effect, as a result of the exercise of these powers under cloak of suppressing some internal disorder which may be suspected, we are really in the grip of a totalitarian tentacle.

What do you suggest?

I am suggesting something that is perfectly obvious. Power breeds on power. How much of it have we not seen in the course of the last 12 years! I suggest to the hon. the Minister that in the interests of the Government itself—and I go further, in the interests of South Africa—it would be wise if the Minister were to accept this amendment. Then he would have common ground between all three parties represented in this House, namely, that we are determined to ensure that the safety of the State is preserved and, not only that, but that we are determined to ensure that it is preserved on a basis of the acceptance of the rule of law, the rule of democracy, and not merely that power should be given to be used as a subterfuge for preserving the State. In other words, we feel that the real danger is that some Minister, some Government could, if this amendment in the Bill goes on the Statute Book, abuse these powers on the basis that they are to be used to prevent internal disorder but for the real reason of trying to suppress thought or a political movement or some action taken by those who are regarded as political enemies of the Government. For those reasons I hope that the hon. the Minister will give serious attention to this amendment that we have moved and will accept it. In my view, if he does so, he will be in a position to exercise all the powers necessary if it should become obligatory for the Defence Force to supplement the Police Force in the maintenance of peace in this country.

The hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) has raised the question of the limitation of power of any Minister acting outside the scope of parliamentary control. That is a principle for which we all stand. But I think there is one factor in this particular measure which we either have to accept or reject, and that is the principle running right through the Bill. That principle is enshrined in this particular clause. The principle in a number of amendments now before us, including the one in Clause 16, is for the prevention of internal disorder before it occurs. In this particular case, as in the two following clauses, we find the same pattern. We are being asked to give these additional powers for the prevention or the suppression of disorder.

In the second-reading debate the hon. the Minister dealt at considerable length with the necessity of speed in dealing with a situation such as might arise. I think we all accept that. The necessity is for speed in prevention. My own remark, which I will repeat, was that we have had lessons enough in our own Continent of what one day’s delay can mean to the civilian population, to men, women and children. We have had lessons enough to make us very chary of exposing our own population to similar risks. The line we have taken—and I think it is the correct line—is that the Government of the day are responsible for the security of the nation. And if the Government of the day feel that their carrying out of that responsibility is hampered by the lack of some provision which, in to-day’s conditions, would enable them to act with the necessary speed, then they must be given that authority. It is then the Government’s responsibility to see that they use that power as was intended and do not abuse it.

In terms of this particular clause, although the original Act gives the Governor-General authority to commandeer in time of war or public disorder, the Minister will now be given the power to take action immediately sufficient information becomes available proving that such an outbreak is contemplated. He will then be able to deal with it beforehand and possibly prevent it occurring. That is what makes it difficult to go all the way with the proposal by the hon. member for Salt River. We are not prepared to see our people pay the price of delay. I need not exemplify the type of price that they do pay for delay, but it is the Government’s responsibility to see that there is no delay. The Government are asking for certain facilities and, given adequate safeguards—and I propose at a later stage to ask for those safeguards—which will give them the required authority but which will place the onus on the Government to see that these powers are correctly used and not abused.

I should like to hear the hon. the Minister’s views as to whether the proposal by the hon. member for Salt River is likely to hamper his forces when trying to prevent disorders, because I think that is the crux of the entire issue.

Before the hon. the Minister replies, I would implore him and other hon. members of this Committee to realize just what a serious principle is involved in this and succeeding clauses which embrace the same principle. As the hon. member for Simonstown (Mr. Gay) has rightly pointed out, the important new principle here is contained in the words “or the prevention of internal disorder in the Union”. That prevention is, presumably, in the Minister’s, or in any successor of this Minister’s, sole discretion. There may occur disorder in the Union and therefore he should exercise powers which, it is conceded on all sides of the House, are far reaching powers.

Let us look at this against the background of Africa and against the background of events in our own country in the recent past. When can we be sure that there is not a disorder threatening? At this very moment, as the hon. the Prime Minister has himself told us, there is disorder threatening, in the mind of the hon. the Prime Minister. The powers that are asked for amount to the mobilization of the Defence Force and not merely the police or, if not strictly speaking the mobilization, then to the deployment of the Defence Force. Surely to goodness, in any country when it is necessary to deploy the Defence Force for the maintenance of internal order a state of emergency exists in that country. What, otherwise, does a state of emergency mean? In any ordinary minor difficulty or civil upset it is the task of the police and it is a task that they can discharge, and it is a task for which they have powers, powers to maintain internal order. But we are dealing here with the need to use the Defence Force, and it is our submission that where the Defence Force is to be used then, by definition, there is a state of emergency. Then we should not seek to disguise the fact that there is a state of emergency. We should not seek to act under the lap and to keep our people lulled in a sense of false security. We should tell them that in this or that part of the country here is an emergency and therefore the hon. the Minister and the Defence Force should act.

There is now this question of time and speed. The hon. the Minister has argued that time is of the essence in this modern world with the speed at which things develop. Of course time is of the essence. Time was of the essence last year and that is why action was taken when difficulties broke out in South Africa. And subsequently an emergency was declared with retrospective effect. It is impossible to argue, from the precedent which we all saw as recently as that, that the declaration of an emergency is a time taking procedure which would delay the taking of effective action. The difference between the 1957 position under the 1957 Act and the position under these laws would not be a difference of greater speed; the difference would be that action could be taken without admitting that a state of emergency exists. The essence of the effect of this amendment is that it enables the Minister or any Minister who for the time being holds the portfolio of Defence to take these wide powers and infringe civil liberties to this extent on no other ground than a suspicion in his own mind and to exercise powers which should not be exercised in normal times of internal peace; to exercise these powers while pretending as the hon. member for Salt River has said, that the state of peace continues to exist.

The protection of the civil liberties of all the subjects of any country should be the prime function of its Parliament. We all realize that in the troublous times in which we live, both internally and in the world, it is necessary that these liberties should occasionally be interfered with. But then it is the duty of Parliament to see that these liberties are not interfered with save for good reason and for cause shown. Whether the proclamation of an emergency by itself is sufficient sanction is a matter which could be debated elsewhere, but it is some sanction. What we are anxious to see in the interests of those freedoms on which Western civilization has been built up is that they should not be interfered with unless due proclamation is given that a state exists which makes it essential for them to be interfered with. That is the substance of the case and speed and time have nothing to do with it.

Mr. Chairman, I am responsible to the Government for the safety of the population, and nobody can deny that in the times in which we live it is a tremendous responsibility. We know that in the past there were threats of war and that war eventually broke out after a long lapse of time. But we are living in quite different circumstances and war is liable to break out very suddenly, and disorder may suddenly arise. All we ask here is to be able to commandeer certain vehicles or buildings or whatever we might need—the whole list is mentioned—to prevent disorder also. Now hon. members are making a great fuss about the right which I ask to be given to me to be able to say when disorders threaten to such an extent that they should be prevented. But as the law stands now, Section 100 provides that in time of war or during internal disorder this commandeering may be done, but there is no definition of “internal disorder”. If a Minister is silly enough to be frightened by a charge of buckshot, or as the hon. member for Salt River expressed it, if “a jittery Minister” becomes frightened and wants to commandeer certain things because he is afraid for no good reason, he could always have done so under this Act and he could simply have said: I consider that there is internal disorder. But what do these hon. members do now? Now they ask for much more. They ask that the Minister should do so only “during a proclaimed state of emergency”. Where do hon. members find anything of that nature in Section 100? We know that war is declared in a certain manner. The section refers to a time of war—that is clear—or during internal disorder. If the hon. member and I have a scuffle in the lobby that is also an internal disorder, but any reasonable man will use his head and only do this commandeering if the internal disorder is of a serious nature. And the threat of internal disorder must be of such a nature that an intelligent man realizes it and prepares for it. If suddenly at 6 o’clock to-night it should be announced that there is a tremendous riot somewhere in the Western Province, it is absolutely essential that I should be able to bring some of my Permanent Force men here, perhaps from Bloemfontein, and I must be able to commandeer in order to be able to do so; and to-morrow, if nothing has happened, I must be able to send them back. But if I do it in the way suggested by hon. members, a state of emergency will have to be declared, and that is what we do not want to do. We may be able to prevent the riot, and then it is unnecessary to declare a state of emergency. Why then should it be done? No, I am afraid that if we always regard the actions of a Minister with suspicion we will never be able to have any empowering legislation, and it is absolutely essential to have it in these times in which we live. The hon. member for Simonstown (Mr. Gay) made it quite clear that we are living at a time where war and internal disorder are not easily distinguishable from one another. Action can be taken to prevent war, and in the same way one should have the power to act to prevent internal disorder. My colleague reminds me of the fact that I am not the Minister of War but of Defence, and therefore I have to try to prevent these things happening. No I cannot accept this amendment. I said the other day that what hon. members are asking for is that powers which were granted to the Minister of Defence three years ago already should be withdrawn, and conditions have not improved in the world during the last three years. Every realist will admit that conditions on our own continent as well as in the world have deteriorated and are more dangerous than was the case three years ago. But now the hon. member asks me to relinquish and to reduce powers which were granted to the Minister three years ago. Unless I am mistaken, the hon. member was also responsible for these powers being given to the Minister in 1957, but now he asks that in these dangerous times in which we live those powers should be relinquished. I can imagine numerous instances where, if we act timeously, we could act in the most humane manner possible. But if we cannot act timeously to prevent internal disorder we must sit and wait until there really is internal disorder, and then different measures have to be adopted, from the very nature of the case, and for that reason I want to plead with the House to-day to give us the opportunity to prevent internal disorder, because that is more essential than its suppression; because one can only suppress internal disorder with a heavy hand, and having such a heterogeneity of population groups which are on different levels of civilization, we must be very cautious in dealing with internal disorder. If one delays, the inevitable result is always that too severe punishment has to be meted out. But when one can prevent it, one can do so without adopting severe measures, but in that case one must be able to act promptly. If there are hon. members in this House who would rather not entrust me with any powers at all, I want to tell them that they are seriously endangering the safety of the population of South Africa. But if this is a political manoeuvre and the hon. members want to endanger the people of South Africa for that reason then I say that this is really an unforgiveable sin.

Mr. Chairman, I have been exhorted to withdraw the amendment, but I want to reinforce the argument I used before. The hon. the Minister begs the question. He is now trying to colour the argument in such a way as to suggest that this amendment is the result of lack of patriotism on the part of myself and others who think like me and that it is a vote of no confidence in the Minister. But it is not a question of votes of confidence or no confidence in the Minister, and I reject entirely any suggestion that because we are trying to ensure that the Statute Book is not loaded with powers to a government which may be abused, we are being untrue to South Africa.

Who said so?

The Minister suggested that the safety of the State is the supreme law and he spoke about the unforgiveable sin if we brought politics into this. I am not bringing politics into this. The Minister must not fall for the fake propaganda of some of those who are not prepared to listen to arguments based on the merits. Of course it is common cause that the safety of the State has to be preserved, and I agree with the Minister that if there is the threat of a disturbance in the Western Province it may be necessary for him to send for reinforcements from Bloemfontein, although I should have thought that he should have had sufficient men on hand here!

Well, you know what I meant by that.

If he has to send for reinforcements it must be a pretty big emergency. It is not a question of bringing politics into the matter, but it is a question of the powers granted. We know that many members of this Government have abused their powers, and we know that many people were locked up last year …

Order! The hon. member must come back to the amendment.

I am dealing with the amendment. The Minister is seeking to increase his powers.

That is not in the amendment.

With respect, Sir, this clause deals with the powers which the Governor-General may exercise, and it must be accepted as common knowledge that the Governor-General never acts except on the advice of the Minister. The commandeering is done on the instructions of the Minister of Defence. I trust that you will allow me to go on with the argument which affects not only this clause but the subsequent two clauses in order to try to curtail the debate. I suggest that if the Minister is faced with the necessity of bringing in reinforcements he can do so now. He has referred to his powers under Section 100 and he has suggested that I am trying to curtail them. I am not trying to do so in the slightest, but I suggest that if he exercises powers to suppress or prevent internal disorder the stage has arrived when we are all virtually in a state of emergency. In other words, if the Minister finds it necessary to send for reinforcements from Bloemfontein, or to call up units of the A.C.F. in the Western Province, to prevent internal disorder, I suggest that he can do so now. But in terms of our amendment clearly a state of emergency will have arisen and it will be necessary to ratify I what he has done by proclaiming a state of emergency, and in terms of the Public Safety Act an emergency can be proclaimed in any given area of the Union. It is not necessary to declare it in the whole of the Union if you have disturbances in the Boland only. The emergency can be localized. I am suggesting that if there is this safeguard in the clause, it will put beyond all doubt whatever any suggestion that powers are being taken of such a nature that a Minister or government which wishes to abuse them may do so to the detriment of their political opponents. It is only in that sense that I am bringing in politics, but I am not talking party politics. I am talking about a difference in ideology. We know that a large number of people were locked up and detained last year because their politics were not accepted by the Government, although I hold no brief for their politics.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the amendment.

These powers are so wide that they can be exercised and invoked by a government in circumstances which do not justify them in the slightest degree. If we accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for East London (North), there is a safeguard. If the Government proposes to take this drastic action, or the drastic action under the subsequent clause whereby the Government can take over the whole of the transport system of the country, it must at any rate proclaim to the country that it does so because there is a state of emergency. I grant that the Minister may be taking the powers to prevent something happening. But then he does so because affairs have so deteriorated that it can only be inferred that we have arrived at a state of emergency which demands the proclamation of a state of emergency. Otherwise, as the hon. members for Maitland and I have tried to point out, you will leave free to any government which wishes to abuse its powers the opportunity to exercise these wide powers under the pretext that it wishes to prevent the outbreak of civil disorder, while really it does so from sinister political motives which are not justified on the ground of the safety of the State. In those circumstances I trust that the Minister will be prepared to accept the amendment.

I cannot help but feel that those hon. members are playing at politics. If it is not politics and we weigh the two impressions which they create in our minds against one other, you will have on the one side a small amount of sickly sentiment and humanitarian considerations as against realistic patriotism. However, I think as far as those hon. members are concerned the sickly sentiment weighs a bit more.

This whole clause and the principle contained therein centres round one thing only and that is to provide for the prevention of disorder. Our laws may have been appropriate in the past and may have met the demands of a particular period but with the world in which we are living to-day a certain element has come into our defence policy. During the past ten to 15 years a certain element has crept into the defense policy of every country in the world, an element which was not there before, and that is the element of unpredictability. The object of this clause is to meet the demands with which our defence policy is faced because of this unpredictability. During the past few years the activities in Africa and elsewhere have assumed a certain form and that is that an attack may come in the form of global warfare, in the form of a localized clash, or in the form of arson and riots and disorder. The pattern as far as arson and riots and disorder are concerned is that it is first of all properly planned by well-trained agents such as we find throughout Africa as well as in this country. We have examples in this country of those agents, well-trained in the art of preparing their victims mentally, the victims they want to use, and the unpredictability lies in this method of theirs of preparing the victim to commit disorder in such a way that you do not know when it is going to descend upon you. During the last few years the entire pattern of preparing the field for disorder or for a local war or a global war has also changed in South Africa. I repeat that this factor of unpredictability is to be found throughout the world to-day and this factor has caused America to keep a 24hour watch along her borders which is costing her millions of dollars. The world to-day is in a state of preparedness as never before because of this factor of unpredictability. In this clause the Minister makes provision to meet that factor and if we accepted the amendment of those hon. members and acceded to their request not to make provision for the prevention of disorder, we might just as well discard the entire Bill because then it will not mean a thing. I support the hon. the Minister wholeheartedly as far as this new approach to disorder is concerned. It is necessary and essential. We have learnt this from experience and it is in line with the new pattern which has developed throughout the world as well as in South Africa over the past few years.

I do not propose to play politics on this clause. I propose to put before the committee the clause which it is proposed to amend and the effect of that clause, and I shall be glad if the Minister will tell me whether I am correct. I do not propose to follow either the hon. member for Venterdorp (Mr. Greyling) or the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) because a great deal of what they have said, with respect, does not refer to the amendment before the House, nor to the clause which it proposes to amend.

The Bill before the House seeks to amend the provisions of Clause 100 and the clause we are considering now is Clause 16. Section 100 deals with commandeering. It says that in time of war or internal disorder the Governor-General may commandeer from any person or any body and without the consent of such person or body take possession of buildings, vehicles, aircraft, etc. In other words, it is a clause which deals with the power to commandeer for the purposes set out in the clause. The amendment seeks to substitute for the words “internal disorder” the words “during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder”. But the clause still deals with commandeering during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder. I have been listening to the discussion but it seems to me that if it is possible to prevent internal disorder, it is the bounden duty of the Minister to do so, because by doing so he prevents many of the unhappy things which follow upon this order. Then there is the question whether it is for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder. In regard to the suppression of internal disorder, as distinct from the prevention, a heavy responsibility rests on the Minister. Quite clearly, it is necessary to preserve order in the State, but where there is a proposal to suppress internal disorder it is obvious that any of the powers granted here should only be granted in extreme circumstances and I submit only for a very limited period, but in my submission it would be utterly wrong if over a long period serious action were taken to prevent civil disorder. As far as commandeering is concerned for the purpose of preventing it, it seems right that there should be the power to commandeer for the purpose of preventing civil disorder. I think the responsibility rests upon the Minister to show—and he has attempted to show—that when dealing with civil disorder speed may be of the essence, but obviously it would be quite wrong to use the provisions of Section 100 as amended to enable these extensive powers of commandeering to continue over a long period. I wonder whether the Minister is not prepared to consider it, because if the disorders continue over a long period I think a case may be made out in the circumstances which might then exist either for the declaration of a state of emergency or possibly for even more drastic action than that. But what I think is necessary, and what I believe the Minister has in mind, is that he should have power to act quickly to prevent disorder. But if it is a question of the suppression of disorder, in my view it would be an abuse of the provisions of this section if it continued over a long period. It seems to me that the Government would be duty bound to carry the matter further if there is continuing disorder, and possibly a legal state of emergency should be declared. I put this to the Minister because we are dealing with a matter here which I hope we will not consider as a political question, which I am afraid has been the hallmark of the debate up to date. We are dealing with the future safety of the State. But while the safety of the State is the highest law and it is necessary to have speed, it must be brought within the ambit of the civil law, or at least of the emergency regulations as soon as possible if there is a continuing emergency. I appeal to the Minister to reconsider it and see whether he cannot perhaps limit the powers. For my own part, in the case of an emergency, I think the Minister needs the powers, but I do not believe he needs those powers if there is a continuing state of internal disorder. I believe other measures could be taken then. Therefore I ask the Minister to consider it seriously and if necessary ask for this clause to stand over so that he can consider whether it is not possible to obtain the powers needed in an immediate emergency when there is no time to publish orders in the Gazette, but at the same time to limit the operations so that the Minister could not abuse the powers by using them over a fairly lengthy period of time when there is a continuing state of emergency. In that event it seems to me that there is a case to be made out for the use of other measures which have been placed on the Statute Book to deal with the situation. I ask that the Minister should deal with the matter in that spirit and I appeal to other hon. members not to play politics in this question; let us realize that here we are dealing with the safety of the State, which is something in which I hope all of us have the greatest interest.

May I say that we welcome the contribution which the hon. member for Springs (Mr. Tucker) has just made on this clause. The hon. member feels that the fairly wide power given to the Minister, not only in terms of the amendment, but actually also in terms of the existing section, should be limited in point of time. His suggestion would involve, not only a limitation on the amendment which is proposed by the hon. the Minister, but it would involve a limitation actually on the existing section. With respect, I think the argument of the hon. member is a good one. We, of course, wish to go a little further. We agree fully that there should be some limit to the period over which these powers can be extended for the suppression of disorders, but we feel also that the powers which the Minister wishes to take for the prevention of disorders are also too wide. Sir, there are two points on this particular issue. Firstly, the Minister already has very great powers to cope with a situation of developing disorder. After all, he has his Police Force, and, apart from the Police Force, he can mobilize his Defence Force, the Permanent Force and his reserves. What he is asking for here is extra powers, powers of commandeering. He can move his Police Force and he can move his army very quickly under existing circumstances without any special power. What the hon. the Minister is asking for here is for power to commandeer. If the powers which he already has by virtue of our normal law to use his police and to mobilize his army and his reserves, are not sufficient, then we have clearly reached a very serious state of affairs indeed.

But this is not a question of commandeering people.

No, of course, it is not a question of commandeering people, but the Minister can mobilize under other sections. We are not dealing with mobilization now. I say that under existing sections without the power to commandeer, he already has plenty of resources to deal with a situation of developing disorder. As I have said, he has his Police Force; he can use his Defence Force and his reserves. He has that power, quite irrespective of this clause. What the hon. the Minister is asking for is special powers; he is asking for the right to commandeer.

A teeny weeny bit more.

Exactly—a teeny weeny bit more. It involves the commandeering of private persons’ vehicles, etc.; it is an invasion of civil liberties. The other is not— this is—and it is a very important difference of principle. We say that this extra power is not necessary. As I say, the Minister has his Police Force and his Defence Force, if he wishes to use them in the normal way. What he is asking for is the extra power to commandeer. If the situation is so bad that commandeering is necessary, then we, in this corner of the House, say that a situation has developed which justifies the declaration of a state of emergency. That is the crisp point. If the situation is so bad that he has to go to the extent of commandeering vehicles, premises and other things, then clearly the situation is so bad that it justifies the declaration of a state of emergency. It is not a question of being able to take action in time. Action can be taken immediately, and a state of emergency can be proclaimed later, within two or three days, as the Minister knows. Therefore, we feel that this extra power to commandeer is not necessary. He has plenty of power to cope with a situation of developing disorder without the use of this special power. We see no necessity for it, without the declaration of a state of emergency.

The question has just been raised by the hon. member that it may be necessary to declare a state of emergency. Sir, it seems to me that the hon. member does not realize that the declaration of a state of emergency, applicable possibly to a local area, is, in effect, the application of martial law to that area. That is a very serious matter indeed.

That is the point.

I am going to use the term “martial law”, because that, in effect, is what is being advocated by my hon. friends on my left.

If things are that bad, yes.

No, that is not the point. In this clause we are dealing with the question of commandeering buildings, goods, vehicles, etc., to enable the Government to cope with a situation, and the proposal in the amendment is that this can be done during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Union. Sir, I have put my case to the Minister. I feel that he could probably deal with this situation. There are obviously degrees in these matters, and that is the difficulty. I would say at once that if there is commandeering in the interests of the safety of the State in a fairly restricted field, I believe it would be the height of stupidity on the part of the Minister to declare a state of emergency which is, in effect, a declaration of martial law.

For that particular area.

Sir, it is a matter of degree, and it is a question of the reasonable exercise of the responsibility which rests upon the Minister. And, as I have said, in respect of the prevention of disorder, I cannot for a moment conceive, where you are taking action in commandeering goods in order to prevent disorder, how it can be said that you must declare a state of emergency, otherwise you cannot commandeer. That is what my hon. friends on my left are suggesting, that, even if you wish to take action to prevent internal disorder, you must declare a state of emergency.

That is right.

I appeal to them in all seriousness, and I ask them to ask themselves honestly whether it is not better that there should be a power to commandeer to prevent disorder, rather than we should, even after a limited period, be forced to declare a state of emergency. For my part I believe it would be wrong to declare a state of emergency in those circumstances. But, Sir, when you come to the second part where you are dealing with the actual suppression of internal disorder, I think there the hon. the Minister should be quite clear as to what is intended. I can conceive of circumstances in which it is unnecessary to declare martial law. It may be internal disorder of a limited character. But the clause as it stands is all-embracing, and I again say to the hon. the Minister that he might consider the matter very seriously indeed and, perhaps, ask for this clause to stand over, so that he can give it further consideration. I can imagine nothing which will give me greater pleasure than to find that the Minister is able to deal with this matter in a way that will enable us to put this measure on the Statute Book as an agreed measure. I do not know whether my hon. friends on my left are seeking agreement on this matter. Sir, because the safety of the State is involved, I would like, in this matter, to be able to support the Minister. I realize the responsibility which rests upon him. I hope the Minister will be prepared to deal with the matter, and I hope that my friends on my left will realize that the amendment which they have moved would certainly not be in the interests of the State in certain of the circumstances which can be dealt with under this clause.

I have listened attentively to the hon. member for Springs (Mr. Tucker) but in my opinion he has missed the point entirely.

A new soldier.

We all know, Sir, that in a modern state disorder does not descend upon you out of the blue. There is a big field for proselytizing, as it were, people become dissatisfied for various reasons, and ultimately they want to do something about it. Sometimes it results in active disorder and sometimes not. But when you give the Government, in other words the Minister, power ostensibly with the object of preventing disorders—and my objection is against the word “prevention” which is used so vaguely—what does all that embrace? I can well imagine a group of White people feeling strongly about some measure or other which the Government is on the point of passing, wanting to arrange a demonstration on a Saturday afternoon to the Union Buildings or rather to the House of Parliament in order to register their protest against that measure. The possibility does exist that disorder may result from that demonstration. That is a possibility which we must never lose sight of. When free people are dissatisfied the possibility always exists that something which we would not care to see happening, may happen. That is one of the risks that always confront free people. The man who is not free will be prohibited from staging such a demonstration, and my objection is that the Minister will be able, ostensibly with the object of preventing trouble, to smother any movement in its initial stages whereas the chances are one in a thousand that no trouble will result from it. In my opinion we are giving the Minister powers which are too drastic, powers which may smother the freedom of the nation and that of the individual. The hon. member for Ventersdorp (Mr. Greyling) talks airily about these things, but we are travelling so fast along the road of Communism and communist methods with this sort of thing, that I am really becoming alarmed.

But who declares the state of emergency? Surely the Minister does.

When there is a real state of emergency it is for a responsible Government to declare a state of emergency before people who are demonstrating get killed. It is for him to judge, but here we are being asked to give him the power to say: Well, I did do it, but my intention was to prevent trouble and disorder. Where does it start and where does it end? That is my objection. I hope the hon. the Minister will appreciate our objection on this side of the House and that he will not continue with this sort of thing. If we continue in this way we shall eventually reduce the entire nation to a state of slavery. It is beyond my comprehension how hon. members opposite, like the hon. member for Ventersdorp, manage to swallow this sort of thing year after year.

I really cannot understand the objections of hon. members opposite or their allegations that we are now taking such tremendous powers to put the liberties of people under restraint. When we read the section as it stands at the moment, coolly and calmly, what do we find? In time of war or during internal disorder—we now want to change it to read “during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder”—“the Governor-General may authorize and appoint officers of the South African Defence Force or of the public service to obtain in the manner and subject to the conditions prescribed, from any person or any public or other body corporate or incorporate, and without the consent of such person or body, to take possession of buildings and other premises, vehicles, aircraft, vessels, machinery, equipment, animals, foodstuffs, forage, fuels, oils and any other materials, articles or things necessary for the mobilization or the maintenance of the South African Defence Force or any portion thereof or of other forces acting in co-operation therewith. Sub-section (2) of Section 100 reads—

Mr. Chairman, we are not commandeering human beings; we are not putting human liberties under restraint. It is purely and simply when certain materials and buildings are required for the mobilization of the South African Defence Force for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder, that those things are commandeered. In a sensible speech the hon. member for Springs (Mr. Tucker) asked me whether a time limit could not be introduced. Let us assume that we have commandeered foodstuffs and fuel in order to convey people quickly then there is nothing of a temporary nature attached to that. The material has been commandeered and compensation has been paid. Let us assume, for example, that disorder is threatening in a certain place and that a few men from the Defence Force have to be taken there. It may happen that you have to commandeer fuel or food along the road. But it is not a question of suppressing human liberties. Surely everybody should be prepared to make such a sacrifice for the sake of the maintenance of peace. The hon. member for Germiston (District) (Prof. Fourie) made the point that we on this side were continually suppressing human liberties.

But that is true.

No human liberties are being taken away here. As the law stands at the moment the Governor-General has the right to commandeer transport, consumer goods, accommodation or whatever it may be, during the suppression of disorder. Hon. members of the Progressive Party expect us first to declare a state of emergency in the country. Mr. Chairman, we must always be prepared; we see what is happening not far beyond our borders; there may be instances where we have to act quickly. Hon. members want us, in those circumstances, first to declare a state of emergency before we act. Just imagine, Sir, how that would affect the economy of the country. Just think how detrimental that would be to the good name of the country. We are asking here for the right to take certain steps for the prevention of disorder. What steps? The right to commandeer certain things when we need them—not people; we are not going to force people into a war, but we want the right to commandeer articles, transport etc. For instance, we may suddenly discover this evening at seven o’clock that there is going to be trouble here at eight o’clock. It may happen that we require the hon. member’s motor car and in that case an officer should be able to commandeer it in order to convey people to a certain place. What human liberties are being curtailed? No, I really cannot see that this is in any way a severe curtailment of human liberties. As Section 100 reads at the moment, it lends itself to terrific abuse on the part of the Minister, if he wants to, but no Minister since 1957 has been so mad as to abuse those words “or during internal disorder” in Section 100. Where action has been taken in this country, it was taken after the declaration of a state of emergency. Why should we only now go mad and, where we are anxious to maintain the peace, abuse a right which we have had all these years? These words “or during internal disorder” have never been defined; the Minister had to interpret them and the Government had to interpret them with the Minister. We have never as yet abused them; where does this sudden fear come from that we will now abuse the position if we add the words “during operations”. The old section refers to “during internal disorder” not even to “operations during internal disorder”. No, I am sorry but I cannot accept this amendment. I am also sorry that I cannot accede to the request of the hon. member for Springs—I know he means it well—that this clause should stand over with a view to imposing some time limit, because most of the things that are done are of such a temporary nature that from the very nature of things, you cannot impose a time limit. If operations for the prevention of internal disorder have to continue over any period, surely it is clear that a state of emergency will have to be declared; that is obvious. These actions for the prevention of disorder have to be taken quickly if you wish to prevent it. If I have to send people to X in the Western Cape, for instance, for the prevention of disorder, I send them there and I commandeer certain things if necessary, to get them there. It may be necessary to send people to 30 or 40 places simultaneously; we do not know what the position will be in future, and in that case it may be necessary for them to remain there for a week or ten days or even a month. What limit are you going to impose? Once the troops arrive there nothing probably happens, but you cannot take them away immediately and it may be that you have to commandeer something or other. Assume for a moment that we have to post a number of soldiers somewhere or other in the country and that the local inhabitants refuse to provide them with food. We must then have the right to commandeer it. It may be that we have to send troops quickly to a certain town and that we cannot provide them with accommodation there; the Show Committee deliberately refuses to make the showgrounds available to us for accommodating the soldiers. Well, in that case we must have the right to commandeer. What drastic curtailment of human liberties is there in that? No, I am afraid I cannot accede to this request.

I think it is really time my independent Progressive friends came down to earth. We on this side of the House are only concerned with one thing and that is the safety of our women and children in this troublous world. I wonder if they realize that in America to-day aircraft are flying about every minute of the day and night for the prevention of trouble. If trouble is to be prevented, you must have the necessary power to prevent that trouble. [Interjection.] Sir, in this case we are not interested in politics or in Green Point. We are only interested in the welfare of our country and the safety of our women and children. To our way of thinking these amendments are purely designed for the safety of our people. Sir, hon. members on my left talk about the declaration of a state of emergency. What happens if trouble starts in the middle of the night? Must we then sit back and do nothing and wait for the declaration of a state of emergency? What is the Government to do? That is their idea; that is exactly what members of the Progressive Party have said. In other words, do nothing until the declaration of a state of emergency. My hon. friends must not shake their heads. I understand English and I know what they are capable of. I do feel that in a matter of this sort, we should study only one point and that is this: If the Government say that they require these powers in order to safeguard the welfare of the country, then it is the duty of every citizen to assist them in that object. If they abuse that power they will have to answer to this House. We do feel that everyone should look at it from that angle and that angle alone. Although I do not want to give the Government any unnecessary powers, when it comes to a question of the protection of our women and children in this country, I for one am prepared to give them any powers for which they ask. Who would be the first people to grumble and grouse where there is a delay in taking action to quell any disturbances? Who would get the blame? This Government would be told immediately: “Could you not foresee this; why didn’t you do this; why didn’t you do that?” If we do not give them these powers they may not be in a position to prevent the troubles which we anticipate, and I trust that my hon. friends of the Progressive Party will come down to earth and think only of the safety of the people and that they will not be actuated by any political motives.

I think it is necessary that members of this House should understand exactly what it is that we are being asked to do in this case. I have before me the Public Safety Act of 1953. The question here is what are the alternatives? I would like to point out that when a power is given to commandeer goods, vehicles, etc., for a particular purpose it obviously follows that there are already men in the field who need those things in connection with an emergency which already exists. In other words, troops have already been called out and the clause with which we are dealing does not deal with the many matters mentioned by the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) but with the commandeering of goods.

Only.

Those goods have to be paid for. It is provided in the amendment which has been moved on behalf of the Progressive Party that a time limit should be fixed and that a state of emergency should be declared. Sir, the declaration of a state of emergency is a most serious thing, as I have already indicated, and I would like to refer to the powers which the Progressive Party wants to be invoked, whether those powers are necessary or not, in a case where it is considered desirable to commandeer goods. Firstly, the Governor-General is prepared to declare a state of emergency “if it appears that any action or threatened action by any person or body of persons in the Union or any area within the Union is of such nature and of such an extent that the safety of the public and the maintenace of public order is seriously threatened thereby”. It goes on to provide for the creation of emergency regulations. We know what very drastic powers have been included in emergency regulations in the past. They are all provided for in detail, and the powers which are granted in emergency regulations go far beyond the mere commandeering of goods, which is in fact the object of the clause which is now before the Committee. I do again make an appeal to my hon. friends on my left to realize that here we are considering not only the safety of the State but what is in the best interests of the State. I want to ask my hon. friends whether, when there is possibly a disturbance of a local nature, they think it is desirable that this very serious step of framing emergency regulations, of declaring a local state of martial law in effect and vesting tremendously wide powers in the Government, should necessarily be taken? It seems to me that there is no question that this is what they are asking for and that is what they are asking this House to agree to this afternoon. Sir, I believe that our duty is not only to consider the safety of the State, but in view of the tremendously difficult problems we are faced with, such as the amendment of the Act wants to cope with, I believe it is necessary that we should think with our heads and not with our hearts, that we should bear in mind the interests of individuals in respect of possibly life and liberty rather than the interests of persons in respect of their material goods. Having looked again very carefully at the provisions of this clause, it seems to me that it deals only with the taking of material goods from persons, against compensation, and I do not believe for a moment that it justifies the extravagant language which has come from my friends on my left.

Amendments put and a division called.

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Messrs. Butcher, Cope, Dr. de Beer, Prof. Fourie, Mr. Lawrence, Dr. Steytler, Mrs. Suzman, Messrs. R. A. F. Swart, van Ryneveld and Williams) voted in favour of the amendment, the Chairman declared it negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and a division called.

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Messrs. Butcher, Cope, Dr. de Beer, Prof. Fourie, Mr. Lawrence, Dr. Steytler, Mrs. Suzman, Messrs. R. A. F. Swart, van Ryneveld and Williams) voted against the clause, the Chairman declared it agreed to.

On Clause 17,

This is the clause which now, if accepted, will enable the Governor-General to authorize “during operations for the prevention or the suppression of internal disorders” any officer of the South African Defence Force to assume control over any railway system or air service, or any portion thereof. Similarily, the clause, if accepted, will also authorize the Minister, during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorders in the Union, to requisition the authorities controlling any railway line or air service in the Union to supply certain engines, rolling stock, etc. The power to take over control of the transportation system of this country is given to the Government in terms of existing legislation in time of war. The purpose of this amendment is to extend those powers, to enable the Government (in this case the Minister of Defence on behalf of the Government) to exercise those powers “during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Union Here our objections are similar to those we expressed on the previous clause, and I do not propose to repeat them at length. The arguments which we have adduced in respect of Clause 16 are applicable here in respect of these drastic powers to take over the control of the transportation system of the Union during a state of peace. In order to pinpoint our objection, I move the following amendment—

If that amendment is accepted, the effect of the clause as amended would be that during a state of war, or during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Union, these drastic powers could be used, if an emergency is proclaimed. No doubt the argument will be used again that this amendment would tie the hands of the Minister of Defence in times of emergency because he has to act quickly and because he cannot first proclaim a state of emergency. I have tried to make this point, which I believe is a valid point, that if the situation has developed to such an extent, if the internal position has deteriorated to such an extent, that it is necessary for the Minister of Defence to take over the transportation system from his colleague, the Minister of Transport, then there must be a very dangerous state of affairs in the country indeed, which would fully justify the proclamation of a state of emergency, either in terms of the Public Safety Act, or of some other relevant statute if, for instance, it happened in Pondoland or the Transkei. In any event the Minister need not wait. He can act: and any action that he takes can be in pursuance of a proclaimed state of emergency, although the emergency is not proclaimed until a few days later. He would be covered completely by existing legislation. If this amendment is accepted, then, just as we suggested in regard to a prior clause, it would mean that no government in this country could exercise these drastic and totalitarian and draconian powers unless there really was a valid state of emergency which would justify the taking of such powers and which would necessitate the prevention of something worse, or unless a state of war had been declared. Therefore I move this amendment.

I regret but I am unable to accept the amendment proposed by the hon. member as it is similar in substance to an amendment moved to the previous clause and which was negatived by the Committee.

May I take a point of order, Sir? Sir, in the previous clause, Clause 16 …

Order! I have given my ruling.

With the greatest respect, Sir, I am seeking to amend a different clause.

The amendment is similar in substance to an amendment already negatived.

With the greatest respect, Mr. Chairman, it deals with a different subject. In the previous case we were dealing with commandeering. This clause deals with the taking over by the Government of the transportation services of this country.

It also deals with commandeering. I am sorry but I cannot put the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, with the greatest respect may I ask that the ruling of Mr. Speaker be obtained?

No, I am sorry, the hon. member must abide by my decision.

In regard to this particular clause I think it is well to make our attitude clear. The powers sought by this amendment in regard to Section 102 are really, if one may put it that way, consequential on the amendment the House has just approved in regard to Section 100. In other words, the hon. the Minister is now asking, the House having accepted the previous amendment and authorized him to use the forces, authority to actually make use of the forces and the material to be commandeered, in other words, to put some officer in charge of them. I think we should be clear on two points, which have been very widely stressed in the arguments, used against these amendments. One is that it is unnecessary to bring in the Defence Force because we have our Police Force. As far as I know it has been accepted that the Police Force in this country, and the same thing applies to any other democratic country, is essentially a force of law and order, but is not sufficient numerically to deal with any widespread disorder. It has always been an accepted fact in the Union that the Police Force and the Union Defence Force together, combined, have to operate in times of disorder. That has been the accepted fact. The principle to bring in Defence to support the police in matters of this nature, either to prevent or to suppress disorder, has been an accepted feature in the life of this country for many, many years. Having approved of the previous amendment and given the hon. Minister authority to commandeer certain equipment, as enumerated in the amendment and in the original Act, having extended the Minister’s powers from purely a time when war is declared, to the period of “operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder”, it would be folly on the part of the House not to give the Government powers by which to make use of the material and equipment which we have allowed them to commandeer. In other words, if the Minister takes over trains, he has got to move his troops from place to place, and naturally if he takes over trains or planes, he must have authority over the personnel to make use of this transport. Having therefore granted the Minister the power to do commandeering, we now allow him to appoint an officer to exercise control over the railway system, or the air services, or any portion thereof, etc., all the things that are necessary for the movement of either the police or the troops, which together then undertake the defence of the country in time of emergency, or with the object to prevent or suppress internal disorder. As far as we on this side of the House are concerned again it rests on the principle of preventing disorder and trying to limit the extent of it, rather than to wait until things happen and then having to go considerably further, with probably considerably more loss of life than would be necessary in the first place. It is a responsibility of the State, of the Government of the day, and they having asked for these powers in order to carry out their responsibilities, the obligation is then fairly and squarely on them not to abuse these powers. It is not a power we readily give. We do not like to give such powers to any government, but it is power which is symptomatic of the times which the world is passing through, when speed has become so important that one has to take these short-cuts, whether you like them or not. But I want again to emphasize that once the authority is granted, the responsibility rests entirely on the shoulders of the Government.

Mr. Chairman, in terms of your ruling, we are unable to move the amendment we wish to move, and we shall therefore vote against this clause. I want to underline shortly the arguments which have been presented by the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence). Here the power is given to the Governor-General to authorize an officer of the South African Defence Force to take control of any railway system, air service, or section thereof within the Union. Now I want to put a question to the hon. the Minister which I put to him at the second-reading stage, but to which the hon. the Minister did not reply. My question is this: Would he please indicate in what circumstances it would be necessary for an officer of the South African Defence Force to assume control over the railway system? I cannot conceive of circumstances in which the hon. the Minister would want to use this power. What has the hon. Minister got in his mind? If he wants to move his troops, he has only to ask the hon. Minister of Transport to make the necessary provision. In fact I believe that the hon. Minister of Transport would achieve the purpose much better than the hon. Minister of Defence. I find it very difficult to envisage circumstances in which the hon. the Minister would wish to take over control of the transport system. If there is a serious emergency and control should be placed in the hands of the Defence Force, then let the emergency be proclaimed as such. But I cannot see that this is necessary “to prevent any internal disorder”. In what circumstances does the hon. Minister envisage that it will be necessary to take over control of the transport services for the prevention of internal disorder?

Clause, as printed, put and a division was called.

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Messrs. Butcher, Cope, Dr. de Beer, Mr. Eglin, Prof. Fourie, Mr. Lawrence, Dr. Steytler, Mrs. Suzman, Messrs. R. A. F. Swart, van Ryneveld and Williams) voted against the clause, the Chairman declared it agreed to.

On Clause 18,

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, as the majority of these amendments which are being moved all serve the same purpose, namely newspaper publicity, may I draw the attention of hon. members to the fact that the papers have already reported “U.P. Votes with Nats on Defence Bill”, and perhaps we can save a lot of time if we draw the attention of hon. members to the fact that publicity has been given to their stand.

Sir, we are dealing here with internal disorders, not mental disorders!

Sir, with your permission, I want to move the following amendment—

We are now dealing with an entirely new clause which provides for a Section 103bis. The latter gives wide powers to the Minister of Defence to take certain action against a person or persons by way of compulsory evacuation or concentration of such persons, etc. In those circumstances I submit that the amendment is in order, but before addressing you on this amendment, would you be good enough to let me know whether you are prepared to accept this amendment?

Will the hon. member please continue.

The effect of this amendment, if accepted, would be that the proposed new clause would read that in times of war, or during operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Union during a proclaimed state of emergency, the Minister may do certain things. If that amendment were to be accepted and if the Minister’s amendment which he has placed on the Order Paper were accepted, we could then accept the section as so amended for the purposes of the powers being exercised either during the state of war or during a state of proclaimed emergency. The argument which we have put up regarding the two previous clauses applies. There is no doubt that the proposed amendment which the Minister announced in his reply on the second reading, and which he has placed on the Order Paper, does remove from this particular clause what, without it, would be a very sinister provision indeed. It does not help to say that the Minister did not intend to take powers which might enable him to concentrate persons in certain areas; in other words, just set up concentration camps. Because on a proper construction of the sentence, this clause would give him those powers. This is not merely my view, it is the view of a number of persons both inside this House and outside this House who are accustomed to interpret legal statutes. There is no doubt whatsoever that the clause, even though it purports to be an innocent one—and I accept from the Minister that he never intended it to be used for the purpose which I suggest it can be used for— in its present form, without amendment is an invidious clause. The amendment that the Minister proposes certainly removes the pernicious evil of the clause as it stands, because it does limit the operation of the clause to four days. In that sense it does negative what otherwise was the irresistible inference that this clause could be used for the purposes of setting up concentration camps. In that sense the proposed amendment of the Minister removes, to a large extent, what is objectionable. But not altogether. Here again this clause, just as the two previous clauses, clothes the Minister with very wide powers which, if exercised not during a proclaimed state of emergency or not during a state of war but when we are purporting to be living in peaceful conditions, is unwise. Therefore there should be this qualification that these additional powers shall not be exercised until there is a proclaimed state of emergency. I repeat, of course, that if it was so urgent to exercise them that the proclamation could not be duly signed and sealed before action was taken, the Minister could still take action and he would be safeguarded and validated in his actions by the provision of the proclamation proclaiming a state of emergency being made retrospective. I move.

I have considered the amendment of the hon. member and regret that I am unable to accept it as it is similar in substance to an amendment previously negatived by the Committee.

Clause 18, although it is part of the pattern of Clauses 16, 17 and 18 altogether, introduces quite a new aspect of the additional powers now being asked for by the Government. It introduces a very important principle which we accepted in the second reading, but nevertheless we did make it clear then that we were not satisfied about it. It clothed the hon. the Minister with powers to deal, not only with individuals but with whole groups of people termed, in the amendment, persons of any particular class. It gives power to cause them to be moved or assembled or concentrated in any particular building or area. It may be argued from two angles: In the first place that the amendment is designed to enable the Minister, where he knows that certain punitive action is going to be taken in a particular area, to remove people from that area if they are likely to suffer harm as a result of the action which the Minister knows is going to take place. I do not think anybody will quibble with that. You always find the odd invididual who decides to stick his toes in and hamper the operations which would be much more expeditiously handled if that type of person was not there. That is one aspect. The other is that this clause also clothes the Minister with power to remove from any particular area an entire class of person whom the Minister or his advisers expect are going to be the cause of trouble. By getting them out of that area you may nip the trouble in the bud. In other words you prevent the unrest and deal with these people in another manner. This is importing into the Principal Act this very important change in policy. It also brings about a change in the principal Act in that where the original Act dealt with war-time conditions under which the Governor-General was given certain powers, now in time of peace, in order to prevent internal disorder, the Minister is given powers to take certain action. Just how far Parliament regarded it necessary to curb even a Governor-General in the exercise of his powers, is made quite clear by Section 103 of Act 44. First of all, the Governor-General, in terms of that section could not issue his proclamation or exercise his authority until he had gone through the statutory process of a declaration of war published in the official Government Gazette. It was only after that step had been taken that the Governor-General was empowered to do the other things authorized by that section. In the measure now before us these powers have been asked for not in time of war but in time of peace in order to prevent certain disturbances. But the Act goes further. It stresses the intention of Parliament to preserve its authority in matters like this by laying down in sub-sections (4) (5) and (6) certain provisos relating to the use of these powers by the Governor-General. In sub-section (4) it is laid down that any regulation made under this section shall be laid on the Table of the House within 14 days after promulgation or 14 days after the commencement of Parliament if then not in session. Sub-section (5) goes on to give both Houses of Parliament by regulation passed in the same session, power, if both Houses disapprove of such regulations laid on the Table, to regard them as ceasing to be of force and effect. Sub-section (6) then goes on to validate certain things which have already been done, in the case of Parliament afterwards refusing to accept them. That, to my mind, is a very good example of the importance which Parliament places on parliamentary control over all matters affecting the liberty of the subject. It is a principle which we believe should apply in the present case as well. I cannot see that it is going to hamper the hon. the Minister in any way if he is permitted the powers asked for in terms of Clause 18, but subject to the same measure of parliamentary control, even if in this case—as will naturally happen in time of emergency —he comes to Parliament after having taken the necessary steps.

There was an objection taken during the second reading with regard to the construction which might be placed on the words “concentrate in any one building The fear was that this might be a form of provision of concentration camps. The hon. the Minister has tabled his amendment which, as far as this side of the House is concerned, we are prepared to accept. That limits this power to a period of four days. However we feel that it does not go far enough and I want to move as an amendment—

1. (2) The provisions of sub-sections (4) and and (5) of Section 103 shall apply mutatis mutandis to any order issued under sub-section (1).

In other words, it would call upon the Minister, having utilized the powers granted under this clause, to report to Parliament within the statutory period exactly as is provided for in the original section. He would then lay on the Table within 14 days the orders which he had issued and Parliament would have a right to debate and reject or approve of them. We feel that that will give an overriding control to Parliament. Also, there may be a Minister who is a little over-enthusiastic or some of these advisers may be a little over-enthusiastic and this will apply the necessary brake in the form of parliamentary control to ensure that the use of these powers was kept within the prescribed limits.

The hon. member for Simonstown (Mr. Gay) has raised certain valid objections to the methods in which the hon. the Minister can use the powers proposed to be conferred on him by the new Section 103bis with which, as far as they go as safeguards, we would agree. We, of course, have taken our objection principally on the contents of the new Section 103bis rather than on the safeguards or the absence thereof. Whereas it is perfectly clear that in principle our objection to this clause rests on much the same sort of considerations as our objection to the other two Clauses 16 and 17, it is clear, as the hon. member for Simonstown has said, that there are substantial differences. Here we are dealing with members of the civilian population and such defence as was possible of the clause dealing with commandeering is not possible here. Even Clause 17, far reaching as it was, was dealing with the use of the Railway, whereas here we are dealing with interference in their normal lives of the civilian population of the country. Nobody is more aware than we are that in times of war or in times of emergency it is very often necessary, for their own good, to move sections of the civilian population either in the direction of assembling them or in the direction of evacuating certain areas. But even more now here than when we were dealing with purely material things, we are anxious to ensure that these powers are only employed when there is real danger.

The hon. the Minister looks at me as if to say “do you think I would use these powers if there was not a real danger?” The answer is that if there is real danger such as to warrant powers of this sort then, we believe, that danger constitutes an emergency. Hence we have taken up the same attitude as we did on the other two clauses although in terms of your ruling, Sir, we cannot vote for it as an amendment. For this reason we will vote against this clause.

We do hope that the hon. the Minister will not be too much put out by what he believes is a lack of confidence on our part in him, or even a lack of confidence on our part in some hypothetical successor to the Minister. This is an argument which occurs in this House from time to time on various pieces of legislation that come before us. One of the biggest problems that Parliaments have to deal with is the question of delegation of powers to Ministers. The question simply of confidence does not arise. If one takes that argument that this corner of the House has expressed lack of confidence in the Minister to its logical conclusion, then, of course, we should end up by handing over all of our powers to the Ministers and closing down Parliament. In that sense it is the job of Parliament to lack confidence in the Minister and that is the sense in which the word is being used. It is in that sense and in no personal sense that we take objection to the extension of these powers, and we do so both on the ground which the hon. member for Simonstown has advanced and on our own ground: our objection to the use of powers of this sort when there is no emergency and when there is no war. In terms of your ruling, Sir, we shall vote against this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment as printed in my name on the Order Paper—

For the reasons which I have mentioned before and which I need not reiterate, I am not prepared to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence).

The amendment of the hon. member for Salt River is not before the Committee.

I understand it has been ruled out of order. I may say that I do not agree with the view of hon. members of the Progressive Party, that they are only prepared to grant certain powers once a state of emergency has been proclaimed. We have argued that point over and over again this afternoon, and I do not think anybody will expect me to pursue the matter.

As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Simonstown (Mr. Gay) is concerned, I have really done my best. I have spoken to the law advisers about this matter to see whether it is possible to apply that amendment in practice. The hon. member put it this way that regulations which are promulgated by the Governor-General should be laid on the Table of this House within a certain period. That is all very well and it can be done where regulations are promulgated. It is clear, however, that in practice that is impossible. What we visualize here is that when steps have to be taken for the prevention or suppression of disorder, or even when steps have to be taken during war-time, the rights which are being given in Clause 18, will be needed. There will be cases where fighting will take place in the street and where an officer or an official should have the right to order people to clear out of the street. In that case no regulations are promulgated and I cannot see how in practice regulations can be laid on the Table of the House. It may well be that certain individuals will have to be removed for their own safety, and then the orders given to each person—and there will be a great many—would have to be laid on the Table. I really cannot see how this is possible in practice. This right to determine the place to which the public should go is one which will only be taken for a very short period. Let us assume that in war-time or in times of very serious disturbances—as in the case of the example I mentioned in my second reading speech—something happens on the East Rand and people have to be removed from that area to another area where they can be offered safety and where they can be protected and accommodated, it must be clear that it should be possible to exercise that right on more than one occasion during a given period. My question now is whether it would be possible in practice in those circumstances to lay the orders in that connection on the Table of the House?

Mr. Chairman, what does one actually achieve by Tabling these orders? The only thing that can be achieved is that if the majority of the members of the House decide that the regulations promulgated by the Governor-General are wrong, the regulations will lapse and all future action will fall away, but it will not undo what has been done already.

Are we never allowed to use that procedure then?

My argument is this: This House does get various opportunities during the next session of Parliament to discuss the Minister’s activities. In the debate on the motion of no-confidence, in the Budget debate and on the Minister’s Vote, his action under the powers granted to him in this clause can be fully discussed, just as fully as it can be discussed when those regulations are laid on the Table. It does seem to me that the powers given under this clause will often be used to cone with minor incidents. When there is trouble on a really big scale a state of emergency will be proclaimed and the regulations which are framed for that purpose will be Tabled. But it is here that we want to use these powers to prevent trouble that may occur and also, of course, when there is actual trouble. We may want to remove people from an area and if there is really unrest on a large scale, when there is actual fighting, when there is street fighting, then the exercise of these rights will be practically an every-day occurrence. We are very fortunate in this country because for 60 years we have had no war on our own soil. But as realists we must prepare for the possibility that we may be engaged in warfare on our own soil in the future. We would then be in a state of war in our own country. Heaven forbid that that should take place, but that is a possibility. In those circumstances, when we start fighting in the streets, I will imagine that the powers which are given in this clause to enable us to remove people will be used daily. It will then be impracticable to lay documents on the Table of the House.

If the Minister is given the right to use those powers in war-time and in times of disorder, and he actually uses them, it will not serve much purpose to come along afterwards and to Table the orders that were issued. I really cannot see of what value it would be. I can understand that if we were mean enough to say that a certain type of voter would not be allowed in Green Point tomorrow—just to mention an example—or that a certain type of citizen should be removed from his area, it would be practicable to Table such a document. But that is not what is intended here. In any case that would be a very minor exercise of this right. What we are really asking for here is the right to remove people from an area in times of emergency or times of sudden action. If we do become involved in a war or in serious internal disorder, this power will have to be used frequently, particularly when there is fighting in the densely populated areas. If these powers are then used there under such circumstances I really cannot see that the amendment, which has been moved in good faith by the hon. member for Simonstown, is capable of practical implementation, Mr. Chairman, a law which cannot be carried out is one in which I have very little faith; it is no law. If we accept the hon. member’s amendment, I can visualize that it will not be capable of implementation in certain circumstances, and it is because it will not be practicable, that I appeal to this Committee not to insist on it.

I have listened with great interest to the reply that the hon. the Minister has given on the amendment moved by the hon. member for Simonstown (Mr. Gay), and I wonder whether I could assist the hon. the Minister. He was not here at the time when this Act was reviewed and enacted in 1957. The hon. the Minister will recall that there was a Select Committee that sat for a very long time on the Bill, and this particular provision was carefully considered. If my memory serves me correctly the inclusion of subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 103, which gives the Governor-General the right to promulgate emergency regulations, came about by general agreement between all members on that Committee, and those provisions were passed by this hon. House without any comment at the time. But the reason for the inclusion is that it was felt on all sides that in spite of the wide powers given to the Governor-General and to the Government in time of war, those powers must still be subject to this Parliament as the highest law making body in the land and that the people’s representative should have the right, if they considered that the regulations promulgated were not to the advantage of the citizens of the country, to voice their objections to those regulations. When the hon. the Minister says that that is not practical, may I draw his attention to the first clause in this section.

But you still have the opportunity under the procedure of the House to raise the matter.

It is more than that, it is a gesture to the public indicating that there is no form of dictatorship. Everything that is done can then be brought to the attention of the public after being placed on the Table of the House and the public representatives have the right of criticizing what has been done in terms of those regulations. The second argument of the Minister is that it is impracticable. Now that was very carefully considered as well, because it was argued that if you have to promulgate regulations, how can a war be conducted, because there must be no delay. It warrants immediate action. The first paragraph of the clause says that in time of war the Governor-General may, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (6) by proclamation in the Gazette make such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for providing for the defence of the Union. Now I think the Minister will agree that a time of war is even a greater emergency than a time of internal disorder. The paragraph goes on to refer to the defence of the Union, the safety of the public, the maintenance of public order and the effective prosecution of the war, and then these are the governing words: “and for making adequate provision for dealing with circumstances which in his opinion have arisen as the result of such war”. And in the second paragraph it goes on to say what powers the Governor-General may exercise. The Minister’s own law advisers must have considered this, because in this clause it says that these powers of evacuation or assembly are not exercised directly by the Minister but by the military authorities by order made known in such manner as he may deem sufficient in the circumstances. Those are also the words used in Section 103. Surely the Minister does not envisage that these powers in the Bill will only be exercised by him immediately a state of disorder breaks out. Regulations will have to be promulgated for this provision as they are promulgated for any other provision of the Defence Act. So whilst we support this provision and see the necessity for it, this is a gap in the Defence Act, and I think in all fairness, where all the powers in the Defence Act of 1957 are subject to the will of this House by having the regulations or orders laid upon the Table, I do not think that when such wide powers are being taken here, this exception should be made, and I hope the Minister will see his way clear to accept the amendment.

I think it is necessary to examine a little more closely the powers, authorities and restrictions provided for in Section 103 of the original Act, and those we now have in this amemdment. The Minister has made the point that it is impracticable to carry out our suggestion. The powers that the Minister is asking for now, compared with the wider powers given to the Governor-General by Section 103, are very small and restricted. The Dowers that the Governor-General has to exercise are tremendously wide. The Dower the Minister is asking for is to control certain individuals or classes of people so that they can be called upon to evacuate, assemble, or go to certain particular areas. We are not contemplating for one moment that every order given by an officer of the police in clearing a crowd out of Adderley Street, is an order given by a Minister in this sense. The Minister, in the place of the Governor-General, issues a general order under which all the junior officers operate, and we want to know what authority the Minister has given them to act. Section 103 (2) gives you the general picture. It says the Governor-General is authorized to make regulations, etc., and then there is a long list of. powers. Those powers are far in excess of what we are now giving to the Minister, and yet the Governor-General has to table those regulations. We have been told that opportunities are afforded under the Votes and various other debates in the House to review the policy of the Minister. that may be so, but this is the traditional method of parliamentary control where we delegate authority to a Minister. The Minister in this particular clause is asking for a most important authority to be delegated to him, not in time of war or emergency, but at a time preceding an emergency, when he anticipates that it might be possible to stop disorder developing. We feel that it is far more important there that this parliamentary control should be exercised by the Minister tabling such orders as he has generally issued and which in terms of the original Act will approximate to what would be the regulations issued by the Governor-General. That is all we ask and it seems a fair thing to ask the Minister. We are going a long way in the interests of national security to support the Minister’s requests for the extension of its powers, and the Minister himself has gone a good way to meet some of the objections by the limitation of four days he placed on the measure. Naturally we assume that four days will mean four days and not successive periods of four days, but that is another matter. But the Minister has gone quite a long way to meet us and we appreciate it. We are endeavouring as a responsible Opposition to put legislation on the Statute Book which will help the Government to preserve law and order. However, there is a limit to which we can go and we feel that we have reached that limit unless we can get customary parliamentary control, which may not be of much value in stopping things happening but certainly act as a brake, when people know that they have to answer for what they have done; because it can be criticized in Parliament. I repeat that the Minister’s amendment goes a long way to meet the situation and we are prepared to accept this amendment. But even with that amendment we are unable to accept the measure without the further safeguard of parliamentary control which is embodied in our amendment. That is the maximum that we could be expected to accept. That is as far as we are prepared to go and I ask the Minister to reconsider it. I realize that there are difficulties. The difficulties arise out of the very difficult decision which the Minister has asked the House to make in extending these powers to him, but they are not insurmountable difficulties. We do not expect all the minnows to be caught in the net, but you certainly expect the big fish to be there when the matter is put on the Table. We do not expect a junior officer’s order to a platoon to be tabled, but the overriding orders issued by the Minister under which the police or the defence organization acts must be tabled.

With the permission of the Committee, I want to ask that this clause stand over until a later occasion in order to give me the opportunity to go into the matter thoroughly. I move—

Before doing that, may I make one point which may help the Minister. It seems to me that the difficulty the Minister has in regard to this clause is that there is no provision in Section 103bis analogous to the provision in Section 103 itself in relation to the making of regulations. Section 103bis is an entirely new clause and cannot be related to Section 103, except by a direct reference. The amendment of the hon. member for Simonstown says that the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 103 shall apply to this new Section 103bis. But Section 103 relates to the Governor-General making regulations in wartime for the safety of the public and various other matters relating to the conduct of the war. Sub-sections (4) and (5) lay down the safeguards, namely that any regulation made in terms of that power should be laid on the Table of the House within a certain time …

Order! The hon. member wanted to make a point and bring it to the notice of the Minister, but now he is making a speech.

The point I have attempted to make is that there are regulations which the Governor-General can make under Section 103 and which have to be tabled. The amendment of the hon. member for Simonstown says that the order should be tabled. The difficulty which the hon. member himself has conceded is that the orders may not be written orders.

It is the same under Section 103.

I have no doubt it is, but there is nothing in Section 103 (4) and (5) which refers to the laying of orders on the Table.

Order! There is a motion before the Committee that this clause stand over. The hon. member must come to the point he wishes to make.

What I was going to point out is that the difficulty of the Minister in accepting the motion at present is that orders may be verbal and you cannot Table a verbal order. You cannot lay the Minister on the Table! It seems to me that if there is to be any change the whole framework of the clause must be changed.

Motion that the further consideration of the clause stand over, put and agreed to.

On Clause 25,

I wish to move a small amendment which I am sure the Minister will accept—

This clause is an indemnity clause against the Minister’s Department in the event of any injury occurring to someone who has been assisted in terms of the provisions of sub-sections (a), (b) and (c) of Clause 5 which the Committee has already accepted. The Minister has conceded the principle when he accepted a similar amendment in Clause 10 on the basis of the argument presented by the hon. member for Simonstown that it would be extremely difficult for a private person, if he sustained an injury, to prove that it was wilfully done by any member of the Minister’s Department. Let me put it this way. There is a mercy flight and the person who is assisted is unconscious and through negligence on the part of a member of the Minister’s Department he sustains further injury. The Department is indemnified because the unconscious person could not sign the indemnity form. But in the event that there was negligence by a member of the Minister’s Department, how can this person prove it? Look at the extremely difficult position he would be in when trying to prove that there was wilful negligence. I ask the Minister to accept this amendment because whilst the Department is getting complete indemnity, at least the Minister should give the members of the public an opportunity also of protecting themselves.

What is the difference between negligence and wilful negligence?

I am not prepared to argue the legal aspect. It says that the State shall not be liable except in the case of any wilful act. My amendment will read “any wilful act or negligence”. It is easy to prove negligence, but very difficult to prove that it is a wilful act, and I ask the Minister to accept the amendment. If the Minister wants to consult with his Department again, I would suggest that this clause stand over.

No. I am afraid that it is very unreasonable to ask me to let a matter on which I have complete clarity stand over. As far as I am concerned, this is a service rendered by the State on request. How can the State be held responsible for accidents or damages sustained when it was requested to perform those services? As the position is at present, the parent or guardian or the husband or the wife has to sign an indemnity form. In any case no claim can be made against the Government. Now we want to eliminate this hindrance, because the father cannot sign for the child alone; the mother must also sign, or vice versa. Now the law advisers say that in regard to these indemnity forms which have to be signed, many other legal difficulties can arise, that the people who have to sign these forms cannot always be found, and therefore it is much better to amend the Act in such a way that where the State is requested to render these services it should be totally indemnified. But of course if the man commits murder along the way, that is something quite different and therefore we say “wilful act”, but otherwise the State is not responsible for any damage suffered. I cannot accept this amendment. The State is rendering a service which it is requested to render in order to assist the public, and often this service is rendered under very difficult circumstances. If a mercy flight has to be undertaken to take a sick patient to hospital for an emergency operation, it may be possible that the pilot will take a chance in landing even if there is thick mist, but he does so for the sake of the patient, and if something happens the State is responsible, and for that reason the State must be indemnified, and I cannot agree to accept this amendment. I cannot expose the State to the danger of being held responsible if something goes wrong when it renders a service to the public.

I want to take one more opportunity of dealing with the Minister’s argument, in the hope that he will accept my amendment. The Minister says that if an emergency landing has to be done under misty conditions and an accident occurs, the State would be liable. In my view it would not, because you would have to prove that it was a negligent decision on the part of the pilot to land in mist. But we are dealing with principles here. The Minister has conceded the principle already in Clause 10, because he was prepared to concede that in the protection of military property where fences and other restrictions to the public are set up it was possible that there could be negligence on the part of a member of the Defence Force in putting up sufficient warning notices as the result of which the public might suffer. But let me use the Minister’s own argument. Could any member of the public have a claim against the Minister for the reason that around a particular defence property properly protected by fences on a misty night there were no warning lights put up 100 yards away from the fence and in the mist I walked into the fence and I claim damages. It is the same principle. The Minister accepted the principle in Clause 10 that negligence may occur. If there was bombing practice going on at night and a member of the public walked on to the property in the mist when there was no warning light, would that be negligence on the part of the commanding officer? You see, Sir, you can carry that type of argument a long way.

Yes, I can see that.

I submit to the Minister that it is not a question of holding his Department responsible, but a case of what the citizen can prove in law, and the Minister will concede that it is very difficult to prove wilful negligence, but it is a different matter to prove negligence. In any case, if the State is prepared to even take the step of making its facilities available to assist the public, it must also assume responsibility for its officials, and one of the things its officials can be guilty of is negligence.

May I ask how you will define “negligence”?

Surely it is for the courts to decide on the facts. This seems to be a high-handed step and I appeal to the Minister again.

How can it be a high-handed step?

It seems to be an insincere effort. The public previously had a claim on their indemnity forms. The man could prove negligence, but now he has to prove wilfulness, and that makes an impossible situation. The result will be that there is a hesitancy on the part of the public to ask for these services because they have no protection. If the Minister is prepared to give the public protection in respect of defence property, let him give them protection also in respect of the services he renders.

I do not want to deprive the hon. member of the opportunity of voting against the Government this afternoon, but I just want to point out that this is something quite different from the other instance where I accepted the amendment. That dealt with the case where the State does certain things or takes certain action on its own. Here it is not a question of the State taking certain action of its own accord, but here it is rendering certain services on request. The hon. member said that, as the position is at present, the public has the right to claim damages if there was negligence. Here I have the indemnity form which these people sign, and it reads as follows—

That is the indemnity which people sign now when they request us to render these services. But because it is a hindrance we simply want to embody it in the legislation that there is no such claim which people voluntarily have to sign away, and that will save these people all this trouble. They are not always available. Therefore I do not admit that the position is parallel with the previous clause where I accepted the amendment. I regret that I cannot accept this amendment.

I wonder if the hon. the Minister would just clear up one point. He referred to it several times and I think correctly so, that this particular clause deals in the main with people who have asked the Defence Force to be allowed as a favour to utilize some form of their transport. I refer to what we usually refer to as mercy journeys. I want to ask the Minister just to clear up this point because I think it has a bearing on the argument which he has put up. Does this limitation of the right of redress only apply in the case of people who themselves ask for transport facilities—in the case of mercy flights? I want to use this example: The use of the transport resources of the Defence Department has grown to a tremendous extent owing to the development of the Union and the natural hazards that we experience in this country. I refer, for instance, to the North-Western and Namaqualand drought where the mobile units of the Defence Force have played a most valuable part in assisting farmers in the drought-stricken areas by moving animals from one area to another. Now, to move a flock of 300 or 400 sheep you have convoys of military vehicles. The animals are placed in these vehicles. It may be argued that the farmer himself has asked for that assistance. Probably an employee of the farmer will have to travel on the lorry with the livestock. In the course of the journey, due to the neglect of the driver, there is a bad smash and the farmer himself suffers a very serious loss of stock, or there may even be loss of life; his employees may be killed. Are those people included in this indemnity exemption or do they fall outside the category of people that you are dealing with here? Would they also be regarded as people who have applied for that assistance and who would therefore have no claim against the State, or would the ordinary principle of common law apply in a case like that? In other words, would the person, if he is able to prove negligence, be able to recover damages in a court of law? Even if this is rigidly applied to people who come along and ask for assistance, even that is going a long way, because you may get the sort of case where a man’s wife or a member of his family is suddenly stricken down with illness 100 miles from the nearest hospital. There is no transport available and the obvious thing to do is to fly, and the only way in which that person can get an aircraft is to apply for assistance to the Defence Force. It does seem tough, where a man is driven by force of circumstances to accept help from the State, of which he is a citizen, that he should then be debarred from instituting any action for damages in the case of an accident. I think it might help if the Minister would make those two points clear.

Mr. Chairman, I do think that the type of people mentioned by the hon. member would also be included in this. After all, it is at their request that the military authorities assist them and we are not a transport company. We give a specific service, because we are requested to do so under certain circumstances. The hon. member referred to the question of moving livestock. I feel that if livestock is moved on a military vehicle and the farmer chooses to go with the livestock or to send an employee of his along, they should sign a declaration of this type. That should always have been done, because that truck which is there for the removal of stock was never meant for the conveyance of human beings, and if the farmer chose to accompany his livestock he should always have been required to sign a declaration of this type. He would have no right to put in a claim against the Government in case of an accident because in a case of that nature the Defence Department comes to his aid at his own request; it is in the nature of mercy help. I cannot accept the proposition that the Government must be held responsible in the type of case referred to by the hon. member for Simonstown.

We on this side of the House completely disagree with that view. In the case of a national disaster of the magnitude which this country does experience unfortunately through floods and droughts—we have had many examples of this in the last year or two—the only organization in the country capable of giving the necessary assistance to the stricken farmers in time is the Government, and the only organizations which the Government can use are the Railways on the one hand and the Defence Department on the other. This is not a case of an individual just asking for help by his own whim and fancy; he asks for assistance in order to survive. After all, the farmer produces products without which the people of this country cannot survive, and these droughts and floods come along through no fault of his own— they are an act of God in such case it is the responsibility of the Government to assist the citizens of this country, and when in a case like that it is necessary to remove livestock literally by the thousands, then the hon. the Minister’s argument about the farmer or his employee who he stated should not accompany the livestock, falls away. It is impossible to move livestock on such a scale without placing those animals in the care of people who are accustomed to handling them. I am afraid we on this side cannot agree to the proposition that in cases of this nature the people concerned should have no right to claim compensation in the event of some accident due to the negligence of military authorities.

Tellers: N. G. Eaton and A. Hopewell.

Tellers: W. H. Faurie and J. J. Fouché.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to.

Remaining clauses put and agreed to.

The Committee reverted to clause standing over.

I move—

Agreed to.