Mr. Speaker, with the leave of the House, I would like to make a personal explanation.

In the debate on Vote No. 41, Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, on 2 May 1961, I said that one of the Natal daily newspapers prominently published the allegation that the S.A.B.C. had kept silent about the so-called National Convention in Natal. On this point in the debate I mistakenly referred to the Natal Mercury, whereas, in fact, I meant the Natal Witness.

I do not want a paper to be blamed which was not at fault, and I, therefore, want to express my regret for having, by a slip of the tongue, referred to the Natal Mercury.

I move—

Hon. members will recall that last year this Bill was introduced into this House, but it was one of those that fell by the wayside! It is now being introduced again. The necessity for this Bill arises primarily from the accepted policy of consolidating and translating into Afrikaans all pre-1925 Union legislation.

When the High Commissioner’s Act, 1911, came up for consideration in pursuance of that policy, it was realized that the need for the perpetuation of its provisions has, to a large extent, fallen away, due to the fact that the Act principally consists of provisions relating to the appointment, remuneration, tenure of office, etc., of the High Commissioner and the staff for his office, the necessity for which provisions has lapsed owing to the introduction, subsequent to the enactment of this particular Act, of comprehensive legislation dealing with the Public Service of the Union, culminating in the Public Service Act of 1957. There is, however, now a further necessity for the repeal of the Act occasioned by virtue of the fact that the Union will no longer be a member of the Commonwealth of Nations after 31 May next, after which date the designation of the Union’s heads of missions in Commonwealth countries will have to be changed.

Except for those provisions relating to locally recruited staff (that is, staff recruited in the United Kingdom), the staff provisions of the High Commissioner’s Act have thus become redundant. For example, although the Union has heads of missions accredited to various other countries besides the United Kingdom, no special legislation governs these appointments, nor is any necessary, because they are all made in terms of the Public Service Act. The same applies to all appointments of other staff to posts in the offices of our other overseas missions. In fact, with the present exception of the London mission, all appointments to the Union’s diplomatic missions abroad, including appointments to heads of missions, are made in terms of Public Service Act.

Although this is so, the High Commissioner’s Act cannot be scrapped entirely, because, unlike the Union’s other missions abroad, there is a large body of locally recruited staff employed in London which has acquired certain vested rights in regard to pensions and other matters. This local staff consists of some 225 persons employed mainly in the administrative, accounting and stores and shipping branches of the London office; others again are employed to meet the clerical requirements in London of the Railway Administration and of various State Departments such as External Affairs, Defence, Commerce and Industries, Customs, etc. Irrespective of the Department or administration on whose behalf they are employed, the salaries of the locally recruited staff are all borne by the Treasury, and they have always been appointed under the direction of the Minister of Finance. Although the existing Act does not require this, the conditions of service of the locally recruited staff are determined after consultation with the Public Service Commission. As far as the locally recruited staff are concerned, therefore, it is necessary to preserve the status quo, which is the principal object of this Bill. As I have mentioned, the need for the re-enactment of a number of provisions of the existing Act falls away.

These provisions are, firstly, Sections 1, 2, 3, 3 bis and 4, which deal with the following matters relating to the High Commissioner himself—

Section 1: Appointment and functions;

Section 2: Tenure of office;

Section 3: Salary and allowances;

Section 3 bis: Excludes from the operation of Sections 2 and 3 an officer of the Public Service who is appointed to the post;

Section 4: Holder of office is not to engage in any other employment.

Now these are all matters which can conveniently be dealt with in terms of the Public Service Act and are, in fact, so dealt with when all other appointments to posts of heads of missions are made. When the High Commissioner’s Act is repealed, therefore, all that will be necessary will be for the Public Service Commission to create, in terms of the Public Service Act, a post of head of mission in the United Kingdom on the fixed establishment of the Public Service. Thereafter, the filling of the post will be done in accordance with the normal Public Service routine in these matters, whether the appointee is a public servant or a person from outside appointed on contract.

Of course, the repeal of Sections 1 to 4 of the existing Act will not in any way affect the conditions of appointment of the present head of the London mission, who was appointed on contract. His position is fully safeguarded by the provisions of Section 12 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1957. A further provision of the existing law which need not be reenacted is sub-section (1) of Section 5. This sub-section deals with the appointment to the London office of permanent public servants; that is, persons from the Union Public Service, and provides that the Governor-General may make such appointments. Here again, the existing provision is archaic, having regard to the fact that all the posts which these people occupy are posts on the fixed establishment of the Public Service and, therefore, fall to be dealt with by the Public Service Commission in the normal way. Here again it must be remembered that this provision was inserted at a time when there was no Union Act specifically governing the Public Service, and has outlived its usefulness.

The remaining provisions of the existing Act are sub-section (2) of Section 5 and Section 6. Section 6 is merely a matter of defining certain expressions which occur in pre-Union legislation, like “Agents-General” and so forth, and is being retained as Clause 2 of the Bill. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 deals with the appointment of locally recruited staff, a matter which I have already expounded. This is being re-enacted as Clause 1 of the Bill, which provides that I, as Minister of Finance, shall be responsible for all such appointments, subject to the laws governing the Public Service, and may delegate my powers in this connection. Here I may say that there is no intention to deviate from the present practice whereby the actual day-to-day appointments are made under delegated authority by either the head of mission himself or his chief administrative officer. Furthermore, the practice will be continued, as in the past, of determining the service conditions of the general body of locally recruited staff in consultation with the Public Service Commission. These service conditions are, generally speaking, those applicable to the Union Public Service, but adapted to take into account local practice.

I come now to Clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill, the objects of which are to perpetuate certain rights in regard to retirement and benefits which are enjoyed by the locally recruited staff in London. Here I should explain that in 1936 it was decided to grant the locally recruited staff the option of becoming members of the Union Pension Fund. At the same time, membership of the fund was made compulsory for all future recruits who satisfied the prescribed conditions for membership. Clause 4 again, which is purely consequential, deals with the position of those locally recruited persons who, in 1936, decided not to excise the option of becoming members of the Pension Fund. In their case, it was provided that the age of retirement applicable to members of the fund would apply to them also, and that, upon retirement, they would be entitled to a gratuity. The relative provisions are now contained in Section 61 (4) of the Government Service Pension Act, 1955, and to protect the rights of those individuals, that section must be amended to incorporate a reference to this Bill, which is the sole object of Clause 4.

Clause 5 deals with the laws repealed, and Clause 6 gives the short title, and provides that this measure shall come into operation on a date to be fixed. The latter provision is merely to ensure that the administrative details arising from the Bill are worked out before the new measure becomes law.

This Bill has been before the House for well over a year, as the hon. the Minister has pointed out. When it was originally introduced it was designed—again as the hon. the Minister has pointed out —primarily to safeguard and regularize the position of the 200-odd locally recruited staff in South Africa House, and we had no objection to it. The hon. the Minister has pointed out that events since then have made it necessary to repeal the Act, principally because there will be no High Commissioner in future. That, of course, is unanswerable. But it does lead to various other questions which I do not, however, propose to deal with this afternoon. I simply want to say that, in terms of this Bill as we have had it before us for the last 18 months, we have no objection to it.

Motion put and agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

I move—

Mr. Speaker, we deem it necessary to pass this partly temporary measure in order to cope with possible disturbances of law and order. The Government, as always, is going ahead calmly but with determination to ensure and to maintain law and order in South Africa. There is no reason whatsoever, therefore, to be alarmed. But we must consider the fact that we are living in a new era, an era in which many Western countries find that former measures are no longer effective in maintaining law and order. This Bill must be seen against that background. I shall return to that aspect at a later stage.

Generally, the whole world is going through a turbulent period. It is not necessary for me to emphasize that. There are few countries to-day that do not experience unrest or where unrest does not threaten in some form or other. In Africa, even close to our borders, disturbances and violence are definitely assuming widespread proportions. The Black man in Africa has set himself a gaol, with outside assistance he wants to push the White man back, and drive him out step by step. He makes no secret about it. Unfortunately there are White people in Africa who are pleased at this drastic turn of events. Against that, fortunately, there is a large majority of Whites who will fight this tendency right to the bitter end with all the power at their command. Those who believe, therefore, that South Africa, unlike other countries, will be free of unrest and violence if it only had a Government which would be willing to accede to the demands of the Black man step by step, and who hope that in that case the White man will be able to remain here, live in an imaginary world; they live in a land of make-believe. Mr. Speaker, we in South Africa should not deceive ourselves. It is the objective of communist-controlled subversive Bantu and other elements in Africa ultimately to gain control of the Government.

Whereas the continued maintenance of law and order is the motto of the Government, all subversive elements, every one of them, are being watched strictly, particularly in these days. Consequently, Ministers of Justice have, from time to time in the past, placed General Law Amendment Bills before this House. Usually such legislation covers a wide field which leads to the amendment of various Acts. The measure before us to-day differs from previous measures of a like nature, in that it envisages the amendment of only three Acts and in that contains only nine clauses.

As the Long Title indicates the Arms and Ammunitions Act of 1937 is being amended. That Act provides that anybody who wishes to import or export a weapon or ammunition into or out of South Africa, has to obtain a permit from a magistrate. This also applies to arms and ammunition merchants, except that in the case of cartridges for shotguns and rimfire cartridges of a .22 calibre and less they need not have import or export permits. It has once again become necessary to exercise stricter control over the importation and exportation of all types of ammunition. That is why the exemption which traders have hitherto enjoyed is now withdrawn in this Bill. New regulations which envisage stricted control have already been drafted and will shortly come into operation.

To come to another matter, as hon. members know, there was a general registration of all firearms in 1937. Since then many of the weapons which were registered at that time and thereafter, have been lost or disposed of in some way or other. It is essential, in the interests of public safety, for the Government to know how many weapons there are in the hands of members of the public. That is why this Bill provides for the renewal of licences, which will, however, only take place from a date deemed necessary by the Government and within such a period as may be determined by proclamation.

The Bill also envisages an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 which deals with the granting of bail. The granting of bail lies in the discretion of the courts. When application for bail is made the Attorney-General or his representative has the right to object to the granting of such an application. But he has to submit his reasons for his objection to the court. That does not mean that the court will refuse the application. The court’s attitude, as far as bail is concerned, is that the only thing the accused has to do is to show that circumstances are not such that he is likely to leave the country or interfere in some other way with the administration of justice. In Prentice Hall (H/196) we find the judgment of Judge Henochsberg in the case of Rex v. Limbada and Others, 1955 (2). The judgment reads—

But, apart from the function of the court to administer the law justly, the freedom of the individual has to be protected as well. In the case of Lobel and Another v. Classen, N.O., 1956 (1) S.A. (page 532), we have the judgment of Judge Ramsbottom. The details of the case are immaterial. Application for bail was made and I want to refer to the finding. The finding was—

That is the attitude of the courts. We live in a time, however, when it often happens that people are arrested for having acted in a manner which was dangerous to or which could have endangered the safety of the public or the maintenance of public safety. To-day such people are entitled to be released on bail shortly after their arrest—at the most 48 hours —unless the Crown can prove that the accused is likely to abscond or that he will interfere with the administration of justice. The fact that his detention is in the interests of public safety is insufficient reason to refuse bail according to court findings. We have the judgment in the case of Rex v. Shaw of 1922, T.P.D. (page 203). That judgment was given by Judge-President Wessels and Judge Mason. The Judges came to a unanimous finding and I want to quote the crux of it—

These findings clearly indicate that the courts should be placed under restraint. In other words, such a person can be arrested for having committed a crime that has endangered the safety of the public or of the Government and the maintenance of public order; he may be released on bail shortly afterwards and immediately continue with his activities or leave the country. That is why we are now amending the Criminal Procedure Act and giving the Attorney-General the right, where he thinks it is in the interests of public safety and in the interests of the maintenance of public order, to issue an order that such a person should not be released on bail or released otherwise within 12 days of his arrest. If such an order is issued the courts will not have the right to release such a person.

And if such a person is acquitted?

This deals only with the question of bail. If the court discharges him immediately that is a totally different matter.

The Bill is not clear on this point.

It is very clear. The Attorney-General or his representative requests that bail be refused and on the strength of the evidence adduced by the accused it is either refused or granted. The Attorney-General may, however, withdraw his order at any time before the expiration of the 12-day period. In that case the ordinary legal provisions as to release apply. If this provision is passed it will lapse on 1 July 1962 and the Senate and the House of Assembly may thereafter extend it from time to time.

Not only is it unrealistic in times of great unrest to expect the police and the Attorney General to formulate and to submit the charges to the court within 48 hours in the case of every person that is arrested in the interests of the public safety and order, but it is also disquieting in these days.

I now want to deal with trial by jury. As the position is at the moment the Minister of Justice may, in terms of Section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Act, order a person who is charged in a Supreme Court with certain crimes to be tried by a Judge without a jury, in spite of the fact that such a person has elected to be tried by a jury. These crimes include the following: (a) contravention of certain of the provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956; (b) contravention of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948; (c) certain contraventions under the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950; (d) contraventions connected with illicit trade in precious metals or precious stones and supplying liquor to Bantu or Coloured persons; (e) contraventions connected with insolvency; (f) contraventions where certain facts have to be considered by experts in order to understand them properly; (g) offences committed against non-Whites where the accused is a White person, and vice versa. What we have in mind now is that where a person is charged with murder or arson or attempted murder or arson, the Minister may order a trial without a jury. Mr. Speaker, I do not intend going into the merits and demerits of trial by jury to-day. This matter has often been discussed in this House and in the Other Place in the past. As you know, there are often cases where a large number of persons are charged, cases which are very complicated particularly to the layman. We had an example of that in the Bergville murder trial which took place a year ago and the Sukukuniland murder trial of about two years ago. In those cases the accused elected not to be tried by jury, but they might just as well have elected to be tried by jury. Trials of this nature last a long time from the nature of things. It is undesirable to take private people away from their normal life to serve as members of a jury for long periods. As a result of the riots in Pondoland a number of serious cases are still awaiting trial. The charges are murder and arson and in some cases 30 and more people are being charged. It does not follow automatically, of course, that if the contemplated amendment is accepted every case of murder or arson will be tried without a jury in future. On the contrary the Minister considers every case on its merits in the light of a detailed and reasoned report by the Attorney-General concerned.

The third Act which is being amended by this Bill is the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956. It is a punishable offence under the Act to attend a public meeting that has been banned and to address such meeting, or to hold a meeting that has been banned. It is also an offence to-day to print and distribute notices convening a meeting or to publicize it after such a meeting has been banned. It is found in practice that although such public meetings are banned in terms of the law, some agitators encourage people to attend such meetings or even threaten them to attend them. After such a meeting has been banned, there are some who go out of their way to advertise it or to give publicity to it in some other way. We think it is in the interests of public safety and the maintenance of public order that actions such as those are curbed, and that is what this amendment aims at. To-day the maximum sentence that can be imposed in respect of the actions to which I have just referred, is very small. It is three months’ imprisonment for the first offence and in the case of a second offence the maximum penalty is six months. We contemplate increasing this period to 12 months for the first offence and to two years for the second offence, without the option of a fine. As the position is to-day it is only a policy officer with the rank of inspector or captain or higher who has the right to order people attending a banned meeting to disband but in practice it is not always possible to have an officer of that rank present at such meetings, and the rank is now being altered to that of head constable and higher. Anybody who fails to leave a meeting that has been banned or a riotous assembly when he has been ordered to do so, is guilty of an offence. The prescribed maximum penalty is R50 or three months’ imprisonment to-day. It is not necessary for me to say that this penalty is wholly inadequate. It is now being increased to R400 or one year.

In conclusion, we intend amending the Riotous Assemblies Act the object being to take effective steps against people who intimidate others. Intimidation has assumed ghastly proportions in South Africa. In 1953 Parliament increased the penalty for intimidation to a fine of £500 or five years’ imprisonment or ten lashes plus the five years. Section 10 of the Act, however, prohibits intimidation or interference with persons, their family or dependants only in so far as it concerns performance of duty. Last year when we had the trouble here, there was intimidation in various forms. It was not confined to performance of duty. Even people who wanted to make legitimate purchases on the market or in the shops were told or made to understand that their homes would be burnt down or their throats cut. Intimidation has become a ghastly practice in South Africa. The Government has decided to take firm action against this sort of action in our well-ordered society. I trust that the courts will not be afraid to impose these higher penalties for intimidation. The law-abiding citizen must feel that the laws of the land protect him at all times and that the person who indulges in intimidation will be heavily punished. That is why the provisions of the existing section are being extended so as to include not only intimidation where duties are performed in the course of employment but intimidation where a lawful action is performed. Furthermore the onus is now being placed on the accused to prove that he was justified in doing what he did and that his action was unconnected with similar action on the part of other persons to attain a specific objective. I said at the outset of my speech that I would return to the broad background against which this proposed measure should be seen.

The police already know sufficiently about the pattern which the inciters follow over the whole country so as to sow unrest, with the result that nothing will be left to chance. You can often tell by the leaves in which direction the wind is blowing. I do not wish to detain the House very long but I do wish to draw the attention of hon. members to certain things that these people say just to give an indication of what is happening.

Last month a fairly big meeting of 400 Bantu women was held in Durban on the occasion of Africa Day. One woman speaker said—

Another speaker said—

On 25 and 26 March a conference was held at Pietermaritzburg called the All-In African Conference. They appointed a National Action Committee. I wish to deal with two aspects. I think it is necessary that the verbatim resolutions passed at Pietermaritzburg go on record. The Press merely published certain extracts, but it is just as well that we know what they resolved and to know what the National Action Committee which was appointed on that day, have done since. I just want to read the resolution—

These resolutions which I have read out were roneoed in the form of pamphlets and they are being widely distributed throughout South Africa to-day. A few weeks ago that National Action Council met in Johannesburg and decided to hold country-wide demonstrations if the Government should refuse to call a multi-racial National Convention before 31 May. We know the pattern of those demonstrations in South Africa, and we know how easily they can lead to violence.

At a meeting on the Parade here in Cape Town a few weeks ago, a meeting which was attended by some 3,000 people of all races, one of the speakers appealed to the Coloured people to tighten their belts and to lay in supplies of food so that they will be prepared to join the Bantu in the nation-wide demonstrations that will take place in May. Another important speaker said—

We have information, however, that the final instructions in connection with the demonstrations to which I have referred will only be issued towards the end of May, during the last week prior to our becoming a republic. The organizers which include two members of the Executive Committee of the banned A.N.C., who are travelling round the country to-day hope that by doing that they will prevent the Government from taking precautionary measures timeously and that they will catch the police off-guard. A roneoed pamphlet in Xhosa is being distributed from East London warning the Bantu to be on their guard seeing that great things are fast developing. During the night of 24 April roneoed pamphlets were widely distributed throughout the Peninsula with the heading “Prepare for May”. Two nights later numerous pamphlets were distributed which inter alia announced the Pietermaritzburg resolution under the heading “Reject Verwoerd’s Republic. Prepare for action at the end of May”. Although the National Action Council keep their plans as secretive as possible and although they even talk about “peaceful and discipline demonstrations” towards the end of May, we have information that Bantu have been told to lay in supplies of food and to prepare themselves for nationwide strikes that must last for three days, from Monday, 29 May to Wednesday, 31 May. The object seems to be that the stay-at-home campaign should be conducted so effectively that it will paralyse the whole country. Pamphlets which were confiscated in Durban before they were distributed read—

According to information that we have obtained from the inner circles of the organization, we must not for one moment think that they will not resort to violence.

I am about to sit down, Sir, but there is another significant pamphlet—“Guides to Organizers” of the African National African Council and this was drafted by a prominent Bantu leader. It is at the moment being distributed throughout South Africa. It says, inter alia, what the organizers have to do—

I do not wish to bore the House. I have merely pointed out certain aspects of the background against this partly temporary measure that we have introduced must be seen, a measure that will be more effective than the existing measures to maintain law and order. I thought that this House and the public were entitled to have a few details which are probably not generally known. We do not wish to create the impression, however, that we are expecting a state of emergency. Existing legislation and the legislation proposed to-day will in all probability be adequate to enable us to maintain law and order; prevention is better than cure also in this case.

Hear, hear! That is the only wise thing you have said.

Judging from that interjection it seems that we can even depend on the co-operation of the Progressive Party if we continue to prevent instead of curing. Law-abiding non-Whites and other law-abiding citizens need have no fears. They know that the White man in South Africa treats them better than they are being treated in any other country in Africa. The police will protect them. The world knows that the Government of South Africa will not lightly allow the law and order for which our country is well known, to be disturbed. Those who incite, resort to violence and intimidate and those who assist them in any way whatsoever, through their organizations or activities, all those who wish to endanger the safety of the public in South Africa or who wish to disturb the public peace, all those who wish to attempt to paralyse the Republic of South Africa at its very birth by unlawful actions, must take notice timeously that their actions against the ordered society of this country will not go unpunished.

One has listened with great interest to the hon. the Minister of Justice giving the reasons for the legislation which he has introduced this afternoon. What I found the greatest difficulty in correlating are the state of affairs which he paints and the steps he asks for in the legislation now before us. He is in no way second to his predecessor who told us the same hair-raising stories about poisoned wells and things of that kind, as excuses for the legislation he introduced in this House from time to time. One would have thought that a Government which had made these amendments to the Riotous Assemblies Act which this Government introduced, and to the Suppression of Communism Act and the General Law Amendment Act of 1953 and the Public Safety Act of 1953 and which had the experience which this Government had last year, would have felt that it had sufficient power to deal with the situation with which it believes it is faced at present. Everyone in this House wants to see law and order maintained and wants to see a situation in South Africa in which it will be unnecessary to have legislation of this sort. The fundamental reason for the difficulties with which we are faced are the policies of this Government during the period they have been in power. Would there have been any necessity for legislation of this kind had there been a thoroughly satisfied and well-looked after Bantu population, both in the urban areas and in the reserves; would there have been any necessity for this sort of legislation had the law-abiding African been properly protected by the bobby on the beat which we have pleaded for for so long in this House? What possible chance would the agitator have had amongst the African population if there had been sensible, properly thought out policies applied to the Natives in the reserves during the past 13 years? But what have we had? A series of patchwork and a Government hopelessly incapable of dealing with the situation, a Government which is filled with fear from morning to night and is simply going ahead with one stop-gap after another to try to cope with the situation with which it is faced.

What about Swellendam?

I am sure that hon. member is one of those who went and preached fear and told the people down there how frightened they should be because the Government could not cope. I do not believe anybody could cope with the mess they have made. Of what possible use is this legislation to cope with the situation with which the Minister fears he may be faced on 31 May? This is legislation of a kind which gives inordinate powers to the Executive, interferes with the freedom of the subject, prevents the ordinary individual getting the protection of the courts, and in no way deals with the problems with which we are faced. Well, let us deal with this legislation and see what it is meant to cope with. First of all, there is the second clause which deals with the question of the registration of firearms. I do not think anyone has much objection to that. Then I would like to deal with Clause 5 which provides that in certain additional cases, murder and arson—most serious cases—the Minister can direct that they be dealt with by a Judge without a jury, at his discretion. One must, of course, bear in mind that under later legislation a Judge can in fact sit alone in dealing with cases of that kind, because the proviso to Section 109 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 has been done away with and that provided that in cases where the Minister has exercised his discretion and ordered trial by a Judge without a jury, the Judge must have two assessors. That has been done away with and the Minister can now direct that this matter be tried otherwise than by a jury and the Judge can sit alone in these two most important cases. The Minister will know, of course, that the Bar councils of South Africa have protested against any further limitations on trials by jury, and I think I am right in saying—I stand to be corrected—that the Advisory Committee was divided 50-50 on this question. And yet in these two most important types of cases the hon. the Minister lays down that he is to have the discretion to decide whether the accused may ask for a jury or not. Why? As long as we have known our law, there has been the right of the accused to choose to be tried by his peers; he has the right to ask for a jury. It has been limited in certain cases where it was feared that the jury might be influenced. Now we find ourselves in the position that the Minister may direct that in certain cases there will be no jury and that the Judge has the right to try the accused on his own. Sir, I cannot support legislation of that kind. I cannot understand what it has to do with the situation which the Minister envisages may be developing in South Africa.

I have explained what is happening in Pondoland.

Why is the hon. gentleman afraid of a jury?

Are the facts against you?

If he can make out a good case why is he afraid of a jury? You see, Sir, under the cloak of a situation which he sees developing, the hon. the Minister is trying to frighten this House into virtually doing away with jury trials in this country. I say that there is no cause for it and this side of the House certainly cannot support it, and I believe there will be very few lawyers on that side of the House who, when they search their hearts, will be prepared to support this legislation.

What is the good of a jury in any case?

Sir, what sort of a lawyer is that? Surely the one thing with which the ordinary citizen of South Africa has always been able to comfort himself, is the knowledge that if he were in real difficulty, then whether he had acted as a reasonable man or not would be judged by his peers, by people who had his own fears, his own doubts and his knowledge of the situation.

Then let us come back to Clause 4. Clause 4 provides that in certain circumstances the Attorney-General, if he considers it necessary in the interests of the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order, can issue an order that such person shall not be released on bail or otherwise before the expiration of a period of 12 days after the date of his arrest. “Shall not be released on bail or otherwise.” I put it to the Minister when he was talking: What happens if he is tried and acquitted in that period? The hon. gentleman said that the law was plain. Well, here is the law—

Why the “or otherwise”? The “or otherwise” is purely here in case the man is acquitted. Before he is finally acquitted or sentenced he can only be released on bail. The Minister knows it. Why then “or otherwise”? Is he taking power here to detain a man for 12 days after he has been acquitted, and why is he interfering with the discretion of the courts in respect of this matter? Why should he be doing so?

There may be an application to lengthen the period for the non-granting of bail.

I am sorry; I cannot follow that.

We are asking for 12 days now. After 12 days we may approach the court again to ask for an extension.

On what grounds?

That is another story.

I think the hon. the Minister has either said too much or too little now. He says that after 12 days he may again approach the court for a further extension. Am I to understand from that that after the accused has been held for 12 days the Attorney-General can again give a direction and that the accused can then be detained for a further 12 days?

I said that the Attorney-General can apply. That is in the court’s discretion.

Very well, let us deal first with the first 12 days. In the first 12 days the Minister says the court can only refuse bail if there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused may flee justice, or secondly that the accused may interfere with Crown witnesses. He says that he wants power where he believes that it is in the interests of the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order. Well, if it is in the interests of the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order, he knows very well that he can declare a state of emergency under sub-section (c) of Section 2 of the Public Safety Act of 1953. But if he wants this power, why does he not give it to the court? Why must it be handed to the Attorney-General? You see, then it would place the Attorney-General in this position that he would have to show the court that it was in the interests of public safety or the maintenance of public order, but here he has to show nobody; he issues an order. What worries me is this: We know very well that under recent legislation the Attorney-General has to take instructions from the Minister. There is a recent piece of legislation which lays down that every Attorney-General—

In other words, Sir, we are in the position that what the Minister is doing is that he is not just asking authority for an Attorney-General who he may say is an unprejudiced official connected with the Department of Justice, but he is asking that power for himself, Sir. He is asking that power for himself to direct when an accused will be allowed bail or not. I feel that is something which this side of the House cannot support because we feel that if a situation arises in which powers of that sort should be used, it is the duty of the Minister to declare a state of emergency and tell the country that he can no longer maintain law and order without special powers, and in a state of emergency he would have those powers. But it seems that what he is asking for now is to take powers of summary detention without declaring a state of emergency, and I believe that to take powers of that kind would be entirely unwarranted, except in a state of emergency. If there is an emergency the Government should declare a state of emergency and take the consequences, and if there were a state of emergency, then the powers for which the Minister is asking at this moment are entirely unnecessary unless the hon. the Minister is trying to create a dictatorial state of affairs which is quite foreign to this country.

What is the position with which we are faced now? In effect it is an abuse of the process of arrest, because once a man has been arrested he must be brought before the court within 48 hours and faced with a substantive charge, and the court then decides in its discretion whether he should be granted bail or not, and if the charge is serious enough then the Attorney-General has very good grounds for opposing the granting of bail. But, Sir, where are we now? Here we find that the Minister can direct that in certain circumstances bail must not be granted; that the Attorney-General can so direct, on facts not known to the court or to the public, and the man can be locked up for 12 days without any chance of getting bail. Sir, if I read this clause correctly, he may be detained for that period even if he is acquitted. I think the Minister must give us some reason for taking a step of that sort. Normally speaking, the Attorney-General opposes bail only in certain exceptional circumstances, and so far the Minister has only given us one or two cases in which people have estreated bail and indicated that that was one of his reasons for this clause. Surely if there is an emergency he can hold those people. What we are in fact being asked to approve is that an Attorney-General, directed by the Minister who may take fright as easily as the hon. member for De Aar-Colesberg (Mr. M. J. de la R. Venter) is going to detain any accused for 12 days no matter what the position is. Sir, what are the principles? The principles involved are firstly that the accused is in effect denied the rights of the Habeas Corpus Act which applies to him in normal times. He is deprived of the protection of the courts from the actions of the executive.

In principle to-day he has not got that right.

Then why does the Minister want these additional powers?

You are quarrelling with the principle.

Let us deal with the principle. There are certain circumstances in which the court can say that it refuses bail. If there is an emergency and the Minister declares it then he can use emergency powers. But here the Minister is wanting to use emergency powers without declaring an emergency, in cases which he will specify from time to time. The right to bail has been something which has been granted to every accused, save in exceptional circumstances, since the time of Magna Charta, and here we have this Minister, frightened by rumours of what is going to happen on 31 May, taking steps of this kind. I cannot help feeling that the steps which this hon. Minister is taking, must be a source of tremendous satisfaction to those non-Europeans who were involved in the Pietermaritzburg conference. They have only got to start threatening something of this kind and this Minister takes fright and rushes to put legislation before Parliament. Sir, that is bad enough …

You are always being ridiculous.

I know there are some hon. gentlemen who do not understand what is going on. Sir. I would beseech you to treat them a little kindly. We always get those remarks from them. But now let us deal with the position in respect of the amendment of Section 10 of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Now we are faced with something that is a little different because the effect of that Act will be felt when one is dealing with the question of bail. Section 10 is now to read as follows—

And then certain provisions are set out of which (b) is—

Mr. Speaker, I wonder just what that means. It means that if a person wishes to compel any other person to abstain from doing something which he has a right to do or doing something he has a right to do, or to have an influence on him because he has not done something which he has a right to do, remains at or near the premises where that other person resides or works or is seeking to work or happens to be, then he shall be guilty of an offence. The original section had to do only with the position when this action was taken in respect of the employment of the individual concerned. Now the Minister has widened it so that any act, regardless of whether it is in respect of employment or not, falls under the purview of this clause. What does that mean? It means that if a group of students from the University of Stellenbosch or Cape Town demonstrates against any law …

You are talking nonsense.

My old friend has woken up at last. Let us give him something a little nearer home. Let us suppose that his Cradock branch of the Black Sash holds a protest meeting. I believe that they have caused him a lot of trouble here. I quite understand his feeling so strongly on the subject. Supposing they were to have a demonstration in protest against any law; then, unless they can prove to the court that they had a lawful reason for holding such a meeting, they are guilty of an offence. In other words, a presumption of law is created that if such a meeting is held then an offence is committed, and such presumption continues until the opposite is proved, that is to say, until that presumption is rebutted by the evidence of the accused. Well, you cannot prove until you have been before the court and, therefore, they are in this position that only a court can hear evidence and determine whether or not such evidence as is adduced is sufficient and satisfactory to rebut the presumption of guilt. That means that if they have a demonstration or a protest meeting of any kind, it is presumed that they have committed an offence; they are arrested and the Minister has the right to direct that they will not be granted bail for 12 days. They can all sit in gaol then for 12 days as a summary lesson by the Minister for their daring to protest against any of the laws of the country.

Is that not a bit far-fetched?

It is not farfetched at all. I only wish it were far-fetched, but that is what this law lays down.

You are entirely wrong.

The Minister says I am entirely wrong. He will have his opportunity of proving that, but I can only say that on the facts before me at present, I would give judgment against him and mulct him in costs as well, because so far he has produced no reason and the law itself shows no reason why that should not be the position. It might be argued that the reason for the demonstration is quite lawful, but until the accused are brought before the court, until they have had an opportunity of showing the court that the reason for the demonstration is perfectly lawful or that the action was not connected with any similar action by any other persons to achieve a particular purpose, they are guilty of an offence; they can be arrested and the Minister will have the right to say that, because of the state of the country at that time, because it is in the interests of public safety or the maintenance of public order, he is going to detain them for 12 days. No, Sir, this is legislation which in my opinion is entirely unnecessary, legislation which in no way meets the problems with which South Africa is faced at the present time. The problem with which we are faced is a lot of frustrated, unhappy people who have no hope for the future because of the policies of this Government. Sir, we have the Natives permanently settled in the urban areas deprived of their political rights and told that one day they are going to get the vote in a Bantustan yet to be created by the hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.

I hope the hon. the Leader of the Opposition will not carry that too far.

No, I won’t carry that too far. I want to say that there are a number of frustrated and unhappy people because of the policies which this Government is applying, and to try to deal with that problem in this way is once again merely trying to close the stable door after the horse is gone. The Minister talks about prevention rather than cure. Mr. Speaker, he is long past the stage of prevention. This sort of action is merely a cure for evils which he and his Government have created and for that reason this side of the House cannot support this Bill and I, therefore, move as an amendment—

That will cost you another 1,000 votes.

That is all you think of.

I second the amendment.

The hon. Leader of the Opposition started by saying that this Bill has become necessary through circumstances caused by the way in which this Government has acted during the past 12-13 years since it came into power. When the hon. the Leader of the Opposition makes such allegations one becomes dejected to think that in times like these the hon. the Leader of the Opposition seeks excuses like these with which to oppose essential legislation, knowing that the hon. the Minister of Justice has just made a statement as a result of circumstances in the country which have necessitated the placing of this kind of legislation on the Statute Book. I say that the hon. the Minister of Justice made a statement here which clearly indicates that the persons for whom this legislation and these measures have become necessary are not satisfied with anything else but absolutely equal administration and equal rights for Whites and non-Whites in this country. This is the position in which we find ourselves. Movements which advocate this kind of agitation have been established; therefore this kind of legislation and these strict measures are necessary, and then a responsible Leader of the Opposition comes along with these excuses as to why he and his supporters are opposed to this Bill. It drives one to despair. What is more, throughout the world there are to-day disorder and circumstances much worse than that in South Africa, in countries and parts of the world where there is not a Nationalist Government which can be blamed for what is taking place, countries where strict measures must also be taken, measures which are far stricter than those envisaged in this Bill, measures which would probably not have been necessary if the governments of those countries took measures of this nature in good time. The world is seething with examples of this and therefore I am so disappointed that this should be the attitude of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition.

I wish to give my whole-hearted support to this Bill because as the hon. the Minister has just said, and as I have just shown, the whole world is in a turmoil to-day. We are living in difficult times, times in which throughout the world one must be able to hold one’s own in order to maintain law and order, and because we are living in such difficult times and are experiencing such circumstances I wish to support the first part of the Bill in particular. I am glad that the hon. the Minister is now also providing in this Bill that one must have an import permit for shotgun ammunition below a certain size because in these times in which we live an irresponsible person can cause tremendous harm with a shotgun.

You must have a licence for any shotgun.

No, I am sorry, have hon. members opposite never heard about a 410 shotgun for which a licence for ammunition was never required? Mr. Speaker, those are the people who are opposing this legislation; that is their knowledge of the subject. I am glad that this measure is being placed on the Statute Book. I am also grateful for the provision being made for firearms to be registered anew so that people who have legitimately lost their licences need no longer fear bringing in their firearms for new licences.

And they can now obtain it free of charge.

They can obtain it gratis. I think it is a very good thing that every person who obtained a firearm at one time or another without having a licence will now have the opportunity of obtaining a licence for it, whether he lost it originally or not—also gratis. I think it is very essential in these times that firearms should be registered and that there should be no fear of being penalized for possessing an unlicensed firearm. I think it is very good indeed because in these times it is necessary that there should be a check on every weapon in the country; it should be known where every weapon is, and the opportunity must now be given to people who are not unjustifiably in possession of weapons to be permitted to retain them with a licence. When I say “unjustifiably” then I do not refer to people who do not really have to have a licence and who have not got it; I am referring to people who are entitled to a licence but who have not got it for some reason or another. I say it is good that such people may now obtain licences in order that there will be a check on all the weapons.

I now want to pass on to the next part of the Bill. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that the hon. the Minister was now coming along with this drastic measure “because he is frightened by rumours of what might happen”. Mr. Speaker, if a Minister of Justice and a government get to know that this kind of meeting is being held, that this kind of campaign is being waged, that statements such as the hon. the Minister of Justice read out here to-day are being made and they do not take the necessary measures to prevent trouble then such a Minister of Justice is not only unworthy of his portfolio but should be hanged. Here the hon. the Minister of Justice introduces a measure to overcome this sort of thing and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition says that the hon. the Minister allows himself to be frightened by rumours in circulation. In all my life I have never heard a more irresponsible recommendation being made to an hon. Minister of Justice than that made by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon.

The second principle contained in this Bill is the principle that the Attorney-General can issue an order that no bail shall be granted for a period of 12 days. It is not really a new principle because an arrested person has in any case to be brought before a court within 48 hours. There are therefore in any case 48 hours in which a person can be arrested and detained without being given the opportunity of appearing before a court or being released on bail. All that is really being done here is that the 48 hours is being extended to 12 days. I think it is a very good thing. I really cannot believe that we have so little faith in each other in this country. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition is fully aware of what the the purpose of these 12 days is, and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition also knows that one cannot always announce publicly the reasons why certain steps are being taken. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition knows full well why this legislation is necessary, and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition also knows just as well that these measures will not be abused and that the measures are being proposed in order to be able to take immediate action in certain specific circumstances. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition knows this and therefore I say that I regret that he has adopted this attitude. We must have more confidence in each other in this country. In these difficult times which we are experiencing we should have more confidence in each other than this. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that by declaring a state of emergency the hon. the Minister could do all the things he wants to do through the medium of this Bill. But one cannot continually declare a state of emergency in the country. It is precisely because the Government does not wish to declare a state of emergency and because it wants to combat the position before it reaches a stage where a state of emergency must be declared that the hon. the Minister is introducing this measure. Many things can of course be done when a state of emergency is declared. But where does it get one if a state of emergency has continually to be declared? What is more, if a government in these times and in the circumstances in respect of the category of people for whom this measure is being passed, has reason to think that it is suddenly necessary to arrest someone on very strong suspicion of crime and the Government cannot bring the necessary proof before the court within 48 hours, and the court has not got the proof, then that person must be released within 48 hours, whereas if the police could provide the proof in time even the court would not have released that accused or even have granted bail. The period must be extended to 12 days so that the Government, or the state or the police will in these difficult circumstances have the opportunity of gathering the necessary evidence. But if they cannot gather the necessary evidence and therefore cannot lay it before the court then the person is released after 48 hours and he can do incalculable harm before the Government can provide the necessary evidence. Therefore I am wholly in favour of this step. This clause says very clearly that these measures which are now being taken will not be placed on the Statute Book for all time. This clause will only be of force until 1 June 1962. The measure can be extended by a resolution of the Senate and the House of Assembly but not for a period exceeding 12 months. In other words, the opportunity will always be there to call the hon. the Minister to responsibility in these the highest councils of the country should he abuse these powers.

There seems to be some misunderstanding in connection with Clause 5, which extends the principle whereby the hon. the Minister can prohibit certain cases from being heard by juries. I think the Bill is very clear. This is a proviso which empowers the hon. the Minister, in the cases he mentioned, to extend the prohibition on trial by jury. But it does not mean that the trial by a jury in such cases is being excluded altogether. It is by no means automatic. All the Bill provides for is that the hon. the Minister can, in such a case, prohibit the case from being heard by a jury, i.e. by a judge and a jury. The hon. the Minister explained why it is necessary. The hon. the Minister quoted Pondoland as an example. In other words, the hon. the Minister requires this power to be able to prohibit specific cases from being heard by a jury when he thinks that it is not in the interests of the administration of justice. No automatic prohibition is attached to this. The hon. the Minister must exercise the prohibition in every specific case, and all that this clause means is that the hon. the Minister will now also have the power to do so in these cases if it is necessary.

I now come to the increase in penalties under Clauses 6 and 7. Here I also want to give my wholehearted support to the hon. the Minister. Riotous assemblies have often been the cause of blood flowing unnecessarily, not only here, but everywhere. Therefore it is necessary to have particularly strict measures for riotous assemblies, not only to have very strict measures, but also to have the power to impose penalties which will serve as a deterrent. It is no use prohibiting a certain deed or action, especially deeds or actions as serious as holding riotous assemblies, if the necessary sanction cannot be applied to it. There must be a penalty which will act as a deterrent to committing such a crime. For that reason I agree that these penalties should be increased.

In regard to Clause 8, there have been examples in the recent past of how law-abiding and innocent citizens have been intimidated and how agitators and intimidators have made the position virtually impossible for people who wished to maintain the law. Last year, in connection with Sharpeville, Langa and Nyanga, it was seen what could be done by intimidators, and when that intimidation took place everyone felt that something should be done about it. Even the hon. Opposition shouted about it, and said that those poor people were not being protected against intimidation. But now that the hon. the Minister feels that those people should be protected, and he introduces a measure, it is also not good. It must now be decided once and for all whether to allow the intimidators to make life bitter for innocent law-abiding citizens and to make it impossible for them to maintain the law, or whether to create the powers to protect those poor, innocent people. I think any right-minded person will realize it and agree that it is necessary to take the powers to protect those innocent people, and that is what the hon. the Minister wants to do with this measure. I therefore agree wholeheartedly that powers be taken to protect the innocent people who want to maintain the law. It is not only in connection with the performance of work that people were molested in the past, but to maintain law and order it sometimes requires other actions than simply taking steps in connection with work. In other words, the people are not intimidated only in connection with their work, they are also intimidated in connection with other deeds they would want to perform in order to maintain law and order and, therefore, it is good that the law is being amended as it is by the hon. the Minister through the deletion of those few words.

What is more, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition now comes along and states, for example, that students may also be arrested as a result of this measure when they want to organize a protest meeting against some matter or another. But the Bill is very clear. This measure is in connection with intimidation. I say that no person, whether he is White or non-White, or a student or not a student, but who wants to intimidate another person to break the law, deserves any sympathy. Any intimidator, whether he is White or non-White, whether he is a student or not, or whether he or she is a member of the Black Sash or not, can easily be included under this measure, and no right-minded person will object to it.

The hon. member who has just sat down added nothing new, but he rather piously indicated, in his own words, that we cannot go on having a state of emergency all the time. I ask him therefore: Is that the reason for this panic legislation? Because my hon. Leader has indicated that the effect of this legislation is that the individual can be arrested and detained over a long period without trial, just as if a state of emergency had been declared. It seems, therefore, that in spite of not wanting to declare a state of emergency all the time, legislation is now being provided which will create that position de facto if not de jure.

But, Sir, the courts of law have suffered rather badly at the hands of this Government over the past decade, either by way of restricting their discretionary powers, particularly in the matter of imposing punishments, or by way of their prerogative powers being usurped by the executive, or by the legislature.

The old, old story!

I am coming to the old story, because the most flagrant instance of usurping the prerogative powers of the courts was, of course, the passing of the High Court of Parliament Act, 1952. I hope the hon. member now enjoys the old story, because that was the most flagrant case we have had. I call it the ill-fated High Court of Parliament Act, which has now come finally to an end by being included in the repealed Schedule of the South African Republic Constitution Act. All I can say is that is not a case to which the old Latin tag de mortuis nil nisi bonum can be applied. I mention that Act because this Bill is an equally clear example of the prerogative powers being usurped, this time by the executive and not by the legislature.

The hon. the Minister has admitted that in our judicial system it has always been the peculiar right, or the prerogative of the courts to determine whether a person under arrest for a criminal offence, who is still unconvicted, shall be released from custody on bail or not. And it is for the courts to declare, after hearing the views of the prisoner, as well as of the prosecutor, what the nature of that security should be for release pending trial. Not only have the courts exercised that power justly and well in the past, but it is a fundamental principle of our system of justice that every man is innocent until he has been found guilty by a court, and that punishment follows upon conviction and does not precede it.

Trite law.

I am glad the hon. member calls it trite law, because he is going to see a change in the law if this Bill goes through. Clause 4 of this Bill is designed to bring an end to that trite law; it is designed to bring an end to that salutary legal practice and that essential principle of justice. The Attorney-General, who is a part of the Executive Government and who, as my hon. Leader has pointed out, is under the direction of the Minister himself, is now to be empowered to usurp the functions of the court and himself to determine that a person under arrest on a criminal charge shall not be allowed bail. One’s whole sense of justice revolts against such an arrangement. Instead of the Attorney-General the agent of truth, as he should be, whose duty it is to assist the court to do justice, he as the prosecutor being the procurator viritatis, and to settle the refusal of bail.

Does the period change a principle? The 48 hours are now extended to ten days.

He has never had the power to refuse bail even for 48 hours.

Of course he can apply after 48 hours.

He can apply immediately. The hon. Minister is wrong about the period, just as he is wrong about the principle.

The prosecution has 48 hours.

The prosecution has 48 hours to formulate a charge, not to detain a person without bail. As soon as the charge is formulated, whether it be within 48 hours or within one hour, he can apply to a court for bail.

Immediately after the arrest he can apply.

Yes, but whether it be within one hour of arrest or 48 hours after arrest, here, as I say, the gravamen of my criticism is that the Attorney-General is now to assume the role of a Judge and settle the refusal of bail, which is really a judicial decision. And worse still, he does so without hearing the other side. Sir, it is quite obvious that the Attorney-General will have to rely on_ ex parte statements when he makes his decision. The danger therefore is that instead of being the procurator viritatis, he now becomes obliged to make arbitrary decisions against the accused person, and he may well be seen in the eyes of that person as the persecutor rather than the prosecutor. I think it is a tragic situation that our system of justice should be reduced to a situation where that is possible to happen. Now it is perfectly true that the Attorney-General’s so-called judgment lasts for no longer than 12 days, and it is also true that the clause as a whole may cease to be law some 12 or 13 months after this Bill has become law, but all that of course is beside the point. A wrong that is done under circumstances such as these can never be corrected. Any wrong suffered under these circumstances can never be put right, and I hope no one will try to argue that an arbitrary decision is a fair substitute for a judicial decision. I say this clause is thoroughly bad and should never be given the force of law. It is in fact a form of despotism. And there is of course no need for such a law, because if the prosecution can make out a good case for the refusal of bail, the courts can be relied upon to judge accordingly. The hon. the Minister makes a case in quoting a decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division that the question whether the public safety is involved is not a ground for refusing bail. As my Leader has indicated, if there is justification for making a change in that direction, why not change the law in that way and leave the decision to the discretion of the court. I say leave it to the court to decide on the facts whether or not the public safety is endangered. Leave it to the courts to decide after hearing both sides. Do not deal with it in this arbitrary fashion where the Attorney-General, either under direction from the Minister or not, has simply got to make a judicial decision on ex parte statements.

I think Clause 4 can best be described as an unwarranted invasion by the Executive into the sphere of the courts. It will have the effect of course of the accused first suffering imprisonment and punishment and then being tried. That is quite a reversal of any principle of justice we have thus far known, and it does mean that in these circumstances we are no better than any dictatorial state which tries to administer justice in circumstances such as is proposed here.

Just as no good was done by substituting Parliament for the courts in the High Court of Parliament Act, so no good can be done by substituting a prosecutor for a Judge or a magistrate in terms of the present Bill.

But the Bill is objectionable in other directions as well. It also restricts the right of the accused person to a trial by a jury, and it gives the Minister arbitrary powers to direct that in a case of murder the trial shall be by a Judge without a jury. The hon. member for Smithfield rather indicated that there is really nothing wrong about it because the Minister will select the cases. But the principle is wrong. Why should there be a selection of cases? The Crown as such, or the State as such to-day has large powers as regards special courts that can be created. But one of the principles of our law has been that the accused should be given the right to determine whether he wishes to be tried by a jury or not. That was indeed written into our law not long ago, and that is now to be negatived. The hon. the Minister has really given us no reasons, except the one that mass trials might arise. Otherwise he has given us no reasons for extending this provision to the case of murder or arson.

I dealt with a number of cases where the Minister can extend that provision.

I know the law provides for that already, in specific cases. Why widen it? Why widen it in the case of two common law offences, in the case of murder and arson. I say why again give the Executive this arbitrary power. All this strengthening of the hands of those who are charged with the duty of bringing people to justice, is really making a mockery of the Rule of Law. We in this country have always prided ourselves on the observance of the Rule of the Law.

What is the Rule of the Law?

I could give the hon. the Minister a definition, but I assume that the hon. gentleman as the Minister of Justice would know what that is, and I will not belittle him by giving a definition. But I do repeat, as I said at the outset, that the courts have suffered badly at the hands of this Government over the past decade.

Clause 8 which has about it an air of innocence if you look at it and see how short it is, has very dangerous implications in it as my hon. Leader has indicated. It is likely to place very serious restrictions on what up to the present has been an inalienable right of the citizen, namely the right to demonstrate and to protest his dislike of government by lawful means. There is extreme danger that the case that the hon. Leader of the Opposition made out can be brought within the terms of the law as it is now to be amended. It is no good us talking about being concerned only with intimidation of persons, because the very clause amends the section which relates to a person who—

That is Section 10 of the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, and that can cover a vast number of what I call inalienable rights of citizens to demonstrate their dislike of government by lawful means. The point has already been made, and I do not want to enlarge on it, that Section 10 of the Riotous Assemblies Act was originally designed to deal with offences relating to employment only. Although the words “in respect of employment” are now to be deleted, the heading of the chapter still reads “Offences in relation to employment”, and the marginal note of Section 10 will still read “prohibition of intimidation or annoyance of persons, their relatives or dependants in relation to their employment”. Sir, this is just making nonsense of legislation to bring about what seems to be a harmless amendment, or as I put it, an amendment with an innocent air about it, whereas it can have very serious consequences.

Contempt of Parliament.

I think it is contempt of Parliament. Because by the removal of those four words “in respect of employment”, the whole ambit of this legislation is now being changed and being enlarged and widened to include what otherwise would be legitimate demonstrations by bodies such as have been mentioned—student organizations or bodies concerned with the moral aspects of the matter, such as the Black Sash movement. But the clause also shifts the onus of proof and places upon the accused the obligation to prove that he had lawful reasons for doing what he did do. In other words, once the prosecutor has established a set of facts covered by the section as it is worded, the accused is then deemed to be guilty, unless he can prove that he is innocent. That again is a complete reversal of our system of justice as it has always been known to us.

The facts are within his knowledge, mostly alone.

That applies in every criminal case. It applies in the case of theft. From the hon. the Minister’s remarks, are we to expect the law to be changed in every such case now? You see, the operative words of Section 10 are the last ones, “shall be guilty of an offence”. Those are the operative words here, and as soon as you have established certain facts then the accused is deemed to be guilty of that offence unless he can establish that he is innocent. And I find it very alarming that the hon. the Minister, in replying to that, should simply use the argument that the person accused is aware of the facts. It seems to me that that foreshadows a similar type of amendment in regard to our whole criminal procedure.

Mr. Speaker, the whole of Clause 8 can best be described as a determination by this Government to enforce order regardless of even the elementary concepts of justice.

I come then to Clause 2 which deals with the re-licensing of firearms. Sir, whatever the merits may be of having re-registration of firearms, this clause is going to place a very grave burden (a) on the public and (b) on the magisterial staff. I believe that whatever the merits may be that burden, both on the public and on the staff, may well outweigh all the merits. Already the magisterial staff is overburdened with work. In a recent debate I quoted to this hon. Minister the report of the Chairman of the Public Services Commission giving recent very alarming evidence about that state of affairs. It is evident, therefore, that if this scheme of registration of firearms is to be proceeded with, it inevitably will mean that some other essential work will have to be left undone.

It is very easy for the hon. the Minister to get legislation of this nature placed on the Statute Book, but it is very far from easy for that legislation to be implemented by the staff after it has appeared on the Statute Book. All I can say is that if the need for re-registration arises because the present registration is in a state of chaos, then it seems to me that the hon. the Minister should give us some sort of guarantee that when re-registration takes place we will not again get into the same state of chaos.

Very few quarrelled with it in 1937.

I am not quarrelling with the re-registration. I say that whatever the merits of re-registration may be, you are going to impose an almost impossible task on the magisterial staffs. The present registration has been carried on over the period since 1937, but the re-registration is all going to take place in a brief period of, possibly, a few months. And the burden that is going to be placed on the staff is such that it may well outweigh the benefits that are going to derive from it.

Four to six months may be a reasonable period.

Even to cram into four to six months what has been done over 24 years is, I say, a task which can be well described as being by no means easy.

What is the alternative that you suggest?

I did not draft the legislation, Sir. All I am doing is to try and point out that whatever the merits of re-registration of firearms may be—and I personally cannot see very great merit in re-registering what is already registered—they may well be outweighed by the additional burden placed on the staff. I am simply suggesting that the hon. the Minister should give consideration to the matter because we might well be placing on the Statute Book some provision which, from a practical point of view, cannot be carried out. I therefore think that the hon. the Minister should satisfy us that the system will not fail even before it has been completed.

I support the amendment moved by my hon. Leader, and I say that this legislation is unnecessary, that the powers which have been vested in the Government to date are more than adequate, and that the Courts should be trusted to carry out their duties as they have done so admirably in the past.

I want to join issue immediately with the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) (Mr. Plewman) on his interpretation of Section 10 of the Riotous Assemblies Act, or rather Clause 8 of this Bill under discussion. The hon. member is obviously living in a fool’s paradise and is unaware of the problem which faces us in this modern era. The Act of 1956, which originated in a totally different era, namely 1914, dealt with other problems. At that time there was terrorism only in respect of employment. This pattern of terrorism has developed, however, and terrorism is to-day being used as a weapon outside the field of employment. What happened in Algeria? Precisely the same thing that was prohibited in this country in 1957. But then it went further. For example, they simply told the people in Algeria: If you do not plant this hand grenade here or there, this or that will happen to your animals, this or that will happen to your families. There were all sorts of threats and the legislators omitted to take the measures that they should have taken and that is why the position in Algeria has developed into what it is to-day. Does the hon. member want us to do the same thing and wait until members of his own family are raped or murdered, until the people in the area which he represents are attacked? I ask this question: Must we wait till that happens? We say it is much better to take steps timeously than to take them too late. The jackal says it is a good thing to run away but then you should start running timeously. That also applies in this case: You must take steps timeously.

The hon. member also had a great deal to say about people who find themselves involved in one or other demonstration where one or other of the acts prohibited under Section 10 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Riotous Assemblies Act are committed. He complained and said that in the case of those people the onus now rests on them to prove that they were there legally. Is that such a catastrophe, Sir? He says “It is wrong in principle”. Let us accept that it is wrong in principle, then I say this: There may be a time in the history of any nation where, for the sake of its own safety and for the sake of its continued existence, it is compelled, as I shall show in a minute, to sacrifice individual liberty. The little that the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) had to say about the Attorneys-General and their function under the proposed legislation, was rather far-fetched. He said the Attorney-General was nothing else than an instrument in the hands of the Minister of Justice. The Attorneys-General are honourable men; they perform an honourable function; they are responsible men. But if the Attorneys-General think …

And the Judges?

I am coming to the question of public safety. I say that if the Attorney-General thinks that it is in the interests of public safety or in the interests of the maintenance of public order to detain anybody for a longer period, does the hon. member think that he will do so arbitrarily? Does he think the Attorney-General will not consider the circumstances in giving a decision for the sake of public safety; or does he wish to see order disintegrating and chaos taking its place?

Another point raised by both the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition was that if a change were to be made the change should be made in respect of the grounds on which bail was granted. I do not think the hon. Leader is serious. It is very undesirable in the case of crimes of this nature where the very being of the state is concerned—the safety of the public, law and order and public order—to make everything on which your suspicions are founded public in court. By doing that you will thwart your very aim namely to catch the guilty person.

If hon. members looked at the grounds for bail that we have to-day, they will find that both those grounds have a bearing only on the individual. They have no bearing on other people who may be involved and it is not an individual but a number of individuals who are concerned when it comes to the question of disturbing public order or endangering the safety of the State. Do hon. members want the police to make all the evidence they have collected public in court so that other people can make a getaway or take steps so that the guilty persons will not be traced? Hon. members must tell this side of the House whether they are prepared to allow law and order to be maintained or not. That is what we want to know.

Mr. Speaker, I think the speech made by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is nothing less than scandalous. This motion that he has introduced is most unpatriotic, to put it euphemistically. If we study it properly we find that it contains material that will make headline news in the Leftist Press in London. They will say that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition maintains that there is a number of unfortunate people in this country who are being thwarted in their aims, people who have no hope whatsoever and that our courts are being muzzled. I say it is a scandal and the nation will call him to book. We shall see to that.

I want to ask him this. He said that there was no necessity for this legislation. What proof must we bring to satisfy him? If his hay-stacks are burnt down will that be sufficient proof to him; will it be sufficient proof for him if the people in his immediate locality are attacked? Surely we know that the whole country, practically the whole of Africa is in a state of ferment for various reasons. It is common knowledge that the whole object of the communists was, after Lumumba had been conveniently installed in the Republic of the Congo, to pick a quarrel with Portugal about the border between the Congo and Angola.

Do you suggest that this Government should stop that?

The hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) need not think that by interrupting he will put me off. I was in Belgium last year in July and the right-wing people over there told me that they thought that was the intention. They themselves did not believe it. But what is happening in Angola to-day is part of the pattern that was designed the previous year already. The happenings in Angola should be an indicator to us. We stand to lose everything by violence. We stand to lose everything if we show signs that we are unable to maintain law and order And then the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and the member for Johannesburg (North) —the only two members opposite who have spoken on this Bill so far—suggest that we should take action under the Riotous Assemblies Act. In other words, they suggest that we should declare a state of emergency at any time, at any place, no matter how insignificant a little place it may be. If we do that we shall be disgracing ourselves. It is not always necessary to declare a national state of emergency. If you can maintain law and order by detaining somebody for 11 days, that may put an end to the disturbance. The hon. member for Johannesburg (North) says that this is a kind of interim measure. Let that be the case. It is much better to introduce interim legislation than to use a sledge hammer to kill a fly. This comparison only compares the state of emergency with a sledge hammer and not the people with a fly. It is really ridiculous on the part of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and the member for Johannesburg (North) to suggest that when circumstances do not demand it, a state of emergency should be declared in the country.

It is a well-known fact that the difficulty in maintaining law and order is that you always clash with rights; it is always the right of the individual that is affected as against the right of the community when the community lays down certain patent conditions for social order. We have paid a great deal of attention to that in the past. In the past we have always gone against the interests of the individual when we thought it was necessary to do so in the interests of the community. There is a multitude of exceptions to the rule on our Statute Book whereby somebody can be placed under arrest on the strength of a warrant of arrest and brought to court immediately. I want to give one example of the first case. As long ago as 1883 there were cases here in the Cape Province where persons who were not even officers of the peace had the power of arrest without a warrant. That may seem peculiar to us to-day but that was important to the people in those days. For example cemetery officials who worked in cemeteries had the right summarily to arrest persons who desecrated graves or who committed other offences in the cemetery. That is another case where the freedom of the individual comes into conflict with the demands of the community. I have forgotten what the considerations were. There is another example. [Interjections.] I am merely giving these examples to show that where society believes that it is necessary to interfere with the rights of the individual, it has never hesitated to do so. I have mentioned the examples of 1883. I want to give another one. This may sound peculiar to us to-day. We have the 1914 legislation in respect of the ill-treatment of animals. Anybody, he may not necessarily be a peace officer, who sees anybody ill-treating an animal has the right to arrest that person immediately without a warrant of arrest. I only refer to this in passing, I am not discussing the question of whether or not he should have a warrant of arrest. I am only drawing attention to the examples that we have to show that it often happens that the rights of the individual are interfered with when there is good reason to do so. The examples that I have given date back 40 and 50 years ago. Another example can be found in the National Parks Act. In terms of that Act certain people who are not peace officers, have the right to make arrests even outside the game reserve. We have the position under the Forest and Veld Protection Act. Under that Act people have the right to interfere with the rights of others in a most unusual manner.

What are we doing here? We give a responsible officer the right to detain somebody when he thinks it is in the interests of public safety and the maintenance of public order to do so. We are doing it in this way because we do not think it is wise in that specific case to make all the secret information public and thus thwart your whole object.

Mr. Speaker, we are taking these steps in view of what is happening to-day. The things that have happened indicate that the pattern in respect of crimes against the public safety has changed completely. I pleaded on a previous occasion that this House should revise the position in respect of crimes against public safety. I said that the crimes as listed to-day no longer covered the position. We only have the old-fashioned crimes of high treason, sedition and public violence. 150 years ago the Dutch said that high treason was no longer high and that it was not even treason any more. They created a new crime and they called it state danger. When we study the agreements that are concluded under the auspices of UNO to combat international terrorism we find that the one country prohibits a long list of offences in order to safeguard the interests of another country. And here we have this unpatriotic Opposition who, when we prohibit certain acts that are committed in this country against the country, accuse us of violating everything that is holy and decent.

I should like a reply to this question from the entire Opposition as we see them there. I notice the hon. member for Salt River is preparing himself to take part in the debate. I want to ask him whether the Opposition object to it that the public, they themselves, their own people, their families and the property should be protected. And if they agree with that then I want to know whether they have any objection to it that that safety should be protected in this way. And if they object to that what is the alternative; how should it be done? We know to-day that with the powers at our disposal we are unable to do so unless we declare a state of emergency, which we think will be unwise for various reasons.

I want to return to Clause 4bis. This clause is really the super-structure to Section 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Opposition’s complaint is really that the person is not notified within 48 hours with what crime he is charged, in other words, as soon as possible. Numerous judgments have been given throughout the world which more or less indicate what is meant by the words “as soon as possible he must be brought before the court “as soon as possible” and he can be detained on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the court. Our own law says a period of 48 hours is long enough. In America, England and Australia there have been decisions to the effect that “as soon as possible” means “as soon as possible in prevailing circumstances”. That is very important—“prevailing circumstances”. Hon. members may perhaps think that the circumstances are of such a nature that it should be done much sooner. It is their privilege to hold that view because they do not carry the responsibility. The responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Minister, on the Attorney-General, and on the police in the first instance. When the law says that a period of 12 days is long enough it does so with a view to the changed circumstances. Hon. members should not try to create the impression that this will be the general rule, as the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) tried to do. It is only in respect of those cases where somebody is arrested for having committed a crime, and in that case the Attorney-General may deem it necessary in the interests of public safety and public order—only in that respect; not in respect of any other matter; not in respect of fraud; not in respect of assault, the safety of the whole state must be involved. I can give hon. members numerous decisions which clearly indicate that “as soon as possible” means “as soon as it is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances”. That is the criterion.

Mr. Speaker, in returning to the Bill itself in greater detail I want to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to Clause 6 (c) which says “that any person who advertises or in any other manner makes known such a prohibited meeting”. The word “advertises” has a meaning of its own. I am not very happy about this wording. I wonder whether the words “or in any manner make known the proposed assembly” will not cover a wider field than the wording “advertise or in any other manner make known”. The legal profession has its own way of interpreting things but I am not convinced in my own mind that as this particular section is worded, the words “or any other manner” are not connected with advertising. I may be wrong. I hope I am wrong. However, if I am right, I think it would be wise to make the prohibition apply to “make known in any manner”. That will be wider. I will tell you, Sir, why I say that. I have nothing against the newspapers. They have to reflect daily occurrences. But by simply publishing it as a news item newspapers may make the fact so well known that the meeting will take place, as happened in the case of the passive resistance movement in the ’fifties. It was on the strength of the daily announcements in the newspapers that that movement gained its own momentum. As soon as the daily Press realized that they were getting into danger, that their editors were in danger of being beaten up if they continued to give such great publicity to the matter, the whole thing collapsed due to inadequate publicity. As far as Clause 7 is concerned, I notice that the fine is being increased to £200. I am sure the hon. member for Kensington (Mr. Moore) will be unhappy if we make it R400. I do not want to know why it is £200. I have merely mentioned these few things. We may perhaps return to this at the Committee Stage.

Then I want to deal with Clause 5 which deals with trial by jury. There is one thing that we must never forget and that is that everybody in this country is not so enamoured of trial by trial as we think they are, and a great deal can be said for both points of view. We heard a few minutes ago that the Law Revision Commission made a 50-50 recommendation in this connection, for and against. What is the position to-day? The position to-day is that the Minister may order a case to be tried without a jury and what reason does the Minister advance? The reason is that he cannot find people to act as a jury; they are not prepared to withdraw from their ordinary occupations and to serve on a jury perhaps for months in the case of big mass trials at the remuneration paid to members of the jury to-day. Is that not a feasible reason? And when an accused, knowing that the trial will last such a long time, insists on a jury, he is abusing the law. What objection have hon. members of the Opposition to this? There are cases where the advocate for the defence has said that he would summon 400 witnesses and actually did so; he was prepared to let the case drag on as long as the Rosenberg case dragged on in America. Well, if people have such a lot to say they are welcome to say it, but then they must not expect the Minister of Justice to accommodate them and to allow them to abuse the law and to perpetrate the very injustice which we are trying to prevent. That is a feasible excuse and what objection do hon. members have to that? It is a reasonable demand. This is something which is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice and if the Minister of Justice does not react to it, he is not worth his salt. Mr. Speaker, what we have had here to-day was similar to what we have had in the past. The Opposition is quite incapable of gauging the problems which beset this country. All they are capable of is to accuse us and to say that the position that we have in this country is due to the policy of this side of the House. That is all they can do. It has never entered their minds to suggest an alternative course. I am still waiting for an alternative course that will prove that they are better than we are.

I think I could describe the Bill now before the House as providing for more force, tougher penalties and further infringements of the rights of the individual. If I wanted a short title for the Bill, I would call it the Temporary Detention Bill, the Twelve-Day Detention Bill.

The Minister of Justice, in introducing the Bill, said it was a temporary measure. He certainly painted a sombre picture in recommending its terms to this House, and some of the speakers opposite have maintained that picture of gloom and despondency. The hon. member for Standerton (Dr. Coertze), whom I would liken to a South African Senator MacCarthy, spoke about “vaderlandsliefde”. He has suggested that if we oppose this Bill we are guilty of un-South African activities. Well, this is all in keeping with this witch-hunt which is going on at present. The hon. member for Standerton said we are living in a different period and under different circumstances from those which prevailed when the Riotous Assemblies Act was originally introduced. That is true. But he went on to pose a remarkable question. He asked members of this House: Do you want to wait until your family have been raped? Apparently this is now the current idiom to replace the previous classic question posed by Nationalists at the hustings: Do you want your daughter to marry a Kaffir? I want to ask the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister, who happens to be here now, whether he approves of that question: Do you want your family to be raped? I would have liked to ask the Minister of Finance if he were here to-day whether he approves of that question. I can hardly think that such a question, coming from a pillar of the Nationalist Party, is likely to send down the bank rate in South Africa, or to bring further immigrants into the country. We hear talk about the English-language Press doing harm to South Africa, but a question of that sort is unworthy of any hon. member of this House. It is based on bigotry and racial prejudice calculated to stir up emotions in regard to this Bill. The hon. member for Smithfield (Mr. J. J. Fouché, Jnr.), who supported the Minister, said: We Nationalists know why this is necessary, and we in the Nationalist Party cannot give all the reasons.

On a point of explanation, I did not say that. I said we all know, and not only the Nationalists.

I accept that. The hon. member says we all know why this Bill is necessary. To some extent that is correct, but I would say this. I do not accept that this legislation is necessary. But I do know why there is this fear which compels the Government to introduce this Bill, and that is a different matter. The hon. member for Smithfield said that powers are needed to avoid proclaiming a state of emergency because we cannot have a permanent state of emergency in South Africa. In answer to that, I would say that this Bill, if passed, is another cogent sign of the fact that, under the policies of the present Government, under the granite rock policy of apartheid of the Prime Minister, we are in a permanent state of unproclaimed emergency. The Minister himself has admitted that. He painted what I have described as a gloomy picture. He said with unconvincing optimism that it was a temporary Bill; that the Government intended to maintain law and order; that we live in a new period when old methods of preserving law and order were no longer efficacious; and that those who believe that South Africa would be free from disturbances if only the Government would accede, step by step, to the demands of Black nationalism were living in a dream world. But who on this side has suggested that we should concede to every demand of militant Black nationalism or any other type of nationalism? I should have thought that the Whites in this country are in an especially strong position by reason of the fact that the White population here, relative to the Blacks, is numerically stronger than in any other State on the African continent. Why does the Minister talk in those terms of making concessions, of surrendering and of conceding to every extravagant demand? It is quite obvious that this Government, having decided to go into a laager and to maintain its inflexible race policies, is now attempting to bring down every South African with it in that laager.

Order! I hope the hon. member will not attempt to cover too wide a field.

But this is the basis of the Bill. With respect, the Minister has told us that this country is being menaced by possible insurrection, and I am compelled to refer to these matters if I want to deal with the subject realistically.

I request the hon. member not to cover too wide a field.

I will do my best to cover the scope of this Bill and the evils which the Bill is intended to meet. On his own admission, the Minister has conceded that this is a tough measure, a strong-arm Bill. I want to deal with its background. I would say that the Bill now before us is part of the pattern of legislation dealing with our criminal law. It is a peculiar pattern and, in my opinion, a very menacing pattern. It started way back in 1952 when our Judges were deprived of their discretion and it was made compulsory to give lashes in respect of certain crimes.

Did you take that from the leader in the Argus?

The hon. member who interrupted is peculiarly susceptible to lashes because of his experience of the Ossewa Brandwag during the war.

Order! I must appeal to the hon. member not to cover too wide a field. He is going back to 1952 now.

I am dealing with our criminal legislation. I want to draw deductions from it because this Bill now before us, with its toughness and increased penalties and its interference with the liberty of the subject, is intended to be a deterrent to criminals. And I am pointing to the fact that this Government embarked upon a pattern of legislation the distinguishing feature of which was toughness and increased penalties in order to wipe out crime, and I am suggesting that that has failed in respect of the whipping legislation. I am suggesting that this House should remember that, when it is being asked to concur in even tougher legislation relating to possible disturbances amongst our people. We had that whipping legislation in 1952. Then we had the Public Safety Act in 1953.

Did you not support that?

Yes, but I did not support what was done by regulations last year under that Act when over 12,000 persons, many of whom were women, were detained without trial for long periods. During that period under the Public Safety Act, and under the regulations promulgated after the declaration of a state of emergency, the police virtually became a law unto themselves.

In the same year, in 1953, we had the Criminal Law Amendment Act giving further wide powers to the Government to maintain law and order. We had this constant process, this consistent pattern. In the years that followed the powers of the police to search without warrant were extended, in 1955. The field of justifiable homicide was widened. In 1958 police powers were again increased. There was greater exemption from liability for acts done without warrant. In 1956—I come now to an Act particularly mentioned in this Bill—we had a new, consolidated and streamlined edition of the Riotous Assemblies Act with further prohibitions and penalties. Then, under Section 15 of that Act, there was a fine of £50 or six months. That was under the original Act. But last year the penalty increased to £500 and five years’ imprisonment, plus ten strokes. Gradually you had this persistent addition of new crimes and increased penalties in order to deal either with what I might call normal crime, or with crime connected with activities amongst those sections of the public which were frustrated by the Government’s policy. There was the Bill to prohibit the granting of interdicts by the established courts in respect of certain bannings of individuals. And last year we had the Banning Bill, the Prohibition of Unlawful Organizations Act, which enable the Minister of Justice, by a stroke of the pen, to ban the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. Against that background we now come to the present Bill. Let me for a moment examine one or two of the provisions of this Bill.

Clause 2 provides for the calling up of licensed firearms and for the licensing of arms for which no licence is held. It also deals with certain other ancillary matters arising out of this. I do not intend to refer to the specific provisions of the clause. If I have any comment to make upon them I will reserve that for the Committee Stage. I would say that this clause by itself, or these provisions by themselves, are not obnoxious. After all, rifles have been called up before in this country. The Minister reminded us this afternoon that there was a registration of weapons in 1937. It was an interesting little throw-back in our history which was disclosed in that statement. We know that rifles were called up in 1939 or 1940. I do not know whether every hon. member opposite was entirely enthusiastic about handing over rifles, but I know we had some difficulty in getting in all the rifles.

Order!

I am discussing the question of calling up rifles.

Order! The hon. member must obey my ruling.

What is your ruling, Sir?

That the hon. member should not cover too wide a field, and I hope he will obey my ruling.

May I not quote precedents for calling up rifles? I say there are precedents, and for that reason I have no objection to this clause. But I am perfectly permitted to point out that there was a calling up of rifles in this country. That is why this provision may have been put into the Bill. I would say that if this clause stood alone in the Bill there would not be much material for comment. But the clause does not stand alone.

I come now to Clause 4, which was dealt with very ably by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) (Mr. Plewman). It deals with the question of bail, and I have only this to add to what has been said, that I regard it as a grave infringement of the right of habeas corpus. In terms of this proposed provision—and I am not going into the details of the cases quoted by the Minister—the simple fact emerges that if this provision becomes incorporated in our law, citizens of this country can be incarcerated for 12 days without bail. That is why I say that I characterize this measure as the Twelve-Day, Temporary Detention Bill. I ask the Minister: Why this provision? At present the discretion rests with the courts. The Minister says that the courts are limited in their jurisdiction because of certain decisions he quoted. He quoted the decisions of Judges Wessels and Mason in 1922, and the judgment of Judge Ramsbottom, who uttered the dictum that the Crown ought not to be allowed to detain persons for long periods while investigations were proceeding. I think that is a very salutary principle in a civilized state. Then he quoted what was said by Wessels and Mason, JJ. that the Crown was not entitled to detain an accused in the interest of public safety. That was their interpretation of the law. The Leader of the Opposition very cogently put the question to the Minister why, if he feels that persons should not be permitted to be released on bail if such release might endanger the public safety, does he not empower the courts to make such decisions? Why put it in the hands of what is in effect an administrative official who is subject to the orders of the Minister of Justice himself?

The Minister never interferes.

No, but we know only too well that the Minister’s influence can influence a weak Attorney-General. The Minister of Posts and Telegraphs does not interfere with the S.A.B.C. either.

Order! What has that to do with the Bill?

I am giving an analogy in order to make my point. You must allow me, Sir, in order to develop my argument, to give a parallel case. It was the Minister of Justice who interrupted to say that he does not interfere with the Attorney-General, and I pointed out that the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs says that he does not interfere with the S.A.B.C. But we know very well what happens in the S.A.B.C.

Order!

The Minister has made out no case whatever for this provision. But I want to put this question to him: Why should the Attorney-General, an administrative official, be given these Draconian powers? On whose advice will he act? The clause says that the Attorney-General may, if he considers it necessary in the interest of the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order, issue an order that such person shall not be released on bail. He must issue an ad hoc order in respect of every person arrested. Now we know from experience, and from what we read in the newspapers, that the Security Branch is very active. During these “routine” raids citizens are woken up in the early hours of the morning all over the country. Where is the Attorney-General? I assume he is sleeping peacefully then. At what stage is the Attorney-General informed that a particular person has been arrested, and of the reasons why he should not be granted bail? How is this going to work? On whose advice will he act, and when will he act? Will he act on the advice of the Minister of Justice? The Minister denies any interference with him. Is he going to act on the advice of the Security Branch, and if not, is he going to act without any papers before him? Is he going to do a sort of mesmeric act and just decide out of the air that a particular accused should not be allowed out on bail? I put that specifically.

Then I come to the extraordinary nature of Clause 4 (5) and (6). Sub-sec. (5) says that subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (6), the provisions of this section shall lapse on 1 June 1962. Why on that date? Then it goes on to say that the operation of the provisions of this section may from time to time be extended by joint resolution of the Senate and the House of Assembly for a period not exceeding 12 months at a time. That is the sort of provision that the Leader of the Opposition asked the Minister to introduce into the Banning Bill last year, a provision which would ensure that you could not extend a banning or an infringement of personal rights before first coming to this House. I ask the Minister why he limits the present provision to 1 June 1962, and why has he incorporated in this Bill a provision which says that this prerogative given to the Attorney-General can only be extended by resolution of the Senate and the House of Assembly?

I do not follow. Do you want it to be extended further?

No, I ask the Minister why he takes these powers only until 1 June 1962, and why is he saying that the operation of this clause, which gives this special prerogative to the Attorney-General, shall not be extended beyond 1 June 1962, without a resolution of both Houses of Parliament, when he was not prepared to do that in the case of the Banning Bill?

I then come to Clause 5, which enables the Attorney-General to order a non-jury trial in certain cases. I am not very perturbed about this matter. We have already made quite a number of infringements into the system of trial by jury. It seems to me that the proper administration of justice, if you are going to eliminate a jury, depends on the calibre of our Judges, on their experience and their legal acumen, and that stands very high at present. That is why I would like to ask the Minister, particularly in relation to this clause, whether he intends to appoint magistrates to the Supreme Court bench. I think that is pertinent, because if the Minister is going to do away with the right of trial by jury in the cases mentioned he should let the House and the country know whether he proposes to maintain the very high standard of the Supreme Court Bench.

I have already replied that there was no intention to deviate from the customary procedure.

Well, Sir, I did not know that. I understood that the Minister was thinking differently. But if he tells me that he proposes to make his appointments to the Supreme Court Bench from members of the Bar, I am very happy indeed. I think that is a wise decision. The Minister purposely said he would not go into the merits of the jury system. When he said that I was reminded of some of his youthful exploits on the platteland at circuit courts, where I am not sure whether justice was done but the hon. gentleman was able to mesmerize a jury pretty well …

Order! How is that relevant?

It is very relevant to the question of the Minister abolishing juries. I am just suggesting that it is probably those nostalgic memories of the past which may have induced the Minister to do away with gullible juries. Then I come to Clauses 6, 7 and 8. Their effect is to create new offences and impose higher penalties. I am not going into the details. The Minister gave us details of the new offences, but let us consider some of the new penalties. Let me, perhaps, consider just one of the new offences. In terms of Clause 6 (c), where a meeting has been properly banned and thereafter anyone “advertises or in any other way makes known the proposed assembly”, such person shall be guilty of an offence. Has the Minister considered the meaning of the words “advertises or in any other way makes known the proposed assembly”. What is the position if a newspaper bona fide reports the fact that a particular meeting due to take place at, say, the Grand Parade Cape Town, has been banned? Is that advertising the meeting? Does that fall within the mischief of this clause. I ask that because it seems to me that this offence, phrased as it is at the present time, is ambiguous, and I feel that because of the additional penalty stipulated the law should be made abundantly clear. What are the new penalties? We find that the penalties for publishing or advertising meetings or presiding at meetings after such meetings have been banned, have been increased from three months’ imprisonment on the first offence to imprisonment for one year, and that on a second offence, the sentence has been increased from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment. We find, under Clause 7, that whereas formerly the penalties were a fine of £25 or three months’ imprisonment, the fine is now £200 or a period of imprisonment not exceeding one year. These are viciously high penalties, and I ask the Minister whether he considers that these penalties are going to meet the evil against which he is aiming.

So much for the provisions of this Bill. The effect, very shortly, of the provisions of this Bill is to create new offences and higher penalties and to infringe the liberty of the subject. I want now to view this Bill against the background of 13 years of Nationalist legislation and the situation in which we find ourselves to-day. I am not really so much concerned with the details as with the effects of this Bill, not so much with the intricacies as to whether the fine is £25 or a higher amount; I am concerned with the fact that this Bill represents an attempt at greater toughness, at greater strong-arm methods, at greater force, in an attempt on the part of the Government to compel persons whose political views differ from theirs to come to heel.

You know that that is not true.

The hon. gentleman says that I know that that is not true. Let me say what I have to say and the hon. gentleman can then answer. He will have an adequate opportunity of dealing with this matter, which is a serious matter. I regard this Bill as a very serious symbol of the deterioration of government in this country. I regard this Bill as a very serious symbol of the way in which we are slipping down the totalitarian path in South Africa. During the past 13 years we have seen increased restrictions on personal liberties and more and more oppressive legislative enactments. But I would say that oppressive and strong-arm methods have neither decreased normal crime—normal crime as opposed to what the Minister might call subversive activities—nor have they led to peaceful, happy and contented conditions amongst our non-European people. These oppressive, restrictive, strong-armed measures have not decreased …

Order! The hon. member is reflecting now on legislation passed by this House.

Well, I do so, Sir, legitimately, if I may say so.

Order! The hon. member not only cannot do it but he must withdraw it.

I cannot withdraw the Acts. May I say that these strong-arm measures have not decreased the frustration amongst our non-Whites. On the contrary there is the evidence before us. After 13 years of Nationalist Government what do we find? We find that our Defence Force has now been transformed into an auxiliary of the Police Force. I would say that this Bill is a symbol of more force, more routine police raids and tougher penalties, and a further infringement of personal liberties. But above all, it is another outward, visible sign of a consistent deterioration in government and of the Government’s inability to govern. Sir, there were some in this House who were prepared to support the powers given by the Banning Bill last year on the understanding that constructive attempts would be made by the Government to alleviate strained race relations. In order to make my point I am going to quote what was said then, but before doing so I propose to move the following further amendment—

To omit all the words after “That” and to substitute “this House declines to pass the second reading of the General Law Amendment Bill because—

1. (1) it proposes the extension of dictatorial powers in order to enforce policies which have failed and cannot succeed;
2. (2) it is in conflict with the principle of personal liberty and the Rule of Law; and
3. (3) the Government has consistently failed to consult with representative leaders of the non-European population in order to avoid the aggravation of racial tensions which create dangerous situations, leading to the introduction of this legislation”.

I should first like to know your ruling, Sir, whether this amendment is in order.

The hon. member for Salt River was good enough to furnish me with a copy of his amendment, and I have consequently had an opportunity of considering it. Paragraphs (1) and (2) are similar in substance to the amendment moved by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. Paragraph (3) in my opinion, is not relevant to the principles of the Bill and therefore I regret I cannot accept his amendment.

I abide by your ruling, Sir, and therefore I move the following alternative amendment—

I was about to say that last year there were those who were prepared to give support to the Government on the understanding that constructive attempts would be made by the Government to alleviate the strained racial situation.

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to move two amendments.

But you have ruled the one out of order.

Yes, the hon. member must make sure that his amendment is in order before he moves it.

With the greatest respect, Sir, I did not take my amendment up to the Table. I asked whether you would be prepared to approve of that amendment. You ruled against it in your wisdom; I accept that and I now move an alternative amendment.

I am sorry, I cannot allow the hon. member to move an alternative amendment as he has already spoken to the question before the House.

Well, the matter is of somewhat technical interest, because I would have been formally seconded, and no doubt one of my colleagues will move that amendment in due course, and then I will be able to second it. I want to deal with this matter of the greater and greater assumption of power. Last year in this House on 29 March the Leader of the Opposition said this to the Minister of Justice during the debate on the Banning Bill, and I want to suggest that the Minister of Justice has failed to respond. The Leader of the Opposition said—

The hon. the Minister has come before the House this Session and he has simply, with a rubber stamp, extended that Act. He has treated the Opposition with contempt. We in this corner of the House voted against the Bill; we were not prepared to take any of those assurances. I want to quote one other statement made by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. The talkative member over there, the hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman), said by way of interjection, “Tell us why you support this Bill?”; and then the Leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graff, said—

After I laid it on the Table, there was ample time to discuss it under my Vote.

What has the hon. the Minister done? He has merely laid a proclamation on the Table automatically, which by a rubber stamp extends the provisions of the Banning Proclamation. Sir, some of us opposed the Banning Bill, but there were those who supported it. They said they were prepared to help this Government. But they did so on the basis that the Government would come forward with some constructive suggestion to get in touch with the non-Europeans and to prevent a repetition of what happened last year. Why has there been no consultation with the African, Coloured and Asian leaders? Sir, I say to the Minister: Consult with the people; get down to a firm and tenable basis. Is that not really what the Pietermaritzburg conference asked for? Not one of us wants riots and insurrection. Sir, we cannot go on for ever governing by force. Let us beware of too much power in anybody’s hands. The greater the power the greater the danger of abuse, the more dangerous the abuse. I want to conclude now with the very wise words which Burke used in his speech on conciliation with America in 1775. He said this—

I say that to the Minister and to the Prime Minister and to the Government. This nation is not governed if it has perpetually to be conquered; if those who disagree with the sentiments and the political views of this Government perpetually have to be conquered and put down by saracens, rifles and other stern measures. Let the Minister learn that before it is too late. That is why we shall have nothing to do with this Bill. [Time limit.]

I would very much like to reply to the speech of the last speaker, but his speech was really like the sermon of an elder which one reads in the Kerkbode. It so happens that I have already read most of his speeches, not in the Kerkbode but in the Press.

There are really three principles concerned in this Bill. The first is the re-registration of firearms by amending the Act of 1937; secondly, the prohibition on the grant of bail for 12 days after arrest by an amendment of the Act of 1955, and thirdly, the extension of the provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act by certain amendments of that Act. This Bill stands in the sign of the times in which we live, when everywhere in the whole of Africa and also in South Africa there are disturbances, and where incidents take place which are dangerous and which may become even more dangerous. The Bill must be viewed against that background. All three of these principles relate only to the conditions under which we live to-day. This is not the ordinary General Law Amendment Bill; it is a Bill which should be seen against the background of the conditions in which we live to-day. The hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) complained that this was another of the Bills which fit in with the so-called “pattern of legislation” of the last 13 years. I want to put this question to the hon. member for Salt River: Who is guilty of the fact that such a pattern of legislation has developed in the country in the past 13 years? I want to blame the Opposition for that pattern of legislation. I take, e.g., this pamphlet sent to members of this House by the South African Congress of Democrats, which every one of us found in his letter-box this morning, the pamphlet read out to us by the hon. the Minister. This pamphlet speaks the language of the Opposition. Just listen to this—

Did we not hear that from platform to platform last year from members of the Opposition during the referendum campaign?

And still do now.

In this House we still hear those same words, quoted literally just as members of the Opposition use them on public platforms, and also in this House. But this pamphlet goes further and says this—

If one refers to the amendment moved by the Progressives to the Referendum Bill, one will find those sentences in it. The pamphlet says, further—

The hon. member for Salt River was one of those who in the republican debate said that that Bill was an “undemocratic act”; those were the words he used. The pamphlet further refers to “the force to perpetuate the tyranny of the minority”. Even this morning we still read in the Cape Times about “the tyranny of a minority”, as they describe this Government, and that is really what the speech of the hon. member for Salt River amounted to this afternoon, because he spoke of a dictatorial state. Sir, this pamphlet is issued by the South African Congress of Democrats. They are the people who ask that before 31 May there should be “consultation with the people”, and that was the peroration held by the hon. member for Salt River this afternoon, that we should consult with the people, meaning the non-Whites of South Africa. This “pattern of legislation” we have is due to the fact that we have an Opposition which does not compose legislation on the proper basis, viz. to ensure that law and order are maintained in the country. No, what they do is to stigmatize every measure passed here by using bad names, as the hon. member for Salt River did again this afternoon. He commenced his speech by saying: “This Bill is the Twelve-Day Detention Bill.” He gives the Bill a bad name right from the start. To-morrow or the day after when this Bill is on the Statute Book and non-Whites are being arrested in terms of this measure, they will say: “Mr. Harry Lawrence set us the example by calling it a Twelve-Day Detention Bill.” What respect can these people have for the legislation of this country? What respect can they have for law and order if law and order are not even respected in this House by the hon. member for Salt River?

We listened this afternoon to the Leader of the Opposition, and I now want to say that under the cloak of all kinds of legal arguments and legal hair-splitting the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is prepared to gamble with the safety of the Whites in South Africa. He called that opposition, but I do not call it opposition. I say he is playing into the hands of those who want to achieve the doom of the Whites in the country, and then he calls it opposition. Behind these nice, legal arguments he advances he wants to disguise his real motives, his real object, and that is what the whole of the Opposition does. They disguise their real object. Their real object is not to base their opposition on legal arguments, but to incite lawlessness outside this House.

Order!

Nonsense!

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked: Why cannot the accused be tried by a jury? This Bill provides for only two cases, viz. murder and arson. He was very clearly told why these two crimes are being added to those mentioned in the schedule, because those are the two crimes which are now repeatedly being committed in Pondoland, murder and arson. Huts were burnt and chiefs were murdered. That was the pattern of the crimes committed there. That is the pattern of the crimes committed everywhere where the communists infiltrate. That is why they are placed under this schedule, but he wants these cases to be tried by a jury. Is the jury system still practical in South Africa? If one takes into consideration that jurymen must be people who are on the Voters’ Roll, it is obvious that they must be Whites. In the first place, that will just serve as a stick in the hands of the communists to tell the non-Whites: It is your White oppressors who try you and send you to prison. Therefore it is no longer practical to have a jury in such cases. But in any case, what is the object of having a jury in this country? Every one of us who practises law and who knows something about the practice both in the lower and in the higher courts knows that the jury system has no more use in South Africa. Most of the cases in South Africa are being heard without a jury.

Order! The hon. member cannot discuss that matter now. The jury system as such is not under discussion now.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition further stated—

May I say that this is a grave distortion of the actual provisions of this Bill, because the Bill provides that the abolition of the jury system in respect of these two crimes only will apply for 12 months. He also knows why it should be left to the Attorney-General to decide that bail should not be granted. This Bill, as I have said, stands in the sign of the times, and the sign of the times is that we find ourselves in an emergency. We are practically in a permanent state of emergency right throughout the Commonwealth of Africa.

Oh!

Or does the hon. member not know that? There is a state of emergency right throughout the continent of Africa. It is a state of cold war. Perhaps the hon. member does not know that there is a cold war in the world; perhaps he does not know that the communists are fighting that cold war day after day and that they are very energetic also in South Africa to-day, in the Transkei, in our large cities, and even here in Cape Town. They are fighting the cold war here. We therefore have practically a permanent state of emergency on the continent of Africa.

But this Bill is not justified for that reason only, by arresting a person and locking him up for 12 days we can cope with a dangerous situation without declaring a state of emergency. By proclaiming a state of emergency you announce to the whole world that there is an emergency in the country, and that not only affects the maintenance of law and order but also the economy of the country. By refusing bail to a person for 12 days one can immediately deal with trouble which can expand later, and without proclaiming a state of emergency with its concomitant harmful consequences to the economy of the country.

The hon. member for Johannesburg (North) (Mr. Plewman) asks why we place the right to refuse bail in the hands of the Attorney-General and not in the hands of the courts. He says: “It is a peculiar power of the court; it is a prerogative of the court,” and that this Bill “is usurping the functions of the court”. He asks why the Bill cannot provide that the court will also be able to refuse bail if public safety is endangered, but he would be the first person to object to such a provision because he will say that that also usurps the prerogative of the courts; that we are depriving the courts of certain rights by providing that where public safety is endangered they must refuse bail and that bail should not be granted in those circumstances.

But there is another very sound reason. When we are dealing with the public safety it is obvious that the Attorney-General will have certain information about the crime concerned which he does not want to divulge at that particular moment. The hon. member for Salt River ought to know that very well because during the war he was Minister of Justice and he put many people behind barbed wire because he had certain information …

Order! The hon. member is going too far again. He is now paving the way for a very long discussion.

Mr. Speaker, I am illustrating …

Order! I have stopped the hon. member for Salt River also, and now the hon. member mentions similar examples to which hon. members on my left will want to reply, and what happens then?

With all respect to your ruling, may I just say that your ruling simply makes it impossible to illustrate any matter by quoting examples from the past.

The hon. member must give other examples.

In this particular case the Attorney-General will have to divulge information which he should not divulge in the interests of law and order and the safety of the State. If one leaves it to the courts to refuse bail on the grounds of public safety, then the Attorney-General must divulge what information he has which makes him come to the conclusion that public safety will be endangered. Then he divulges his whole case and information which should not be divulged in the interests of public safety. That is why it is essential to draft the Bill in this way.

I now come to the last portion of this Bill, the scope of the Riotous Assemblies Act. The first amendment really deals with intimidation. Now the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) says that we are making this Bill ridiculous because the chapter containing that section says that it refers only to intimidation in connection with labour and that the marginal note next to the section concerned has the same tendency, and by deleting these words it no longer refers in any way to labour, and consequently the whole of the legislation becomes ridiculous. But surely that is no argument. This is a matter which can be remedied when the Act is promulgated. It is a matter which can be remedied by the Clerk of this House when the legislation is passed. The marginal note can be corrected. That is no objection to be advanced against the Bill in the second reading when the principle of the Bill should be discussed. It is just a nonsensical argument which should not be used in this House. Then the hon. member has serious objections to the onus of proof now being shifted by this Bill. Sir, we are tired of hearing from the Opposition in this House all the time in connection with almost every Bill, where the onus is placed on the accused, that we are derogating from the rights of the individual. There are numerous examples in our legislation since 1910 of the onus being placed on the accused. It is nothing new at all. But the members of this Opposition always appear to be behind the times. They have suddenly discovered that there is such a thing as placing the onus on the accused, and now they say that this makes tremendous inroads in our Common Law.

Mr. Speaker, this Bill stands in the sign of the times. It has become necessary under the circumstances, circumstances which have not been created by this Government but which were created particularly by the Opposition, by the United Party and the Progressive Party. They have sown the dragon’s teeth and this Bill is the fruit of it.

We have become so used to Bills of this nature being introduced by this Government over the last 13 years, we have become so used to a succession of Bills which restrict the freedom of the subject and interfere with the rights of approach to the courts for rulings in respect of vital rights hitherto enjoyed, that we are apt to take these Bills now as a matter of course, as a matter of routine. In fact, Sir, the country has become so used to it that Nationalist members opposite do not realize any longer that there is anything wrong with it. They do not realize what is happening. Listening to a speech such as we have had from the hon. member for Heilbron (Mr. Froneman) who is a lawyer, makes one realize just how bad it has become. This is simply one more inroad into our accepted rules, one little further step, and it does not stand out as objectionable as it should. This Bill before us merely carries on the process of subjecting the public to the custom of accepting restrictions with every session of Parliament. Why for instance were these penalties which are now increased in this Bill not increased in 1956 when the Riotous Assemblies Act was amended?

Would you then have had no objections?

Of course we would have objected. But why were they not increased then? This hon. Minister is no tougher than the previous Minister of Justice. The previous Minister amended the Act then, he told us what was good for us, he addressed us over the years in as gloomy and sombre a manner as this hon. Minister has done this afternoon, we were warned by him of the frightful prospects in store for us in this country, and in respect of every Bill which the previous Minister introduced we were told that that was the answer to our problems and the only way in which he could maintain law and order. We thought the Anti-Communist Bill had all the answers to the Minister’s problems, and we remember what he warned us of then.

Sir, we cannot agree to the passage of this Bill, because we do not feel that these hard measures will ease the dangers which the Minister sees before us. The hon. member for Heilbron delivered a speech which was a shocking one from a lawyer, and even the hon. the Minister must have said: “Save me from my friend.” The hon. member for Heilbron made an attack on the hon. member for Salt River, because the hon. member for Salt River had called this Bill by a “bad” name, and he said that when the Bill becomes an Act, the Africans will always call it by that “bad” name. Sir, we think, and the hon. member for Salt River thinks that the measure is a bad measure. Must we then refrain from saying what we think for fear of the fact that the Africans will say the same about it? Sir, if we thought it was wrong to hold the referendum as we did, if we thought that the method of holding the referendum was wrong because all the people who were entitled to the vote were not given the vote in the referendum and the people who were entitled to be consulted in regard to the referendum were not consulted on the establishment of a republic, were we to keep quiet and hide the truth, as the hon. member for Heilbron apparently wants us to do merely because the people who were not consulted would complain that they were not consulted?

Who are these people?

The Africans. The hon. member for Heilbron dealt with them; he quoted from a pamphlet. It comes back to the same complaint against this side the whole time that we must not criticize, because if we do people will believe what we say and they will use what we say against the Government.

Since when is abuse argument?

We have never abused our rights in this House, Sir. The hon. member dealt with the question of trial by jury. To show how irrelevant his argument was, in dealing with Clause 5 (the jury clause), he said that there was nothing wrong with Clause 5, that there was nothing wrong in taking away the right of trial by jury. He went on to attack trial by jury until Mr. Speaker had to pull him up. And in the same breath the hon. member then asked why we objected to this amendment as it would only be effective for one year. Sir, if trial by jury is so bad as he attempted to convey to this House, one would have thought that he would have asked the Minister to extend it for all time and not just for a year. But he gets up and attacks trial by jury and then he says that we should not object because after all it is only for one year.

Listening to the speech of the hon. member for Smithfield, what amazed me was that he said that the right of bail could already be refused for 48 hours, and the Minister asked, if the principle was right to deny bail for 48 hours, what was wrong with denying it for 12 days? Sir, if the hon. the Minister wants to argue that way, you might as well say that on the same principle it can be denied for 20 years.

Yes, but then criticize the time and not the principle.

We do criticize the time as well. Sir, 48 hours is a reasonable time in which to expect the accused to be brought to court and to be charged. The time of 48 hours was fixed because it was reasonable. But the 48 hours has got nothing to do with bail. The accused can apply for bail before the 48 hours are up, and I think the hon. member for Smithfield missed the point too. Why was the period of 12 days fixed? The hon. member for Smithfield says that it is all right and that 12 days is only a little longer than 48 hours. But why 12 days, why not a week, why not a fortnight?

We can always accept an amendment making it 14 days.

No, I am asking the hon. the Minister to justify this period of 12 days. He must have had a reason to pick on 12 days, and we have had no explanation from him or the other hon. members who have so far spoken as to why this particular period was chosen. The hon. member for Smithfield said that this was less harsh than applying a state of emergency. He said that we could not continually declare a state of emergency throughout the year. But this Bill of course now has the effect of declaring a state of emergency for 12 months, because the Minister takes steps under this Bill to enable him to do what virtually amounts to applying a state of emergency. In order to protect safety, he is now taking powers in this Bill which will last for 12 months, and I say that he in effect is taking powers which formerly he could only have in a state of emergency. In dealing with this question of bail, the Minister says that he has to pass this clause because the courts won’t refuse bail merely on the grounds of public safety. But if that is what the Minister is getting at, if that is all the Minister wants to achieve, why does he not say so in this Bill, why not introduce that as a reason for the court to refuse bail, instead of coming with this wide provision allowing the Attorney-General and the Minister to prevent anybody from getting bail for a period of 12 days? This is far too wide. The hon. Minister has not justified the wide terms of this measure. It is useless to tell us that the Attorney-General is an independent official and that he will not act unless he thinks it is right to do so. But the hon. the Minister knows that he has the power to overrule the Attorney-General and to tell the Attorney-General what to do. The Minister will be getting the information from his security officers, from his Police Force, probably more information than the Attorney-General will have. The Minister will be in close touch with the police at all times, and will know what they are doing. I say that it is most likely that the hon. the Minister in the circumstances will use his influence with the Attorney-General in cases of this nature.

Not this Minister.

Knowing the hon. Minister’s past in another Department, I am afraid I am not prepared to accept his word so easily in this matter that he is not going to interfere with the Attorney-General. As the hon. member for Salt River asked earlier, when is the Attorney-General going to exercise this power? If somebody is arrested and he is let out on bail after 12 hours and the Attorney-General only then receives information, or gets all the facts before him, will it merely mean that the accused will be arrested again and that the Attorney-General will then keep him in gaol 12 days, and after that perhaps for another 12 days? The hon. the Minister did say that the Attorney-General can apply for an extension at the end of 12 days, for an extension of the period. Did the hon. the Minister mean that the Attorney-General could have him arrested again and that he could proceed in this manner by arresting a man, keeping him in gaol for 12 days, releasing him (because the charge is not ready) and then arresting him again? We know that under the state of emergency people were kept in gaol for weeks and months without any charge being preferred against them at all, simply because charges could not be framed: because it was difficult to frame any charge, and they eventually were released without meeting any charge. Here a man can be kept in gaol for 12 days, be released and then arrested again and kept in gaol again.

What about the 48 hours? It can also happen there, I presume?

The hon. member has not read the Bill. It is not a question of a charge here. He can be kept in gaol for 12 days, but I want to know from the hon. the Minister whether this is correct: Can he be released after 12 days and then be arrested again and kept in gaol for 12 days again? The Attorney-General, and the Minister, and the House must remember that the Attorney-General only gets one side of the picture. He will get some information from a security officer or from a prosecutor. He will accept that statement and the accused will have no chance of denying the allegations made there. We know that it frequently happens that the Attorney-General objects to bail and he gives as a reason that he is afraid that the accused may interfere with witnesses, or that he may attack some of the witnesses and that he may interfere with the course of justice in some way, and the accused is then given the right to rebut the evidence, and the magistrate or the Judge after hearing the accused often refuses bail, but just as often allows bail if he is not satisfied with the information given by the prosecutor and after he has heard the rebutting evidence of the accused. But in this Bill there is no chance of rebutting the accusations, and as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition rightly pointed out the Black Sash, for instance, could be arrested for demonstrating, in terms of this new Clause 8. The hon. the Minister says that that is far-fetched, but we are dealing with far-fetched Ministers and in far-fetched times and the mere fact is that the Minister has the power to apply the law. It might be done. We are suspicious. The fact is that these women would not be able to protest; they would sit in gaol for 12 days before they would be able to do anything about it, and then they might be let out without a charge being preferred against them. These things worry us and worry the public. If the Minister wants the powers that he says he needs, he should bring in another Bill altogether. It is not necessary to make the provisions nearly as far-reaching as he is doing in this Bill. He can practically do anything he likes now in terms of this Bill.

The hon. Minister says that the Bill as it stands restricts intimidators from stopping workers going to work. But that provision is in the present law. This clause now alters Section 10 of the Riotous Assemblies Act, and it empowers the Minister to do practically anything he likes. He and his Department can stop anybody from any type of demonstration at all. When the Bill was introduced in 1956 there was a special reason for it and the chapter was headed and the clause read that it was to deal with intimidators stopping other persons from going to work. The whole object of that section is now being defeated. By taking out a few words, the Minister is now applying a section which would never have been passed in 1956; even the Nationalist Party Government would not have accepted it in 1956. He now merely takes out a few words, and then says it is only a small amendment and it does not look so bad.

The Minister says that he is prepared to consider amendments in the Committee Stage. But we have dealt with the Minister in respect of other measures and in his address to-day we got a purely political speech warning us of what dangers we could expect, and I tell you this Minister will not be prepared to accept any material alterations to this Bill in the Committee Stage. The line he took in introducing this Bill showed us what he intends to do. He has warned us of dangers lying ahead. The Minister intends applying the hard hand and he wants hard laws to enable him to apply that hand. We cannot support this measure.

It is a pity that the hon. member for Transkeian Territories (Mr. Hughes) made the speech he has, because I cannot describe it as anything but a method of assisting the agitators. Like other hon. members, he has said that the Attorney-General will now be able to do certain things. In the first place this was not a very original idea because we now have the same position as applies to-day in Southern Rhodesia. In Southern Rhodesia the law provides—

In our case a period of 12 days is laid down, but in the Rhodesian Act no limitation is provided.

Are you now in favour of “partnership”?

Whether it is done under partnership or apartheid, the position remains the same. In Rhodesia provision is not even made for a period of 12 days, but bail can be refused for an unlimited period. But now the National Party Government is doing a terrible thing! Hon. members have also used the argument “Yes, but the Attorney-General is a person who will be biased and the Minister has influence over the Attorney-General”. What did Mr. Knight, the Minister of Justice in Southern Rhodesia, say—

But hon. members have now cast a slur on the Attorney-General in the five divisions of the Union. Hon. members opposite have cast suspicion on the Attorneys-General of the Free State, the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal, the Western Province, Natal and Windhoek. They have placed them all under suspicion and I ask whether this is the way to ensure that the judicial system here in South Africa is respected? I do not think that one hon. member will have the courage to make his allegation as regards the various Attorneys-General outside this House. If they should do so, I think that the Attorneys-General would be entitled to institute libel actions against the various hon. members. Doubt has been cast on the character of the Attorneys-General.

That is nonsense!

No, hon. members have implied that they are in effect the “stooges” of the Minister, that they will not do their duty, that they will do things merely to please the Minister. Is this the way to uphold the highest authority in the land?

Who said so?

The hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) and others.

I deny that emphatically.

The hon. member for Salt River has said that he will not be able to adopt an independent position vis-à-vis the Minister. Will the hon. member rise and deny it?

I say that I deny that.

The hon. member will not rise and deny it directly. I shall take this point further. As I have said, Southern Rhodesia has adopted similar legislation, and this is what their Minister has said—

In Southern Rhodesia it is a good thing, but when it is done here in South Africa it is of the devil. There are other provisions in the Rhodesian legislation which are in effect the same as the provisions of this Bill. If a person convenes a meeting in Southern Rhodesia without a permit or even takes part in a procession, the penalty is a maximum of one year’s imprisonment. This Bill contains practically the same provision. But in Rhodesia it is quite correct. Their legislation goes further and gives an ordinary constable the right to break up a meeting if there are more than three persons attending the meeting. But in their case it is all quite in order, but when this Government takes similar action, it is terrible because this is after all a Minister of the National Party! Mr. Pitman, the son of the former Judge-President of the Eastern Province —he is not a Nationalist because I know him well; he was with me at Rhodes—said in the Rhodesian Parliament—

That is what has been said there, but in this country the impression is being created that this Minister and this Government want to establish a dictatorship. Hon. members knew that such an Act had been adopted in Rhodesia, because it was in fact the Star which published an article dealing with it and gave the details, and hon. members after all read that newspaper. When this legislation was introduced in Rhodesia last year, the Star said: “This Rhodesia-ban Bill is tougher than ours.”

Mr. Speaker, when business was suspended I had indicated that these powers which were being given to the Attorney-General were not excessive and that even more far-reaching powers already applied in Rhodesia. I just want to quote the reason why these powers have been granted in Rhodesia from the speech of the Minister who introduced the Bill. He said—

He then went on, and I am quoting this with reference to the argument of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and other hon. members opposite, namely that the law is being changed. The Rhodesian Minister went on to say—

That is absolutely the same position as applies in our case to-day. I may be interpreting this Clause 4 completely incorrectly, but the accused still has the right to go to the court if he can tell the court: “I am doing nothing which is detrimental to the safety of the public; I am doing nothing which is in conflict with the maintenance of public order.” He can tell the court that he has not done those things. In other words, under those circumstances he can still be released on bail.

I now turn to the intimidation which has taken place and in respect of which hon. members have also objected. They cannot deny that in the past there has been intimidation and that it will occur again in the future. I have here the report by Judge Wessels on the Sharpeville inquiry. On page 26 he says—

He repeats this on page 61—

He then goes on to say on page 65—

That is what happened and it is for that reason that the hon. the Minister has now introduced this amendment aimed at eliminating this type of thing. The hon. members for Transkeian Territories (Mr. Hughes) and Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) are unfortunately not here. I still think that the latter should apologize for the insult which he has levelled at the Attorneys-General of South Africa. I still stand by that point, and I think that as a former Minister of Justice he should do so. Hon. members opposite were fully aware of the fact that similar legislation and even more drastic legislation than this Bill was adopted in Southern Rhodesia in November of last year. As I have said, the Star stated: “Rhodesia’s banning Bill tougher than ours.” The newspaper went on to say—

Hon. members opposite are now speaking as though they have never heard of the fact that this type of legislation already exists. But this is not only the position in Rhodesia. There are other parts of the democratic world, of the Western world, where members of the legal profession are becoming concerned—persons such as the hon. member for Transkeian Territories and the hon. member for Salt River as well as the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) (Mr. Plewman) who has also had a legal training—about these conditions with which we are faced to-day. In this regard I want to refer more specifically to an American journal which is as leftist inclined as can be, from which I want to quote the following extract dealing with court decisions which have been given on similar legislation. It begins as follows—

And that is what this legislation now before us is doing. They are asking for exactly the same legislation as the hon. the Minister has now introduced. The article then went still further—

Absolutely the same! They are concerned about the position there and they ask for legislation similar to that being introduced here to-day—

This is the committee to which the hon. member for Salt River has referred to-day. This is the committee of which Mr. Nixon was chairman at one time—

This is happening in a democratic country—

That is what is felt even in America. They say that they cannot wait until the damage has already been wrought. These 264 members of the Bar Association went to their legislature and asked that these matters should be put right before the damage was already wrought.

Hon. members have referred to the “rule of law”. The hon. member for Johannesburg (North) has spoken about the “rule of law” and the hon. the Minister of Justice interrupted him and asked him what he meant by that. What “rule of law” are hon. members referring to? In this regard I want to read to the House from the latest edition of “The Law and Constitutions” by Jennings, in which he makes this interesting remark—

I think the hon. member should know that himself. What is the “rule of law”? He says—

South Africa is after all a civilized state—

That is why the hon. member for Johannesburg (North) could not answer the hon. the Minister—“because it includes motions which are essentially imprecise”. The hon. member is now laughing at his argument.

Mr. Speaker, I now come to my penultimate point. It is easy for hon. members to argue in this House that no violance will be used. But I have here Judge Diemont’s report on the Langa inquiry in respect of which the same allegations were made: How do we know that violence will be used? Hon. members have asked: Why are you already introducing legislation of this nature; you do not know whether violence will be used? On page 27 of his report Judge Diemont says—

Hon. members now say that we should wait until violence has taken place, because various leaders have said that no violence will be used, as happened for example in the case in Durban which the hon. the Minister has mentioned. Here we have the Judge’s finding. But we now find that hon. members opposite no longer trust the Attorneys-General, and apparently they no longer trust the Judges of our country. The Judge then goes to say—

This is the type of thing which is now being defended. I regret very much that the hon. member is not here to-night, but it is this type of speech which is being defended by none other than the hon. member for Wynberg (Mr. Russell). In discussing this instance which the hon. the Minister of Justice and the hon. member for Frankfort (Mr. Froneman) have quoted, the hon. member for Wynberg has said—

It is to deal with this type of thing that this legislation has been introduced. I just want to ask hon. members whether the following is a “peaceful and constitutional request”, namely No. 2 on this page—

This is a “peaceful and constitutional request”. Mr. Speaker, that is my final point. I just want to tell the House that it is quite clear that it is unfortunate that this debate has taken place to-day—it is very unfortunate because this debate has in fact given ammunition to the agitators who want to take action on 31 May.

I think as good a point as any to begin an examination of this Bill at this time is the period a year ago when another restrictive measure of considerable importance was introduced into and passed through this House, the Unlawful Organizations Act. And it was interesting that on both sides of the House at that time consideration was given to the question of making that legislation operative only for a year. Why does one do that? Why does one, in introducing any Act into any Parliament, suggest that that Act or part of that Act should be operative only for a year and subject, after that, to review and reenactment by Parliament if necessary? Clearly one would not do this if one felt the measure was intrinsically a good one, intrinsically a desirable measure in a normal democratic country. So that, in the first place, one only proposes a temporary operation of any restrictive measure when one is admitting, at the same time, that it is an undesirable measure and something that ought to be got rid of.

There is a second factor, Sir. Even when one recognizes the undesirable nature of the measure one is introducing, one still does not make it temporary unless there is some genuine hope, some apparent reason to believe that within the period to which one restricts the action of the measure, things might get better, things might improve. It might in some way become less necessary to have this undesirable piece of restrictive legislation. And I think that in the minds of hon. members on the Government side, and hon. members on this side of the House, who at that time, under those conditions, saw fit to offer support for that Bill—in their minds there must have been a hope that somehow the situation in South Africa would improve; that tensions would get less; that dangers would diminish within the period 12 months from that time. It would have been unrealistic beyond one’s wildest imagination to have thought that anything could happen to improve the situation between last year and now, unless the Government, with the power to control the country, had, during that time, taken some action to improve race relations; had taken some sort of action to minimize bitterness, frustration and hostility in South Africa; some sort of action that might have made legislation of that kind unnecessary after a year. The fact that now the Government comes to Parliament asking for powers that extend further, and extend beyond the powers that were given in the Unlawful Organizations Act, is the measure of the utter failure of the Government during the last 12 months. Things have not become better; they have become worse. Those wide powers which were given a year ago have proved to be inadequate. To-night it is necessary for this Government to come and to ask for powers that are not included in that measure nor, indeed, in any other one of the series of measures to which the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) referred this afternoon, and which give the Government special powers to deal with internal tensions.

Mr. Speaker, the chapter of catastrophes has gone on unbroken since last year. Tensions have built up. South Africa, externally, has suffered rejections, has experienced greater hostility, until one is tempted to cry: “How long, oh Lord, how long?”—how long until the Government will come to realize that it is only by governing the country in a different way that they can prevent the multiplication of tensions and the heaping of one situation upon another which calls for one Draconian piece of legislation upon another.

The taking of greater powers …

Order, order! I hope the hon. member is not reflecting on the legislation passed by this hon. House.

Mr. Speaker, it was my intention to refer to the legislation at present before the House.

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the word “Draconian”,

Very well, Mr. Speaker, I withdraw it. I beg your pardon, Sir, I only intended to refer to this piece of legislation.

There are thousands of years of history, thousands of years of the stories of nations where there have been tensions, where one group of human beings has been set against another; where one group has had it in its power and has sought to keep it in its power to dominate another group. There is hardly one of these stories that does not tell of greater powers taken by that Government. And there is hardly one of these stories that does not tell of the ultimate catastrophic failure of government by the simple measure of taking greater and greater power.

In this debate to-day, Mr. Speaker, hon. members on the Government side of the House —some of them at any rate—have made no secret of the fact that they consider the measure now before the House to be a strong measure. Indeed, I think from the speech of the hon. the Minister, and most particularly from the fact that he said he hoped that the passing of this legislation will be purely temporary—most particularly because the hon. the Minister said this, I believe it is admitted from the Government side that they would rather not do the things which are being done in this legislation. I must say that an exception to that rule is the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (North) (Mr. J. A. F. Nel), who has just sat down and who seems to delight in doing it, and who seems to consider that this was the best possible kind of legislation for anyone to have. But the hon. the Minister, I think, very fairly and very rightly made it clear that he would wish that it were not necessary for him to introduce legislation of this sort. Now if that is so, then one must presume—and one is happy to presume that the hon. the Minister speaking, I think, for the Government, would rather have government by consent than government by force; that they would rather have a situation in which the normal processes of law would be sufficient to control internal disturbances and any internal crime. They would rather have a situation in which it was necessary to restrict bail, unnecessary to step up penalties and unnecessary to create new offences under the Riotous Assemblies Act. And, as I say, I believe—and I am glad to believe—that the hon. the Minister regrets the necessity of introducing this legislation. But I say again that the very fact that it is introduced a year after another such piece of legislation was introduced in this House, is evidence that, given present Government policies in present South African circumstances, it is impossible to avoid introducing into this House this kind of legislation which the hon. the Minister dislikes and which we, on this side of the House, dislike even more.

Sir, this legislation is introduced against the background to which I have referred; the background of the chapter of catastrophes that has been our national history over the last year or two.

Order! I hope the hon. member will leave the background now and come back to the Bill.

This legislation is introduced in order to strengthen Government power, in order to make it easier for the Government to act against people who have not been proved guilty; against people to whom a court would presumably not refuse bail; to act against people for actions which hitherto have not been considered as or held to be crimes. And one speaker from the Government benches after another has told us that this is a sign of the times; that this sort of legislation is necessary in South Africa to-day; that this sort of legislation is necessary because of the circumstances —if I may discuss the circumstances, Sir—in which the country finds itself. The essential character of the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the essential character of the situation which hon. members on the Government side advance as justification for legislation of this sort, is that the Government is acting in South Africa with the consent of only a relatively few of the South African people. It is not governing by consent; it is governing by domination.

I do not want to discuss this in any sentimental way. I want to discuss why this creates the necessity for legislation which even the hon. the Minister who introduces it finds unpalatable.

Order, order! I think I have allowed the hon. member a lot of scope now to state the background. He must now come back to the provisions of the Bill.

Mr. Speaker, with respect, I am doing my very best to abide by your ruling, but would you let me have a ruling on this: Is it competent or is it not competent for hon. members on that side of the House to argue that this Bill is necessary because of contemporary history in South Africa and Africa as a whole, and is it then permissible for me to argue that in terms of that history there is something much better than this Bill that can be done?

The points that have been raised by one side have been replied to by the other.

Is it then your ruling, Mr. Speaker, that the offence that I am committing is the offence of repetition or the offence of irrelevancy?

Both.

On a point or order, Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask you whether you now propose to curtail this discussion?

Order, order! That is not a point of order. What is the hon. member’s point of order?

I wish to know whether the hon. member for Maitland (Dr. de Beer) is permitted to reply to the hon. the Minister of Justice who introduced this Bill?

Order! That is not a point of order.

It is a point of order, Mr. Speaker … [Interjections.]

Order, order!

Mr. Speaker, you must allow me to put my point of order.

Order, order! Will the hon. member resume his seat?

Will you not allow me, Mr. Speaker …

Order, order! Will the hon. member resume his seat?

Yes, I shall.

The hon. member for Maitland may proceed.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Minister, when he introduced this Bill told us a good deal of what has been taking place in the country. He quoted to us speeches that had been made by African organizations, by people who are seeking to organize strikes and disturbances at the end of this month. And he told us that it was against the background of that sort of situation that it was necessary to introduce this legislation. Now, Sir, I am going to suggest, and I am suggesting that the passage of this kind of legislation is most unlikely to put a stop to these evils which the hon. the Minister adduces as the reason for its introduction. In any country in the world there are certain facts of power which do not necessarily accord with the facts expressed at the ballot. In any country those who form an essential part of its economy, those who form an essential part of the body of the State, even if they do not form a part of the electorate have, in fact, certain power to influence the course of events within that state. And my argument is that government will succeed only if it is actually or approximately in line with those facts of power. It is my contention that this legislation of a sort which is admitted to be undesirable, becomes essential when government is based upon a line which is out of tune with the real facts of power in a country. And this, I believe, is the situation that is arising here. And there are two ways in which it can be put right: One I believe permanent, and one I believe temporary and fatal in its consequences

The one way of putting this right is to adjust the line of government to the point where at least a sufficient number of people will consent and will obey the law willingly …

Order, order! That is not relevant now.

Very well, Sir. I will go on to the next point which you will perhaps allow as relevant, and that is the other thing than can be done in a situation like this, which is to try and increase the power in the hands of government to compel and to coerce. And this is a measure designed to put power into the hands of government to compel and coerce. For so long as it remains unnecessary to compel and coerce unwilling citizens it is possible to govern with harmony and it is possible to govern with personal liberty. As soon as that is not possible then one must govern by increasing … [Interjections.]

Order, order! I appeal to hon. members to give the hon. member for Maitland an opportunity to make his speech. It is difficult for me to follow the hon. member in what he is saying if I have to listen to all the other hon. members of this House.

Thank you. Mr. Speaker. I was just saying that if one can govern by consent then one can govern with harmony and liberty. And a measure like this, which admittedly restricts liberties, becomes necessary because the Government is out of tune with consent, because it is not obtaining the willing response of the people whom it seeks to govern.

The rule of law has been discussed by, amongst others, the hon. gentleman who resumed his seat just before I got up. I would not wish to query, speaking as a layman, the validity of the observation of Sir Ivor Jennings which he quotes, that the concept of the rule of law has become somewhat ill-defined in the hands of the many people who have interpreted it. And what I quote now I quote not because I regard it as a definitive edition of the rule of law, but because I regard it as a first class statement of that for which every nation should aim in the administration of justice. The general principle is stated as follows—

This authority goes on to discuss the importance of this personal liberty in relation to all other freedoms within a State, and to point out that freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of association; any of these becomes impossible to exercise once personal liberty has been taken away …

Order! When is the hon. member going to deal with this Bill?

Mr. Speaker, if hon. members will direct their attention to Clause 4 of the Bill they will see that Clause 4 makes it possible for it to be decreed in the case of any person arrested on any offence, that he should not be released, either on bail or otherwise for 12 days. Surely that is a curtailment of personal liberty, which is contained in the Bill? And I would submit with very great respect that that entitles us to discuss the question of personal liberty. Clause 4 of the Bill you will find, Sir, deals with the question of bail and restricts the circumstances under which a person can be allowed to go free and under which personal liberty can be allowed.

Order! I shall be glad if hon. members will give the hon. member a chance to speak.

I would point out that the ideal, and even short of the ideal, of any government which could be called good and satisfactory is government in which that liberty can be permitted, because where it is not a legacy of bitterness and hostility must be left behind which in turn must lead to more disturbance and insurrection and to more Government force being used, and increases in penalties such as we find in Clauses 7, 8 and 9. The taking of greater power leads to the building up of ever greater strains and stresses. It is precisely because of the sort of argument I have heard to-day in speeches from hon. members opposite that citizens of South Africa in many quarters are beginning to feel a sense of desperation and hopelessness and the feeling that it is too late. Hon. members opposite have told us to-day that it is in their view quite impossible to think of coming to any sort of accommodation with the non-Whites or with their leaders, and that there can be no other method than this, but they themselves admit that this method is undesirable. I have argued that it is a method which can only lead to further and further steps in the same direction. It is this that leads to the kind of Götterdämmerung mentality where we do not know whether there is a future or whether we can survive, but we will go down fighting. I believe that we cannot and must not accept that Götterdämmerung mentality, that bunker mentality. I believe that government by consent and without measures like this, government by the ordinary process of law, is worth striving for.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the Bill now or I must ask him to resume his seat.

I was about to deal with an argument the Minister raised in his speech and which as far as I know has not yet been dealt with from this side. The hon. the Minister said that prevention was better than cure and the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) interjected … [Interjection.] The hon. the Minister went on to argue that this Bill with the provisions it contains was a measure of prevention rather than cure. I think it is of the utmost importance that we should take this argument and ask the Minister whether it is really preventive. I know what the Minister means. He means that if you lock a man up before he commits an offence, you have prevented him from committing that offence. That is true.

And to prevent others from committing that offence.

The Minister now suggests that by locking up one man you might prevent others from committing that offence.

That is intimidation.

I want to ask the Minister to consider whether in this sort of situation it is not true that often by locking up a person before he has committed an offence you raise the level of frustration and hostility-amongst others to the point where they who might not have committed the offence now commit it. I do not dismiss the Minister’s argument, but I think this other aspect must be taken into account.

But your case is quite wrong. Nobody says he must be locked up before he has committed an offence.

I am sorry, but the word “prevention” led me to suggest that I do not know what the Minister is preventing by locking up a man if he has already done wrong. Then it is not prevention, but the Minister says this is prevention and not cure, so presumably this measure must be used in order to stop people from doing something they might otherwise do. But particularly with reference to Clause 4, I want to ask the Minister to consider seriously whether the opposite is not the effect of this sort of provision. I do not know whether there is any connection between the routine raids carried out in the Cape and other parts of the country and the fact that as reported in the Press this morning a meeting of Moslems, Cape Malays, yesterday took an extremely drastic resolution. I think the Minister knows what sort of people the Malays are, and I think he is probably as surprised and distressed as I am to see them adopting that attitude. I cannot prove this, but I can only suggest that there may be a connection between what I know to be a sudden flaring up of hostility on the part of that community and the routine raids carried out a short time ago. The only limited sense in which a measure like this can be called prevention is that it is prevention at the very last moment before the offence is committed or the catastrophe takes place, but surely if we want to discuss prevention and cure we must go back to the removal of the basic causes, to the prevention of the disease in the society of which this is only the symptom. We must go back to the grievances which led to the hostility and the frustration, which led to actions of the kind we are trying to stop. Again, if I may refer to what I said in the beginning of my speech, the very fact that we had a measure a year ago which it was hoped would be temporary, and now we have another temporary measure should make it clear to us that along this road we will not find what we look for. The hon. member for Smithfield, in justification of this measure, advanced what is perfectly true, viz. the fact that every African leader of confidence anywhere on the African Continent insists upon the grant to him and to his people of the one-man-one-vote policy. The hon. member for Smithfield argued that it was for that reason not possible to seek a solution by negotiation, but that the solution should be sought by taking greater powers. But what else has been offered? What attempts have been made to negotiate? What sort of reports can the Government bring to us in regard to attempts to obtain the co-operation rather than the coercion of the non-Whites? Again I do not say this in any sentimental way but out of a desire I share with the Minister not to have to do this sort of thing and not to introduce such legislation. Surely if people are led to believe, rightly or wrongly, that there is no hope for them by negotiation, then they are more and more likely to turn to measures of this sort. If some fair and reasonable offer were to be made, it might become unnecessary I put it no higher than that—to introduce legislation of this kind, and even if it does not become unnecessary there might be a better justification at least to offer for legislation of this kind than there is now. But no attempt is made. What we have had was more raids at midnight, more powers to arrest and to hold, more stringent penalties in terms of various Acts and a sense that we are participating in a movement towards a clash because we are not prepared to consider any alternative other than a clash. This is the effect of a law of this kind introduced at this time, at any rate on me as a listener. Hon. members over there simply can consider nothing simply than the strengthening of measures which they know perfectly well will bring counter-hostility, if not to-morrow then in due course. [Interjections.] When a measure of this kind is introduced against this sort of background, it gives one a feeling of moving towards a catastrophe, and it does not make one believe that it can do anything in the long run, or even in the short run, to alleviate the troubles from which we suffer. For that reason, I move—

To omit “now” and to add at the end “this day six months”.

I second.

Order! The hon. member has already spoken to the Question before the House and I cannot allow the hon. member to second the amendment.

No, Sir, I submit that under Rule 62 I am entitled to address you on this amendment.

The hon. member will be entitled to address the House subsequently on the amendment itself, but his remarks must be confined strictly to the terms of the amendment. Who seconds this amendment?

I second it.

I shall try and confine myself to the subject now under discussion to a greater extent than the hon. member who has just sat down, the hon. member for Maitland (Dr. de Beer). I wish to refer briefly to his analysis of “prevention is better than cure”. I see that phrase used by the hon. the Minister in an entirely different light from that of the hon. member for Maitland. I see it in the light that there must be laws for bringing to book those people who are to-day agitators and inciters and who are intent on causing trouble, not in order to better them but to prevent them from continuing their malicious activities and from inciting others and causing trouble. But I want to say to the hon. member that they are using the floor of this House to a great extent for encouraging those people in their wrongdoing. Everything that has been said here to-day and this evening, particularly from the ranks of the Progressives, is actually in defence of and encouragement to those people who want to cause disorder. The hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) corroborated the allegations made in the pamphlet distributed among us and which the hon. the Minister read out, and not only the allegations made in it but also the threats. We are aware that this legislation is not meant for normal circumstances. If times were normal this legislation would most probably not have been necessary. It is for that reason that I regret that the only criticism raised by that side of the House, by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and by the hon. member for Salt River, and also by others, is that the legislation is necessary because of circumstances brought about by the Government. If legislation is to be considered, the necessity or the desirability thereof, it does not help asking what the reasons are which gave rise to the existing conditions. Because this is the only criticism expressed against the legislation it can be accepted that the legislation is necessary. The arguments advanced here are not so much against the principle of the Bill but is interwoven throughout with what the causes are for this legislation. I gained the impression that hon. members opposite are testing the desirability for the legislation by the deeds of the Government over the past 13 years, and I have come to the conclusion that those hon. members’ primary consideration is not the safety of the country or the welfare of the Whites but that it is motivated by their political hatred of the National Party.

Order! The hon. member must not sketch too wide a background.

I shall try to obey you, Sir. The hon. member for Maitland devoted 80 per cent of his speech to this aspect. I do not intend devoting so much of my speech to it. I wish to discuss a few principles of the legislation, but I hope that you will permit me to discuss the background and also the atmosphere in which this legislation is being introduced.

We are aware that legislation is to a great extent aimed at determining the individual’s rights and duties, and also to restrict the individual to a great extent. Statutory legislation is a living adaptation, something which must be adapted to the circumstances of the time. In like manner it has become necessary for us, when the time necessitates it, to introduce legislation of this nature. The times in which we are living to-day are not the times of ten years ago, nor the circumstances of 20 years ago, and much less the times of 30 years ago. Hon. members opposite can easily talk about government of fear” but I ask of them that we, as responsible people, should realize the seriousness of the position and not rise here and wave our arms and accuse the Government of being scared. We are concerned about conditions in the world, and even more concerned about conditions in Africa, and we are particularly concerned about conditions in South Africa. Hon. members opposite must not tell me that they are not also concerned about it. I am convinced that they are. Therefore. I feel that we must review the present position soberly and put our house in order. It is no use saying this one or that one is responsible for the circumstances. The circumstances are there and we must combat them to the best of our ability. We realize that in this country we get threats such as those contained in this pamphlet, but we are also aware that it is not only in South Africa but in at least the whole of Africa that these circumstances prevail. There is a double-column article on the front page of to-night’s newspaper that 200 people, with pistols in their pockets, gathered in Nakura, in Kenya, yesterday to discuss the safety of the country. It is the same position in which South Africa finds herself, if not worse. We are in the same position as the rest of the Whites in Africa, in relation to the large numbers of Bantu. I want to plead that we consider this legislation soberly.

I wish to deal briefly with two principles of this legislation. The one is contained in Clause 4, in terms of which the Attorney-General may, when he deems it to be in the interest of the security of the public or the maintenance of public order, detain a person for a total of 12 days without allowing bail. I think there are obvious reasons for this, but the hon. the Leader of the Opposition mentioned the fact that it should rather be left to the court, and he asked why it could not be left to the court. Mr. Speaker, it is so obvious to me, and I think the hon. the Leader of the Opposition will agree with me, that if this is done it will defeat the whole object of the clause, namely, that, when one has to go to the court to determine what the bail should be and whether the person may be released on bail, then the court should at least be placed in a position to know what the person has done and then the actions and deeds of such a person are made public, and that is precisely what it is aimed at preventing. I, therefore, feel it will defeat the whole object of the clause if this is done.

Mention has been made of sub-clauses (5) and (6). The hon. member for Salt River put a whole series of questions to the hon. the Minister as to why this proviso should be effective for one year only. But in the same breath the hon. member says: We asked for this before in other legislation and you would not grant it. This again shows how inconsistent the Opposition is. They ask for it in certain circumstances, and when they get it in other circumstances they do not want it.

Now I wish to express a few opinions in connection with Clause 5. It deals with the jury system. In Section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Act there is provision for various circumstances where the hon. the Minister may order that an accused person shall not be tried by a jury. All that is being done now is that two offences are being added, murder and arson. I do not regard this addition as being very serious. The hon. the Minister has in any case explained the circumstances and I do not want to elaborate on it but I want to say that in my opinion the jury system is useless. All hon. members who are lawyers will agree with me. We all believe that a judgment should be given on legal considerations and not on sentiment, and it so often happens in the case of a trial by jury that a sentimental argument is advanced to the jury which has not got a legal background.

Order! the hon. member must not discuss the jury system as such. It is irrelevant.

The particular clause clearly provides that where in the case of these offences it was previously compulsory to give the offender the option of asking for a jury, the hon. the Minister may now determine that in certain circumstances—this does not mean to say he must do so—the offender can be denied that right. It is for that reason that I feel, with respect, that I am within the limits of my right to make this analysis.

Yes, the hon. member may discuss that aspect but not the jury system in general.

I say it is not such a big inroad in any case, because I feel that the jury system is not so exalted. We heard from the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that inroads are again being made on the rights of people because these offenders will no longer have the right to ask for a jury. I feel it is desirable and good and I want to go so far as to say that in all circumstances the courts should be based on legal men and legal judgments and not on sentiment or on a combination of laymen. The allegation has been made that this legislation is motivated by fear on the part of the Government and that it reveals weakness. I want to allege that this legislation is a clear indication of strength because it combats the circumstances which we foresee and because the Government has the courage to tackle it and to set it right before matters get too bad. The hon. the Minister said “prevention is better than cure”. I want to go further and ask that those people who are known to be agitators and inciters and who are the cause of these difficulties—we know how susceptable the people in this country are to incitement—be brought to book in good time. Only recently under the Justice Vote much was heard about the long treason trial, but if those people were not engaged in their trial then South Africa would have had more trouble long ago, because those people are the inciters. We know them Not only did we have them in this House but also in the Provincial Council where they incited feelings between White and non-White. I want to express my gratitude for this legislation which shows strength on the part of the Government because through this the Government is combating the trouble and wants to extinguish in advance the fire which it knows will come about.

Mr. Speaker, there is no reasonable person in South Africa whose heart does not want to see law and order maintained and who is not prepared to help the Government of the day to see that that is done. But every well-informed person also realizes that if the overwhelming majority of the population of a country legitimately feels aggrieved and sincerely feels that it is being oppressed and humiliated, and as the result of that it revolts, no Government can for long handle the position with force and oppressive legislation. The mighty Britain has had experience of that in India, Ghana and Cyprus, just to mention a few of the most recent examples. By means of increasingly stricter laws and military force, and with the help of the police, it tried to apply a policy of banning, severer penalties and fuller prisons. Nehru spent 12 years of his life in prison; Nkrumah was behind bars for a long time, and Makarios was banned and locked up. To-day Nehru is the Prime Minister of India, Nkrumah is President of Ghana, and Makarios is President of Cyprus. The Hollanders had the same experience in Indonesia with Soekarno, and the French tried to follow the same policy in Algeria. They also wanted to govern a dissatisfied population by means of force; and now finally the strong man of France, President de Gaulle, has been compelled to come to terms politically with those who were dissatisfied. The point I want to make is this, that it has been proved time and again that a policy of violence, of “vasvat”, as the hon. the Minister calls it, has precisely the opposite effect from what it is intended to have.

The hon. member must come back to the Bill.

The Minister correctly stated that one cannot deal with this Bill in any other way than against the background of prevailing circumstances in the country.

The hon. member should not deviate too far.

I would like to reply to the Minister. The Minister had much to say about the possibilities of having unrest and violence in the country.

On a point of order, the Minister in his second reading speech quoted from pamphlets and speeches made by Natives to show why this legislation was necessary. He told us what they intended doing. Now the hon. member wants to tell the Minister how he can counteract it. I submit that he is merely following the same line as the Minister.

I would like to obey your ruling, Sir, and I will not cover a wider field than the Minister did.

What seat is the United Party going to give you?

It is often necessary to take strict action, and I am not opposed in principle to a strict measure, but strictness, if it is necessary, can only succeed if it is accompanied by a policy which gives as much satisfaction as possible to as many members of the population as possible. And because the Government in this respect falls hopelessly short it has become impossible for the Opposition to support legislation of this nature any longer. For the last few years the Government came to this House year after year with requests for greater powers. Year after year they introduced new “vasvat” legislation. And in that process the freedoms of the citizen and the authority of the courts have been curtailed step by step and, as opposed to that, the powers of the Government and the authority of the police were extended step by step.

Order! The hon. member must now come back to the Bill.

Last year when the Government introduced the Unlawful Organizations Act …

Order! That is not under discussion now.

On a point of order, there have been repeated attempts to curtail the debate on this Bill and I think the hon. member is quite entitled to give the historical background of the Bill.

The hon. member may continue.

Sir, I can assure you that I will remain within the scope of what the Minister himself said in his introductory speech. I will not go beyond that.

Order! The hon. member cannot discuss last year’s legislation.

I am not discussing that….

With respect, why not?

Order! The hon. member may continue.

Last year the hon. the Minister asked for powers to deal with riots. I then warned him that unless the Government could bring about greater satisfaction in the sphere of policy and administration he would again have to ask for even more drastic powers in a year’s time, and that is precisely what is happening now. In spite of the powers granted to the Minister last year, the position in South Africa has not improved. Has anything been solved? Have we got more order? No, the Minister finds it necessary to come to Parliament and to say that the probabilities of disorder are greater than ever before. He must again ask for further powers. Indeed, the position has deteriorated to such an extent that the Government again has to introduce a panic Bill in which it takes further powers; and the result will just be more court cases, harsher action, more severe penalties and even fuller prisons, without there being the hope that it will solve a single problem. In the circumstances I have no alternative but to vote against this Bill. I shall vote against this Bill, and if I could have done so I would have done it with both hands.

You will also ask for protection with both hands.

Mr. Speaker, will you not maintain order in this House?

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, may the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) ask whether you cannot keep order in this House?

Order! Did the hon. member for Salt River say that?

I asked whether you would keep order in the House.

On a point of order, Sir, the hon. member said that you could not keep order.

I did not say that.

You did.

Order! If an hon. member says that he did not say it, then another hon. member must accept his word. The hon. member may continue.

I feel compelled to vote against the Bill in the first place because I believe that the Government already has more than sufficient powers to cope with the position in the country. The Minister admitted it in his speech this afternoon in almost so many words. If he cannot handle the position with the powers he already has, one can come to only one conclusion, and that is that the Government is not able to prevent these troubles or to solve the problems of the country properly.

The second reason why I cannot vote for this Bill is that the Government has consistently shown that it has abused the drastic powers which were entrusted to it in good faith by Parliament. As one example, I want to mention the Suppression of Communism Act. I gave that Bill my wholehearted support because it was necessary. I still think it is necessary and I am still 100 per cent in favour of that Act, but what one must deplore is that lately this Act is being used by the Government in order to get rid of political opponents who have never been communists and who advocate precisely the opposite of Communism. That happens in regard to the implementation of other Acts also, and I think it has now become the duty of the Opposition to put its foot down and to refuse to grant the present Government any further powers which it can use to break down the form of the democracy on which our system of government in South Africa rests. The Opposition dare not accept co-responsibility for the erosion which democracy in South Africa is suffering under the present Government.

The third reason why I am opposed to the Bill—and this is really my main reason—is because this Bill does not really penetrate to the root of the evil which the Minister painted in his speech this afternoon. It neither prevents nor cures. We always had inciters, agitators and Native activists in this country. It is nothing new. Agitators in South Africa are as old as this Parliament itself. We even had an active Communist Party in South Africa for years, but in all that time they never succeeded in uniting the mass behind them. In fact, there has never been a strike or a riot in South Africa because of the franchise. They have always gone on strike or rioted about economic matters or irritating measures. In particular, those agitators never succeeded in getting the Coloureds solidly behind them. In spite of the agitators, the mass of Natives in South Africa has always been peaceful, and the Coloured community even more so. And to-day? Today the picture is different.

The Minister is quite correct when he says that the position is serious. The masses are being increasingly united behind the extremists, and increasingly the demands of the masses for economic improvements are changing into demands for political power. Nobody prevented this less and stimulated it more than this very Government, with all the unnecessarily irritating measures for which it was responsible in recent years. The Government has consistently refused to realize the danger. The Minister referred this afternoon to a meeting which was held on the Parade. He indicated what the Coloureds had said there. I take it he is aware of the mass meeting of Malays held in Cape Town last night. The Malays have always been fairly well disposed towards the Government. What happened at their meeting and what was decided there is, however, an indication of how the wind is blowing in South Africa at present. I want to ask the hon. the Minister: Will he deny that the fact that the Coloureds are to-day co-operating with the Natives in opposition to the Government is the direct result of the Government itself and the measures passed by it? Will he deny that the real reason for it is not the demand for one man, one vote, but the inhuman application of the Group Areas Act and of job reservation?

Order! The hon. member must come back to the Bill.

This Bill solves nothing. It creates false confidence on the part of the public, and the chances are that it will rather worsen than improve the position. Unless the Government is prepared to let strictness—which may sometimes be necessary —go hand in hand with a policy which gives greater satisfaction, it will be quite impossible for me to support fruitless legislation such as this.

It has been pleasant to listen to-night to the leader of a future party discussing a Bill to-night and talking such nonsense. We have listened to the Progressives whom I have considered to be good debaters. One hon. member has asked: “How can the rule of law be an unruly horse if the law is an ass?” Then one of them said: “The law is a mule.” With the apologies to Disraeli I just want to say “But the Progressives are the mules of politics, obstinate animals that produce nothing”.

I now want to come back to the Bill. When one analyses it, Clause 1 is quite simple. In the first place the Minister says that he is going to withdraw the exemption in respect of permits for shotguns and .22 cartridges. That is to say, whereas these shotguns and .22 and shotgun cartridges could in the past circulate freely amongst all sections of the community—Natives, Indians and other non-Whites as well as certain irresponsible Whites—that will no longer be the position in future. The Minister is now restricting it. The Opposition says that this is a weakness in the legislation. In the first place, where is their moral obligation to the people of South Africa? Where is their ordinary common sense as normal citizens of the country? They are the people who plead for justice and for the protection of our own South African nation, English-speaking as well as Afrikaans-speaking, as well as the non-White population. They want this position to continue whereby anyone can freely acquire shotguns and .22 cartridges and do what he likes with them so that smuggling can continue unhindered. That is the first point. I am surprised that the Leader of the Opposition did not study the Bill before speaking. Hon. members have spoken in generalities, they have spoken …

What are you doing?

I am discussing the Bill. They have spoken about democracy and the various types of government which they want and “the right to rule by consent” and so on. It makes one wonder when they oppose democratic legislation such as this, whether the stage has not been reached where democracy is completely bankrupt in this country. Has democracy not been completely lost in this country? Has democracy not degenerated completely and should we not think of something quite different?

I now come to Clause 2 of the Bill. This deals with the general registration of all firearms. In 1937 general registration was asked for and the United Party placed the necessary legislation on the Statute Book. At that time it was a 100 per cent registration. No one complained about it, not even the then Opposition, but to-day it is wrong. To-day we should not know how many guns and how much ammunition there is in the country. We should not carry out a census of these firearms; we should not be able to ascertain where those fire-arms are. Hon. members say that an Act which makes such a provision is a bad Act. It should surely be clear to a school child that if one knows where the firearm is, then one knows in whose hands it is; and if that fire-arm is not in good hands, then one takes it; then one restricts the right to possess that fire-arm. If it is not a licensed fire-arm and it is in the possession of someone to whom it does not belong, then one takes that weapon away. If anyone who does not have the right to do so, possesses a firearm, then one surely knows that he is a wrong-doer or he is a person who does not have the right to possess that weapon, and one takes action against him. Then we will know that all the fire-arms in the country are in the hands of people who will be entitled to possess fire-arms. Why are the Opposition opposing this legislation? They do not want us to ascertain where those fire-arms are. They do not want us to ascertain in whose possession those fire-arms are. [Interjections.] Hon. members can now speak in a different vein, but they have moved an amendment which is hostile to the whole Bill; and consequently we must infer that they are opposed to this clause as well. They want to reject the whole Bill. As a result we can only come to one conclusion, namely that they want to leave these weapons in the hands of people who should not have those weapons. I think it is time the people of South Africa knew that. When one supports a Bill then one should say: I support these provisions or I do not support those provisions. One does not move an amendment which could result in the whole Bill being rejected because then one has ulterior motives. I accuse hon. members to-night of not wanting us to have the right to carry out a census of all the arms in the country; they do not want anyone to know where those arms are. They want guns to be allowed to circulate freely in the country so that there can be an unrestricted smuggling trade. They want these fire-arms to move from one person to another—from White to non-White—without anyone knowing about it, because if we cannot undertake this census, we shall not know where those fire-arms are. They can argue as they like, but they have said to-night that they oppose the Bill. They have moved two amendments and neither of these amendments is aimed at any particular clause, but are both aimed at rejecting the Bill as a whole.

The amendments have nothing to do with fire-arms.

Read the amendment. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition has said that all the words after “that” should be omitted, and where does the “that” appear? It appears before the Bill as a whole. With all due respect to the hon. member for Springs (Mr. Tucker) I want to point out that his leader has said: Reject the whole Bill. An hon. member of the Progressive Party has moved that the Bill should be read this day six months. That means that the Bill should not be read at all. Mr. Speaker, the implication is simply that they do not want the census to be carried out, because they do not want this Bill to pass. If they were in favour of a census they would after all have said: We shall allow these two clauses to pass but not the others. After all, one does not do something by implication. One says that one agrees with this provision or one does not agree with that provision, but one cannot oppose a provision by implication. Mr. Speaker, that is how we have come to know them. This is how they manoeuvre. They want to give the people the impression that they support this clause, but nevertheless they move amendments which would wreck the whole Bill. They are doing so by underhand methods.

I want to go further. Nor do they want those people who have weapons illegally in their possession to be unduly severely punished. No, the penalties are too high. They have had a great deal to say to-night and they have said that the penalties are too severe. We must not punish these people. But what happened in previous years? During the war years when our people did not want to hand over their weapons because they wanted to keep them so that they could defend themselves, then it was a different matter. To-day these same people who introduced those laws are advocating the very reverse. This is illogical. With all due respect to Disraeli, I say once again: The Progressive is the mule of politics, an obstinate animal that produces nothing.

And you are the donkey of the National Party.

I may be the donkey, but I am still carrying my own weight.

Clause 4 deals with the question of bail. Let us now review the position. If difficulties arise and the police or the Defence Force arrest four or five hundred agitators and imprison them, then they cannot after all obtain all the necessary information within 48 hours and draw up the charge sheets in respect of all those people. They must have time to do so because in the meantime the agitation continues. I hold it very much against the hon. member for Salt River (Mr. Lawrence) that he has adopted the attitude he has. I want the country to know this. He is a responsible member who has been a Minister of Justice, although I no longer think he is so responsible to-day. I hold it very much against him that he opposes this provision and says that it is discriminatory and I don’t know what else. What will happen in such a position? There is trouble; one does not have time to try these people immediately but one only has 48 hours. If one has 12 days, it is far better.

Why 12 days, why not 11?

What is the difference? [Interjections.] That hon. member who is a member of the Side Bar surely knows as well as I that it is impossible to collect all one’s evidence within 48 hours and to prepare one’s case if 50 or 60 people have been arrested. The police cannot do it. Many of these cases have to be postponed for days and weeks on end. When there are widespread disturbances in the country, hundreds of people are arrested and it is impossible to try all of them within 48 hours. One has to have time. The police and the Defence Force are engaged on quelling the riots which are taking place and which we assume may take place …

So!

They may take place. But the hon. member no longer believes anything. He only believes in the Ossewabrandwag because …

What do you know about the Ossewabrandwag?

Order! The hon. member for Salt River …

Do you want to say something to me, Mr. Speaker?

Order, order!

I am just listening to this boring hon. member, Sir.

Order!

Allow me to say this, Mr. Speaker. During the war the hon. member for Salt River sat here; he was too afraid to go and fight and I had to go and fight for him.

Where did you fight?

Order! The hon. member for Salt River, I am addressing him. The hon. member for Salt River continues to disregard the authority of the Chair.

I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, but the hon. member has interrupted me to such an extent that I cannot continue. I shall come back to the question of bail. If disturbances should take place …

Are you a member of the Broederbond?

Order! The hon. member for Salt River must withdraw from the House for the remainder of the day’s sitting.

You are a member of the Broederbond and now I shall leave the House.

Mr. Lawrence thereupon withdrew.

On a point of order, is the hon. member for Salt River entitled to make such a remark?

On a point of order. While the hon. member for Salt River was leaving the House, he said: “You are a member of the Broederbond.” That is a reflection on the Chair.

Is the Broederbond then so bad?

You know what he meant.

Order! The hon. member for Edenvale (Mr. G. H. van Wyk) may proceed.

In terms of Clause 4 the Attorney-General—and I believe that he will not do so in every case—can refuse bail and where it is essential that he should do so, he will make use of this power. I have given the example of disturbances. We hope that there will not be any disturbances. But assuming that there are disturbances, then people will have to be arrested and if they cannot be tried within 48 hours, they have to be released on bail. The result is that these people will go free and they will cause the same difficulties as before. Then they will be re-arrested and this will result in such confusion that one will not know where one is. As I have already said, it places the judiciary, the police and all the officials in an impossible position. We know what happens in those cases where a person is arrested over the week-end and he cannot be tried. Then he must be released on bail. Eventually he appears before the court and it takes days and weeks before the matter can be investigated. In the case of ordinary offences such a person does not go out on bail and then commit the same offence. However, in the case of this type of offence, such a person if released on bail will commit exactly the same offence. He will once again endanger the security of the country and he will continue to incite other people. I am very sorry that a member like the hon. member for Namib (Mr. J. D. du P. Basson) is opposing the legislation. I really think the hon. member has not done his homework because if he had done his homework and if his conscience was clean, he would not have opposed this Bill. Furthermore, he has only adopted this attitude in order to establish his little party which was stillborn because all its roots have already died.

The hon. the Minister has referred to the case of Rex v. Shaw in 1920 (T.P.D.). The Minister has mentioned three cases, but this one in particular, in which after the prosecutor had urged that the person concerned should not be released on bail because his actions had endangered the safety of the public, the Judge found that he could allow bail although the man’s actions had endangered the safety of the public. For that reason it is essential that he should adopt this clause, because the courts will find—there is no precedent and legislation is required—that they cannot detain a man if his actions have endangered the safety of the public of the country and that he must therefore be released on bail.

I now come to Clause 6. Take the case of Luthuli and other agitators. They have been banned and they may not appear at meetings. They sit at home but they write pamphlets and they record speeches and these records are played at meetings. The result is that the propaganda continues. This is another provision which hon. members are opposing. They want such a person to have freedom of movement and freedom of speech. We know after all that although such persons cannot move freely, they are continuing with their propaganda, as I have already said, by means of pamphlets and recorded speeches. These activities are being restricted, but why are they opposed to this provision?

Which clause is that?

Clause 6. They are now fighting for the freedom of the agitator, so that he can continue to do just what he likes.

Clause 7 deals with penalties. Hon. members are now complaining and they are saying that a penalty of R200 is too high and that one year’s imprisonment is excessive. I am sorry that we have not made the penalty higher and the period of imprisonment a little longer. Only when a man has been effectively punished will he realize that he has done wrong. They claim that the National Party is trying to pass discriminatory legislation and that we want to intimidate people, but that is not the position. The National Party is trying to work with the Native, the Coloured and all sections of the White population and wants to allow them as much freedom as possible. However, when a person acts wrongly, he must be restricted and he must be severely punished. If one does not chastise one’s child properly, he will not grow up a good child. If one does not effectively punish a disobedient person who is living with one in the same country, then he will not become a law-abiding citizen. The position is that they do not want us to punish such people. We must let these people go unscathed so that they can move freely and do what they like. This brings me to the final clause, namely Clause 8. In the past, when a person intimidated another person, he was guilty of an offence under the Riotous Assemblies Act. We now have the case where one person says to another: “If you do not see to it that that person does not go to work, I shall cut your throat.” He could not be found guilty under any Act; that intimidation could continue. We are now trying to provide protection to people who are being victimized by agitators. We are trying to restrict the activities of the latter. Why are hon. members opposing this provision? Do they support those people or do they not? They cannot tell us that they are opposed to the National Party. These matters are of national importance and the White people of South Africa will call them to account. I am convinced that not one of them sitting here to-night can state with a clear conscience that he opposes this legislation …

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, is the hon. member entitled to refer to hon. members on this side of the House as “them” (hulle)?

I mean “hon. members”. Sir, I did not mean to be disrespectful. It was merely a slip of the tongue. I want to say once again that if hon. members want to clear their consciences they will support this Bill. Hon. members know that everywhere in the country, in the Transvaal, the Free State, South West, the Cape and Natal, the people know that the National Party stands for the safeguarding of the White man as well as of the non-White of this country. They can put forward their various arguments, as the hon. member for Salt River has done—I am sorry he has been ordered out—they can make submissions and they can vilify, but they will pay the price and none other than the people of South Africa will make them pay that price.

The hon. member for Edenvale (Mr. G. H. van Wyk) said that we oppose the clause in regard to fire-arms. He is under a misapprehension and I do not intend to deal with that point.

As far as the question of bail is concerned, I intend to deal with that point in some detail in the course of my speech.

Mr. Speaker, we are opposed to the increased powers taken in this Bill, as has already been indicated. We believe that these extra powers will not help to stop the deterioration which has been going on in the situation in South Africa. The powers which the hon. the Minister and his colleagues have taken in previous years have not helped to stop that deterioration, and nor will this. What is needed is not more powers but some attempt to cure the root causes of to-day’s troubles.

Coming to the clauses of the Bill, I want to deal first of all with the bail clause, Clause 4 of the Bill. I think it is agreed on all sides that it is undesirable that a person should be detained before trial unless there are cogent reasons for it. Until now bail has been refused for only two reasons, firstly, if the judicial officer felt that the accused might abscond and not stand his trial, and secondly, if there was a danger that he might interfere with witnesses. Now it is proposed to change the system in two ways; firstly, it is intended to make the safety of the public and the maintenance of public order a ground for refusing bail, and secondly, the hon. the Minister proposes to give the Attorney-General in each province the decision to decide whether bail should be refused or not, at any rate, for a period of 12 days. As regards the first, namely making the public safety a reason for refusing bail to an individual, the fact that this power is asked for is an indication that we have reached a very serious state of affairs, that is if people who are arrested on a charge and who obtain bail are prepared to go out immediately and commit the same offence. Because that is what the hon. the Minister is afraid of. It suggests a state of frustration with the law which is very serious indeed. Secondly, as to whether the decision to refuse bail should lie with the Attorney-General …

I said that this is still a step this side declaring a period of emergency.

Yes, that is so, but clearly the declaration of a state of emergency is something we object to violently as well.

You know that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that I should rather declare a state of emergency.

That is not our concern. We are clearly opposed to the declaration of a state of emergency. We hope that it won’t become necessary. Quite irrespective of that, we feel that this kind of power is undesirable. As regards the second question as to whether the decision to refuse bail should lie with the Attorney-General or not, I submit that the hon. the Minister has not made out a case for leaving this decision with the Attorney-General. The system of leaving the curtailment of a right such as personal liberty to an official is undesirable. There has been some argument as to what is meant by Rule of Law, but clearly this kind of provision which gives an official of the Government the right to curtail liberty without taking the matter to the courts is a curtailment of the Rule of Law. It is quite clear that the Rule of Law as originally posed by Dicey has not been maintained, but what we do attempt to maintain—and that applies to every civilized country—is the system of the Rule of Law as far as it can be maintained. It is clear that certain decisions must be taken by administrative tribunals, decisions which originally were left entirely to the courts and which, where it is possible, should still be left to the courts. I think what is important to-day is that while we must admit that the Rule of Law as originally evisaged is not being maintained, nevertheless we should maintain it as far as possible. This provision which gives the Attorney-General the decision whether to refuse bail or not is a further inroad on that principle. It is undesirable for a number of reasons. For one, the accused person has no opportunity of being heard. It is an infringement therefore of the principle of audi alteram partem. Up till now the prosecutor has had to adduce reasons to the magistrate why bail should be refused and the accused person has been entitled to be represented by counsel, or by a legal representative, and to contradict those reasons and to give evidence. It is a valuable right to be represented in this kind of inquiry by a legal representative. Now the decision is to be taken behind doors and the person taking the decision does not have to give reasons of any kind. Moreover he is a person who is directly concerned in the case. He is one of the parties to every criminal case. So that not only does he not have to give reasons, but he cannot give the matter that objective approach which is fundamental in any judicial inquiry. There is a further point which I wish to raise in connection with this clause. I want to ask the hon. the Minister about the use of the words “or otherwise” in this clause. Sub-section (1) of the proposed Section 108bis gives the Attorney-General the right to refuse bail and to order that the person shall not be released on bail or otherwise before the expiration of a certain period. I should like the hon. the Minister in his reply to deal a little more thoroughly with the meaning of the words “or otherwise”,

I shall do so.

The question I want to put to him is this: Does the hon. the Minister mean that the accused person need not be released even though he is not brought before a judicial officer at all? Need he not be charged within the period of 12 days? You see, Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Minister spoke of the difficulty of bringing charges against people, and he also spoke of the period of 48 hours. That period of 48 hours is used in the present Act in relation to persons who are arrested without a warrant.

It simply means that a person can be released on his own cognizance.

On his own cognizance. Why did the hon. the Minister speak then of the difficulty of charging people immediately? I cannot see where that point is relevant to Clause 4. Yet in speaking about Clause 4, the hon. the Minister referred to the difficulty of charging people.

That is not the case we are concerned with here. I said that it was difficult to obtain the information. So it takes a long time.

Yes, but how does that affect the question of bail? Why is it necessary to refuse bail merely because it may take some time to charge a person?

Very elementary, my dear Watson.

Perhaps the hon. the Minister will deal with it a little bit more fully in his reply, because the whole essence of this provision is that the Attorney-General may, if he considers it necessary in the interests of the safety of the public, refuse bail. How does that concern the difficulty of framing a charge? I cannot see that the two things are related at all. I still ask the hon. the Minister whether this particular power will be used to detain people for 12 days without bringing a charge.

Getting on to the clause relating to the jury, Clause 5 of the Bill, I think the hon. the Minister has made one point which merits consideration, and that is that if there are going to be long and complicated murder trials, which involve a large number of accused, it may be that the system of trial by Judge and assessors is a more convenient method of trial than trial by Judge with jury. Nevertheless there are two aspects which worry me. In this Bill the cases of murder and arson are now included in the type of case which the hon. the Minister may order to be heard by a Judge without a jury, and there is provision in another section of the Act which states that it is no longer necessary to have assessors sitting with the Judge. To me it seems most undesirable that in serious cases such as murder cases a Judge should be able to sit on his own. I know it is not frequently done, although it has been done—I have experienced it myself. But particularly in the kind of serious case the hon. the Minister has in mind, it is most undesirable that a Judge should sit without assessors. We should be very much happier if there were some safeguard in the Bill which prevented that happening.

To-day the accused has the right to appear before a Judge without assessors. They often exercise this right.

Nevertheless they have the right to demand a jury.

Or the contrary. They can appear before a Judge without a jury.

Yes, but at present the accused has the right to demand a jury, and the hon. the Minister is taking away that right. What is more …

For a specific period for a specific purpose.

The limited period does not appear to be of very great importance in this respect—in fact I don’t think that in this case the period is limited. Whereas the operation of Clause 4 is limited, the operation of Clause 5 is not limited in point of time. Therefore this is not just for a specific time. This is a permanent provision of our law. But as to the specific purpose, there too I assume —because this was the reason given by the hon. the Minister—that it is for the kind of trial that has been going on in Pondoland and in Sekeukuniland where a large number of accused are involved.

That is correct. I explained why.

If that is the purpose for which the hon. the Minister wants this power, we would be much happier to see some safeguard in the Bill which requires a Judge to sit with assessors and not alone in serious cases of murder and arson. That is the one aspect about which I am disturbed.

The second point is this: I am prepared to support a further limited inroad on the right of accused persons to choose juries only while we have Judges of the standard which we have to-day. Originally the jury system was a safeguard of freedom in days when Judges were under the control of a monarch or government. That is not so to-day, but nevertheless it is essential if we are to do away with juries that we should have Judges who are independent and of high standard. During this week I put a question on the Order Paper which the hon. the Minister answered, in which I asked whether he was considering the appointment of Judges from the ranks of magistrates. The answer which the hon. the Minister gave was not a denial. He said that each case would be considered on its merits. When the hon. member for Salt River raised this question again this afternoon, the hon. the Minister appeared to indicate that he was not considering the appointment of magistrates.

I clearly said that I was carrying out the existing practice.

Which is not to appoint Judges from the ranks of magistrates. I should like to clear up this point, because it is a point which is disturbing the minds of many people.

I said that in the past Judges have not always been appointed from the Bar.

It is correct that there have been exceptions where people have been appointed to the Bench from outside.

That is why I said that I was carrying out the existing practice.

The point I want to make is more specific than that. Recently, as was indicated in the reply that the hon. the Minister gave to my question on Tuesday, a senior magistrate of Johannesburg was made a silk and the question has arisen as to whether the hon. the Minister is considering the appointment of Judges from the ranks of the magistrates.

I dealt with all that under my Vote. Are we going to repeat this all over again?

Apparently we did not get a straight answer from the hon. the Minister, with all respect. The hon. the Minister does not appear to be prepared to give an unequivocal assurance that he is not considering the appointment of Judges from the ranks of magistrates. Under those circumstances I wish to say that we are disturbed about the inroads upon the right to trial by jury. If we were to be assured of Judges of a high standard, who are independent, then I think the inroad on the right of an accused person to choose jury trial would be less serious, but unless the hon. the Minister can assure us that we shall have independent Judges of the same standard as we have today, then we are disturbed about any further inroad on the right of choice of a jury trial.

Coming to the amendments to the Riotous Assemblies Act, there are important extensions of that Act contained in the amending Bill. I want to refer firstly to Clause 7 of the Bill which relates to meetings which are prohibited in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. The position at present is that whenever a public gathering, the assembly of which has been prohibited under Section 2, has assembled in a public place, or alternatively where people have assembled quite lawfully but the meeting has become disorderly and an intention is shown of killing or seriously injuring people or doing serious damage to property, then, as the law at present is, a police officer of the rank of inspector or captain or higher may call upon the persons assembled to disperse. Now the proposal is that it shall not be necessary to have a police officer of the rank of inspector or captain but that a head constable may assume this duty, and also if within the time in which he orders the dispersal of the gathering, people do not disperse, then again where previously it was within the power of a captain or inspector to order the use of force to disperse the gathering, now a head constable may assume that duty. We regard it as undesirable that this very responsible decision should be placed in the hands of a head constable. Here too I do not think that the hon. the Minister has made out a case for allowing a head constable to take over these powers.

Why not?

Because it is a most important power to order the dispersal of persons and if the persons do not disperse within a short time, to order the use of force, if necessary even the use of firearms. The dispersal of a gathering which may be excited is a most responsible job. The inquiries into the events of Sharpeville and Langa last year, have shown how tricky the situation can be, how cool a judgment is necessary to deal with such a situation, and the evidence which was led in those two inquiries, shows that even senior officers may not handle the situation as we would like. Now it is intended to give this power to a more junior officer of the police and we regard it as undesirable. By contrast the march to Cape Town which culminated in the gathering of people outside the police station at Caledon Square was extremely well handled, but it was handled so well only because of the ability and cool judgment of the officer in charge. We feel that it is undesirable that a head constable should be given these powers and this responsibility. In Clause 6 of the Bill, also dealing with the Riotous Assemblies Act, there is a further extension of the Act. At present the prohibition contained in Section 2 of the Riotous Assemblies Act gives a magistrate the power to prohibit public gatherings in public places and sub-section (4) of the section says that “any person who, after the prohibition in terms of this section, of the assembly of a public gathering and in contravention thereof, convenes, presides at or addresses; or prints, publishes, distributes; or, in any manner whatever, circulates a notice convening a public gathering”… shall be guilty of an offence. Up to now the offence has only been committed by persons who took an active part in the organization of the meeting, either by presiding at the meeting or by circulating notices of the meeting. Now the section is to go very much further. It will now include persons who in any way make known the meeting, or in any way encourage people to go to the meeting, and again the penalties for an offence under the section are drastically increased. Also in relation to the other amending clause of this Bill, Clause 8, which amends Section 10 of the Riotous Assemblies Act, there is a further extension of the Riotous Assemblies Act which again attempts to plug a loophole in the existing Act and again increases the penalties for offences under it. We believe that this continual extension of the Act which already curtails freedoms and liberties, and which gives further powers to the Government, is undesirable. If it were shown by the Government that such provisions in any way helped to improve the present position, we should hesitate to oppose it, but the fact is that year after year we get further powers without in any way stopping the deterioration of the present position. That is why we on these benches will oppose this Bill as we have opposed other similar Bills in the past. We believe that it is now urgently necessary to eliminate the root causes of the trouble in South Africa. Merely to go on increasing the powers of the Government is not going to stop the rot. Therefore we shall oppose this Bill.

I would like to say that I hope that it won’t be very long before the day comes that instead of opposing legislation which is reducing the area of freedom, I will have the pleasure of supporting legislation which enlarges the area of freedom in South Africa. Sir, I would like to say to the hon. the Minister that I believe that it is a cause for deep regret that he should have found it necessary to come with this legislation at this late stage, and apparently legislation which is designed to deal with happenings which he fears might take place in the immediate future, and I would like to say to him that I believe that the worst time to have legislation before this honourable House is at such a time. I believe that if legislation is necessary, it is the duty of the Government to bring that legislation at a time when the circumstances are such that we can debate it calmly and quietly on the merits of the legislation, and we don’t have, Sir, the attitude which we have seen during this debate. I am glad the hon. member for Cradock (Mr. G. F. H. Bekker) is here because various of his interjections showed quite clearly the spirit in which some of hon. members on the other side are considering the legislation which is before this House. The hon. member for example during this debate in my hearing (I doubt very much whether it reached to you, Sir) made such remarks as “Dit is ’n wet vir skurke”.

Yes.

That is not the sort of spirit in which we should deal with legislation which comes before this honourable House. That is not the only sort of interjection the hon. member made. When another hon. member on this side of the House was speaking, he said “Dit is net vir skelms, man!”, and then the worst interjection that was made by the hon. member and one of which I hope he is thoroughly ashamed was “Ons het net te doen met kaffers”. I do submit that interruptions of that sort show how necessary it is that the Government when legislation is necessary, should bring that legislation before this House at the right time and not in the atmosphere that we have had from some hon. members opposite during this debate. Sir, I wish to deal briefly with the provisions of Clause 2. The hon. member for Edenvale suggested that that provision is opposed. Sir, the amendment which was moved by my honourable Leader shows quite clearly that that is not one of the provisions on account of which this Bill is being opposed at the present time. I would like to say to the hon. the Minister in regard to that provision that I hope he will be prepared to give this House the assurance in his reply to the second reading debate that it is intended that all of the sub-paragraphs of the proposed new 4bis contained in Clause 2 of the Bill, that is paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) will be the subject of one regulation, in other words that the regulation will deal comprehensively with this matter as is the case in this Bill. I have not fully considered the matter, but it does appear to me that it would be possible to issue regulations which deal only with some of these matters, and I don’t think that that would be the right way to deal with the matter. I hope the hon. the Minister will give us the assurance that any regulation which it is proposed to issue in terms of that section will be comprehensive and it will all be part of the same proclamation and brought into force at the same time.

I wish to deal further with Clause 4 of the Bill, the powers of the Attorney-General to prohibit release on bail or otherwise, and I wish to submit to this House and to the hon. the Minister that he was wrong when he dealt with this matter, that his view of the meaning of sub-section (1) was not correct. The hon. the Minister interjected while the point was being raised by the hon. member for East London (North) that the words “or otherwise” dealt with the case where a person was released on his own cognizances. I accept from the hon. the Minister that that is his intention, and if that is his intention, then I hope he will be prepared, if this Bill passes the second reading (I hope he will withdraw it in view of the case put up against it) to accept an amendment in Committee which will make it clear that that is the meaning of “or otherwise”. On the plain meaning of the clause and of the words “or otherwise” it is quite obvious that under the provisions of this clause it would be competent to keep a person incarcerated even if he had been found not guilty by the court before the 12 days had expired. That is clearly within the plain meaning of the clause, and I raise the matter now that the hon. the Minister may give the matter some consideration, and I hope that in reply to the second reading he will be prepared to give the assurance that he will see that this particular provision is amended in the Committee Stage in order to exclude the interpretation which I have mentioned and which clearly is a possible interpretation of the clause under consideration.

The hon. the Minister has said that this is temporary legislation. In other words, the provisions of sub-section (4) are to be on the Statute Book only until 1 June 1962 and that they may be extended by the House by a resolution from time to time. I hope that the Minister by that means that it is not intended to renew this. But of course the fact is that it can be extended from time to time, and the fact that this radical power is being taken is something which obviously we must all regret, and I hope that even now the hon. the Minister will be prepared in regard to this provision to make it of an even more temporary nature. Sir, it is a grave inroad on the rights of the individual for this power to grant bail to be taken away. I think it is one of the fundamental provisions of our law and certainly the fundamental conception underlying our law that a man is innocent until he has been proved guilty before the courts of the land. It is in those circumstances that in all seriousness I put it to the hon. the Minister that this provision is a most undesirable one and that I don’t believe the hon. the Minister or any of his many colleagues who have entered this debate gave one single valid reason why this particular power should be placed in the hands of the Attorney-General. But I go further: The point is made that this in effect places powers in the hands of the Minister and I wish to submit that in fact is the case. Although Clause 4 which refers to the proposed sub-section 108bis refers to the powers of the Attorney-General, it is a provision included in our Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, once this Bill is passed into law, and I would like to refer the hon the Minister to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act which show quite clearly that the Attorneys-General fulfil their functions not only subject to appeal to the hon. the Minister, but under the direction of the Minister.

That goes back much further, to 1927. I do not deny that.

I am glad that the hon. the Minister does not deny that, because the hon. member for Port Elizabeth (North) (Mr. J. A. F. Nel) did maintain that the Minister has not the right to intervene in these matters.

At 10.25 p.m., the business under consideration was interrupted by Mr. Speaker in accordance with Standing Order No. 26 (1), and the debate was adjourned until 9 May.