Mr. Speaker, when the House adjourned last night, I had just referred to the statement which was made by the hon. the Minister of Defence. I indicated that there were certain important questions which had not yet been answered. What we saw was the hon. the Minister giving answers to questions which he himself had set. But he failed to give answers on behalf of the Government, in the same way as the Government has consistently failed over the past three months, to the questions of the South African public, answers to which the South African public is entitled.

The position is that the Government’s own action in requiring servicemen to serve in Angola as volunteers in terms of the Defence Act, is an admission that there is a state of war. A state of war is the only circumstance in which the consent of individual servicemen is required for service outside South Africa. The Defence Act makes this quite clear. There is therefore a state of war. Our young national servicemen and members of the Permanent Force have been committed to military operations in a foreign country on the one hand, and on the other hand the Government of this country has consistently tried to conceal from the public this fact, the nature of the circumstances and the cause for which they are fighting. We believe that when young men are being asked to be prepared to sacrifice their lives and while others at home are being asked to make all kinds of personal sacrifices in support of them, then at the very least the people of South Africa and the Parliament of South Africa are entitled to know the nature of the objective for which people are being asked to fight. [Interjections.] This Government has failed to take the people of South Africa into its confidence as regards the very essential features of our involvement in Angola.

I am not asking for detailed logistical or military secrets. I am talking of the essential features and the nature of the commitment of the cause. As hon. members to my right have mentioned, this provided the basis for destructive rumour-mongering in South Africa. And let us face it, this has taken place over the past few months. It has created the circumstances in which it has been impossible for the Government to rally or to motivate the total South African population behind what they say is a national cause.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I believe that to a very considerable extent it has destroyed a bond of trust which traditionally exists in South Africa between the people on the one hand and the Government on the other. I tell hon. members on the other side that never have I had more members of the National Party telephone me or write to me and say: “What is happening in Angola?” [Interjections.] This trust has developed over the years between the people and the Government, irrespective of whether they have agreed with the Government’s policy or not, and is based on the belief that no government of South Africa would wilfully or secretively go outside the mandate which it had received from the people. And in this case all the evidence is that the Government in the case of Angola has both wilfully and secretively gone outside of the clear mandate of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries.

The Government has repeatedly stated that South Africa’s involvement in Angola has been limited to the protection of the water works at Calueque and of the hydro-electric scheme at Ruacana and to protecting the borders for which we have accepted responsibility. This has necessitated the involvement of South African forces in occasional hot pursuit of terrorist groups who have violated or threatened to violate the border. And there has also been a general assertion, often used by the hon. the Prime Minister, that our cause is the cause of the free world. But it has not been defined in any more specific terms. Now, Mr. Speaker, let me make this point quite clear. Seen from these benches, in the confused state which exists in southern Angola with the lack of a controlling authority, the question of the protection of our borders and of the hydroelectric and water schemes is not an issue between ourselves and the Government. I do not believe that these two situations are really a major issue between South Africa and the rest of Africa or the rest of the world. I might mention to the hon. the Prime Minister that on 8 October I had a lengthy discussion in Dar-es-Salaam with President Nyerere … [Interjections] … at which meeting, inter alia, the question of Angola was raised. I did not sense from the discussion which we had there that as far as Pres. Nyerere was concerned—and he is now on the side supporting an MPLA régime in that area—that this question of the dam or the protecting of the border was a major issue with him at that stage. Let us get this quite clear. This is not the issue between ourselves and the Government and it is not the essence of the issue between the Government and the significant part of the rest of Africa. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the hon. the Minister of Defence added two new areas to South Africa’s involvement in Angola. The one was to deal with refugees and the other with the dangers which could result from the chaotic administrative and government conditions which exist in southern Angola. But once again the hon. the Minister stopped short of giving answers to the key questions which the public we believe is entitled to know.

What has happened over the past three months is that while the hon. the Minister of Defence in particular and others in the Government have repeatedly denied South African military involvement except to the extent of the dam and the protection of the immediate border, including hot pursuit, masses of coincident information have become available to the people of South Africa from various sources. This information has made the Government’s denials more and more suspect and more and more disbelieved. It is a fact that the Government denials are now no longer believed by the people of South Africa. Let us look at the nature of the information which has become available. The Leader of the Opposition mentioned it to an extent yesterday. There have been eye-witness accounts which could be read in the newspapers and journals which come from overseas to South Africa. The Observer, The Telegraph, The Guardian, Newsweek, African Development, almost any journal dealing with international affairs, whether it be a daily, weekly or monthly, has dealt with South Africa’s involvement in Angola. This information is freely available in South Africa.

Secondly, there have been certain diplomatic moves. It has been reported that Mr. James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, called in our representative to discuss South Africa’s withdrawal from Angola. Mr. Henry Kissinger has repeatedly used the phrase of a “phased withdrawal” of South African and Russian forces from Angola. Certainly there is no need for ‘ ‘phased withdrawal’’ from Ruacana which is only 15 kilometres across the border. There have been accounts of interviews with our young men who have been taken prisoner. Granted, they have been made under pressure, but nevertheless they have been given and accepted by the Press. There have been first-hand reports and accounts given by young servicemen who have returned from wherever they have been. We cannot deny this; these are facts. Youngsters are returning from Angola and they are saying where they have been and what they have been up to. There have been reports in the Press supporting the Government on that side, and particularly in Die Burger. There have been repeated detailed reports of the combat situation. Added to that there has been an almost daily or weekly editorial comment arguing the case for South Africa’s continued support of two of the movements and the dangers should South Africa withdraw its active support from those two movements. This has been the tenor of the discussion in Die Burger and the attitude of the editorials day after day and week after week. So a situation has developed that all of these factors combined have established a basis of accepted fact in the minds of South Africans, and in the minds of the rest of the world, that South Africa has become or was directly involved in the civil war in Angola. This has been established in the minds of people, whether this Parliament or whether this Government likes it or not.

I believe that the crisp question which people want the Government to reply to at this stage, because their sons have been involved is: “Have South African forces in fact been involved in the civil war in Angola?” This is what the public wants to know. This is what they are entitled to know as it is their children that are involved. Linked to this question is another: “Why has South Africa abandoned its policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign country?” These are the two questions which are put repeatedly and which I believe the Government has to answer.

There is another question which arises out of the statement made by the hon. the Minister of Defence yesterday. Now that the hon. the Minister of Defence has indicated that South African forces have been withdrawn to a border area, I believe that South Africans are entitled to ask a further question. If it was necessary, as the hon. the Minister indicated, to send South African forces into Angola, to counter the Russians and the Cubans using the Marxist MPLA as an instrument for controlling Angola, why is this no longer necessary? If it was necessary until now, why is it no longer necessary? I expect the Government on the other side to tell us what has changed, what circumstances have changed. The Russians and the Cubans are still there. The missiles are still there. As far as I know the MPLA is still Marxist.

The war still rages. The confusion still continues and the danger, if it is a danger, of the MPLA taking over in Angola, is as great today as it was before. So we want to know and the public wants to know, if it was justified yesterday and the day before, what in substance has changed, since it is now said that there is no need for us to go beyond our protected borders.

Sir, I want to make this quite clear: In analysing our attitude towards this venture we do not cast doubt on the Government’s intentions, or even its motives, in connection with its involvement in Angola. We do not believe that the hon. the Prime Minister would take a decision of this nature lightly. We reject those who assert that our involvement in Angola was in any way an exercise in South African military expansionism. We do not believe that the South African Government wants to impose its will on the people of Angola. We also believe that the collapse of formal authority in Angola was a tragedy for the Angolan people and held potential dangers for the whole of Southern Africa. We accept that these are valid points for any government to consider. We, too, are concerned at the blatant attempt by Russia to exploit the Angolan people for its own imperialistic ends and, to make this action even more despicable, to use Cuban agents to do the Soviet Union’s dirty work. Sir, when I have said all that and I have accepted the intentions of the Government, let me say that we believe that viewed in terms of South Africa’s interests, the Government’s decision to involve us in some way or other in the civil war in Angola was an error of political judgment, and what is more, was an error of political judgment which could seriously prejudice and jeopardize the future security of South Africa. So, Sir, we are saying that we believe that the Government’s judgment in this matter was wrong. We are not attacking its motives or its objectives, but we say its judgment in this matter was wrong.

Who says so?

A lot of people say so.

It is up to the Prime Minister to persuade the public that they are wrong, because at the moment the public believes that the Government has made an error of judgment. [Interjections.] Let me look at a few areas in which I think there has been an error of judgment. I believe that the Government underestimated the extent …

May I ask you whether you are talking on behalf of your party now, never mind the country?

Sir, I want to tell the Prime Minister that we are speaking not only on behalf of this party, but on behalf of hundreds of thousands of voters in all the parties. [Interjections.] Sir, I believe the Government has underestimated the extent to which South Africa’s involvement could be used to cloud the issue of Russia’s intervention and even to give it a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of certain people. The hon. the Minister of Defence has said that because no resolution was passed at the Addis Ababa conference of the O.A.U. therefore there was in fact a division of opinion amongst African states as to whether South Africa’s intervention was right or wrong. But he will concede, regrettably, that what both had in their respective resolutions was that South Africa’s forces should withdraw and should not have been there.

Secondly, it is quite clear that the Government overestimated Western European response to the Russian involvement in Angola. One only has to read the statements anticipating a dramatic Western response to the situation to see that there was an over-estimate of the response of the West. But much more important than that, the indications are that the Government made a serious mistake or evaluated incorrectly the degree of fragmentation which exists within the total American system of government, and that agreement or tacit agreement with one arm of the government does not necessarily mean the approval of the American Government as a whole. Secondly, it miscalculated the mood of the American people in the post-Vietnam era. Sir, I think the Government misassessed the sophistication of the weapons which the Russians or the Cubans would be able to throw into the fray. They either misassessed that, or they anticipated that there would be big power support from the West. I refer to a most alarming statement made by the hon. the Prime Minister in an interview with a certain Mr. G. L. Sulzburger published in America on 25 December, about two months after the reports of our first involvement in Angola. In this interview the Prime Minister said that the Russians were sending sophisticated weapons which were certainly beyond our limits to counter. He continued: “Only big powers can offset this arsenal. It is certainly beyond our limits.” Here is the Prime Minister announcing publicly, whilst our youngsters are somewhere in Angola that South Africa has not got the weapons to counter the sophisticated weapons which the Russians are using. Sir, either the Government miscalculated—and there is no excuse for miscalculating in a situation like this—or else they knew what the situation was when they sent our youngsters in there and I do not believe that they would have done that, or they knew what the situation was, but believed that the necessary weapons they needed would be available from the big powers. How can the Prime Minister say that although we have not got the weapons which the big powers have, we nevertheless got ourselves involved in Angola? I hope the Prime Minister will explain to us the circumstances in which he made that statement, because that statement on its own is an indictment of the Government’s judgment in regard to the whole question of involvement.

The hon. the Minister of Defence said yesterday that our limited objective—I think those were his words—had been achieved, but I want to make it clear that the fact is that South Africa’s involvement in the manner determined and decided upon by the Government was not sufficient to produce either a military or a political result. As a result the struggle for power in Angola still goes on. There is every prospect of protracted and escalating warfare, and the probable result will be a MPLA victory. Now let me say this again. Whatever the Government’s intentions may have been, we believe they have committed an error of judgment in this matter. It has not resolved the Angolan issue. The MPLA is still there. The Russians are still there. The Cubans are still there and the missiles are still there. It has not resolved the issue. But what it has done, as far as we are concerned—and perhaps this is a very important thing for us to learn—is that it has revealed that even at a time when we claimed that we were fighting the cause of the free world, we could not count on a single active participating ally in the West. Sir, this is a very salutary thing for us to find out in these circumstances.

I believe that as a result of this venture the people of South Africa will now have to contend with a new situation. I believe that what has gone past is far less important than how we on both sides of the House are going to conduct ourselves in the future, because the events of the past three months have changed the nature of the political issues confronting South Africa. The Government has abandoned the cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy, that we would not interfere in foreign countries. The spectre of South African militarism, whether we like it or not, once again looms large after the Prime Minister, by withdrawing police from Rhodesia and accepting the fact of Frelimo in Mozambique, had laid that spectre low. I believe that it has created a climate in which it is going to be ever so much more difficult to find an acceptable political solution to the problems of independence and self-determination for South West Africa. But what is much more important is that in the short space of three months we have moved from an era of peaceful, albeit strained, co-existence into a new era of militarism in which the effective defence of South Africa, while we are in the process of reshaping our society, becomes a new and immediate factor. This is a factor and we have to accept this, whether we like it or not; this unhappy situation which has been precipitated by the Government’s involvement in Angola.

We believe that in these circumstances the defence of South Africa will have to be tackled at three levels.

Firstly, the Defence Force will have to be adequate in terms of trained manpower and military equipment to meet any direct military threat across our borders. Secondly, we believe that the Government must take bold diplomatic initiatives. In Africa, especially, it must once again try to achieve peaceful co-existence. I believe that as soon as a single Government emerges in Angola, our Government should make every effort to establish formal contact with the Government of Angola and in addition, offer to assist in getting the shattered economy of that tragic country going again. I believe it is appropriate for us to seek non-aggression pacts with other countries in Southern Africa. It is appropriate for us to seek to enter into formal treaty agreements for mutual assistance with Southern African states which share our desire to see that this part of Africa does not become the victim of big power politics or big power imperialism. Thirdly, I believe that right here at home we must make a more determined effort than we have hitherto to start winning over the hearts and minds of the whole South African people. In order to do that we will have to create conditions within South Africa in which the masses of the Black people, together with the Whites, will believe that South Africa is worth defending and worth dying for.

Do you still believe that the Communist Party should operate in South Africa?

Changes of a fundamental nature in the South African society are no longer subjects for debate or long-term planning. The fundamental restructuring of the society away from race discrimination is an imperative and essential feature in the defence of South Africa.

Do you still believe that the Communist Party should operate in South Africa?

If we want to win the hearts and minds of Black South Africans, we will have to abandon any vestige of colonialism in our attitudes towards our fellow South Africans. We should become the champions of African liberation from discrimination within an ordered and organized South African community. If we want to win the hearts and the minds of these people, we shall have to get rid of discrimination, not as we see it but as the Black people feel it and see it in their daily lives. We shall have to have not only expenditure on the provision of trained men and weapons and a logistic back-up; there will also have to be sacrifices—made by the people who can afford to pay—to find the money for massive expenditure on housing, amenities, education and jobs. There will have to be acts of good faith. It is in the hands of the Prime Minister today and tomorrow to say to the Coloured people that places like District Six will be given back to them. This is the kind of approach that is needed by the hon. the Prime Minister. I believe that a strategy for the defence of South Africa involves the recognition of the oneness of the South African community. In spite of our diversity and differences there is an essential oneness. If we want to have people share in the defence of South Africa in time of war, we have to allow them to share in the decisions concerning South Africa in times of peace. This is not the time for one group to try to impose its will on other people. This is not the time for people to say that they have made up their minds and that this is the final solution. This is a time for the Prime Minister to work towards a consensus, for the Prime Minister to work towards the holding of a conference or a convention, as representative as possible of the whole of the South African people, in order to find agreement on the basic pattern of development in South Africa. I believe that the Government and the Opposition, at this stage, have a tremendous burden of responsibility. We on these benches will discharge our responsibility by being critical of the Government when we believe this to be in the national interest. We will continue to press for the elimination of discrimination, but we will also support the Government every time it takes its courage in its hands and does move away from discrimination. However, until this Government fulfils the commitment it gave to the world, to South Africa and Africa, i.e. that it was going to do everything in its power to get rid of discrimination within South Africa, I believe this Government will be jeopardizing the security and defence of South Africa. It will not have the support of the majority of the people of South Africa and it will not deserve the confidence of this House.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to associate myself with my colleagues who expressed their appreciation for the reasonable and responsible manner in which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Durban Point introduced the debate on a very delicate subject. The hon. member for Sea Point did his utmost to follow their example, but I am afraid I cannot congratulate him on having completely succeeded in his purpose. The hon. member told us how he had been inundated with telegrams in which our people protested against the actions of the Government. It may perhaps surprise him to learn that we in the Government were also inundated with telegrams of support and encouragement, and many of those telegrams were in fact received from supporters or former supporters of the hon. member. Perhaps he will believe me one day when the election is held again and those people do not vote for him.

The hon. member asked quite a number of questions to which my colleague, the hon. the Minister of Defence, has already furnished replies. There are aspects of the hon. member’s speech with which I do not agree, and I hope I shall have time to deal with those aspects. If time does not allow me to do so, there will be other hon. members on this side of the House who will deal with those aspects. I agree with the hon. member that the situation in regard to Angola is alarming. It is a serious situation, serious for Angola, for us, for Southern Africa and also for Africa as a whole and for the world as a whole. In the first place any civil war, anywhere in the world, is always disastrous and tragic. It is far worse if the struggle of one of the parties in a civil war is being waged by foreign troops and advisers, equipped with the most sophisticated and deadly communist weapons. Surely it is self-evident that such a war is not an ordinary civil war and that such a war constitutes a serious threat to the neighbouring states of that particular country. No one can accuse a neighbouring state of such a country of intervention or aggression if it takes the steps it considers necessary to ward off that threat. This was precisely what one of the objectives of our actions in regard to Angola was. Consider the excessive build-up of arms close to our borders, a situation to which my colleague referred. It was a build-up which was completely out of proportion to the requirements for the war in Angola. Nor should we forget that the Russians and the Cubans have for a long time been openly supporting and advocating the use of force against South Africa. By taking cognizance of the threat the Government was not conjuring up spectres. Our involvement was therefore not intervention or a departure from our policy of non-intervention. We have not thrown that policy overboard, as the hon. member said and the hon. member for Bezuidenhout proclaimed in Middelburg. It is no more intervention than the presence of South African Police on the banks of the Zambezi was intervention in domestic affairs of Rhodesia or of the states north of the Zambezi. No, it is the Russians and those who sympathize with them who level accusations such as these at us. Why do hon. members not read instead what leaders in Africa have to say about this matter? Why do they not read what is being said in favour and in support of South Africa in overseas publications? It cannot be mere coincidence that, precisely at this juncture, when South Africa’s alleged involvement in Angola was front-page news throughout the world, voices were raised in support of South Africa. I am thinking of Newsweek, the Daily Telegraph and the Christian Science Monitor. I am also thinking of the failure of the Russian attempt at the U.N. to have a resolution passed against South Africa’s involvement in Angola. These show which way the wind is blowing.

What happened in Angola indeed presents an ugly picture, but although there is reason for concern, there is no reason for panic. If the Government had done what that hon. member and his party wanted, the impression could very easily have been created that the Government is uncertain of its cause, that we had become alarmed, that we had become panic-stricken and had acted precipitately. Surely this is not the case at all. In the first place the hon. member insisted on a special session of Parliament, and in the second place his party requested that the hon. the Prime Minister should make a statement on Angola on the occasion of the opening of Parliament. These are both unusual steps which would have caused a stir in South Africa and throughout the world, and would not have served South Africa’s interests.

However, one can hardly blame the hon. member for becoming so excited and impatient. We must remember that there is someone in that new little team of his who is constantly treading on his heels and breathing down his neck. In fact, I think he is doing so at this very moment. [Interjections.] It is true that this particular colleague of the hon. member has the reputation and has proved that he is a good South African, that he is a good patriot who always places South Africa’s interests first. Such a lieutenant could of course become a very formidable rival, and may not be underestimated by his leader. I shall leave it at that, however; I would prefer to-go on to more serious matters.

Let me say at once that I believe that if it had not been for the Government’s actions during the past few years and until the present day, the position of South Africa in general and its position in Africa in particular and in the world at present, would have been far more difficult.

No, Harry, do not walk out now.

The hon. lieutenant has stopped breathing down his leader’s neck. What would have happened if our actions in regard to the independence of Mozambique had not been so irreproachable? What would have happened if the détente policy with which our hon. Prime Minister took the initiative and to which we made important contributions, had not led to talks instead of an escalation of violence in Rhodesia. In this regard I want to repeat what I said last month in my new Year’s message. I emphasized then that a settlement of the Rhodesian question had become more imperative than ever before in view of the Russian and Cuban presence in a neighbouring state. I feel it is my duty to repeat that a lesson should be learnt from Angola. What is happening there presents irrefutable proof of Russian strategy, namely to exploit problem-situations wherever they may occur in the world to further their imperialistic aspirations to world domination. In view of this the parties in Rhodesia simply cannot allow a situation to arise which could develop into a second Angola.

But I want to return to my theme. Can you imagine what would have happened if representatives of the peoples of South West Africa were not already, at this moment, holding consultations on their future, if South Africa had not succeeded in forming valuable contacts with African states, and if these contacts had not led to combined efforts to find political solutions to critical issues? Can you imagine what would have happened if we had not become involved in Angola? Before dealing with this matter I want to enumerate a few aspects of our actions for the purposes of the record.

I come firstly to the question of the recognition of Angola. South Africa was one of the first states to recognize Angola as an independent country. However, we did not recognize any of the three movements involved in the civil war as a government. In that way we left no doubt that we accepted the principle that the population of Angola could and should elect their government themselves. In the third place I want to repeat what my hon. friend and colleague said. We have no territorial or other ambitions in Angola. In the fourth place we did not try, nor will we try, to prescribe what type of government the people of Angola should elect. Just as in the case of Mozambique and other countries, this has nothing to do with us; it is simply none of our business. If it is the will of the inhabitants of Angola, they have the right to elect for example a Marxist or communist or any other form of government. That is, after all, their business. However, it is an entirely different matter if a foreign power intervenes by force of arms and in that way tries to decide who should govern that country. Our attitude in respect of Angola’s future is virtually the same as that of many African states, for many of the African states, like President Ford and the leaders of most other states in the West, are in favour of (1) a cease-fire; (2) the termination of outside intervention; (3) the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military advisers; and (4) the formation of a government of national unity. Surely that is our standpoint as well. We have remained in constant contact with as many African leaders as possible, as well as with other Governments. They are all aware of our standpoint. Where possible and where necessary we held consultations, and we are still doing so today. Probably there has never before, within such a short space of time, been so much liaison on one problem between Africa and ourselves, and between other governments and ourselves, as there has been during the past few months. In the numerous talks we have held we re-emphasized that our basic policy towards everyone, and towards African countries in particular, is one of peace. Our endeavour is to seek peace and to promote peace. This is fundamental to our attempts to establish contacts with African countries and to expand those contacts. This has been and is our approach in respect of Angola, just as it is our standpoint in regard to South West Africa and Rhodesia. We desire peaceful solutions to their problems. It must be emphasized that South Africa did not force itself upon anyone in Angola. It all began with the Ruacana incident which my friend and colleague has already dealt with fully. I need not dwell on that matter again. However, there is one aspect of the entire Kunene project which I wish to emphasize. Our actions there since August of last year were not the result of and did not stem from self-interest. We were obliged to intervene in the interests of Black people who comprise more than 40% of the population of South West Africa, viz. the Owambo nation, whose water supplies are being threatened. If those water supplies were to be cut off, it would be disastrous for both man and beast. That is how it began. Therefore our objective was and is clear.

Exactly the same also applies to our undertaking to hand over the duties of protection as soon as there are other bodies, preferably an established Angolan authority, that are prepared to take over and capable of taking over this protection in the interests of Owambo as well as of Angola, for this scheme will also benefit a large part of southern Angola. In exactly the same way our further intervention had a limited and very clear objective. Our actions were purely to meet our obligations. Firstly, as an African State we have a duty to Africa; and secondly, as a member of the free world, we have a duty to members of the free world. Wherever it was in any way possible we acted only after consultation with others, but in view of political and military aspects which not only affect us—the hon. member kicked up a terrible fuss on this point—but also affect many others, it is not in the general interest to say very much about this. Our limited objective was to gain time for Africa, and specifically for Angola to devote attention to this particular problem in the hope that the Angolans would be able to solve it themselves without outside intervention.

Have they done so?

Give me a chance. In addition we wanted to gain time so that Africa as a whole could also make its political and diplomatic contribution in order to keep the Soviet Union and other foreign powers out of Africa. It was undoubtedly the plan of the Russians and Cubans to bring the whole of Angola under their control before the OAU could meet or the free world could recover. Presumably they hoped, so we must assume, that Africa would then resign itself to the situation. It must have come as a great shock to them that matters did not take this course, and that such a large number of African States expressed their displeasure at Russian and Cuban intervention in Africa. From this it obviously follows that we do not rejoice in the inability of the OAU to reach unanimity on Angola. We agree whole-heartedly with those African leaders who deplore the stalemate in the OAU, who regard it as a tragedy. The object of our involvement was furthermore to afford other members of the free world the opportunity of realizing what was really happening. We hoped that they would see that what Russia envisaged and was doing in Angola, formed part of Russia’s global strategy aimed at world domination. At the same time we made strong pleas for greater Western involvement. To allege now that the West did not take stronger action as a result of our involvement, is utter nonsense.

Who alleged that?

There were other very sound reasons for this, as I shall indicate.

On our part we did what was expected of us and what we had set ourselves as a goal. Alas! Because of the rift in the OAU it was powerless to make its influence felt. The rest of the free world is rigidly observing the course of events as though hypnotized.

What is happening in Angola is an extremely serious development. However, it is no longer an African issue, but the unfolding of a terrible danger and threat not only to Southern Africa, but also to Africa as a whole as well as to the entire world. Unless the great powers realize in time that if this situation continues the light of freedom will soon be extinguished everywhere for ever, the future for everyone will be extremely sombre.

We believe, however, that it is not yet too late to exclude the power politics and the dictatorship of the Soviet from Africa. In spite of the fact that the OAU was unable to act unanimously, it was clear that a large number of its members would also like to see Angola, and consequently other African countries as well, deciding their future themselves without outside intervention. Even some of the African States that recognized the MPLA are in favour of a government of national unity in Angola. Most of them are strongly opposed to outside domination, whether by Russia or by anyone else. Voices confirming this are already beginning to be raised, also from those who were not among the 22 States.

South Africa’s efforts to find and promote peace will continue unabated. In spite of what has been said in certain newspapers and here as well, our actions in Angola did not frustrate our endeavours to expand contacts with African countries. On the contrary. South Africa’s involvement in Angola led to an expansion of contacts with Africa, as I have already indicated. Instead of being a setback to our detente policy in regard to Africa, our reaction to the intervention by means of force by foreign powers in a neighbouring state promoted our peace offensive, inter alia, because it has furnished proof of our bona fides. My friend, the hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs, has already discussed this, and I do not want to repeat it because time does not allow me to do so. But others also support us. I want to mention only one example. Some of you may perhaps have seen the interesting and extremely encouraging article in the Sunday Tribune of 18 January, an article written by Robert Ardrey, the well-known American writer and authority on Southern Africa. The caption to the article was: “The road towards détente is open for you, Mr. Vorster”. What is more: Our actions in the past have greatly contributed to the fact that the threat which Angola poses to Africa as a whole is being seen in its proper perspective.

The Angolan crisis should definitely not be seen as a confrontation between South Africa and Africa. It is by no means a colour conflict between White and Black Africans. It is in fact a struggle between Africans, White and Black on the one hand, and White Russian and Cuban imperialists on the other. In this context I must remind you that almost two dozen members of the OAU were not prepared to single out South Africa for condemnation, as had been customary in the past. Among those 22 African States were all the Black States in Southern Africa, with the exception of two. Not only these countries, but also those that were in fact prepared to condemn South Africa out of hand, are also beginning to feel uncomfortable about the habit of the Russian guests to take up permanent residence wherever they move in.

What happened in Addis Ababa may influence the Russians to come to their senses, for it is no secret that they would not like to fall into disfavour with Africa. The refusal of half of Africa to accept the Russian attempts to decide the future of Africa by force, must have been an indication to the Russians that Africa, after centuries of colonial domination, is not prepared to tolerate new overlords. I also trust that the Western countries will realize what a great injustice they are doing to Africa by remaining aloof in respect of Angola. I hope they will realize how the seeds of world power politics are being planted here in Africa through coercive communist methods, and what consequences this also entails for the rest of the world. In addition I hope they will realize how the Russians have dragged the Cubans into Africa as well, and that the Russians will not hesitate to turn Angola into a second Cuba, another communist satellite state, thus, which the Russians can use as a springboard for their onslaughts on other African States.

Above all it is, however, for the countries of Africa to make it impossible for Russia, or for any other great power, to use Africa for their own selfish ends. It is for them to make their voices heard in the capitals of the world, as well as in international organizations. They must also make their voices heard in Moscow, with which many of them have diplomatic relations.

The Angolan issue is fundamentally a Soviet Russian issue. It forms part of Moscow’s global strategy. It is truly a serious warning and challenge to the free world, for resignation on its part will undoubtedly act as an incentive to the Russians to realize their further ambitions, first in Africa and then elsewhere. Therefore I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the non-communist world should wake up and should realize that this time it is not merely another minor civil war in Africa, thousands of miles away, in which they have no real interest and which does not affect them. What is in fact happening is that Russian and Cuban actions in Angola are causing a completely new situation to arise in Africa, but also a completely new situation in the epic struggle between communism and the free world. It is the beginning of a new offensive, which is aimed at control over Africa in order to facilitate the conquest of the West. This Government and its predecessors have for many years been sounding a warning that the Russians were gazing at Africa with greedy eyes. Their role in Africa, and at present in Angola, does not therefore come as a surprise to us. Yet we cannot help being impressed by their carefully planned strategy. Why has the choice in fact fallen on Angola? Why did they not choose a country in Africa with a firm pro-Russian government? Why did they choose a country without a government, a country which has been afflicted for years with an anti-colonial war, and subsequently a bloody civil war? They have chosen a country with a great potential, but one that has been temporarily paralysed and turned into a seething cauldron, in which lawlessness, violence, deprivation and want prevail, a country which offers a fruitful breeding ground for communism. Angola was clearly chosen with a view to its situation. They did not choose a country in North or East Africa. There they are already well entrenched. They chose a country in West Africa, a country with a strategic situation in respect of its neighbouring states, in respect of the Atlantic Ocean and the Cape sea route. Their timing is just as significant. They are intervening in Angola at a time when South Africa’s détente policy in respect of Africa is beginning to bear fruit, and this definitely does not suit Russian imperialism. It is happening not long after the tragedies of Vietnam and Watergate. It is happening on the eve of the American presidential election, in the midst of tensions in various Western States, and at a time when the free world is heavily burdened by inflation. It is unlikely that the Russians could have chosen a more inopportune moment for the United States—in fact, for the entire free world—to carry out their ploy, but that is typical of them. [Time expired.]

The hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a very true statement when he said that the Russians had had their eye on Africa for years and that it was their strategy to exploit problem situations. We know this. What is regrettable is that the Government does not avail itself of this opportunity to tell us what it is going to do to improve problem situations within South Africa so that South Africa, all races and colours, may make a united stand against Russia. The hon. the Minister was correct in saying that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition opened the debate on a high level. But, Sir, it is also typical of that side of this House that very soon somebody will get up to try to bring down the level of the debate. We experienced this behaviour yesterday from the hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs. Sir, the times are too serious for me to devote too much time to his speech. It was a miscarriage in any event, it miscarried. He wants to know what I am doing in the United Party …

The hon. member must withdraw that word.

Which word, Mr. Speaker?

The word “miscarriage”.

Sir, I said his speech was a miscarriage.

I feel that the hon. member may as well withdraw the word.

May I not say that it was an abortion?

No.

Very well, then I withdraw it. He asked me what I was doing in the United Party. Sir, let me tell him that I am in the United Party because the United Party is the only political party which has the basic answers to South Africa’s problems. [Interjections.] And just note, Sir, the greater the dangers besetting South Africa, the more the country will have to turn to the answers of the United Party. The hon. member said I was “a lone wolf”. He intended this to be an attack, but I consider it as a compliment. But I want to tell him one thing, and that is that I shall definitely not follow the footsteps, nor in the footsteps of the chairman in the Transvaal who succeeded him. Sir, if he were to undertake a few trips in the Transvaal, he would very soon discover that I am not so much of “a lone wolf" as he would like to believe, least of all in the matter of Angola.

Mr. Speaker, I have always had respect for the political awareness of the National Party. My colleagues will confirm this. But, Sir, it is a well-known peculiarity in the political world that when a leader of a party is on the highest rung of the ladder, that party often is closest to its downfall. For the first time in years the Government is out of touch with what is going on amongst the people outside. A war is not something which can be waged in secret or behind the backs of a people. It is becoming more and more clear to me that the true reason for the Government’s secrecy about events in Angola, is that the Government is unsure of the reaction and of the judgment of the people; because everying points to the fact that the Government has made a miscalculation somewhere.

Sir, three members of the Cabinet have already participated in the debate. The hon. the Minister of Defence did not give a single reason of any consequence for our engagement in the civil war in Angola. The hon. the Minister emphasized the chaos which is prevalent there, he emphasized the Russian and Cuban military intervention in support of the MPLA, and he indicated the threat that this posed for the south. What he said, is true and is to be condemned. But if these were the reasons for our intervention in Angola, what are the reasons for our withdrawal? The chaos is just as bad as it was, the Russians and the Cubans pose as much of a threat as they did before, and the danger to the south is greater than ever now. The hon. the Minister of Defence did not make out a case for or in favour of our involvement in Angola in reply to the question of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition.

The hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs cast a little more light on the subject. But he, too, did not make out a convincing case.

The hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs looked for trouble with a little lecture on patriotism, which according to his dictionary means that in this country one should do as the Government does. We on this side of the House know from experience that the surest sign of those on the opposite side of this House being in trouble, is when they come forward with talks on patriotism. If, however, the hon. the Minister wants me to take him seriously, he must explain which of the two actions he regarded as the patriotic one: Entering Angola, presumably to free the Angolans from communism, or withdrawing and leaving Angola to the advance of communism? I leave it to the hon. the Minister to say which one of the two actions was the most patriotic one.

It is high time that members on that side of this House realized that if it were to come to defending South Africa against aggression, no questions would be asked, not even what government was in power. This side of the House would not trouble itself about who was in power in South Africa if the country was attacked. It has always been the policy of this side of the House, that when this country is being attacked, we do not ask who is in power. At such times there is only one thing to be done and that is to fight and to stand resolutely behind whoever may be in power in South Africa. After all the enemy is not going to ask who belongs to the National Party and who to the United Party.

Out standpoint is, however, that whenever the Government acts beyond the bounds of defence against aggression and involves the country in a war which may lead to an attack on us, it has the duty to consult Parliament, to state its objectives and to motivate the country. If the American Senate, which is thousands of miles away from Angola and which has no direct interest in the affairs of Angola, can meet in secret session for three days to discuss America’s standpoint in respect of Angola, our Government, too, could at least have summoned the South African Parliament to meet. I have it on good authority that one of the major reasons for the unfavourable reaction of the American Senate is the very fact that the Ford administration did not consult and inform its Congress in good time. Exactly the same thing has happened here. The Americans have developed such an aversion towards action, by their Administration, behind the back of their Congress, under the counter and in secret, that the reaction of Congress was such as it was. People over there who know the situation, say that if it had not been for this, the Senate would probably have given its support to limited assistance in Angola.

As far as we are concerned, I just want to add that the time has passed when South Africa could enter a war of any type, limited or otherwise, on the unilateral decision of the Whites alone. The leaders of the non-White peoples in South Africa will have to be consulted in a matter of this nature. Now it has become a matter of the greatest urgency that the Government create permanent machinery so that White and non-White may consult one another in matters of peace and war so that joint action may be taken against the dangers threatening our country. It is alarming to read in a weekend newspaper the comments of Black leaders concerning the fact that they have been totally ignored. We must avoid this, because every man in this country, whatever his race or colour, has an equal interest in his own safety, and the inviolability of our country is just as important to them as it is to us.

The Black leaders who were affected, were consulted in this matter.

We shall only…

The leaders of Kavango and Owambo were consulted in this matter.

South Africa is involved. Did the Government consult the leaders of the Black peoples in South Africa?

The peoples who were affected were consulted.

If the hon. the Minister of Defence tells me that the Owambo leaders were consulted, but this Parliament was not, and that while he was involving South Africa in a military action, then it is so much the more unpardonable.

Let us understand one another. No one on this side of the House has asked the Government to broadcast to the world any information which is essentially of a military strategic nature. The logistic facts concerning a war are usually revealed only when the history of the war is being written. However, we all know that when a country engages in military action beyond its borders, the decision to do so is a political one and that political considerations are behind such a decision. It would be a serious neglect of duty on the part of the Opposition if, with an eye on the future and in view of the Opposition’s responsibilities towards the public of South Africa, it were to fail to demand from the Government to give an account of the political decisions which it has taken or which it will have to take in the future. This holds true especially when war or peace is involved and the whole future of the country which is bound up with that. This is the fundamental function of Parliament. Pressmen are informed of certain events, but Parliament is not. It is essential that we look at the political side of this situation, the positive as well as the negative, so that we may know what is awaiting us and how we are to act in future.

One of the costly lessons that the Americans learned in Vietnam, and which we, too, will have to learn rapidly, is that no matter how conscious the non-communist world is of the dangers of communist expansion, when it is a matter of waging a war in a foreign country, nobody is prepared to come to one’s assistance in the military sphere, no matter how sympathetic they are. In Vietnam it was only Australia, New Zealand and a few neighbouring states which went to America’s assistance against communism. We did not offer to go and help, and nobody held this against South Africa. None but those I mentioned helped America during her struggle of ten years against communism. As in the United States, the parties which were in power in Australia and New Zealand suffered serious setbacks as a result. The fact is that no country in the non-communist world today is willing to have itself involved in military operations in foreign parts if its interests are not directly affected. If the Government truly believed at any stage that it would receive support in Angola in the form of troops from America or from whomsoever, then it made a serious error of judgment and there is something terribly wrong with its military and especially with its political and diplomatic information services. Any Western power who wants to become involved in anything besides a global war must realize—and this is a lesson which we must learn—that he will experience a serious shortage of effective allies.

Another unfortunate fact which we must face, is that today there is hardly a continent in the world on which there are not communist or Marxist states. America has to put up with Cuba, India stands back to back with China, Thailand is a stone’s throw from Vietnam and from China, and in Europe there are several Western countries with communist States as their immediate neighbours and who are forced to live with this situation. No matter how much all of us dislike seeing this on our own continent, it would be unrealistic to believe that communist States or States which are well-disposed towards Russia and China will not emerge on the continent of Africa as well, some of them on our borders. Indeed, Mozambique, which has a long common border with the Republic, is a Marxist State which is trying to mould itself according to the teachings of Mao, the Chinese model. It became this with the open military aid not only of Russia, but also of China. Its capital is just over 300 miles from Johannesburg and from the industrial areas of Natal. The establishment of this Marxist State was accompanied by civil war and disorder in Mozambique. We in South Africa had to take in large numbers of refugees as a result of the chaos there. But the Government decided not to choose sides with any of the factions there and to try and live with the situation. Madagascar, not far from our sea borders, became an out and out Marxist republic a few weeks ago, and declared itself as such. Madagascar was of great strategic importance to us during the Second World War and still is. The establishment of the Marxist State there was also preceded by fighting between the different population groups. Our Government, however, decided to live also with this State on our borders. What might happen in countries such as Lesotho and Zambia and also perhaps in an independent South West Africa in the future, is something which nobody can foresee now. As leaders come and go in Africa, policies and constitutions change. The Transkei is due to become independent this year. As matters now stand, we have no reason to believe that it will seek its salvation from Russia or China. Nevertheless the future remains uncertain. The hon. the Prime Minister said openly that an independent Transkei would be as free as any other country to enter into a military alliance with Russia if it wished to do so. Surely it is obvious that the question may arise in the minds of the public why Angola, for example, as far as we are concerned, should fall into a different category from the establishment of Marxist States on our north-eastern and eastern borders. Not one of the Government’s spokesmen has given a satisfactory answer to this. There is no right-minded person in South Africa who does not realize the danger of the communist threat. If, however, action must be taken, especially military action, one wants to have the assurance that the Government sees the whole picture in its full perspective in Southern Africa, and that it has a comprehensive policy to cover the entire threat, and that it will not, by its action at any place, create more danger than already exists. We are aware of the threats which spokesmen of the MPLA and its allies utter against South Africa; we know that they say that they want to “liberate” South West Africa from their position in Angola. How does this differ from the remarks which were made this week in Lourenço Marques by Frelimo against South Africa? A conference of the Liberation Committee of the OAU was held there. The conference was addressed by Mozambique’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Joaquim Chissano, and what did he say? He expressed himself as follows—

The leaders of the Pan African Congress of South Africa and of the African National Congress were present. He said the following to them—

He added that he was—

Does the Government have a policy concerning these matters? Does it have a comprehensive policy concerning the dangers in Africa? If it does have a policy, what is it? The hon. the Minister of Defence said that he denied that our action in Angola had prejudiced our position in Africa. I would like to put this slightly differently, but basically I do not disagree with him on this point. Our action in Angola did have certain advantages. It had certain advantages for us in certain circles in Africa. It kept the way open for a possible agreement at a critical time. It was definite progress that all 46 African States at the meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa did not simply jump on the anti-South African bandwagon as they did in the past. At the same time, however, we shall have to guard against false reassurances. Not a single one of the 22 which were in favour of noni-ntervention recognized Unita as the government. Not a single one of the 22 asked for anything but a national government in which the MPLA should also have a position of authority. Not one of them recognizes our right to be in South West Africa. Indeed, most of them are sympathetic towards or support Swapo and its Namibia Liberation Army. This includes even Unita as well as countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia. Lusaka in Zambia is still the centre for the activities of the UN against South Africa’s position in South West Africa. In fact, Zambia, together with Russia and China, is a member of the Council for Namibia which regards itself as the provisional government for South West Africa. A country such as Uganda, which was also on the side of the non-interventionists, openly advocates war against South Africa and boasts of its exercises in this connection.

Not one of us can have any doubt about what lies ahead for our country. We can make accusations, because we consider the race policy of the Government as the basic contributory cause for South Africa being in this position. However, we shall have to begin thinking positively and we shall have to take rapid action.

†That is why I want to say that we need a new foreign policy in South Africa with which our internal policies will have to fall into line. If we do not do this, it will be the end of peace in our country and also in Southern Africa. The first essential is that we immediately seek entente, firm entente with the more powerful nations of the West. I am referring here particularly to the United States of America, Prance and Britain. There will be a price to pay, yes, but it will not be a price that we cannot pay and that will not in the end make a better South Africa of our country. Contrary to popular opinion, the leaders of the West never deliberately isolated South Africa. The unhappy fact is that it was because of its apparatus of discrimination on the basis of colour that we estranged ourselves from the Western alliance, and placed ourselves outside the framework of Western values. This was never more obvious than at the time when our country, with Russia and a few of her satellites, stood out alone and together in our refusal to accept the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was essentially a Western effort. It is not enough simply to be anti-communist to qualify for membership of the broad Western alliance. We can return and we will be accepted in the Western alliance once again if the Government carries out the clear and categorical promise it made to the Security Council in 1974 to do “everything in its power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour’’. This undertaking of two years ago should receive priority attention. I can think of no greater act of anti-patriotism than for the Government not to come forward with a comprehensive programme for the removal of discrimination during this current session.

The second priority for a new foreign policy is to emancipate South West Africa and to bring it to independence without undue delay. As long ago as 1966 the Government first agreed that South West Africa was a territory with an international status. That is still Government policy. In the following year, 1967, it accepted the principle that South West Africa’s future was “one of self-determination and independence”. That was 10 years ago. A constitutional conference has now been convened in Windhoek in order to give the various population groups an opportunity to seek a solution to the question of how South West Africa is to become a self-governing state. The objective is right; it is a good one, but now we find that the White leaders of the conference in Windhoek believe that it will take the conference at least three years of talking before agreement can be reached, if agreement is ever reached; and even then no population group will be committed to the terms of an accord. [Interjections.] Another great weakness is that not one of the representatives at that conference has the vaguest idea of the constitutional possibilities which are open to a pluralistic society such as the peoples of South West Africa are, and the retarding effect of this on the conference is obvious to all. Sir, we believe that it is the duty of the Government to give a bold lead to establish a representative and working Government in South West Africa—and it can be done on a federal basis—to whom it can start to transfer power, and then to give the various peoples of the Territory the opportunity to exercise their self-determination through proper elections and through referendums if necessary. Sir, Portugal’s experience in Africa holds a serious lesson for us. The biggest disservice that the old colonial leaders of Portugal did to Portugal and to Africa and to the West was not itself to bring these colonies to independence. Sir, if they had done it in time, if they had done it themselves … [Interjections.]

But you are complaining about the Transkei.

I have never complained about it.

†We would not have had the chaos and the troubles in Angola today if the Portuguese themselves, even as late as under Caetano, had brought them to independence. Sir, that is a lesson for us. We have been controlling South West Africa for 60 years and for 28 of those 60 years this Government has been in power. There is no reason why a solution to the South West Africa problem should not now get the topmost priority. A year or two ago a solution could still have been reached in peace. Now I am afraid that with the adverse developments in Angola the situation has undergone a radical change. We are now faced with a “liberation army”, the beginnings of the same kind of endless guerrilla and terrorist activities which caused havoc in the affairs of Portugal. In the light of these circumstances we firmly believe that it is the duty of the Government to settle the South West Africa question now, and to do it with determination while the external position is still under control. The alternative is, in the words of the hon. the Prime Minister himself, too ghastly to contemplate.

Mr. Speaker, great things have happened to both previous Opposition speakers since we last met. The hon. member for Sea Point, the leader of the Progressive Party, has gained four members to reinforce his party, and the hon. member for Bezuidenhout has become the leader of his party in the Transvaal. I must dwell on these two events for a few moments, but not for very long, before I turn to the rest of the debate.

Sir, the House will recall that the Prime Minister predicted before the previous election that a new orientation of political parties would take place just after the election and that a new party would be founded. He spoke of the South African Party and said that this party would include persons such as the hon. member for Sea Point, the hon. member for Yeoville and the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. Heated objections were raised to the standpoint of the hon. the Prime Minister by the hon. member for Yeoville, and the hon. member for Sea Point agreed with the Prime Minister. I have here a quotation from a report in the Rand Daily Mail, which is unlikely to distort the words of that party, according to which the hon. member for Yeoville said the following on that occasion—

Then he attacked Mr. Eglin on this point—

And there they are, beautifully together.

For how long?

Then the standpoint of the hon. member for Yeoville proceeds as follows—

[Interjections.] This is what that hon. member said a few months before the election, but where is he sitting now? Beautifully together with the Progressive Party. They have not yet adopted the name of the South African Party, just because the Prime Minister predicted that name. But they have no name. They are the “Progrefs” or I do not know what party they are, but arising from the speech made here this afternoon by the hon. member for Sea Point and in the light of the points he made here this afternoon about this serious matter of Angola, I think, and particularly because of his standpoint, unless he wants to deny it, that in his opinion the Communist Party must still be allowed to operate in South Africa—or does he want to withdraw and deny that?—that was his standpoint when I last heard it; in the light of this I think that this party will be able to choose a very good name for itself. The name that this party should choose for itself is that of the Spinola Party, because the course they are pursuing is exactly the same as the one pursued by Gen. Spinola in Portugal, which led to the chaos which prevails in that country at the moment. He found fault with everything in the old dispensation and promised the people a paradise, but in the process he plunged Portugal into the misery in which it finds itself at the moment. I think they should choose to be known as the Spinola Party, because that is what they are headed for.

But the hon. member for Yeoville said something else in the same speech which is very important and which I want to apply to the hon. member for Bezuidenhout, whom I want to deal with now. First I just want to add that the hon. the Leader of the Progressive Party should not be so pleased with the praise for his leadership expressed by the hon. member for Yeoville, for that is exactly what he said of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition about a year ago—

[Interjections.] Sir, I think the hon. member for Sea Point should prick up his ears to hear whether the same words are not being addressed to him by the same man. But the same hon. member for Yeoville also said the following—

How wrong he was! [Interjections.] It is strange that of the names he mentioned, three belong to people who are already sitting there in the Progressive Party. By mistake, one of them is still sitting over there in the U.P., but this hon. member is sitting there with a very specific purpose. The hon. member wanted to be leader at any cost. We have known him for many years, after all. He was a member of our party; then he wanted to be leader and then he formed his own party. Then he was leader of his own party and then he negotiated with the United Party and obtained a seat for himself and there the hon. member sits, for he wanted to be leader at any cost. The hon. the Prime Minister gave a beautiful analysis of the hon. member’s leadership at a meeting in Durban when he said of the hon. member for Bezuidenhout: He is the leader of the United Party in the Transvaal, but what exactly does he lead? The Transvaal is a province with 76 seats, and what does the hon. member lead? The United Party was a powerful party in the days of Gen. Smuts.

Am I to blame for that? [Interjections.] Here the man is sitting behind you.

Of the 76 seats in the Transvaal, the National Party has 61. The Progrefs have eight. That hon. member is one of seven. What exactly does he lead? He leads six members of the House of Assembly, three members of the Provincial Council and two and a half senators; the half a senator, Senator Scheepers, got in with the votes of the United Party members and the Progs. In other words, he leads 11½ people in the great province of the Transvaal. The hon. member’s problem is that he cannot operate in the party as a member of a team. That is impossible. Just listen to the speeches made by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition yesterday, the hon. member for Durban Point and the hon. member for Bezuidenhout today. Surely these are not the standpoints of the same party. That cannot be. Can the hon. Leader accept it once again? How many more times is he going to accept it? Their respective standpoints differ completely. On the one hand there is responsible action, understanding for the problems of the Government, the realization that a situation arose over which we have no control, that a request came from the Ovambos because their water at Calueque was endangered, and there is understanding for all the problems. Consequently there was positive criticism in respect of improvements to our forces there and of the people’s circumstances, in other words, a positive view. This hon. member, however, made a speech which was identical to the one made by the hon. member for Sea Point. They said that everything was wrong, that nothing was right, that we should not be there, etc. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition thinks that he has got rid of his problems. I want to predict here today that as long as that hon. member remains in his party, he will not be rid of his problems. With that hon. member one can have no peace; it is impossible. He is like a millstone round one’s neck, and that is permanent. And, of course, the hon. the Leader of the Progrefs has exactly the same problem with the hon. member for Yeoville. So round his neck, too, he has a permanent millstone.

I do not want to devote much time to the speech made by the hon. member for Sea Point. I just want to react briefly to it and to the speech of the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. The hon. member tried to make comparisons. To most of his questions the previous two Ministers on our side, who dealt with this specific matter, have replied quite adequately. They have replied adequately to questions concerning our involvement and things of that nature. Then the hon. member advanced a foolish argument. He compared the position of Mozambique and Madagascar with that of Angola and said that the position was identical. Does the hon. member not know the facts? Is he being mischievous or is this just an argument which he is advancing for the purpose of this debate? He knows quite well that in the case of Mozambique, too, there was a revolt, but that the Portuguese Government handed over power to the Frelimo group and recognized it as an official government. The people in that country accepted this. So there we were faced with a fait accompli, an established situation. There was a legal government, therefore, which was recognized by everyone and which we too recognized at once according to international law, as is proper. Exactly the same thing happened in Madagascar. We handle these things. However, Angola created a completely different situation. Portugal did not hand over to one of the fighting parties. The battle for supremacy has not been decided. More than half of the African states have not yet recognized the MPLA as the government in Angola. However, the hon. member enjoins us to handle Angola in exactly the same way as Mozambique. Either he is naive or he is completely uninformed—one of the two. What does the hon. member want? When Calueque was threatened, when the water of the Ovambo’s was in danger of being cut off, when those leaders came to ask us to protect them, because they depend on the water for their livelihood, should we have said no, we are not prepared to do so, we cannot because the situation is the same as the one in Mozambique? The hon. member is completely irresponsible in his approach and I think that someone should tell him this.

I have really risen to speak about the position of refugees, for whom the Department of the Interior is responsible. I want to state briefly the policy of the Government in this regard. I want to say at once that we are sorry that this situation has arisen. We know what the people there must be suffering. In the first place, it is our policy to accommodate the people who fled because they were in danger of their lives, and to provide them with everything they need. It is our policy to treat them in the most humane way we can, irrespective of race or colour or who they are. This is our duty as human beings and as Christians. People in distress receive assistance, medical supplies, treatment, food, clothes, and whatever else they may need. However, South Africa is not prepared to lower its standards in respect of permanent residence in South Africa under any circumstances, and for this reason those who do not meet our standards will not be accepted as permanent inhabitants in South Africa. Then, too, we are continually trying to co-operate with other countries and other organizations in order to relieve the distress and to solve the problems of these people. In the final instance repatration to the country of their citizenship, the country where they come from, is our final step.

What has happened here? Between 1 September 1975 and 14 November 1975, approximately 13 000 refugees from Angola arrived in South Africa—I do not want to give the exact figures now. This is a tremendous number. Of these, 1 412 people—men, women and children—met our requirements and were accepted as immigrants in South Africa; so they have achieved permanence here. With the help and co-operation of people such as the Portuguese ambassador—and I thank the Portuguese Government for its co-operation—the rest were absorbed into Portugal, Brazil or Rhodesia. These people were accommodated for more than a month in camps in South Africa. They were transported from South West Africa by boat from Walvis Bay and by aeroplane from Windhoek. Medical services, hospitalization, etc., were provided to them. Without great publicity, and without a single unpleasant incident, these 13 000 people were repatriated to the countries I have mentioned. Here we have a very clear example of the very best co-operation between all the departments concerned with this specific matter. With very little said and without newspaper headlines a splendid and enormous task was successfully completed. Consequently I want to pay tribute once again on this occasion to the officials and departments that were involved in this matter and completed such a great task so efficiently. In all charity, this is not only a question of the handling of refugees. There is also the question of the cost. I agree that one has to be humane, but there is the question of the cost, unforeseen expenditure for which we could not have budgeted. We could not have foreseen that such a thing would happen. I am not going to give all the figures in detail, but the total is more than R4 million. It affects the Department of Defence, the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health, the Department of Customs and Excise, the Department of Transport, and others. Expenses amounting to more than R4 million have been incurred by the State. The State did not ask anybody for money—we simply went ahead and handled the matter. I must say at once that the Portuguese Government agreed and pledged itself to fulfil certain financial obligations in respect of the travelling expenses of these people. We have already received an amount of R75 211 from the Portuguese Government, and negotiations are still being conducted about further amounts to which that Government has pledged itself.

On what was the R4 million spent?

It was spent on many things. An important part was spent on transport. We shall have to provide in the Additional Appropriation for the amount that is required. We have no choice. The whole matter was more or less concluded on 14 November and we can look back gratefully on a successful team effort by the various departments.

Is there no United Nations fund to which application can be made?

There is no fund specifically for this purpose, but I shall come in a moment to the question of international assistance. In this matter there were circumstances beyond our control. We accept our responsibility in respect of these refugees, as we initially accepted the Mozambique refugees as well. But now the situation is repeating itself. After that project had been concluded, various boats containing approximately 2 200 refugees arrived in Walvis Bay. Once again the Portuguese Government co-operated immediately. On behalf of his Government, the Portuguese ambassador accepted the responsibility for the Portuguese citizens among the refugees. I want to say at once that the Portuguese citizens were selected by the Portuguese officials. They decided who were Portuguese citizens. We do not have the right to choose who is a Portuguese citizen and who is not. The Portuguese officials went on board the ship and according to their standards and norms, which I do not question at all, they ascertained who were Portuguese citizens and who were not. Everyone on those boats were taken off as being Portuguese citizens, except for 250 people.

Are they still on the boats?

They are still on the boats. All the other refugees are in transit in South Africa—I emphasize “only in transit”. They have not been granted residence in South Africa. They have no temporary permit or permanent residence. They are in transit. They were conveyed by train from Walvis Bay to Windhoek, and from there by aeroplane to Portugal. At the moment 250 of them are still left on the boats, and we are negotiating about them. According to the Portuguese authorities, these people are not Portuguese citizens. They are not entitled to Portuguese citizenship at all. They are Angolese who are entitled to citizenship in Angola as soon as peace has been restored to that country. In the meantime, as the hon. the Minister of Defence has announced here, we have established refugee camps in the south of Angola, where the Defence Force is responsible for looking after and aiding these people. We have gone out of our way to do everything in our power. However, I think it is time to say that the world as a whole cannot look on without lifting a finger while Russian imperialism advances, leaving thousands of people homeless in the process, and then expect one or two neighbouring States, such as South Africa, Zambia or Zaïre, to accept full responsibility for all the refugees. I think that is asking too much. For this reason the matter has been raised with the Secretary General of the U.N. My hon. colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought the matter to the notice of the U.N. on 22 January. The Secretary General was asked to request the U.N.’s High Commissioner for Refugees to help try and find a solution to this problem. When this communication was handed to him, Dr. Waldheim indicated that he would contact the High Commissioner and the International Red Cross and that he would do his best to enable assistance to be rendered. Dr. Waldheim further indicated that he would appreciate it if the South African Government would cooperate with the High Commissioner and his staff. This we shall do, of course. On the same day a report was received from our permanent representative in Geneva, saying that the Assistant High Commission had approached him about the possibility of having an official from his office fly to South Africa to discuss the matter concerning refugees with the South African authorities. The High Commissioner indicated that his organization accepted the responsibility of repatriating to Angola or to other African countries the refugees trapped on boats in Walvis Bay. He further indicated that financial assistance would be available if the question were to arise. We should welcome this, of course. South Africa’s approval for such an official to come here for further discussions in South Africa concerning the whole matter was immediately transferred to the High Commissioner’s office. The passage of the official concerned was booked for 24 January, but before he could leave, the High Commissioner was apparently informed from New York that he was not to proceed with the mission. In the meantime we have not heard anything directly from the Secretary General and it is not clear whether the possible intervention of the High Commissioner for Refugees in the matter has been cancelled only for the time being, which is the best one can hope for. We do not know what is going on and we are making enquiries at the moment. I may just add that this whole matter of refugees falls entirely within the mandate of the High Commissioner, and even if he were to be prevented only temporarily from aiding the unfortunate persons, it would be a tragedy. It is difficult to believe that the Secretary General or the U.N. would be able to impose a blanket bar on such assistance. Such a step would naturally give rise to serious questions about the reason for the decision.

However, this has not been our own liaison with international bodies; other liaison has taken place as well. The representative of the International Red Cross in Southern Africa asked on 20 January whether he could go to South West Africa to ascertain to what extent his organization could assist in dealing with refugees. His request was immediately granted. He visited Walvis Bay, and according to our information he is still in Windhoek at the moment. However, we have not had any proposals from him yet. So in practice the whole matter has in fact been submitted to these people.

This is where we stand today. There are still 250 refugees on board those ships. The rest have been taken care of. In the meantime we are still negotiating with international organizations in an attempt to relieve the sufferings of these people. We are aware of the fact—I think it is only realistic for us to realize it—that if the MPLA were to advance further down into the south—I am merely speaking hypothetically—it could cause more refugees to move in this direction and it could aggravate the problem to such an extent that it could really become a disaster and a tragedy. I want to say that I trust this will not happen. This is the reason for our attempts to deal with this matter in the right way as far as possible.

Why all this distress and all this suffering, all the destruction of a prospering country? Have these things been caused by the factions fighting for control? Are the three small groups in Angola the cause of this conflict? No, for then its extent would have been much smaller and the weapons would have been much more primitive. The damage would have been much more limited and it would have been a question of a guerrilla war which could go on for years, as we have got used to it in the many countries in which there is a battle for supremacy between various factions. I think that the world must see the situation in a wider light, as being part of a greater scheme, part of a global plan, part of the Russian global strategy for world domination. It amazes me every time that the great countries of the Western world cannot or do not want to see this problem in its proper perspective. Surely it is as clear as daylight that a plan was drawn up years ago according to which international communism was eventually to achieve world domination. The plan was worked out in detail and that plan is being faithfully adhered to, except for the fact that it is a few years behind schedule at the moment. The content of that plan is known; it is not a secret. Russia was first to move into Eastern Europe as far as it was practicable without getting involved in a third world war. This was the first step in this direction and it was executed with great success in respect of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and many other countries. According to this global plan, the next step was to move into Asia and to extend the communist influence there and to strengthen its foothold. This was done with great success in respect of Red China, Vietnam and Cambodia, and at the moment Thailand, too, is involved. The next step, according to the original plan, is Africa. Africa is to be eliminated because it supplies the raw materials for the economies and for the industries of Western Europe and the USA. The specific task of eliminating Africa is spelt out in detail in that plan. The standpoint of Stalin at the time was that Africa would fall into the lap of the communists like a ripe apple if three obstacles could be removed in the process, namely Algeria, Israel and South Africa. So pressure was immediately brought to bear on these three countries in that order in an attempt to overthrow them. In Algeria the French got out—the story of that is known. We also know what pressure is brought to bear on Israel every day and how that every possible means and any possible ally is used in an attempt to embarrass Israel and to eliminate it. If it is possible, Israel must be overthrown. The strategy in respect of South Africa is also known. Originally an attempt was made to strike at South Africa not only by means of insurgence from within, but also by means of small risings inside the country. We all know the plot of the sixties and the communist cells which this involved. We also know that the present hon. Prime Minister, at that time the Minister of Justice, made short work of the communists. We saw through the whole plot and the whole game. That attempt at world domination was transparent. Africa was to be conquered, for if Africa has been conquered and the supply of raw materials to Europe has been cut off, an economically weakened Europe will more easily fall a prey to communism and then, if necessary, there can be an open confrontation to eliminate America. Then the plan will have been carried out in full.

To me, the question is only how long the Western world is going to allow this creeping death, which is proceeding step by step, according to plan, to achieve that predetermined final purpose, to go on before saying: “Here we draw the line.” As long as they are not personally affected, the attitude of the great nations of the Western world seems to be to look on without lifting a finger. However, there are a few phenomena which I consider to be important. The communists are internationally linked up. All communist countries link up with one another on the international level, they have dealings with one another, they meet at congresses, etc., but in the case of the free world there is not this connection between the various countries. Perhaps NATO is the only sign in this direction, but in view of the latest circumstances we find in some countries, NATO has many weak links. The fact remains that countries of the free world are not internationally linked up with one another. Every country is well organized on the national level, but one by one they are heroically going under because there is no international cooperation and mutual connections in order to offer a combined resistance to the wall of the communists’ international alliance. So effective were Russia’s international alliances at the time of the Angola invasion that it could very obviously choose whom it wanted to help it. I think we have all noted how perfectly the choice was made to use the Cubans in this conflict. They did not decide to use the East Germans or the Czechs, nor the Orientals of Vietnam. The Cubans had to be used. Why? In the first place because the Cubans too are a coloured people, with the result that the local population, which is also a coloured one, will not react against them on the grounds of discrimination. In the second place, the Cubans speak Spanish, with the result that they can speak some Portuguese, enabling them to communicate with the local population. This is why Russia chose Cuba out of all its satellite states to come and help in Angola. They are the people who are best able to achieve the necessary results.

This is the kind of situation to which this House and the whole country must give their undivided attention. The question is: How long is the world going to allow this creeping death to continue? The question I want to put to this House today, as well as to the hon. member for Bezuidenhout, in consequence of his irresponsible speech a short while ago, is whether the time has not come for South Africa to speak with one voice at least about matters in which South Africa’s safety is at stake. Is there not a thing such as patriotism in the true sense of the word, which will prevent a man from adopting a certain standpoint here for the sake of publicity, or any other consideration, while he knows that the interests of South Africa require a completely different approach, a responsible approach such as that adopted by his own leader and that of the hon. member for Durban Point? I am not even talking about the irresponsible behaviour of the Progressive Party. The people of South Africa will deal with them the next time they get the chance to do so. It is a party which is not really South African, but which is essentially undermining the foundation of our country and dividing the people of South Africa. That party is paving the way, not only for aggression, but also for chaos in South Africa. I repeat: It is a Spinola party.

I want to conclude. We as a Government will handle the refugee question as humanely as we can and we shall provide for the practical requirements of the refugees. However, South Africa is not going to violate its policy to give people permanence here if those people do not meet our standards. As far as it is practicable, we shall co-operate with international bodies in order to alleviate the suffering of the people and we shall adopt the standpoint in respect of Angola which is the correct standpoint under all circumstances, namely: What are the interests of South Africa? That will determine our actions, no matter what the standpoints of isolated members in this House.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Minister of the Interior ended his speech on a somewhat bitter note. I listened with great interest to most of what he had to say. In fact, in my opinion one could find little fault with the greater part of his analysis. However, when one starts to use patriotism to hide one’s own faults, then that is a sign of moral vulnerability of one’s own standpoint. I am not going to argue on that level.

To me it is important to take up the question which the hon. the Minister asked at the end of his speech, namely: “What is in the interests of South Africa?” A number of Ministers have now stated in this House what the nature of our involvement in Angola is. The hon. the Minister of Defence spoke about a “limited penetration”. The hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that it by no means constituted interference, whereas the hon. the Minister of Defence said that we were in Angola, but that we are now withdrawing. The hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs and of Tourism said that we were there.

Where do you come with that story? Surely I never said that.

It is important that we should avoid this confusion. The hon. the Minister would do well to go and read the speech by the hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We must have a clear answer from the Government. This state of affairs reminds me of a fortune cookie I was given at a Chinese restaurant. The words on the cookie were: “You can bluff all the people most of the time if you have a majority.” [Interjections.] We need not seek to quarrel with each other about Angola across the floor of the House. The question which may be asked in regard to Angola is quite simple; it is the same question which the Minister of the Interior asked here, namely whether now that we have withdrawn, as announced by the hon. the Minister of Defence, South Africa is in a better position than she was before. That is the simple question which must be asked. Can we say that internationally, as a result of our involvement with Angola we are in a better situation than we were before?

Of course.

Are there Western countries that can tell us so openly? Is there any African state which is prepared to state openly that South Africa is in a better position as a result? Can we say that we have improved the chances for a peaceful political settlement in South West Africa as a result? Are our chances any better of reaching a settlement with the rulers of Angola, whoever they may be, in regard to the water scheme which is so vital to Owambo? Can we answer that question in the affirmative? Have we in any way reduced the increasing militarization of Swapo outside South West Africa as a result of our involvement? Have we contributed in any way to the diminution of the increasing Russian participation in Angola? Concerning all these questions we must at least have certainty. However, I do not believe that we have certainty in this regard. The mere fact that we are arguing about this across the floor of the House affords proof of that. The hon. the Minister of Defence stated by implication that this problem was the reason for our initial entry into the conflict in Angola. He said that there were four reasons: Firstly, the terrorist attacks in South West Africa, and secondly, the refugee problem; thirdly, the water scheme, and fourthly, the escalating activities of the Russians in Angola. The hon. the Minister went on to say that we succeeded in our purpose. On that basis we must deduce that in regard to at least one of these aims, we have no further cause for concern. If we cannot do that, then this Government has allowed us to become involved in a political adventure in which there is no second prize for failure. In fact, there is not even a consolation prize.

I am not really all that concerned about obtaining further information about Angola. I am satisfied that information has been furnished to the effect that we were in fact involved. The hon. the Minister of Defence stated very clearly yesterday that we were involved. One could perhaps require further information concerning the nature of our involvement, but the cardinal fact is that we were in fact involved.

However, apart from all the questions, an important principle is at stake too, namely the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another nation in Africa. Let us not simply set this principle aside and pretend that we have not violated the principle. While in the U.S.A. I attended a meeting which was addressed by, inter alia, our Ambassador. This was on about 12 November last year. Our Ambassador was attacked from an extremely irresponsible quarter in the U.S.A. in regard to this specific issue. He rose and stated that we were not involved in the internal affairs of Angola, but that we were protecting our interests in the water scheme. At that time I said to myself: “But that is really as clear as daylight to me. Even though I am not a member of the same party, I agree with him. ’’Why did I do so? I did so because the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another African state is crystal clear. Now the official Opposition comes along and, in the person of the Leader of the Opposition and also of the hon. member for Durban Point, requests further information before being able to say with certainty whether they support this principle or not. I see that the hon. member for Bezuidenhout harbours no doubts in that regard. I am pleased to see it. Thus the official Opposition is requesting more information in order to be able to decide whether they support this principle or not. However, the principle of non-interference, too, is based on facts. It is based on old and well-known facts which are clear to everyone in South Africa. In fact, they are facts which have repeatedly been stated by innumerable members on that side of the House. Perhaps I could just refresh their memories a little. What are the facts on which rests the principle of non-interference? I ask this with specific reference to Angola. Firstly, it is a well-known fact that one of the essential characteristics of Russian strategy in Southern Africa is to get South Africa involved in a war beyond its own borders. The hon. the Minister of the Interior himself has also said this. Secondly, it is a well-known fact that hostile countries are trying to make the entire territory of South West Africa an area of international warfare. It is also a well-known fact that whenever there is colonial withdrawal from any African state, a period of flux and instability usually follows before an established government comes to power. It is also a well-known fact that the militant wing of Swapo is specifically seeking a firm base in an African state in order to be able to perpetrate violence in South West Africa. It is a well-known fact that those who are hostile to us, the Russians in particular, want South Africa to militarize on its domestic front to an increasing extent so that it will not be able to use its manpower and resources to solve its own problems.

All these are well-known facts and I am sure that any member on the other side of the House would have repeatedly brought up these facts in their speeches if they had been taking part in the no-confidence debate last year. Now, all of a sudden, these old facts are no longer important. The new facts are not made available, at the discretion of the Government. The official Opposition and, in fact, the Government too, are apparently prepared to say that the principle of non-interference is seemingly no longer so important. What is going on, then? What role are we now going to play in the matter if we do not stick very steadfastly to this principle? Last year the hon. member for Bloemfontein West introduced a private motion concerning the Russian strategy, the importance of non-interference and the fact that we must not become involved in a war beyond our borders. I remember it very well. Now I am standing here and hon. members on that side of the House are sitting listening to me and behaving as if they do not know what I am talking about. Surely it is clear that they know what I am talking about. All the problems I have mentioned concerned political judgment. They have nothing to do with military efficiency and actions. In fact, I do not differ with the hon. the Minister of Defence in regard to this point. I want to thank him for the invitation he extended to me. I found it invaluable. It is clear to me that the high command of our Defence Force is in the hands of men who compel esteem and respect from any South African, irrespective of the political party to which he belongs. It is clear to me that military preparedness in Africa, and in South Africa in particular, must form the basis for peaceful and non-violent change. But then those changes must take place.

It is clear to me too that the program of civil action to which the hon. the Minister referred is the key to the solution of the problems of South Africa. The fundamental aspect of that programme is that there can be military action for 20%, whereas for the remaining 80% attention may be given to changing peoples’ attitudes and obtaining the co-operation of all the people in South Africa. However, we cannot expect our soldiers to be prepared to act on a military, and even on a civil level if we consistently saddle them with a political mess. Whereas they are prepared to sacrifice their lives, they ask what our politicians are doing to safeguard and alter the domestic situation to enable everyone to retain their loyalty towards South Africa.

You are doing exactly …

They ask us whether there is hope for all the people in South Africa, Black and White and Brown.

… the opposite of what the military is trying to achieve.

Unfortunately I am unable to determine why the hon. member for Waterkloof is getting so excited. They ask us, we who are here in the interior of South Africa, the politicians and the administrators of South Africa, what hope there is for the urban Black man, for the Coloured and for the Black labourer. They want to know what hope there is for these people to improve their opportunities and to increase their loyalty towards South Africa. They ask precisely the same thing of the White man. They ask whether we are prepared to persuade the Whites in South Africa to undertake the vast and fundamental changes which will have to come about in our society. They want to know from us what future we hold out as a prospect for these people, whether they believe in that future and are prepared to work for it. If we do not furnish positive replies to our Defence Force in regard to these questions, we are leaving them in the lurch and demanding from them things which we ourselves are not prepared to give. We in South Africa would then be following the example of the French in Algeria, of the British in Kenya and Rhodesia, and, in addition, of the Portuguese in Angola and in Mozambique. All of us in South Africa, White and non-White, will have to furnish an answer to this question before long.

We shall have to take preventive measures in South West Africa and the people who will have to do it will have to be drawn from our own ranks. If they have to be drawn from our ranks, we shall have to be capable of affording them justification for their actions. What this amounts to is that we shall have to reach a settlement in South West Africa which will have to be acceptable to all its population groups. Not only that; we shall have to reach a settlement here in South Africa too. We shall have to continue to create circumstances here in South Africa in which we shall all be prepared to defend this society everywhere and at all times against any outside aggression.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member who has just sat down said that too little information was available on the nature and extent of our involvement in Angola. What difference does it make what the nature and extent of our involvement there were, as long as it can be motivated as being in the interests of South Africa? However, the hon. member’s party has become alienated from the concept of what is in the interest of South Africa. This is illustrated very clearly by his final remarks on the young men of today who allegedly ask the question: What am I fighting for? I am expected to sacrifice my life on the battlefield, but are things at home as satisfactory as I would like to have them? Sir, this is a total misconception of the idea our young people have of matters of national interest. We have experience of the fact that the young men who defended our country in 1 Military Area did not ask what was happening on the political front. Nor did they ask what the policy of the National Party was regarding the Black man in Soweto; they only asked one question: What is in the interests of South Africa? On that basis they went into battle without a moment’s hesitation. The young people of South Africa, as well as the general public, have been warned for many years about the dangers of the Russian penetration into Africa. The hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs also referred to this fairly comprehensively.

In accordance with a policy which was laid down by Lenin as far back as 1920, National Liberation Movements are created ostensibly for the purpose of liberating the population, but then that Liberation Movement is undermined and taken over by the communists to establish a new order. This strategy is applied consistently by Soviet Russia. In this way, Russia saw the MPLA in Angola as a National Revolutionary Movement. The premise of the Russians is that those organizations need not be communist orientated initially. The re-orientation to communism will in fact follow in due course under the pressure and under the guidance of the Russians.

In the publication Conflict Studies of November from which the hon. member for Bloemfontein East also read, the following is quoted from a book which is published by the Russians, namely “Political Parties of Africa’’:

… in other words, to socialism.

Seen against this background, the content of a speech which Podgorny made in the Kremlin in March 1975 acquires a completely new meaning in regard to South Africa. He said, amongst other things:

The objectives of Soviet communism in regard to South Africa could not be stated more explicitly. To stress this point, I quote from the publication Conflict Studies, in which the following comment is made on an article which appeared in Pravda on 5 June 1975:

Therefore there is no doubt about this. It is confirmed by the contents of an article I have here entitled “Soviet Strategic Crises Management”. It is a summary of an article which was published during 1975 in Strategic Reviews, a quarterly of the United States Strategic Institute in Washington, D.C. I read a few extracts from this article to you:

[Interjection.]

Page 2.

You are quite correct, it appears on page 2 of this particular document. I applaud the hon. member’s insight.

*Seen against this background there is, no doubt about the fact that the aid of the Russians to the MPLA is part of the Soviet strategy against Southern Africa in general and against South Africa in particular. Seen against this background, the South African Government had no other option than to become involved in the battle which was taking place in Angola. As the hon. the Minister of Defence has already indicated, South Africa acted firstly to defend its legitimate interests and secondly in an effort to create peace and order in an area where it was essential that peace and order should prevail.

At this stage I would like to reply to the question put by the hon. member for Rondebosch when he asked whether anything had changed after we became involved in Angola and whether there had been any improvement in the situation. I want to do this by putting a counter-question to him: If we had not intervened to the extent to which we did intervene in Angola, would there still have been a possibility of being able to talk peacefully at a conference table in South West Africa? Would a bloody revolution not have broken out there as well by this time? He should ask himself whether that battle might not have escalated with the result that we would have had to defend our borders at Upington and Kakamas today.

A third reason for our involvement in Angola was to defend the vested interests of the Black people of Owambo, Kavango and the Caprivi and to strike a blow for the free world on the important, strategic west coast of Africa. This must have been a very strong motivation for the Government. That the West reacted to our effort in Angola in the way it did stands as a pitiful accusation against them. There was a fifth reason as well, namely to show Africa and the rest of the world that we relentlessly oppose communism and that we are in earnest when we say we are anti-communist and will reject communism where we come into contact with it.

There was a great deel of discussion on the question of the so-called withholding of information by the Government in respect of our involvement in this battle. The complaint of the Opposition that the public was not taken into the Government’s confidence and especially the statement of the hon. member for Durban Point that “it is a sad reflection on the confidence of the Government in the people of South Africa” I think is undeserved and uncalled for. In The Argus of Saturday, 24 January, the hon. member for Durban Point put it as follows:

This reveals a traditional defect which the Opposition displays and it is untrue that this is a reflection on the confidence which the Government has in the public of South Africa.

Is it true or is it false?

If the hon. member will be patient, I shall deal with this further and give him a conclusive answer.

Are the facts true?

The Opposition is traditionally incapable of interpreting or voicing the public opinion. It is therefore not surprising that they have made a blunder in this respect as well. Of course people are inquisitive. It is natural, after all, for any person to want to know what is happening. Therefore we are bound to receive inquiries about it. It is natural that the Press should badly want to obtain certain information, because its function is to disseminate news. It is natural for parents to put questions and express concern for their children, because it is their sons who are involved in the matter. It is natural for all of us to want to have the information at our disposal. But the parents and the public and especially our business institutions convinced me during the past crisis that they display a much deeper insight into these matters than the Opposition wishes to give out. They were satisfied with the information given to them, because they realized that if further or full details were to be made available to them, it could lead to the creation of greater dangers for their sons. This is after all an elementary fact …

The whole world knows it.

It is not of so much importance, after all, if the Prime Minister of England makes a statement on the involvement of South Africa in Angola. Does it carry as much weight as it would if our own Prime Minister were to make the same statement? Surely this is elementary. If our own Minister of Defence or Prime Minister were to rise and reveal details of what is happening in Angola, it is an elementary principle of military strategy that the element of secrecy which must always be part of such an operation will then be lost and that the surprise element will be taken out of the whole expedition. This is how elementary it is. The Government knew perfectly well that it had a mandate to defend the interest of this country and that it had to act against the possible violation of its country’s borders and its people where there were unrest and discord.

The point I want to make in respect of the hon. member for Durban Point is that it was precisely because the Government enjoyed the trust of the Republic of South Africa and respected this trust that it could undertake this involvement in Angola.

May I please put a question?

I am sorry, I do not have the time for that.

Our involvement in Angola has confirmed once again the Government’s confidence in its own policy of national unity. The efforts which were made over the years by the Government were not in vain. During a recent visit to I Military Area it was striking to see how boys of different political affiliations, from different churches and with different cultural backgrounds acted in unison, positively and purposefully because they regarded it as being in the interests of their fatherland. The attitude of the young men, and pride which emanated from them, inspired me. I was privileged to attend a church parade with a few of these young men. It was inspiring to see how they looked to their Creator for support and consolation. It was also inspiring to see the courage with which they set about their task. It was also inspiring to see the discipline which those people displayed. I had the privilege of talking to an officer in the Defence Force about what happened in this particular area where the operations took place. It filled one with pride to hear that these men behaved like true gentlemen under very difficult circumstances; that there was no question of looting in that area and that the property of other people was treated with great respect. This could only be attained as a result of the discipline these people received in the Defence Force.

There are aspects that worry parents in connection with their sons who are active in this operational area.

That’s it!

We admit this. I have admitted that there was concern and that you and I as parents are concerned about it. We are entitled to be concerned about it. For that reason one wants to use this occasion to refute certain rumours which are in circulation. The accusation was made in certain newspapers that our young men who are not properly trained are being sent to our borders to defend them. This is absolute nonsense as I would like to indicate now. I would like to indicate to hon. members the training cycle of national servicemen in the South African Defence Force. The basic training for all corps lasts nine weeks and during that period they are taught marksmanship and fieldcraft and there is also mine training, first aid and health, drill, regimental services and practical work. The subject training varies from seven days to 11 weeks. This depends on the particular corps and the requirements of that corps, as well as the nature of the distinctive weapons allotted to those various corps. During this time they are trained in the handling of platoon weapons, the battle handling of the section in the platoon in battle, ground-air co-operation, signal training, marksmanship competition, etc. The training in anti-insurgence operations lasts approximately five to ten weeks, depending on the needs of the particular corps and the way it is used in this type of warfare. After completion of the anti-insurgence training—this is after five to six months—members of all corps are thoroughly trained for operational utilization in the various areas. Conventional training varies from three to 13 weeks and this is followed by general training. In short, it means that the fighting corps undergo between 29 and 32 weeks of applied training, as well as four weeks of acclimatization and orientation training, before they become available for full operational service. In the supporting service weapons the training lasts between 30 to 36 weeks.

I have pointed out that the Government of this country would have let us down badly if it had taken a different decision than it did in respect of Angola. The Angolan situation should be seen as a message to South Africa from the Soviet Union that it will be the Republic’s turn very soon. On the other hand our involvement in this battle should also serve as a counter-message to the Soviet Union that we are prepared and that this nation has the will to hold its own here at the southernmost point of Africa, to fight for its rights and to fight to the last man in the interests of South Africa. We have shown that we have the ability to defend ourselves and to strike back, and that that ability is not inconsiderable and that it is a factor which should very definitely be taken into account. It has also been shown that the détente policy of the hon. the Prime Minister rests upon a firm foundation and does not merely consist of empty words; that we are prepared to become involved in the problems of Africa; that we are prepared to assist Africa when its integrity is being attacked and that we are prepared to assist Africa in its struggle against communism. These facts, this involvement of ours in Angola, have not passed Africa by unnoticed. They have made an impression upon Africa. They have created the impression that we are prepared to sacrifice our lives and our possessions in protecting those interests which have been entrusted to us and that we are not only prepared to act in our own interest, but that we are prepared to act in the interests of Africa. Africa might not support or endorse us publicly, but our willingness to become involved here has earned us the esteem and respect of Africa. We need only look at what happened at Addis Ababa should we doubt this statement.

If we have one lesson to learn—one cardinal lesson—from the Angolan situation and our involvement in it, and the warnings it has given rise to, it is that we shall have to spend considerably more on our defence force and our defence in future. While the emphasis has been more on guerilla warfare in recent times, this conflict has proved to us that conventional warfare is a reality in these particular circumstances and that we must also make provisions for this. We shall have to prepare ourselves by purchasing sophisticated weapons for use in the air and on land. This equipment is expensive, but for the sake of our defence and our situation here at the southernmost point of Africa we have no option other than to incur this expense. Our young men have shown in Angola that if they are given the arms and the equipment they are fully capable of handling those arms with efficiency and skill. Those young men have a right to demand of us that we give them what the situation requires. The hon. member for Hillbrow often scoffs when we quote figures of amounts spent by other countries on their defence. It is striking to notice that we in South Africa spent 18,5% in 1975. I find this in Military Balance, which is published in America.

18% of what?

I shall come to that. 18,5% of our Government expenditure is spent on our defence force, and this represents 3,2% of our gross national product. As against that we have a small country like Israel, which in 1975 spent 37,6% of its Government expenditure on defence, which represents 32% of the gross national product of Israel. When we compare this to Australia, we should remember that Australia is not a threatened country. Australia does not face the threats that we at the southernmost point of Africa face, but Australia spends 13% of its budget on its defence force and exactly the same part of its gross national product as South Africa, namely 3,2% on defence. Then there are other countries which spend varying amounts on their defence forces.

In the life of any Government there are moments when critical decisions have to be taken in the interest of the country it serves. Decisions have to be taken without its being possible to determine what the contributory causes are, without its being possible to determine how necessary they are. The decision simply has to be made. The nature of that decision determines whether that Government is able and has the ability to interpret the feelings of its people. In this case one is glad to be able to state that when the Government of the Republic of South Africa had to make a critical decision in respect of Angola, it made the correct decision and that it made a decision in which it enjoyed the support of all the people of South Africa, no matter what has been said here by other parties. We heard the evidence of the hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs yesterday, when he reported that the Indian Council had requested to be allowed to make a contribution in this battle that has to be fought. If this decision of the Government had been different, it would have resulted in a loss of national self-esteem. It would have made us lose the respect of the Western or the free world and it would have made us lose the respect of the Black people of Africa. Thank God that the right decision was taken.

Mr. Speaker, so far the debate on this motion has centred very largely around the first leg of the motion which deals with the failure of the Government to take the public into its confidence and to motivate adequately the Government’s actions and objectives in Angola. I find it very unsatisfactory that that question has not been adequately answered by the frontbenchers on the other side who have taken part in the debate so far. I hope that when the time comes the hon. the Prime Minister will be more frank with this House and with the country than his colleagues in the Cabinet have been so far.

I propose moving on to the second leg of the motion before this House, which deals with the failure of the Government to maintain economic growth, and to combat inflation in particular, in a manner consistent with increasing defence and other demands on our resources. In other words, the second leg of this motion deals with the mismanagement by this Government of the finances and the economy of South Africa. In particular it deals with its failure to take adequate steps to deal with inflation which continues to plague the economy of South Africa and the lives of the people of South Africa.

Like my leader, I would like to emphasize that we on this side of the House give our full support to the collective programme for fighting inflation. In fact, we will give our full support to any reasonable measure taken by the Government which is likely to lead to some relief from this scourge in our lives. But I would be very much more confident of the success of this collective programme if I could see tangible results on the part of the Government, and the part of the Government has undertaken to play in this collective programme. So far it is only the private sector to which any yardsticks of performance have been applied. The trade unions have agreed to limit their claims for higher wages to 70% of the increase in the cost of living, and the private sector has agreed to absorb 30% of increased costs. At this stage I would say that this whole exercise of the collective programme smacks of the Government passing the buck to the private sector, when the main responsibility for inflation and for fighting inflation should rest squarely on the shoulders of the Government itself.

I am also concerned at the conclusion being drawn by Government spokesmen that inflation is being overcome, when in fact it is not being contained, and many of the fundamental steps required to be taken before it can be conquered have not yet been taken. The factual position in regard to the cost of living is that for the three months from September to November last year we had virtually a static rate of inflation of 12,2%. In December it fell somewhat, very slightly, to 11,7%. But I think before any conclusion can be drawn from those figures, the whole position must be analysed, because the fact that the rate of inflation over that period was relatively stable is attributable, in the first place, to the effect of the collective programme and the restraint that it imposed voluntarily on prices and on wages. I should like to pay tribute to the private sector, to the trade unions and to businesses, for the sacrifices they have made, under this collective programme, to carry out a programme which has been rendered necessary primarily by the mistakes made by the Government.

Secondly, there has been relative stability in the rate of inflation because we are in a period of recession, because competition has sharpened, because in fact there have been some very sharp price wars over that period. But the main reason why there has been relative stability in the rate of increase in prices is that over the period the prices of foodstuffs rose at a slower rate than the prices of other commodities and services. This was due, not only to climatic and seasonal influences, but also to the fact that there were, over that period, some very sharp price wars at retail level, especially between supermarkets. I would like to ask what joy there is in a rate of inflation of 12%. What joy is there in the fact that a rand, which last year was worth 100 cents is this year worth only 88 cents? How can we be complacent when we still have to feel the effects on prices of the massive devaluation of last September? How can we be complacent when the wholesale price index is still rising at an escalating rate and the effect of wholesale prices which are still in the pipeline, have still to be felt when they reach the retail level? How can we be complacent when most of us know that the price wars which helped to keep prices down last year appear to be over? How can we be complacent when the director of the Agricultural Union warned only last week that food prices, which have helped to keep the cost of living down over the past few months, are likely to rise sharply in the near future? How can we be complacent when the Government, despite its promises, has still to show that it observes the basic rules of sound financial management? Let us not delude ourselves. A 12% per annum rise in the cost of living is a disastrous rate of increase. It is disastrous for the housewife, for people with lower incomes, for pensioners, for people with fixed incomes and for the economy as a whole because it distorts the economy. It inhibits saving, investment and growth. One cannot build a prosperous, growing economy on a rate of inflation as high as 12%. The blame for this situation, as I say, must rest firmly and squarely on the shoulders of this Government on account of its mismanagement of the economy. I say this because the Government has not conformed to the basic rules of sound management. The Government has not taken the necessary steps to prevent exploitation of the public where monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions exist, nor has it used the powers which it has to encourage competition where competition can be encouraged, because competition is the best force known to economists to keep prices in check. The Government has failed to observe the basic rules of sound management because it has failed to observe the No. 1 rule of good housekeeping, and that is to live within its own means. Despite repeated warnings from this side of the House during the last session to the effect that expenditure was running at too high a level, the Government has allowed expenditure since then to run at a considerably higher level than its revenue receipts. This Government seems to lack the realization that when one has to spend a large amount in one direction, as this country obviously has to do at present on defence—and that is something which we on this side of the House support—sacrifices have to be made in other directions. We on this side of the House are quite prepared to see sacrifices made in other directions if more money is needed for defence purposes. However, we have already been warned this session that we are going to have to deal with supplementary estimates. We were warned of that after we had promises by the Government that they were going to cut down expenditure below the level of the estimates. If those supplementary estimates of expenditure cover departments other than the Department of Defence, we shall want to know the reason why, and we will want very adequate explanations for that additional expenditure. I do not have much confidence in this Government’s ability to reduce expenditure. Its whole history has been one of profligate spending. This is a characteristic of the Nationalist Government, and much of it is caused by spending on the ideological policies of Apartheid and Separate Development. [Interjections.] Every time we get a new measure, money is required to implement it. It is a fact that between 1948, when the Government came into power, and 1974, the latest year for which I have figures, Government expenditure has increased nearly fifteenfold, whereas expenditure by the private sector over the same period has increased only just over eightfold. In other words, Government expenditure has been increasing at nearly double the rate of that of the private sector.

What period is that?

The period is 1948 to 1974. This is a pattern which has been consistent over the whole of that period. When, on top of this heavy Government expenditure, the position is such that the supply of money has grown at a much faster rate than the supply of goods and services, one has all the elements present for a runaway inflationary situation. In fact, one has the classical situation of too much money chasing too few goods, and this is exactly what has happened to the economy of South Africa. Over the period 1969 to 1974, a five-year period, the supply of money increased by 111%, whereas the supply of goods, as measured by the gross domestic product, increased by only 25%. This whole position, bad as it is, could have been improved and counteracted to a large extent by imaginative and energetic steps to increase the productivity of the economy. This is the crux of any solution to fight inflation, as the leader of my party so ably said yesterday. Here again the Government has failed the country and failed it badly. It has been a captive of its own policies. It has hung on to measures like job reservation and the restrictive clauses of the Physical Planning Act which hang over the heads of employers like swords of Damocles. They are measures which directly or indirectly impede productivity because they do not allow the resources that are available to us to be used in the most productive manner. Again, as my leader said yesterday, the Government has moved at a pedestrian pace in regard to the training of Black labour to fill more skilled jobs, when what has been needed for years, and is still needed, is a crash programme of training.

All in all this Government gives me the impression that it has been living financially and economically in a fool’s paradise. It has relied on a rising gold price, which it thought and predicted publicly would rise much more consistently and to much dizzier heights than it has risen, to sustain a reasonable balance of payments position, to finance its own rising expenditure and to be the catalyst to generate growth within the economy. It has been relying on a rising gold price to do that, instead of following fundamentally sound economic policies. Fundamentally sound economic policies would have involved in the first place containing the growth of the Government’s own expenditure within the growth of the gross domestic product, containing the rate of the growth of the money supply also within the rate of growth of the gross domestic product and promoting productivity in an imaginative and energetic manner. Now the Government has been caught napping, not having done those things, when adversity has struck. It has been caught napping by the world recession, it has been caught napping by a lower gold price and it has been caught napping by having to pay higher oil prices. The result of these failures, of this being caught napping, is not a happy picture. Besides continuing double-figure inflation, of which I have already spoken, we have a virtually perennial balance of payments problem. Our balance of payments position is vulnerable and appears to remain continuously vulnerable. We are heavily dependent for the maintenance of a reasonable level of foreign exchange reserves on the inflow of foreign funds. We on this side of the House welcome foreign capital into this country, providing it is put to productive uses and providing it is used to develop the country, but when the Government has to rely on an inflow of foreign capital to finance its own consumption expenditure, as has been the case, then that is not a healthy picture. Even more serious is that whatever steps can now be taken to rectify this position of double-figure inflation, whatever steps are available, all have painful consequences because all entail the pulling in of horns; in other words, the slowing down in spending, the slowing down in production, a period of austerity and generally the lowering of living standards. Last year saw an actual shrinkage in the gross national product—the gross national product is the total measure of what is available to sustain living standards—while the population increased by approximately 3% and the prospects are not much better for this year. I find this a very, very sobering thought. The stark realities of that situation are in fact a lower average real per capita income for the population, lower living standards, but more seriously they spell out increasing unemployment and increasing unemployment among our Black population.

Can you give us figures to substantiate that?

You cannot give us those figures.

According to what the hon. the Prime Minister said in this House a few years ago those are the ingredients for giving that hon. gentleman sleepless nights. I have now outlined the position in which South Africa found itself during the second part of last year and unfortunately it still finds itself in that position. I pose the question: Is that a position of economic strength required to ensure the security of South Africa and enable us to pay for increased defence expenditure which is clearly on the cards? There are no easy ways out of this problem because there are no sound alternatives to living within one’s means. I would say that when one has been living beyond one’s means as this Government has, to rectify the position, to pull in one’s horns and live within one’s means, becomes all the more difficult the more difficult the economic times are, and recessionary as they are at the present time.

We on this side of the House are highly critical of the Government’s decision to attempt a short-cut alleviation of the position by a big devaluation of the rand such as took place last September. Even more critical than of the fact of devaluation are we of the massive, savage extent of the devaluation. Let there be no doubt whatsoever of the seriousness of the step or the implications for the economy and for the wellbeing of the peoples of South Africa. However, if I am critical and highly critical of the act of devaluation and the extent of the devaluation, I am still more critical of the Government for not being frank with the people in regard to the consequences of devaluation.

They are keeping the people in the dark.

To state, as the hon. the Minister of Finance stated at the time, that devaluation would not lead to a lowering in the living standards is so much balderdash. It smacks of hoodwinking the population. Surely, the main intention of any devaluation is to correct an imbalance between one country’s economy and the economy of the rest of the world, to correct an imbalance in the purchasing power of that country’s currency and the other currencies of the world. The way it is done is by lowering the standards of living of the people in the country whose currency is devaluated.

That is what the experts say.

I hope that during this session we are not going to hear any speeches from that side of the House in which members gloat over a successful devaluation. [Interjections.]

You will hear one pretty soon.

I hope that we are not going to hear speeches such as we heard in 1972 after the devaluation of 1971. [Interjections.] At the very best, devaluation is a dubious act and one arising out of weakness and not out of strength. It is an act which is no matter for pride. I believe that in this case the act of devaluation was a panic measure and I shall give my reasons why.

I believe it was a panic measure, because the problems that were facing the Government at the time were primarily short-term problems or should have been short-term problems. There were speculation against the rand as a result of a leads and lags situation; stagnation of exports as a result of a world-wide depression in trade; a lack of growth of South African industries on account of the economic recession through which the country is going; a lower gold price which affected not only the gold mines but also the receipts of the Treasury. To apply as a solution to those problems a long-term structural change in the relationship of the rand with other currencies was to apply a long-term solution to short-term problems. If the Government did not think these were short-term problems, I think they were admitting defeat and that they had a lack of faith in the economy of the country, in our export ability and particularly in the future of the price of gold. Those were the advantages claimed for devaluation. In my view, and in the view of this side of the House, the disadvantages of the devaluation so outweigh the advantages that the act of devaluation must be regarded as a serious mistake.

During this debate other speakers will highlight the reasons why we on this side of the House disapprove of and, in fact, condemn devaluation. I, unfortunately, do not have time to say anything further on this subject. I would just like to say that I regard as very serious the fact that the Government has glossed over the effect of devaluation on the cost of living and on those members of the population who can least afford to cope with that situation. I regard it as totally irresponsible not to face the fact that in a country such as South Africa where our imports amount to approximately one-third of our gross domestic product, a devaluation of 18% has a very, very considerable impact on the cost of living. It has such an impact whether that impact is reflected in an increase in the rate of inflation or in impeding the slowdown in the rate of inflation that might have come as a result of other factors coming into play. One has only to see what happened to price levels after the last devaluation. There was an explosion of prices, which has continued for virtually the whole of this decade so far, and the people who are worst hit are the poorer sections of the population, our pensioners and the people on fixed incomes. These are the people who are having to pay the price for the mismanagement by this Government of the economy of this country. I think I have said enough to give an indication that I support very strongly the second leg and in fact the whole of the motion of no-confidence of my leader.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Constantia presented his usual annual economic arguments in the classical fashion. Having listened to him on a number of occasions and having identified the question of devaluation as of prime importance in all of his speeches I have heard, I found he held us in suspense right up to the end of his speech today. This time, having suffered an enormous explosion himself as far as this matter is concerned, I think he has destroyed his credibility to a large extent by calling the devaluation a panic measure taken because of short-term problems.

You tell us what it was.

I shall deal with the matter a little later in my speech. I should like to say now that if the Government did not act at that particular point in time, the hon. Opposition would today have had ample reason to tear the Government to pieces for not having devalued, because whatever reasons existed then for devaluing, would have existed to an even greater extent today if there had been no devaluation. The leads and lags have repeated themselves in the meantime. The position of our exports has not improved. The conditions of economic stagnation in overseas countries have not changed to the extent that would have justified actions other than those the Government has taken. The recession elsewhere in the world definitely did not change so much that we can expect a significant increase in the prices of our commodities in the short term. Therefore, only on those basic points I think it is safe to argue that the problems which existed then were not short-term problems and that the Government did in fact act very responsibly.

The hon. member further asked what joy there is in a double-figure rate of inflation. He accused the Government of being complacent about various things. As has happened in the past, he again put the blame for inflation and all the other ailments of the economy “squarely on the shoulders of the Government”, to quote him. It is significant to note that in all the arguments on economic affairs forthcoming from the hon. Opposition, never has a single word been said about the responsibility of the public, the industrialists, the individual consumers and the role they can play in combating inflation and making a significant contribution towards increasing productivity in our economy. Their arguments have always been tuned to serve their political ends. I think it is grossly irresponsible, to say the least, once again to blame only the Government for what is happening, particularly in the face of the anti-inflation campaign which is currently under way. This applies also to the hon. member for Hillbrow who, in his speech yesterday, again said—

I think it is one thing to take political advantage of a certain situation, but to do so continually—the hon. Opposition has done it on a number of occasions—in the face of the grave economic situation before us is, to say the least, to fail in one’s duty.

The hon. member for Constantia also referred to the painful measures which will have to be applied to curb inflation. A little earlier he said the Opposition would support any measures which would effectively combat this problem that is Public Enemy No. 1. It is to be hoped that if it should become necessary for the Government to put its hand in the pocket of the consumer in order to finance certain projects and to curb spending, this will also be supported by the hon. member for Constantia despite the painful effects of such a measure. However, if such measures were to be taken, it is to be expected that the Government would again be blamed for increasing this, that and the other.

*It was to be expected that a great deal would again be said about devaluation. It is certainly a fact that no Government likes to devalue. It is certainly a fact that it is a tragedy for any Government to cause the value of savings which many people have built up over so many years to be reduced so dramatically in a certain sense. When a Government takes such an important and drastic step, it can certainly only happen after thorough consideration and proper consultations with various experts in this field.

We had the accusation on the part of the hon. member for Constantia that we had relied too heavily on gold. It is quite easy to speak about gold in retrospect. If the Government were pessimistic about the price of gold and if the Government had underestimated the revenue it would have derived from gold, the Opposition could have accused the Government of being out of touch with reality and of not providing for the prosperity derived from our great wealth to be utilized in favour of, for example, a sound infrastructure for the country, welfare services, education services, and so on. However, if it appears as if the Government has overestimated the price of gold, the Opposition advances the argument that the Government relies far too heavily on the price of gold. When advance estimates were made for the financial year which is nearing its end now, prominent economists, here and elsewhere in the world, had very high expectations as far as the price of gold was concerned. Surely, when speaking about gold, one cannot speak about it in the sense of an ordinary commodity which is only subject to supply and demand. One has to bear in mind, among other things, that America has an established interest in a low gold price. Russia pays for its wheat in gold, although I think America would have preferred that they rather pay in oil. The demonetization of gold is such an important matter for the Americans and the IMF, and there are so many factors at work which have, as far as we are concerned, a detrimental effect on the price of this particular metal, that any person who writes down what the average price of gold will be in a year’s time, can regard himself as an extraordinary prophet if his estimate is within 10% of the actual price. This is the nature of the situation the Government is faced with when making advanced estimates of its revenue in order to finance certain expenditure. If it was true that the Government had not incurred certain expenditure and established certain infrastructures, the Opposition would have been quite justified to say in a few years’ time that the Government made no provision for the needs of the country in times of prosperity and for that reason we have an economy, a transport structure, ore-mining, and so on, which have lagged behind. However, it is essential that expenditure be incurred in other respects as well.

The hon. member again referred to so-called “ideological expenditure”, but we should rather consider the facts in this regard. How often did we not hear from hon. members opposite—only last year, for example—that one of them said that there was economic sense in decentralization, while another one called it ideological expenditure. I think they must now decide what their standpoint is in this House as far as the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act, the decentralization of industries, and so on, are concerned. Sometimes one has to make sacrifices of this kind and display some courage in the economic sphere in order to ensure and place on a sound basis one’s physical existence and future economic progress.

The hon. member for Constantia referred to a structural adjustment. How could one effect a structural adjustment, whether in respect of the economy, or in respect of the infrastructure of the country, if one does not invest well in time? Could one blame a government in the uncertain world in which we are living today that things, over which it has no control, change? To my mind this is the key question that should be discussed in this House today and not to quote figures, to give us a history lesson and tell us that this, that and the other thing happened. The question before the House is whether we could have expected the Government to have been more accurate in some of their forecasts in these difficult times. If the reply to this is “No”, it means that the Government in its financial management succeeded even though we still have double-figure inflation, something no one in this House is happy about.

We could also consider the events which preceded devaluation. The hon. member referred to certain measures which had to be taken, rather than to devalue. What happened at that stage, was that our exports were very detrimentally effected by the world-wide recession in major economies which caused both the demand for commodities and their prices to drop. In other words, the anticipated revenue from our exports dropped dramatically. A high rate of inflation was prevailing in all those countries from which we import our capital goods. Unfortunately it is a fact that we are enormously dependent upon the importation of means of production and capital goods. Because we have to import these goods all the time not only to provide in our present general demand but also to be able eventually to provide in our own needs regarding means of production, we had to pay much more for those imports because of the high inflation rate prevailing in those countries from which such goods were imported. These two factors had a ripple effect, because our revenue was less and our expenditure much higher than we expected. Consequently, we started having problems with our current account. We now come to the key question and the reason why I can quite rightly criticize the hon. member for Constantia. At that stage and when the Government saw what was happening to our current account, it did not react immediately and took panic measures by devaluing. The Government watched the situation and was alarmed to see, month after month, that the economies of the U.S.A., West Germany and other European countries did not show the anticipated improvement. In other words, the long-awaited demand for our commodities and subsequent higher prices and revenue accruing to us did not materialize. Month after month the deficits which arose because of our reduced revenue and our sustained high level of imports, increased, and these deficits were dealt with by means of short-term loans incurred by the State. At last, after a period of three to four months when this deficit assumed dangerous proportions and when, at the same time, widespread speculation took place by means of leads and lags, the Government, after thorough consideration, had no option but to devalue. Therefore it was not a question of total irresponsibility. The things happened during the middle of last year and we have now reached the first quarter of this year. By now the situation would certainly not have changed to such an extent that it would have been able to avert devaluation. The Government then had to devalue by a substantial percentage. Hon. members will recall that there were even further speculations about devaluation in the interim. These speculations were not entertained in Government quarters, but various economists were of this opinion. In 1974 imports constituted 35% of our gross domestic product, and exports 31%, which is an enormous percentage. This also involves large sums of money and it would have been extremely irresponsible of the Government if it did not put a stop to it at that stage. If one referred to devaluation as a panic measure which was not preceded by some other measures, one could probably have attached a certain measure of credibility to the argument advanced by the hon. members. However, what did the Government do before devaluation? The Government adjusted exchange control measures and the floating was stopped. The bank rate was increased from 8% to 8½%. The liquid asset requirements of banks were increased. The Government was unable to apply import control; there can be no question about that. However, in order somewhat to dampen the demand for imports, the money supply with which imports have to be paid for and which encourages people to import, was reduced. However, before these important measures could have an effect, the gold price dropped dramatically in September last year and it was evident that the recession abroad would continue indefinitely and the Government was unable to act otherwise. Even those interim measures which any person could reasonably have expected to have had a beneficial effect, did not work in the short while they were in effect. As far as devaluation is concerned, the actions of this Government are therefore above suspicion.

When one compares South Africa with other countries, one can see that we in South Africa are still relatively fortunate even though the situation leaves much to be desired. Something the Opposition has to appreciate, is that if one says that South Africa is still relatively fortunate, it does not mean that we are full of joy and complacency, but that we are grateful for what we have and that those measures we have taken, in spite of the relative dampening effect they had, still afforded us the opportunity to maintain a reasonable growth rate. Unlike other countries we cannot summarily kill the economy and in that way cause unemployment. The socio-economic consequences would be too much for us to handle; we simply cannot do that. How do we do the one without omitting the other? This is an extremely delicate matter and I think we rather need a more exact and detailed recommendation from the hon. the Opposition with regard to steps they think we should have taken instead of quoting a whole series of figures and indulging in generalities here.

Mr. Speaker, if we pause for a moment and consider this situation, if we consider the price of commodities and the price of gold, we have to realize that there is very little we can do about it. When we consider the question of imports and we appreciate that the bulk thereof is essential for the country for production purposes, we have to appreciate that we cannot do anything about that either. But here we are dealing with a very important matter, i.e. that portion of the imports into South Africa constitutes consumer goods. Every person can do something about this. If every person who spends money, restrains himself in what he buys and rather buys South African goods, he will be able to make a small contribution.

As far as imports are concerned, we have an extraordinary problem in South Africa because of the vast distances to the markets. Our transport costs are therefore higher compared with those export countries which are situated close to the markets. For that reason we have to keep our marginal costs as low as possible. This immediately involves productivity. As soon as we refer to productivity, we hear from the Opposition that the Government is to blame because our workers are not productive. Has the hon. the Opposition ever encouraged industrialists to undertake their own in-service training?

Absolutely!

Well, not today. Why then is this not one of the main thrusts of their pleas? Why do we not have any encouragement for our exporters on the part of the Opposition? Prominent economists say that many of our exporters in South Africa are somewhat lax. They exist on our local markets. It is quite easy to make a good living on our local markets, because one gets everything back: a good profit or all one’s production costs, and so on. But when one wants to export, one needs sound management and planning; then one has to keep all costs as low as possible and apply mass production in order to obtain the benefits of mass production. Then it becomes a very difficult game. Many people maintain that this is too much trouble for some industrialists. I am inclined to agree with those economists who say that many of our exporters, of our industrialists, can do far more to obtain for South Africa a better place in the export markets abroad. If we produce a quality product, we will be able to compete with those people, despite the transport costs to which we are unfortunately subject. Furthermore, as far as export services are concerned, we immediately have in mind our ore export, which will partly be able to compensate for the loss on our gold revenue. But there is another aspect which is of the utmost importance in this regard, i.e. the value of agriculture. This is one field which can make a real and ever-increasing contribution to South African export services, even to a greater extent than is the case today. We should look to this industry for further technological developments and for increased production and productivity.

Mr. Speaker, there is one final matter I want to raise. Much is being said about anti-inflationary financing of State expenditure. This is a two-edged sword. In the first place, the State could draw money from the public by means of stock and investments. In fact, this the State has already done. Recently the State obtained R90 million at 8¼% on four-year stock. In a week’s time further stock will be issued, namely for three years at 77⅞% and 15 years at 10%, which are both extremely attractive rates. By means of this the State hopes to draw a considerable amount of money from the public sector for its own financing purposes. If this is inadequate and people keep on raising a hue and cry about anti-inflationary financing a considerable portion of that money will have to come out of the pockets of both the responsible and the irresponsible consumer and spender and this is inevitably going to be painful. This is anti-inflationary financing. We hope that when we reach that stage, the Opposition will also support us.

Mr. Speaker, history may well record that this debate was perhaps one of the most historic that has taken place in this hon. House. It takes place at a time when our country and our economy is balanced on a knife-edge between the threats of war and the possibility of peace. It takes place when South Africa is fighting on two fronts: for its security on its frontiers and on the economic front. It is in this atmosphere of responsibility that I believe it is the duty of the Opposition to examine clearly, and in a sense coldly and analytically as my hon. friend from Constantia has done, defects that we see in the administration of the economy by the Government during recent years. While it is a truism that we may soon have to mobilize a larger proportion of our Defence Force, it is equally true that it would be necessary, morally and completely, for this Government and for South Africa to maintain that force with everything that is needed for it to remain a striking force of the first magnitude. It has been said that an army marches on its stomach. The stomach is dependent upon the economy. I would also like to say from the experiences in the last war that, however brave our forces may be, and however wonderful their conduct, unless they are provided with the equipment and the fighting power necessary to face up to their task, all the bravery in the world will not enable them to succeed. We saw this when we were facing the Germans in the last war in the desert and the war was mobile, when we fell back. We had the same troops but we were outgunned, outflown and outshot by the German forces until such time that we were able to mobilize our own forces and provide them with the weapons necessary for superior fighting power. Bravery also plays its part of course.

I believe that it is only right that I should say that I think that the hon. member for Florida was hiding his hurt, the hurt of the truth, made so apparent by my hon. friend from Constantia. During recent months the public of South Africa, the electorate, have become more and more despondent due to their inability to understand the economic situation. So, while my hon. friend from Constantia has spoken of high economic and financial theory, I want to put the viewpoint of the man in the street. I believe that in recent months the public have come to believe that we are losing the fight against inflation. I believe that a shock-wave hit them when the Minister announced on 22 September 1975 the Government’s decision to devalue the rand by 17,9%. The public were taken aback. I believe that we have the right to expect from the hon. Minister of Finance an explanation—if I may have the attention of the hon. the Minister of Finance for a moment …

He thinks it is screamingly funny.

I believe we have the right to ask him to explain if he was reported correctly in the statement which appeared in The Argus of Monday, 22 September, the black Monday in our economic history. The headline was “Stimulation for Living Standards”. “Devaluation would stimulate living standards by boosting the value of production and of exports”, the Minister of Finance, Senator Horwood, was reported to have said today. It is apparent to the man in the street that from the moment of devaluation, the prices of almost all commodities have gone up and up. They have hit the roof. Somebody has mentioned petrol. I shall have more to say about petrol later. However, one thing is certain and that is that from the moment of devaluation the price of oil, which was already excessively high through no fault of our own, increased for South Africa in terms of the rand by 22%. This inevitably has had a ripple effect in every facet of our commercial and industrial world. We do not have to look at petrol only. From the moment of devaluation, the price of all imported products went up, and I want to charge the Government with having hidden behind this fact of imported inflation as being the main reason for inflation in the economic affairs debates and the budget debates of the last couple of years. The Government has always claimed that imported inflation is beyond their control and has contributed to a major degree to the whole facet of inflation in this country.

By the act of devaluation they immediately increased the price of 35% of the products this countrys needs by 18%. The things that were most hit were our own defence requirements as well as our capital requirements necessary to promote an economy which could become more productive and, therefore, more useful in the helping of our own people. I would like to ask this Government what they have done with the wasted years, the locust years, since the devaluation of the rand of 12,28% in 1971.

They have forgotten.

We devalued to buy ourselves time, but the Government squandered the time. What is their answer to that one?

The second devaluation of some 4,6% took place in 1972 and in September 1975 we had a further devaluation of 17,9%. What is the value of the rand in terms of what it was when this Government came into power? We should be ashamed of the performance of the rand in the years that have gone by. If this Government stays in power much longer, we will see the rand devalued not to 40% but to 20% of its value. The hon. the Minister of Finance, the hon. the Minister of Economic Affairs and other Cabinet Ministers must accept responsibility for the actions of this Government. I would like to put the matter in its utmost simplicity; I would like to quote Prof. Sadie of the Bureau of Economic Research of the University of Stellenbosch. I would like to quote what he said in the 1976 assessment of the situation—

This the man in the street understands and my wife and I understand it as well. If one spends more than one earns, one is in trouble and if one spends one’s earnings in anticipation, it is not a question of being in trouble, but of being stupid.

I believe I have the right to say that only some four years ago this side of the House was urging the Government to make the optimum use of the gold bonanza when the gold price was threatening to go through the $50 an ounce level. We had grand plans; we hoped the Government would spend the additional income, the bonus it was acquiring, on helping the man in the street, on helping the African, on helping education, on a grand scheme to improve the public good. The gold price then went through the $50 an ounce level in 1970, I think.

It was in 1971.

The previous Minister of Finance, who became known as Mr. Gold, speculated that the price of gold was going to rise to $200 per ounce. There were people who said that the price would go up to $400 per ounce. This Cabinet and this Government behaved as if the price of gold would rise continuously and save them from their follies. I now take this Government to task and I criticize the hon. the Minister of Finance who once took the clerks and typists in Johannesburg to task because he complained that during the share boom of 1969 they had been utterly and completely irresponsible and had behaved as if the sky would always be the limit and shares would never come down.

And they did the same thing.

A Government with the skills of the Public Service available to it, a Government with experts available to it, should not so have conducted the affairs of our country as to spend so excessively and to rely so implicitly on the probability that the price of gold would continue to go up. The moment gold came down we found, as Prof. Sadie had found, that we were scraping the barrel and the economic principle that a community cannot spend beyond its means became apparent.

We have challenged this Government in the past to take account of the folly of its ideological spending, and I want to say to the hon. member for Florida that I make no apology for reverting to this subject. If we had put the money that was wasted on ideological spending into the correct channels, we would today have had an economy which would have been infinitely stronger than it is and we would have been more prepared to face the outside threats to our economy than we are. I believe that when one faces the threat of war, unless one makes the maximum use of all one’s national resources, particularly one’s manpower resources, and if one shackles one’s economic machine, one can be accused of economic sabotage. Economic sabotage at a time of national emergency can never be justified by any Government.

That is being unpatriotic.

If we are going to be forced to withdraw some 30 000 or 60 000 or perhaps 90 000 young White South Africans from the economy, those who are presently active in the economy, there is going to be a vacuum. Let me reiterate that in Angola 100 000 men have been killed in the current war and this should make one realize that manpower has become vital. The vacuum I have mentioned would not be as severe if we could rely on the maximum skills of all our non-White fellow citizens. Here I find myself supported by the chairman of Iscor, who complained that even Iscor could not face the future unless more and more White jobs could be filled by people from the non-White ranks capable of adapting themselves to the necessary tasks. Yet we recently had the hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs talking to the motor trade in Port Elizabeth and repeating this balderdash that this Government would never see a White man’s job usurped by a Black man.

How limited their horizons are, Sir. In a country of 24 million people who enjoy the optimum benefits of climate, raw materials and entrepreneurial skills, of everything that a country could wish for, how could anyone be talking of a White being faced with the threat of replacement by a Black man? We need 24 000 000 Blacks to achieve the optimum benefits which can come to this country. No White man will ever be threatened unless he is not worthy of his own heritage. To say that a man who has had the full benefit of education at all levels as well as the advantages of our Christian heritage is frightened of his job being usurped by a Black man, makes no sense at all.

Under the serious conditions which South Africa is facing, I would appeal again to this Government no longer to shackle the economy, no longer to put our imagination in blinkers, no longer to prevent us from achieving maximum productivity, but to face the fact that if we are threatened in South Africa, it is not only the Whites who are threatened, but all South Africans. The economic machine will have to be strong in order to maintain the necessary supplies which are going to be called for.

I, too, would like to take the hon. the Minister to task for having appealed to the private sector to put its house in order. We on this side of the House have gone along fully with all proposals for combating inflation. However, I do not think it is right that the private sector should be made to feel the burden or the shame of the situation we are facing today. In almost every instance where prices have risen, it can be laid at the door of the Government. We do have plans which will improve productivity, but we are shackled in these plans because labour restrictions, the immobility of labour as such and the difficulties which we face make it impossible to bring them to fruition. The hon. the Minister of Economic Affairs has been reported only recently …

Who is that?

The Minister of Economic Affairs. The hon. the Minister was reported in the Press as having said that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet had decided that the Ministers serving on the anti-inflation committee and those who had given undertakings in terms of the joint action programme would give some details about their actions in the near future. As we are asking for more details about the situation on our borders to be given to members of this House, I would appeal to the hon. the Minister of Economic Affairs not to wait for an interview on television, which is only seen by the Europeans anyway, but to allow his fellow Ministers to come into this debate today and tell the hon. House exactly what plans the Government has for curbing the wild and excessive expenditure which has taken place without regard to the necessary economic priorities. I want to make our position quite clear by saying that we on this side of the House share with the Government the ambitions, the desires and the dreams that we should have the most prosperous possible economy. We would like to see Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay come to fruition. We would like to have a new steelworks, oil from coal …

And St. Croix?

We would like to have St. Croix and the Orange River scheme, but I must again refer to Prof. Sadie: “One cannot have everything.” A responsible Government should sort the priorities out, particularly at this stage when we are faced with expenditure of R1 000 million on defence, an amount which may well escalate.

Then I want to refer particularly to the Government’s handling of the Phase 3 proposition as applicable to the motor industry. Hon. members on both sides of the House will recall that for a number of years I have warned the Government—and I have not been alone in my warnings—that the forcing of Phase 3 at too fast a speed could only have a highly inflationary effect on the economy. Four years ago I also warned that the increase in the price of motor-cars, because of the forcing of Phase 3, could well rise from R50 per car to R100 per car. I am advised by the Automobile Association that the prices of cars are rising out of all proportion. In fact, South Africans who are dependent on their motor-cars because of our lack of adequate public transport, and to whom a motor-car is no luxury of any kind, almost cannot afford a motor-car. The cost of running a motor-car today will shock most individuals in this House, particularly when we realize the need for the conservation of oil. I quote the official figures as prepared by the Automobile Association and which are current at the moment. The cost of running a medium car today is 10,182 cents per kilometre or 16,387 cents per mile, and the cost of running a large, but not a luxury, car is 12,482 cents per kilometre, or 20,088 cents per mile. The price of vehicles has also gone up by between R600 and R1 200 per vehicle in the class Volkswagen, Opel, Chef Commando and Chrysler Valiant in recent months. These higher prices have a ripple effect through our entire economy. The transport involved in the delivery of goods and services, as well as the transport involved in the movement of labour, feels the effect and it comes down to higher prices for the man in the street, who today has to face higher prices for milk, for rice, for meat, for sugar, for clothing, for doctor’s requirements, for services, for licences, for insurances, for housing and for flats. This is at the very time when the man in the street—and I am not referring to the upper middle class, but to the man who lives in our economic shadows—is feeling the hardship tremendously. These are the people who have no say in this House. I speak of the widows, pensioners and retired schoolteachers who live in my constituency, and it is a tragedy to see how these people are struggling. The impact of inflation, and particularly since devaluation, is not felt in all its severity by those of us who are privileged to be in commerce or industry, but is being felt by the least fortunate section of the community. It has been said that we must save, and here I want to take to task the hon. the Minister of Agriculture. I think that this is the attitude which ordinary South Africans will not tolerate and should not be made to tolerate. I want to refer to a comment made by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Hendrik Schoeman, as reported in The Cape Times of Saturday, August 30. Addressing the 78th annual congress of the Transvaal Agricultural Union, he said—

Unnecessary articles like housing, like clothing, like transport and like medicines? But the hon. the Minister went on … [Interjection.] No, I am quoting the hon. the Minister. He went on to say—

As far as that comment is concerned, I can understand why Mr. John Scott up in the Gallery is on record as having said: “If we pull in our belts any tighter, then our pants are going to fall down.” To treat the South African public with this levity is a shame, and to the eternal credit of a more erudite individual, Dr. Frans Cronje, he is on record as having told the congress that farmers were not responsible for South Africa’s high cost of living, but that it was the Government.

Hear, hear!

At a time when we are being told to save, what have the actions of this Government actually achieved? Headlines in the papers: “Car sales hit through the roof” and “TV sets sold by the thousands and ten thousands.” Is this saving? Is this the action of the Government? On every occasion when there has been a crisis, the Government’s actions have driven the public, out of fear of erosion in the value of their money, to spend what little they had and to live on the future. I am glad to see that the hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs is in his seat. I want to mention that in his absence I took the Government to task for not coming out loudly and clearly and stating as its intention that Phase 3 of the local content programme for the motor industry would be halted not for two years, as is envisaged for 1977 and 1978, but indefinitely, until such time as the industry is capable of absorbing the fantastically higher capital costs involved. I say this, because when the hon. the Minister of Indian Affairs was sitting on this side of the House he was my main supporter and the Government’s greatest critic. His statement is on record, in case he has forgotten. He said—

In conclusion, I want to say that the indications are that South Africa has in recent months moved from a situation of boomflation to a situation of stagflation, and that our economy, in terms of those who think on these matters, is slowing down. In fact, it is on record that we can expect little or no growth in the standard of living of the Whites in South Africa during the rest of this decade and if we are to see the non-Whites brought to their rightful place—unless they are allowed to become fully economic and unless we do away with these barriers of immobility and ideology of the Government—the average White South African will have to tighten his belt and accept lower living standards until the end of this decade.

Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure that I enter this debate. However, you will agree that we have heard so many strange things this afternoon, especially from that side of the House, that you will perhaps permit me to move—

Agreed to.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Agreed to.