Mr. Speaker, in regard to the business for next week, I want to say that we shall follow the Order Paper as printed. Then I should like to announce that the Part Appropriation Bill will be introduced on 9 February, the Railway Budget on 3 March, the Post Office Budget on 17 March and the Main Budget on 31 March. The Easter Recess will be from Friday, 9 April, to 20 April.

Mr. Speaker, before I come to the motion of the hon. member I feel compelled to say that I listened to the discussion in this debate as often as my duties allowed. In the course of this week we discussed very delicate matters. We discussed matters which could even be described as very contentious, and I as a parliamentarian, in common with you, was very proud of the fact that Parliament discussed these delicate and contentious matters in the manner it did. I think it redounded greatly to the credit of this Parliament that the discussion was at all times conducted on such a high level.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition saw fit to move a motion of no confidence in the Government and in myself, a motion which stands on three legs. Naturally the Leader of the Opposition has the right to move a motion of no confidence in the Government, but I feel that my friend failed to read the signs of the time correctly. As far as this Government is concerned, there may be differences of opinion and opposition as regards the handling of the matters which were mentioned here, as well as other matters. Sometimes a great number of questions are even asked about these matters. I readily concede that. However, there is no lack of confidence in this Government. No, Sir, there is understanding among the general public; there is support among the general public; there is confidence among the general public. Therefore I believe that the motion of my friend does not in any respect reflect the feeling which is prevailing in this country. In fact, Sir, your announcement of the unopposed election today, in an urban electoral division in Bloemfontein, of a National Party member, correctly reflects the confidence which exists.

The hon. the Leader based this motion of his on three legs. Perhaps it was because the motion was so shaky and would have fallen on only two legs that the hon. member gave it three. It deals, firstly, with Angola; secondly, with the economy; and thirdly, with the relations issue. I think the hon. member will agree with me that I should allow the main emphasis of my reply to fall on the Angolan situation. I do not think the hon. the Leader of the Opposition will take it amiss of me if I therefore refer only in passing to the other two legs. I am not doing this because I do not think that they are important. They are indeed very important, but they are certainly being overshadowed at this moment by the Angolan situation. I am doing this in the second place because I believe that the Opposition on the other side has already been provided with satisfactory replies in respect of the other two matters.

With reference to the economy the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic Affairs have furnished specific replies, with which I am in full agreement, to the questions which were put to them. I know of no one of any significance who ever doubted, or doubts today, that South Africa acted correctly in devaluing when it did and to the extent to which it did. I do not think we need argue about that.

Replies with which I am also in full agreement were furnished in regard to the question of inflation. As is fitting, the Government has devoted more of its attention than ever before to these matters. Nor did the Government simply leave it at that; it proceeded to take positive action. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my special appreciation for the way in which all our people have co-operated in combating inflation. I think it was a unique achievement in the history not only of South Africa but probably of most other parts of the world. It was an achievement that we were able to bring employer and employee together around the conference table, and that cordial co-operation between them was achieved. Worker and employer, farmer and urban dweller, consumer and manufacturer, clerk and businessman, housewife and industrialist, all co-operated cordially in regard to this matter. That is also why the results, as has been indicated, did not fail to materialize. It is not a matter which one can solve overnight, for it is intimately bound up with what is happening in other parts of the world, and a very large part of our inflation is being imported from those countries. I maintain that the positive results which have been achieved and the spirit which emanated from that co-operation augurs well for the future. I do not know, nor do I think that anyone in South Africa can say, precisely what is in store for us and how matters are going to develop during the next few months. I do not want there to be any panic; indeed, there is no reason for panic, whatever may happen in future. But I want to say, with all the conviction I have at my command, that during the coming months in particular, there is every reason to exercise moderation, vigilance and care, moderation in our demands, moderation in the expenditure we incur, not only as State or as corporations, but also as individuals. I believe, and there is abundant evidence supporting this from all over the world, that South Africa’s economy may be considered to be strong and healthy, and that South Africa may still be regarded as one of the best areas of investment in the world. This was proved by the inflow of capital last year, and noticeably so towards the end of last year, precisely the time one would perhaps have expected investors to have been discouraged. Naturally one would have liked the situation to have been more favourable, but under the circumstances I believe, in view of the problems we had to overcome, that the Government has done well on the economic front, and hon. members may rest assured that we shall maintain and stimulate the economic growth to the best of our ability, as we have in fact been doing over the years. From time to time we experienced setbacks, if one looks back over the years we have been governing South Africa, but we consistently overcame those setbacks. As far as I am concerned the trend is still a progressive one and the graph an upward one. Occasionally there will be a downturn—this is to be expected; it has always been the case and is the case in other countries of the world. But it is not important whether there is an occasional downturn; what is important is whether the trend is an upward one. The same applies to political parties. What is important is not whether they occasionally fare worse in a constituency; what is important is who they bring in through that door. We have the reply to that question, Sir.

As far as race relations are concerned, I want to state that basic relations in South Africa are sound, in spite of what is being said and written. Let us consider the Coloured situation for just a moment. My colleagues have already dealt comprehensively with the CRC aspect. I am in full agreement with the dismissal of Mr. Leon. Let us consider the matter honestly. After the dismissal of Mr. Leon there were meetings, there was incitement, and the most reckless things were said. Thousands of people attended the meetings. But I make bold to say, and I keep my ear very close to the ground as far as this matter is concerned, that there was no fit of agitation among the ordinary people. There was not that fit of agitation some newspapers wanted to make out there was. Certain leaders, yes; certain newspapers, yes. Speaking of the leaders, Sir, I held talks with Mr. Leon and his Executive. Hon. members know that I have issued invitations to them over the years, and that they never wanted to come. Recently they did come, and I held talks with them. I explained my offer to them personally. I spent a lot of time on them. My door is open to them at all times. It is my duty to receive them at all times and I shall receive them at all times. I made my offer to them.

Was that after the dismissal?

No, it was before the dismissal. They left and were to have returned, for they were to have discussed the offer I had made them with their people; they were to have consulted their people and then return to me. I regret to have to say, Sir, that they did not go and consult their people; they went to incite their people.

Time does not permit me to deal with this in full today, but I do want to say this: The Progressive Party played its part in that connection. On other occasions, such as my New Year’s message, I dealt with that offer and the circumstances in full. My past, the nine years I have been holding this office, proves that my door is open at all times. I am prepared to hold talks and negotiations at any time. No one can level any reproach at me in that connection. But in spite of that hon. members such as those come forward and poison not only the situation here in South Africa but also in the outside world by accusing me and saying: Yes, there is a relaxation of tension on the foreign front; there is détente on the foreign front, but why is there no détente within South Africa? Such hon. members are not seeking détente; they are seeking surrender. I am not prepared to do that; I am not at all prepared to do that. I say that I am in favour of talks and I am in favour of détente at all times, and I do not like threatening people. Nor am I doing so in that spirit today. I am merely stating this as a fact. When it comes to consultation everyone will find me willing at all times to hold consultations with them. But I have never yet flinched from the confrontation other people wanted to force on me. I do not seek it, but if other people wish to force it on me I am not going to run away from it. I think it is good that we understand one another as far as that matter is concerned. I made my offer. Owing to a lack of co-operation I am unable to carry out part of that offer. I shall carry out that part which I am in fact able to carry out; I shall proceed with it whether or not there is co-operation from the leaders of the Labour Party.

I come now to the Indians. I think there is a firm understanding between them and us; the co-operation is good. I made the same offer to the Indians. They are prepared to accept it and I am therefore proceeding to implement it in practice.

Then there is also the question of the Bantu. Over the years the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has levelled the accusation at my predecessors and at myself that our policy has failed, that it is not practical and feasible, that it is “a pie in the sky”, that we are not in earnest about it, and so on. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition has always tried to imply that the fragments of that policy are lying scattered around the feet of my predecessors and myself. If we were to piece together all the fragments which have fallen around my hon. friend I would not be able to see him today; there would have been a hill between us. Our policy has not failed; our policy has succeeded in spite of the obstacles which were placed in our path. This year not only South Africa but the world as well will see that that policy of ours, of self-government for the homelands leading to independence, is acceptable and practical and that it will in fact reach completion this year.

But there is another aspect of this matter which is very interesting. Over the years, after we had convinced them, hon. members have been saying that it is perhaps practicable for a homeland that has been consolidated into one contiguous area. There it might work. However, it cannot work for the others, and what is more the others would not touch it with a barge-pole. Bophuthatswana is not consolidated into one contiguous area. On the contrary. Its component parts are widely separated. But Chief Mangope has announced—and his council has approved and ratified this decision—that in spite of this—we considered and discussed the matter—he was also going to request independence. It is wrong, some people say, to become free. People are not unfree; they are not unfree because it is the policy of the Government—announced by me a year or two ago—that every homeland is at liberty to choose its own time to approach this Government and say that the time has arrived and that it wishes to have its full independence. That policy of ours has succeeded. There is no one who can form a different judgment. One considers with gratitude the statements of homeland leaders on communism and terrorism. The Progressive Party would like to set themselves up as the mouthpiece of the urban Bantu in this House. Therefore they should also take cognizance—I did not seek this—of the findings of the Bantu newspaper, The World. An article in this newspaper happens to concern my person. However, one cannot divorce the person from the party or from the policy of the party; they are inseparably associated with one another. Fifty-three per cent of the readers of that newspaper did not lack confidence in South Africa; they expressed the belief that the leadership of South Africa was in the right hands. No wonder that the report received world-wide publicity, and that a newspaper such as the Christian Science Monitor, inter alia, had the following to say in its edition of Friday 16 January 1976—

It was a triumph for my party, for my colleague here and his assistants; it afforded recognition to the way in which they are performing their tasks. It is a triumph for the policy of the National Party, for what does this newspaper say? Why did these people poll as they did? This newspaper said that they polled as they did because things were going well with them, as they themselves stated. I quote—

And so it continues. Not all of them have these things, but do all the Whites? It was only yesterday, the day before yesterday, when there were still many thousands of Whites in South Africa who had nothing. I do not want to say that it is a paradise, but these Black people have in the meantime compared their position with the position of the Black people in other parts of the world and have come to realize what they have in South Africa. In spite of instigation there is gratitude to be found among these Black people.

When did you last visit Soweto?

The hon. member need not ask me now when I last visited Soweto. I want to ask the hon. member when last she read The World. She will find the answer in it. On what do those who are opposed to this, as this newspaper states, base their case? I quote—

The hon. member knows that this is a matter on which we can no longer be reproached if there are complaints about it. Surely the hon. member knows what agreement I reached with the Black leaders in this regard. The ball is no longer in our court. The ball is now in the court of the Black leaders. In this way one can analyse the matter. However, the following was also revealed by the newspaper. Those who were opposed to this said—

Surely this is not true. [Interjections.] This Government has a proud history of dedication by its officials and the other people dealing with this matter. It has over the years, and it shall persevere in this in future, had a proud history of dedication to those affairs of the Bantu in order to make life better and better for them in South Africa. However, this is not what the hon. member wants; nor is it what the Progressive Party is seeking to achieve when it holds talks with the Bantu. No, what they want—the hon. member for Umhlatuzana was quite correct—is not improved circumstances, is not a say on their own level and over their own affairs for the Black people, but is surrender to those people of what belongs to the White man. [Interjections.] I am not talking behind the backs of the Black people; I have always spoken openly to them. As I am now talking to you, so I also speak to them. They know they can rely on me to do whatever is necessary and within my power, but they also know—in fact, this is what I told them—that I am not prepared to surrender the identity of the Whites and what belongs to them in the process.

†I say that considering the circumstances, the conditions in which we find ourselves, one must conclude that the relations between White, Coloured, Indian and Black are good. What is more, I make bold to say that the relations between Afrikaans and English-speaking persons have never been better under any party than they are at the moment under this Government. [Interjections.] I think that no one outside this House will deny the truth of this statement. Talk to the man in the street and you will find that, as far as he is concerned, it is in fact so. Compare the grass-root relations between Afrikaner and English-speaker today with those in the days of the United Party: There is no comparison whatsoever, and for very obvious reasons. But I do not want to dwell on that today. We shall have another occasion to debate this and I personally would be very pleased to have an opportunity to debate that in full. If there are hon. members who want to debate it with me, then I say now that I would appreciate an extensive debate on this issue when my Vote comes up for discussion.

Here again it is not necessary for me to blow my own trumpet or that of my party in this regard. Because these are facts, I need only refer hon. members to the poll conducted by The Star and The Argus last year. I do not want to go into details; all hon. members have read the results of that poll. Again I say that one cannot divorce the leader of a party from the party and its principles. In the 1974 election, unlike the 1970 election, this party gained a substantial English-speaking vote. Therefore I say without hesitation that grass-root relations between Afrikaners and English speakers are good. I have dedicated myself to improving them and I and my colleagues will at all times continue to do so. I am not saying for one moment that apart from the substantial English-speaking vote that we got in the 1974 election all English-speakers will vote for us. Naturally not. There will always be those who vote against us. Quite naturally I hope that they will vote for me. I shall certainly do my level best by word and deed to persuade them to vote for me.

It is for that reason that my party has decided to put up a candidate in an otherwise impossible seat, the seat of Durban North. We will fight that election.

We want Horwood.

To satisfy the curiosity of my hon. friend on the opposite side, the candidate who will bear the standard of the National Party will be the hon. Senator Denis Worrall. [Interjections.] Let me say that I find him an eminently suitable candidate, a man in whom I have the fullest confidence, and I take this opportunity to recommend him to the constituents of Durban North. As far as I am concerned he has my best wishes …

He is going to need them.

Yes, I know that. I have been in politics too long to deny that he will need them. I do not for one moment say that he will win, but I maintain that he will fare better than my hon. friend in Middelburg … [Interjections]… and what is more certain, he will fare better than my hon. friend did in Bryanston.

To conclude this part of my speech, let me say that no matter what anybody says, the fact remains—nobody can dispute it—that our people are growing together in this country, and hon. members on the other side know it. Our people are more and more finding a common basis on which to stand, and they will find it; they must find it.

*I come now to the Angolan situation. I have seen fit, in respect of this matter, to get away from the stereotyped amendment which one moves in this regard. Because I am in earnest about this matter, because it is the case for South Africa, I want to say to the hon. members: Let us stop this nonsense of arguing in this House about who trusts whom. Surely we know what the position is. Let us pass a motion which will let South Africa speak and which will speak for South Africa. For that reason I move as an amendment—

1. “(1) this House expresses its grave concern at the Communist aggression committed in Angola by Russia and Cuba with a view to imposing a Marxist state on the unwilling inhabitants by force of arms;
2. (2) it is obvious to this House that it is a further object of the aggression similarly to subject other territories and states, inter alia South West Africa and South Africa;
3. (3) this House takes note of the steps already taken to halt the aggression;
4. (4) this House directs the Government, in view of these objects and threats, to take all reasonable steps to foil this aggression and to safeguard our country as well as the territories and borders for which we are responsible; and
5. (5) this House in conclusion conveys its sincere thanks and appreciation to the Defence Force and all officers and men for the courageous and heroic manner in which they have acquitted themselves of their task in the operational area and expresses its deep sympathy with those who have lost loved ones in the struggle.”.

I do not think there is any member in this House who will not be able to support this amendment. I am giving notice of my amendment in good time so that hon. members may consider it, and cast a considered vote.

Before dealing with the actual Angolan situation itself I believe it is necessary to pause for a moment to consider the total strategy of the communists. There is no doubt at all that the strategy of the communists is world domination, and that this will continue to remain their strategy. They can achieve world domination in three ways. They can achieve it firstly by infiltration and subversion, by propaganda and terrorism. Consequently they give preference to these methods at all times. They also know more about these methods than any person in any Western country can ever know or will ever know, for they excel in the softening up and subversion not only of the country itself but also of the morale and the values in which the free world believes, and in the exploitation of grievances. History has proved this throughout the world. When it comes to terrorism and murder there is no one who can hold a candle to them. If this does not succeed the second alternative is conventional warfare in all its nakedness and reality. The third alternative is nuclear warfare.

Although they are experts in the first sphere, namely that of infiltration and subversion, I am apprehensive, as far as the second and third alternatives are concerned, when I look around me at the world that the Russians have succeeded with their propaganda in causing the free world to be obsessed with the prospect of a nuclear war while they, on the other hand, are applying themselves to conventional warfare. They are causing the world to be obsessed with nuclear weapons while they know—I firmly believe this—that the next war will not be a nuclear war, just as the last war was not a poison gas and germ war. The nations recoiled from this, and I think that all the great powers, Russia included, will recoil from a nuclear war. They are causing the world to be obsessed with this, and in the meantime they are preparing themselves thoroughly in the sphere of conventional war. When it comes to warships, tanks and other heavy weapons, they are definitely leaving the West far behind in the race to produce such conventional weapons. In my opinion this is the danger in store for the Western world. It is good for a country to prepare itself for a nuclear war. It is good that the countries which have the means are prepared for it, but if the West should make the mistake of dismantling its conventional war machinery, it would be ploughed under by the communists in the years which lie ahead for us.

As far as South Africa is concerned it is, as a result of its strategic situation and its industrial and mineral potential, a key factor in the conventional war which Russia is planning. Surely it is self-evident that that country which controls South Africa has a powerful advantage over other countries in a conventional war, namely the resources, the sea route and everything that goes with it. If one reflects for a moment and begins to fit the pieces in the puzzle together, it is very clear to one that the communist strategy for South Africa is to cause South Africa to fight simultaneously or as much as possible on three fronts, namely on the Mozambique, Rhodesian and Angolan front. In addition to that they have relied and are still relying on the fourth front, namely the defeatists and the “joiners” within South Africa itself. One is grateful that, owing to level-headed action, nothing came of the planning on the Mozambique front. I shall return to this matter again when I reply to what hon. members said. The communists expected us to interfere in Mozambique, and they were disappointed when we did not interfere. I am not saying this merely for the sake of talking about this matter, or on the basis of hearsay: I have had personal experience, from talks I held in Africa, that this was indeed what was thought.

Thanks to our African initiative—I am still grateful that I said what I did in the Senate on 23 October—we were able to prevent an escalation on the Rhodesian front. You can imagine this for yourself. And the people who speak so easily of war—just think here of Albert Hertzog and his people …

Mr. Speaker, when the hon. member for Sea Point spoke—not on this issue, but on the Angolan issue—I asked myself at times whether it was Colin Marais speaking, or Jaap Eglin. This is just by the way.

Mr. Speaker, if we had been compelled to fight on three fronts you could imagine—and this is just what Albert Hertzog would have liked, and what he and his people are now reproaching us for—what this would have meant? It would have meant total mobilization; it would have meant the large-scale conversion of factories to the manufacture of armaments; it would have meant a tremendous increase in the defence budget and the disruption and halting of the country’s economy.

The Government was mindful of all these things. We did not flee our destiny. I want to state here—if people were perhaps to think that we are afraid or that we do not see our way clear to doing so—that we shall fight on three fronts if it should become necessary, that we shall have to fight on three fronts if there is no alternative. I believe, moreover, that we shall be able to repulse any such attack, and if it is forced upon us, this is what we shall do. I have confidence in our people; I have confidence in our ability to defend ourselves, and I have confidence in the strength of our economy. It goes without saying that the damage to the economy will be great and that the mortality will similarly be high, but I feel instinctively—every time I speak to our people about this matter—that our people are prepared to defend the soil of South Africa at all costs. For that I am very grateful.

Since I am now going to deal with the Angolan matter I want to tell you in this regard that I have full confidence in my colleague, the hon. the Minister of Defence, and in his handling of this matter. I was with him all the way in this matter. I also have confidence in the leaders of the Defence Force, in the officers and the men of the Permanent Force and the Citizen Force; I have confidence in the young men who are receiving training, and I have confidence in the young people of South Africa.

I am not speaking now as a person who has not yet had any experience of these matters. My own son was 18 years old when he had to patrol the Zambesi border with a machine gun for months on end. I heard very little from him because there was no communication with him. I received no report from him other than his letters. I never made inquiries about him or abused my position in that regard. He had to endure it as all the other men did. I know how this pulls at one’s heartstrings. I know what feelings arose in me when he walked in unexpectedly at the door one fine evening. So I know what it means. One is not indifferent to these things, but thank God, our children—and I am saying this with all the conviction at my command—are tougher than we think, they are more mature than we think, and they are more courageous than we think.

Sir, before I proceed to deal with the Angolan situation itself it is worthwhile asking oneself—for we must see it against that background—where we now stand with Africa, after everything that has happened. That question was asked repeatedly in this debate, and outside this House as well. In earlier years it was simply the case that Africa, just because it was South Africa, took up a position against, and voted against South Africa without inquiring into and apart from the merits of the question. As far as South Africa was concerned, there was simply no place for it. It was not of Africa; it was an intruder, a colonialist; it was an exploiter that had to be expelled from this part of the world. That situation has changed; that situation has changed noticeably during the past 18 months. We have come a long way in that time; further, in fact, that I ever expected we would have come in such a short time. Naturally one cannot, if one knows what troubled waters have passed under the bridge, expect matters to change overnight. If one knows how people have committed themselves, what standpoints they have adopted and what decisions they have taken, one can understand that matters must proceed slowly. Africa was indeed closed to us. And now? The fact of the matter is that we are paying visits and receiving visitors on a very reasonable scale. In spite of the fact that African states decided at Dar-es-Salaam in April last year that there should be no talks with South Africa and that South Africa should not be received, we are receiving one another and we are exchanging visits with one another on all levels. Our aircraft may land in certain African states, and have in fact done so. Our people may hold meetings in certain African states, and have in fact done so. We have open lines of communication with many African countries. Trade between African states and our country is becoming more and more of a reality. Our technical assistance is being requested and given. We are exchanging missions and representatives on an official and non-official level, admittedly on a non-official level more often than on an official level, but that does not matter. The fact is, Sir, as I have stated on a previous occasion, that the trend of the graph is an upward one. I am aware that there will be hon. members who will laugh cynically at this, who will ridicule this, and who will dismiss it as being of little or no significance. They would be making a mistake if they did so. In particular they would be making a mistake if they dismissed it because they were afraid to give the Government any credit for it. Unfortunately it is true that there are people—and some of them are sitting in this House—who cannot distinguish between South Africa and the Government, and who think that, if one deals South Africa a blow, one is harming the Government. A demonstration of this was the sardonic smile on the face of the hon. member for Hillbrow, among others, when my hon. colleagues were discussing the economy.

One should be realistic and not consider only the progress which has been made with Africa in the sphere of relations. One should also be level-headed and realistic and consider where Africa differs with us. Africa differs with us on South West Africa. It differs sharply with us, but I can assure hon. members that it differs less sharply with us now than 18 months ago. Why does Africa differ with us? It differs with us because it is committed to recognizing Swapo as the only organization which represents South West Africa, and to recognizing Sam Nujoma as the only leader to whom South West Africa can be handed over. This is again becoming evident now, and I want to reaffirm emphatically here today that one cannot draw a distinction between Swapo within and Swapo outside South West Africa. The hon. member for Yeoville made a good and a moderate speech, on which I want to congratulate him, with the exception of what he said about Swapo. I do not think the hon. member knows the circumstances, for then he would not have said what he did. The one faction of Swapo poses as being moderate because it is inside South West Africa. But have you ever heard it once it is outside South West Africa? One cannot draw a distinction, for as an organization Swapo in its entirety was conceived and born in communist sin here in Cape Town in 1957 when it was established by two Whites, Messrs. Simons and Turok.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Prime Minister whether this is not the same as in Rhodesia. There one also has one organization, the ANC. But talks are now being held with one of its leaders, the one who is prepared to talk, while the others find themselves outside the country.

The one organization is in fact a myth. Zanu and Zapu have never amalgamated. They have merely acquired an umbrella organization. They differed with one another from the first day. There have been rifts within Zapu and Zanu. I want to go further and say that in this connection I cannot care less about what is happening in other countries. I have no reason to believe that Nkomo is a communist. There is nothing in Nkomo’s early history which proves that he was a communist. But I am telling you that Sam Nujoma is a communist, and that Swapo was established by White communists in Cape Town in the late ’fifties under the original name of the Owambo People’s Organization. Unfortunately, owing to the U.N. decision, Africa has over the years accepted Swapo and Nujoma. We have argued about this a great deal, and we shall argue about this a great deal more. However, I am not prepared, as far as this matter is concerned, to change my standpoint in any respect. Africa rejects our homeland policy. They see South Africa—and they say that they are forced to see it in this way for many understandable reasons—as a unitary state, and they desire “one man, one vote” for Blacks and Whites in the whole of South Africa. They reject the policy of the Progrefs; they do not accept it, unless the policy of that party is a camouflaged policy which will lead to “one man, one vote”. If only they would tell us what their policy is we would be able to pass judgment on it. The fact of the matter is, and hon. members must know this and face up to it, that there are good African states that do not believe that the leaders of the Black people in South Africa are Matanzima, Mangope, Buthelezi, Phatudi and others. They believe that the only two leaders of the Black people in South Africa are Mandela and Sobukwe. One will first have to clear up and argue out the matter with them. Take the present problem I am experiencing with President Tolbert of Liberia. He addressed a request to me to allow Sobukwe to visit him as his guest of honour at his swearing in as President for the next term. I was unable to do so, for Sobukwe is not the leader of the Black people in South Africa.

He is not a communist though.

Let me say at once, since the hon. member has made an interjection, that I know who made the recommendation that Sobukwe should attend. [Interjections.] I was unable to let Sobukwe go, owing to the things he had been guilty of. I need not go into that. It would have been a slap in the fact to the actual, the elected and natural leaders of the Black people in South Africa if I had done so. The strategy was—and I am not accusing President Tolbert of this, but the people behind it—that I was to have been accused at a later stage of having rejected the Black leaders of South Africa and having elevated Sobukwe to the position of the actual leader of the Black people in South Africa. I am not that stupid. Unfortunately they have committed themselves in respect of Sobukwe, and they have committed themselves in respect of Mandela. One need only read their documents, for unfortunately it is a fact that not only the world at large, but Africa as well is being fed with false propaganda, which emanates from South Africa. Let me give you an example. I make no apology for quoting you an example, for—and I have read widely on this subject—I have never seen a more effective exposition of South Africa’s position than the one I read in the Natal Daily News of 25 September. This was a report from Ken Owen. He is known to us all. He is not a friend of this Government, and I very often doubt whether he is a friend of South Africa. This is what he wrote—

Then he concludes, and this causes misgivings in all of us—

That is what Mr. Ken Owen had to say. If you would just consider the Dar-es-Salaam declaration of last year, you would see that it contained certain specific words. The facts are false. They wrote as follows—

I discuss this matter with leaders in Africa, for we have discussed it on various occasions, and they ask me: “But why do your own people say this, that and the other?” The hon. the Deputy Minister has dealt with the speech made by the hon. member for Pinelands. They are going to cast his speech in my teeth, because it agrees in certain respects with the Dar-es-Salaam declaration, and it is not true.

Scandalous!

This is what they say, while there are 9 062 Black people in South Africa who are at present studying at universities and while, of the 28% of the total Bantu population that is of school-going age, 21% is already attending school. This is an achievement which does not exist in other African countries, an achievement which is unique to Black people in South Africa alone. But we receive no credit for this. All we receive are reproaches of this kind. In respect of all these matters, we find this kind of wild talk, but it is a different matter when one is confronted with the facts. Take the main source of revenue of the Progressive Party, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer. When he is confronted with the facts on Black trade unions, this is what he has to say, according to an edition of Optima published towards the end of 1975—

What is wrong with that.

When we do this, we are condemned and arraigned by the outside world, but when the businessman, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, is confronted with the reality, he writes as he did in Optima and states his point in this manner.

I come now to the essence of the Angolan matter, and I want to say at once that hon. members will understand that it is an exceptionally delicate matter. Even on this occasion there are things which I simply dare not say. South Africa’s involvement was not an isolated involvement; others were also involved. I am not going to mention their names. It is not for me to do so. Everyone must speak for himself on this matter. I am only prepared to say what I said at Stellenbosch, i.e. that I am prepared to stand up and be counted in regard to this matter. It goes without saying that, on the question of their involvement, those people should come forward themselves.

Let us now approach the matter from a different point of view. Let us ask ourselves what would have happened if South Africa had not become involved. Then, firstly, the MPLA, with Russian and Cuban help, would have taken over the whole of Angola and would have subjugated the entire population. They would have had the harbours of Lobito, Mocamedes and other harbours at their disposal right at the outset. They would have had the Benguela railway line at their disposal. They would have created the impression in the outside world that the people of Angola wanted the MPLA and were well-disposed to the MPLA. Initially the MPLA did not disclose the presence of the Russians and the Cubans. They concealed their presence; they did not mention them, and the Russians and the Cubans did not announce their own presence there either. They tried to create the impression that it was the MPLA that was finding favour with the people of Angola and had the support of all the people in Angola. They did this although they controlled only one-third of the population and less than one-third of the territory. I maintain in all seriousness that South Africa’s involvement exposed the Russian-Cuban involvement. Even if South Africa did nothing else, South Africa did do the free world a service in Africa by causing this to emerge very clearly. But what would have happened further? The OAU would have recognized the MPLA unanimously or with few dissenting votes at its conference, and South Africa would have been condemned in one morning at Addis Ababa. This did not happen.

Thirdly, Angola would at that juncture have been used as a base for attacks on South West Africa, but also for a possible attack on Zaire and a possible attack on Zambia. The communists are engaged in underground activities in both countries, and I am not being wise after the event now because President Kaunda declared a state of emergency. I can refer you to statements I made in December, and prior and subsequent to that, in which I warned that this was going to be the case. I saw it coming. And that was precisely what happened, and President Kaunda was compelled to take those steps. But he was not only compelled to take those steps. You have seen how the Soviet threatened him in public and said to him: You must be careful, certain things are going to happen to you—so insolent has it become as a result of the lack of action against it from certain quarters. Tanzania, who recognized the MPLA, would have been forced to co-operate with the communists, and the final result would have been a communist belt from the Atlantic Ocean, from Luanda across to Dares-Salaam on the Indian Ocean. With that Africa would have been cut in two. But what is more, if we had not become involved, the defence of South West Africa would have been impeded, if not rendered impossible, by 30 000, 40 000 or more refugees which they would have driven before them into South West Africa. They would, as it were, have driven them in like a battalion of infantry to make it impossible for one to carry out a proper defence. And Swapo would have been among those refugees and among those invading troops. It is a well-known fact, Sir, that the members of Swapo carry three cards in their pockets. They carry an FNLA card in their pockets when it suits them, and they carry a Unita card in their pockets when that suits them, and if it is necessary, and that suits them, they pull out an Ovambo tribal card. One is therefore dealing with three-faced persons. Last year already—and I am not saying this in a spirit of reproach; I am saying this simply because I owe it to Parliament—I considered it my duty to bring this situation very strongly to the attention of the countries that should have known this, both in Africa and in the free world. I have a clear conscience in this regard, i.e. that we did everything in our power to bring this situation and its consequences to the attention of those who should have known about it. I am not going to bandy names across the floor of this House. Nor am I going to level reproaches. To do so would be of no avail to us at this stage. But I do want this House to know that I went out of my way to settle this matter. In the process I informed the hon. the Leader of the Opposition from time to time of what was happening, and I gave very serious consideration to informing the leader of the Progressive Party as well.

Never!

But I decided against it because I was afraid to run the risk.

That is a scandalous allegation.

I was not afraid because I did not trust the hon. member, but because the hon. member and members of his party go along with people I do not trust. [Interjections.] And the hon. member need not become angry at me now because of this.

Who are those people?

A time will come when I shall tell you. To mention only one thing now: The hon. member heard the hon. member for Durban Point. Did the young hon. member at the back hear when they asked him about his standpoint on the Communist Party in South Africa while he was speaking? He did not reply to them. Both of them put the questions to him. He did not reply to them. [Interjections.] My question is why not? And if the hon. member subsequently wants to take this up with me, he is at liberty to do so. I shall gladly have a word with him in this connection. [Interjections.] In addition there is the fact that the communists are straddling the Cape sea route, and it is not only South Africa that says this. Military experts all over the world say it. The Belgian Prime Minister told us only this morning.

†Sir, when reproaches are made about Angola, I think it can best be discussed by reference to a leader in The Cape Times of 20 January 1976. In that leader the editor of The Cape Times put four questions to me: (1) Is South Africa fighting in the Angolan civil war?; (2) If so, why have we departed from our policy of non-intervention in the affairs of our neighbours; (3) Why was the public not kept informed, and (4) What is the extent of our present commitment and what will it be in the future? These questions more or less deal with the whole Angolan situation, also the questions that were put to members on this side of the House. When the question is put to me whether South Africa is fighting in the Angolan civil war, I say that South Africa was never a party in this civil war. South Africa did not become involved in Angola because it wanted to take part in the civil war. There must be absolute clarity about that. What is more, it must be at all times understood, because that is the situation, and hon. members know that that is so, that our involvement in Angola was not the cause of Russian and Cuban intervention. Our involvement was the effect of Russian and Cuban intervention. If they did not enter Angola, if they did not take part in this affair, if they did not try to subvert the whole of Angola and to suppress its people, South Africa would never have entered Angola at all. We were not involved in the civil war. We had nothing to do with it whatsoever; it was not our affair. I therefore say that we were not a party to the civil war. My hon. colleague explained that. He went further and said that our objectives were limited and that we achieved our ends. That is so. If hon. members ask me what our objectives were, then I say: Firstly, to chase the MPLA and the Cubans away from the borders for which we were responsible, to chase them away from the dam, because we did not go there in the first instance to occupy the dam. You will remember that my colleague explained that we went there to investigate the situation and were fired upon. That was the first time we ever went into Angola. We went in to chase Cuba and the MPLA away from the dam.

And now?

By force, naturally. We did not merely say “Shoo, Shoo!”. [Laughter.]

My question was not “how”. It was “and now?”.

I am coming to the “now”. You must first take your medicine before you come to the “now”. I am busy with the “how” at the moment. Sir, we chased them away from the borders for which we were responsible. My hon. colleague over here told you about the build-up of arms on the borders of South West Africa and for what purpose. And then, secondly, and I want to be very candid about this, it is rather difficult, Sir, when you chase a man away to decide when to stop. That, candidly, is a difficulty. Naturally it must be left to the people who are responsible for doing the job to decide how far you are going to chase away the man, knowing that if you chase him away a short distance he may come back. I make no bones about the fact that we chased him a very long way, and I take full responsibility for that. [Interjections.] Secondly, let us look at what happened next. Again I am only talking about my involvement and my Government’s involvement, and not about the involvement of other countries of the free world. We became involved to prevent the MPLA and the Cubans from harassing the people in the traditionally Unita and FNLA areas, harassment to such an extent that they had to flee to Owambo and South West Africa in their tens of thousands. I make no apology for having done that either. Thirdly, we became involved in order to bring to the notice of the free world and of Africa the fact that an unwilling people was being driven into the communist fold at the point of a bayonet, or otherwise was being shot to pieces. We did exactly that. Because we did that, there are those who turn round and say, firstly, that we should not have done it. If I understood the hon. member for Yeoville correctly, he is with me on this point, that there are some who do not hold it against us that we did it. There are those, however, who immediately turn round and say: “Why did you throw overboard your policy of non-intervention? You acted in a certain way in Mozambique but took an opposite course of action in the case of Angola.” However, one cannot equate the two. They are absolutely and totally different. I was accused, first of all by Dr. Albert Hertzog, closely followed by the hon. member for Sea Point, though he managed to beat the hon. member for Sea Point by a short head, or a short beard.

Let us now look at the arguments of hon. members on the other side. This was thrown at my head also by the hon. member for Bezuidenhout, and he was applauded by the hon. member for Rondebosch. In fact, they appeared on the same page of The Cape Times—Karperde! The hon. member for Rondebosch applauded him for the stand he took, unlike the stand taken by the hon. member for Durban Point and the hon. Leader of the Opposition. He congratulated the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. No wonder! They are birds of a feather. I do not often give advice to the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. However, I think it is appropriate that I do give him advice on this occasion. Let me say to him, in the popular turn of phrase: Why do you not take your seat where your mouth is? [Interjections.]

Order!

Let me first of all deal with the hon. member for Rondebosch. Out of the mouth of the babe we heard the truth. The great cry was that they wanted information and that this “cruel” Government withheld it from them. What did the hon. member for Rondebosch say after he was informed by my hon. colleague here? He said—

*What does he want to do with that? Use it against South Africa? Why does he say that he is not interested in the other things? He only wanted this one piece of information, as it suited his purpose. He only wanted to be able to say: South Africa was involved; the Minister said so himself. Surely that is not something which we previously concealed. I shall come to this again when I deal with the remark made by the hon. member for Sea Point.

Let us now consider the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. The hon. member for Bezuidenhout said more about this matter outside than he did inside this House, for it is easier to say things outside this House. After all, there is no one who can call you to order.

I only get a half-hour to speak. You have already been speaking for nearly two hours.

What did the hon. member say in his speech at Middelburg. He made a very serious accusation, an accusation which is now being made against us at the U.N. I quote—

This is the man who had no information, who did not know what the position was! Before the parliamentary session began, however, he spoke of how “involved” we were, and of how we had thrown our principles overboard.

I stated both sides of the case.

Sir, I am now referring to these facts. I shall come to the hon. member again, if I consider it worthwhile.

†Now I come to a real jewel in this report, and I quote—

He went, and you went with him! I hope that my genial friend on the other side has thanked the hon. member for Rondebosch appropriately for taking him along.

*The hon. member for Bezuidenhout put a question to me in this debate about the difference between the allegation that they wish to liberate South West Africa from Angola, and the statement made by Frelimo against South Africa this week in Lourenço Marques. My reply is that there is a tremendous difference between Mozambique and Angola. Mozambique was handed over to one Government. It made no difference whether or not one like that Government. South Africa’s foreign policy is still that if there is a Government which it does not like, it does not make war against it. As long as that Government leaves South Africa in peace, South Africa will leave that Government in peace. Surely we made it very clear that we were not seeking a quarrel with Mozambique, that we were not interested in who comprised that Government, just as long as there was a stable Government and that country was not used as a base for an attack on South Africa.

They say it is now going to become one.

No, Sir. Many a lie is told from hearsay. After all, there are many people who say they are going to attack us. The hon. member says that his party is going to win the by-election in Alberton, but should I worry about this now? [Interjections.]

You yourself say in your amendment that they are going to attack us!

It does not stop at talk only; after all, I want to explain this now. On the one hand it is a matter of talking, and on the other hand a matter of doing. There was no build-up of an arsenal of weapons on the border between Mozambique and South Africa. What is more—the hon. member probably does not know this—we fenced off the border between South Africa and Mozambique at a time when one would have expected feelings to be at their highest pitch. I was on that border myself; we were on the one side and Frelimo on the other. We recruited labour among them, and we fenced off that border which we had not been able to fence off in the time of the Portuguese, without there even being an argument about where the border ran.

Why did you not fence off the border of South West Africa as well?

Surely no attack was planned on South Africa, and if an attack on South Africa is planned and executed, we shall repel it. I told Mozambique this at the time. In the case of Angola forces were built up on our border. After all, there are no Swapo activities in Mozambique. In the case of Angola refuge was granted to members of Swapo, and those members were allowed to enter South West Africa to commit murder there. What is more, they occupied the dam and fired on our people. We did not intervene; we acted in self-defence, and we shall at all times continue to do so.

State your case now.

But surely that is what I am doing now. I am not talking to you. You must not be so conceited as to think that I am talking only to you; I am talking to hon. members in the House. I come to the hon. member for Sea Point in this connection.

†This is what the hon. member said to me (Hansard, 1976, col. 101.)—

Why did the hon. member lay words in my mouth which I never used? I never spoke about “the cause”, nor did I say that our cause is the cause of the free world. I used the word “involvement” and “involvement” is a totally different word from the word “cause”. I never disputed or denied that South Africa was involved. It is true that we did not give more information. We did not give more information because the matter was delicate and because we were not alone in our involvement in this. It worried me as it worried everybody else. However, we did not leave it at that; we explained it to the media as best we possibly could. I did so personally. I interviewed how many editors and how many journalists and explained it to them at length and my hon. colleague, the Minister of Defence, went out of his way to explain to all the editors of the newspapers what the circumstances were. It was impossible for us to go beyond the word “involvement” in this matter because too much was at stake. I accept full responsibility for that. Whilst I am on this point, let me say something in respect of which I am sure all hon. members who take it seriously will agree with me: America lost the war in Vietnam because inter alia the Press was too much involved with that war. [Interjections.] I am glad that I get a “hear hear” from the other side because that is so. One does not fight a war in order to supply news to newspapers. War is a serious matter. War is a matter of life and death and very often the wrong word at the wrong time in a newspaper can cause the death of people. It can also upset your strategy. It can make all your plans go wrong. It can undermine the morale inside and outside your country. We did not snub the newspapers. Why should we want to snub the newspapers? We want their co-operation and that is why we went out of our way to explain to them.

We did not depart from our policy. I want to repeat that if in the case of Angola there had been one Government to which the Portuguese had handed over, then as far as South Africa was concerned that would have been the end of the matter unless they had attacked us either through South West Africa or otherwise. My time is running out but I may say that there are other arguments which I can use to show that you cannot equate the two.

There was also a third question asked: Why was the public not kept informed? In answer to that I say that the public was informed. There was also the question: What is the extent of our present commitment and what will it be in future? I say that our present commitment is as it always has been, namely the protection of our country and the borders for which we are responsible. In the case of Angola it also refers to the Kunene scheme and whatever goes with it. We are committed and we will at all times defend our legitimate interests and those of the Ovambo people.

For a reason I would not know, the hon. member for Sea Point asked about the article which Mr. Schulzberger wrote. I have not seen that article, but it is perfectly clear what happened. I more particularly discussed, as far as this question was concerned, the North. The FNLA forces were not far from Luanda at the time and the hon. member has surely read what Holden Roberto said, namely that he was out-gunned by the Russians and the Cubans, that the morale of his people was high and that they were a match for the MPLA soldiers, but that he could not fight the 120 mm rockets barehanded. Of course, I said to Mr. Schulzberger: South Africa does not have that sort of thing; so we cannot give it to them even if we wanted to. It is only the free world that can give it to them. I am sorry that the free world did not do so. I thought that, by saying that, I might have touched a spark somewhere and that these people would at least be given the tools required for the job they had to do.

It nevertheless revealed a very ugly situation as far as our preparedness was concerned.

This had nothing whatsoever to do with our preparedness. It had to do with a situation 1 500 or more miles away from us. It had to do with a place wherein we were not involved at all. I am sorry that I have to say that the free world alone could at that time have cut off the communist and Cuban supplies through Luanda. That was not done and the result was what we have seen it to be.

*Mr. Speaker, I have tried to argue and prove that we did not become involved because we wanted to be involved. South Africa has a record in this regard. We do not want to become involved, but we were involved because we had no alternative. I am grateful for the understanding shown by my friends, the hon. member for Durban Point, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, and others, in this regard. They themselves said that they did not agree with everything we were doing, but I appreciate the spirit in which they discussed matters with us, even when they reproached us.

I referred at the outset to the communist objectives. Those objectives have always remained the same. We have learned a lesson in Angola, a lesson which we have already learned before, for I am on record as having said a long time ago in this House that, when it comes to the worst, South Africa stands alone. People will have to realize this. I think our people have realized this for a long time, for the instincts of a people whose survival is at stake, are never wrong. That is why our people are moving closer together, and that is why there is the intensification of feeling among our people which one sees in these days, and which we saw more than ever before on the day of humiliation. One observes it in one’s correspondence, and one hears it in one’s conversation with people. There are difficult days in store for us. It is going to be a difficult year, a year of endless problems. It is a watershed year. But I believe, as I stand here before you, that it is also a year of grace. It is a year of hope and a year of faith, because we have a task which we have to accomplish. Thank God our people are prepared to accomplish that task.

Mr. Speaker, I intend following the fine example set by the hon. the Prime Minister by first discussing economic affairs and race relations before coming back to the important matter of Angola. In this way I want to remind this House of the fact that in one of the legs of my motion I accuse the Government, and consequently express no confidence in it, of not providing adequately, in the gravest circumstances which South Africa must be ready to meet, for the national security of the country in that it has failed to maintain economic growth and to combat inflation in particular, in a manner consistent with increasing defence and other demands on our resources. The hon. the Prime Minister replied to our criticism in this regard by saying that he was satisfied with the answers given by his Ministers, inter alia, that we had done right to devalue, and that he expressed his gratitude to all for the manner in which they had helped to combat inflation. He went on to speak with great confidence of an upward trend in the economy. One has really been waiting for many years for a realistic debate in this House on the financial and economic factors which influence our economy, but that hope is disappointed virtually every year. We do get answers, but these are answers which do not go to the root of the matter. It is clear that the Government is treating symptoms and not the disease itself. We always hear how clever the Government is, and when the Opposition expresses criticism, we are accused of a lack of patriotism, especially when the country is in danger, as it is at the present time. Fortunately that accusation does not put us off, but unfortunately, it affects both businessmen and the economy. Nobody can tell me that the spirit of enterprise and the initiative of our businessmen are still as enthusiastic today as they were in the years before Government ideology changed virtually every board-room, workshop and factory into a workshop for the removal of red tape before the day’s work could be commenced. One asks oneself how much confidence an economy is able to inspire when 60% of the workers in the industry have no statutory training or qualifications. Patriotism is important, and it is important that one should discuss it, but it must be supported by arms and a strong economy.

This year the attack on the Government is based on inflation and devaluation. To my mind the answers we received from the Government were satisfactory on neither the one theme nor the other. Devaluation is but a temporary aid which can hardly cure the basic disease. I know speakers on the Government side quoted cost of living figures and dealt with the position of our current account which should be attributed to devaluation and the campaign against inflation. However, devaluation can only assist in the matter of our exports as long as our domestic price increases are not so substantial that we are no longer able to sell cheaply overseas. Sooner or later domestic price increases must be affected adversely by devaluation which causes imports to be higher than those of last year by 22% on average. As yet the full effect of the devaluation has not worked through to the whole economy. This means that we cannot boast of an inflation rate which dropped to 12% in December. What is also remarkable, is that whereas the costs of imports increased, the volume of imports decreased. If we wish to maintain the value of our imports in 1976 at the same level as that of the previous year, the volume of imports will have to decrease by 30%. In that case competition for the decreased volume will lead to still higher prices.

Since the largest part of our exports consists of capital goods, only one of two things can happen this year: Either we shall have to import, in which case production costs and prices will rise considerably, or we shall have to cut imports drastically, in which case the economy will develop more slowly, and will even deteriorate. Neither of these two possibilities create a favourable picture. The present inflation together with a slow growth rate is fatal to the maintenance of good race relations. Our economic and military efficiency is undermined drastically by both these factors.

Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of devaluation may be, devaluation on its own cannot solve our problems. If there is no change in the volume or in the prices of imports, all prices will be increased by devaluation and our domestic debt will rise considerably. The hon. the Minister of Finance became annoyed when we accused him of spending excessively and that the extravagance of the Government is one of the main causes of inflation. The fact remains that Government expenditures continued to rise over the years, and rose at an impossible rate during the past two or three years. During the financial year 1973-’74 consumer expenditure rose by 23%, the year after by 24% and in the financial year 1975-’76 by 19%. I quote from the Hill Samuels Quarterly Economic and Market Appraisal (page 4)—

Now the hon. the Minister relies upon the present campaign against inflation. Does he not realize that temporary success will undoubtedly be followed by the outburst of the pent-up expectations of both businessmen and wage earners in the country? Mr. Speaker, these are short term solutions. In the long run there is only one real solution, and that is increased productivity. This is what I stressed in my introductory speech. Nobody contradicted me and nobody on the Government side declared himself prepared to take the necessary steps to promote increased productivity.

I mentioned four essential steps. Now I am going to add the fifth step, i.e. the amendment of section 3 of the Planning Act. The Government is now using this legislation in some of our most important industrial areas to limit the number of Bantu labourers to what it was in 1968. Inspectors go around threatening employers with a fine of R10 per Bantu per day in respect of every Bantu labourer by whom the 1968 figure is exceeded. In other words, in practice it amounts to the prohibition of development and growth. In this way they are trying to bring pressure to bear upon industrialists to move out to the border areas, something which will definitely have an inflationary effect on the short term. They are being forced to the homelands, where, according to publications of the Government and of various investment corporations, it is clear that the expenditure regarding these industries rose by an average of 21,5% per year. As against this enormous increase, we nevertheless find that all the homelands put together contributed only 3% of the gross national production in 1975. In other words, this is indicative of an extremely shortsighted approach.

And what is the answer of the Government with regard to the other four steps I asked for? I am just going to repeat them: The abolition of job reservation; the inclusion of non-Whites in the definition of “employee” in the Industrial Conciliation Act; compulsory education for all races; facilities for professional and technical training modelled on the economic requirements and not on race or colour, and acceptance of the fact that Blacks are permanently resident in White areas.

I cannot deal with all the answers. For that reason I confine myself to the question of job reservation. What is the Government’s interpretation? What is its defence? According to what the hon. the Deputy Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions said yesterday, it only relates to 2,9% of the manpower. The hon. the Deputy Minister also said, “it is being phased out”. If this is true, it is not consistent with the policy of the former Minister of Labour. He was the one who said that it would be abolished over his dead body. Could this possibly be the reason why that hon. member was promoted to the Other Place?

Who are the people covered by this 2,9%, in any case? This excludes the mine workers and the Public Service, where a different methods of reservation is applied. For that reason it is, in practice, applicable to a much larger section of our labour force. The problem is that it covers the peak of the labour pyramid. Although it only applies temporarily to a negligible number of workers, it has a limiting effect upon the whole labour structure in South Africa.

There are other ways in which the progress of Blacks is being hampered. There is, for instance, the system in respect of apprentices. Admittedly, it is not prohibited under the Industrial Conciliation Act, but there are other regulations limiting Black apprentices to the homelands, where employment opportunities, of course, do not exist. This undoubtedly has a limiting effect as well and it dampens the enthusiasm of the employer to have his employees trained. He selects a man, trains him, spends money on his training and then finds that job reservation is applied and that he cannot use the man in the job for which he was trained. For this reason this figure of 2,9% means nothing whatsoever. It is in no way an indication of the effects of this measure, and it is no defence either.

After all, South Africa promised the U.N. that it will gradually abolish discrimination, but job reservation is undoubtedly colour discrimination in its most flagrant form. It cannot be justified and harms our name as well as our economy immeasurably. I think it is a foregone conclusion: No man with common sense, no person who is informed, can argue that this Government is taking sufficient steps to maintain the economic growth and to combat inflation in a manner consistent with the increase in defence and other demands made on our resources.

†The hon. the Minister of Finance may have pointed to some signs of economic improvement and of Government willingness to discipline itself better in the future. What we cannot forget is that this Government has repeatedly confronted itself with financial crisis after financial crisis in the whole of the last 28 years. Devaluation in any circumstances is only resorted to as a drastic step in the last resort. It has been taken by this Government four times in the last four years, twice in 1975 alone. In our opinion the villains of the piece have been successive Ministers of Finance who have been countenancing excessive expenditure and financing it in an inflationary manner.

Secondly, there is the Government’s race policy which builds an empire of ideological legislation within the State. Add to that a penchant for State interference in affairs that should be left to private enterprise and, inevitably, the tail must wag the dog. The Government must take the lion’s share of the blame for increasing imports, for competing for labour and material in short supply and, above all, for setting a spendthrift example and setting the mood against personal sacrifice and self-discipline. But I think their greatest sin in the economic field has been in the sphere of labour where not one single member of the Cabinet, and especially the hon. the Minister of Labour, has recognized the urgency of relaxing racial barriers to further productivity. The cost in this respect to the country is incalculable and totally incomprehensible in any country, except one totally blinded by ideological motives. I have no hesitation in saying that in so far as my accusations against the Government’s management of the economy and inflation are concerned, my case is proved and proved up to the hilt.

Secondly, I would like to deal with the Government’s failure to improve race relations by making more rapid progress towards a system that will unite South Africans of all races in a common loyalty. The hon. the Prime Minister replied to that by saying that basically race relations were good. He spoke about the Coloureds and said that he had approved the dismissal of Mr. Leon. He admitted that meetings followed and that there was, as he said, incitement, and he said that he had his ear to the ground. He also said that he had consulted with them before the dismissal and that his door was open to them. He also said that he would not run away from confrontation and that part of the offer he had made would be implemented and that the other part would not because there had been a failure, as far as he was concerned, in respect of co-operation.

The hon. the Prime Minister then went on to deal with the Bantu. He told us that the Government’s policy in regard to the Bantu had been a success. By way of proof he quoted the fact that Chief Mangope, whose territories are not consolidated, had asked for independence. Here was the ultimate proof that the criticism of the Opposition that you could not give independence to an unconsolidated territory or that the Bantu would not take it, was entirely unjustified. Fortuitously Chief Mangope spoke in Cape Town the night before last. In The Argus of 29 January he is reported as follows—

It does not seem that the hon. the Prime Minister has proved anything. In fact, it seems to me that he has proved conclusively that the criticism I have levelled from this side of the House is soundly grounded.

Chief Mangope discussed that very issue with me before he made the declaration that he was going to ask for independence.

I see. Did you promise him further consolidation?

A few days ago he reiterated that he was going to ask for independence, and he is committed by a resolution of his council.

I would like to ask the hon. the Prime Minister a question. Did you promise him further consolidation?

No.

Did you promise him more land?

No.

No? Well, then here is something very interesting. I have here a report published in The Argus of last night of what Chief Mangope said the night before. From my own conversations with him previously, this is consistent with his point of view. It shows how unsatisfactory the situation is.

We did discuss once that there can be further negotiation between Government and Government to exchange land. [Interjections.]

Before or after independence?

At any time. I said so in this House and outside.

I am sorry, but I have the greatest difficulty in accepting that there has been consensus between the hon. the Prime Minister and Chief Mangope. It seems to me as if there is still complete disagreement.

Having listened to the hon. the Prime Minister this afternoon, it is quite clear that South Africa is on the threshold of a war of survival on the African Continent. I think that the Government accepts that under those circumstances, race relations, the development of a common loyalty to South Africa, is one of the most urgent things with which we have to deal, but listening to the Ministers who have spoken in this debate and to the hon. the Prime Minister himself, it seems that what is lacking is that sense of urgency on the Government’s side to get on with the job. They make all sorts of promises but there is very little to show. How long ago was it that our ambassador at the United Nations promised the gradual removal of discrimination on the grounds of race alone in South Africa? What has been done since then? It is when one asks questions of that kind, that this Government is unable to meet the charge that unless things change in South Africa there are going to be many people of the non-White races in South Africa who are going to be less afraid of communism than they are of the present deal they are getting in South Africa. That is becoming more and more evident in the studies of people who know about the non-White people.

Let us look at the situation with regard to the Coloureds. The hon. the Minister of Health has made out a case justifying the dismissal of Mr. Leon for failing to carry out his statutory duty. The hon. the Prime Minister says that he approves of that entirely. There may or there may not be a case, but the fact is that as far as the Coloured people are concerned, they feel that the hon. the Minister had no case and that Mr. Leon did the right thing. We have a new hon. Minister who has taken over the portfolio and he has given no indication whatsoever of what his plans are for the Coloureds in future. It looks as though he is merely proceeding with the same sterile ideas which must end in disaster. It seems to me that he is living in a state of euphoria as far as the relations between the Whites and the Coloureds are concerned, which is entirely unjustified by the facts. I should like to put one or two things to him: The moderate Coloured, such as the ex-serviceman, asked that war veterans’ pensions be placed on a 4:3:2 basis instead of a 4:2:1 basis, in other words, that they should get three-quarters of what the Whites were getting, instead of half. That request has been turned down. How do you think those people feel about it, Sir?

*I think there are many Whites in whom the remarks made by some of the Coloured leaders are causing a feeling of unease and disappointment. No concessions made by the Government are accepted; in fact, they are rejected. They prefer to speak of an alliance with the Blacks and they regard themselves as being the only real opposition in South Africa. Consequently our object must be to neutralize the lack of confidence and the despair in their own future on the part of the Coloured people, and to change these feelings into something which will inspire confidence. They think that the move away from discrimination, as they have experienced it up to now, means nothing to them. The position in which they find themselves is exploited by some of the leaders and their position does not improve. They are seeking nothing else today than full citizenship on an integrated basis, as I have already warned the Government. They are adopting a quite outrageous attitude and the hon. the Minister knows that what I am saying is true. They take no account of the group identities which have become the accepted practice over a period of generations. What has given rise to this situation? I think the question is whether these people should be given a breeding-ground in which even the moderate and realistic Coloured person is driven into the arms of the extremists. The reason is the fact that this Government has never clearly spelt out its policy in regard to the Coloured people.

But you know you are talking nonsense.

The hon. gentleman says it is nonsense. Allow me to read to him what one of his own Ministers, Dr. Connie Mulder, said a few months or weeks ago. In this statement Dr. Mulder said that the course which the Coloured people were to take had not been decided yet. He spoke of territorial separation and integration, and then he said the following (translation)—

This was said by Minister Mulder. In other words, the final course to be taken by the Coloured people is not known. This is what the hon. the Minister says. And, Sir, he is a member of the Cabinet. He spoke with the Prime Minister and presumably with the present Minister of Coloured Affairs. He does not know the destination of the Coloured people. The hon. gentleman believes that he can go on telling the people year after year that he has a policy, while he has no policy. Now it seems to me as if the hon. the Minister is hiding behind the Theron Commission. We do not know when the report will be published and what its recommendations will be. We know what became of the Tomlinson report. We awaited that report for years and when it was published, the Government rejected almost all the most important recommendations. What is going to happen to the Theron Commission? It is not up to a commission to take the lead; it is the responsibility of the Government to take the lead concerning this matter.

But did you not listen to what I said yesterday?

I listened very carefully and I read the Hansard as well, and I am even more confused than before.

†Now, Sir, we are faced with a new situation in South Africa. The whole scene has changed in the past few months. We are going to have communist States on our northern borders and it is vitally essential for the security of this country that we have plans which will consolidate the whole population. Not only must they be politically, economically and socially in a better position than the inhabitants of the territories to the north, but they must be seen to be in a better position than the inhabitants of those territories. The one thing on which we will have to work is to see that they understand that situation. What have we got so far? We have been told by the Nationalist Party that there are only two roads open as far as colour policy is concerned. The one is the road that leads to apartheid, and the other the road that leads to integration. As far as the Coloureds are concerned, apartheid has manifestly failed. Are they going to lead us in the direction of integration, or are they at last going to accept the fact that there is a third road, namely federalism, in which they can realize the aspirations of the Coloured people?

That is unsaleable.

The hon. gentleman says it is unsaleable. Let me tell him that his apartheid policy is completely unsaleable to the Coloured people. What is more, this does not only apply to the Coloured people; it applies to the Indians as well. It applies to the urban Bantu as well. It is a far more important problem than just the Coloureds. It is probably the problem in South Africa, and in this debate there has been no attempt to deal with it at all. What is needed is a new philosophical framework to cater for the situation as it is at the moment, and it is perfectly clear that this Government is completely incapable of producing it. Sir, in the field of race relations, I feel that I have every justification for my accusations against the Government.

I now come to the position in respect of Angola. May I say here that it seemed to me for a considerable part of the Prime Minister’s discourse on this matter that we were talking past each other. It seemed to me that the hon. gentleman had not appreciated the charges that were levelled against him, nor did he make any real attempt to meet them. My charges against him were that he had failed to take the public into his confidence and to motivate it adequately in regard to the Government’s actions and objectives in Angola. I chose my words with care because I believed that the safety of troops and the lack of desire to help those who wanted to damage us were two very big considerations. Even having regard to those issues, I think it is perfectly clear already that a great deal more should have been made available to the public. This week’s debate has resulted in the public being very much better informed and motivated than they were when this debate started on Monday. That, to a great extent, proves my case, but I believe the public are not satisfied yet. Until the hon. the Prime Minister spoke today, I believe they felt that our troops had been used as pawns in a game of political and diplomatic power. I think that is the feeling they had. They felt that we had become involved in what you may call a large armed raid, if you like, which could easily have deteriorated into a full-scale war in which Russia herself would have played a part. They have been told that those troops must now be withdrawn and they do not understand why. They do not know what the troops have achieved and where we go from here. I believe the public wants answers to four questions: They want to know why we went in, they want to know what we achieved, they want to know why we withdrew, and they want to know where we go from here. I will not say that there have been no attempts to answer those questions. There have been attempts and I want to examine them. As to the question of why we went in, I conceded in my opening speech that there could be military justification, but I asked for the political justification, in view of the political and diplomatic dangers involved. What have we had so far? The hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs said—

That is, with foreign troops and advisers—

In other words, what the hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs was telling us was in effect that this was a pre-emptive strike. There has been no admission of that even from the hon. the Prime Minister. We have the fact that there was a build-up and that when we visited the works at Ruacana we were fired upon. We took the works and we then found that there was a build-up outside. We then chased people away. That is why we went in. In chasing people away, whom were we chasing? Were we chasing just the MPLA? Were we chasing just Cubans? Whom did we fight? The public of South Africa would like to know why we went in. The hon. the Prime Minister very delicately this afternoon tried to answer the question of what would have happened if we did not go in. Very well, what would have happened if we did not go in? First of all, the hon. gentleman said that we did not go in alone, that others were involved and that they must speak for themselves. In other words, the public is entitled to believe that the hon. the Prime Minister went in with the approval, tacit or overt, of certain other powers.

Order! The hon. members in the corner at the back must please converse more quietly.

He says that had we not gone in, the MPLA would have taken over the ports and the railway. Our objective, then, was to prevent their doing that. He says, secondly, we revealed the Russian-Cuban presence. Did we know they were there when we went in, or did we not? He says Angola would have been used as the base for an attack on South West Africa, Zaïre and Zambia. Is it not going to be used for that purpose today? The hon. the Prime Minister said the OAU would have recognized the MPLA. Was one of our objectives to stay there until the OAU conference was over? The hon. the Prime Minister says that if we had not gone in, Tanzania would have been forced to go with the communists, and that there would have been a communist belt right across Africa. Is that going to be prevented today? You see, Sir, our problem is that we want to know why we went in. We want to know what we achieved, and we want to know why we came out. Those are the questions people are asking. They want to know where we go from there. We went in obviously with certain objectives. The hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that it was a pre-emptive strike. The hon. the Minister of Defence has said that we were asked to go in by Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi.

No, …

He said our troops gave development aid to the local population. I accept that. I have no doubt that we did. There is nothing wrong with that.

You have misquoted the Minister of Defence.

He says our troops gave development aid, “opheffings-werk”, to the local population.

In Owambo.

I accept that. Chaos developed across the frontier and the defence of Calueque became necessary. Did that justify a military offensive?

But go on.

The Minister added that a refugee problem had developed and that South Africa’s assistance deserved wider recognition. Attacks by terrorists across the border necessitated hot pursuit reprisals and engagements across the borders. I quote further—

Now, Sir, the Minister is introducing an entirely new concept of defending the freedom of the whole of Southern Africa. It is accepted now that we went in, according to the Prime Minister, to chase certain people away; they ran so fast that we went on following them, and the problem was to know when to turn back. Is that correct, Sir?

You heard me.

Yes, and that is how I understood the hon. gentleman. But, you see, Sir, we find ourselves in difficulty in coming exactly to a conclusion. It is important that we reach a conclusion, because unless we know exactly why we went in we will not know whether we achieved our objective. We will not know what was achieved. Now, when we come to what was achieved, if you read through what was said by the two Ministers before the hon. the Prime Minister spoke this afternoon, you find that they both made broad claims that our intervention was politically rewarding and that Africa understands us better. They give little substantial proof and they make no claims of any military advantage. Now, what does the hon. the Prime Minister say? He said our objectives were limited and they were achieved. He said we got involved to prevent the MPLA and the Cubans harassing the inhabitants, to the point of chasing them away and causing them to flee. He said our intention was to bring to the attention of the free world that people were being forced under the communist yoke. Well, how much was achieved? Why did we withdraw? The hon. the Prime Minister said we chased them away and that, having chased them away, we had achieved our objectives and returned back home. Have we chased them away for good or are they coming back again?

You know them as well as I do. They might very well come back again.

You see, Sir, neither Minister has attempted to justify the withdrawal, but what is so interesting is that here is an article written by Christopher Manion of Johannesburg for the Daily Telegraph on 22 January, and this is what he said—

One wonders whether that has something to do with our withdrawal. I think what we have to ask ourselves at this stage is where we go from here. I think we must draw up a balance sheet of the pluses and the minuses and the sort of direction we have to follow hereafter. As far as the pluses are concerned, I think public opinion in South Africa, much of it complacent or unaware of the imminence of potential danger, has been made acutely aware of the unexpected speed and nature of the dangers that can arise. I think, secondly, our military forces, although they have acquitted themselves well, must have learned many valuable lessons in regard to this type of rapid defensive and preventive action on our borders. I think, thirdly, on the plus side, the border remains intact, the works at Ruacana and Calueque are protected and the work by the international consortium is still proceeding. I think, fourthly, that while some tragic loss of life occurred, this has been far lighter than may well have been the case. Hopefully some of the international implications and complications of this type of action are now more clearly understood. Russian strategy in Africa has been more clearly exposed and may be better understood by ourselves and the outside world. The Western world, although it did not come to our aid, has been alerted to further threats and the necessary responses in defence of the sea route and other areas in Southern Africa.

Now, what are the minuses? There are minuses. The Government has lost public trust through its failure to take South Africa fully into its confidence.

Tell me, how can you say that now, after yesterday’s by-election?

Does the Minister never get the telephone calls from worried parents, wives or children?

Yes, but they do not tell me that they do not trust us.

My goodness, they tell me they do not trust you.

Why did you not nominate a candidate in Bloemfontein?

Sir, the hon. the Minister is so childish that it is very difficult to converse with him on an intelligent level.

Do not be insulting, reply to me.

The Government failed to explain its motives abroad and it conceded a propaganda victory to our opponents overseas. Doubts have been raised in many African States as to the sincerity of South Africa’s declared policy of non-intervention.

That is not correct as far as the 22 countries are concerned.

The hon. the Prime Minister is entitled to make that statement, but I can say that in many African States doubts have been raised as to the sincerity of South Africa’s declared policy of non-intervention.

Lastly, the hostility of all States in Africa towards South Africa’s continued occupation of South West Africa has been sustained and may be increased. So what are the lessons to be learned? I believe that if similar threats should occur in the future, the Government should insure that military information services are adequate to the political task of maintaining public confidence, which it did not do in this case. There must be fuller justification, combined with adequate reassurances as to our limited objectives, and these should be disseminated. We must proceed with far greater speed to find a solution for South West Africa. We have to broaden our system of co-operation in Southern Africa, so that it is understood that we defend ourselves as a region. We must accept the fact that new, heavy burdens may be placed on our economy, and we must ensure that it remains vigorously productive, even at the cost of discarding ideological luxuries. We must make greater speed in the field of race relations so as to build a common loyalty. I believe that our defences have to be in an even greater state of proficiency than at the present time.

If I might sum up, let me say we face a future in which threats to our security will be a permanent feature of our existence. The country’s greatest task will be the motivation of all people of all races to defend every inch of South Africa as if it were their own. I ask myself if this is the Government to do the job. I believe it is not. The hon. the Prime Minister has sought to introduce an amendment for which he says every South African can vote. However, I have very great doubts as to whether this amendment is in order, because it seems to me that it contradicts my motion in no respect whatever. It does not call for confidence in the Government. The essence of my motion is no confidence in the Government.

It is exactly similar to the amendment I moved last year.

No, it is entirely different to the one the hon. the Prime Minister moved last year. I am going to disappoint the hon. the Prime Minister. I do not intend taking the point of order because I believe that at a time like this it is very important that there should be the greatest measure of national unity possible on defence and security matters, and while I shall vote for my motion, I want to say that if it is defeated, I shall accept this amendment.

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: I should like you to consider whether this amendment moved by the hon. the Prime Minister to the Leader of the Opposition’s motion is in order. In terms of the rules of this House, and in terms of the rule of relevancy, there are certain features of the Prime Minister’s amendment which are not relevant to the motion of no confidence which has been introduced by the Leader of the Opposition. Secondly, in terms of Speaker’s rulings over the years, an amendment may not extend the scope of the original motion. Quite clearly, in a number of respects the amendment moved by the hon. the Prime Minister, in particular the fifth paragraph of his amendment, extends the scope of the motion moved by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. I therefore respectfully submit that both in terms of the rule of relevancy, and in terms of the rule relating to extending the scope by way of an amendment, this amendment is not in order in terms of the rules and procedures of this House.

Order! I may inform this House that the matter raised by the hon. member for Sea Point was brought to my attention this afternoon, and that I have had some opportunity to consider the matter. The matter of Angola was brought before this House in paragraph (a) of the motion moved by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition in the form of a censure of the Government for its actions in connection with that matter. Any amendment in which this House wishes to take up any other standpoint on this matter will therefore in my opinion be relevant and admissible.

†I must further point out that as stated by Sir Erskine May on page 379 of the 18th edition of his work, Parliamentary Practice, one object of an amendment may be to modify a question in such a way as to increase its acceptability. I consider that the Prime Minister’s amendment falls into this category, and accordingly rule the amendment to be in order.

Question put: That all the words after “That” stand part of the Question,

Upon which the House divided:

AYES—45: Aronson, T; Bartlett, G. S.; Basson, J. D. du P; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs, G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Van Rensburg, H. E. J.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

NOES—117: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Plessis, P. T. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hartzenberg, F.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, J. P. C.; Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Nothnagel, A. E.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reynke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, H.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Swiegers, J. G.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Treurnicht, N. F.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, C. V.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, P. S.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van Heerden, R. F.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vilone, J. J.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux and A. van Breda.

Question negatived and the words omitted.

Substitution of the words proposed by the Prime Minister agreed to (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Question, as amended, accordingly agreed to, viz:

That—

1. (1) this House expresses its grave concern at the Communist aggression committed in Angola by Russia and Cuba with a view to imposing a Marxist state on the unwilling inhabitants by force of arms;
2. (2) it is obvious to this House that it is a further object of the aggression similarly to subject other territories and stages, inter alia, South West Africa and South Africa;
3. (3) this House takes note of the steps already taken to halt the aggression;
4. (4) this House directs the Government, in view of these objects and threats, to take all reasonable steps to foil this aggression and to safeguard our country as well as the territories and borders for which we are responsible; and
5. (5) this House in conclusion conveys its sincere thanks and appreciation to the Defence Force and all officers and men for the courageous and heroic manner in which they have acquitted themselves of their task in the operational area and expresses its deep sympathy with those who have lost loved ones in the struggle.