Order! Before I call for notices of motion, I should like to inform the House that I have been giving careful consideration to the use of expressions in debate which go beyond what can be regarded as parliamentary.

It is obvious that members, in discussing matters about which they feel strongly, express themselves forcibly. Subject to the rules of debate members are indeed entitled to use such expressions as they may think necessary, and I would be the last person who would wish to stifle debate.

However, I am sure members will appreciate that their freedom of speech must of necessity be subject to the principle that they may not impute improper or unworthy motives, dishonesty, hypocrisy or want of sincerity to their fellow members. All members of this House are honourable members, and every honourable member should therefore always act towards other honourable members with the same decorum and respect which he expects from them.

While members may for example argue that certain policies or actions of the Government or a political party will harm the interests of South Africa or even lead to its downfall, they may not state or imply that members are guilty of any form of subversion or other treasonable behaviour or of deliberately harming the interests of South Africa.

*Every member of this House has made and subscribed the oath prescribed by section 52 of the Constitution; through this oath he has undertaken to be faithful to the Republic of South Africa, and any allegation of behaviour in conflict with that oath can only be brought before this House by way of a substantive motion.

The use of expressions which do not comply with the principles I have already stated cannot possibly strengthen the arguments of members and can only lead to lowering the tone of debate and to bringing the proceedings of Parliament into discredit.

I must furthermore point out that it is not in order to use unparliamentary expressions against a political party which reflect upon members of this House or the Other Place. In addition, to say that such an expression has been used in a political sense or hypothetically does not render such an expression any less inadmissible.

I therefore appeal to all hon. members, in addressing this House, to bear in mind at all times the dignity of this House, as it is the duty of every member to assist the Chair in upholding the dignity of this House.

As Mr. Speaker Jansen stated in 1925, it is very difficult indeed for Mr. Speaker to know always where to draw the line, but if hon. members will bear the rules in mind, it will lighten Mr. Speaker’s delicate task of keeping the scales evenly balanced.

I know that I can rely implicitly on the willing co-operation and assistance of all hon. members in carrying out what is without doubt the most onerous of a Speaker’s duties.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

This is a Bill which makes provision for a permanent Internal Security Commission. In other words, this Bill deals with an aspect of internal security. It does not, therefore, deal with all the aspects of security, for hon. members will agree with me that there are various aspects of security. As far as this aspect is concerned, it is being requested that a permanent commission be appointed to deal with such aspects of internal security as the State President may refer to that commission—a very important provision, to which I shall subsequently return.

I also want to say at the outset that when we deal with this Bill there are two aspects which we should not confuse with each other. Although there could perhaps be a connection between the two, each one should be considered on its own and each one should stand on its own feet. These two aspects are on the one hand information made available to Parliament—in whichever way this is done—and on the other hand the actions of the Government, of the executive authority, in terms of instructions and in accordance with defined powers given to the Government by way of an Act of Parliament. If these two are confused with each other, problems arise, and I shall subsequently refer again to these. Because this Bill deals with security, it goes without saying that it deals with subversion. Subversion may assume various forms, and various authoritative bodies take action against subversion. Subversion may be of a violent nature and originate from outside a country’s borders, in which case it is the task of the military to take action against it. Subversion may assume the form of deeds which are committed, in which case it is the task of the courts to punish the perpetrators on the basis of the evidence submitted. Any investigation into subversion is the task of the Police.

However, there is another aspect as well, which is that Parliament—which is the highest authority—has the right to keep itself informed of matters which may be connected with subversion—hon. members should note that I said “may be connected with”—and which may give rise to subversion. The question is whether Parliament has the right to keep itself informed in regard to this matter—yes or no? No one argues Parliament having the right to keep itself informed in regard to financial matters, in regard to the spending of money voted by Parliament. For that purpose the standing Committee on Public Accounts is there. Similarly, no one disputes the right of Parliament to keep itself informed of Railways matters, marketing matters and all kinds of other matters by means of committees.

But suddenly, when it comes to security, there are people who are over-sensitive about this, and rather excessively over-sensitive, simply about whether Parliament has the right to keep itself informed of matters. How is Parliament able to keep itself informed of matters? Parliament may listen to surveys with which it is furnished. The individual member of Parliament may ask questions, to which he receives replies. However, it goes without saying that in many cases the magnitude of the task is such that time does not allow a matter to be dealt with in Parliament or that the individual member of Parliament has neither the time nor the facilities to keep himself informed of matters.

In my humble opinion only two methods then remain by means of which Parliament may keep itself informed of what is happening outside. These two methods are either a Select Committee of Parliament with such terms of reference, or a commission consisting of members of Parliament which hears evidence and which then brings out a report and makes such report available to Parliament itself. It is then incumbent upon hon. members to read these reports and to pass their judgment on those matters which have been brought to the attention of Parliament by either the committee or the commission.

The question immediately arises whether members of Parliament are competent to perform such a task. There will be those who will say that a member of Parliament is not competent to do so. My humble comment is that if a member of Parliament is not competent to assemble facts and present them to Parliament in a comprehensible form, then, with all due respect, we are wasting our time in Parliament. If one questions the competence of the House of Assembly in respect of this matter, there is nothing that one could in fact entrust to it. Mr. Speaker, I believe that those who have been elected to serve the highest interests in this highest Chamber are pre-eminently suited to assemble such a body of facts. I repeat: If they are incompetent to perform such a task, Parliament fails to justify its existence and then has no real task or function to fulfil. This does not mean to say—I want to make this clear at the outset—that such a commission should take over the task of the courts, or that such commission should take over the task of the Police. It may be supplementary to the task of the Police, as I shall indicate. It does not detract from the function of the courts either. I am aware that it may be argued that if Parliament wishes to keep itself informed of these matters the proper course is not to make use of members of Parliament, but to make use of a judicial commission. Otherwise—so it is argued—that commission is taking over the function of the courts. We have argued about this matter over the years, and therefore I do not want to prolong this debate by spending a long time discussing it again this afternoon. I just want to make my standpoint very clear again. When it comes to combating subversion originating outside a country’s borders by force, then it is the task of the Army. When it comes to the combating of internal disorder, then it is the task of the Police, and if it becomes too much for them, they have the right to call in the Army. This is the normal routine which is followed in this regard.

Parliament has the right to keep itself informed, for it is the task of Parliament to adopt preventive measures. Parliament has always seen its task in this light, and Parliament has given the executive authority certain powers to take action from time to time against organizations and individuals in the manner determined in the relevant legislation. I am aware that there are hon. members who say that this is wrong, and that the courts, and the courts alone, should act in this way. Anyone who, in these evil times in which we are living, adopts the standpoint that one could combat subversion by means of the courts alone, is living in a fool’s paradise. It is not the task and function of the courts to take preventive action against subversion. It is the task and function of the courts to punish offenders as and when the deed has been perpetrated and as and when sufficient evidence has been placed before it to prove that a deed has in fact been committed. But the courts cannot, and have no function or power to take preventive action against any individual or organization. That is not their task and function, and if one expects this of the courts, then we are expecting the impossible from the Supreme Court not only here in South Africa, but in any country in the world. In other words, because the courts are unable to do this, one is handicapped because one is unable to take preventive action and simply has to sit and wait until the deed has been committed. One now has to wait until the horse has bolted and then lock the stable door. Although one knows for certain that the horse wants to bolt, one cannot lock the stable door. Prevention is the task of the Government, the task of Parliament, and the Government may only take action in this regard under instructions from Parliament. I believe that I have acted in the light of this principle over the years, and I make bold to say that, according to the experience of many years, this is the only way in which one is able to take preventive action.

The object of this legislation is not to punish. That is the function of the courts. Nor is it the object of this legislation to hold a hearing. That is also the function of the courts. The object of this legislation is to gather information so that Parliament may ascertain what is happening. That is the exclusive object of this legislation. I know that it will be said that the executive authority wishes to take action against individuals. But the executive authority has that right in any case, whether such a commission as this exists or not. The executive authority has that right in any case. It has been given to it by Parliament, and it will therefore be able to take action in any case. It is possible, however, for a commission of this nature to be supplementary, and to throw light on matters. I shall return to this aspect later.

In 1972, when I proposed in this Parliament that a Select Committee be appointed, we argued the question of whether or not there should be a Select Committee at length. My side of this House felt that this was the proper course, while the opposite side of the House felt that the way to go about this should be by means of a judicial commission. Although the Opposition was initially opposed to the appointment of a Select Committee, they nevertheless decided—in my humble opinion quite rightly—to participate in the activities of the Select Committee, despite the fact that they were opposed to the creation of a Select Committee, which subsequently became a commission, and they participated in the activities of the committee without abandoning the standpoint which they had adopted during the debate. It is also a fact that some hon. members on the opposite side were unhappy about the decision of the official Opposition, despite their standpoint, to participate in the proceedings of the committee and the commission. Naturally the Progressive Party was opposed to it, as it is opposed to everything that is good. However, it was not only the Progressive Party that was opposed to it. It was an open secret that some hon. members of the United Party were also unhappy about the decisions their party had taken. The hon. member for Bezuidenhout, for example, was not happy about it …

About what?

About the participation of the United Party in the Select Committee.

I am sorry, but you are wrong.

The hon. member may say that this was how he felt about it. However, we have evidence which indicates otherwise. But how the hon. member felt is not important to me at the moment, for his feelings change considerably on a matter like this. What is important to me is that the hon. member for Yeoville was very unhappy about it, and unlike the hon. member for Bezuidenhout, he will not deny it. On the contrary, I think he will admit today that he was in fact unhappy about it. The hon. member is nodding his head so vigorously that I can hear him say “yes”. In other words, I have proved my argument that some hon. members who were sitting directly opposite at the time were unhappy. One of them, the hon. member for Yeoville, has now confirmed that he did not feel happy about this matter. But, Sir, he had friends, for surely he is not a man who would stand alone. [Interjections.] The hon. member is saying that he did in fact have friends. We know that he had friends.

I still have them.

He says that he still has them. However, not all of them are where he is now. [Interjections.] While the hon. member for Yeoville and I are now conversing in this good spirit there is just one thing I want to say to him. He has moved away from that side of the House to where he is now. He should really come to a halt where he is now. He should not move any further. [Interjections.] It is therefore a proven fact that some hon. members opposite were not happy about this matter. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to speculate in depth here today on who was happy and who not. If we, as responsible members, we who have been placed here to protect and guard the highest interests of the people, were to look back today, there is one question we would have to answer. Has it been worth our while to have appointed that commission—that commission which brought out its reports, reports which were tabled here, and which we discussed from time to time? Here I am once again in the fortunate position to be able to say that we need not speculate on whether or not it was a good thing we did. It is not necessary to speculate about it, for we know the answer to that question.

It goes without saying that the people who were intimately involved in it in the first place have a standpoint of which we should take cognizance. We should take cognizance of their standpoint on the question of whether or not it was worthwhile. However, we could also take cognizance of the leaders of the party—even of those who aspire—when they discuss this matter. Nevertheless I believe that when the accusation is made that this commission is now going to take over the function of the courts, that this commission is going to take the task of the Police out of their hands, that the creation of the commission was a waste of time and not worthwhile, I am once again in the fortunate position that I am able to call a witness who, as far as this matter is concerned, is unimpeachable. This is a witness whose word has to be accepted when he replies to the question of whether or not it was worthwhile appointing the commission. This is my hon. friend, sitting directly opposite me, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. Just as the hon. member for Yeoville did, he is nodding his head and saying “yes”. On 16 August 1975, on the occasion of a discussion, the hon. member stated categorically with reference to the attacks that had been made on the commission and its members: “We feel that the attacks made on the procedure adopted by the commission are entirely unjustified and unjustifiable”.

This is my reply to those people who say that the procedure adopted with the appointment of the commission should be regarded as being objectionable and unacceptable. With regard to the procedure that was adopted I have the testimonial of the hon. member that the attacks were entirely unfounded and that the procedure was correct. Not only do we have the word of that hon. member on this score; we also have the word of the hon. members who served on the commission itself that the procedure was correct and that no injustice was done to anyone by this commission in the course of any hearings.

We come now, Mr. Speaker, to the question of whether the commission wanted to take over the function of others, for it has been alleged in leading articles in various newspapers that it was objectionable because the commission was supposedly elevating itself into a court and ostensibly taking over the task of the Police. In this regard the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said on Friday, 16 August 1974, col. 851 (English Hansard)—

In respect of this matter as well as a similar commission to the one I am now proposing received a testimonial from the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself. But now we come to the final question, which is this: Was it a good thing, or was it a waste of time to appoint such a commission? To that question the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself has furnished a reply in col. 852, at the end of his speech, by saying—

Sir, all I want to do now, is to perpetuate these things which were praised here by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. I want to point out further that the facts of the commission were questioned—by The Cape Times, by the Sunday Times, and by goodness knows who else. Particularly in respect of its findings on Nusas there were hardly enough words with which to disparage the commission. Hon. members who served on the commission are aware of all the things that were cast in their teeth and how it was said, inter alia by the hon. member for Houghton and by the newspapers supporting her cause, that the factual findings of that report in respect of Nusas were false and mistaken; the commission had done nothing right in respect of that matter. And then certain things happened in South Africa. The Breytenbach trial took place, and once again Nusas was involved and then—and I want to congratulate the hon. member for Green Point on this—the hon. member for Green Point took the trouble to compare the opinions on Nusas expressed by the moving spirit of the liberalists in South Africa, the father of them all, Alan Paton, with the findings of the commission. What a remarkable similarity there was between the views of the spiritual father of Nusas—the honorary president if I am not mistaken—the man who had seen its inside operations at close quarters over the years and had been actively involved in these operations, and the findings of the commission as pointed out by the hon. member for Green Point. What I found interesting was that the hon. member for Green Point took the trouble of sending his findings to various newspapers in the form of a letter. Particularly interesting was the comment of The Cape Times—which was one of the most vitriolic commentators in this regard and which did not have words enough with which to disparage the members of the commission—written in a footnote to the letter of the hon. member for Green Point. They did not dispute his facts—he confronted them with the facts and they did not dispute those facts—but appended a tame footnote to his letter which read as follows—

You see, Mr. Speaker, as soon as a person gets into trouble, he falls back on “the rule of law”. This is what The Cape Times did. Because they were unable to contradict the arguments of the hon. member for Green Point, it was said—

When they were unable to repudiate the facts, they fell back on reproaches, and one of these was that the hon. member for Green Point—of all people—did not believe in the “rule of law”.

I do not think it is necessary for me to prove any further that the commission did in fact serve a very useful purpose, and that that is why it is a good thing it is being made permanent. The commission did not do the witnesses an injustice. For that we have the testimonial of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself. Nor did the commission try to take upon itself the task of the Police or the Supreme Court, and because this was so, I believe it is right for Parliament to perpetuate that commission. We debated this matter at the beginning of the 1972 session. The Select Committee was then appointed and subsequently became a commission. It commenced its activities in July 1972, and set to work in all earnest from August 1972 onwards.

†This commission then brought out a report on 17 January 1973. Hon. members will recall that this was an interim report and that it was a unanimous interim report. Having heard evidence for six months or so, the commission came to this House with a unanimous report, and I think it is fit and proper, for record purposes, that I read out to the House what the unanimous recommendations of the commission were.

I quote from page 9 of the report—

You will note, Sir, the words they use. I shall read them again—

You will recall, Sir, that when I tabled this report in the beginning of 1973, I informed the House that, as far as this recommendation was concerned, the Cabinet had considered and accepted it, that the necessary legislation would be drafted and that a Bill would be introduced into Parliament. You will recall further, Sir, that this Bill was not introduced because I was asked to hold it back until such time as the commission had completed its work. I did that, and it is for that reason that the Bill is before Parliament only now, the commission having finished its work only last year.

In paragraph 12, on page 10, of the report the commission went on to say—

1. (a) The body should be seen as a parliamentary organ, although existing practice probably does not allow of a permanent Select Committee and the body would therefore have to be established by Act of Parliament. The members should be Members of the House of Assembly.
2. (b) The body should consist of six members. Members should be appointed by the State President.
3. (c) The body’s powers of inquiry and rules of procedure should be comparable to the powers and rules of your commission.
4. (d) The body should be required to inquire into matters of importance to internal security, referred to it by the State President. It should report to the State President.
5. (e) Without detracting from the matters of any other kind which may receive the body’s attention, existing and proposed security legislation and existing and proposed administrative action in the sphere of internal security should be matters which could be referred to the body for inquiry and report.
6. (f) The body should be regarded as an information organ for Parliament, on the one hand, and as a link in the sphere of internal security between Parliament and the Executive Authority on the other hand.
7. (g) The body could be linked to the Department of the Prime Minister. Legal and administrative staff should assist the body in the performance of its functions.
8. (h) The body, which could be known as the Internal Security Commission, could make for a broader distribution of the responsibility for safeguarding of the existing order and at the same time to some extent lift it out of the political arena.

That is what the commission recommended. These recommendations, as I have already said, were accepted by the Cabinet. In other words, what hon. members have before them today is not my Bill, it is not the Government’s Bill in the first instance, but the commission’s Bill. This Bill has, in fact, got ten fathers. Nine of them are still members of this House.

*It will now be interesting to see who is going to acknowledge and who is going to deny the child “soos hy daar in die tjalie lê” as the words of an Afrikaans song have it.

Hon. members opposite and hon. members on this side unanimously proposed that a permanent commission be appointed. I instructed the law advisers to write nothing into that legislation, apart from the normal provisions which should be in a Bill, but what was recommended by the commission. I want to say at once that if hon. members opposite can show me something in this Bill which was not recommended by the commission or which is in conflict with the recommendations of the commission, I shall be prepared to remove it immediately. For the rest I cannot emphasize strongly enough that hon. members—nine of whom are still sitting in this Parliament—concluded a contract with me. As honourable men they made a recommendation to me and I, as an honourable man, accepted their recommendations. I promised them, and gave them the undertaking, that I would carry out their recommendations. I am now before this House with these recommendations.

†In the first instance the commission recommended that the permanent body should be a parliamentary organ. You will find, Sir, that the Bill seeks to create such a parliamentary organ. You will find that the commission recommended that, because existing practice does not allow it, this body should be established by an Act of Parliament. That is why the Bill is now before hon. members. The commission further recommended that the members should be members of the House of Assembly. Here I think all hon. members will agree with me that it is right that instead of them all being members of the House of Assembly, they should rather be members of Parliament, as I have said. I do not think there is any hon. member in this House who will want to exclude Senators from such a commission.

Secondly, Sir, you will note that this Bill provides for ten members whereas the commission at the time proposed six. I changed this for the very reason that it was found in practice that the commission wanted to split up into smaller groups on account of the work that had to be done and that six could not cope with the work. For that reason the commission was increased to ten members and for the same reason the Bill provides for ten members.

To my surprise I now find that there is objection from certain quarters against the proposal that the members of this commission are to be appointed by the State President. The commission, in paragraph 12(b) of its report, states explicitly that members should be appointed by the State President.

The commission recommended, thirdly, that the powers and procedure should be comparable to the powers and rules of the then commission. Hon. members will find such provisions in the Bill. The commission in the forth place recommended unanimously that the body should be empowered to inquire into matters of importance to internal security referred to it by the State President and that it should report to the State President. I now find, however, that there are hon. members who say that the State President should not be put into that position, that he should not be asked to instruct the commission to inquire into certain matters. There, again, my argument is that it is not only fit and proper that it should be done, but what is more, it was the unanimous recommendation of hon. members on this side as well as of that side of the House that that is the way in which it should be done. Furthermore the commission felt that existing and proposed administrative action could be referred to the commission for inquiry and report. Whereas hon. members will find in clause 4(1) of the Bill that the State President can refer matters to the commission, they will find in clause 4(2) that such matters as proposed administrative action can also be referred to the commission.

*Because these commissioners, after hearing evidence for months on end and in spite of the debate we had previously had on the matter, concluded that the best way to deal with this matter was a permanent commission, and did not simply leave it at that either but in fact made a unanimous recommendation, this Bill was drawn up. I cannot, with the best will in the world, understand why there should now be a departure from this. I cannot understand why, if I am to believe the newspapers, hon. members opposite have now decided that they are no longer going to participate in the commission.

If you had got as far as the fourth report, you would have seen why.

No, I did indeed get as far as the minority report, and read it I do not know how many times. If the hon. member could indicate to me that there is any repudiation of this recommendation in the minority report, I should very much like to hear it. If the hon. member could indicate to me that those hon. members stated by means of the minority report that there should no longer be a permanent commission, that the commission should no longer institute investigations, he would have a case to argue. However, I want to say that this minority report is so skimpy a fig leaf that even Eve would not have worn it. [Interjections.] There is no substance whatever in that argument. Nevertheless I should very much like to hear it, if hon. members wish to advance that kind of argument.

We have a Bill here which seeks to render a service to South Africa by keeping Parliament informed of matters affecting the security of the State, in exactly the same way as the old commission rendered pre-eminent service to South Africa. The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that South Africa needs such a commission, for when we try to compare the present times with the times in which the commission wrote its report, when it investigated these things, we shall find that there is no comparison. After all, we are living in far more serious times today than those times were. If it was necessary to have a commission in 1973, 1974 and part of 1975 to investigate these matters, how much more do we not need it now! If it was a good thing at the time—as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself said—that the commission occupied itself with these matters, how much better is it not that a commission of Parliament should now occupy itself with such matters!

It was my standpoint at all times that I should have liked to have had the co-operation of the entire House, of all the various parties in this House, in this regard. It is fit and proper that they should all have representation on it. However, I want to make it very clear that if there are parties present in this House which say that they will not serve on the commission, it will not deter me from proceeding with the commission. In view of the background to and the history of this matter, and in view of the seriousness of the times in which we are living, I cannot allow this to be said: “Very well then, if there are parties in this House which do not wish to associate themselves with this commission, I shall leave it alone.” If Parliament should see fit to pass this Bill and it comes to the appointment of members to the commission, I shall consult hon. members. If they wish to serve on it, I shall appreciate it. If they do not wish to serve on it, I shall continue to allow such members to serve on it as are prepared to serve on the commission. I believe that in the same way as the previous commission did good work, the commission which is to be appointed will also do good work.

I conclude by saying once again that nine members of the commission, who are still members of this Parliament, concluded a contract with me. I have fulfilled my part of the contract, and I am eager to see whether they, too, will fulfil their part of the contract in this regard.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is very clear that a bipartisan approach to security matters is extremely desirable. It is desirable because of the times in which we live, desirable because the maintenance of internal security often leads to that classical conflict between the safety of the State and the invasion of the liberties of the individual and desirable because it is right that in matters of security we should show a united front to the world outside. Having said that, I cannot help but refer to what the hon. the Prime Minister said this afternoon in his attempt to apportion responsibility for security to the various arms or organs of State—the Army, the Police, the judiciary, the executive and Parliament. If ever I have heard hopeless confusion it was in the approach of the hon. the Prime Minister to the responsibilities of the legislature, Parliament, and of the executive in respect of security. That is where his whole argument falls down. At one moment he identifies the executive with the legislature; in other words he seems to imply that the legislature should be taking steps which rightly belong with the executive. He said Parliament has the right to inform itself on certain issues. He quoted the standing committee on financial matters. That committee informs itself for what? To ensure that there is not unlawful expenditure because Parliament is responsible for voting the money. He spoke of members being on a marketing commission and said that it was right for them to inform themselves. Of course it is right for them to inform themselves; they are going to pass legislation dealing with marketing.

The hon. the Prime Minister gives security as an example. Let us deal with that. The issue before us in this Bill is not the desirability of a bipartisan approach. That is accepted on both sides of the House.

Except that you will not serve.

The hon. the Prime Minister says except for the fact that we will not serve. If the hon. the Prime Minister retains the Bill in this form I will, of course, not serve, and I am going to tell him why very clearly. What is at issue in this Bill is what the function or the role of a member of Parliament, of the legislature, of the Parliament of South Africa, should be in security matters. That is the issue in this debate. There are two alternatives. The first is that the role of a member of Parliament should be to keep in constant review all existing and future legislation to do with security and to keep in constant review all associated administrative procedures and to see that Parliament is informed intelligently, with the help of the executive, so that it can legislate in respect of those matters. The job of Parliament is to legislate. The hon. the Prime Minister implies that Parliament has an additional duty, viz. to act as an investigator, at the behest of the executive—that is what it amounts to; the State President acts on the advice of the executive—to investigate, armed with a subpoena, to go into and report upon any matter which the executive thinks it would like information about, whether it has to do with legislation or not. In my opinion this is not the job of the legislature. Sometimes the executive will be in a position to prevent those legislators who act as investigators for it, from informing Parliament what they have discovered and what their report will be. This is the issue in this debate.

I would like to say to the hon. the Prime Minister and to hon. members on that side of the House straightaway that if the first alternative were the objective, viz. that it is the role of a legislator to legislate in the security field, after the necessary inquiries and after the necessary reports to this House, to legislate wisely and well, then the hon. the Prime Minister could be assured of the full support of this side of the House, and of service on any Select Committee appointed to do that particular job.

Is this not precisely to put the legislator in that position? [Interjections.]

I am not surprised at the hon. the Minister of Finance putting that question, because if he had listened to the hon. the Prime Minister, he could not help being confused. The hon. the Prime Minister made no distinction between the different roles of a legislator. I want to say to him that a Select Committee to review existing security legislation, to recommend future security legislation, to deal with certain administrative processes which have to do with security matters, is long overdue. There are people who will tell one that the biggest problem in combating communism in South Africa today is the Suppression of Communism Act itself because of its vagueness and because of the way in which it has been framed. We on this side of the House have pleaded over the years for a judicial tribunal to review executive action by the executive in respect of security matters. We abhor the powers of restriction which the executive use. However, the Government seems determined to retain those powers. If they are to be retained, then surely the least we can do is to have some means of controlling them and of limiting them by means of a judicial tribunal to review actions of that kind. That was recommended by the minority report in the fourth report of the commission. It was recommended by us in this House when we discussed the last of the Schlebusch reports in this House. The hon. the Prime Minister knows that when I make him that offer, it is a sincere offer. He knows he has no security risks among the ranks of the people sitting behind me on this side of the House.

However, if the hon. the Prime Minister is intent on the second alternative, viz. that legislators, members of Parliament, are expected to act as investigators on behalf of the executive, armed with a subpoena, in security matters not concerned with legislation, then the hon. the Prime Minister will not be surprised to find that we are not prepared to co-operate with him or to serve on a commission of that kind.

Why did you serve on the Schlebusch Commission?

I thought that sweet little canary sound would emerge. I am going to deal with that matter later. I have no doubt the hon. member will direct her entire speech to that point. However, I will deal with the hon. member in due course.

Do not flatter yourself.

Our attitude with regard to this matter has been consistent throughout. When the hon. the Prime Minister moved the appointment of a Select Committee in this House in 1972, a committee to investigate certain organizations, we protested that it was work that should not be done by members of Parliament, but that it was work that should be done by a commission, preferably a judical commission. That was in 1972. What happened? We were outvoted.

[Inaudible.]

Order! The hon. member for Houghton will still get her opportunity to speak.

I do not know why she should, Mr. Speaker, because she talks all the time anyway. What happened in 1972? We were outvoted. Two and a half years later when Parliament debated the final report of this commission in this House, our commissioners, after all the experience they had had, were still of the opinion that the work would have been done more properly by a judicial commission. That was the view of my caucus. When that debate took place and after the report had been studied, I was authorized to come to this House and say that we believed that that work should have been done by a judicial commission. To refresh members’ memories, and for the record, I want to repeat exactly what I said then (Hansard, Vol. 50, col. 839)—

We on this side of the House are still of that view. We believe that it is our job in this Parliament to legislate, to take note of anything in the security field which affects present or future legislation on security matters and associated administrative procedures. If the executive wants matters in the security field, unconnected with legislation, investigated and brought to the notice of Parliament, then it is the job of the executive to do the investigating itself with or without the assistance of a judicial or any other sort of commission and submit its report to Parliament. That is why I say we are against the Bill. It is the executive’s job to do these investigations.

Will you deal with the interim report?

Certainly I shall deal with the interim report. The hon. the Prime Minister relies on the First Interim Report which recommended a permanent commission of the kind envisaged in this Bill. However, much water has passed under the bridge since that First Interim Report. [Interjections.] Our commissioners had second thoughts, I believe much wiser thoughts. In the fourth report they returned to this matter in their minority report …

The newspapers castigated you and that is why you are adopting this attitude.

Does the hon. the Prime Minister really think that? Has he so small an opinion of the commissioners, whom he has just been praising so much, to believe that they have changed their minds because of the tripe which was written in some newspapers? The hon. the Prime Minister does not believe it for one moment. The whole trouble, I think, is that he forgot about the Fourth Interim Report and did not take it into account. The minority in that Fourth Interim Report turned to this matter. They dealt with it very fully and set out exactly what they believed the role of a permanent commission should be. For the record, I think it wants to be clearly stated before this House—I refer to page 520, paragraphs 20.5.7.14 and 20. 5.7.15—

1. (a) to take into review any existing legislation relative to the security of the State;
2. (b) to determine proposed legislation to be placed before Parliament authorizing any executive action as contemplated by paragraph 20.5.7.8; …
   This paragraph deals with the cases where the executive should have exceptional powers. I continue—
3. (c) to receive evidence as to the necessity for any legislation relative to State security;
4. (d) to inform Parliament from time to time in respect of matters investigated by it.

There it is, as clear as daylight. In other words, in their view the function …

Where in that report is the first report repeated?

The recommendation here is perfectly clear. They believe the function of this commission should be limited, and they set out the limitations. The hon. the Prime Minister, in his Bill and in the First Interim Report, envisages far wider powers and functions for that commission, and I am going to deal with that in one moment. The minority recommended that the functions should be the review of proposed, future and existing legislation, and associated administrative procedures to do with security. In other words, that would mean that clause 4(2) of this Bill would correspond to what the minority of commissioners desired. It says—

That is the recommendation which was made by these commissioners. But the hon. the Prime Minister has clause 4(1) in this Bill, which reads—

Any matter to do with State security …

Do you agree that that is in accordance with the interim report?

Of course, and I am going to deal with the interim report in one moment. This Bill goes even further and in clause 12(1)(a) it says—

Any additional powers and any additional duties may be given, and these are not limited to legislation. The purpose will not be to inform themselves for legislative purposes, but to do anything and undertake any duties which the State President asks them to do in connection with State Security, to invade the functions of the Police, to invade the functions of the judiciary. This is absolutely limitless and the State President can do it by way of regulations. The views of the minority were perfectly clear. This Bill goes far beyond what they recommended and it goes far beyond what we believe is the function of a legislator. They did not arrive at those recommendations lightly. If one reads the previous pages, and especially the previous two paragraphs of the report, one will realize that it was after consideration of the philosophy underlying the division of powers between the various organs of the State that they came to the conclusion which they did. It is so that their views differed from those expressed in the First Interim Report. I concede that at once, but it will not be the first time that members of a commission have found it necessary to change their minds. It is not the first time either that a Government or an official Opposition has not accepted the recommendation of a commission which has reported to Parliament. That first report is a somewhat contradictory document. The report suggests that this body, this permanent commission, should be an organ of Parliament. It is true that the members of the commission are to be M.Ps, but that is the only connection it has with Parliament. The commission is appointed by the State President, its procedure is determined by the State President, what it shall look into is laid down by the State President and it reports to the State President. Is that a parliamentary organ?

Of course not.

Of course those were the recommendations, and rather stupid they were, do you not think? It is not a parliamentary organ; it is an organ of the executive. That is what it is. And just as that would be an organ of the executive, so in this Bill the commission which the hon. the Prime Minister wants to create is not an organ of Parliament but an organ of the executive. Now, the hon. the Prime Minister brushes all these arguments aside. He says it is the duty of Parliament to appoint a fact-finding body to inform itself of certain matters which he wants to lay before it. At least, that is what he said when he asked for the appointment of the first Select Committee. But surely that is just a fig-leaf. It is true that the commissioners obtained certain information, but they could not share that information with their colleagues. Their colleagues got no information until the reports were tabled in this House, and then they had to read them like any member of the public. What difference would there have been if that report had come from a judicial commission instead of a commission consisting of members of Parliament? They would probably have done the work much more quickly and they would probably have reported more succinctly. We are in this position here too. If this commission is created and comes into being in the way the Prime Minister envisages in this Bill, will members of Parliament be informed of what is being investigated? The Bill says the reports will be tabled in Parliament, unless the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, thinks parts of the report should be excised or the report should not be tabled. “After consultation with the Leader of the Opposition’’ does not mean “in consultation”. The hon. the Prime Minister has the last say. It may very well investigate matters which Parliament never hears about. How is Parliament going to be informed? The Prime Minister may say it is not good for us to know about it. And you know what this Government is like, Sir. They see communists behind every stone and terrorists behind every tree. [Interjections.] Sir, this argument that Parliament must inform itself of matters other than those connected with legislation, quite frankly, is not much of an argument. It is not much of an argument for members sweating it out for years, dealing with thousands of documents and hearing hundreds of witnesses. What for? To inform themselves, not for legislation, but just because the executive wants certain matters investigated. Now, I know that I will be told at once that my attitude is a reflection on the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission and the work it did. Let me tell you at once, Sir, that nothing could be further from my mind. I have said before that I believe that they did a good job. I said it in this House and I say it again this afternoon.

And now you are finished with good jobs.

Sir, I said they did a good job, but I did not for one moment say that a judicial commission could not have done as good a job. I did not for one moment say that a judicial commission could not have done a better job. I did not for one moment at any time agree that this was the sort of work members of Parliament should be doing. I believe it could have been done by a judicial commission, and probably much more quickly and at much smaller cost. Then I will be asked why I agreed that our members should serve on the Schlebusch Commission, despite the fact that we thought the work should be done by a judicial commission, whereas now we refuse to serve for the same reason. Sir, let us go into the history. The Schlebusch Commission started life quite respectably as a Select Committee of this House, the meeting of which could be attended by any member of Parliament to inform himself, as the Prime Minister said. Secondly, Parliament decided what it was to investigate and what it was to report upon. Thirdly, the procedure was the normal Select Committee procedure and its members were selected by Parliament. Fourthly, the Prime Minister had undertaken that Parliament would consider its reports and decide what should be done, if anything should be done. Now, what happened? The experience of our commissioners showed that our view that the work should have been done by a judicial commission was well founded. They said so in this House. The hon. the Prime Minister allowed executive action by one of his Ministers arising from the view expressed in the report without discussing it in Parliament and without any reference to Parliament. Fifthly, the Select Committee became a commission sitting in secrecy and members of this House had no means of finding out what was going on, better than any other member of the public, until the reports were tabled in Parliament. Now what is the position with the commission now envisaged? It is not a Select Committee or a judicial commission. It will not be appointed by Parliament. Parliament will not set out what its terms of reference are. It will not report to Parliament, but will report to the State President. Parliament may never see its reports. There is no provision for review of executive action by any independent judicial tribunal, as recommended in the minority report by commissioners on this side of the House. The commissioners are to have far wider powers and duties than was recommended in that same minority report. Sir, we cannot be associated with it. It is totally opposed to the principles we have in regard to the functions of legislators and members of the executive.

I want to pose one important question. What has given rise suddenly to this insistence that this sort of work should be done by members of Parliament? Throughout the history of the Republic security matters have traditionally been investigated by members of the judiciary. After Sharpeville, was it not Mr. Justice Wessels who went into the causes?

After!

After Langa, was it not Mr. Justice Diemont, and after Paarl, was it not Mr. Justice Snyman? After Profumo, was it not Lord Justice Denning? When the Bureau for State Security was to be set up, before it was set up, was it not a judge who submitted a report? When Dr. Albert Hertzog made statements about BOSS, was it not a judge who investigated the matter? It suited them then; it suited them perfectly. Is there any reason, Sir, for changing, save this somewhat poorly motivated first report, drawn up before the commission had had the experience it ultimately had, and at a time when it never considered the alternative in its arguments in regard to a judicial commission? Their reason for recommending a permanent commission was the changing faces of the various front organizations.

The hon. the Prime Minister knows about that. He read it out this afternoon. There was also the justification of watchfulness. Is it not the job of the executive to keep an eye on these organizations and to take preventive measures, and is it not the job of Parliament, if the executive has not the power to take preventive measures, to see that it gets it by way of legislation? And is it not the job of the executive, if it does not have the powers it wants, to come to Parliament and motivate its case and, if necessary, to lead evidence before a Select Committee as to why it needs these powers? That is the difference between the functions of the executive and of the legislature. Sir, if the idea is that you have to keep tabs on the changing faces of front organizations, is it not a judge who should be called in, who is accustomed to evaluating facts and separating fiction from fact and drawing sound conclusions, and would it not without any doubt give greater public approval, whether the hon. Prime Minister likes it or not? You see, Sir, I think the hon. Prime Minister must face up to the fact that the public does not like commissions of politicians. It regards them as being politically motivated. It does not think their judgments are impartial. It does not matter whether this is true or not, but the fact is that that is the public view. Sir, we are engaged today in a propaganda battle with the communist propaganda machine. We want all the help we can muster in that propaganda battle, and the best way to muster it is to hand work of this kind over to a judicial commission. Sir, let us be honest with ourselves, as we were in the debate when this commission was appointed. We in this House know only too well how subjective our judgments are and how often we appal each other at the attitudes we adopt, and how surprised we are to find what people on the other side of the House think. Are we surprised that the public sees that and believes it as well? Sir, the Bill introduces a principle which I believe will be an added cause for public suspicion. It provides that these commissioners will be paid a salary, in addition to their parliamentary salaries, to be determined by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Minister of Finance.

That is an unworthy thing to say.

No, it is not unworthy. I believe, and I think the hon. the Prime Minister will also believe, when he thinks about it a little, that there is very good reason for the old rule that a member of Parliament should not hold an office of profit under the Crown, i.e. an office of profit under the State President at the present time.

Why did you not object when it was turned into a commission?

They were not paid salaries.

They are not paid salaries now either.

But you lay down in this Bill that they will be paid salaries. [Interjections.] I quote subsection (1) of clause 11—

Remuneration means payment for services rendered; that is what remuneration is.

Why have you never criticized the Bantu Affairs Commission in that respect?

I will deal with that in one moment; it is a very old one.

Do you think you have found something?

Why has clause 11(2) been added? I quote—

Why has that provision been included in the Bill?

According to the law advisers, for very good reasons.

Exactly. The only good reason is that they are not only getting a subsistence and travel allowance, but that they are getting a remuneration as well. I know that there are parliamentarians who are paid salaries for their services, as in respect of the Bantu Affairs Commission, and in the nature of things, what has happened? They are all members of the Government side and they have become an extension of the executive. What independence do they display? Here I believe, we are faced … [Interjections.] When the dialogue is over I shall be happy to continue. We are faced here with an entirely different situation. The hon. the Prime Minister wants this commission to consist of members of both sides of the House and I believe that it places him and that it places those members in an impossible situation. I believe that is a very good reason in itself not to accept appointment on the commission.

This gives rise to another issue and that is the whole question of the division of powers and the theory underlying it. Once you start paying members of Parliament salaries for work they do outside of their duties as a member of Parliament, and those salaries are paid by the State, then they become an extension of the executive. They no longer are purely legislators. This does not apply to members of the Government because they control the executive anyway, but for members of the Opposition this is an entirely impossible position to be put in.

Let us look at the work and the various reports of the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission and let us ask ourselves in all honesty what work was done by that commission which could not have been done by a commission of non-parliamentarians, preferably presided over by a judge. The famous Franks Committee in Britain is presided over by a judge and has as its members elder statesmen, other judges, prominent figures who were highly placed civil servants, academics and people of that kind, and it deals with matters of public policy. This is one of the most influential committees there could be. Why should we not have something of that sort to deal with security matters in South Africa? I believe that it would work more expeditiously, that it would be able to give all its time to its work, and that it would probably, in the end, work more cheaply. I say again: If the real objective is the investigation of front organizations, as indicated in the First Interim Report, who could do better than a judge? Why does the hon. the Prime Minister not follow the example of his illustrious predecessor, the late Dr. Verwoerd? When he was faced with one of the most important inquiries in his career, the inquiry into the Sons of England, the Masons and the Broederbond, he relied not on a Select Committee, but on a judicial commission, a one-man judicial commission. I believe that parliamentarians should indeed be wary of serving on commissions unconnected with legislation and unconnected with legislative duties, particularly where they are not appointed by the House, where the procedure is not laid down by the House, where the terms of reference are not determined by the House, where they do not report to the House, and where there is no limitation preventing their duties being extended into the field normally more properly covered by the Police or by members of the judiciary. For those reasons I want to move the following amendment—

1. (1) to provide that its functions will be confined to the investigation and report of matters concerning existing and contemplated legislation and associated administrative procedures; and
2. (2) to prevent the implied or possible extension of Parliamentary action into areas which are more properly areas of police action and the jurisdiction of judicial officers”.

Mr. Speaker, I do not have the privilege which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has to speak for longer than half an hour. He must therefore excuse me if I react to his speech very briefly. In the first instance, he made great play of a judicial tribunal. I should like to ask the hon. member for Albany whether Nusas was satisfied with a judicial commission’s findings on disturbances at Grahamstown. The constitution of that tribunal was similar to the constitution the hon. the Leader of the Opposition wants the proposed commission to have. In that case we had the findings of a judicial commission which were subject to the highest degree of discord and dispute we have ever had in this country, and this was caused by the persons against whom the findings were made. I want to suggest that what is at issue here in the first instance is not the constitution of the commission; what is at issue here in the first instance is the findings of that commission on organizations such as Nusas and others.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition made the following amazing statement: “Parliament only has the duty to legislate. It is Parliament’s duty to legislate”. The hon. gentleman did not however, brush up on his knowledge of procedure. Kilpin clearly states, inter alia, the following on page 113: “A Select Committee is a committee appointed by the House to consider any matters upon which the House may desire information or assistance. ’’

For what purpose?

For any purpose, of course.

*Mr. Speaker, hon. members must please be patient and must allow me to continue. It is a well-known fact that, in this case, a Select Committee was appointed. For reasons which were practical and relevant, this committee had to be converted into a commission of the State President, because otherwise it would not have been able to function with continuity. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition furthermore objected to the fact that the reports of a permanent commission like this might, as it were, be censored by the hon. the Prime Minister, after consultation with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. To my mind this is one of the most amazing statements the hon. the Leader of the Opposition made. The hon. the Prime Minister included this provision in the Bill in consequence of the specific experience he gained in the case of the Potgieter Report. I should like to know from the hon. the Leader of the Opposition whether it is not true that with regard to the Potgieter Report this procedure was followed with his permission, with his agreement and with his co-operation? After all, the Potgieter Report, too, was one which dealt with security measures. If this specific procedure was followed in one case with regard to a report on security, surely the hon. the Prime Minister is entitled to assume that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition would approve of the same procedure being followed in other similar cases.

At the start of this session we heard a great deal about patriotism. The outcome was very encouraging. There were signs of a major consensus between the governing party and the official Opposition as to what may be regarded as patriotism in the South African set-up. There was an encouraging display of a bipartisan policy on patriotism, especially as far as foreign threats were concerned. We are living in serious times today, times in which a mere definition of patriotism is not sufficient. We must go further and with sober realism devise ways and means for protecting physically and spiritually the matrix and the domicile of patriotism. In the present set-up it will not help us at all to be a Kerensky or a Spinola. We cannot, in other words, be people inspired merely with a pure patriotism and at the same time be so enmeshed in impractical ideas and actions that the communists will easily outwit us.

This Bill is one such practical means of protecting us against subtle onslaughts. It is 100% the same Bill which was proposed in the first interim report. The basic clause—clause 4—is virtually a verbatim reproduction. Where there are changes they are improvements. The original meaning has not been deviated from in any respect. I say that this report is virtually 100% the same as the Bill before us. Where it differs from the Bill, it merely amounts to certain things having been carried into effect by us by common consent after the experience we had gained. In this regard I am referring to the increase in the number of members and their subdivision into committees, for example, as well as to the question of the approval of the entire report prior to its being referred to Parliament. As I have already said, the procedure here is the same as what it was in the case of the Potgieter Report.

I therefore declare that in its first interim report the commission unanimously recommended this Bill which is before us. The hon. members for Green Point and Mooi River, and the member for Orange Grove at the time, Mr. E. G. Malan, were amongst those who signed the first interim report. They not only signed the report, but also evinced in that report a clear and strong motivation for the appointment of such a parliamentary commission. In their motivation, they contended, inter alia, that they had already heard 58 witnesses at the time and that the evidence given at that stage already came to 3 388 pages. In other words, at that stage they had already gained intensive experience of the work, work which was no longer in the initial stages at the time.

In the second place, the commission pointed out how organizations came and went. However, the commission contended that the influence of the same people and of organizations abroad always was to be detected in the new organizations. So what the commission was telling us was that continuous vigilance on a permanent basis was necessary.

In the third place the commission contended that it fulfilled a useful function. The commission said furthermore, that because the necessary machinery did not exist in another form, the information which the commission had obtained, would partly not have been available if it had not been obtained by the commission. Therefore the appointment of a permanent commission was recommended. This is also my answer to what the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said. I want to contend here today that an inquiry such as the one into occurrences at Wilgespruit would not have been possible except by means of the machinery which had been set up. I want to contend furthermore that were it not for this commission, this House and the country as a whole would not have had the advantage of the commission’s work and consequently would not have seen the decay which was exposed at Wilgespruit at that time.

The decisions of the commission were unanimous. The first and second interim reports were tabled here by the hon. the Prime Minister on 27 February 1973. On the same day the hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked whether an adequate opportunity for debating these reports would be created. The answer of the hon. the Prime Minister was that the matter could be debated during the Third Reading of the Additional Appropriation Bill and that if the hon. the Leader of the Opposition should need further time he could make arrangements in that regard with the Leader of the House. As far as I know, no further time was requested by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition or by his Chief Whip? What happened then? During the Third Reading only two members of the official Opposition spoke on the first and second interim reports but these two hon. members did not dissociate themselves in any way from the recommendations in connection with this permanent commission. They did not have a single word to say about this. Indeed, we had a very enthusiastic defence of such a permanent commission from the hon. member for Green Point. In fact, the hon. member for Green Point, a good friend of mine, was so enthusiastic about the work of this commission throughout that we may in the future consider calling it the “Murray Commission”. In his reaction to what the hon. member for Houghton had to say, the thon. member for Green Point said the following (Hansard, Vol. 42, col. 1596)—

I repeat … did not lightly recommend this proposed commission”. On that occasion the official Opposition had the opportunity to distantiate itself from the proposed permanent commission. I do not know of one case in the parliamentary history of this country where the government presented a report, took up a standpoint in that regard and said that it accepted the report, without the official Opposition expressing an opinion on it. In this case it did not happen either. Two senior members of the official Opposition, who had served on the commission, stated the opinion of the official Opposition. At that stage they had misgivings about administrative action but their attitude was, as in the report which they signed, that they accepted the permanent commission. In fact, the hon. member for Green Point admitted this. Now, in these circumstances, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition must not hold it against me if I say that no reasonable person could draw any other conclusion, on the basis of the way matters have developed, especially the circumstances surrounding the Third Reading debate to which I have referred, but that the official Opposition’s official attitude was one of support of the two members who spoke. Later on, I shall come to this subsequent attitude.

Now I want to deal with a further aspect which I want to raise with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. Apart from the few things to which I have referred this proposed permanent commission will function on virtually the same basis as that on which the Commission of Inquiry into certain organizations functioned. Its composition and its machinery are precisely the same too. Now I want to ask: To what extent does the official Opposition find fault with the work done by this commission? In fact, only today the hon. the Leader of the Opposition—who is a friendly man at all times—made a very friendly remark about the work of this commission.

Let us take, for example, the fourth interim report, the main report on Nusas. Not only were all the factual findings in this report unanimous, but also all far-reaching recommendations, except for the few recommendations in the minority report. These were not relevant, in any event, as I shall demonstrate in a moment. But what is more, our factual findings at that stage—I am not speaking of the factual findings in the first and second interim reports, but of the factual findings in the fourth report—remained standing unassailable. Not one liberal newspaper could attack us on anything of note in this respect. They merely hid behind the fig-leaf that it should have been a judicial commission. They even dropped the Wood case like a hot potato and this holds true of the hon. member for Houghton as well. After the first and second interim reports they cried to high heaven but when we played our trump card in the fourth report and exposed a letter which Wood had written to the World University Service, they were all deadly quiet—the hon. member for Houghton and the whole liberal press. In that letter Wood wrote: “I do not care one iota where the money comes from.” Of course, the best proof of objectivity and of the thoroughness with which the commission did its work comes from the arch-liberal, Alan Paton himself, as has already been mentioned by the hon. the Prime Minister. According to The Natal Witness of 28 November 1975 the following was said of him—

One would say that this was the considered opinion of the hated Commission of Inquiry into Certain Organizations and not of one of the arch-liberals of South Africa. I want to proceed and quote Clive Keegan as well. Clive Keegan was one of the little fish amongst the eight on whom restriction orders were served. According to the Sunday Times of 22 February 1976 Clive Keegan said the following—

I think that what I have read here places the stamp of objectivity and thoroughness on the work done by this commission. Now I ask the hon. Opposition: If this work has been done so well—work of which they themselves, according to statements, were proud—why do they now object when all the hon. the Prime Minister wants to do is to set up the same type of machinery to continue this work on a permanent basis?

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

I only have ten minutes left. If the hon. member wants to put his question during the Committee Stage, he is welcome to do so.

Now I want to make a few remarks about the minority report in the fourth interim report of the commission. The recommendations concerning a judicial tribunal are not relevant. I emphatically refer this House to the official Opposition’s own opinion on the matter as it can be found in paragraph 12(e) of the first interim report. Here they said themselves that a permanent commission should consider inter alia, whether or not a judicial tribunal would be desirable. Therefore it is not relevant. In any event, if the greatest democracy in the world, the USA has a system whereby members of congress can examine matters of security, why can our Parliament not do this too? I am referring to the Committee on Internal Security of the American Congress. This is not the Senate body on which Senator McCarthy served at that time.

Much is now being made of the fact that the initiating and instructing body is the State President. The Opposition is not only running away from the first interim report, which was signed by their members too, but they are also running away from their own Act which they passed in 1947, viz. the Commissions Act, Act No. 8 of 1947. The Commissions Act provides clearly that the Governor-General is the initiating and instructing body there. I want to tell the hon. Opposition that they are making an attempt here which is aimed at emasculating the executive, which according to tradition has certain powers and duties and also had these under their rule, in the same way as is happening at present in America with the tragic occurrences taking place there.

Nonsense!

I do not have the time to speak about other matters. Therefore I just want to say in conclusion that the reason which the minority gave in their minority report for changing their opinion, concerned the question of administrative action after the publication of the second interim report. I think that I must rectify a matter here in connection with which certain members of the commission, the National Party members of the commission to be specific, have been calumniated over a very long period. The impression was created that only National Party members were available for administrative action. I want to say in deadly earnest that this is not so. I am not going to appeal to any of the proceedings of the commission—by which I do not want to insinuate that anything has been said in connection with the proceedings of the commission. I want to refer specifically to the second interim report, pages 17 and 18. The second interim report was also supported unanimously; therefore it was signed by members of the Opposition as well. In paragraph 16, on page 17 of the report one finds the following statement—

This refers to the behaviour of certain students—

On page 18 of the report it is stated further—I want to repeat that it was supported unanimously by all members of the commission—

If the two paragraphs which I have read out do not extend a clear and unambiguous invitation by all members of the commission to the Government to consider serving restriction orders on certain people I do not know what Afrikaans and English means in this country. The people concerned were described as “undesirable”—in other words, they had to be removed. How else can one remove them?

By means of a court case.

One would have had to be sure that they had committed an offence against the State. One would have had to be sure that they had contravened the Terrorism Act. One would have had to be sure that they were going to be prosecuted, something which would mean a very protracted process. Finally, one would also have had to be sure that they would eventually be convicted and imprisoned for five years. Surely it is quite impossible, when one says that A and B are undesirable in student politics and that urgent action is required, for it to mean anything but administrative action.

Read Mr. Steyn’s speech of 3 March.

I am not concerned about any member’s speech. What I am concerned about is how the hon. member for Green Point is now going to justify his standpoint, especially in the light of the first interim report of the commission, a report which he supported.

I want to conclude by levelling the reproach at the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that his party has run away from the first interim report in order to accommodate certain leftists. But it has not helped them at all. Similarly it will not help them now to accommodate the leftists, because they will not pay any attention to that, but will disappoint him again.

Mr. Speaker, I think one must in all friendliness say of the hon. the Minister of Public Works and of Immigration that he was unconvincing today. Perhaps this is so because he himself was not convinced of his cause. In the first place we are dealing here with a Bill and not with a post-mortem on the Schlebusch Commission. This is not concerned with what was done in the past, but with what we are to do in the future. I think we should go into the merit of the Bill. We should determine what it is based upon, how it will work and what its aim is. This is what any discussion of the legislation should be concerned with. Therefore I do not want to spend any time on a discussion of the Schlebusch Commission.

The hon. the Minister referred to Kilpin. I will come back to Kilpin, because I think the hon. the Minister did not quote him in full. Kilpin has a fair amount to say on the question of commissions and Select Committees. The hon. the Minister also referred to Wilgespruit and said this was proof of the fact that that kind of investigation could only be done by a commission, like the one which is now being proposed in the legislation. Why could this not have been done by a different type of commission? Why should it necessarily have been a parliamentary commission? During the course of my speech I want to indicate how far Parliament has deviated from the correct use of commissions and Select Committees. I also want to indicate the difference which should exist between the two.

The hon. the Prime Minister said that Parliament may investigate any financial matter and then said that this side of the House objected to the investigation of matters concerning security. This is not the point. Parliament may investigate any matter, including the security of the State. However, this must be done in accordance with parliamentary principles. I maintain that a commission like the one which is being proposed is not and cannot be a parliamentary institution. This is basically what the whole argument is about.

When did you discover this?

I shall explain this now.

†It is my view that it is an attack on the independence of Parliament to require its members to sit as an extra-parliamentary commission, and I shall show in due course why I regard this to be so. I believe that it is a corrosion of the recognized and traditional parliamentary practice to require members serving on a commission that is composed exclusively of parliamentarians, to do so in a manner other than is laid down by parliamentary procedures. I believe it is a degradation of the principle of the separation of powers to require members of Parliament so sitting, i.e. in a so-called parliamentary commission, to be appointed by the executive branch, to serve according to instructions given by the executive branch, to have their terms of reference altered at the whim of the executive branch, to have to report back to the executive branch and even, as is provided in clause 11(1) and (2) of the Bill, to be paid by the executive branch at the discretion of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance. I believe these things are entirely wrong; they are alien and foreign to proper parliamentary practice.

You are being terribly sanctimonious this afternoon!

I believe in fact that there is a growing practice in South Africa which needs to be looked at very hard. That is the practice of converting a Select Committee, which is a proper parliamentary institution, into a commission. I believe that this is a practice which has grown up as a matter of convenience, because of the fact that Parliament sits only once a year and that very often the duties of its Select Committees are undischarged at the time when Parliament is to be prorogued. It is then found a matter of convenience to turn such Select Committees of Parliament into commissions.

Why do you not come back to the Bill?

I am coming to the Bill.

Are you questioning the Chair?

Order!

I believe that the practice of converting Select Committees into commissions has given rise to the kind of Bill which is before us today. That is the point.

Again my question: When did you find this out?

When did I find out what?

That this is wrong.

I have been looking at these things very deeply from some time, and I believe that this thing has been going wrong for quite a long time. Most of us must admit our guilt. We were unaware of what was going wrong. [Interjections.] It was that hon. gentleman’s Bill which has, in fact, brought the whole thing into focus. I shall explain why.

But what went wrong?

I believe that what has gone wrong is that Parliament has adopted a practice of converting its Select Committees, which are bodies of a particular character with particular duties, into commissions—which are bodies of a different character with different duties. We have not realized that in doing this as a matter of convenience we are, in fact, departing from parliamentary principle and subjecting our parliamentary work to a different set, of procedures with certain harmful results. That is what I believe is wrong with this.

When I talk of commissions, I should first of all like to point out that nowhere in the Standing Orders of this Parliament relating to the conduct of public business, is there a single reference to a commission—not one. There is reference, in describing the work of this Parliament and the conduct of its public business, to the work of Select Committees. There is no reference whatsoever to the work of commissions. There is no precedent anywhere in the constitutional law to say that commissions may do the work of Parliament or have any part in the work of Parliament. I believe it is a corruption of practice that has crept into the business of this Parliament and something which we need to guard against. I shall show why. [Interjections.]

What is a Select Committee? The hon. the Minister has quoted Kilpin. Kilpin says that a Select Committee is the creature of the House. It is, in fact, the House in miniature. It is appointed by this House and its members are nominated by this House. Its business is indicated to it by this House. It sits, and if it needs any other instructions, it comes back to this House for such instruction. When it has discharged its duties, it comes back to this House and reports. Throughout the whole piece it remains an instrument of this Parliament—obedient to this Parliament, the servant of this Parliament. That is a Select Committee.

There is talk in this Bill, and there has been talk in this debate, of a “parliamentary” commission. I say, with great seriousness, that there is no such animal. There is no such thing as a ‘’parliamentary” commission. One may search the literature, and I recommend hon. members to look at Erskine May. They will find nowhere in the whole of his Parliamentary Practice any reference whatsoever to a commission. A commission is a foreign animal to Parliament; it does not belong here. There is no justification whatsoever for turning a Select Committee, with its special characteristics, into a commission. I believe it is a corruption of good practice. That is the major problem …

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. member, why, if that is his argument, did he not advance it when the first interim report was tabled in this House?

The answer, quite frankly, is that I had not then looked into the matter in detail. I was conscious of something being wrong, but I did not know what. Now I know. [Interjections.] I am very glad that hon. members enjoy my frankness. Sir, Select Committees are appointed by this House or the Other Place from time to time, to consider, inquire into or to deal with certain matters or Bills. A Select Committee, like a Committee of the Whole House, possesses no authority except that which it derives by delegation from the House by which it is appointed. I quote Erskine May—

And here we have Erskine May on unfinished inquiries. Since the hon. the Prime Minister was interested in how I came to my conclusion, I should like to read this to him—

That, Sir, is parliamentary practice. What is not proper parliamentary practice is to refer the work of a Select Committee to a commission. Now, we have in consequence of this undesirable practice a Bill before us today which assumes that you can appoint a commission consisting of members of Parliament, which thereby becomes a parliamentary commission. The authorities say very clearly that such a practice is most undesirable and that it has been abandoned because of the fact that the membership of such a commission, if it is constituted of members of Parliament, will tend to bias in that they will necessarily represent the views of the political parties from which they come. One of the most modem constitutional authorities is Professor De Smith of Cambridge University. He talks, firstly, about parliamentary inquiries. Now, these are Select Committee inquiries in which Parliament sits in Select Committee to inquire into the background material relating to Bills, and this of course is a very proper thing for Parliament to do. It may do so in public, or it may do so in secret, if necessary, when dealing with certain types of legislation. Then there is the use of commissions or committees to conduct public inquiries, and about this he says the following—

That is to say that if an inquiry is going on into a public matter, not a parliamentary matter, then it is correct to appoint a tribunal outside Parliament headed by a judge.

Surely that is under the Tribunals Act?

Yes. I quote further—

Now, Sir, the fact is that the use of a commission as an instrument of Parliament does not occur anywhere in the constitutional practice of countries employing the Westminster type of system except, as I am trying to point out to this House, that it has crept into the usage here, and I believe that this usage is faulty and undesirable in that it has created a new situation which is inconsistent with proper parliamentary practice. That is the reason why we have a Bill such as the one before us today. Here we have a Bill which purports to create a parliamentary commission. It is not a parliamentary commission at all. It is a commission. It is an executive commission. It is a State President’s commission consisting of members of Parliament. The members of Parliament have their very independence, their autonomy as members of Parliament, brought into prejudice by the fact that instead of sitting as members of this House, in respect of which they have an independent and autonomous status, they are being used by the executive to carry out the behest of the executive as members of a State President’s commission. Sir, this Parliament, this House, is supposed to control the executive. This House is supposed to control the moneys of the country. The executive has to come to this House for approval. But here we have a situation where members of Parliament are taken out of this Parliament and put into a commission at the behest of the executive. They are appointed by the executive and they receive instructions from the executive and they report back to the executive, all of this turning an alleged parliamentary commission into a State commission.

What is the point?

The point is that it is not a parliamentary commission when that happens to it. It merely happens to consist of members of Parliament, but every other characteristic is that of a State commission, of a State President’s commission, of an executive commission. This is something which should never be allowed to happen to members of Parliament. When this happens we have such confusion of powers, such disregard of the proper separation of powers, that we are going into a state of complete disarray in this Parliament. Surely every member of this Parliament is aware of the separation of powers and the very jealous guard he should place on his position as a member of Parliament and on the privileges of this House. How can we as members of Parliament allow a Bill to come before us which takes away from us the very status which makes the position of a member of Parliament so important in the Constitution of this land? We find that clause 4 says that the commission shall investigate matters which in the opinion of the State President—not in the opinion of this Parliament, but in the opinion of the State President—affect internal security and which are referred to it by the State President, and shall report thereon to the State President. Without any prejudice to the generality of the provisions, the State President may also refer to the commission for investigation and report any matters concerning existing and contemplated legislation. Here we are now getting close to something like a parliamentary function, but who is telling the members of Parliament to do this, to review matters with a view to legislation? It is not this House.

Of course it is. It is the House which is passing this Bill.

No, you are a long way off the mark. Perhaps that hon. member will try his intellectual muscle on this one, clause 12. It says that the State President may make regulations (a) assigning additional duties and powers to the commission in connection with the internal security of the Republic. Here we have a commission, purportedly and allegedly a parliamentary commission, though appointed by the State President, acting in according with instructions received from the State President and reporting back to the State President. But while it is sitting the State President may send it further instructions, totally unspecified. He may say to this commission of parliamentarians: “I desire you to track down every communist in the country and to string him up from a lamp-post.” [Interjections.] That will be in order, in terms of this Bill, and these are parliamentarians who are liable to receive such instructions. Sir, it is entirely out of order. The clause goes further, and in subsection (1)(d) empowers the State President to make regulations “generally, as to any matter which he considers it necessary or expedient to prescribe in order that the achievement of the purposes of this Act may be promoted or facilitated”. So, generally, anything he chooses to do can be done by the State President prescribing to members of Parliament of this House what it is they may or may not do, what they should do and what they should not do.

May I ask the hon. member a question? On the assumption that if this were a Select Committee which was fully responsible to Parliament, and which would fully report to Parliament, would the hon. member in fact agree to a Select Committee having these powers in terms of this clause?

The answer is no. [Interjections.] I will come to the point in a moment. If the hon. member had listened carefully, he would have heard the hon. member for Yeoville asking whether we would agree to a Select Committee having the functions which are ascribed to this commission in this Bill. Now, quite clearly, the functions ascribed to this commission are not the functions of a Select Committee at all. That is the point. Sir, a Select Committee of this House is part of Parliament. It is this House in miniature. It has certain functions which it carries out in terms of the parliamentary procedure as laid down in our Standing Orders. Now, such a Select Committee certainly has the right to examine evidence and to call witnesses, and it certainly has the right to look at the facts, to weigh them, to discuss them and to come to certain conclusions; and then it not only has the right, but it has a duty to report back to this House its findings, with recommendations for such legislation as this House may think proper. That is the function of a Select Committee. If that were the function of this commission, and if this commission were in fact not an extra-parliamentary commission, but a Select Committee carrying out the functions which I have just described, then we would of course have no objection, because to object to that would be to object to the very basic procedure on which Parliament has been running for years. Obviously that is entirely in order. However, when we come to the other corruption which appears in this Bill—I speak of “corruption” in the sense of departure from ordinary and proper practice—we find that far from being a servant of this House, far from receiving instructions from this House, far from carrying out the behest and the will of this House, far from recommending legislation to this House, this commission is in actual fact being vested with all kinds of powers—in terms of clause 12 unlimited—which may be conferred upon it from time to time, and it may do what it wishes or what it is required to do at the behest of the executive.

This means that a commission of this kind, consisting purportedly of parliamentarians to give it respectability—it has no other parliamentary characteristic at all—can do all these things purportedly in the name of Parliament. This would be gravely misleading to the public. It is not a parliamentary body, because it has none of the qualities of a parliamentary body. It can then go on and perform the functions of a tribunal. It can make inquiries and in the process might have to act in a judicial capacity. It might have to prosecute or persecute people. These additional functions can be ascribed to it in terms of clause 12.

You are talking nonsense.

The fact is that the powers of this commission are not limited in this Bill and can be added to from time to time.

We have here a complete departure from proper parliamentary procedure, and this is what we object to. If the hon. the Prime Minister were prepared to say to this House that we should have a Select Committee with powers to hear evidence on security matters—in secret, if the matter is secret—and that it should report back to the House, or limit its report as far as secret matters are concerned, in order that this House may legislate or amend its legislation or do whatever is necessary in order to bring its legislation up to date, that would entirely be the proper function, one which no member of this House—I am sure not even the member for Yeoville—will have difficulty in supporting. If, in addition to this, there are other functions which the hon. the Prime Minister wishes to have carried out, and he would appoint a judicial commission, an external non-parliamentary judicial commission operating with the full powers of the judicial commission as laid down in the Commissions Act, it would be in order. He can require it to inquire into matters, an inquiry which is not the business of this Parliament. To that also no one could have any objection. Those two things put together would meet all the purposes of the hon. the Prime Minister. However, instead of doing these two things—both of which are provided for in the Standing Orders of Parliament and in the statutes and which are proper and right and in accordance with the separation of powers and in accordance with proper constitutional procedure and which no one will have difficulty in supporting—he comes with this extraordinary creature, this commission, an allegedly parliamentary commission but which is not a parliamentary commission at all but is in fact completely contrary in concept, spirit and position to anything belonging to Parliament or parliamentary practice. That is what the hon. the Prime Minister has come with.

Your own people came with the idea.

So? It was quite clear during the progress of that particular commission that, as they looked more and more closely at the way things were operating, they began to realize that they were going about it in the wrong way. They therefore put in a minority report. It is all very well for the hon. the Prime Minister to smile, but I would like to ask him whether he has anything to smile about when he puts up a creature of this kind, this type of commission.

The question the House should be asking is not a question from that side of the House as to why this side is not supporting the Bill, but a question from this side of the House to the hon. the Prime Minister: Why can he not support the regular procedure? If he wants a Select Committee, why does he not have one? If he wants a judicial commission as well, why does he not have one? These things are proper and constitutional, and they are provided for by precedence.

It does not require legislation either.

It does not require legislation, because legislation already exists. The Standing Orders are there. The hon. the Prime Minister can have a Select Committee—the statute is there; he can also have a judicial commission. He does not need this Bill. But instead of doing that, he brings in this Bill, this curious creature, to Parliament and asks us to vote for it. The question ought not to be directed at us why we do not vote for this particular Bill. The question should properly be directed at the hon. the Prime Minister: Why does he bring this peculiar Bill to Parliament when he has both the Standing Orders and the statutes at his disposal to do things in a proper and respectable manner? This is the question to ask, and instead of us answering questions, we would like the hon. the Prime Minister to answer our questions. That is what this debate is about. It is he who has departed from standard practice and it is he who has departed from the proper separation of powers. It is he who has brought this hybrid thing to Parliament. It is therefore he who has to answer the questions. There is no doubt he can do what he wishes in terms of proper constitutional practice. That is what this debate is really about.

As far as we are concerned, this Bill is highly improper and constitutes a total departure from proper parliamentary practice. We do not see how we can possibly support it without grave harm to important parliamentary institutions and we certainly cannot agree to serve on a commission of the nature as proposed in the Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I think that today will go down in the annals of South African history as an evil day, not only for the security of the State, but also with regard to the behaviour of the UP towards certain of its members who took part in a very valuable piece of work. At a later stage I shall come back to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. I first want to finish dealing with the academic dissertation which the hon. member for Von Brandis came up with, without understanding the whole essence of the matter. I should like to say to the hon. member that the previous commission, viz. the Schlebusch Commission, and also, therefore, the commission which is now being proposed by this legislation as a continuation thereof, was not the first commission to arise out of a Select Committee. At the moment there are other commissions, too, which are carrying out certain tasks and on which members of the UP are serving. I have in mind, for example, the commission investigating transport legislation. This was a Select Committee and was then converted into a commission. The UP had no objection to this being done. Similarly the UP did not object at all when the original Select Committee on certain organizations was converted into a commission.

Oh yes we did!

Yes, the hon. member for Bezuidenhout and the hon. member for Yeoville objected at the time. However, the other hon. members did not object to the Select Committee being converted into a commission. Nor did the hon. members on that side of the House object when the then Select Committee on the Stock Exchange was converted into a commission. The academic dissertation by the hon. member for Von Brandis therefore gets us nowhere. The hon. member may as well go upstairs to see whether he cannot get any exercise in the sauna bath or elsewhere.

If the hon. member states that there is no precedent in other countries for a parliamentary commission such as this one to which the hon. the Prime Minister is asking the House to agree, then the hon. member knows absolutely nothing about what is going on. Such parliamentary commissions exist in various other countries of the world. The hon. member would do well to go and examine the situation in America and Canada; after all, we know what is going on there. It is specifically with reference to the existence of such permanent commissions in other countries that the hon. members of the United Party joined us in signing this report and by so doing made a recommendation to the hon. the Prime Minister.

Since we are now referring to the signing and submission of reports, I want to tell you that the hon. the Minister of Public Works indicated very clearly with what degree of urgency the Schlebusch Commission at that time regarded the work done at that stage concerning Nusas and Wilgespruit. He also indicated how urgently the commission insisted that action should be taken. This was all done in in an atmosphere of urgency. Why did we do this in an atmosphere of urgency? At that stage we had before the commission virtually all possible evidence in regard to Nusas. We had before us evidence concerning the work that was being done at Wilgespruit and it was at that stage that we perceived the co-ordination there was between the leadership training programme offered at Wilgespruit and the way in which the programme in question was carried out by an organization like Nusas. At that stage we saw the danger that if action was not taken against those people, major problems for South Africa could develop. At the same time, arising out of everything that was already before it, that commission found that the people who were subtly engaged in acting as terrorists of the spirit of the people in South Africa were acting in mushroom organizations. If one tackles and demolishes one, then another one crawls out somewhere else, but the same people are still behind it. It was in that very atmosphere that we published a unanimous report with regard to (1) the fact that there should be a permanent commission and (2) that urgent action should be taken against certain people who were mentioned in the second report at the time.

At that stage there was no doubt whatsoever in the minds of the United Party, with the exception of certain members, that the Schlebusch Commission had acted correctly and that they had been justified in making such recommendations. The hon. members of the Opposition even went so far as to endure the abuse and derision that fell to their lot on the campuses of English-speaking universities with regard to that decision. Those hon. members suffered all those things while knowing full well that administrative action would not necessarily result from those recommendations. In fact, I am convinced that many members of the Opposition—and I want to say that as far as the members of the Opposition who sat on the Commission are concerned, I am convinced of it—were grateful that there was administrative action in regard to those people who were restricted after the appearance of the report.

The hon. members of the Opposition must tell us today whether they are prepared to allow this chopping and changing, and academic and futile exercises on the part of the hon. member for Von Brandis to continue when we are discussing the issue of state security and when we are discussing the things which pose a real threat to the will of our people to continue to survive in South Africa. As far as I am concerned—I believe that this is the standpoint of any Nationalist—we are prepared to make this a political issue to the last. To us it is essential that legislation of this nature be placed on the Statute Book in order that we may investigate this matter.

This metamorphosis which the official Opposition has undergone in regard to the proposed legislation has only occurred at a late stage. At the time there was no objection on their part to such a commission and they served on it. In fact, when the hon. member for Houghton asked them why they had not withdrawn from the commission since there had been so much opportunity to do so, the hon. member for Yeoville said that the work had already been done and that it was merely a question of finalization. He in turn wanted to know why she thought they should do so. The hon. member for Yeoville was therefore quite satisfied that the commission should finalize its work at that stage. I think we would have great “sports” in the House if we were to lay the speeches made on that day by the hon. members for Yeoville and Houghton side by side and compare them, while also bearing in mind the somersault performed by the hon. member for Von Brandis in regard to this whole matter. We should then ask ourselves the question: Did the United Party simply decide to run away from this baby, the commission, in which they had a part? I should like to admit my fatherhood, but I do not know whether the other members of that commission want to admit their fatherhood of this baby. Is the United Party really prepared to leave in the lurch those of their members who served on the Schlebusch and Le Grange Commissions just like that, for the sake of a few liberal votes which they might be able to pick up here and there? In fact we are forced to ask the United Party whether this is an indication of how seriously they approach the entire situation of internal security.

At the start of this session I had hoped that we had made reasonable progress in regard to matters such as security as far as the official Opposition was concerned. In fact it was not only in this session but earlier, too, that I felt this hope. I should like to proceed by quoting to you what the hon. the Leader of the Opposition had to say on 16 August 1974. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition referred to the case of Bell v. Van Rensburg and made certain remarks, some of which were quoted by the hon. the Prime Minister. I should like to quote them a little more extensively, because it is of great importance that we should take a closer look at the words of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. He states (Hansard, Vol. 50, col. 851)—

That was in respect of the Bell case to which he was referring—

If this was a pronouncement by the Opposition concerning the justification of their presence in the Select Committee and the Schlebusch Commission—let us call it that for the sake of convenience—then I want to ask the hon. the Leader of the Opposition today, in view of the above, where that moral duty of theirs is. Whereas at the time they were opposed to the Select Committee too, nevertheless they later decided to serve on it because they said that it was their responsibility to serve on such a Select Committee and commission in order to keep check on members of the National Party and the Government to ensure that they did not act irresponsibly towards certain people and organizations. If this was their duty and responsibility at the time, then has the official Opposition no responsibility and obligation, as far as the future is concerned, in regard to the legislation before us today? I put this question because the hon. the Prime Minister, by means of this legislation before us, has brought before the House precisely what was requested in the first and second reports of the commission.

The hon. member for Von Brandis is trying to make something out of the fact that the State President must be reported to as requested here and that the commission is appointed by the State President. The hon. members of that party who served on the previous commission were all appointed by the State President and not by the Speaker of the House of Assembly. It was announced by way of proclamation in the Government Gazette that they were appointed by the State President. You can go and read the first page of each report and you will find that it is stated there that each commissioner was appointed by the State President. The terms of reference of that Select Committee and the commission came from the State President. It was never stated that it would be an instruction from the House of Assembly as such. The instructions carried out by that commission were all instructions from the State President. This being the case, clause 5 of the Bill provides that—

The exceptions are those cases in which the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, decides that a report in its entirety cannot be tabled due to reasons of security, or where the hon. the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition decide that certain parts of a report may be deleted and not tabled, once again due to reasons of security. This is therefore the same position as we had before. The functioning of the proposed commission is cast in the same mould as that of the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission. Now the hon. members have effected a total somersault in their attitude.

The hon. members are now complaining about the provisions in clause 12 to the effect that the State President may make certain regulations and through those regulations may give further instructions to the commission. The proclamation in terms of which the Schlebusch Commission was appointed also provided that the State President could make certain regulations. In fact, the terms of reference were stated very widely. The terms of reference read that the four organizations mentioned, together with related matters which the commission may from time to time see fit to investigate, could be investigated. It was specifically with reference to these related matters, things which were related to the matter under investigation, that we came across Wilgespruit. If it had not been for that, this House would not have been aware of Wilgespruit today and the activities which took place there. The commission was not instructed to investigate Wilgespruit, but this was a matter of importance which concerned the chief terms of reference of the commission. Consequently this is of no arguable importance either as far as that party is concerned.

It is striking that neither of the two members of the United Party who served on the commission was the first speaker after the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. The hon. member for Von Brandis had to come along with this little exercise of his to try to prove that the commission could not be a parliamentary commission. If an Opposition were really to wish to act responsibly, then one of those two members should have risen immediately after the Leader of the Opposition had spoken. We have not had any member on our side who did not serve on the commission, participating in the discussion after the Prime Minister had made his speech, and this is not due to the fact that we lack able members. After all, we are now speaking from experience and I have referred to this specific aspect because I want to deal with the situation as regards experience. The Leader of the Opposition and all the members on that side of the House who served on the commission have said that they were satisfied with the treatment accorded the witnesses. They said that the witnesses were accorded the opportunity to obtain legal representatives as far as this was allowed during the proceedings of the commission and that nothing irregular had taken place. All these things were said in the 1974 debate during which the Prime Minister thanked the commission.

The Bill which is now before us for consideration follows the same guidelines as the commission followed in the past. If in these circumstances there is an about-face in the attitude of the official Opposition, then it means that these people have decided that the security of South Africa cannot be entrusted to members of Parliament. They want the security of South Africa to be entrusted to the so-called judicial tribunal and an investigation into internal security to be carried out by the judicial tribunal, as they call it. Let us ask the official Opposition whether they do not want to review the situation again. The hon. the Minister of Public Works and of Immigration referred to the fact that we have experienced the phenomenon on a number of occasions that where judges have acted as chairmen of such tribunals, those who have been concerned with the matter and who have not liked the findings of such judges have disparaged the judges in a manner unbefitting a judge’s dignity. The hon. the Minister has already referred to the Mr. Justice Harcourt’s report. We could also refer to the report by Mr. Justice Munnik on Rhodes University, and perhaps the most important one to which we could refer is the report published by the commission on universities, of which Mr. Justice Van Wyk de Vries was chairman. What was the attitude of the official Opposition and the Progressive Party with regard to the report of that commission? The judge acted as chairman and some of the most outstanding educationists in the country served on it. It is pointless for us to try to hide the fact—when something is not to the taste of the United Party or the Progressive Party, then it makes no difference whether a judge is chairman of such a commission or whether it consists of members of Parliament. If they do not like it they will condemn it. Precisely because we are aware of this fact, I think it would be unfair to continue to delegate a matter like internal security, which is primarily the task of Parliament and the Executive, to a judge. All that we and the judge will hear—because these people do not like it—is that the judge is a stooge of the National Party or the Government. We do not want to expose one of our judges to such statements, because we know what has happened. The hon. member for Sea Point shakes his head, but if we look at what the hon. member has said in this connection in the past, then it is quite understandable that he should shake his head. Another hon. member on our side will presently deal with the speech which the hon. member made some time ago.

To conclude, I want to tell the hon. members of the Opposition that if they should decide to back out from providing the support which the hon. the Prime Minister seeks for this Bill, they should reconsider as to whether they do not want to keep their word to the electorate. They gave their word when the original Select Committee was established. They said that although they did not like the proposal they would serve on the commission in order to ensure that nothing untoward occurred in respect of these people, that the procedure followed was correct and that no injustice occurred in the commission and in the findings of the commission. I think the United Party owes this to South Africa.

Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to spend much time replying to the speech of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke. I find to my intense surprise, and no doubt to his as well, that I agree with quite a lot of what he has said. I was touched by his concern for the tender feelings of judges, and I now realize why the Government has not appointed judges to take charge of the commission which they are about to set up. For the most part, his speech was devoted to the United Party’s actions and I just want to add one or two little things to what has already been said by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke and by the hon. the Prime Minister, who did a fairly good hatchet job, I would say, this afternoon on the official Opposition.

I listened with the greatest of interest to the hon. Leader of the official Opposition explaining why his party has turned its back on its members of the Schlebusch Commission, who, after all, signed the first interim report, which recommended a commission which is not at all different from the one which we are examining today. Many of the objections raised by the hon. member for Von Brandis relate to points which were contained in those recommendations, viz. that members would be appointed by the State President, that they would report back to the State President. Consequently Parliament would have had very little to do with the appointment of the commission as recommended by the interim report of the commission. [Interjections.] I did not sign the first interim report of the Schlebusch Commission. I was very fortunate in that I was too wise to serve on the commission. I am the only person on this side, among the members on my right, who is at least consistent in my attitude about serving on commissions of this kind. [Interjections.] The hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that one of the things done by the Schlebusch Commission, to which he objected, was that the Government took administrative action after the second interim report. He knows perfectly well that urgent action was recommended. He also knows perfectly well the reputation of the Government in eagerly taking administrative action. Therefore it should have come as no surprise to him when eight students were banned as a result of the commission’s recommendations.

Restricted.

Restricted. Whatever word the hon. member wants to use. The question I want to ask of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is the same question that the hon. the Prime Minister asked of the hon. member for Von Brandis. Why did he not get off the Schlebusch Commission after the Government had taken the step which he so profoundly disapproved of? The students were banned in the beginning of 1973, in February 1973. The United Party remained on that commission for nearly three years after that. I wonder why they did not get off when the commission became secret, because that is another objection we have had from the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. Why, the minute the Select Committee became a commission and its hearings were to be held in secrecy, did the hon. the Leader of the Opposition not say: “Thus far and no further”? Instead, they stayed on till the bitter end. The real reason for not supporting this Bill in fact, was given in a simple little sentence which he used right at the end of his speech, when he said that the public did not like commissions consisting of politicians. That is the reason why they got off serving on commissions. They got off four years later, when they were four years wiser. They got off, and they are not getting onto this one. That is the point I am trying to make. [Interjections.] They are minus six seats, minus two Senators and minus four extra MPs. That, Sir, is the reason why … [Interjections.]

Why are you crying about it then?

I am not crying. I am being honest, unlike the other members, who have given their peculiar explanations as to why the United Party stayed on the commission and as to why it is now not serving on this commission, which is identical to the one proposed by their members on the Schlebusch Commission.

The real reason is the general election of 1974, in which the United Party lost six seats. That is the only reason. [Interjections.] That was when the hon. member for Von Brandis realized what went wrong. [Interjections.] “Through all these years,” he said, “most of us were unaware of what went wrong. ’’ On the night of 24 April 1974 they suddenly were struck by the horrible realization of what went wrong. That is what went wrong, and that is why they are not serving on this commission. [Interjections.] Oh, I am scared of the hon. member for Von Brandis? That is likely, is it not? [Interjections.] Sir, I want to say that I personally, and I am sure the hon. members here too, are glad that the official Opposition has refused to serve on this commission. We are glad that the official Opposition is opposing this Bill and that it has said it will not serve on this commission.

It is about time that the official Opposition in South Africa stood up and was counted and struck a blow for those values of Western civilization which are so jeered at in this House. [Interjections.] When I mention those values which are so jeered at, I refer, among other things, to the rights of individuals, and that much sneered at expression, the rule of law. It is just about time that they stood up for it. [Interjections.] I am thankful therefore, that the official Oppostion is going to do this, and I am thankful it has abandoned all those specious excuses that it used when it agreed to serve on the Schlebusch Commission, of assuming the role of watch-dog; a toothless watch-dog indeed, as it turned out to be. I am very glad that the aura of respectability that the official Opposition at first gave to the Schlebusch Commission, which soon disappeared, is not going to be given to the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission.

There is no doubt that the moment the first 10 Nationalists, or however many are going to be appointed, sit on this commission—and they sit there communing with themselves, like a lot of yogis contemplating their navels—the whole thing will be exposed for the farce that it is. It is going to be another High Court of Parliament, nothing less, nothing more. And that is exactly what the hon. the Prime Minister wanted to avoid.

That, Sir, if I may now come to the hon. the Prime Minister, is the reason why he waited from February 1973 until February 1976 for the Parliamentary Internal Security Bill to reach this House. There is no other reason. The hon. the Prime Minister gave me a reason, and I have fortunately done a bit of research. I have exactly what he said, and it indeed contains the words he said to me, the words he mentioned here today. He used these words on 30 May, towards the end of the session. However, at the beginning of the session, remember, he had told us that he was going to introduce an internal security Bill. Then, on 30 May, he told us—and I have the reference, if hon. members want it—

He said somebody had asked him, but he did not tell us who that somebody was. I have a sneaking suspicion that it was the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, who was having an awful lot of trouble in his party at that time.

You have that trouble, sitting there right now!

I have no trouble. [Interjections.] Hon. members must not go in for wishful thinking, Sir. I have no trouble whatever. Knowing that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition was having a great deal of trouble, the Prime Minister wanted to keep that pot boiling a little longer. He did not stop to say that it was because the commission had not yet finished the work it had been engaged in. He went on to say—

Not years mark you, but months—and this was 30 May 1973. He said further—

Next year was 1974. Did someone come and ask the Prime Minister again: “Please do not introduce it this year. Wait another year. Give us another year and let us try and settle our internal differences first.”?

The whole of the first short pre-election session of 1974 came and went without anything being done about the Parliamentary Internal Security Bill. Then came the ordinary post-election session, which also came and went. I wonder who asked the hon. the Prime Minister then not to introduce the Bill. The whole of the 1975 session came and went, and still there was no Internal Parliamentary Security Commission.

I want to remind this House that the first interim report was signed by everybody; the hon. member for Green Point is still here, and there is the hon. member for Mooi River, the two extant United Party Schlebuschniks. There is another one, but he is on the other side now, and there was a fourth one, but that hon. member has unfortunately lost his seat. Hon. members can imagine how sad I am about that! The important thing is that the whole of 1975 also went by and still we did not have the internal security commission. Yet the commission recommended as a matter of urgency—they said it was “dringend”—that an Internal Parliamentary Security Commission be appointed. Now why did our Government and the hon. the Prime Minister of all people, who is never backward in coming forward with measures of this kind, delay right from February 1973 till February 1976 before introducing this parliamentary security commission which was urgently and unanimously recommended by the first interim report of the Schlebusch Commission? I shall tell the House why. The hon. the Prime Minister was playing politics because he knew what was going on inside the official Opposition at that time. And, how wicked of him, he was playing politics with the internal security of South Africa! Imagine that! With all those subversives and communists running around, the hon. the Prime Minister delayed all those years before coming to this House with a parliamentary security commission Bill. I think it is reprehensible, really reprehensible. As I say, he was hoping to get a consensus. He did not want a parliamentary commission consisting only of Nationalist members of Parliament or Senators because then, as I mentioned, that would expose it for the farce it is. That is why I am glad that the so-called official Opposition is at last taking the stand it should have taken years ago when matters of this kind came up in the House. They should have taken the advice I gave them free, gratis and for nothing, when the first Select Committee which became the Schlebusch Commission was appointed. I told them not to touch it with a barge pole. They not only touched it with a barge pole; they impaled themselves on the barge pole and they have emasculated themselves.

I Now want to come to the Bill. I cannot think of any good reason why the hon. the Prime Minister should have come now with this Bill to the House unless he felt he had a chance of getting those hon. members to serve on it, otherwise he would have delayed a little longer. Something must have given him the idea that he was going to get the support of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and the official Opposition on this committee. However, he has misjudged the situation because the United Party is wearing its liberal colours at the moment, and this is not the moment when the hon. the Prime Minister should have come along to the House with this Bill if he wanted them to serve on his commission. There can be no other reason for coming along now with an expensive commission of this kind at a time when we have been asked to fight inflation. A completely unproductive commission it is going to be, just like the Schlebusch Commission, which produced its seven volumes of rubbish at a cost of R183 000 to the taxpayer. Let me tell hon. members, who take so much pleasure at the fact that Mr. Alan Paton has now come out against Nusas and so on, that these are a different batch of students altogether. [Interjections.] One lot of students was banned four years ago as a result of the Schlebusch Commission: Curtis, Pretorius, Paula Ensor, Keegan, Wood and that lot. None of these students was involved in the Breytenbach affair. The Breytenbach affair involved a different lot of students altogether, a completely different lot, and yet hon. members act as if this justifies the action they took against other students in those past years. What a fine lot of judges these would make! Heaven help me if I ever have to appear before this lot of judges if that is the way they carry on.

Strange that Paton said he had come to the same conclusion.

Well, Mr. Paton also said this did not in any way justify the methods or procedures or anything else of the Schlebusch Commission: the method of procedure, the bannings, the secrecy, the lack of cross-examination, the fact that nobody was given the chance to know what the accusations were or anything like that. In his view, because of those aspects, the Schlebusch Commission was in no way justified. Let us not forget that. I would point out that no charges have ever been brought against those students other than that some of them broke their banning orders, although all sorts of accusations about the misappropriation of funds, etc., were brought against them. Heaven knows, we have enough security laws against which their actions could have been tested had the Schlebusch Commission had any real foundation for its findings. Now we are going to have this commission and goodness knows what that is going to cost. It is going to be a permanent commission, sitting day in and day out with members of Parliament or Senators cross-examining, summoning, subpoenaing fellow South African citizens, year in and year out, in session and out of session. It will be doing the work that only the Police and the courts should be doing. This is reminiscent of Britain in the fifteenth century when there was the famous Star Chamber that we have all read about. It is reminiscent of the days of McCarthy when so many good lives were ruined in America, and it is reminiscent of a secret cabal of ten. They are going to sit there cross-examining and taking evidence and never will the unfortunate witness who appears before this commission have the right to know what accusations have been brought against him, nor will his counsel—if counsel is allowed to appear—have the right of cross-examination. None of the normal safeguards of the courts of law is going to be afforded to the unfortunate witnesses. This commission is, of course, going to sit in secret as the Schlebusch Commission sat in secret and it is going to spend countless days prying into private lives, reading private letters, scrutinizing documents that have mysteriously disappeared from their owners’ briefcases, relying on unsubstantiated reports and drawing deductions and conclusions from those unsubstantiated reports.

You cannot be serious.

I am deadly serious. It is going to be like the Schlebusch-Le Grange Commission—I am sorry I have not given the hon. Deputy Minister his due by giving the Commission its full name. This commission is going to spend endless weeks prying into the ideology of its victims, the private and public statements that people make, prying into people’s private lives and their morals and the associations of the individuals and groups who have the misfortune to be their target. I envisage a situation in South Africa in future where there will be a vast system of files on individuals, very much like the American system which I am coming to in a minute. I am glad I can now once more cross swords with the hon. member for Kroonstad instead of having to defer to him all the time. There are going to be thousands of files on individuals in South Africa, and I can just imagine the sort of data that is going to go into the files if the commission disapproves of the views of those people. The hon. member for Kroonstad referred to the United States and said they had a commission similar to this operating, the House Internal Security Committee, HISC, as it is popularly known.

Appropriate initials.

I wish people would think of initials before they appoint commissions. Anyway, I want to tell the hon. member for Kroonstad a little something about this House Internal Security Committee. A Committee was established in 1945 and its name was changed in 1969 to the House Internal Security Committee, and since then there was constant pressure to abolish it.

Because it broke down the Black Panther Movement.

Oh no, it did not break down the Black Panther Movement. Not at all. Those hon. members have not seen the petition that I have seen, a petition presented to Congress and signed by 377 law professors from the most prestigious law schools in the whole of the United States, from Harvard down to any other law school one could care to mention.

The committee is still there.

It is not still there. What is true, is that that hon. member is no longer here on this side. The House Internal Security Committee is not still there. It was allowed to enjoy its demise, and that is a very nice way of saying it was allowed to fade out of existence. At the beginning of last year it disappeared from the scene and has been unmourned and unheard of ever since. The hon. member is wrong in his statements. It has gone. It went because, just like the Schlebusch Commission, it cost a great deal of money and proved to be utterly useless. I have no doubt that the same accusations which were made by the 377 American law professors against HISC will in fact be made against the S. A. Parliamentary Internal Security Commission. Just as they said “It will become a permanent governmental mechanism, based upon a hardening bureaucracy of staff and files, designed to investigate and record the political opinions and associations of citizens and to use the data so collected to harass particular points of view which the commission does not happen to share’’, in the same way, mutatis mutandis, this is what ours will become, except that it will apply to South African citizens. I am quite sure that that is what is going to happen in this case.

There are no standards laid down as to what constitutes internal security. Who knows what constitutes internal security? We have already experienced how Wilgespruit suddenly got involved in internal security. All that “Last Tango” business in Wilgespruit suddenly was involved in internal security. I do not know what is going to be involved in internal security when this commission starts sitting. Look at clause 4, for instance. “Internal security” is a catch-all phrase which gives the widest possible powers to the commission. As for the childish safeguards in clause 5, I have to agree with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that the fact that the Prime Minister has to consult with him, does not mean a row of beans; it does not mean anything. We have all had experience of the duty laid on the Government to consult with homeland leaders, the Coloured Council and all sorts of bodies, but what happens is that it consults and then goes its own merry way. It does exactly what it wants to do, and not at all what the people, with whom it has consulted, want it to do.

What are the real objectives behind the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission? I say there are three. Firstly, just as in the case of the Schlebusch Commission, to divert attention from the ground swell of dissatisfaction with the Government’s policies.

Nonsense! Tell that to the Marines.

Does the hon. the Deputy Minister also believe in the World survey which the hon. the Prime Minister quoted so proudly the other day? I refer to the couple of hundred letters or so that came in saying that he was a good Prime Minister. Does he also think that that really represents the feelings of the Black people of this country today—or even of the White people, I may add? Does he not think there is any ground swell of discontent? The second objective is to attempt to intimidate critics of the Government into a submissive silence.

Oh no, Helen!

It is a crude device which, certainly, may work with some timid citizens, but I am happy to say that it is not going to work with everybody. The third objective is to produce a climate in which protest is equated with subversion. That they are well on their way to doing already. All protest is today equated with subversion. They also want to create a climate in which criticism is equated with lack of patriotism—as far as that is concerned, they are also well on their way already—and in which opposition to the Government’s policies is equated with being un-South African. Those are the three objectives of the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission.

Having said all that, I want to point out that there is very little left to say other than what I have been saying year in and year out in this House, viz. that if the Government wants to stamp out communism and subversion, commissions are not going to do it, the 90-day provision is not going to do it, the 180-day provision is not going to do it, and the Terrorism Act is not going to do it. Let me tell the Government how to do it. They can do it by removing genuine grievances, by going to the root causes of the discontent. That is the only way to stamp out subversion.

The other day I read the Snyman report. It gave me a distinct feeling of deja vu. I had been there before, I had seen it before and I had read it before. I wondered what it reminded me of and then I remembered that it reminded me of another Snyman Commission report, the one that appeared after the Paarl riots, when Pogo was operating. I remembered then that the hon. the Prime Minister, who was then the Minister of Justice, came along with his 90-day law. That was his answer to the Snyman Commission.

That was a very responsible step.

It is no good wagging your finger at me.

It was recommended by Judge Snyman.

Yes, but there were other things recommended by Judge Snyman which the hon. the Prime Minister, as Minister of Justice, completely disregarded at that time.

That is not so.

That is so. Certainly, he did not act on it if he did not disregard it. The hon. the Prime Minister will remember that the Snyman Commission report stated that one of the major reasons for the trouble were the conditions in the Paarl location—the men living in hostels.

That was attended to; you know that.

The hon. the Prime Minister has not attended to that—he is busy building hostels all over the country. The hon. the Prime Minister does not know what is going on in his own country. Does he know that not a single house was built in Cape Town last year in the urban areas for family housing? Hostels are being built. In Alexandra Township hostels are being built. In Soweto 761 houses were built, while 18 000 are needed there. Those are the things that ought to be attended to, but the things Judge Snyman said about the rotten conditions and about the unnatural conditions of living in a hostel were disregarded, just as I know that the Government is going to disregard the newest Snyman Commission report, except for those parts it wants to pluck out of it. It is going to ignore completely the root causes which Judge Snyman has drawn attention to.

Sir, the Government is not going to learn anything and this commission certainly is nothing we want. Just as we never wanted, never served on and would not touch with a barge pole the Schlebusch Commission, so equally we shall not touch this commission with a barge pole. For all these reasons I wish to move as a further amendment—

Mr. Speaker, I think the hon. member for Houghton was quite justified in gloating a little, as she did in the first part of her speech. The point of view she has adopted in the past as a small single-member Opposition party is a point of view she has held consistently. It must, therefore, give her a feeling of triumph to see that the agents which the Progressive Party left behind in the United Party have actually succeeded in suborning the United Party and bringing them around to her point of view and that of her party. On that I want to congratulate her, because I think it is a great achievement on her part. For the rest, I must say that I found much in her speech that disappointed me. The very victory she achieved offered her the opportunity of making a truly constructive speech this afternoon, instead of which we got a speech that I cannot describe other than as an attempt at suspicion-mongering. It is very interesting that some of the opponents of our Government, in the absence of valid arguments to discredit the Government’s sincere attempts to maintain peace and order in South Africa, indulge in the most violent and the most excessive declarations of what the Government intends to do and what the Government will do.

Eighteen months ago I took part in a debate at one of our great universities. My opponent was a professor at law at one of our great universities and the author of a book on constitutional law. In order to make his case, he told the students’ law society that in terms of the Terrorist Act the Government could sentence to death a waiter who, while carrying a tray of food in a restaurant, slipped and spilt the contents of the tray. This was said by a professor of law at a South African university, a man who is an authority on constitutional law. If I had not taken the strongest exception to his statement, it would have stood. I forced him to qualify it by admitting that he was taking the matter to extremes. He then admitted his allegation was absurd. If I had not been there, he would have left that statement uncorrected. A similar tactic was used today. The hon. member for Von Brandis had the cold effrontery to say that the State President could instruct the proposed commission to hang every communist in South Africa. What utter nonsense! What are these people trying to achieve? Because what they say is not true. It is impossible. It is impossible for any reasonable man to believe what he said. And then the hon. member for Houghton comes along and tells us that under the Government now—almost any minute—there will be a file on every South African; there will be persecution; nobody will be entitled to liberty any more; it will be the end of everything. I ask the hon. member for Houghton to what extent has she, the most consistent critic of this Government in and out of South Africa, been barred by executive action from carrying on with her opposition to the Government. And that is the test. Opposition to this Government is free, provided it is constitutional.

It is when opposition degenerates into the instigation of violence and incitement that the Government is entitled and forced to act. I want to say this and have it on record, that any person who says of the Government’s intentions what that professor said and what the hon. member for Von Brandis said and what the hon. member for Houghton said, can only say it if he believes that members of the present Government in South Africa, the representatives of the majority of people in South Africa, the representatives of the vast majority of the Afrikaans-speaking people of South Africa, are people who are utterly dishonourable, without any integrity, without any moral insight, murderous, vile, wicked and despicable. Because unless you think that of hon. members on this side of the House, your fellow-South Africans, you cannot make those extravagant, those violent and utter indefensible and unjustifiable statements. [Interjections.]

*Sir, one came to this debate with expectations—not always pleasant expectations, because we all know that South Africa and the world are living through a critical period in our history and may have reached a turning point in the history, not only of our own country, but of the whole world. I do not want to say any more, but against this background the hon. the Prime Minister has produced a measure which be believes, and which we all believe, and which the Opposition also believed, in the days when it still thought independently, to be essential for the efficient protection of the State in South Africa. And then the hon. the Leader of the Opposition came along, Sir, and made a speech so unreal, so totally removed from reality, that one could have believed he was living in fairyland, or worse still, in the delightful days of Queen Victoria, when the Pax Britannica applied over the whole Western world and over a great part of the Eastern world as well. [Interjections.] Because everything he said today was based on the assumption that there was not really any great danger to South Africa, that Parliament could abdicate its responsibilities and that we had unlimited time to act even in these moments of crisis.

Sir, he did not only create the impression that he was living in the days of Queen Victoria; he also created the impression that he was desperately looking for an argument with which to substantiate his standpoint. In the process he became completely confused. He began to make great play of the fact that one judicial commission after another had been appointed to investigate matters of State security, and every time I pointed out to him that this had only happened after the danger had become apparent and had had serious consequences. And then, seemingly in desperation, he mentioned the Potgieter Commission on State security which according to him was appointed before BOSS existed. But, Sir, this is wrong. BOSS—as they call the Bureau for State Security—already existed at that time. Only afterwards, because there were certain criticisms, did the Prime Minister appoint the Potgieter Commission. So this also took place afterwards. Consequently, not even his facts are correct. But the thing which the Opposition has not been able to talk away, which they have not been able to argue away, is the fact that this Bill today is the result of a unanimous report, and of a well-considered report, as I am able to confirm, published by the Schlebusch Commission on a question of urgent State security.

An interim report.

Yes, the interim report. This makes it even more important. That unanimous report also contains a testimonial regarding the work done by such a commission—not only by this specific commission, but by such a commission—because the commission says unanimously in paragraph 9(a)(v)—

But Derick was not there yet at that stage.

Yes, Derick was not there yet at that stage. In paragraph 10 the testimonial is continued, because the reports says—

The commissioners of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition themselves confirm that a commission such as this one is able to do things which cannot be done and to obtain facts which cannot be obtained in other ways. This is an answer to his great argument that a judicial commission would be just as good.

Even better, according to him.

Yes, even better, and yet his own commissioners say here that this kind of commission is unique in its ability to ascertain facts. Nor is it the task of the commission to give rulings or to prosecute; its task is only to ascertain facts in the light of evidence which can be obtained.

Feeble, Marais!

But he is referring to your leader; if the hon. the Minister is so feeble, then your leader is feeble too.

In addition, the commission clearly recommended that this be a parliamentary commission. I want to emphasize that the unanimous report of the commission twice recommends that it be a parliamentary body. There must be liaison between Parliament and the executive. This is precisely what is intended here, but now the hon. the Leader of the Opposition argues that because it is appointed by the State President, it is not a parliamentary commission. That is all he can say.

That is not really all he said.

How often has it happened that Select Committees, which are parliamentary committees, have been converted into commissions, as happened in the case of this commission as well? It is quite obvious, after all, that a commission on State security must not only function when Parliament is in session. There are constant dangers, after all, and what is more, the dangers which the future holds are unknown. For this reason the commission must always be active. However, it cannot always be active if it is a Select Committee. So the commission must be a permanent commission from the outset so that it can do its work continuously and keep Parliament continuously informed.

Has the instruction not been given to the commission by Parliament?

Let us look at that argument. It is typical of the far-fetched arguments which hon. members opposite advance in defence of their standpoint. Parliament gives an instruction to the commission by means of this legislation. This is that the commission is to act at the initiative of the State President, who in turn will react to the advice of the Cabinet, in investigating certain matters of security. So the instruction is a parliamentary instruction to the commission to investigate matters referred to it by the State President, as advised by the Cabinet.

To whom does it report?

Surely it is quite clear that the commission reports to the State President, just as a Select Committee which has been converted into a commission reports to the State President. The Schlebusch Commission reported to the State President. The commission which inquired into the Stock Exchange, a commission of which the hon. member for Von Brandis was a member, if I remember correctly, did not report to Parliament, but to the State President. In spite of this, however, the commission was basically a Select Committee. This is essential. It cannot be done in any other way, because when Parliament is prorogued, all Select Committees stop functioning. Consequently one has to take these steps.

However, this is not the only problem one has with the hon. Opposition. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition is now advancing something which he thought out afterwards. He now alleges that the commission should be a judicial commission. But by doing that, Parliament would be abdicating its responsibility. The United Party members of the commission made it quite clear themselves in a subsequent minority report that certain functions in connection with State security must be exercised by the Police and the courts. But then it was specifically stated that as far as the prevention of subversion was concerned, this was the function of the executive. In the minority report, which came afterwards, it was said that in performing that function, the executive must act in terms of powers conferred upon it by Parliament and that it is accountable to Parliament. Surely then it is also the task of Parliament to ensure that it is able to perform its task as effectively as possible. Surely it is the duty of Parliament to ensure that it has the fullest and most comprehensive information available to it in order to perform its task in this connection. Now, all of a sudden, we are to have a judge to do the work of Parliament. But surely Parliament is the body which is supposed to watch over the executive, not the judiciary. The judiciary has to interpret and apply the measures taken by the legislative authority. The responsibility for the actions of the executive rests with Parliament; the actions of the executive are subject to the criticism and the supervision of Parliament. Now, all of a sudden, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition actually wants to restrict the supervisory function of Parliament in respect of the executive, just to have an argument. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition expressly said that it was the duty of Parliament to supervise financial measures and to ensure that the money which was appropriated was spent as it should be spent. However, three-quarters of Parliament’s time is devoted not to this, but to analysing, criticizing and evaluating the administrative actions of the executive. Hon. members would do well to pay attention to what happens in the debates. See what happens for six weeks on end in the Committee Stage of the Appropriation Bill. It is the function of Parliament to ensure that the executive does not only do its work, but does it correctly. And according to the commission’s report, it is the task of the executive to prevent violence aimed at overthrowing the government. This is not the function of the courts, but the function of the executive.

The hon. the Prime Minister is prepared to give the hon. the Leader of the Opposition a large measure of co-responsibility. He offers the Opposition in South Africa the opportunity to obtain knowledge and information at their own responsibility. However, this opportunity is refused. I cannot understand such mistrust on the part of members of the Parliament. Why must Parliament’s work be done by a judge? I am reminded of the reaction of the Opposition—I was still sitting on the other side of the House at that time—when Mr. Swart, a previous Minister of Justice, wanted to do away with the jury system, juries which consisted of ordinary people taken from the street and appointed, people who had not been selected by the process of parliamentary selection, which is a hard process. Their task was to ascertain the facts, not the law, but the facts in cases which could involve hundreds of thousands of rand and which could mean the lives of people, guilty or not guilty. However, this was opposed. It was said that it was a motion of no confidence in the people, an attack on democracy. So ordinary people could act as jury members in cases of the greatest importance, but the elected representatives of the people in Parliament are not competent to judge facts affecting the security of the State and the actions of the hon. the Prime Minister and the hon. the Minister of Justice … [Interjections.] It does not make sense. [Interjections.]

Order!

It does not make sense.

Where do you stand now?

I stand now where I stood when I signed the report, the unanimous report. I still stand by the same principles. I am not running away.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question? The hon. the Minister says he stands now where he stood when he signed the report. Would he tell us what he had in mind when he signed the second interim report and asked for “dringende optrede”—urgent action—against individuals? Was it administrative action he had in mind or were they to be brought before a court?

Mr. Speaker, at that time I had in mind that these people were to be brought before a court. I am not a fool, and the hon. members for Green Point and Mooi River are not fools either; if we wanted to limit the Government, we could have said so, but we fully appreciate that the Government in its wisdom would possibly have to take other action, but we would have preferred judicial action, and we said so at the time. However, we did not put any restrictions on the Government in the recommendation, because we were fully aware of the urgent need for action. The action had to take place almost immediately. I certainly meant that. I cannot speak for the others.

I respect your answer.

I want to look for a moment at the minority report, which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition made such a fuss about. I should like to draw your attention to paragraph 20.5.4, on page 517, of the fourth report of Nusas. Here the Opposition members of the commission—I was no longer a member of the Opposition at that stage—give their reasons for having changed their standpoint. What I find so interesting is the fact that there is no mention here of the sanctimonious rule-of-law stories or of the allegation that members of Parliament are not competent or cannot be trusted to do the work. Nowhere does it say that our politics would confuse our thought. Here, on page 517, is the only reason for the change—

That was not the only reason.

It was the only reason. Let us get the facts straight. What I quoted now is an extract from the minority report. It is from the amendment the Opposition members moved to the recommendation of the commission. In the amendment they indicated this as the only reason why it should not be a parliamentary body. They did not say that a judge would be better.

Have you read the report?

They did not say that an MP would be politically biased. I have read the report.

How then can you say that that is the only reason?

I say, Sir, and I repeat …

How then can you say that that is the only reason?

Will the hon. member please listen? May I answer his question? I think I can at least expect that courtesy from the hon. member. He has asked me a question, and the answer is that in the amendment the United Party members moved to the recommendations of the commission—their own statements on page 517 of the fourth report of the commission on Nusas—the only reason given is that service would make excessive demands on the time of members of Parliament if they were to serve on the commission. When they wrote the minority report they quoted it and then tried to find other reasons. The interesting thing about the other reasons …

It is not correct.

But it is correct. The hon. member for Umhlatuzana will have an opportunity to prove that it is otherwise.

Having moved their amendment in the commission, they tried other reasons in the subsequent minority report. The interesting thing is that every reason they gave why it should be a judicial commission, could have been used to argue against a judicial commission and in favour of a parliamentary commission. There is nothing to persuade one of the superiority of a judicial commission over a parliamentary commission. I would now like to tell the hon. member for Houghton and the other very superior people when it comes to political morals, that we already had a judicial commission examining Nusas. Not so long ago we had the famous case, which I quoted in another debate, of Justice Munnik investigating Nusas.

It was not a judicial commission.

But he was a judge. I see the hon. member for Griqualand East’s point, but the fact is that he was a judge, and judges are men of integrity and unbiased. Judges are always impartial and, in that respect, they are better than politicians. This is probably true, particularly in this particular instance. I believe it. He gave a finding which accords in detail as well as in broad principle with the findings of the Schlebusch Commission on Nusas, and what was his fate? The very people who condemned the Schlebusch Commission, condemned Mr. Justice Munnik in turn, almost word for word the same. He was biased, the Schlebusch Commission was biased; Judge Munnik had no appreciation of the students and their lives, the Schlebusch Commission had no appreciations; Munnik was prejudiced and had preconceived ideas, the Schlebusch Commission was prejudiced and had preconceived ideas. I am still waiting for any member of the House, the hon. member for Houghton or the hon. member for Yeoville, to stand up and condemn the people who criticized the judge.

Name them.

The students from Nusas. I gave many of their names in a previous debate, and I do not want to repeat it in full detail. Students and professors at the university …

Students often say stupid things. [Interjections.]

I concede that only for argument’s sake, but I know responsible students too. I have never heard them condemn the professors and staff members of the university who said exactly those same things about the judge. [Interjections.]

My time is running short and I now want to address myself to the United Party and to the Progressive Party. They may try to make everything that is done by the Government, at this stage of South Africa’s history, suspect. They may discredit the motives of the Government, and they may impute intentions to the Government which exist only in their own imagination. These things will be carried abroad, but I am not making an issue of that. They will be believed by people who are not well-disposed towards South Africa.

Is that the answer to that sort of criticism?

Yes, and I give the same answer now. I have never, in all my political career, imputed base motives to the Government in its administration of justice or in its administration of public security. I defy anybody to tell me so. I have never made the sort of statement which has now been made by the hon. member for Houghton or the hon. member for Von Brandis or by the professor who said that people spilling food can be shot by the Government under the Terrorism Act. That is not the level of argument I will ever indulge in. However, I want to say that this Government is acting responsibly, knowing the dangers that beset South Africa, knowing of the dangers which were exposed so adequately by the Schlebusch Commission. The hon. member for Houghton called the Schlebusch Commission a lot of rubbish, but it is interesting that in not one instance have they suceeded in repudiating or disputing successfully any finding of fact by that commission. They tried to by referring to the case of Wood and the banking transaction, but the facts beat them.

Why did you not prosecute them?

Order! I really think hon. members must keep quiet now.

The hon. member for Yeoville has now brought us back to the point at issue between us, namely that the courts and the Police can deal with crimes that have been committed. The executive, with a full responsibility charged upon it by Parliament, has to deal with the prevention of crime before it has been committed and before it has done irreparable harm. [Interjections.]

Order! We cannot debate like this. Hon. members must keep quiet now.

Sir, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

My time is just about expired. Members must know that the Government will continue to do what is necessary to preserve the safety of the people in South Africa against any form of illegal subversion. The people of South Africa can be assured that all the peaceful men and women, whether they are supporters or strong opponents of the Government, can sleep in peace as far as their own personal integrity is concerned and as far as their own safety against prosecution by the authorities is concerned. Above all, they can sleep in peace knowing that the Government is vigilant in the defence of true Western standards, true civilization and conscious of the aspirations of all the people of South Africa. This Government will not let South Africa down.

Mr. Speaker, unfortunately I cannot be here tomorrow when the debate is resumed. Therefore I must confine myself to a few points only in the short time at my disposal and I am unable to answer all the arguments. I just want to ask the hon. the Minister: since when has it been the practice that members who serve on a commission, bind their party? One may go through the entire history of commissions, and one will find that the reports of commissions appointed by the Government and on which members of the Government served, have often been totally rejected. Take an instance like the Tomlinson Commission. A man served on that commission who subsequently became a Minister of Bantu Administration in the Cabinet. Yet the essence of that report was rejected by the Government. It has never been the practice …

What did the party do?

One cannot attack a party, because a party’s policy is determined by its caucus. When people sit on a committee in isolation, even though they are members of a party, they merely make recommendations to the Parliament and recommendations to their party. It is only when the party judges these in the form of legislation which may be introduced, that it says whether or not the recommendations should be accepted. This has always been so, and I now want to ask the hon. the Prime Minister whether he would accept the report of the Theron Commission without question because a member of the National Party, a member of Parliament, is serving on it? This has never been the practice and no one has ever adopted the attitude that if a member of a party serves on a commission, the recommendations of the commission are ipso facto party policy. Therefore to equate the commission with the party, which has its own machinery for determining policy, is completely incorrect, and we reject it.

I want to come back to the speech of the hon. the Prime Minister and I want to say that it is a pity that a man in his position is incapable of putting his case to Parliament without becoming personal and often insulting into the bargain. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member cannot say that the hon. the Prime Minister insulted him.

He did insult me, Sir.

Order! I did not hear it, otherwise I would have called the hon. the Prime Minister to order.

I shall come to it.

In the meantime the hon. member must withdraw the word “insult”.

Certainly, Sir, I shall help you if you say that I cannot say he was insulting. I think it is unparliamentary. He is always insulting. But I withdraw it.

Order! The hon. member must withdraw it unconditionally.

I withdraw it unconditionally, Mr. Speaker. He said that I was unhappy because our party served on the Select Committee. This is not true. My Leader has already explained what the situation was, why we wanted a judicial commission and why we eventually served on the Select Committee. My standpoint has always been that a Select Committee is an organ of Parliament and consequently it goes without saying that a party must serve on a Select Committee. I could just as well leave the Chamber if I did not like a Bill, but we do not merely walk out if we do not like a Bill. Our objections were not directed at the Select Committee and in that respect the Prime Minister was wrong. I want to admit that things took a turn where I said in public that I was not a Schlebusch fan. That is so, but this has nothing to do with our serving on a Select Committee, which is an organ of this Parliament. A Select Committee is an organ of Parliament, and it is not a commission. I want to tell the hon. the Prime Minister that he knew long ago that this Bill was of such a nature that it would not be possible for this side of the House to accept it. Last year the hon. the Leader of the Opposition made a statement of principles in a statement which clearly set out the standpoint of this side and which indicated the type of Select Committee, or even commission, on which we would be prepared to serve.

Now the hon. the Prime Minister and other hon. members have made a big fuss about the security of the country which supposedly rendered essential the existence of a commission of this kind and our serving on it. Everyone knows that the security of the country is a much wider matter than the subject of the Bill which is before us now. The first security front of the country is its Defence Force. In past years we have repeatedly proposed here that there should be a defence council on which the Opposition could also serve, but this has been refused point-blank by the Government. The Government refused point-blank to have a joint approach to defence. We have come to this Parliament year after year and I myself as chairman of our party’s foreign affairs group have proposed at least six times that a standing committee on foreign relations be established. As you know, our foreign relations are a matter which affects our security drastically and intimately. This is what was proposed—a Select Committee on foreign relations on which we and the Government would be represented. This was refused point-blank. The Government was not even prepared to discuss it. Is there a matter today which affects the security of the country to a larger extent than the question of South West Africa? We have proposed in this House at least four or five times that there should be a joint Select Committee on South West African affairs, on which the two sides of this House could be represented—not on a basis of political parties—to see to the real interests of South Africa. This too was rejected out of hand. Every proposal from this side of the House concerning joint Select Committees on vital matters affecting the security of South Africa, has been rejected by that side of the House. Now one asks oneself what has happened that this matter, which affects a very limited aspect of our country’s security, has become such a terrible test for the Opposition’s responsibility concerning the security of the country. I think that the answer is very clearly this, that although the Prime Minister had many motives, one of them was a party political motive. He thought that by coming forward with this proposal, and I want to emphasize the fact that he waited 37 months to introduce this Bill …

It was a very urgent matter.

Your leader asked me to hold it back. [Interjections.]

Then the two of them should settle it between themselves. [Interjections.] After 37 months he now comes forward with this Bill.

Your leader asked me to hold it back.

I shall say what I think the real reason is. If one sees it against this background that all proposals from this side of the House concerning the basic security of South Africa, have been rejected by the Government, then one wonders what the motive is for this aspect suddenly becoming so important. The fact is that the Prime Minister thought he could sow dissension on this side. That is the real motive. But the only thing he has achieved, is to bring about greater unity than there has been in this party for many years.

In the few minutes which are left, I should like to deal with the real objections which we have to this Bill which are founded on principle. We on this side have always adopted the attitude that there are few things so important in South Africa as the security of our country and its people. We have never been reluctant to support any Government measure in which the real security of South Africa has been the primary consideration. We have emphasized time and time again, as we did once more here today, that we are prepared to participate in a Select Committee of Parliament concerning itself with the improvement of our security laws. Legislation is, after all, the most important function of Parliament. But Parliament cannot be Parliament and a court of law at the same time. It cannot take over the work of the Police and the security services of our country.

What is more: The Bill which is before us—and this is our main objection—affects the nature and character of our Parliament in a very detrimental manner. Clause 8 provides that the commission, for the purpose of an investigation envisaged by it, shall have the powers which a provincial division of the Supreme Court has within its area of jurisdiction. It will have the right to summon witnesses, to examine them and to call for the production of books, documents and other objects by them. What is envisaged here, is a partisan court. The essence of a true court is its independence and its impartiality. I do not want to suggest that there are no members of Parliament who are competent. No one says that there are members of Parliament who are not competent for this task. There are some who are competent to become, when they leave politics, even judges. No one denies that there are members of Parliament who are competent for certain tasks. However, it is in the nature of politicians sitting in Parliament, that they are not independent of their party’s policy but that they are party conscious. Party politics is synonymous with partisanship, with partiality—not with impartiality. There is, of course, nothing wrong with being partial. A politician is bound to his party and consequently members of Parliament are definitely not the sort of people who can set themselves up as a type of court.

It is only you who is not bound to a party!

It is not difficult for one to imagine the abuse which can be made of such a position, the intimidation which can flow from it. Organizations and candidates may even be subjected to an investigation. Suppose the situation arise in which candidates serving on the commission are opposed by organizations and other candidates. It is just possible that they may later be subjected to an investigation. Consequently it does not take a great deal of imagination to realize what an extremely undesirable effect this type of legislation will have on political life in South Africa. For example, consider the effect which this may have on race relations. The commission envisaged by the Prime Minister, will consist chiefly of politicians and N.P. members of Parliament. If this proposed commission were to proceed to investigate political parties in the Coloured, Indian and Bantu areas, to investigate the organization of these parties and to call for the production of books, documents and other objects by them—it will not surprise me at all if this is one of the motives behind this Bill—it would involve the White Parliament in one hostile confrontation after the other with the other population groups.

I thought the Progs were irresponsible!

The proposed commission will have the power to punish people in the event of their refusing to give evidence.

The commission does not punish people.

They have the right to punish people who refuse to give evidence.

That is absolutely untrue!

Mr. Speaker, the commission may decide to fine them if they do not …

That is absolutely untrue.

Very well then.

The commission may take them to court.

Why do you make a statement like that?

There are people, and there will always be people—and this is the important point—who will feel that, because this is a commission consisting of politicians and which …

But why do you make that statement?

Very well, that was my impression. If you now say that this is not so … [Interjections.] That was my impression, but I am prepared to correct myself. [Interjections.]

Order!

The fact is, however, that there would always be people who will refuse to give evidence, because it is in the nature of things that the commission will be biased, since it consists of people who are bound to their party and to the policy and views of their party. Therefore, if something like this were to continue on a permanent basis, it would necessarily harm the image of Parliament. [Interjections.] We have already referred to the question of remuneration. Reference is made to remuneration, to payment, for members serving on the commission. This, too, is absolutely contrary to the nature of Parliament, i.e. that a member, over and above his parliamentary salary, should be paid for special parliamentary duties. Hon. members will in any event be tempted to create work for themselves.

Is that what you think of your colleagues?

These are only a few of the reasons why this Bill cannot be accepted by the Opposition. I know that the hon. the Prime Minister has never been a great admirer of our democratic parliamentary system. One had hoped, however, that he had changed his attitude over the years. This Bill definitely does not point in that direction. Therefore I think that it will be good and is good for the Opposition to make the hon. the Prime Minister understand clearly that it will not put up with this interference in the traditional and established character and functions of Parliament. I believe that the hon. the Prime Minister ought to take cognizance of this and keep his hands off our parliamentary system as we know it. I shall content myself with these few points.

With which few points will you content yourself?

I should like to emphasize once again that the whole attack here today was based on the fact that a party is automatically bound by a recommendation in the report of a commission signed by four of its members. I served on the Commission on publications together with three of my colleagues.

You have just said yourself that you are against a minority decision.

I did sign the report, but did not automatically bind my party by having done so.

It was a minority report nevertheless.

That minority report did not automatically bind my party. When the report was submitted to the caucus, I said: “Here is the report, which we had to draw up in isolation, due to the secrecy aspect of the commission”. Because members of a party work there as individuals, in isolation. My attitude was that we could not go to the caucus and establish beforehand what their policy was.

Did the Nats do this?

My attitude towards the caucus was: “Here is the report.” The caucus has the right to reject it, to amend it or to accept it. In this case they accepted it, because they agreed with it. However, no member of a commission can bind his party in advance. Therefore the whole attack falls flat. The recommendations which were signed in the first report cannot automatically be accepted as being the policy of the party. The hon. the Prime Minister accepts automatically that it is the policy of my party, and on top of that he also divorces it from the report as a whole. This is entirely unforgivable. The recommendations in the first report, which was an interim report, cannot be divorced from the full deliberations of the commission, as set out in the fourth report. Anyone who does this comes to this Parliament with only half a case. I believe that it is important that we must not lose sight of the fact that members who serve on a commission do not automatically bind their party.