Mr. Speaker, we listened with pleasure and interest to the speech of the hon. member for Middelland yesterday afternoon. Although we might not have agreed with every word that he said, we want to concede that what he said, was not controversial, or not sufficiently controversial in any event for me to want to have a controversy about it this afternoon. Consequently we should like to express our appreciation for the special knowledge displayed by him, and for the interesting nature of his contribution. Mr. Speaker, the concession you allowed the hon. member might have been somewhat wide, but it meets with the approval of this side of the House because we enjoyed his contribution so much. We listened, with special interest to the hon. member for Middelland’s discussion of Rehoboth affairs, and also to his references in connection therewith, which covered a much wider field.

Since this is an exceptional day in the sense that I am inclined to praise hon. members on the opposite side, I should also like to say that we welcomed it that the hon. the Minister was prepared to make certain concessions yesterday which we regard as being of vital importance to South Africa as a whole, particularly in view of its relations with countries abroad.

†Mr. Speaker, the Bill which we are discussing today at Third Reading has certain problems inherent in its formulation and its content. We have discussed these now at some length, and we have pointed out that these difficulties which have arisen are both of a practical nature, in some respects, and of a constitutional nature, in others. During the Second Reading and the Committee Stage we drew attention to certain difficulties which we feel are implicit in the way in which this Bill has been formulated. We are not yet entirely satisfied that all these difficulties have been overcome. It is not a perfect Bill, but then how often does any Parliament pass a perfect Bill? As I have said, we congratulate the hon. the Minister on the concessions he made yesterday. We believe that these go quite a long way to improving not only the content of the Bill, but also certain constitutional implications which arise from the Bill or which might be thought or seen to arise from the Bill. We believe, therefore, that by and large, on balance, and taking all these things into account, this is a Bill which we can support at Third Reading and which, in fact, we shall support at Third Reading.

The main considerations by which I think one should be guided in respect of a Bill of this kind are the following: Firstly, do the people of Rehoboth want this Bill? We spend a great deal of time talking about self-determination, the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, and so forth. When we profess these principles I think we must have a real regard for what people want and not so much regard for what we might tend to think they should want. On balance, having considered the evidence, having heard the views of the people concerned and having discussed this with them, we feel that a fair case has been made out for this legislation. It is not necessarily a 100% case in respect of all the people who occupy that area, but there is a clear balance of advantage in favour of the conclusion that the people of Rehoboth do want a Bill of this nature. The second question we must ask ourselves is this: Is this Bill consistent with what is being done in South West Africa to achieve a constitutional agreement for the future of South West Africa? Again, one can express certain reservations. Some of these reservations have been expressed by people who actually are participating in the constitutional conference. Other reservations have been reported in the Press. Statements have been made which do indicate that there is not yet total consensus on this matter. Nevertheless, we have had before us and we have discussed a declaration of intent which was produced by the members participating in the constitutional conference. If one examines this, one must conclude that the people who have signed this declaration of intent, including the representatives of Rehoboth, do not believe, on balance, that this Bill, which the latter have asked for, is inconsistent with their declaration of intent which they have signed as members of the constitutional conference. So, however much one may argue the details, it does seem that on balance, and in the main, the intent of the Rehoboth people to participate in the constitutional development of South West Africa is not seen by them nor, in the main, by the other participants, as being inconsistent with the terms of this Bill. In this regard we have been greatly encouraged by the hon. the Minister’s suggested amendments. We believed at the outset, and we believe more strongly now, that the hon. the Minister is in fact a reasonable man.

I am not a “non-sport”, as has been suggested in the Press.

Yes, I would agree; that is what I am trying to say. The hon. the Minister, if he wishes, is a sport. He has seen the advantage of making certain changes to this Bill which will ease its passage, which will make it more acceptable and which will make it less thorny in its international aspects. In doing so I believe he has shown a broadminded and constructive approach which we on this side of the House greatly welcome. I think the third question we must ask ourselves is whether this Bill is in conflict with our international commitments in respect of South West Africa. One may examine this Bill as carefully as one likes, and one will not find anything in the Bill itself, in the actual wording of the Bill, as the hon. the Minister has pointed out and as we have agreed, which is in verbal conflict with our international commitments. If any conflicts should arise, it would be by implication rather than in the actual meaning of the words. One would have to look to external constructions placed upon this Bill rather than to the internal content of it if one were to look for such a conflict with our international obligations.

However, having said this, we have nevertheless thought it wise to make this even more clear by moving certain amendments and we still think it wise that those further amendments should be accepted, because they would take this Bill entirely out of the area of controversy which might surround it in the atmosphere which is prevalent at the UNO. Nevertheless, the hon. the Minister has, as I have said, agreed to certain amendments which I think will go a very long way towards meeting that difficulty. We very strongly welcome the amendments which he intends moving.

The last consideration is one which we obviously have had to look at. It is perhaps a slightly different one from those I have been discussing. We also have had to ask ourselves whether the Bill is consistent with our own policy, whether it is consistent with our own attitude in regard to the future of South West Africa. Without going into the detail of our federal policy, which will not necessarily be the same in South West Africa as it is in the Republic, nor would we wish to impose it in South West Africa where a separate option is to be exercised by a separate people, I must point out that we do think that there are certain fundamentals which need to be looked at. The first fundamental is the question whether it provides for the protection of minorities by giving them adequate control over their own affairs. In that respect we believe that the Bill meets that condition, whether or not the people of South West Africa choose a federal solution. We think they will, because the signs are that they are moving in that direction. However, if they wish to choose a federal direction, then we believe there is nothing in this Bill and certainly nothing in respect of the protection of, or the need to defend, the interests of minorities which is in conflict with that federal solution.

Secondly, as regards the decentralization of power we believe that any solution which will protect the rights of minorities, which will produce an acceptable solution to all the people of South West Africa and enable them to work together, must provide, amongst other things, for the decentralization of power: of executive, of legislative and, if necessary, even of judicial power so that the people may have the feeling that they are running their own affairs without interference in those matters which essentially concern themselves alone. In this respect, again, we feel that this Bill is not in conflict with that principle.

Then there is the question of geographical content. Geographical content is not something which is always attainable in total, because people in a modern world tend to move around and to settle in other areas or are compelled by industrial needs to move from their original area into other areas. This is a situation with which we are familiar in South Africa and a strong move in this direction is beginning to show itself also in South West Africa. However, to the extent that people can be given a geographical base, we believe it is important because it does help to establish a local jurisdiction and a sense of identity. Here again we believe that in giving local self-government to the people of Rehoboth to be exercised in their own area, it meets this very important criterion.

If there are hon. members in this House who still have reservations about this Bill, I think they should measure the merits of this Bill against the federal policy, concept or philosophy which is going to play a major part in the evolution of this sub-continent of ours. Eventually the question of representation in a central authority arises, because whichever way the constitutional evolution of South West Africa moves, there will be a need in South West Africa as there will be in South Africa, for the people who have the exercise of local self-government in their own areas, to work together and to agree on those matters which are of acknowledged common concern to them all. There is nothing in this Bill, as we read it, that precludes that happening. We believe there is nothing which precludes the people of Rehoboth, enjoying the rights of local self-government and enjoying their own institutions even under their paternalistic laws, modified as they may be in the course of time, from participating, firstly, in the constitutional talks that are now going on—it may actually aid them to do so more effectively—and, secondly, in a government established, if the people of South West Africa wish it, to look after the joint interests of all the people who live in South West Africa.

Therefore, in conclusion, we have looked hard and carefully at this Bill, and we have pointed out, at the Second Reading and at the Committee Stage, those imperfections which we thought should be remedied. We are grateful to the hon. the Minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations, for being willing to see our difficulties and for being willing to co-operate with us in a constructive way to overcome these difficulties. Although this Bill is no more perfect than any other Bill passed in any other Parliament—there is no such thing as perfection—it goes a long way towards meeting the basic requirements which I have outlined. We shall therefore have pleasure in supporting this Bill at the Third Reading.

Mr. Speaker, we moved a reasoned amendment to the Second Reading of this Bill and in that reasoned amendment we stated a number of points on the basis of which we objected to the Second Reading of the Bill. Some of these objections relate to issues which have again been raised by the hon. member for Von Brandis. I am not going to deal with them immediately, but I hope to deal with them during the course of my speech. The points we made in support of our objection to the Second Reading of this Bill, was because it was contrary to the stated policy of the Government that it would respect the wishes of the whole population of South West Africa and that it was for the inhabitants of South West Africa to decide their own future. This was our major point of objection. The second objection related to the fact that we felt there was insufficient evidence that the people of Rehoboth themselves accepted the contents of this Bill and that there was also insufficient evidence that the other population groups of South West Africa accepted this Bill as well. The arguments I presented during the Second Reading as well as during the Committee Stage have not been refuted or adequately considered by the Government or by the official Opposition. Rather than stating the arguments again in detail, I should like briefly to restate some of the major points which I made then. Against the background of these points I should then like to make some comment on the amendments which, as the hon. the Minister mentioned yesterday, it was his intention to move in the Other Place.

The first objection in our amendment relates to a fundamental point of policy in which a clear principle is involved. Negatively stated, this principle says that it is inappropriate for this Parliament independently to negotiate with a particular population group in the South West African territory. Positively stated, the principle says that it is for the population in South West Africa as a whole to decide their own future. Within this policy context it is in fact irrelevant whether the constitutional arrangements proposed in this Bill correspond to the policy of any particular party in this Parliament. I know the hon. member for Von Brandis makes quite a strong issue of the fact that the official Opposition feels that this Bill corresponds more or less to their declared policy. However, if this is so, it is more of a pleasant coincidence than having any significance. The real significance is whether the constitutional provisions of this Bill correspond to the evolving policy of the people of South West Africa. This is the crucial test, and in a sense it is irrelevant whether it corresponds to the particular political policy of any party in this Parliament. Secondly, it is also irrelevant whether the parties in the South African Parliament are satisfied that the constitutional arrangements in the Bill correspond to the wishes of the particular population group concerned. Of course, it would be callous of us to say that we do not take the wishes of any population group into consideration. What is important, is whether the contents of this Bill correspond to the wishes not only of the people concerned themselves, but also of the other population groups in South West Africa. The question is not whether we here are satisfied, but whether they there as a whole population, are satisfied.

Why?

Because it is part of stated policy. The hon. member should know that.

Whose stated policy?

If the hon. the Prime Minister will allow me, I will read to him the statement of the hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is quite clearly stated in the official yearbook of South West Africa for 1975, on page 949—

Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated the following statement to the United Nations Secretary-General for incorporation in the latter’s third report to the Security Council on his contacts with the parties concerned: “Desiring to enable and assist the population of South West Africa to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, the Government of South Africa will fully respect the wishes of the whole population of the Territory.”

We stated time and time again that the peoples of South West Africa will decide on that.

I agree, the peoples, but it does not conflict with the point I am trying to make. The second quotation to emphasize this point is from page 951—

It is against this background that I maintain and it is against this policy context …

The South West African Survey, page 49, will give you the answer.

I hope it does not conflict with this, otherwise we sit with a dilemma. As long as I understand the English used there, I will not have any problem stating my position.

You quoted the other part out of context.

If that is the case, the hon. the Prime Minister can indicate this to me, but I have studied the context very carefully. The point I want to make is that it is also irrelevant, within this policy context that I have just mentioned, whether this Bill enables the Rehoboth people to become independent, sovereign, self-governing or with a local administration. The reason why I say this is because some of these aspects appear to have become contentious during the Second Reading of the Bill as well as during the Committee Stage. We have had some remarkable arguments from members on the opposite side when they tried, laboriously, to distinguish between self-government, independence, sovereignty, etc., and many of these arguments were so tortuous that a number of these members ended up gazing rather despairingly and confusedly through the orifices of their own assumptions. These arguments did not make any sense to us. This is because the contentious issue during the Second Reading was not relevant within the context of this particular Parliament.

Order! May I point out to the hon. member that what is relevant today is the Third Reading—in other words, the Bill as it comes from Second Reading and after having been dealt with in detail in the Committee Stage. That is what is before this House and that is all that is relevant.

I accept your ruling, Mr. Speaker, but I did mention that I was going to discuss this Bill against the background of the amendments mentioned by the hon. the Minister himself, amendments relating to our objection to the Second Reading and that I would explain whether we regard these amendments as bringing about any significant change in the contents of the Bill. The point I am trying to make is that if the people of South West Africa should negotiate with the Rehoboth people and eventually end up with one of these possibilities, viz. independence, self-government or sovereignty, then obviously we have no objection. We do object if this is done between the South African Parliament and a particular population group in South West Africa. If this is the case we have an objection in principle against declared policy. The second objection that we raised relates to the amendments mentioned by the hon. the Minister. This refers to the fact that we find that evidence is inadequate or insufficient on the question of the acceptability of this Bill to the Rehoboth people themselves as well as to the rest of the population in South West Africa. The first aspect of our second objection, namely the acceptability of this particular Bill for the people of Rehoboth themselves, is something I have argued extensively during the Second Reading, as well as during the Committee Stage, and there seems to be a fundamental point of disagreement on this between me and the hon. the Minister as well as the hon. member for Middelland. The hon. member for Middelland yesterday treated us to a truncated and rather eclectic account of British constitutional history, generously spiced with Ripley-like “can you believe it?” anecdotes about voting patterns and voting deadlocks, the relevance of which I still fail to see as far as this Bill is concerned.

What this objection is fundamentally concerned with is the difference in purpose and in consequence between a by-election and a referedum, and the point that I repeatedly tried to make was that there is a difference, that if one tries to fill vacancies during a by-election, other aspects, other issues, come into play in the political process than when one confronts a population group with a clear-cut choice in terms of which they have to answer “Yes” or “No”. The hon. member for Middelland, as well as the hon. the Minister, refused to accept this distinction for the purposes of this particular Bill.

The second aspect of our second objection was the question of the acceptability of this particular Bill and its provisions for the other population groups in South West Africa. I have stated that there has not been sufficient evidence given before this House to the effect that the rest of the population of South West Africa were adequately confronted with the contents of this Bill and were given an opportunity to express their support for this Bill. In that respect I find no reason why we should change our position. Our amendment and our objections are based on the principles of policy, rather than on the intrinsic merits of what is envisaged by this Bill. We do not deny any people the freedom or the right to ask for self-government. We do not deny them the right to commit themselves to their traditions and to their culture, but we do object when the very constitutional future of a country, faced by the most serious problems confronting any society in southern Africa, is contaminated or jeopardized by the actions of this Parliament, who in the first and final analysis is responsible for the effective solution of the problems of that society as well.

In conclusion, I would like to return to the amendments mentioned by the hon. the Minister himself yesterday. These amendments have been accepted by the official Opposition with alacrity and with a great deal of enthusiasm. There are only two that could possibly be controversial. The first one relates to the fact., that within the long title of the Bill the word “in” is to be substituted by the word “within”. According to the dictionary definition, “in” is a preposition referring to the inclusion within space, time or circumstances of a particular aspect. If, in terms of the rules of definition and logic, one enquires into the meaning of “within”, one comes up with exactly the same kind of reply. So this is nothing but a semantic subterfuge. It does not change the logical contents of the Bill. It does not add any new dimension to it, but simply serves to placate the doubts that might have arisen in the minds of some of the members of the official Opposition. These doubts originated out of the content of the argument rather than from the intrinsic consequences of the Bill itself.

The second amendment of the hon. the Minister refers to the fact that in the preamble of the Bill it is stated that this Bill will in no way jeopardize any further constitutional developments for the area of South West Africa as a whole. Our whole argument was based not on what the future consequences of this Bill would be after it came into force, but on what the present consequences would be of introducing a Bill of this nature. Both amendments, therefore, only seem to serve the purpose of placating the official Opposition. While I understand why they accept it, I still maintain that in the last analysis these arguments become irrelevant in terms of the statement of policy on South West Africa. Therefore, not reluctantly, but if anything with added conviction, we feel that we cannot support the Third Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I gladly take this opportunity of congratulating the hon. member for Von Brandis on his very reasonable approach to the Bill now before the House and to thank him for his congratulatory remarks as far as the hon. the Minister is concerned, and also for his support of the Third Reading of this Bill.

*But while one has great appreciation for the standpoint of the official Opposition in supporting this Bill, there are nevertheless a few matters which one cannot allow to pass without further comment.

In his Second Reading speech the hon. member for Bezuidenhout stated—

Throughout the Second Reading, as well as the Third Reading speech, the hon. member consistently referred to the effect of this Bill as ostensibly being nothing more than the granting of increased local government to the people of Rehoboth. The hon. member could or would simply not perceive that what is involved in this Bill is for more than simply the granting of increased self-administration, and that what is involved in this Bill is in fact the granting of self-government to the people of Rehoboth on the basis of the Paternal Act of 1872. It is after all more than clear to any objective observer that the authorities and powers which are set out in the schedule to the Bill, comprise far more than purely local government powers. After this hon. member, and other hon. members of the official Opposition who had supported him in this standpoint, had repeatedly been corrected on this score in the Second Reading debate, and it had repeatedly been pointed out that on the fundamental issue this Bill was the right of the people of Rehoboth to self-determination and self-government, they introduced a series of amendments in the Committee Stage which were obviously aimed at watering down this Bill to such and extent that it was more or less in line with their preconceived interpretation of it, i.e. that what was involved in this Bill was merely local government.

In support of one of the amendments, the hon. member for Bezuidenhout used the argument that legislation of this House relating to South West Africa, was examined with a fine-toothed comb, as it were, and that it was therefore necessary to stress very clearly in the Bill that the unity of the territory of South West Africa was not being infringed by it. However, the hon. the Minister in his reply to the Second Reading debate clearly spelt out that this Bill aims at or implies nothing more than is stated in it in so many words. This Bill implies nothing more nor anything less than self-government for the people of Rehoboth. Any objective judge ought to be convinced by it that there cannot in this Bill, be any possibility of the granting of separate independence to Rehoboth or of the breach of any assurance which has been given by the Government concerning South West Africa. What better authority could be desired for the motivation or the effect of the Bill than the clear statement of the responsible hon. Minister? Certainly not the misgivings of hon. members of the Opposition. In this respect I should like to refer the hon. member for Bezuidenhout to the reaction to a statement of his former leader, a statement which was also made in this hon. House. In a speech in this House in July 1925 the late Genl. Smuts made a most sensational statement concerning the relationship between the then Union and the territory of South West Africa. Although this statement was broached at the ninth session of the Permanent Mandate Commission, the commission—in view of the fact that Genl. Smuts was not a member of the Union Government in 1925—did not consider it desirable to make a formal statement on what was the opinion of a private individual. This was how it was interpreted. This is the reaction in international forums to statements of hon. members of the Opposition.

However, there is little, if anything, which can be done to prevent ill-disposed people from seeing malevolent motives or objectives in this Bill. As has already been said by an hon. member in the course of the Second Reading debate, the spider draws its poison from the same flower from which the bee extracts its honey. It simply depends on the attitude with which the Bill is approached. Nevertheless, the hon. Minister himself effected certain amendments to the wording of the Bill, to spell out what already was clear, even more clearly. Therefore, the responsibility for any misinterpretation of the motivation and objectives of the Bill will now rest squarely upon the shoulders of the ill-disposed people.

If ever there were a Bill which had been built upon a sound foundation, then it is this Bill. What could be a better basis for legislation of this kind than the emphatic request of the people concerned and the recognition of a people’s right of self-determination?

However, the hon. member for Rondebosch is questioning the fact that this Bill has the support of the people of Rehoboth. He is suggesting that the reinstatement of the paternal laws is taking place at the request of a minority of the people of Rehoboth.

I never said that.

Now the hon. member is saying that he never said that, but he waxed lyrical here about the percentage of votes polled by the different parties in Rehoboth during the elections. With that he implied that there was no proof—he has just repeated it in his speech—that there is a majority in favour of this legislation in Rehoboth. It is of no avail to try to bluff one another with words here. Surely the clear implication of the hon. member’s whole argument was that we have no proof that there is a majority in favour of this legislation. To allege now that he did not say this, is merely to play with words.

As I have indicated, the hon. member implied that the reinstatement of the Paternal Law of 1872 was taking place at the request of a minority of the people of Rehoboth. He criticized the hon. the Minister because a referendum had not been held on this Bill.

Yes, that I said, but I did not say what you alleged just before that.

This is a very naïve argument. Surely the hon. member knows that Parliamentary democracy does not work in this way. The hon. member may argue equally well that a prior referendum should be held on any other legislation for the implementation of Government policy, for otherwise it would not be clear whether the majority of the electorate supports the legislation in question. After all, this is why every party has to set out its policy during elections or at least ought to set it out, i.e. so that support for the party at the ballot box may be regarded as approval for the implementation of the policy of that party, by legislation or otherwise. In this way the parties of Rehoboth during the most recent election also adopted standpoints on the reinstatement of the Paternal Law of 1872. It became clear that, apart from differences in respect of other matters, the overwhelming majority of the enfranchised people of Rehoboth were in favour of the reinstatement of the Paternal Law, and they still are. Consequently it is hardly realistic to expect that the opinion of the people of Rehoboth should be tested by means of a referendum on this matter.

During the course of his speech the hon. member for Rondebosch also remarked that the Bill is not supported by all the people of Rehoboth. I do not want to quote him out of context, but, he did make that statement. I only want to say that I cannot believe that the hon. member expects that all the people of Rehoboth who have the vote should express their support for the reinstatement of the Paternal Law before we continue with the present Bill. After all where in the world has there ever been 100% support for any measure?

I agree.

The hon. member says he agrees, but he made that statement nevertheless.

The hon. member for Bezuidenhout also intimated that he agreed that the desires of the people of Rehoboth should be complied with as far as possible. It is not clear to me precisely what the hon. member meant by the qualification “as far as possible”. To me it seems suspect and very much like a repudiation of the principle of the right of self-determination which every nation has. But since the hon. member and his party is supporting this Bill, a Bill which is a clear manifestation of the right of the people of Rehoboth to self-determination, it does seem as though the hon. member does not want to take his aforesaid qualification too far and that does after all endorse the principle of self-determination. Therefore I shall leave his remarks at that.

I am sorry the hon. member for Houghton is not here at the moment, because I should also like to address a few remarks to her. If she is interested, she could look it up in Hansard, or otherwise other hon. members could convey it to her. Why this hon. member participated in the Second Reading debate, was even less clear to me after her speech than before. What was clear, however, was that she had no knowledge, neither of the people of Rehoboth nor of the background to this legislation. For her information I should like to quote briefly from the official year book for 1975 states. I quote—

afsonderlike gemeenskap erken word. Hulle praat byna almal Afrikaans en is afstammelinge van … Blankes en Namas. Die Basters het die Oranjerivier in nagenoeg 1868 oorgesteek om hulle in Suidwes Afrika te vestig. Die gebied wat hulle betree het, het lank gebuk gegaan onder verwoestende stamoorloë tussen die Namas en die Herero’s wat sedert die 19de eeu in ’n voortdurende onderlinge stryd verkeer het. Die Basters was nietemin vanaf die jaar 1871 de facto in beheer van die Rehoboth Gebiet.

From this it becomes irrefutably clear that, firstly, the community of Rehoboth is a remarkable and practically unique community and can hardly be dealt with on the same basis as other peoples or population groups. It is a group of people with an identity, tradition, history and structure of their own. They are proud and jealous of their distinctiveness and their own identity. A second fact which becomes clear from this, is that the Paternal Law of 1872 dates back to the period immediately after the settlement of the Basters at Rehoboth and may therefore rightfully be regarded as their constitution. It is no subsequent, incidental law which had simply been accepted in passing. On the contrary, it is indeed the constitutional foundation of the community of Rehoboth. Thirdly: The people of Rehoboth have been in de facto control of the Rehoboth area since 1871 and the present Bill is now granting judicial recognition to this factual situation. When it is taken into consideration in the face of what onslaughts and under what difficult circumstances the people of Rehoboth have maintained their de facto control over the years, they definitely have every right now to claim de jure recognition of what has factually existed for many years.

Mr. Speaker, with your permission I should like to repeat what I said in my Second Reading speech, i.e. that this Bill is a progressive action which testifies to faith in the people of Rehoboth and which creates wonderful new vistas of self-realization for them. For that reason I gladly support the Third Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I followed the speech of the hon. member for Mossel Bay with great interest, and in general I do not find any fault with his view of the background of Rehoboth. It is correct and I agree with him wholeheartedly.

I want to comment in passing on the points which the hon. member for Rondebosch made and upon which the PRP’s opposition to this Bill is based. As I understood the hon. member for Rondebosch, their chief objections were the following: Firstly, that the other nations in South West were not consulted about Rehoboth. I think the hon. member for Rondebosch went even further by saying that the other nations or communities of South West oppose this Bill. [Interjections.] I am speaking under correction, but this is the impression I received.

I said that there was no evidence that it was acceptable to them.

Yes, that there is no evidence that it is acceptable to them. However, the criterion the hon. member for Rondebosch should have used, was not whether there was evidence of acceptability, but whether there was any sign that the other nations in South West opposed the Bill. It is very clear that the Bill was published quite some time ago. There was therefore sufficient opportunity, if any of the other groups in South West had felt so strongly that they were convinced that the granting of self-government to Rehoboth in terms of this legislation was contrary to their own conception of South West, to register their opposition to this Bill. However, I am unaware of any opposition to the Bill having been expressed at all, whether by the conference or any other body or person in South West. This is as I know the situation there, and it therefore seems to me that in fact this point, upon which the hon. member for Rondebosch has based his opposition, is not valid.

The second point of opposition was that the other people resident in Rehoboth—the few thousand Damaras and others—were not consulted in this matter.

No, I did not say that.

I apologize. It was the hon. member for Sea Point who said that. However, I think that the hon. member for Rondebosch repeated it. Naturally, in a certain sense one would of course have preferred everyone to be consulted, but if one knows the history of Rehoboth and knows the attachment of the Rehoboth nation to their territory, it nevertheless seems that the argument that a minority group which is resident there on a largely temporary basis and will therefore not have a permanent say there, should give an opinion on the future of the area, is not valid either. When I consider the Bantu homelands and the policy of the party to which the hon. member for Rondebosch belongs, I want to say at once that since the homelands are also going to play a part in that party’s policy, the PRP will surely not let the future of the homelands, in terms of their policy, be determined by a small minority of people belonging to other tribes or even by a small group of Whites who may be resident in the homelands.

The third point which the hon. member raised was that although the Rehobothers were consulted, in fact there was no proof that the vast majority of the people supported the Bill. Although I respect this standpoint, nevertheless in essence it attests to a lack of knowledge concerning the whole course of history we are dealing with in the case of the Rehobothers. I shall return to this later.

The fourth point was that this Parliament was not competent to take matters into its own hands in connection with any measure in respect of any specific group in South West. At this stage this Parliament is the only competent body which can act in this connection; no other body has that power. The measure being adopted by means of the Bill, does not in any way hinder any future negotiations which the Rehobothers may conduct with whatever authority may come into being in South West. It will be possible for negotiations to be conducted with such an authority about the constitutional future of Rehoboth or that of the whole of South West. It therefore seems to me that there are no grounds for this argument either.

What seems very strange to me, is the statement by the hon. member that the policy in respect of South West which any of the parties in this House may have is not really to the point. This is a point which escapes me entirely, because if it had in fact been a well-formed argument, we should nevertheless have to say that neither the Government, nor my party, nor the PRP had the right to formulate any constitutional policy. What is strange to me, is the fact that although this is the hon. member’s standpoint, a few months back the PRP itself presented constitutional proposals for South Africa and, by implication, for South West Africa too.

Now you are reading things into it.

I now want to return to the argument concerning the lack of relevancy, that is, if I understood the hon. member for Rondebosch correctly. If I understand the constitutional policy of the PRP correctly, the basis of it is, in the first place, a geographical federation. Therefore, if we assume that in essence or to a very large extent, the conditions in South Africa correspond to the fundamental situation in South West, and that we are struggling here, as we are there, with the problem of effecting a political reconciliation among a large number of groups within one constitutional context, then surely the situation in South West is relevant, and the policy is relevant too. In the first place, as I have already said, the PRP’s policy is based on a geographic federation. This is put very clearly as the fundamental point of departure of that party’s policy. The PRP has also put it very clearly that their policy differs in that respect from the policy of this party. I cannot imagine anything better than this very type of legislation for the purpose of affording the Rehoboth Gebiet, the greatest possible degree of integration in a broader political federal structure based on the geographic concept, particularly in view of the course of its history. This therefore gives effect to the policy of the PRP.

A second principle which is basic to the policy of the PRP, is the recognition of the right of existence of minority groups. It is the recognition of the right of every minority group to uphold its culture and its identity. Surely this is very clearly stated in their proposals In this connection I also want to point out that this Bill constitutes a striking implementation of that same principle, because what we are doing by means of the Bill, is granting recognition to the Rehobothers as a group. We are also giving them the opportunity to maintain themselves, their culture and their identity.

A third principle which is basic to the policy of the PRP, is that there will be a large-scale decentralization of power. It is clearly stated in their policy that the chief element in their geographic federation, is the existence of several states. This is clear in their proposals that “the maximum legislative, judicial and executive powers” be granted to the government of every state. In all honesty, Mr. Speaker, this, after all, is all that is being done here. Under the circumstances, maximum legislative, judicial and executive powers are being granted to the people of Rehoboth. If we were now to accept the argument that it is totally irrelevant which policies a party advocates and applies in respect of this matter, then I want to ask: What contribution did these constitutional proposals by the PRP make in respect of the whole situation? If we may use the concept “irrelevancy” in respect of South West, then we can also use it in respect of the Republic itself.

Nonsense!

That is the comment which I want to make on those points. Therefore, in all honesty, I want to say that to me, the particular points which the hon. member for Rondebosch stated and upon which his objections to the Bill are based, indeed lack any validity in this connection.

I want to refer in passing, without unnecessarily wasting the time of the House, to the principle “self-determination” which was used by the hon. member for Middelland and has also just been used by the hon. member for Mossel Bay. I want to concede at once that it is entirely correct to say that this Bill envisages granting of a large degree of self-determination to the people of Rehoboth. I do not think any one can doubt that, but nevertheless I now want to put it very clearly that we must not introduce an element of absoluteness to the principle of self-determination, because the meaning of that principle cannot be clearly defined. In other words, self-determination is something which lies along the road to sovereignty, but although it may be sovereignty, it need not necessarily be so. All I want to say is: Let us concede that a degree of self-determination is being granted to the people of Rehoboth here, but let us not elevate it as if we are dealing with an absolute concept, or with a term which may be properly and precisely described. In this connection I just want to point out that there is no question of sovereignty here. When we speak of self-determination, we must also recognize the supreme authority of this Parliament, because this Parliament has the right to repeal this Bill if it wishes; this Parliament is entirely free to do so. It is not the people of Rehoboth who can do so. Indeed, yesterday the hon. member for Middelland indicated that even if the people of Rehoboth should make a specific request themselves, this Parliament, if it was convinced that that request did not represent the will of the people properly under certain circumstances, would be fully within its rights to refuse that request. In other words, the right of self-determination is once again being made subject to certain limitations.

In the third place, legislation passed by the legislative authority of Rehoboth, must still, as always, be submitted to the State President of the Republic for approval. The State President acts according to the advice of the Cabinet of the Republic and not according to the advice of the Kaptein’s Council. In other words, in this connection too there are limitations on the right of self-determination of the people of Rehoboth. There are also limitations as far as the legislation is concerned. The legislative authority of Rehoboth can only pass laws in respect of those items set out in the schedule. Therefore it is not an unlimited legislative authority like that of the Parliament of the Republic, for example.

In the fourth place, in terms of the Bill, the Minister is authorized, if circumstances demand, to exercise all powers in connection with the administration of Rehoboth. In other words, as far as the legislative authority too, is concerned, that self-determination is not sovereignty and it is subject to limitations.

In conclusion, if I understand clause 32 correctly, there is no free and complete right of self-determination for the people of Rehoboth in respect of the judicial authority either. Let us therefore be careful about elevating the right of self-determination as if we are dealing with an absolute principle, because it is not absolute. It is a degree of self-determination and although we are indeed dealing with a large degree of self-determination here, there is no question of a complete right of self-determination.

The hon. members for Bezuidenhout and Von Brandis indicated, with reference to the assurances given by the hon. the Minister, that this matter had nothing to do with independence. Because of the hon. the Minister’s willingness to include amendments, of which he informed us yesterday, in the Bill, I want to say at once that any objections which we had and which we raised during the Second Reading debate, have disappeared to a large extent. Therefore I want to identify myself with the standpoint taken by my party, namely that we are going to support the Third Reading of this Bill. I want to add that I appreciate the reasonable attitude which the hon. the Minister has adopted in this connection.

If one knows the history of Rehoboth, one will know how much those people have suffered, one will be aware of the opposition on their part towards tyranny by others, and one will also know about their battle against the Germans at Kubis in 1915. On that occasion they grouped the women above 60 years together and asked them if they would accede to the ultimatum of the Germans to fight on the side of the Germans or to hand their weapons over to them. When they asked the women above 60 years in the tribe for their opinion, those women said: “Not a damn!”—pardon the language. In other words, they decided that they would not accede to the ultimatum of the Germans. Besides that, we must take into consideration that they only surrendered to the Union Forces in 1925 after Sir Pierre van Ryneveld—as he subsequently became—flew over the Rehoboth Gebiet. The people there, mindful of what had happened in the case of the Bondelzwarts rising, then came to the conclusion that it would not pay them to oppose the Union Forces as well. We must also take into consideration that during the ’fifties Hans Beukes approached the UN time after time with a one-man petition for the independence of Rehoboth, and that in 1969 the Rehobothers wanted to seek legal advice to put their case for self-determination to the World Court. If we take all these things into consideration, it ought to be clear that we have no choice in the matter. To say now that not every Rehobother agreed with it, is not to the point. The whole history of those people is like an open book for those who want to read it. I can only say that one can and must treat the struggle for self-assertion of those people through generations, with a great deal of compassion and sympathy. In that sense I then want to say that I associate myself entirely with the idea that we shall give final approval to the Bill during this Third Reading.

Mr. Speaker, I really think it was a pleasure for us to listen to the hon. member for Edenvale, except on a few occasions when he tried to compare the policy of his party with that of the Progressive Party. For the rest his speech was a lesson to the members of the Progressive Party.

He was once again the professor we knew in the old days.

What my hon. friend here said is correct; it was his knowledge of the subject which emerged. I think this was the major deficiency on the part of the Progressive Party which caused them to oppose the legislation. Nevertheless, I shall return at a later stage to the speech made by the hon. member for Edenvale. I have appreciation for the speeches made on both sides of this House, except of course the irrelevant sounds which emanated from the Progressive Party. I have appreciation for the observations made by the hon. member for Bezuidenhout, the hon. member for Von Brandis and also the hon. member for Edenvale. To prove how reasonable I am, I want to indicate that, apart from the amendments which were agreed to during the Committee Stage, I shall effect further changes in the Other Place.

†This is somewhat in contradiction with the remarks made by a journalist, a certain Mr. John Scott, who called me a “non-sport” for not being prepared to accept all the amendments proposed by the hon. member for Edenvale. I am sure I did not do it because I am a non-sport. On every particular occasion I explained to hon. members why I could not accept any particular amendment.

*Nevertheless it seems to me as though the entire debate we had here this afternoon and yesterday proved that if people of differing political persuasions at least have some knowledge of a matter they are discussing and debating, together with the good intention of bringing about what is best for the community concerned, in this case the people of Rehoboth, and also for our country with a view to the international position of South West Africa, then one can go far. Therefore I was prepared—as I indicated when I moved the Third Reading—to effect certain amendments in the Other Place myself, amendments which would have the same effect as I as well as members on the opposite side of this House wanted to achieve. However, it will now be done in a better way, and without complications. Therefore I think this entire debate has been worthwhile, and will also indicate to the people of Rehoboth that we in this country are able to act sensibly and co-operate if we want to.

Yesterday the hon. member for Middelland—and I think this must have made an impression on the hon. members of the Progressive Party—furnished an account of the growth over the years of the system of government in Rehoboth. I think that that was of tremendous importance here. The hon. member for Edenvale, too, gave indications in his speech of a wide knowledge of those developments. The hon. member for Bezuidenhout stated unequivocally that he and his party were satisfied that the people of Rehoboth had been consulted at all times, and that the necessary evidence existed to prove that the legislation was an expression of the will of the majority of the people of Rehoboth. I cannot understand now why the hon. member for Rondebosch allowed himself to become entangled in such a situation as he found himself in this afternoon. Is it because the hon. member has to think and argue as other hon. members in the front benches of that party think and argue? Said with all due respect, what the hon. member proclaimed here this afternoon—and I am familiar with the hon. member’s career—was surely at variance— apart from the political standpoints—with the hon. member’s entire academic background. The hon. member’s speech had then to testify to ignorance, as the hon. member for Edenvale said, although I cannot believe that it was ignorance in his case. Perhaps the hon. member has not visited the Rehoboth territory very frequently but as a student I believe he must have learned enough about the circumstances of Rehoboth. Therefore I can only conclude that under the authority of his hon. leader and his defective knowledge …

What leader?

The hon. member for Sea Point. The hon. member for Rondebosch was in that way manoeuvred into the position in which he found himself this afternoon. Surely the hon. member for Rondebosch will recall that a year or two ago the hon. member for Sea Point also discussed matters affecting South West Africa, not Rehoboth, but South West Africa here. The former hon. Minister of Community Development then asked him, with the object of testing the knowledge of the hon. member, who has travelled so widely in Africa and is so ready to discuss South West Africa, what language was spoken by the Damaras. The hon. member for Sea Point sat there dumbstruck. The hon. Minister went further and asked whether the hon. member for Sea Point could say how many population groups there were in South West Africa, and once again the hon. member for Sea Point was dumbstruck. After all, I cannot believe that the hon. member for Rondebosch shares that ignorance. In other words, he has therefore been manoeuvred into a position in which he has to defend an unjustifiable standpoint. A moment ago the hon. member again wanted to know why a referendum was not held. I shall return at a later stage to the other points which the hon. member raised. Does the hon. member not understand that this legislation gives effect to the will of the people of Rehoboth?

They went through all the channels, and asked for it. I am now going to take the trouble—although I doubt that the hon. member is ignorant of it—to furnish the entire background so that the matter may be placed on record. Surely the people of Rehoboth were able to and had to decide for themselves how they would give expression to their will, whether by way of a referendum, by way of an election, or by way of requests which, over the years, had to be endorsed by elections. Therefore it was surely arrogant of the hon. member to have come here and told me that I should have allowed them to hold a referendum. Surely that is not what is at issue. Since the hon. member is implying that the other population groups of South West Africa should have been consulted about this legislation, I want to tell him that surely it is appalling, even in terms of the policy of that hon. member’s own party, that others should express their opinion on matters affecting the people in the Rehoboth territory. Surely it is appalling to propose such a thing. Suppose the hon. member were in my position. Would he have said: “No, Rehobothers you have to wait; I first want to discuss all the other people of South West Africa”, and then have held a referendum throughout the whole of South West Africa to decide what constitution Rehoboth should receive? Can hon. members see what the hon. member for Rondebosch is becoming entangled in? To clear the air, I am now going to attempt to indicate to hon. members what the irrelevant arguments which the hon. member advanced here were concerned with. They were concerned with these matters because the hon. member attended a symposium held by Mr. O’Linn in Windhoek about three weeks ago. The symposium was also attended by people from Rehoboth, but the majority of those people were members of the Volksparty, the minority party. Those people cannot endure having been defeated—I have nothing to do with their quarrels—but they found in the hon. member for Rondebosch a sounding-board to come here and profess that they had not really been defeated. I know that the members of that party, who comprised the majority at the symposium, spoke to that hon. member. In other words, they were his source. He obtained no information on the views of other people. I am going to quote to hon. members a short report from which either ignorance or other motives is apparent. It appeared last Sunday in the Sunday Times under the headline “Basters are split on constitution”. It was written by a certain Alf Wannenburgh, and read as follows—

This man’s knowledge is so impeccable that he does not even realize that the Second Reading was disposed of last week already.

He did not accept the constitution; he brought it forward—

And so it continues.

What has this to do with me?

It has a great deal to do with the hon. member. He then referred to the leader of the minority party, with whose people the hon. member for Rondebosch spoke, and this is what is relevant—

This is the leader of the Volksparty, the minority party—

This is last year’s election—

He then continued—

You see, Mr. Speaker, this is how the hon. member for Rondebosch also argues. He was influenced by these people’s tales and now he, too, thinks that these people have a case and that a majority is not really in favour of the constitution. Surely, the fact of the matter is that the people attending the conference have nothing to do with a specific political party. The 12 people from Rehoboth at that conference are not all Dr. Africa’s people, and if five of them are no longer there, it does not prove that the people of Rehoboth no longer want this constitution. But I think it is necessary for me to give a full account, for the information of the hon. member and his party, of what led up to this legislation which we have before this House today, and for that reason I want to quote verbatim from a statement issued last week by Dr. Africa the leader of the majority party in the present Advisory Council of Rehoboth. He said this—

That is still the position today—

Does the hon. member now accept that there have been representations over the years to the effect that they wanted to return to that earlier system? The statement continues—

You see, Sir, the request for those people to come forward with what was their own therefore came from the hon. the Prime Minister—

And, as I told hon. members the other day, at that juncture the magistrate of Rehoboth addressed one meeting after another to explain to the people what was being contemplated with this Bill. The statement continues—

The question then was not whether such a draft constitution should be prepared, but whether the ordinary citizens had been sufficiently consulted on the Bill—

But now the hon. member for Rondebosch wants to prescribe to me that a referendum should have been held, and that because this was not done, he is not satisfied. Dr. Africa went on to say—

Now I want to explain to the hon. member once again that there are no electoral divisions. All seven members are chosen simultaneously by all the voters, and if one has a by-election for five members then all the voters of Rehoboth, the entire territory, are involved in that election. Then Dr. Africa went on to say—

So widely has the Bill been drawn up. Therefore I want to say, Mr. Speaker, that if the hon. member for Rondebosch still had doubts on the question of whether the people had been sufficiently consulted, then I have now tried to the best of my ability to indicate to the hon. member that this was in fact the case. This afternoon the hon. member referred in his speech to a letter which was sent to the Secretary-General of the UNO. The hon. the Prime Minister told him, by way of an interjection, that he need only look at the South West Africa Survey of 1967, and he would find the reply to his statement there. For that reason I am going to quote it to the hon. member. It is on page 49 of this publication, which appeared in 1967. It reads—

This refers to South West Africa. It continues—

What is the date of the publication from which you have quoted?

It is 1967. So one can continue to indicate that Dr. Africa said at the symposium recently held in Windhoek that one of the greatest mistakes that had been made in the past with the mandated territory of South West Africa had been that the population had not been trained to govern a country themselves. Now we are coming forward here with legislation with which we want to restore to the people of Rehoboth what they had a hundred years ago. But then the hon. member for Rondebosch advances arguments to the effect that the people of Rehoboth were not sufficiently consulted. He said that the evidence that the majority had been in favour of the measure was inconclusive and questioned the acceptability of the measure to the other population groups in South West Africa. This comes very close to being, I almost want to say, derogatory towards the people of Rehoboth, they who have traditionally developed the furthest, while other peoples have lagged behind. The hon. member for Rondebosch now wants to call in some of the other groups there to tell the Rehobothers, they who at least have the most knowledge of these matters, how to manage their own affairs.

He has thrown his ancestral laws overboard.

With justification the hon. the Minister of Defence is saying that the hon. member has thrown his own ancestral laws overboard. I want to conclude by thanking those hon. members who made a positive contribution to this debate. I believe that greater knowledge and understanding will emerge from these discussions, for the people of Rehoboth and their aspirations as well. As a matter of interest I could mention to you that last year a pupil of the Rehoboth High School was one of the four pupils to obtain the highest points among all the population groups in South West Africa in the matriculation examination. He was among the first four. In addition, there is a woman in Rehoboth who has already obtained a degree in agriculture in an overseas country and is at present studying further in that direction. I could also mention that the choir of the Rehoboth High School, at their first attempt last year, came third in their first participation in a country-wide competition for school choirs organized by the SABC. This was a great achievement for those people. Whatever we are able to do and say to promote an understanding of those people in their circumstances can only be for the best. That is why I am grateful for the positive contributions which were also made during the course of this debate.

Question put,

Upon which the House divided:

Question declared agreed to.

Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Chairman, I move—

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to object, but I think the hon. member should say why he is moving this motion. I have no idea what he is aiming at with this motion.

Mr. Chairman, the reason why I move that clause 1 stand over, is that this clause contains a definition which is dependent upon the acceptance of the clause which deals with purchasers. Until this clause has been accepted, the definition has little meaning.

Motion agreed to.

Clause 2:

Mr. Chairman, I understand from the hon. the Minister that the amendments to this clause which stand in my name on the Order Paper, are acceptable to him. I accordingly move these amendments, as follows—

1. (2) on pages 5 and 7, to omit subsection (2) and to substitute the following subsection:
   1. (2) The Minister shall appoint as members of the committee—
      1. (a) not fewer than seven persons from among at least 18 persons whose names have been submitted for that purpose by bodies which in the opinion of the Minister represent each of the categories—
         1. (i) marketing;
         2. (ii) advertising;
         3. (iii) commerce;
         4. (iv) industry;
         5. (v) consumer affairs; and
         6. (vi) mail orders; and
      2. (b) not more than eight and not fewer than two members competent to advise him on the application of legislation relating to the protection of consumers.
2. (3) on page 7, to insert the following subsection to follow subsection (2):
   1. (3) If after the expiry of a period of three months from the date on which the secretary in writing requested the bodies referred to in subsection (2)(a) to submit a list of persons as contemplated in that subsection, such bodies have failed to submit the said list to the said secretary or have submitted to the said secretary a list of persons which is defective in some or other respect, the Minister shall appoint suitable persons as members of the committee in the place of the persons he would have appointed if the said bodies had not so failed to submit the said list or had not submitted a list defective in some or other respect.
   2. (4) on page 7, to omit subsection (3) and to substitute the following subsection:
      1. (4) A member of the committee shall hold office for such period, but not more than three years, and on such conditions as the Minister may determine at the time of his appointment: Provided that any member shall, subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3), on the expiry of his term of office be eligible for reappointment.

I would like straight away to express the appreciation of this side of the House of the fact that this amendment, which we regard as an important amendment, has been accepted by the hon. the Minister. This is the clause which establishes the Trade Practices Advisory Committee, a committee which is going to play a key role in this legislation. It plays a key role in that it provides the safeguard that the very extensive powers which are taken by the hon. the Minister in this legislation, powers to regulate the giving of benefits, powers to regulate advertising practices and powers to regulate injurious trade practices, are exercised in a reasonable manner, and more important, that they are exercised in a manner which will protect the interests of the affected parties. The Trade Practices Advisory Committee does this because it is given the power in a subsequent clause to the effect that the hon. the Minister may not make regulations or determinations in respect of his powers unless he has the prior recommendation of this committee.

Therefore, as I said, this committee fulfils a very important function in this legislation, and as such it is important, first of all, that its composition be as strong as possible, and secondly, that the powers which it is able to exercise, and the manner in which it is able to exercise those powers, should be correct. The amendments which I have moved aim at improving the composition of this committee, and they aim to do so primarily by ensuring that the committee will be representative of the interests that are going to be affected by this legislation, will have people on it who will have the full confidence of the bodies that represent the interests that are going to be affected by this legislation, and will have the full confidence of members of the consuming public. The amendments aim to bring this about, firstly, by ensuring that members of the committee representing the categories set out in this clause, are chosen from nominees of recognized bodies representing the interests concerned, bodies such as the Handels-instituut, Assocom, FCI and Total. This will ensure that the representatives on this committee will be acceptable to these bodies, and I think it will also ensure that they will be men of high calibre, which is another very important requisite for this committee.

The second thing that the amendments will achieve, will be to ensure that the trading categories which are to be affected by this legislation, are afforded representation on this committee. The amendment will add to the trade categories already in the Bill, the business of mail orders, which is a very big business. I believe that there are no fewer than 1 500 businesses in this country which conduct mail order transactions as a specialized business. This is a type of business which is conducted on a very large scale with the less sophisticated members of our society. The mail order business is a business to which this Bill is going to have direct application in several respects. It will have direct application as far as the advertising procedures used by mail order businesses in their catalogues are concerned. It will have direct application as far as the use of coupons by mail order businesses is concerned. This is a practice which is quite widespread.

I believe that consumers are vulnerable to practices that are conducted by mail order businesses, and that the need for legislation in regard to this type of business consequently is quite great. I have been advised that no less than 10% of the complaints which are received by the Consumers Co-ordinating Council, are in respect of practices being followed by mail order businesses. I believe therefore that this is a business, a type of business, which should be represented on the Trade Practices Advisory Committee. The mail order business has a strong organization of its own: the South African Mail Order Association. It is a responsible body with its own code of ethics, and I believe that its representation on the Trade Practices Advisory Committee will strengthen that body.

Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, these amendments aim at ensuring that there is a balance on this committee between trade interests and consumer interests. After all, this measure is basically a measure for the protection of consumers. I therefore regard it as important that there should be a reasonable balance in numbers between those members of the committee who are representing trade interests and those who are representing consumer interests. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, before I comment on the arguments of the hon. member for Constantia, I believe you will allow me to express my sincere gratitude to the members of the Select Committee who have contributed to the fact that this Bill is before the Committee of this House this afternoon. Of course, everybody has been very aware of the necessity to place legislation on the Statute Book to protect the interests of the consumer. It is of course regrettable to have to introduce legislation of this nature, for one expects consumers to keep their eyes open when making a purchase. However, since many people are usually not able to protect themselves, we have agreed that this legislation is necessary to protect the consumers. I should therefore like to express my sincere gratitude to all the members of the Select Committee who assisted in drafting the Bill which is before the House this afternoon. We achieved a large measure of unanimity because all of us were inspired with the wish to afford members of the consumer public the necessary protection. The points on which unanimity agreement could not be reached, were points which were not really of material importance. The fact that we have indeed achieved unanimity is being emphasized further by the hon. the Minister. The hon. the Minister has now accepted an amendment here that was moved by the minority on the Committee. I do not wish to differ from the hon. the Minister now, for the changes that are being effected are not of material interest.

The hon. member for Constantia had quite a lot to say about the importance of mail order business. We felt, of course, that mail order business could be classified very successfully under the head “Commerce”, the head which is indicated in the Bill. Surely mail order business is a commercial activity, and therefore we were of the opinion that it could be classified very successfully under that head. Therefore we did not introduce a separate category for it. I reiterate that I do not wish to argue about it. This aspect is of no material interest and the amendment may just as well be included.

Finally, I should also like to express my sincere gratitude to the officials who have assisted the Committee with so much conscientiousness and devotion to duty in the fulfilment of its task.

Mr. Chairman, when my time expired on the previous occasion I was motivating the amendments to clause 2 standing in my name on the Order Paper. The final amendment is amendment No. 4 on the Order Paper, an amendment dealing with the period of office of members of the Trade Practices Advisory Committee. As the Bill stands at present there is no specific period of office laid down. The period of office is determined by an ad hoc decision by the hon. the Minister. I consider it to be much better practice, however, to lay down a maximum period of office, as happens in the private sector in appointments to boards, committees and councils and also in the public sector in appointments to boards and other bodies. This is the reasoning behind the amendment. I believe that by the acceptance of this amendment the position of a potential member of this committee will be greatly clarified, and by clarifying and specifying the position, one is likely to attract persons of the very best calibre to this committee. This is very desirable. I am therefore grateful that the hon. the Minister is willing to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, before I react to the argument of the hon. member for Constantia, I should first like to express my gratitude and appreciation to the members who served on the Select Committee and considered the legislation last year. I am concinved that if we had disposed of the legislation at that stage, we most probably would not have had 81 amendments, as we have now. But in my opinion the time which has elapsed in the meantime has not been wasted. Amendments have indeed emerged which in my opinion are acceptable.

†I have already indicated to the hon. member for Constantia that these amendments are acceptable but I hasten to add, for the benefit of the hon. member for Paarl, that the amendment that was rejected in the Select Committee is not the same one that is now being proposed by the hon. member for Constantia. In the interim he also reconsidered the matter and has come to this House with an improved amendment which is, in fact, acceptable.

*There is an important point which I have to raise at this stage. Naturally, it is true that the Trade Practices Advisory Committee is going to play a cardinal role in the implementation of the objects of the legislation, namely to curtail trade practices which are harmful and undesirable. To my opinion, these principles are already contained in the legislation, apart from the amendments. If we want to achieve these objects, we should realize that we would have to intervene in a very drastic and direct manner in the activities of the private sector and the methods they apply in pursuit of the profit motive. I can find no counter-argument which indicates that we should not under the circumstances, take all the security measures to ensure that we do not unjustifiably prohibit a practice which should not really be prohibited. It is, secondly, important to know that this Trade Practices Advisory Committee fulfils a further important function. The Minister is unable to take any formal steps before the Advisory Committee has made a recommendation.

Therefore, the amendments are acceptable on the basis of the considerations I shall now mention. As I see the matter, the amendments will expand the composition of the Trade Practices Advisory Committee and will, therefore, make the committee more representative. There is another very important principle to which I initially gave prominence when the legislation was first introduced. I have the assurance, apart from the amendments which I am now accepting, that I would remain in very close contact with the private sector in regard to the people who will be appointed to this committee when the powers in terms of clause 2 were exercised. The amendments will therefore give substance to the two elements I have mentioned, namely the representativeness of the committee and consultation in the sense that names may be submitted to me. That principle will certainly apply in practice. Seen in that light, a strong case may be made out, in my opinion, for the acceptance of the amendments of the hon. member. The hon. member should understand, however, that it is a sense of reasonableness which is moving me to accept the amendments and that he will have an opportunity to show the same reasonableness in respect of the other amendments he has moved.

Mr. Chairman, now that the hon. the Minister has confirmed his acceptance of this particular amendment to clause 2, I should like to put a thought to him and direct an appeal to him in relation to the composition of the Trade Practices Advisory Committee and the appointment of its members, a function which will be undertaken by him. Subsection (2)(b), as amended in terms of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Contantia, stipulates that the Minister shall appoint as members of the committee—

I should like to suggest to the hon. the Minister that, when he appoints people representing consumer interests, he give serious consideration to the appointment of somebody who is deeply involved in social welfare. I believe that someone who has been associated with social welfare would have a unique and special knowledge of certain habits which are prevalent among consumers. Such a person would be aware of certain trends and habits and would probably be aware of drink patterns, the possible increase in alcoholism, and matters of that nature. If any member of this House viewed the programme on television recently in which the subject of al-choholism was discussed, he will have noticed the contrast between the attitude of the producer of alcoholic products and the attitude of the people who work with alcoholics and seek to help and rehabilitate them. For that reason I think the hon. the Minister will realize that a person with such an ability would be very useful indeed. It goes beyond that, however. I believe that a person with those qualifications would also be able to detect purchasing trends in the home in regard to various other items such as furniture, and household equipment. In this regard I am thinking particularly of the less sophisticated members of the community, as my hon. colleague put it. A person so qualified may be able to detect, at an early stage, consumer trends which have been subject to exploitation by means of gimmick promotions. With those objects in view, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister to give serious consideration, when he appoints the members of this committee, to the appointment of somebody who would have those special qualifications.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Berea is renowned for making highly appreciated pleas in respect of the maladjusted people in our society, and for being an advocate of the combating of social evils. I think there are very few hon. members in this House who would not endorse the sentiments he has expressed specifically and generally as well. At this stage I am naturally unable to commit myself to accepting this suggestion. I should just like to remark that, although, as I have already said, all of us endorse the sentiments which the hon. member has expressed, the legislation which is before us deals specifically with abuses in trade practices, and I am therefore unable to apply it in order to eliminate social evils. I hope the hon. member will understand that. Nor am I able to use this legislation to protect malpractioners, but only to protect consumers. The hon. member will understand that there is a big difference. Nevertheless I shall still bear in mind the suggestion which the hon. member has made. Of course, it is true that somebody involved in social welfare, is indeed aware, not from habit, but from experience, of certain malpractices which exist. This could perhaps be of assistance to us.

Amendments agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 6:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 7, to add the following further proviso at the end of subsection (1):

1. (2) on page 7, to add the following subsection at the end of the Clause:
2. (3) Information furnished pursuant to subsection (1) shall not be disclosed to any person save for the purposes of this Act, or in a court of law in a prosecution arising in terms of this Act.

The hon. the Minister kindly intimated to me that the second amendment is acceptable to him. I shall therefore deal with it first. In the circumstances I shall be fairly brief about it. I think that if I dealt with it at any length, the hon. the Minister could accuse me of being inflationary. The second amendment has the effect of assuring a person who is furnishing information that the information so furnished will only be used for the purposes set forth in this Act or in a prosecution arising out of this Act. In other words, the information furnished could not be used for any other purposes. The person is therefore assured that such information is furnished on a privileged basis. He is also assured that that information cannot be used summarily in a civil case, but will only be used in a criminal prosecution. I believe that the second amendment has the effect of strengthening the Bill, and I want to thank the hon. the Minister for agreeing to accept it.

I know that the hon. the Minister is reluctant to accept the first amendment.

I have no reluctance whatsoever about not accepting it.

I hope he will at least listen with an open mind to my arguments in this connection and that there is a possibility that we can get him to change his mind. Concerning the first amendment, it is obvious that it can never be considered desirable that a person should be compelled to make what is tantamount to a written confession on request from the Secretary for Commerce, because that is what the Bill entails as it stands. In the circumstances, it is most desirable that my amendment should be incorporated in the Bill. The hon. the Minister has only one possible leg to stand on in his reasons for rejecting this particular amendment, viz. if the hon. the Minister were to argue, for example, that the person concerned can rely on his common law rights and that he can plead that, as the information required by the Secretary for Commerce is likely to incriminate him, he does not want to make it available. In view of the hon. the Minister’s training and background, however, I do not believe that the hon. the Minister would have this particular thought in mind or would use the argument of the person’s common law rights.

I should like to point out why the hon. the Minister cannot use that particular argument. In the first place, when this Bill becomes law, this particular Act will supersede the common law in regard to this matter. The Bill specifically provides that a person can be compelled to furnish all the information required by the Secretary for Commerce. It provides further, in clause 19, that if the person concerned does not supply all the information required, he is guilty of a contravention and an offence. Let me very briefly quote the first few lines of clause 6(1)—

Should the person concerned fail to provide the information required and try to defend himself by standing on his common law rights, what happens to him? Clause 19 states that—

I want to put it to the hon. the Minister that this is no common law at all, but that this is a most expensive law for the man who does not comply with the request by the Secretary for Commerce. If he does not obey the order of the Secretary for Commerce, he can naturally be asked by the Secretary to write out his own confession and, if he fails to do that, it would cost him up to R2 000 or two years’ imprisonment, or both. This clause, as it now stands, is a most onerous clause and even offensive. I therefore believe that the hon. the Minister should agree to have it deleted or amended as proposed by this side of the House.

The first amendment specifically states that no person need furnish information which incriminates him of an offence. Clause 6(1) allows the Secretary to obtain such information as he may require from a person in writing before a specified date. I should like to ask the hon. the Minister whether there are going to be any time limits imposed by the Secretary in regard to furnishing of information. Obviously there will have to be some form of time limit, but I do suggest that where onerous information is required, the time limit should be longer while it could be shorter when simple information is required. I should like to appeal to the hon. the Minister that the Secretary must err on the side of generosity towards the person from whom the information is required. Presumably the Secretary will in the majority of cases write to the businessman concerned as a result of a substantial complaint which has been lodged and in this regard I should like to appeal to the hon. the Minister that when the Secretary writes to the businessman, he should inform him of the complaint which has been lodged. This would give the businessman an opportunity of replying fully to the Secretary because he will know what the basis of the complaint is. If the businessman could see from the complaint lodged against him that he was embarking upon the wrong tracks, it will have the further advantage that the businessman will have the opportunity of desisting immediately. If the businessman has to wait until the decision of the trade practices committee is made known, it may take many months after the date on which the complaint has been lodged for him to become aware that he has embarked upon the wrong tracks. It is therefore in the general interest that the businessman should be informed of the basis of the complaint lodged against him. If the businessman is immediately advised of the complaint against him, there is an opportunity, as I have said earlier, of rectification on his part.

I should also like to point out to the hon. the Minister that in terms of clause 7 there is provision for inspectors to obtain all the information which they require. That is another reason why this amendment should be acceptable to the hon. the Minister. In the circumstances I do not see the reason why the hon. the Minister wants the person in reply to a letter from the Secretary for Commerce to give a written confession. The hon. the Minister can obtain whatever information he requires through his inspectors or by means of other procedures laid down in the law. Unless the hon. the Minister accepts this amendment, the businessman will be compelled to give the Secretary a written confession which, as I have indicated earlier, could lead to the businessman being charged and convicted on his own admission.

I should like to state very clearly that if in these days a businessman should offend against this Bill after it has become law, we believe that he should be charged and be punished. What we are pleading for is that there should at least be a fair hearing. I think the hon. the Minister must be reasonable in this regard. Surely, if one looks at the existing machinery in conjunction with clause 7, all possible formation can be obtained without any difficulty whatsoever and without denying the businessman of his common law rights. With his legal background and training, the hon. the Minister should have no difficulty in accepting this amendment. Although he has indicated previously that he is not in favour of the amendment, I should like to appeal to the hon. the Minister to change his mind.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with the hon. member for Walmer as far as his second amendment is concerned, because I think there may be some justification for the idea that publication of this information ought to be limited so that it goes no further than necessitated by the purposes of the Bill, and also that the information should be disclosed only in a competent court of law.

I now come to the first amendment moved by the hon. member. It reads—

furnish any information which will incriminate him of an offence.

I cannot agree with such an amendment, nor can I agree with the hon. member’s interpretation of the matter. After all, clause 6 provides specifically that the only thing which may be done, is to request certain information. It is clearly not the idea that the person who is requested to furnish the information, should incriminate himself in any way or should make a confession which amounts to an admission of guilt. Therefore, I am of the opinion that his statement in this regard as well as his allegation that this provision supersedes the common law, is incorrect. In order to support my opinion I should like to refer the hon. member to the case of Heimann, Maasdorp and Barker v. The Secretary for Inland Revenue, WLD 1968 (4), in which the learned judge said—

In this case, too, this is the test and the crux of the matter. A person cannot be compelled in any way to give evidence against himself. The learned judge went on to say—

Therefore this is a predominant concept which we must accept and for that reason I do not believe the hon. member may rightfully argue as he did. From Steyn’s Vertolking van Wette I quote the following—

This is the very thing that will happen in this case as well. This Bill must be interpreted in a way which is consistent and not in conflict with common law. In the light of the case to which I have referred, it is very clear that in this instance no person can be prejudiced in any way.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal briefly with the two amendments. I think that brevity would perhaps be of importance in this debate since we have already spent over half an hour discussing one clause on which we are all agreed. I therefore do not know how much time we are going to spend on clauses on which we do not agree.

That is a snide remark. [Interjections.]

The hon. member should bear in mind that his party has taken away amendments from other people. However, that is another joke. [Interjections.] If we can go back to the clause and leave the guilty consciences of hon. members to my left …

Sour grapes!

Usually the grapes that that hon. member enjoys are die ones that have fermented and the hon. member knows that. [Interjections.]

Order!

I should like to get to the clause. Both these amendments were moved in the Select Committee and they were both turned down. However, we supported both the amendments and we still support them. Because the second one has been agreed to, there is no need to debate it, but I should like to put our case very briefly on the first amendment. The Select Committee, and now again the hon. member for Ermelo, has come to the conclusion that, although in so far as the amendment is concerned it is agreed to in principle and in spirit, it is not necessary.

That, Sir, is the argument. The argument is that because there is no obligation to furnish information which will incriminate a person, therefore it is unnecessary to say so in this piece of legislation. The hon. member for Ermelo relies on the authority which was quoted in the Select Committee by the department and I want to concede immediately that there is a possibility of two interpretations in respect of the matter. It may well be that in the circumstances of this particular clause, framed in this particular manner, a person is not obliged to answer a question which may incriminate him. But it may also be, bearing in mind Maasdorp’s case and bearing in mind the other authorities, that the court may come to a different conclusion on this clause. I think the argument in favour of this amendment, is that it is common cause in the House that nobody should answer questions which may incriminate him, and therefore there is no reason why the amendment should not be accepted. But if in fact the hon. the Minister is intransigent and does not want to accept this amendment, then I think he should at the same time give the House the assurance that despite the fact that he will not accept this amendment, no one will be required to answer questions which will incriminate him of an offence and that there will be no prosecution asked for by reason of a refusal to answer a question on these grounds. Sir, if he gives that assurance, as far as I am concerned the matter can perhaps be accepted, as he puts it, because then the same result will come about. Sir, there are questions which may be asked in terms of this clause which have no bearing whatsoever on any possible prosecution, because questions can be asked for example to ascertain whether a particular trade practice should be declared one that is undesirable. There are a hundred and one things which can be asked which do not relate to a prosecution. In the circumstances I also want to say that in so far as the department is concerned—and here I refer to what the hon. member for Walmer has said—my own experience of the department and the experience of many businessmen is that the department in fact writes letters in advance of complaints, gives businessmen the opportunity to explain what is involved, and that they do not rush into prosecution if it can be avoided. I have seen this in many cases and I think it is necessary to say that in fact the department acts in a very understanding fashion when it comes to the manner of dealing with matters of this sort. I know, for example, that people who deal with price control matters receive very fair treatment. They may not always agree with the decision of the department. That is another matter, but I think there are very few people who can complain that they are not given an opportunity of putting their case to the department. So we support this amendment. We think it is necessary, but if the Minister will give this assurance we will be satisfied on these benches.

Order! Before calling upon the next hon. member to speak, I should like to make an observation for the guidance of hon. members of the Committee. There are 81 amendments to be considered by the Committee and these would take us a few weeks to deal with if all of them were to be discussed at length. However, it is clear that the hon. the Minister is going to accept several of the amendments. Therefore, it would be unnecessary to discuss at length those amendments which the hon. the Minister accepts. This would serve no purpose. I do not want to give a ruling in this regard, but I do want to recommend that when a clause is put and there are amendments to it, the hon. the Minister should give the Committee an indication at once of what amendments, if they are put— because at that stage he will not yet know whether they will be put—he is prepared to accept, and that any subsequent discussion is confined in the main to those amendments which the hon. the Minister does not accept, unless an hon. member is opposed to such an amendment. I think hon. members will agree that the Committee will find this procedure more convenient and that we shall expedite business in this way.

Mr. Chairman, when the hon. member for Yeoville spoke in the first instance I was not quite sure whether he was discussing political practices between himself and the hon. member for Walmer, or whether he was discussing trade practices, which is the subject of this Bill. Sir, I have indicated that I am prepared to accept the second amendment and I shall therefore accede to your request not to discuss its merits. But I would suggest that the hon. member for Walmer is completely wrong. Let me say quite frankly that I think he is exaggerating the position in his terminology. There is nothing in this Bill that compels anybody to furnish the Secretary for Commerce with a signed confession. I think the hon. member for Yeoville was quite correct. The substance of this particular clause is that the Secretary for Commerce must be in a position to obtain certain information. I would suggest at this stage that most of the information he would require would not relate to any prosecution or criminal offence, because that would in any event be something for the Police to investigate. But it is also obligatory that if we have to make this Bill effective, the Secretary must be entitled to get certain information. The essence and substance of this clause—I am referring to clause 6(1) now—is for the Secretary to obtain certain information subject to the proviso in subsection (1). The amendment proposed by the hon. member for Walmer in fact wants to add a second proviso to clause 6(1).

*The hon. member argues that because clause 6(1) authorizes the Secretary to obtain certain information, and because clause 7 grants inspectors certain powers to obtain information which the Secretary requires, the proviso which he would like to have added, is necessary, because in terms of clause 7 the inspectors may in any event obtain the information. But if that argument were correct juridically, this proviso to clause 6 would not assist us, because he himself argues that in terms of clause 7 the inspectors may obtain the information. But the fact of the matter is that if he looks at clause 7, he will find that in terms of clause 7 inspectors may obtain only such information as the Secretary may require in terms of clause 6. I want to emphasize this. But in the second place his further argument is that because nothing is contained in this clause which protects a person from having to furnish incriminating evidence against himself, he may, in terms of clause 20, i.e. the penalty clause, expose himself at once to prosecution. But surely, Sir, this is not true. In the first instance it is an accepted legal principle that the fact that the Secretary may request information, does not in any way detract from or prejudice any person’s common law right not to give evidence against himself, and for this purpose any proviso, such as the one he requests, is totally unnecessary. May I refer the hon. member to Hiemstra’s Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses? I should like to refer specifically to the comment on section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Act on page 283. The learned author first deals with the position of a witness and then states—

He continues by saying in a note—

Then he continues—

For that reason, Sir, the inclusion of a proviso to the effect requested by the hon. member, is totally superfluous.

†Mr. Chairman, I am quite prepared to give the assurance to the hon. member that this particular provision does not mean that any person can or will be required to give information that will incriminate himself. Secondly, I submit that if it were the intention that persons would, in terms of clause 6(1), be required to give evidence which might be incriminating to themselves, specific provision would have been made to that effect. In this regard the hon. member can refer to the Price Control Act of 1964. He will find that in that Act there is a specific provision which takes away the common law protection which a person would normally have. In that case no person may avail himself of that common law privilege and right not to incriminate himself. In this particular case a proviso such as that proposed in the hon. member’s amendment is in my opinion completely superfluous. In any event, I want to give the undertaking that that is not the intention of this provision.

Mr. Chairman, I do not agree with the hon. the Minister’s reasoning, but I am prepared to accept the undertaking that he has given that a person may avail himself of his common law rights and will not have to incriminate himself. Although I accept his undertaking, I think his argument is fallacious when one refers to the phraseology of clause 6. The hon. the Minister said that the Secretary may obtain certain information. He is wrong in saying that, because the Secretary may obtain any information, in terms of this clause. Therefore, if he can obtain any information, it follows that the person who is called upon to supply the information is in a most invidious position when he receives a letter from the Secretary calling for information. The hon. the Minister knows that once a person has written in reply to the Secretary’s request for information, that letter can be used in a criminal prosecution against him. However, in view of the fact that the hon. the Minister has given the assurance that he has given, I shall accept the position as such.

Amendment (1) negatived.

Amendment (2) agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 7:

Mr. Chairman, I rise merely to indicate that I cannot accept the amendments which appear on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Constantia. I am prepared to accept the four amendments of the hon. member for Wonderboom. I am also unable to accept the two amendments of the hon. member for Johannesburg North.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 7, in line 48, after “secretary” to insert:

1. (2) on page 9, to insert the following subsection to follow subsection (2):

1. (3) Any inspector referred to in subsection (1) shall, before he exercises or performs any power or function under this Act, produce and exhibit to any person affected thereby, the inspection authority referred to in subsection (1).

I am sorry that the hon. the Minister has indicated that he is unable to accept these two amendments. This clause defines the powers of inspectors. I readily acknowledge that inspectors are necessary to administer this legislation and that those inspectors have got to have the power to inspect if the Act is going to be properly administered. However, as it stands at present, the Bill confers on inspectors very wide powers indeed. In fact, in the opinion of this side of the House, those powers are too wide. They allow an inspector to enter any place of business to which this Bill refers—in practice that would mean virtually any place of business—in order to inspect goods in that place of business, to inspect books and documents and to seize and retain books and documents. I do not consider that it is necessary for the good administration of this legislation for inspectors to have such wide powers. Businesses and persons are not, as the Bill reads at present, being afforded adequate protection against the unreasonable exercise of these powers.

I should like to submit that this legislation, in its practical working, is not like other legislation such as the Price Control Act, the Wages Act or the Industrial Conciliation Act, where regular and comprehensive inspections are appropriate and desirable. Offences envisaged under this legislation, such as false and misleading selling and advertising methods and the use or misuse of trade coupons, will be of a spasmodic nature and will not be detectable by regular inspections. I believe that offences under this legislation are going to come to light not as a result of general inspections of businesses, but as a result of complaints lodged by members of the public who have suffered as a result of these practices. This has been the experience in other countries that have had consumer protection legislation, and the legislation in other countries has been framed to deal with specific complaints lodged by members of the public, and not to provide for general inspections to detect complaints. I therefore feel that inspectors do not need to have carte blanche powers to enter any premises at their discretion and to conduct the general type of inspection which is envisaged in this legislation. The first amendment standing in my name accordingly proposes to limit the powers of inspectors to inspections that are specifically authorized in respect of a specific alleged contravention. I believe that in practice this limitation of the powers of inspectors will in no way prejudice the effectiveness of this legislation.

As far as the second amendment in my name is concerned, this deals with the obligation on an inspector to show his authority to inspect. I believe it is only right and proper that an inspector should exhibit his authority to the person who is being inspected, before he starts his inspection. A lot of industrial sabotage and espionage is taking place at present. Competitors are keen to learn the secrets of other people and it is essential if this legislation is going to work smoothly, to dispel any suspicion when an inspector enters premises that the inspector may not be what he purports to be. This can only be done if he exhibits his authority before he starts the inspection. I believe, also, that it is very necessary for the smooth working of this legislation that there should be a good relationship between the inspector and the inspected. This can only be achieved if what I propose is embodied in this legislation. It is something that we on this side of the House have consistently advocated in all types of legislation, and by and large it has been accepted by the Government. For instance, this principle has been accepted in the Hazardous Substances Act, the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, the Medicine Control Act and only yesterday in the Plant Improvement Bill. I very strongly urge the hon. the Minister, in view of the fact that he will not be creating any precedent and that it is a sound practice we are advocating, to accept my second amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am just rising to move the amendments printed in my name, which the hon. the Minister has indicated that he is prepared to accept, as follows—

1. (1) On page 7, to omit all the words after “purpose” in line 51 up to and including “may” in line 54;
2. (2) on page 9, in line 18, after “any” to insert “manager,”;
3. (3) on page 9, in line 28, to omit “(2)” and to substitute “(1)”;
4. (4) on page 9, in line 28, to omit “(3)” and to substitute “(2)”.

I just want to make the single remark that this is actually a simple amendment to make subsections (1) and (2) more streamlined and also to bring the wording of subsection (3) into line with that in subsection (1).

Mr. Chairman, I shall not move the first amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper, because I gather that it involves a question of expenditure. On the other hand, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister to consider at an appropriate time the question of compensation for innocent people who are put under the powers of these inspectors. However, I should like to move the second amendment as it stands in my name on the Order Paper as follows—

1. (7) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to compel the production by an attorney of a letter, report or other document containing a privileged communication made by or to him as an attorney, or to authorize the seizure or retention thereof.

In effect it follows on what the hon. member for Constantia has already said in an attempt to bring down the powers which are granted to these inspectors to something reasonable and to something which businesses would be prepared to accept. Hon. members will remember that these inspectors can, without a warrant or without an inspection authority, enter into any place where they have reason to believe there is something to inspect. It is therefore appropriate in relation to the amendment I have moved, that as far as we on these benches know, it is the first time that the question of legal privilege between an attorney and his client, which might be a letter, correspondence or a file, can be broached in terms of the proposed legislation and that is why we have moved this amendment to simply exclude that which has up to now been a sacrosanct principle.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to reply to the standpoint of the hon. member for Johannesburg North. Once again I am quoting the case which I quoted a moment ago, namely the Heimann, Maasdorp and Barker case. The legal position is that an attorney who deals with confidential information and documents on behalf of a client cannot be forced to reveal those documents, provided that the documents are legally in order. The attorney’s position does not extend any further than the position of his client, and vice versa. In other words, as was clearly ruled in this case, the position is as follows—

If the client can be forced to hand over that document, then the attorney is also forced to do so. Therefore I do not think that the amendment which the hon. member has moved is valid, because what is actually being provided and decreed here is that an attorney will be able to do certain things which he normally may not do in terms of the Act. Therefore I cannot support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to support the hon. member for Constantia particularly in regard to the second amendment he moved, the amendment concerning inspectors. First of all I should like briefly to refer to clause 5, which has already been accepted by the Committee. It says inter alia—

In this particular clause, clause 7, dealing with the powers of inspectors, it states—

1. (1) Any inspector furnished with inspection authority in writing by the secretary may conduct investigations …

It is not my intention to repeat the comments which the hon. member for Constantia made in regard to these broad powers, but something I find a matter of concern, is that I can see nowhere in this particular clause any provision that an inspector shall, even on demand, produce his authority to inspect. I am aware that on page 9 of the Bill subsection (4)(d) says that—

As far as I can see, there is no obligation on the inspector to show his authority even on demand. I know that in most of the laws which operate in South Africa that particular condition applies, namely that an inspector shall on demand exhibit his authority. We on this side of the House have always said that it is an extension of our philosophy that the State exists for the individual and not the individual for the State. That is why we believe that not only should the inspector have an authority, but that before he carries out his powers under the Act, he shall exhibit his authority.

I would like to endorse what my hon. friend from Constantia says, namely that there are examples of legislation where this particular provision is already embodied in the law, that the inspector “shall” exhibit his authority prior to conducting an inspection. We have it in the Atmospheric Pollution Act, in the Dental Mechanicians Act and we have it in the Plant Improvement Bill, which is still being discussed in the Other Place. We also have it in the Abattoir Industry Bill which is due for discussion in the Other Place shortly, but the hon. the Minister has accepted a similar provision in this House. I believe that in this particular Bill the position concerning the inspector is even weaker than in other legislation. The public is not being protected, because they cannot ask for a certificate of authority and, furthermore, those to be inspected, the manufacturers or marketers, are also entitled to some form of protection under this Bill. They are entitled to protection from imposters, as my colleague has already indicated. I believe it is the responsibility of the State in this particular instance, as this is a Bill to protect both those to be inspected and the public who require the inspections to be made to ensure that as consumers they are not being exploited.

Mr. Chairman, there is a feeling of deep disappointment about the fact that the hon. the Minister is not prepared to accept the two amendments moved by the hon. member for Constantia. I can only endorse what that hon. member and the hon. member for Berea have said regarding the second amendment which asks that the inspector, before exercising his duties, should show some form of identification. I want to stress particularly the point the hon. member for Constantia made regarding industrial espionage and industrial sabotage which is taking place. I believe that the hon. the Minister should accept this amendment for the benefit of his department, in order to show the bona fides of his department and in order to get the co-operation and full trust of the trading public, the traders, with whom the hon. the Minister is particularly concerned.

Regarding the first amendment moved by the hon. member, I believe that what he is trying to do here is to say to the hon. the Minister that as this clause reads at the moment, the inspector may investigate and may conduct investigations to gather such information as the secretary may require. This is tremendously wide. The secretary may desire any information, not necessarily information connected with this particular legislation. The amendment which the hon. member has moved, i.e. that it shall relate to a specific business or to a specific alleged contravention, attempts to get the power which the inspector may exercise at the request of the secretary, in some way bound to this particular legislation. I believe that it is a perfectly reasonable request. We have not, unfortunately, heard from the hon. the Minister, having heard only the argument of the hon. member for Constantia. Perhaps the hon. the Minister may indicate by a nod whether …

I have not changed my mind.

He shakes his head to show that he has not changed his mind; he does not nod to show that he has changed his mind. I am disappointed to hear that from the hon. the Minister, because I believe that it is important that the secretary should exercise the powers only in so far as the provisions of this Bill are concerned. For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I move as an amendment—

The clause will then read—

1. (1) Any inspector furnished with inspection authority in writing by the secretary, may conduct investigations to gather such information, in respect of any matter specified in this Act, as the secretary may desire …

I believe that this is perfectly reasonable and I do not believe that the hon. the Minister really can have any objection to that limitation, which is in fact no limitation if we are to accept the undertaking which the hon. the Minister gave in respect of the previous clause. He said there that the secretary would only act in terms of the provisions of the Act. If we look at the previous clause, the one we have just approved, clause 6, we will find that the secretary may from time to time, in respect of any matter specified in this Act, by notice in writing, demand certain information. All that I am asking now is that the hon. the Minister should put that same provision into clause 7 as he himself has inserted in clause 6. I believe that this is perfectly reasonable and that it does not in any way defeat the intention of the hon. the Minister or the intention of this Parliament with the passing of this Bill. I do not believe that it will hamstring or hinder his inspectors in any way and I believe that it can only do good in that it will go a long way towards gaining the confidence of the people with whom the inspectors are going to be concerned.

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that I must disappoint the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South, but I want to say immediately that I cannot accept his amendment. The hon. member must now give me a chance to explain and not put on a disappointed face, because then I cannot argue with him.

†If the hon. member refers to clause 7 of the Bill, he will find, firstly, that the insertion of the words that he proposes is completely superfluous because it is just a repetition of words that are there already. I will read the clause—

1. (1) Any inspector furnished with inspection authority … may conduct investigations to gather such information as the secretary may desire or to determine whether the provisions of this Act are being or have been complied with …

In other words, the qualification which the hon. member intends to insert is there already. The hon. member wants me to insert the following words in line 49: “in respect of any matter specified in this Act”. I suggest, with due respect, that these words are just a repetition of what is already in clause 7, because the authority which can be given to the inspector must be related to the information which the secretary requires in order to establish whether the provisions of this legislation are being or have been complied with. For that purpose he has the other powers. If I was not sure that what the hon. member wants to insert is there already, I would have accepted his amendment immediately. But I give him the assurance that it is there already.

*We must differentiate between the identification of an inspector and a letter of authority for a specific inspection. I am prepared to consider providing that an inspector carrying out his authority in terms of clause 7 should identify himself on request as being an inspector. I am prepared to do this. Let us now look at what the hon. member for Constantia expects of me. In the first instance the secretary is authorized to obtain certain information in terms of clause 6. Naturally he can only request information which enables him to apply the Act. Therefore the limitation on the information which he can request is imposed by the objectives of the legislation itself, as they are described in the long title, inter alia. We come to clause 7 and define another method by which the secretary may obtain information. The issue here is no longer the extent or the range of the information which he wants to obtain, because this is determined in clause 6. This provision concerns a second method by which he may obtain it. This is by making use of inspectors. The inspector exercises his powers in terms of clause 7 directly under the authority of an instruction by the secretary. Therefore clause 7 says very emphatically that it takes place at the instruction of the secretary. Consequently the problem which hon. members see does not exist. The effectiveness of the legislation depends, in the first instance, on the effectiveness with which the secretary and his staff can gather information.

The second point which I want to make is that the information which they want to gather must refer to practices which are alleged to be undesirable. Therefore to concede on the one hand that in principle there must be legislation to protect the rights of consumers, and the following moment, when it comes to the functional implementation of the authorities granted by the legislation, to impose so many restrictions on the persons who have to enforce the legislation, makes the legislation ineffective and meaningless. Allow me to say—and I do not apologize for it—that this legislation is intended to combat abuses. In addition, I want to point out that the ingenuity of cunning businessmen knows no bounds. This is something which I want to emphasize.

Let us now look specifically at the amendments of the hon. member for Constantia. Before I deal with those amendments in detail, I want to repeat my offer to the hon. members. The hon. member for Constantia argued that when people try to discover other people’s secrets, the possibility exists that people may pose as inspectors or as people with the authority to make inquiries, while they do not have that authority. In this respect I am prepared to meet him. I am prepared to move an amendment in the Other Place myself by means of which occurrences of this type may be prevented. However, I want to qualify this by saying that I shall make an amendment by which an inspector will be forced to identify himself to any business concern as an inspector so that no doubt may arise about the authority upon which such an inspector is acting. In this way, I believe, I would also cover the argument of the hon. member for Berea as far as identification is concerned. However, I cannot accept the arguments of the hon. member for Constantia. Just look at what it means. In his first amendment the hon. member proposes that authority in writing be granted to inspectors by the Secretary for Trade, in accordance with clause 7(1), in respect of the specific business undertaking. Remember, we are inspecting a practice, and if I inspect one trade practice which may possibly be undesirable, I must inspect all other business undertakings which are suspected of engaging in the same sort of practice. It is not practicable for me to give a list to an inspector of all the business undertakings which may be involved. I can only send him to a town with the instruction to inspect all the business undertakings and to establish whether a certain practice is indeed being engaged in. I cannot possibly give him a list of specific business undertakings.

The hon. member asks that I should otherwise give the inspector an authority in writing concerning a specific offence. I want to repeat that when this stage of an inquiry into alleged offences is reached, it becomes a matter for the Police, not for me nor for my department. Therefore I cannot say that I am going to investigate a specific offence. I cannot formulate any offence before I have gathered the necessary information concerning that alleged offence. I really feel that, in the light of the experience which the business community in general has had of my department—and that is that my people do not abuse their powers—as well as in the light of the particular responsibility which we all have to protect people from unscrupulous exploitation, hon. members will agree with me that we must not make these people unable to perform their work. I undertake to ensure that, should it be brought to my attention that any of my people are abusing their powers, I shall be the first to limit their authority. I shall do this by means of legislation, and I believe that hon. members know that my record in this respect is clean.

Yes, but you will not always be there.

When I am no longer there, you may proceed with your amendments. Mr. Chairman, I want to take the matter further. The proposed amendments actually mean that a business undertaking must already have been identified, that an offence must have been identified, and that I must then give a written authority to the inspector to inspect something of which I already know. I cannot do this. It is not possible. Furthermore it means that whenever an inspector has to go and inspect a matter, he must have a warrant in respect of the specific business undertaking where he must conduct his inspection. In my opinion, the amendment as it stands is impracticable. For this reason too I cannot accept it.

However, the hon. member moved a further amendment, namely that on page 9, in clause 7, the following subclause be inserted after subclause (2)—

1. (3) Any inspector referred to in subsection (1) shall, before he exercises or performs any power or function under this Act, produce and exhibit to any person affected thereby, the inspection authority referred to in subsection (1).

This is not only the general inspection authority, the right which an inspector has to make an inspection, but it is the inspection authority which is contained in the first amendment which the hon. member moved. Therefore it is the inspection authority which limits an inspector to the inspection of a specific business undertaking or of a specific offence. I shall read the hon. member’s amendment again—

I cannot accept the amendment in this form. However, allow me to design a method—and I shall submit it to the hon. member for Constantia before I take it to the Other Place—by means of which the identification process may take place. From a practical point of view, and for the reasons which I have advanced here, I cannot accept the amendments of the hon. member for Constantia.

In all reasonableness I grant that a need may arise for a method by which my officials may be identified when requested to do so. I am prepared to make the necessary arrangements for that.

This brings to the amendment of the hon. member for Johannesburg North. He did not move his first amendment. However, I want to refer to the amendment which he did move. The hon. member for Ermelo dealt with the argument quite effectively. The Bill which is before us does not detract from the relationship of confidence between an attorney and his client. Whether this amendment is accepted or not, the legal position remains entirely clear. The hon. member for Ermelo referred to the case of Heimann, Maasdorp and Barker. I am not going to repeat this. It was made very clear in that case that in matters of this type, the usual legal rules must apply. Therefore I can assure the hon. member that it is not necessary to accept this amendment because the position in this connection is not changed by this legislation. An attorney will not be forced to provide information without the agreement of his client. I hope that he will accept this.

Mr. Chairman, I want to put our case in connection with clause 7. Firstly, there must be certain powers given to inspectors so that they may carry out their functions in order to see that the law is obeyed. However, it is equally important to us that the rights of the public should be protected and that there should be no question of excessive authority on the part of inspectors. One of the problems we have with this piece of legislation is that we believe that clause 7 does grant excessive authority. We endeavoured in the Select Committee to have certain amendments accepted, but in each case we were unsuccessful.

I also have a problem in regard to the amendments moved by the hon. member for Wonderboom. I endeavoured to question him about these because I think they need some elucidation. Firstly, he has moved an amendment to delete all the words after the word “purpose” in line 51 up to and including the word “may” in line 54. As a result of that amendment the clause will read as follows—

The deletion of these words and the telescoping of subsections (1) and (2) will mean that the powers, granted in the original subsection (2)—for example, the power under subsection (2)(b) on page 9 of the Bill to inspect anything under this Act for what may be a variety of purposes—are now limited. When the hon. member drafted this amendment, I wonder whether it was his intention to limit the powers which inspectors had over and above the purpose originally envisaged in subsection (1). I doubt that that was his intention. The powers of the inspectors are now going to be limited with respect to other aspects of the Act which, to my mind, are equally important in relation to the collection of information not related to prosecutions. While one is desirous, on the one hand, of limiting powers in the public interest, one is not desirous of limiting powers needed for collecting information which would be necessary in terms of the Act. I would ask the hon. member to very seriously consider withdrawing this amendment because it does not achieved its purpose.

What amendment are you referring to?

I am referring to the first amendment of the hon. member.

I also have a problem with his second amendment. For some reason or other he wants to add the word “manager” to the words “agent or employee”. I have always understood—and I do not think anyone understands it differently—that an employee includes a manager and that a manager is an employee. I really cannot understand why the hon. member wants to do this, unless he now, in accordance with the eiusdem generis rule, wants to limit the meaning of “employee” solely to those individuals in the top employment bracket such as managers. If that is his intention, I think he should tell us. However, I cannot understand why he wants to insert this word at all.

The third point I want to make is that we support amendment No. 1 of the hon. member for Constantia since we moved a similar amendment in the Select Committee. We support this amendment because we believe it is wholly undesirable to have warrants at large. The hon. the Minister made the point that he may want to investigate a whole series of businesses, but that can be specified. What worries us, however, is that an inspector can have a written authority and, as such, can then do anything he likes. He may inspect anything in terms of this authority. Inspection is not limited in any way, as can be seen from clause 7(1) which reads—

determine whether the provisions of this Act are being or have been complied with …

In other words, he can go on a jaunt on his own and decide that he is going to investigate whether the Act has been complied with irrespective of any particular mandate he may have been given. We believe that warrants at large and general warrants are contrary to the traditions of common law and are not desirable in these circumstances.

I now wish to refer to the second amendment. As I see merit in the argument of the hon. the Minister that the authority should rather be produced on demand than before the commencement of the inspection, I move as an amendment—

1. (2) Any inspector referred to in subsection (1) shall on demand exhibit to any person affected by the exercise or performance of any of his powers or functions under this act, the authority referred to in subsection (1).

Unless this clause is amended to make it more acceptable within the basic concepts of the common law, we shall regrettably not be able to accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I was under the impression that the hon. the Minister, in considering the amendment moved by my colleague, the hon. member for Constantia, was prepared to meet him halfway. I thought he was prepared virtually to bring this Bill into line with many of the Acts in which that provision had already been established. However, I ask him to go further than that. If I understand the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville correctly, however, he is virtually reverting to the status quo that exists in the legislation to which I have referred. I would draw the attention of the hon. member for Yeoville to the fact that earlier this session a similar clause was debated. We on these benches then moved an amendment indicating that we felt it was desirable for an inspector to produce his authority, not on demand, but prior to inspection. In that instance we were supported by the hon. member for Bryanston. This was when we were considering the Plant Improvement Bill. He actually spoke in support of our amendment, which was subsequently accepted in the Other Place. With respect to the hon. member for Yeoville, I do not believe this amendment goes far enough. It still leaves a negative situation. I have quoted before what the then hon. Minister of Health said about liking a positive approach. He was all in favour of a person saying:“I am an inspector, this is my authority and I wish to perform certain duties under the Act.” What this hon. Minister wants is for the inspector to arrive, declare himself to be an inspector and then to require the person being inspected virtually to question openly the bona fides of the inspector because, if he has the slightest doubt in his mind, he must ask the inspector for his authority. I believe that is detrimental to human relationships because human beings being what they are, resistance will immediately be built up in the mind of the inspector. His reaction will be: This man does not trust me; he does not trust my bona fides and does not accept me, so I will make things difficult for him; I will therefore use my authority to the full extent permitted by the Act. We on this side of the House therefore ask the hon. the Minister to adopt the spirit of sweet reasonableness which many of his colleagues have adopted, some even during this session, and to bring the provision into line with the provisions in other legislation that has already been accepted.

Mr. Chairman, I must agree entirely with everything my friend, the hon. member for Berea, has said. I want to make an appeal to the hon. the Minister. As he knows, I am a storekeeper. Let us say that a man arrives at my store, a man I have not seen before, and introduces himself as Joe Soap. He may say: “I am an inspector of the Minister of Economic Affairs and I have come to have a look at your place in terms of the Trade Practices Act.” I might reply: “I am very pleased to meet you. How do you do? Have a cup of tea. Tell me where you come from. Have you been in this job long?” In so doing, I shall be trying to ascertain the bona fides of the man who has suddenly appeared and introduced himself as Joe Soap, an inspector of the department—a man I see for the first time. Consider what he can do in terms of the Bill. He can come to my store and demand that I open every package in the shop; he can demand that I produce every book that I have and open it for him to see; he can take goods away; he can demand every invoice I have; and he can demand every copy of every advertisement I have in my shop. Sir, I ask you with tears in my eyes, should we not accept what has been accepted in this House before?

Please, the hon. member must not cry.

Only yesterday we accepted an amendment moved by the hon. the Deputy Minister of Agriculture in the Other Place. Sir, if that doctor, the hon. member for Fauresmith, knew what he was talking about, perhaps we might listen to him. However, he just wants to make a noise. He sits there and “broms” and makes a noise continually so that it is impossible to conduct a reasonable or intellectual debate in this House. What is more, he makes such an unpleasant noise.

Order! The hon. members must stay calm. It is not lunch-time yet.

If that hon. member made a pleasant noise, we might still put up with it. A few days ago we considered the following amendment which was moved by the hon. the Deputy Minister of Agriculture in the Other Place to the Plant Improvement Bill—

What could be more reasonable than such an amendment? If the hon. the Minister does not like the present wording of the amendment, we are prepared to accept an undertaking from him that he will move an amendment along these lines in the Other Place. However, immediately when he introduces the element of the shopkeeper or the person being investigated demanding the inspector’s authority of him, I am afraid we cannot go along with him. I believe it should be on a voluntary basis. My experience is that the inspector arrives and says: “Good afternoon. I am Mr. X. Here is my authority.” In such a case one does not even look at it. I have never looked at such proof. One accepts his bona fides straight away and one replies: “Yes, Mr. X, what can I do to help you?” That is the attitude one immediately adopts, an attitude of co-operation. The hon. the Minister is going to defeat his own ends if the inspector can simply walk in and snoop around without even introducing himself. In terms of the Bill, he need not even say: “I am an inspector of the department.” He can simply walk in, snoop around and demand to see one’s books, etc. without saying a thing.

No, no.

That is what the Bill says. I ask the hon. the Minister to be reasonable and to accept this in order that he may enjoy the co-operation of the people with whom he wishes to deal. I believe that this is reasonable.

If you go about the matter the way the agriculturalists do, you cannot make a mistake.

That is as far as the second amendment is concerned.

Regarding the amendment which I moved, I must draw the attention of the hon. the Minister to the fact that there are two things concerned here. Clause 7(1) lays down that—

He can conduct such investigations with two objects in mind. The first is “to gather such information as the secretary may desire”. In terms of the wording, that is as wide as the world. [Interjections.]

You must read further.

The hon. the Minister refers me to the long title.

I am not referring you to the long title. I am saying that, in quoting clause 7, you should read further.

Yes, that concerns the second object of such an investigation. Let me tell him what it is. As I have said, the first is “to gather such information as the secretary may desire”. The second object is “to determine whether the provisions of this Act are being or have been complied with”. Those are the two functions the inspectors have. As the hon. the Minister knows, my first reaction was to take out the first function and to say that it would be adequate if this were amended to read that “any inspector … may conduct investigations … to determine whether the provisions of this Act are being or have been complied with”. If we follow the hon. the Minister’s argument, the inspector does not need to gather information. However, I accept that the inspector should have to carry out these two functions, viz. to gather information and to determine whether the provisions of the Act are being complied with, but when such an inspector seeks to gather information, he should then be limited to the provisions of the Act. It must not be an unlimited provision. The hon. the Minister referred me to the long title. It simply says that the Bill’s aim is to see that there are not improper trade practices taking place. That is all the long title says. I do not believe that the hon. the Minister is right in his argument. I do not believe either that our amendments are unreasonable or that they will affect the operation of this legislation in any way. I believe that the hon. the Minister should accept our amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I want to repeat that I am not prepared to accept amendments to the legislation that would completely impede its practicability. I have already indicated that I am prepared to introduce an amendment in the Other Place which would provide that the inspector has to identify himself, but I am not prepared to go any further than this. I have said this before, so I do not want to debate this point any further.

†I do not agree with the hon. member for Yeoville that the powers of inspectors are excessive. I should rather suggest that the abuses which we want to deal with are excessive. Therefore I am not going to handicap inspectors or allow them to be handicapped. Let me go further. The powers of inspectors are not excessive and I have certain reasons for saying that. Firstly, they execute those powers in terms of an authority from the Secretary for Commerce. The Secretary for Commerce derives his own powers in terms of clause 6(1) of the Bill. Hon. members agreed to clause 6. In other words, if a limitation had to be placed on the powers of inspectors, a limitation must of necessity also be placed on the powers of the Secretary. If there had to be such a curtailment, hon. members should accordingly have moved an amendment to clause 6.

Clause 6 only deals with their undertaking inspections.

Just a moment. The fact of the matter is that in terms of clause 5 the secretary can delegate certain powers to these inspectors. In terms of clause 6 he has the right to obtain information. Clause 7 does not go beyond a particular point; it merely establishes how information is to be obtained.

[Inaudible.]

Wait a moment. I want to reiterate that I cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member for Constantia because it would mean that in the case of every inspection and every request by an inspector, the inspector not only has to identify himself by producing his authority as an inspector, but must also produce a specific warrant. Secondly, he must have a specific order to investigate a specific business.

*It serves no purpose for hon. members to agree with me on the principle of protection on the one hand and then, when I have to create the mechanism for implementing it, to restrict me to such an extent that I am unable to do it properly. I want to repeat, to make my position quite clear, that I am prepared, not to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville as it stands, but to accept its spirit and to consider, in the light of the request made by the hon. members for Berea and Pietermaritzburg South, whether the authority which the inspector has for acting in that capacity should be produced when he wants to inspect a business. When I have done that, I think we shall have gone far enough.

Mr. Chairman, I want to react very briefly to the hon. the Minister. For him to say that we should have voted against clause 6 … [Interjections.] Clause 6 gives completely different powers. In clause 6 there is no power of entry as there is in clause 7. There is no power of seizure as there is in clause 7. With great respect, the matter is quite different. What the hon. the Minister will not appreciate is that in the first instance the rights to property are sacrosanct. Basically we talk about people’s homes being their castles. It is only when you have valid public reason that you can break those sacrosanct rules and even then there must be safeguards in favour of the public. The difficulty we have with this clause—and we cannot understand why the Minister is so intransigent—is that he refuses to give the safeguards which the public are entitled to when you encroach upon what has from time immemorial been a sacrosanct right. As I said right in the beginning, we accept that there must be powers to inspect, as we accept that there must be the right to obtain information, but we also stand by the fact that when you break into these sacrosanct rights which, as I have said, have been there from time immemorial, the rights of the individual, of the public, are entitled to be safeguarded, and that is what unfortunately this clause does not do.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say as far as my second amendment is concerned, that in view of what the hon. the Minister has undertaken, namely that he will consider an amendment whereby inspectors will identify themselves before making an inspection, I wish to withdraw this amendment.

Agreed to.

Amendment (2), with leave, withdrawn.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. W. T. Webber negatived.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendments (2) to (4) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment moved by Mr. G. H. Waddell negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Clause, as amended, declared agreed to. Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member for Walmer or the hon. member for Yeoville would move the amendment printed in their names on the Order Paper, I should be prepared to accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, as the amendments are identical, it makes no difference who moves. I am very happy that the hon. the Minister has agreed to accept it.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 9:

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that I cannot accept the amendment of which notice has been given on the Order Paper.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), one or more of the following, however expressed, constitute a contravention of the prohibitions therein contained:

1. (a) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, ingredients, quantities, components, uses or benefits that it does not have.
2. (b) A representation that the seller or lessor has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection that he does not have.
3. (c) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style or model if it is not.
4. (d) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease has been used to an extent that is different from the fact.
5. (e) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease is new or Unused if it is not or if it is deteriorated, altered, reconditioned or reclaimed.
6. (f) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease has a particular prior history or usage if it has not.
7. (g) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease is available for a reason that is different from the fact.
8. (h) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease has been made available in accordance with a previous representation if it has not.
9. (i) A representation that the subject of a sale or lease is available, if the seller or lessor has no intention of selling or leasing or otherwise disposing of the subject as represented.
10. (j) A representation that a service, part, replacement or repair is needed if it is not.
11. (k) A representation that the purpose or intent of any solicitation of, or any communication with, a consumer by a seller or lessor is for a purpose or intent different from the fact.
12. (l) A representation that a sale or lease involves or does not involve rights, remedies or obligations, if the representation if false or misleading.
13. (m) A representation such that a consumer might reasonably conclude that the subject of a sale or lease is available in greater quantities than are in fact available from the seller or lessor, unless the limitation of availability represented by the seller or lessor has been given prominence.
14. (n) A representation as to the authority of a salesman, representative, employee or agent to negotiate the final terms of a sale or lease, if the representation is different from the fact.
15. (o) Where an estimate or quotation of the price or rental of a sale or lease is materially less than the price or rental of the sale or lease as subsequently determined or demanded by the seller or lessor, and the seller or lessor has proceeded with his performance of the sale or lease without the express consent of the consumer.
16. (p) The use, in any oral or written representation, of exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, or failure to state a material fact, if the representation is false or misleading.

I believe that this amendment is probably the most important one that I have on the Order Paper in so far as this legislation is concerned. Clause 9 is probably the guts of this whole piece of legislation. It is this clause which makes it an offence to make a false or misleading statement in connection with any advertisement, any sale or any provision of service. I believe that it is this clause that will cover the majority of undesirable trade practices which this Bill is designed to stop. The Bill is primarily aimed at protecting the consumer and where the consumer needs protection most, is in respect of wrong, false or misleading statements, misleading information given in advertisements or given when a sale is made. However, the nature of these offences is so wide that it covers an enormous variety of types of deeds. It covers, for instance, misleading descriptions in mail order catalogues. It covers false claims by secondhand motorcar salesmen. It covers gross exaggeration by encyclopaedia salesmen. It covers gross exaggeration in advertisements of patent medicines and so the variety of possible offences goes on. It is for the reason that the variety of offences is so wide, that this clause has had to be framed in very wide and general terms and in very wide and general wording. I believe that as a result of the generality of the definition of the offence in terms of this clause, it is going to be extremely difficult to prove guilt and to obtain convictions in respect of these proposed offences. At very best, I regard this clause as being a deterrent against the commission of these offences and I sincerely hope that it will be a strong deterrent. However, I believe that this clause would be very much more effective both in proving guilt and as a deterrent against the commission of these offences, if those offences were to be spelt out in more detail than they are at present.

During the recess I had the opportunity of attending a seminar in Toronto on the subject of trade practices. On that occasion I was able to learn what the provinces in Canada were doing in regard to consumer protection and trade practices and I also had the privilege of having discussions with some of the provincial ministers involved. As a result of those discussions, I learnt that the Canadian experience had been that it was very, very necessary, in order to make the legislation effective, to spell out the offences in regard to false and misleading advertising and selling practices. Those offences should be spelt out in detail and one should not rely on a general clause.

The amendment I have moved is an adaption of the British Columbian Trade Practices Act and as hon. members will see, in addition to the general clause, it spells out 16 specific offences. I believe it is very important that this is done. I believe that this is the only way in which we are really going to give teeth to this clause and, as I have said, this clause probably covers the great majority of potential offences to be dealt with by this legislation. It may be argued that there are legal technicalities against the acceptance of this amendment. My colleagues, who are better versed in legal technicalities, will, if necessary, deal with that subject, but I do want to appeal very strongly to the hon. the Minister to give serious consideration to this amendment. I believe that if it is accepted, it will bring about a very great improvement to this legislation. It will give it the necessary teeth both to enable prosecutions to be made in terms of the Act and to make this legislation a far greater deterrent against the commission of offences than it will be as long as the offences are described in terms as general as they are at present.

Mr. Chairman, I have already indicated that I naturally have no objection to the specific offences mentioned by the hon. member in his amendment being regarded as offences. I say this for the sake of the record. Let us look at this clause as it is printed in the Bill. In clause 9(a), (b) and (c) general offences are defined, and I think the hon. member will immediately concede that there is not one specific offence in his amendment which cannot be accommodated under sub-paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

In general terms, yes.

There is not a single offence specified in the hon. member’s amendment which cannot be accommodated as a contravention in terms of the general provisions of clause 9.

*Sir, the fact is that I now have a choice. I can choose between a general provision or a provision mentioning specific offences.

You still have the general provisions in terms of the amendment.

No, I do not. The hon. member for Walmer ought to know that there are restrictions in terms of the legal rules …

No.

The hon. member must please give me a chance. He can argue this point in a little while. Is the hon. member not acquainted with the Interpretation Act?

Of course.

He does not seem to be. The effect of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Constantia is that he wants to add a new subsection (2), providing for specific offences, subject to the general provisions and without prejudicing the generality of the provisions of subsection (1). I want to say at once that the amendment is not acceptable to me for one reason only, i.e. that in terms of the existing legal rules, the eiusdem generis rule, it is a fact that if we were to amend this clause as the hon. member has proposed, the interpretation of the general clause would be limited to offences similar to the specific ones mentioned by him. Therefore I want to repeat that I have no fault to find with any of the specific offences. I think the hon. member will agree with me that there may be other offences in addition to these he has specified which may also have to be prohibited or which could be prohibited. I understand the hon. member’s problem in this connection. It is a fact that if I stick to the general provision, any specific offence which can be accommodated within the general provision can be an offence. However, as soon as a general provision is followed by specific offences, as the hon. member has proposed, the interpretation of the general provision is limited to acts similar to the ones specified. Although I can understand the motive of the hon. member, that—as he puts it—he wants to give teeth to this provision, and although I support him in this, he will understand that it is my duty, in evaluating it, to see whether we would be strengthening or weakening the clause by accepting this amendment. The statement has been made that the proposed amendment would detract from the effectiveness of the provision in the sense—this is what I allege— that the general provisions would have to be interpreted in a restrictive way in accordance with the particulars of the specific provisions. Let us say that my argument is wrong, in the sense that it is not a foregone conclusion that I am right. Let us say that I may be wrong or that it is at least debatable whether I am right or not. The hon. member for Jeppe agrees with me.

I just want to hear what your reason is.

Very well. If there is any doubt, I run the risk of having a court rule against me, do I not? However, this could not happen if I were to retain only the general provision. Surely this is so.

†The position in terms of the law of interpretation is that, when a general provision in an Act is followed by a specific provision, the interpretation of the general provision is limited, under the eiusdem generis rule to those that are related to the specific provisions.

I want to ask the hon. member in all fairness: Why leave this clause, which, as the hon. member correctly says, is the crux of this Bill, in doubt? The best that can be said for the other side of the argument is that there could be doubt. I am prepared to state here and now that all these specific provisions which the hon. member wishes to introduce into the Bill represent for me—as I interpret the general provisions of clause 9—contraventions of clause 9. Therefore it can be accommodated under the general provisions of this clause. I want to ask the hon. member whether he will not agree with the fairness of my point, namely to accept my argument that the general provisions are adequate to cover the specific ones. Why limit the interpretation of the general by the specific? Because that is the law of interpretation.

*Surely we all want to make the ambit of the Act as wide as possible in regard to this aspect. No one would argue about that. Secondly, we want to ensure that there will be no dispute or doubt as to the interpretation of the section, and if we are agreed about that, I cannot accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. the Minister, I want to say, firstly, that we owe a debt of gratitude to the hon. member for Constantia for having taken advantage of an opportunity whilst he was abroad to attend the seminar on trade practices and to acquaint himself with what is going on in other countries, because it is very important, particularly in the law of commerce, that we should learn something from other countries, especially the large countries which are engaged in commerce on a very extensive and vast scale. With regard to what the hon. the Minister has said, I realize the logic of his argument from an interpretation point of view, but on the other hand we have the difficulty that in clauses of such a general nature, the hon. the Minister will find that defences will be put up in the most ingenious manner by that small group of people which he has maintained acts to the detriment of commerce generally. They will use every ingenious form of defence in order to skirt around the general terms of the three paragraphs that make up this provision. When you talk about “false and misleading in material respects”, there is a field that is wide open as to whether it is material or not. I am reading from line 2 on page 11, just to give an example. Just as you might be limiting the scope of the Bill by certain specific provisions, as he himself suggests, so on the other hand the wide scope of the Bill may defeat the objective that we have in mind. When you have an extensive list of this nature, which to a very large extent will cover some of the malpractices that take place, some of the very things that we wish to protect as far as the style of trade practices is concerned, then you have a better chance of taking action. That is why the hon. member talks of giving teeth to the Bill, and why he regards it as so important, because then you have at least a better opportunity to ensure that certainly to a very large extent you will have covered the contraventions that can take place in terms of this statute. Although the hon. the Minister may be technically correct in his argument, in practice this is not necessarily so; and if one becomes almost absolute, thereby avoiding the rule of aude alteram partem, the accused will not be able to put up a reasonable defence at all. Therefore you have both those particular aspects on the wide spectrum. The objective of the hon. member is to ensure that, as far as possible, a large measure of the contraventions will be covered. Whilst I realize that the words “without prejudice to the generality” may be strictly interpreted, because I know the strict interpretation of the courts, I nevertheless do feel that in the case of this particular Bill, the objective that we have in mind is to make a very serious and sincere effort to list the possible contraventions. To that extent I think it will be worth while for the hon. the Minister to consider seriously the acceptance of this amendment.

I do not think that will harm or weaken his case in this matter. I do not think it will actually weaken the effect of the Bill. I do not think it weakens the Bill, because, as I say, it is impossible to make it completely absolute on account of the other difficulty that presents itself immediately. Therefore I believe this is a reasonable amendment. It is obvious that other countries have considered this type of thing, where this question of trade practices has been a worrying problem over a number of years, and it is quite clear that in a large part of the world, this form of risk of limitation is being accepted. To as large an extent as possible at least, we feel it covers the contraventions which flow from this type of Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I have indicated that I do not doubt the sincerity of the hon. member for Constantia, and I would commend him for having spent part of his holiday engaged in the business of this House. There are many people who spend their holidays otherwise, in not such commendable directions.

To whom do you refer?

That hon. member has apparently not been overseas yet. The hon. member has taken his amendment out of the Canadian legislation. He would be the first one to concede that this is not an exhaustive list. I think he will agree, and the hon. member for Jeppe will also agree. Having thus agreed with me in this respect, I want to tell them that I have only two alternatives: Either I have to put in an exhaustive list, or I have to put in a general provision. Those are the two alternatives I have.

Surely, the hon. member will appreciate that, if those are my alternatives, the application of the Bill will be restricted should I accept this amendment. That is the only case I am trying to make out. I do not mean this unkindly to the hon. member for Constantia. I have indicated that I accept his nine specific examples of actions which we want to declare contraventions. However, having conceded that this list is not exhaustive, and also accepting the legal principle in respect of which—as the hon. member for Jeppe says—I am technically correct …

He said you may be technically correct.

All right, I shall give the hon. member the benefit. He said that I may be correct. That means there may be doubt, and once one concedes that there may be doubt, one brings doubt into a measure that should not have been there and one inserted the general provision.

[Inaudible.]

With due respect, what purpose would one serve in this way? We agree with each other that the general provisions as they now stand would cover the specific ones. We also agree that this list is not exhaustive. We certainly agree in terms of the rule of interpretation that when a general provision is followed by a specific one, the generality is limited to things that are similar to specific ones. It is not a matter of disagreement. The hon. member for Jeppe has already conceded that point.

No, he said that the generality …

Just one moment, please.

We do not agree on the third point.

Order!

The hon. member made two points. He said he conceded the logic of my argument.

I think you are misleading yourself.

Just one moment. Must I then accept that only unlogical things are correct? [Interjections.] But he accepts the logic of the argument. He goes even further by saying that I might even technically be right in accepting what the hon. member for East London North has said. Well, just working on these two assumptions, why leave the matter in doubt? I repeat that I am correct in saying that the general provisions would include all the specific provisions and more, but I do not suggest that the hon. member must accept me as an authority on this matter. I do, however, suggest that he accept the authority of the authority, and that is L. C. Steyn in his work, The Law of Interpretation. He will find the relevant passage on page 30. I therefore want to repeat what I have said. We now know some of the specific cases that the hon. member has in mind as constituting contraventions. I agree with him on that. I agree with him that these instances should be regarded as contraventions. I also agree that the list is not exhaustive, but I ask him in all sincerity, having accepted his argument, not to place the provision and its interpretation in doubt because that legal principle of interpretation exists whether we like it or not. I suggest that we are weakening the effect of this provision—even if I am incorrect—by placing the question in doubt.

Mr. Chairman, I understood the hon. the Minister to say, when he first spoke on this clause, that he did not accept the amendment for one specific reason.

I made a note of it. The reason was that the eiusdem generis rule would detract from the effect of the generalities in the clause itself, as printed in the Bill. If, however, I can satisfy the hon. the Minister that the eiusdem generis rule does not apply here, will he then agree to allow the amendment to go through as it stands? I ask the hon. the Minister to look again at what Steyn has to say in Uitleg van Wette and to see if he can find there any decision given in regard to the preamble as set out in the amendment namely “without prejudice to the generalities of the provisions of subsection (1)”. This eliminates completely the operation of the eiusdem generis rule, and I shall tell the hon. the Minister why. This type of clause has been used on many occasions in various other types of legislation. The eiusdem generis rule is used in the interpretation of a statute when there is some confusion as to how it should be interpreted. In this particular amendment, however, it is clearly without prejudice. In other words, what the legislation is saying is that without detracting from the powers of the generalities, the following should also be considered as contravention of the statute in question. I shall give the hon. the Minister an example. Let me refer him to legislation we passed yesterday in connection with Rehoboth self-government. That legislation contained the same type of clause. Let me quote section 39(1) of what is to be the Rehoboth Self-Government Act. It reads as follows—

Now let me quote from section 39(2) which reads as follows—

We then have a whole list of acts or operations which the Minister can carry out without prejudice to the generalities of subsection (1). Let me give the hon. the Minister another example a am now referring to a Bill which is going be discussed tomorrow, the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission Bill. Even in that Bill there is a “without prejudice to the generalities” clause. Let me quote it to him.

What is the point?

It seems to me as if the hon. the Minister does not want to listen very carefully here. Clause 4(1) of the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission Bill states the following—

Then I go on to clause 4(2) which states—

Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), one or more of the following, however expressed, constitute a contravention of the prohibitions therein contained.

My whole point—and I am sorry if the hon. the Minister does not get my point—is that once words are used in legislation clearly depicting the fact that the specific elements are without prejudice to the generalities, the eiusdem generis rule does not apply. To go on from there, the reason why this amendment is being introduced is because of the fact that the general public, on reading the generalities, will certainly have some difficulty in deciding whether any specific act of theirs is, in fact, a contravention of the Bill itself or not. The idea of inserting these specific elements is to elaborate and thereby assist the general public to remain within the confines of the law itself.

This amendment follows the Canadian Act almost exactly, and as the hon. member for Constantia has pointed out, the Canadian Act has proved successful over a period of years. They have generalities as well; they have also got specific elements, which have been slightly amended by the hon. member for Constantia to fit in with this particular Bill itself. The fact that this type of legislation has proved successful in Canada, I believe, should be a factor in allowing the Minister to decide that this is a good amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think the motive behind this amendment is a laudable one. I do not think there is any dispute about that. I also, with respect, agree with the hon. member for East London City on legal grounds because to my knowledge there is an English authority which specifically deals, not with the phrase “without prejudice to the generality” of the provision, but with the phrase “without restricting the generality” of the provision, which in effect is one and the same thing. It has been held in English courts that this excludes the eiusdem generis rule. I must therefore agree with the hon. member for East London City.

However, I have some other problems in relation to this matter, and I should like to list them. Firstly I think there might be a possibility that the public, on reading these specific provisions, may think that this is all that is being legislated against. I think this is a problem that does exist, and one must not create the wrong impression that this is all that is being legislated against.

My second difficulty involves the provision that—

I think that the lawyers in this House will concede that where there is a representation as to authority, then that authority cannot be denied, there will then be an estoppel. This particular paragraph (n) is therefore a complete irrelevancy because, if one represents the authority, one will be estopped in law from denying the authority, and I think the hon. member for East London City will be the first to agree with that in terms of legal interpretation.

Business suspended at 18h30 and resumed at 20h15.

Evening Sitting

The amendment deals with some of the problems which I think will arise from dealing with specific instances of misrepresentation. May I again draw attention to the fact that it is necessary in the proposed amendment, if it were to be accepted, to make it clear that all the alleged representations would be material misrepresentations. Without that serious problems would arise. I do not want to go into details about each of the items which have been listed in the amendment, but I would like to draw attention to comparative law. This amendment has been taken from a Canadian statute and I want to draw attention to the fact that it is not a general practice in all countries that all the specific items are listed. If I may, for example, quote the provision of the German law relating to this. It says that any person who in the course of business activities for purposes of competition, commits acts contrary to honest practices, may be enjoined from completing such acts and held for damages. Here again it is done in broad, and not in specific, terms. I think there is substantial advantage in having a provision in broad terms as opposed to setting out all the details. I am not suggesting that we adopt the German example. I am merely pointing out that the German law does not give specific instances.

In regard to the American statute, there the practice must be misleading or deceptive of the public. Here again it is not specified in detail. So whereas we have no problem in accepting an amendment which sets out details. There are certain essential requirements. In the first place the details must be clearly accurate, so that there is no question of any one of them creating a problem, and secondly, the representations must in each case be material. However, we do feel that the position is covered by the broad section which is presently in the Act, and if there is to be an amendment it will have to be very carefully considered to make sure that the public is not led into the trap of believing that the stipulated instances are the only instances for which they can be prosecuted. So, with respect, while we have no substantial objections to the amendment, in its present form, it would create difficulties.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. the Minister and I are in principle in agreement in regard to the object of the amendment I have moved. The hon. the Minister appreciates that if in addition to the general clauses it is legally possible to include specific clauses, this legislation will have more teeth and will be more enforceable than presently drafted. I appreciate that the Minister has legal difficulties in this respect and that he fears that the specific offences which are enumerated in the amendment I have proposed will, if included in the Bill, destroy the effectiveness of the general clause. Well, I have listened to arguments for and against the Minister’s thinking. The hon. member for East London City was, in my opinion, very convincing in his arguments against it. Since the adjournment I have had the advantage of some very, very sound legal advice, and I would like to put to the Minister a proposal which I feel will satisfy his as well as my difficulty. That is that this whole clause 9 should be redrafted and that the specific offences which I have enumerated in the amendment be included as offences under this clause, but to them should be added as further offences to three general clauses appearing in the Bill as presently drafted. I appreciate the argument raised by the hon. member for Yeoville in regard to the fact that all representations, all false or deceptive representations, should be material. My proposal to the hon. the Minister would be that he should reconsider this whole clause and redraft it to include the amendments I have proposed and the suggestions that have been proposed by the hon. member for Yeoville, retaining, as I have suggested, as additional subsections the three general provisions at present in the Bill. I believe that if he were to accept this, we would be greatly improving this measure, we would be greatly improving the effectiveness of it while at the same time satisfying both sides of the House.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Constantia impressed me. He indicated before we adjourned that he thought that the hon. member for East London City had a very good argument. However, in the adjournment he had the benefit of sound legal advice and now believes that there is an alternative for this clause.

*Sir, let me say immediately that the hon. member for East London City asked whether, if he was able to convince me that my argument in respect of the Interpretation Act was wrong, I would accept it. But he did not convince me, because all he did was to quote other legislation which contains a similar provision. I do not think he will disagree with me when I say that this is not convincing proof. Be that as it may, the point is that hon. members are arguing against each other. What the hon. member for Constantia wants, is specific examples of the offences, but he still wants this to be covered by a general provision. The hon. member for Yeoville said quite rightly that when one reads only the specific examples, it could be regarded as if the general provision does not exist. The fundamental objection I have to the amendment, remains, i.e. that the general provision is qualified by the specific instances. It is possible for the specific instances to be mentioned and then conclude with a general provision. I am quite prepared to give the assurance now that I shall reconsider the provision. However, I am unable to accept the amendment as it reads at present.

Mr. Chairman, again the hon. the Minister has disappointed us. He says that we on this side are arguing against each other. Sir, I do not know how he can say that. Then he goes further and says that the amendment moved by the hon. member for Constantia would have the effect of reducing the generality of the provisions of clause 9. I do not claim to have had the years of experience in the practice of law that the hon. the Minister has had, but I can claim to have had a few years’ experience of interpreting the law from the Bench and I want to say just this to the hon. the Minister, that where we have had provisions like this in the courts, the courts have used such a clause as a guide in determining whether or not an offence was committed. We have in clause 9 a general clause which leaves a large discretion to the court in deciding whether or not certain offences have been committed, whether or not there have been transgressions of a particular Act. All that the hon. member for Constantia is moving here is a list of items which will help the courts in determining whether a particular alleged offence does in fact constitute a transgression of the provisions of clause 9. However, there is another aspect to this and that is where I as a practical trader come in. Today, if I as a trader who has no knowledge of the law were to read clause 9, I would not know exactly what is not allowed and what is allowed.

If you are honest you will know.

With what is the hon. doctor there concerning himself? I do not know why the hon. member for Newcastle is making a noise. Earlier the other doctor …

Order! The hon. member should confine himself to the clause under discussion.

Mr. Chairman, I shall confine myself to the clause. Obviously the hon. member for Newcastle knows nothing about the clause. A trader, a person who can be affected by this Bill when it becomes law, finds some assistance in the form of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Constantia, because the amendment will help him to decide exactly how clause 9 should be interpreted. The hon. the Minister concedes that clause 9 is very wide. It is deliberately framed to cover a wide field. It is like casting a net in the hope of catching something. That is what the hon. the Minister is doing in clause 9 as it reads at the moment. The hon. member for Constantia, however, is saying to the hon. the Minister: “Look, tell those fish that you are looking for, exactly what you are going to do with the net you are casting wide.” I believe that on those two grounds alone the hon. the Minister should at least consider this amendment. He has said that he will consider a similar amendment in the Other Place, but once the Bill has gone from here, we have lost control. I do not think there is any need for the hon. the Minister to consider anything. I believe that what the hon. member for Constantia has placed before the Committee this evening, is what is needed in this Bill. I believe the hon. the Minister should accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South obviously does not agree with the hon. member for Constantia.

Nonsense!

The hon. member for Constantia conceded that it would be better if the specific provision precedés the general provision. He also conceded on that point to the hon. member for Yeoville in that there should be a material misrepresentation of the facts in general. As opposed to that, the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South does not agree with it. I am unable to accept the amendment under these circumstances, and I shall not consider an amendment before the Bill goes to the Other Place either.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 10:

Mr. Chairman, I should like to indicate that I am prepared to accept the five amendments of which the hon. member for Wonderboom gave notice on the Order Paper.

Mr. Chairman, I therefore move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 11, in line 8, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
2. (2) on page 11, in line 10, after “coupon” to insert:

1. (3) on page 11, in line 13, after “sells” to insert “or leases”;
2. (4) on page 11, in line 15, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
3. (5) on page 11, in line 18, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”.

Mr. Chairman, one has no difficulty with amendments Nos. (1), (3), (4), and (5) because they are in accordance with matters which were discussed in the Select Committee. However, one has difficulty with amendment No. (2). I am not sure whether either the mover or the hon. the Minister intended the amendment to have the effect that one will no longer be able to give a trade coupon which can be used in order to get a discount or a benefit on goods. If that is what is intended, then it is quite contrary to what we understood from the hon. the Minister during the Second Reading and it is quite contrary to what the department indicated in its evidence to the Select Committee. With great respect I think that the drafter of this amendment—I do not know whether the hon. member for Wonderboom actually drafted it or whether he has just been put up to this …

What are you insinuating?

I am insinuating nothing. It is very strange that he should move this amendment and I should like to hear from him what he intends by this.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member allowed to insinuate that the amendments moved by the hon. member for Wonderboom are not has own product?

Order! The hon. member for Yeoville may proceed.

Let me read the clause as it will read if the amendment is accepted—

1. (a) in connection with the sale of any goods or the rendering of any service, supply or give, or offer to promise to supply or give, any trade coupon if it is a condition of such trade coupon that the person to whom it is supplied, given, offered or promised, must buy or hire any goods or make use of any service in respect of which he must give any consideration, before he is entitled to receive, or to participate in any competition for, any relevant benefit.

This means in effect that the ordinary coupon that has been given before and in regard to which there has been no problem in using it in order to get a discount on goods or to enter a competition, is now being done away with. What is remarkable is that this is in contradiction to an amendment agreed to by the Select Committee to add para, (i) to clause 11.

Nobody then suggested that that paragraph should be deleted, and the effect is that we are now amending a clause in such a way that it becomes contradictory to another clause. I maintain that such an amendment will be contrary to what the hon. the Minister said during the Second Reading when he indicated what he wanted to achieve. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South spoke at great length about the desirability of having the type of coupon which we are now banning. The hon. the Minister agreed that such coupons should exist. However, now for some reason or another and without explanation, an amendment is moved which completely negates the whole of this principle.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply to the argument raised by the hon. member for Yeoville. On page 13 of the Bill there appears clause 12(i), to which the hon. member for Yeoville referred. According to the legal opinion I obtained, that provision is altogether in conflict with clause 10, because in para, (i) it is specifically laid down that a trade coupon may be issued, while clause 10 lays down that it may only be issued provided no consideration has to be given if someone wants to participate in a competition. All that is being done now, is that another provision is being inserted in clause 10 and when we come to clause 11, it will be moved that para, (i) be deleted. Therefore, what is being envisaged, is to remove the contradiction from the Bill. In terms of clause 10(a) as it will read when the amendment has been accepted, it will not be possible for a trade coupon to be issued if it is issued on condition that the receiver has to give a consideration in order to participate in a competition. It is a fact that clauses 10 and 11(i) are not reconcilable, and the amendment I moved merely intends to remove this contradiction. There is no change in principle embodied in the amendment whatsoever.

Mr. Chairman, I want to furnish hon. members with a supplementary explanation to that furnished by the hon. member for Wonderboom. If the hon. member for Yeoville considers the amendment the hon. member for Wonderboom intends moving on clause 11, he will find that it really amounts to provisions being transferred from a certain clause to another. The provision embodied in his second amendment which the hon. member objected to—the hon. member should just stop shaking his head; he should listen to what I have to say—is really inserted here instead of in clause 11(i), as has been said by the hon. member for Wonderboom. The implication of it is that clause 10(a) now makes it clear that the use of trade coupons is prohibited if it is a condition of the coupon that the holder thereof has to give a consideration in respect of the goods or services before he is entitled to receive, or to participate in any competition for, any relevant benefit. If fact, it only seeks to remove a contradiction which exists at present. In other words, the provision in clause 11(i) will be deleted and inserted in clause 10.

Mr. Chairman, if what the hon. the Minister said were correct, I would have no difficulty with it but unfortunately it is not correct. Any reading of this measure makes it clear that if, for example, one gets a coupon which entitles one to a discount on another purchase one makes, that is now disallowed in terms of the amendment which is being suggested. That is the effect of it. It is no use the hon. the Minister contorting his face, because that will not change the Bill. The Bill will remain the same whatever the shape of his face. It is unfortunately only the amendment that can affect the Bill. With great respect, Sir, in the circumstances this amendment goes contrary to what was said during the Second Reading, it goes contrary to what was decided in the Select Committee. It restricts the availability and use of trade coupons for a purpose which, in fact, everyone has accepted as being quite legitimate. I regret that I cannot support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, as has been pointed out by the hon. member for Yeoville, this is a matter which I discussed with the hon. the Minister at the Second Reading. The hon. the Minister is on record in Hansard as having accepted this very principle to which the hon. member for Yeoville has drawn his attention. The effect of the amendment was pointed out by the hon. member.

If I may be allowed briefly to refer to paragraph (i) of clause 11, one finds that clause 11 deals with exceptions. Certain exceptions are provided for to the generality of clause 10 which, in turn, provides for prohibitions in respect of trade coupons. In terms of paragraph (i), “the supply or giving or the offer of a trade coupon, whether or not it forms part of an advertisement relating to goods or a service”, shall not be construed as an offence. That is why it is placed in clause 11. It is placed there to provide an exception. However, in terms of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Wonderboom, this measure will be taken out of the “exceptions” clause and placed in clause 10 which provides for the prohibitions. Paragraph (a) of clause 10 will accordingly stipulate that no person shall “in connection with the sale of any goods or the rendering or provision of any service, supply or give, or offer or promise to supply or give, any trade coupon if it is a condition of such trade coupon that the person to whom it is supplied, given, etc.” first purchase some goods. This is the very principle I discussed with the hon. the Minister at the Second Reading and he accepted my point when I explained to him what the whole situation was in respect of the Spar Group.

Order! The hon. member is repeating himself. He has said the same thing three times now.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to explain the circumstances in which I believe this exception should be made. I believe it should be allowed when a competition is organized whereby any purchaser of any goods—not specific goods, because I believe that in the case of specific goods the clauses dealing with trade coupons apply—at any time over a specific period receives a coupon which entitles that person to participate in the competition. In such a case an exception should be allowed in terms of this legislation. The hon. the Minister conceded this at the Second Reading, but now this amendment seeks to negate that very provision in spite of the undertaking given by the hon. the Minister.

Mr. Chairman, I think hon. members are seeing ghosts where there is no cemetery. What the amendment amounts to is that coupons may no longer be issued, except under the exceptions laid down in clause 11. It is being made quite clear that a coupon may not be issued as a consideration to be able to participate in a competition. In other words, the objection raised by the hon. member falls away completely, because there is no substantial change of approach. The provision is merely being transferred. Whereas paragraph (i) forms part of clause 11, it implies that trade coupons may in fact be issued, but this is not the case. They may only be issued under the exceptions contained in clause 11.

Amendment (1) agreed to.

Amendment (2) agreed to (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendments (3), (4) and (5) agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 11:

Mr. Chairman, I rise only to indicate that, should they be moved, I shall accept amendments Nos. (1) to (16) proposed by the hon. member for Wonderboom, and that amendments (1) to (5) proposed by the hon. member for Yeoville are not acceptable, also that amendments (1) to (3) proposed by the hon. member for Constantia are not acceptable, and finally, that the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Johannesburg North is not acceptable either.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 11, in line 26, after “distribution” to insert “or leasing”;
2. (2) on page 11, in line 28, after “price” to insert “or rental”;
3. (3) on page 11, in line 29, after “purchaser” to insert “or lessee”;
4. (4) on page 11, in line 32, after “purchaser” to insert “or lessee”;
5. (5) on page 11, in line 35, after “price” to insert “or rental”;
6. (6) on page 11, in line 48, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
7. (7) on page 11, in line 52, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
8. (8) on page 11, in line 54, after “purchaser” to insert “or lessee”;
9. (9) on page 11, in line 60, after “purchased” to insert “or leased”;
10. (10) on page 11, in line 61, after “purchased” to insert “or leased”;
11. (11) on page 11, after “purchased” in lines 63 and 64, to insert “or leased”;
12. (12) on page 13, in line 6, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
13. (13) on page 13, in line 10, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
14. (14) on page 13, in line 18, after “purchaser” to insert “or lessee”;
15. (15) on page 13, in line 23, to omit “by such purchaser” and to substitute:

1. (16) on page 13, to omit paragraph (i).

These amendments are merely consequential to the amendments to clause 10 that have been accepted.

Mr. Chairman, let me first deal with amendment No. 16 moved by the hon. member for Wonderboom. Let us just read what we are deleting from clause 11. As it stands at present, the position is that the provisions of clause 10 shall not be so construed as to prohibit—

This was designed to create the situation that one could enter into a competition and be given a coupon as a result of which one could then be awarded something. That was what this was designed to do and this is what the select committee agreed upon. In terms of the amended clause 10 to which we have just agreed, we now have the situation that no person is allowed, in connection with the sale of any goods, to give any trade coupon if it is a condition of such coupon that before the person concerned is entitled to receive anything, he must purchase goods. If a coupon is given on which goods can be obtained at a discount, how can one get that discount if one never buys any goods? It is ludicrous! Obviously one has to buy goods in order to get the benefit of the discount. That is why amendment No. (16) of the hon. member for Wonderboom is absolutely unacceptable to us.

Mr. Chairman, I now wish to move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 11, to omit paragraph (c) and to substitute the following paragraph:

1. (ii) the supply or giving to any person of a document or token entitling the holder thereof to receive a stated discount on the price to be paid for the rendering or provision of a particular service or after having used a particular service to receive on demand a sum of money bearing a proportion to the price paid for the rendering or provision of such service:

Provided that the proportion, and the person by whom and the place at which such discount will be granted or such sum of money will be paid, shall be clearly set forth on the document or token;

1. (2) On pages 11 and 13, to omit paragraph (e) and to substitute the following paragraph:

1. (e) (i) the supply or giving to any person without consideration of a document or token entitling the holder thereof to receive on demand without payment or other obligation goods or services specified therein;
2. (ii) the supply or giving to a purchaser of any goods, of a document or token entitling the holder thereof to receive on demand, at his option, either a sum of money or goods specified therein:

1. (aa) the goods so claimable have been distributed, imported, produced or manufactured by the distributor, importer, producer or manufacturer of the goods purchased and are of the same kind as the goods purchased or have been manufactured from materials substantially of the same kind as the materials from which the goods purchased were manufactured; and
2. (bb) the person by whom and the place at which such sum of money will be paid or such goods will be delivered, shall be clearly set forth on the document or token;

1. (3) on page 13, in lines 5 and 6, to omit “who sells or supplies goods”;
2. (4) on page 13, to omit all the words after “(e)” in line 8 up to the end of paragraph (f);
3. (5)on page 13, in lines 23 and 24, to omit “to the service rendered or provided to such” and to substitute:

Let me say what the object of these amendments is. The first is that one may give cash tokens which allow a discount or a cash benefit when a purchase is made. If I understood the hon. the Minister correctly—it now appears that perhaps we did not understand him correctly—he indicated in the Second Reading that he had no objection to this. I have outlined the effect of amendment No. (1). That is all that that amendment seeks to achieve. Amendment No. 2 seeks to provide that, instead of merely being able to give goods which one has manufactured oneself and which are of a similar nature, the goods which may be so claimable should be goods which are either distributed, imported, produced or manufactured by the person concerned. In other words, these goods need not be manufactured by that person, and do not need to be identical in form to the goods purchased. This benefit will also be able to be extended to people who import or distribute goods which they have not manufactured themselves.

My third amendment will have the effect which I understood the hon. the Minister wanted to achieve, namely to allow tokens to be supplied to people who could then issue them. In terms of the legislation before us you have to be the manufacturer of the goods in order to be able to supply the tokens. The effect of this amendment is to enable people who are not themselves manufacturers to supply tokens to distributors so that they may in turn issue them. My fourth amendment is consequential upon amendment No. 3.

The fifth amendment is aimed at making provision for a type of business which presently exists, and which we think is quite legitimate. I refer to the practice where you say to a man: “In return for a consideration you will get from us a guarantee to render services.” There seems to be nothing wrong with being able to give such a guarantee. Let us take the case of a motor-car. You get a guarantee not from the supplier of the motor car but from a third party that if there is anything wrong with the car, they will repair it. The effect of the legislation as it reads at present is to exclude that practice. For these reasons I move the amendments standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 11, in line 60, after “purchased”, to insert:

1. (2) on page 11, in line 61, after “purchased”, to insert:

1. (3) on page 13, to omit all the words after “giving” in line 5 up to and including “person” in line 12 and to substitute:

The first amendment relates to clause 11(e)(i) which, as it is framed at present, makes provision for a coupon to be exchanged for goods, provided that those goods have been produced by the same producer who has produced or manufactured the goods purchased, and that they are of the same kind or are made of similar materials. Mr. Chairman, I believe that that provision is far too restrictive. I can see no benefit accruing to the public as a result of such a limited provision. If it could be widened in the way in which I propose in my amendment it should be widened, the public could only benefit. I cannot see that the purpose of the trade coupon provisions in this Bill will in any way be destroyed if this exemption is widened in the manner in which I propose it should be widened. The manner in which I propose it should be widened is that a coupon should be able to be exchanged not only for goods manufactured or produced by the producer of the goods purchased, but also for goods produced or manufactured by an associate or a subsidiary, or for goods especially manufactured for the supplier of the original goods. I can see no harm resulting from this. In fact, the public can only benefit if this provision is widened to that extent. At present, in the light of modem business practice, where many groups are composed of subsidiaries and associates, I think it is only reasonable to include in the exemption goods manufactured by associates or subsidiaries. I go further. I believe that the exemption should also include goods whose use is closely related to the goods originally purchased. For instance, I can see no harm in giving a coupon for shoe polish when you buy a pair of shoes. I can see no harm at all in giving a coupon for a film when you buy a camera. The purpose of my second amendment is to allow the giving of coupons for good which are so closely associated in use to the goods originally purchased.

The third amendment I have moved relates to clause 11(f). This amendment does not change the meaning of the paragraph as it is presently worded, but I believe that as it is worded at present this paragraph repeats itself. The fact that documents or tokens are circumscribed by subpara, (i) of para, (c) and para. (e) renders quite superfluous the wording in para. (f) from “on condition” in line 8 to the end of the paragraph. I therefore propose the deletion of those words.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The intention of the exemptions which are granted in terms of this clause would appear to be to permit the manufacturer of a specific category of goods, or a variety of goods, to issue other goods produced by him at a reduced cost, or at no cost at all, to the purchaser of the original goods. Of course we realize that such a manufacturer or producer of goods cannot supply goods in this way if those goods are produced by another manufacturer, or if they are not of the same kind or of substantially the same material as the original goods purchased. The hon. the Minister is, however, as well aware as I am that there are a number of companies which have subsidiaries, and my amendment attempts to make provision for them. The hon. member for Constantia went further and referred to associates of groups, but my amendment simply refers to a holding company or a subsidiary company. I hope, when the hon. the Minister comes to reply, that he will give us a reason why this provision should not include a reference to a holding company and a subsidiary company.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to say immediately that the hon. members have apparently not understood the meaning of clause 10. The essence of clause 10, which we have accepted, is in fact to impose a ban on trade coupons, except in the case of the exceptions mentioned in clause 11. The whole concept of clause 10 would be destroyed if I were to accept the amendments of the hon. members for Yeoville, Constantia and Johannesburg North, because we should then be making a farce of provisions we have already accepted. The whole idea is that trade coupons may only be accepted in certain exceptional circumstances. Now what is the purpose of the limitation of the use of trade coupons? There is a twofold purpose, Sir. The first is that we should try and limit injudicious purchases by the public, and often, too, by the less informed sections of the public. The second purpose, at which the Trade Coupons Act was aimed, was to prohibit instigated sales. In other words, we want to prevent coupons being issued in advance encouraging people to buy in a shop articles they do not need, for the sake of the benefit of the coupons. With all respect, surely we are making a farce of our support of the principles of this legislation if, by way of exceptions, we want to strip the legislation of its effect completely. Therefore, apart from the detail of the amendments, they all signify an extension of the exceptions to a prohibition we have already accepted. Since all these amendments, except those of the hon. member for Wonderboom, are calculated to extend the effect of the Trade Coupons Act, I am quite prepared to have a look at the provisions of the Trade Coupons Act as contained in this Bill during the recess.

Let us now examine in detail what the hon. members’ amendments involve. I shall begin with the hon. member for Constantia, who moved three amendments. I want to emphasize once again that we are now dealing with exceptions to a principle that we have already accepted, i.e. that the Committee has actually decided against the trade coupon as a method. I do not think there is any dispute about that. The first amendment of the hon. member for Constantia seeks to permit the use of trade coupons, which would then give the holder the right, in exchange for one or more other trade coupons—and I want to emphasize this—to receive goods which have been manufactured by an associate or have been specially manufactured for the supplier of those goods. In other words, the whole limitation to the effect that it should be the same business or that the goods should be more or less the same, falls away. The second amendment of the hon. member for Constantia permits the use of trade coupons and gives the holder the right, in exchange for one or more trade coupons, to receive goods which are directly linked to the use of the purchased goods. In other words—if I may mention an absurd example—if the purchased article were to be a motor-car, then one should also be able to provide petrol. The argument of the hon. members for Yeoville and Johannesburg North is that if one were to sell an aeroplane to someone, one could also give him a motor-car as a present. Then it would surely be an absolute farce still to have limits on trade coupons. As far as the third amendment of the hon. member for Constantia is concerned—and if he does not agree with me, he should tell me where he differs—he wants to permit the use of trade coupons that are sold, supplied or given to a business and which are issued by the business concerned in connection with the sale of goods. These are not the same goods, but goods that are distributed by that specific business. I want to ask the hon. member: If we were to accept that, what then is the purpose of any limitation on the use of trade coupons? It may be—and I want to admit it immediately—that circumstances may exist in which we should consider extending the use of coupons, but I am thoroughly convinced that the Committee Stage is not the place to use exceptions, after we have decided against trade coupons in principle, to render the application of the principle completely ineffective.

The amendment moved by the hon. member for Johannesburg North permits the use of coupons that give the holder the right, in exchange for one or more trade coupons, to receive goods produced by the holder of a subsidiary company or by their own company, regardless of what goods they may be. Once again the limitation on trade coupons falls away completely. This also applies to the amendments of the hon. member for Yeoville. I am prepared to look at this during the recess. In the meantime I cannot accept the amendments, except those that I have indicated.

Mr. Chairman, apart from the amendments which have just been dealt with by the hon. the Minister, there is something else which I think should be said in regard to clause 11, namely that it is the only clause in this Bill which refers to a person as being a purchaser. I believe that this concept is one which rather bedevils the whole thinking on clause 11. It is quite apparent to me that I am not the only one who thinks so, because if one looks at the amendment which has been accepted to clause 10, one will see that the word “purchaser” appears nowhere in it. If one refers to clause 11 (i), which was included by the Select Committee, one will see that the draftsman there also avoided the word “purchaser”. I think the reason is obvious, because “purchaser” as a concept is something quite different from “a person” where it is generally referred to in this Bill. I should like to suggest that wherever the word “purchaser” appears in clause 11, it should be omitted and the word “person” substituted for it. This is going to cause a little difficulty to draft, because some of these clauses do not respond to the deletion or omission of the word “purchaser” and the substitution of the word “person”. I should like to explain to the hon. the Minister the reason why I do not like the word “purchaser”. I think everyone on the Select Committee did not like the word “purchaser” because it implies that it is a person who has purchased, whereas I believe that the whole of this Bill refers to persons generally and not only to persons who have purchased. By putting a definite value on a person who has purchased in clause 11, the effect is to bedevil the actual thinking in regard to that clause.

Hon. members will notice that when we come to clause 1, I have an amendment on the Order Paper suggesting that “purchaser” should include “prospective purchaser”. If the word “purchaser” is removed from clause 11, it is quite obvious that I do not need to move an amendment. The amendment is to get round the difficulty that the word “purchaser” is used in clause 11, whereas if the word “person” had been used in clause 11 throughout, that “person” would obviously include a purchaser and it would also include a prospective purchaser—in fact, anybody who has received a coupon, token or document. I believe one could thereby clear up a great deal of uncertainty about this clause. It caused a lot of unhappiness on the part of a large number of the members of the Select Committee who felt very unhappy about the word “purchaser”. Clause 11 is a graft from the Trade Coupons Act on to this Act. It is a very bad graft, and if it is going to be left like that I do not think it is going to be a good graft at all. I think it is going to wither and die. I would suggest to the hon. the Minister that, although we cannot redraft clause 11 tonight, he gives the matter very serious consideration and comes with a redrafted clause 11 in the Other Place amending the clause in such a way that the word “purchaser” does not appear in any part of the clause.

Just to give an example: We are dealing here with the exceptions to clause 10. Clause 10 does not refer to “purchaser” in any of its subsections, nor does the amendment which we have before us. If we look at the second exemption in clause 11 we find that it refers to the allowance and the discount on the price paid or payable by any purchaser for any goods or to any person for the rendering or provision for any service or the offer to allow any such discount. To my way of thinking it would be very much simpler to interpret this para. (b) if the word “purchaser” is not there at all. The paragraph would then probably read something like this—

In this form it will be a very much simpler matter to interpret than at present. And so one can go through the various subsections. One finds the word “purchaser” in para. (c)(i); also in para. (e) and in para. (h). In subclause (h) it may cause a little difficulty in redrafting because there it refers to “the giving or the offer to any purchaser of goods”. That may require a little ingenuity in drafting, but I suggest that it is not insuperable because one could say “the giving or the offer to any person in relation to the purchase of goods”, or “to any person who makes use of any service of any warranty, etc. ” I do believe that it will improve the Bill immeasurably and it will take the word “purchaser”, which is an encumbrance at the moment, right out of the Bill. This will make for far better interpretation.

Mr. Chairman, when the hon. the Minister rejected the amendments which I had proposed, he indicated that in his opinion, if these amendments were accepted, they would be destroying the effectiveness of the provisions regarding coupons. I asked the hon. the Minister in what way consumers were being harmed by the suggestions contained in my amendments. At present the exemption allows a coupon to be exchanged for goods manufactured by the same manufacturer or producer that are of the same kind and are of the same material. In what way is anyone being harmed by extending that to goods manufactured by associates or subsidiaries of the producer? In what way is anyone being harmed if the goods that can be exchanged for the coupon have an associated use in relation to the goods originally purchased. Surely we are dealing here with a measure which has been designed in the interests of the consumer and if the interests of the consumer are not going to be harmed, but, in fact, can be benefited, why should an amendment such as I have proposed, not be accepted? I would like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to another aspect of clause 11 and that is para, (a). I believe that the interpretation of the English version and the Afrikaans version can lead to some confusion. Para. (a) allows for the payment of commission or remuneration for services, in the English version “to any person engaged in the sale”. The Afrikaans version refers to “iemand wat betrokke is by die verkoop”. To my way of thinking the English version indicates a degree of continuity in rendering the service of selling by any person engaged in the sale, whereas the Afrikaans version also covers a periodic service or an irregular involvement in selling goods or selling a service. I would like to mention a case in point and ask the hon. the Minister for his views on it. He is probably aware that the Automobile Association offers a coupon to a member who enrols another member, a coupon which can be exchanged for a variety of goods. In this case the members who are entitled to receive the coupon, are selling membership only on a periodic basis and not on a regular basis, and it would appear to me that they would be exempted by the Afrikaans version of this paragraph, but not by the English version. I would like to hear the hon. the Minister’s views on that. There is a further point on which I would like clarification and that is in respect of para. (e). I would like to know from the hon. the Minister what the thinking behind this paragraph is. Why is it necessary, when a coupon can be exchanged for goods, to give the option that that coupon can be exchanged for a sum of money? There is no indication of what sum of money it has to be exchanged for and there is no indication that that sum of money must bear any relation to the value of the goods for which the coupon may be exchanged. To me the alternative compulsory cash seems quite pointless, and I would like the hon. the Minister to explain the purpose of providing this cash alternative.

Mr. Chairman, I listened to what the hon. the Minister said earlier and I was particularly interested in the statement he made that he would review the whole trade coupon position during the recess. I wonder whether the hon. the Minister would not consider appointing a committee to hear the trade and to hear businessmen on this subject and to see what can be done to put this matter into a manner which is acceptable to the business community and yet gives effect to what the intentions are of the hon. the Minister and his department. I welcome the fact that he will consider it, but I think that he should have some views of the business community and the public as well on this issue.

The other point which I would like to make is that the hon. the Minister, while he fulminated at some length about the fact that these amendments were designed to destroy his Bill, did not actually deal with individual amendments. I would like to get a specific answer from the hon. the Minister on certain points. In the first instance: It is against the public interests that a third party should be able to give a warranty in respect of goods? In other words, is it wrong, is there any harm that can come to our society if a third party, for example, can give a warranty, a guarantee, in respect of repairs that may be needed to a motor-car?

Is there anything wrong with that? And, if so, what? What is the harm that he is seeking to repair by not agreeing to this type of provision? The third point that I would like to hear him on is: In what respect is there a social harm, or a harm to the business community, if a company can supply tokens to dealers, which they can legitimately issue within the ambit of the restrictive provisos of this Bill, if they are not themselves the manufacturers of the goods? What is the evil that he is seeking to do away with in prohibiting this particular matter? These are the effects of amendments Nos. 1, 3 and 4, which go together with No. 5. As far as amendment No. 2 is concerned, there I can at least see the point of the hon. the Minister’s argument, even though I disagree with it, because there he says: “Well, by allowing you to supply other goods, you are extending the ambit of this Bill. ” Even though I do not agree with him on the merits of it, as far as I am concerned I can at least follow that argument. However, I cannot follow the argument on the other three points, particularly as he did not put forward any argument at all. So, presumably, there is no objection to the type of provisions, even though he said he would not accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to begin with the hon. member for Wynberg. He advanced an argument in connection with an amendment that was not put before us. Actually he argued about his amendment to clause 1. But, in any case, he completely missed the point. The point is that the word “purchaser” is used in order to ensure that the trade coupon will in fact be used in the sale, and not beforehand. This is because elicited sales are just what we want to prohibit. If one were to substitute the word “person” for “purchaser”, the limitation that reads that the trade coupon should be used at the same time as the sale, is destroyed. This, basically, is the difficulty with regard to the definition of “purchaser” as well. The hon. member may disagree with me, but the ratio on the basis of which the word “purchaser” was used, is to be found in that. I believe he will understand the argument in this particular connection.

Now I once again come to the hon. member for Yeoville. He put three questions to me. I should very much like to reply to him, if he would listen.

Order! The hon. member for Yeoville should please listen when the hon. the Minister replies to a question put by him.

Mr. Chairman, now I can understand it. He sits there with the words of clergymen in his ears. Perhaps he needs it. He asked what was wrong with a third person supplying a warranty. My reply to that is that, in the first place, the third person is not a party to the contract.

That does not matter.

That does matter. He should know his rights in this particular context. Here a transaction takes place between a purchaser and a seller, and this involves a contract. The seller in this particular context gives a guarantee from a third person. On what should the purchaser now take steps against the third person?

Look at the contract.

On what grounds? There is no contract between the two of them, except if the one is an agent and the other is not. The hon. member knows that. Let us take the matter further. He asked why the coupon was not exchangeable for cash. I want to know from the hon. member where this is prohibited. As the legislation reads at the moment, no-one is prohibited from exchanging a coupon for cash.

[Inaudible.]

There is no prohibition on the exchange of a coupon for cash.

[Inaudible.]

Oh no, show me the clause prohibiting this. Mr. Chairman, then the hon. member went on to ask me why a dealer—and he used a car dealer as an example—cannot give an indication of who the manufacturer of a product is, except when it is himself. The same reasons apply here. The possibility again exists that the question of the enforceability of the warranty and the question of the benefits of the tokens, may be used to solicit or stimulate sales, i.e. that people who would not otherwise have bought a specific article, are now tempted to do so.

Whereas we now allow trade coupons to be used, we specify that they should be used between the parties involved in the transaction. The people who should be protected by legislation are not the sophisticated people to whom hon. members have referred. The legislation is meant to protect precisely those people who experience problems, in the first place, to enforce their rights, and in the second place, to protect those people who are not able to form an opinion or evaluate the unnecessary offers they sometimes receive. I therefore believe that the hon. members should accept my assurance that I shall investigate the question of trade coupons. The hon. member asked whether we could not appoint a committee to investigate this legislation. This legislation, clauses 10 en 11 included, were drafted in collaboration with organized commerce, with the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and with the Association of Chambers of Commerce.

Amendments (1) to (3) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendments (4) to (7) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendments (8) and (9) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. G. H. Waddell negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendments (10) and (11) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment (3) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment (3) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment (12) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment (4) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendments (13), (14) and (15) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment (5) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment (16) moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 12:

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the first amendment by the hon. member for Wonderboom if he moves it. The second amendment is not acceptable. I accept too the amendment by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South and therefore the amendment by the hon. member for Johannesburg North falls away.

Mr. Chairman, I move the first amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

After further consideration and discussion of the second amendment with the hon. the Minister, and since the amendment of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South is acceptable, I shall not move my second amendment.

Mr. Chairman, it does not surprise me at all that the hon. member for Wonderboom did not move his amendment. However that may be, Mr. Chairman, I now move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The whole object of the amendment I have moved, to regularize my position here, is to remove from this Bill any stigma whatsoever of discrimination. The object is that there should be no discrimination against any business or category of businesses, person or area. The amendment which the hon. member for Wonderboom was to have moved would, in fact, have extended the discrimination provided for in this Bill. I am, however, extremely glad that he has seen the light and that he is a reasonable man. We all know that he is a reasonable man. I am glad to see that he is not prepared to take a backward step and have any hint of discrimination attached to this Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I am under the impression that the hon. the Minister has accepted the amendment of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South, in which case my amendment falls away.

The hon. member is quite right.

Amendments agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 14:

Mr. Chairman, I do not accept the first and second amendments by the hon. member for Wonderboom, but I do accept the amendment by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South which is a consequential amendment. The amendment by the hon. member for Johannesburg North therefore falls away.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

“services” in line 20 up to the end of subsection (2) and to substitute “or advertisements”.

My comments in respect of clause 12 refer here as well.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 15:

Mr. Chairman, I accept the first amendment by the hon. member for Wonderboom and I accept the amendment by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South. The amendment by the hon. member for Johannesburg North therefore falls away.

Mr. Chairman, I move the first amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

There is no need to discuss this any further since the comments previously made are applicable.

Amendments agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 16:

Mr. Chairman, not one of the amendments is acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 17, in line 7, after “1(b)” to insert:

1. (2) on page 17, to add the following subsection at the end of the clause:
2. (5) The Minister may, and if so required by an affected person shall, after the expiry of a period of twelve months of the publication of a notice, request the committee to reconsider any matter contained in a notice published in terms of section 12, 14 or 15, and may, after complying with the provisions of this Act in respect of such matter, publish an amended notice or a withdrawal of the notice.
3. (3) on page 17, to add the following subsection at the end of the clause:
4. (6) Any person aggrieved by the contents of a notice published in the Gazette may appeal against the decision or declaration to the Supreme Court having jurisdiction in the area in which he is a resident.

I now wish to briefly motivate the amendments. The reason for the first amendment is that there must be an opportunity for people who are affected to be heard and represented and for evidence to be tested by cross-examination.

In terms of the second amendment, when an affected person asks the Minister, after a period of 12 months, to reconsider the matter, the committee must be requested to reconsider it because quite obviously a decision may have to be reviewed after a period of time.

The third amendment aims at allowing a person who has been aggrieved by the contents of a notice to appeal against that decision to a court. That is in accordance with the principle we believe in, i.e. that there should be access to the courts. Since there has been comparison with legislation in other countries, may I also now draw some comparisons. In the United States the Federal Trade Commission grants hearings before hearing examiners when there is an appeal to the full commission, and if this is not complied with, judicial proceedings are instituted by the Justice Department of the Federal Courts. This is a precedent we might do well to emulate because they have had considerably more experience in this field than we have in South Africa.

I also want to refer to Germany. In terms of the legislation in Germany, there is a special commercial chamber of the civil courts which is, in fact, established for this purpose. There is then final appeal to five judges of the Bundesgerichtshof, which is their appeal court. It is quite clear that here again access to the courts is granted, thus allowing the courts far greater latitude than we are making provision for here by way of appeal. In Germany the courts themselves decide what should be an honest practice in accordance with their legislation, as interpreted. In our view, therefore, there is an undisputable case to be made out for why access to the courts should not be done away with. The amendments I am moving here contains three fundamental principles. The first is that one does not pass judgment on anyone without giving that person an opportunity to be heard. In terms of the present legislation, however, there is inadequate opportunity for a person to be heard and for evidence to be tested.

The second principle is that once an order has been made, it may be necessary to reconsider it and there is no machinery in this legislation for reconsidering a decision which has been made and which has been running for some period and which may have been found now, due to changed circumstances, to be no longer applicable.

The third principle is that the access to the courts should not be done away with, but should be part of this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to see that the hon. the Minister is prepared to hear me, so that I can have some chance of convincing him that these amendments are acceptable. The first amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper is virtually the same as the first amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, and I am quite prepared to withdraw my amendment in favour of his.

It is not necessary to withdraw the amendment. The hon. member only need not move it, or he can even move the amendment if he wants to. It does not matter.

Then I move the two amendments standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 17, in line 7, after “(1)(b)”, to insert:

1. (2) on page 17, to add the following subsection at the end of the Clause:
2. (5) The Minister may, and if so required by an affected person shall, request the committee to reconsider any matter contained in a notice published in terms of section 12, 14 or 15, and may, after complying with the provisions of this Act in respect of such matter, publish an amended notice or a withdrawal of the notice.

When I spoke on clause 2 of this Bill in regard to the Trade Practices Advisory Committee, I mentioned that there were two facets of this committee in relation to this legislation which were important. The first was its composition, and the second, which is embodied in this clause, is the powers the committee will have and the manner in which it may work. Now as this clause stands at present, when the Minister publishes a notice in respect of clauses 12, 14 or 15, persons affected by that notice may make representations in writing to the committee and the committee, having considered the representations in writing, will make a recommendation to the Minister. I believe that the matters which this committee will consider are of such a complicated and important nature that it is unwise to provide that they should come to a decision only on written representations received. They are going to deal with things like for instance pyramid trading, a very complicated matter. They are going to deal with for instance things such as undue selling pressure, another very complicated matter. I do not believe that it is fair to the people who are going to be restricted in any way as a result of this legislation and I do not believe it is fair to the consuming public that decisions on matters as complicated or as important as these should be taken by a committee on only written representations made to it. It is very necessary for the proper and efficient working of this committee that it should be able to hear witnesses and cross-examine them to get the fullest possible information from the witnesses on the matters which are being discussed.

The second amendment deals with the power of the hon. the Minister to amend or withdraw a notice made in terms of any of the three clauses that I have mentioned. At present no power is provided in this Bill to withdraw or to amend a notice once it has been published. I would submit that in the matters which are to be dealt with by this legislation, we must take account of the dynamics of commerce and industry. Change is something which is inherent in business and legislation of this nature must be flexible enough to allow for notices published in terms of this legislation to be amended, to be changed or to be withdrawn from time to time. That is the object of my second amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have already indicated that the amendments cannot be accepted and I now want to indicate briefly why this is so. Looking at clause 16, one finds that before the Minister can place any notices in the Gazette under clauses 12 and 14, certain requirements must be met. The amendments by the hon. member for Constantia and the first two by the hon. member for Yeoville are in fact the same in principle and I shall therefore deal with them simultaneously. When one looks at amendment No. 1 moved by the hon. member for Constantia, one finds that certain things are envisaged in it. The purpose of the amendment is in fact twofold. In the first place, in terms of the amendment an obligation will be imposed on the advisory committee to take into consideration, in considering the documents submitted to it, representations made to the committee by persons or bodies appearing to it to have or to represent substantial interest in the subject matter of the reference, and to hear the legal representatives of such bodies or persons. Basically, this aim is similar to that of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville. However, the Bill already provides that the interested parties may submit representations to the committee in connection with the provisional notification. They may therefore make representations to the Secretary for Trade and the advisory committee has then, in terms of the existing provisions, to consider the representations of the people which the hon. member wants given a hearing according to his amendment. All the amendment will do in practice is effect a duplication in the process in accordance with which the committee must hear the representations a second time, because provision is already made for interested parties to be permitted to make representations which the committee has then to consider.

In his second amendment the hon. member proposed that a subsection (5) be added at the end of the clause. In terms of the proposed subsection (5), provision will have to be made for the reconsideration of the notice at the request of the Minister if he is requested to do so by an affected person. Virtually the same thing is proposed in the second amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville.

Order! I want to put forward the suggestion that it would be better if the hon. the Minister were to deal with the amendments moved by the hon. member for Yeoville because if they are negatived, the amendments of the hon. member for Constantia will automatically fall away.

I appreciate your suggestion, but in principle the reply to all the amendments is the same. I want to make the point that there is an inherent right in terms of which a notice which has been promulgated may be reviewed from time to time. Since such a position already exists in terms of the legal provisions, the amendments envisaging such a review are unnecessary.

Do you not draw any distinction between written and oral evidence?

I am coming to that. I first want to make the point that provision has already been made in the legislation for the representations that people must be allowed a hearing. If we were to allow a cross-examination to take place when the committee considers the representations, then we should be changing the committee’s function to that of a court of law. In fact the committee does not have such functions.

The committee will have to decide on written evidence.

That is correct.

Why can it not decide on oral evidence?

But if we were to introduce such a principle, we should surely be making the committee a court where people could be subjected to cross-examination. The hon. member is well aware that what is contained in the legislation forms part of our administrative law.

I now come to the third amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville. The hon. member is requesting by means of the amendment that we should accept that certain people affected by a notice be afforded the right to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision or declaration. What “decision or declaration”? Nowhere in the Bill is there reference to a “decision or declaration”. It is therefore not clear to what decision or declaration the hon. member is referring in connection with the clause under discussion. As the hon. member knows, the existing legal provisions already make provision for the circumstances in which an administrative action by any person may be the subject of a court case. Since on the basis of the hon. member’s amendment it is not clear to which decision or declaration he is referring and there is no doubt in law as to the circumstances in which an affected person has the right to go to court about an administrative decision, I am unable to accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal briefly with what the hon. the Minister has said. In so far as amendment (1) is concerned, there is a fundamental difference, as he knows and as everybody else knows, between the right to put up written objection or to make written representations and the right to be heard, i.e. the right to test what is being put before the committee. What is being overlooked in this matter is that the entire existence of a man’s business can be destroyed as a result of an order or a declaration in terms of clause 16. A man can be completely put out of business, but the sole remedy he has in terms of the legislation is that, when he sees a notice in the Gazette, he can put in written representations. He cannot test the allegation, which is being made, that there may be an undesirable practice in his business. We know and the hon. the Minister knows that very often all sorts of representations are put up in writing which persuade people to take certain action, but when one tests the representations by way of cross-examination, one finds that they are of no substance. This is the situation here, because what we are doing, is that we are creating machinery in terms of which the entire existence of a man’s business can be destroyed as a result of a declaration in the Gazette. The hon. the Minister is not even prepared to give the man a chance of testing, by cross-examination, the allegations against him. It is almost like the piece of legislation with which we may be dealing tomorrow because there, too, it is not allowed that allegations be tested. The hon. the Minister knows from his own experience how many times there have been people who, having been prepared to make allegations, fall apart when they are tested by means of skilful cross-examination. When you have a piece of legislation which is as far-reaching as this and you only give a man an opportunity of putting up written representations, I think it is not in accordance with the principles of justice as we see them.

In regard to amendment No. (2), the hon. the Minister says that he has the right to reconsider in any case. I do not think he has that right. The second point is that even if he does have that right, the man who is affected does not have the right to request that his case be reconsidered. In terms of this legislation a man does not have that right. The amendment is aimed at providing such a right so that, after a period of 12 months has expired, a man can come along with the request that the committee reconsider his case. We have chosen 12 months because we do not want frivolous applications every few minutes. Where a man is affected, where he is being put out of business, I think he must be given the opportunity to say that he wants the committee to reconsider his case. The hon. the Minister laughs. He thinks it is very funny, but it is not his business.

No, I am not laughing.

The third amendment relates to the question of an appeal to the courts. The remedy, I believe, is clearly set out in this amendment, but here we differ from the hon. the Minister. In our view you do not lightly take away access to the courts. That is something which we believe in and, indeed, which is fundamental to our belief. Here again a situation is being created where a man can be put out of business and where his livelihood can be destroyed, without him being given the opportunity of having access to the courts. In other countries they have access to the courts. The hon. the Minister says that this is administrative law. Well, you can do anything by an Act of Parliament, but that does not mean it is right. The truth is that people who may be very adversely affected and who can be completely destroyed economically are having their access to the courts removed, and this we cannot go along with.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to support the hon. member for Yeoville’s amendment, which is the same as the first amendment of the hon. member for Constantia. I want to say that it is not simply a question of making written representations. What the hon. members are asking for in their amendments is that bodies—they have in mind representative bodies such as Assocom and the Federated Chamber of Industries—should be given an opportunity to appear and to give verbal evidence, and to cross-examine any witnesses which the committee may decide to call before it, if necessary. That is the point at issue, and that is the difference between what is in the Bill and what is proposed in these amendments.

With regard to the second amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville, to coin a phrase, we in these benches have a problem. I refer to the limitation of 12 months which the hon. member places on this question of review. I really do not know why the hon. member for Yeoville has introduced a time element into his amendment.

It is just to stop frivolous and continuous applications.

Sir, I can see what the hon. member for Yeoville is aiming at, but I think that in his attempt to stop frivolous and continuous applications, as he puts it, he is possibly going to create a genuine hardship in the case of an affected person, who will then have to wait 12 months before he can apply for the decision to be reviewed. I wonder whether the hon. member for Yeoville has perhaps thought of that. Frivolous applications, I can accept, will be a nuisance to the committee, but perhaps some limitation could be placed on this by regulation. I wonder whether the hon. member for Yeoville has really thought of the hardships which could be caused in genuine cases, because in such a genuine case a person would have to wait 12 months before making his application. I wonder whether, in the light of that, the hon. member for Yeoville would not consider withdrawing his amendment in favour of the amendment which has been moved by the hon. member for Constantia, so that in genuine cases persons will have the opportunity of having their cases reconsidered within a period of 12 months.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that the committee represents the very people to whom the hon. member has just referred.

One of them.

No, all of them. I have already accepted the amendment moved by the hon. member for Constantia on the previous clause, and that amendment makes the committee more representative. As a result the committee will represent those interested persons to whom the hon. member referred.

Furthermore I just want to say that there is a fundamental difference between my point of view and that of the hon. member for Yeoville. The fact is that before a final order is made, a provisional notice must first be placed. These people are afforded an opportunity to put their case. However, if we were to abolish these provisions, there would have to be a court case as a result of representations. I am therefore not prepared to accept the hon. member’.s amendment.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz put and the Committee divided:

AYES— 38: Aronson, T.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. L; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Fisher, E.L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

NOES— 77: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Nel, D. J. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Swiegers, J. G.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived and amendment (1) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter dropped.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter put and the Committee divided:

AYES— 38: Aronson, T.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. t; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs, G. F.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.;

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. G. Kingwill.

NOES—79: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. D.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Nel, D. J. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Swiegers, J. G.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Amendment (3) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz put and the Committee divided:

AYES—38: Aronson, T.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs, G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

NOES—79: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Nel, D. J. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Swiegers, J. G.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. G; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—78: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. G.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Nel, D. J. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Swiegers, J. G.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, R. J. van B.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux; N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Basson, J. D. du R; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C.W.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs,G. F.; Kingwill, W. G.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer. Clause agreed to.

Clause 17:

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept amendments 1 and 2 of the hon. member for Wonderboom. I am also prepared to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South. The amendment of the hon. member for Johannesburg North falls away and I do not accept the amendments of the hon. member for Constantia.

Mr. Chairman, I move the first two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 17, in line 27, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
2. (2) on page 17, in line 32, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”.

Mr. Chairman, once again we have a provision in this Bill which provides that the hon. the Minister can discriminate against persons, against businesses and in respect of areas. I am extremely pleased to hear from the hon. the Minister that he will accept the amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper to do away with that discrimination, and I accordingly move my amendment, which reads as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I move the two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 17, to add the following subsection at the end of the Clause:
2. (5) The committee shall make a recommendation referred to in subsection (1) only after having given notice publicly of its intention to do so and after having heard such persons as have indicated their wish to be heard.

1. (1) on page 17, to add the following subsection at the end of the Clause:
2. (6) The secretary may at any time withdraw a notice published under subsection (1).

This is a clause which provides that temporary notices may be published in the Gazette by the hon. the Minister in respect of clauses 12 and 15. Those notices may only be made as a result of a recommendation by the Trade Practices Advisory Committee and the purpose of this clause is to take care of situations where urgent action is deemed necessary. I believe that even where urgent action is necessary, the persons who are going to be affected by that urgent action should have the opportunity of being heard and of making representations to the Trade Practices Advisory Committee before the action is taken which may affect their businesses. I do not believe that the first amendment which I have moved, need unduly delay action being taken, where urgent action is indicated, because in any event the Trade Practices Advisory Committee has to meet to consider what action they should recommend. If they have to meet to consider that action, they can also at the same time hear recommendations from persons affected. As was the case with the previous clause, there is no provision in this clause for withdrawing or for amending any notice made in terms of it. My second amendment allows for that omission to be corrected.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to start with the second amendment of the hon. member for Constantia. He suggests that the secretary should be able to repeal a notice published in terms of subsection (1). There is no need to move such an amendment, since the secretary already has such powers in terms of the existing statutory measures. I hope the hon. member will accept this. As far as his first amendment is concerned, he wants to add, in terms of what he proposes, a new subsection (5) to the existing clause as it stands. The provision the hon. member wants to make in terms of his proposed subsection (5) is that, before the committee makes a recommendation in terms of the subsection, notice of it should be given to the interested parties concerned. I should like to point out to the hon. member that the procedure laid down in clause 17, provides for a provisional notice by the secretary. He should bear in mind that this clause will be used by the secretary under circumstances where there are very clear indications that it is essential to place a provisional limitation upon an activity pending the investigation of the committee. If we were to do what the hon. member is asking for in this particular case, we would never be able to obtain a final order, because then we would be getting an extension of the procedure by means of a provisional order, which would prevent us from eventually publishing a final notice. I should like to assure the hon. member that, from the nature of the case, the Secretary will use these powers when steps have to be taken and when it would otherwise take too long to complete the investigation first. I should like to assure him that we shall not use the clause to prejudice people simply on the basis of rumours.

Mr. Chairman, I find it difficult to see how the procedure contained in my amendment is going to seriously delay the issuing of urgent notices in the Gazette. The urgent notices provided for in this clause can only, in terms of the Bill, be issued after a recommendation has been made by the Trade Practices Advisory Committee. If the Trade Practices Advisory Committee has to meet to consider a matter and to make a recommendation, I do not see why at the same time they should not hear representations from the people that are going to be affected. These people may be seriously affected, even though it is a temporary notice. In a period of six months a business can be very badly injured if a notice has not been properly considered. I appeal to the hon. the Minister to reconsider his attitude towards my first amendment.

Amendments moved by Mr. D. W. Steyn agreed to.

Amendment moved by Mr. W. T. Webber agreed to.

Amendments moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

New clause to follow clause 17:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (a) in writing require the Minister to furnish the reasons for such notice or provisional notice, which shall be furnished within 30 days of such request:
2. (b) appeal to the Supreme Court on motion against the publication of the notice in question, in which case, if such person can prove on a balance of probability that the Minister’s reasons do not represent good and sufficient justification for the notice in question, and that he will be materially prejudiced by such notice, the court may set aside such notice.

Mr. Chairman, there is a fairly general feeling on this side of the House that the procedure in respect of the notices which are covered by the four clauses which have been mentioned, namely clauses 12, 14, 15 and 17, gives a very wide discretion both to the hon. the Minister and to the secretary. Indeed, the discretion given to the hon. the Minister or to the secretary or to those to whom they may delegate those powers, is so wide and so far-reaching that it may have extremely serious effects upon the conduct and profitability of businesses. Obviously, in this respect, we think in particular of the smaller businesses in South Africa. As the hon. member for Yeoville pointed out, the business of an individual could in effect be destroyed.

What is more, the hon. the Minister or the secretary can do so in circumstances in which the individual concerned has no right of access to the courts, and has no right to ask for the reasons in writing. Mr. Chairman, it is for this reason that we have proposed this new clause. It has already been mentioned that the principal objection of the hon. the Minister and of that side of the House is that in certain circumstances it is in their view necessary to act urgently. Therefore an amendment, such as that previously proposed by the hon. member for Constantia, or the one we are proposing, would mitigate against that.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister and members on the other side of the House who were members of the Select Committee, have never given any reason why they need to act so urgently that no person can, upon request, be given reasons in writing as to why he should be put out of business. Secondly, they have given no reason why such a person should not be allowed to appeal to the courts. The hon. member for Yeoville has pointed out that what the hon. the Minister is proposing here does not stand up to what is practised elsewhere in the world, and therefore we look forward to hearing from the hon. the Minister, in the hope that he can convince us, that he will give some reason as to why it is necessary to act so urgently that nobody can be given reasons in writing, and secondly, why it is necessary to act so urgently that nobody can have the right to appeal to the courts, for the hon. the Minister and the secretary are taking the right to put an individual out of business at their discretion.

Mr.Chairman, the amendment proposed by the hon. member, viz. the insertion of a new clause 18, really amounts to the following: The proposed clause provides that any person who is financially affected by a notice published under section 12, 14, 15 or 17 of the Bill may in the first place require the Minister to furnish the reasons for any such notice in writing within 30 days. Secondly, the hon. member’s amendment provides that an appeal can be made to the Supreme Court for the setting aside of a specific notice on the basis that the Minister’s reasons do not represent sufficient justification for the notice in question.

However, in order to evaluate the amendment, we must take note of what the clauses which are referred to in this envisaged amendment, involve. Clause 12 of the Bill provides that the giving or supply of any benefit in connection with the sale or lease of goods or the provision of a service may be prohibited.

In terms of section 14 the Minister may prescribe what information may or may not form part of an advertisement. Clause 15 of the Bill provides that the Minister may prohibit certain trade practices.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.