Mr. Speaker, as regards the business of the House, we shall deal with the Orders of the Day more or less in the order in which they appear on the Order Paper, except that Orders of the Day Nos. 7 and 12 will be moved down to be dealt with later. The hon. the Minister of Finance will deliver his Budget Speech on Wednesday.

Mr. Chairman, when the House adjourned last evening, the hon. member for Houghton had already made the position of these benches clear with regard to clause 5. I now merely want to reaffirm our opposition to this clause, our total rejection of it. I refer specifically to subsections (2) and (3). Clause 5 contains reference to consultation with the Leader of the Opposition and, naturally, I assume that we are talking about the Leader of the Opposition, not necessarily about the hon. member for Groote Schuur. I do not mean anything personal in this. The fact of the matter is that there is a growing tendency on the part of the Government to refer again and again in the case of more and more matters on which information is required, also to the Leader of the Opposition. Mr. Chairman, I shall now give you an example if I may.

The hon. member is not in order at the moment.

Thank you very much, Sir. Then I simply reaffirm that we believe this is the wrong method and that the report should simply be tabled in Parliament. Therefore we strongly oppose this clause.

Amendments moved by the Prime Minister agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

AYES—91: Albettyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, P. W.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treumicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—36: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Pyper, P. A.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and T. G. Hughes.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 6:

Mr. Chairman, this clause can, I think probably be termed the “Beyers Naude clause”, because this clause legalises and covers the loophole in past legislation in terms of which certain persons who refused to give evidence to a committee of the Schlebusch Commission, avoided conviction, for not appearing, on the grounds that the committee of the commission did not have the status or the power to call witnesses. With this provision included here, the punitive provisions which would normally apply to the non-appearance of witnesses before the whole commission, can now be made to apply to the non-appearance of witnesses also before a committee of this commission. It will now become possible to lock up all sorts of people who refuse on the grounds of principle or conscience to appear before this body. The spirit of this clause is typical of the spirit of the Bill and therefore we oppose it in its entirety.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—93: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, P. W.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greef, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P.H.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—36: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Pyper, P. A.; Schwarz, H. H.;Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and T. G. Hughes.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 7:

Mr. Chairman, clause 7 refers to the times and places when and where the commission shall meet under the direction of the chairman. I want to refer back to the remark made by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke yesterday in the debate on this Bill and also the the speech made by the hon. the Prime Minister in his reply. This has direct reference to the type and nature of the commission. The hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke referred to a previous security commission and I want to refer to the rules of that commission as they pertain to this Bill as well, to this new security commission.

Order! The hon. member is not in order now. He cannot discuss those matters which were discussed in the Second Reading. He must confine himself to the details of this clause.

Yes, Sir. To that end then I should like to move the following amendment to this clause—

1. (2) The sittings of the Commission or of a committee shall be held in public.

I believe that in the very nature of the matter, when meetings of a commission of this kind, consisting of politicians only, are held in secret it has a sinister air and breeds suspicion. That is why I refer to the question which was put to me across the floor of the House by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke when he stated that I had appeared before another commission, and I understood that this was not permissible in terms of the rules of that commission. I should like to reply to the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke, who did not say this in the Second Reading, but in the debate on the Committee Stage. He put a question to me, Sir, and, with your permission, I should like to try to respond to that. The way I should like to respond to it is by putting a further question to the hon. the Minister of Public Works and to the hon. the Deputy Minister of the Interior by asking them whether I am not right in saying that according to the rules of the commission, which held its meetings in secret, no one who appeared there as a witness—not on trial, but as a witness— had the right to divulge anything which took place in that commission, it being a secret commission? Sir, may I ask whether I am right in that? [Interjections.] Now, if it is true that no witness who appears—and remember he was not on trial, or at least I understand that I was not on trial—may not divulge anything at all is it right for a member of that commission to divulge anything which takes place in the privacy of that commission? Again I put the question to the hon. the Minister and to the hon. the Deputy Minister.

Where did I do that?

The very fact that yesterday in this House the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke put a question to me in the words “Did you not say”, is divulging information and I say it is a transgression of the rules of the commission.

May I ask the hon. member whether he did not make a statement himself in the Press in which he stated that he had given evidence before the commission?

I can answer that question quite simply, and I think I can call as my witness the hon. the Deputy Minister of the Interior. It was divulged not by me, but by someone who made it quite clear that they had a Press photographer waiting for me to go in and come out of the chamber, by whom I do not know. [Interjections.] I was subpoenaed to appear while I had no desire to appear before that commission, wanting to have nothing to do with it. Sir, I have never divulged any details whatsoever in that Press statement, which I made in consultation with the then chairman of that commission. I think he too can make that clear. I never divulged any information whatsoever. But one of the members of the commission did it. Sir, I say that the whole idea of a commission sitting in secrecy is absolutely wrong. [Interjections.]

May I ask you a question?

I am not prepared to answer any more questions. If that hon. member wants to make any statement, he is allowed to do so at least three times in the Committee Stage, instead of grumbling and mumbling over there. Now, Sir, the point of my amendment is very clear and very simple. It is that I believe that if there is need for this kind of commission, it would do a great deal to dispel the suspicion that is in the minds of many people regarding this kind of commission if its hearings were held in public, so that people can see for themselves what is happening, what kind of questions are being posed and what kind of attitude is at work in that commission.

Mr. Chairman, may I just remind the hon. member for Pinelands—perhaps he has just forgotten about it, I do not know—that it is only common courtesy, when an amendment is moved in this House, to furnish a copy to the person handling the Bill.

I apologize for that.

I wish to refer to the hon. member’s amendment. I wonder if the hon. member has taken the trouble to look at the Commissions Act, 1947? It is not an Act that was passed by this side of the House. It was passed by that side of the House. I presume, however, that he was not a member of the United Party, because I have a suspicion that he is ex-Liberal Party. Be that as it may, however, if the hon. member were to refer to the Commissions Act, 1947, he would find that this clause comes out of that Act. All commissions in South Africa have always operated in terms of section 2 of the Commissions Act. That section reads as follows—

Because all commissions operate in terms of this, and if it were not for the fact that this is a commission specially created by Parliament, this clause would not even have been in the Bill and would, therefore, not have been under discussion at all. However, this provision has been taken over because this commission is a special creation of Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is not the proposed amendment out of order in the sense that the Bill, as it stands, allows the chairman a discretion as to whether evidence should be heard in private or public whereas the proposed amendment seeks to extend the ambit the Bill in that respect?

My ruling is that the amendment is, in fact, in order.

Mr. Chairman, may I firstly react to the comments of the hon. the Prime Minister by making two comments of my own. Firstly, I would formally like to tender our apologies for the fact that the amendments were not put on the Order Paper. This is a particular type of Bill, and as a result particular reasons why that was not done. [Interjections.] Sure, we could have had them on the Order Paper for weeks. However, this is a piece of legislation that is quite out of the ordinary. I do apologize because I think this kind of thing can be inconvenient. I do, however, hope the hon. the Prime Minister understands that in the relevant set of circumstances it was not possible to do what can be done in normal circumstances. [Interjections.] I say that in all good faith. If hon. members do not think that an apology is of any consequence, they are entitled to make whatever noise they want to. [Interjections.]

Order! I think the hon. member has made his point and he must now confine himself to the particulars of the amendment and to the clause.

The second point I want to make relates to the Commissions Act of 1947. Section 4 reads as follows—

With great respect to the hon. the Prime Minister, one of the difficulties is that if the Commissions Act, as he puts it, should apply in these circumstances, why do we have to have this legislation at all? Whatever the hon. the Prime Minister wants to do he could surely do in terms of the Commissions Act. There is nothing he could not do in terms of the Commissions Act. However, this is quite a different piece of legislation for a different purpose and that is why it is necessary to introduce an amendment of this nature. We are entitled to look back into the annals of history to see what has happened. One of the criticisms to which any report can be subjected, whether that criticism is justified or not, is that in reports there is a process of selection. Not everything is included in a report. No one can say that everything was in the first and second interim reports or the final report submitted to Parliament. There is a process of selection, and therefore the validity of any report can be subjected to the criticism of selectivity. I now want to ask the hon. the Prime Minister another question. There was considerable criticism some while back, as I remember it, to the effect that members of this House did not avail themselves of the right to be present when the Select Committee, which later became the Schlebusch Commission, was sitting. I think that is correct. I think that on occasion the hon. the Prime Minister himself has levelled that criticism. Since this is supposed to be a parliamentary commission, where in this legislation is it stated that even a member of Parliament can exercise a right to be present while evidence is given? Does the hon. the Prime Minister not think, since this is a parliamentary commission, that a member of this House should be entitled to attend such hearings? If that is so, why has the fact not been stated in this Bill? I say this because, according to the wording of this Bill, the commission to be established is supposed to be a parliamentary commission. We have been told about other examples throughout the world of commissions investigating matters affecting security, but in many parts of the world—and the hon. the Prime Minister knows this—the hearings are in public and the public may see whether justice is being done or not being done.

However, that is not the case here, although the hon. the Prime Minister knows that this happens in other parts of the world. That is why I am not only asking the hon. the Prime Minister to give consideration to this amendment. If he does not like the amendment in its present form he should consider extending certain rights to members of Parliament to attend the hearings, and one further right, and that is the right of a witness who attends to be allowed, if he so wishes, to publish his own evidence. I say this because I think it is quite wrong, as in the case of the hon. member for Pinelands, for a member of this House to be subjected to all kinds of insinuations by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke and the hon. member for Waterkloof.

What insinuations?

They make all sorts of snide insinuations, but a person is not allowed to publish exactly what he said at the hearing. I believe that right should be given to any witness. It is not a question of matters of State security and that sort of thing. It is a question of a person being allowed to publish the evidence that he himself gave before the commission so that he can be judged on the evidence he actually gave.

Mr.Chairman, in the first place it surprises me that the hon. member for Yeoville should have become over-sensitive about the alleged treatment meted out to the hon. member for Pinelands by hon. members. All I can say to him in that regard is that he must say to the hon. member for Pinelands what Eulenspiegel said of himself:“People hate me, but it’s my own fault.” I am afraid I cannot give him any further assistance. I want to repeat that this clause has been taken over unchanged from the Commission Act. However, there is another clause in the Commission Act as well, to which the hon. member referred. I do not intend—in fact, it has not been embodied in the Bill—to incorporate the other section, section 4 of the Commission Act, for the simple reason that we are dealing here with security. It surprises me that the hon. members who took up the attitude from the outset that they wanted absolutely nothing to do with the Bill, and who moved that the Bill should be read “this day six months” during the Second Reading debate, are now falling over their feet to make so-called improvements to the Bill.

It happens all the time.

This really surprises me. The hon. member referred to the presence of members at the sittings of Select Committees. Even that presence is not absolute. The hon. member will find it in Standing Order No. 176, which reads as follows—

1. (1) No persons other than members of this House shall, except with the concurrence of a select committee, be present during any of the proceedings of such committee.
2. (2) All persons other than members of the committee shall withdraw on being requested by the chairman to do so.

It is a general principle of the Commission Act, after all—the hon. member knows this— that the chairman may allow people to be present if he deems fit. However, I do not intend to dictate to the chairman in this regard and I very definitely do not intend to dictate to him when the security of the State is involved. The security of the State may be just a lot of nonsense to the members of the PRP, but to us on this side it is a serious matter. For that reason I am not prepared to accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we have made it clear through the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that, because our point of view has not been adopted in respect of clause 4, we are against the Bill and will take little part further in the proceedings. [Interjections.] I have expected that reaction. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition’s exact words were: “I doubt whether we will take any further part in the proceedings.” [Interjections.]

Order!

Let us get the facts straight.

We do not mind if you change your mind. [Interjections.]

Whilst we are against this clause, the amendment which has been moved introduces a further dimension. The amendment, as I understand it, is to the effect that it would make it mandatory that all proceedings are to be heard in public. The hon. the Prime Minister referred to the rules relating to sittings of Select Committees and he also referred to the Commissions Act, 1947. He quite correctly pointed out that at sittings of Select Committees the chairman had a discretion as to whether the proceedings should be in public or in camera. Likewise in the Commissions Act, 1947, the relevant provision is contained in section 4 which reads—

This is the point made by the hon. member for Pinelands. But then it goes on to say—

In the case of a commission appointed in terms of the Commissions Act, there is, therefore, by authority of this House a discretion vested in the chairman of such a commission as to whether the proceedings should be in public or in private. That is a point of view which we accept. As has been pointed out, it is the standing rule in respect of Select Committees of this House and it is in the Commissions Act in respect of commissions. However, what we are dealing with in this Bill, although we do not like it, is a hybrid. It is a hybrid body because, if I may say so, it purports to be a commission and yet it consists of members of Parliament. It therefore relates to a Select Committee and to a commission. I had not intended to move any amendment in this regard, but an amendment has been moved by the hon. member for Pinelands. Quite clearly, if one is going to have security matters discussed, you cannot have a rule which makes it mandatory that all the discussions should be in public. It is an absurdity if you are going to have a commission dealing with security, the internal security of the country, and at the same time state that everything that is said and done there, has to be disclosed for the whole world to hear. Unless this is a tongue-in-the-cheek amendment—however, I do not say that it is because I do not believe that he has considered the matter in that light—I feel that if he is serious and genuine in his approach, he would support a further amendment, an amendment in terms of the proviso which I have just read out from the Commissions Act which gives a discretion to the chairman as to whether the proceedings are to be disclosed publicly or whether they are not. I therefore move as a further amendment to the amendment of the hon. member for Pinelands—

Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to deal with the hon. the Prime Minister’s remark. What I find quite remarkable is that the hon. the Prime Minister appears to object that whereas we oppose the Bill in total, we want to discharge our duty as Parliamentarians to effect to it such amendments as we think are necessary and proper.

I did not object at all; I only remarked upon the peculiarity.

It is not a peculiarity because in the case of very many Bills although an amendment was moved in the Second Reading that the Bill be read six months hence, amendments were nevertheless moved during the Committee Stage. I want to make it quite clear, so that there should be no misunderstanding, that this Bill is one to which we object in total. There is no question of our wanting to have this Bill on the Statute Book. However, we have been told by the hon. the Prime Minister that this Bill is going to become law; he is determined that it will become law. As far as we are concerned, we must therefore assume, because he has said so, that it will become law and also, because he has said so, that the commission will function and that people will be called to appear before it. In these circumstances we regard ourselves as having a duty to those people who will be called before the commission, at least to try to get for them the protection to which we believe they are entitled.

We also believe that, whatever our views might be on the Bill as a whole and even though we reject the Bill as a whole, from the public’s point of view we still have to discharge our responsibility to improve the Bill where possible. That is the responsibility members of Parliament have. I hope the hon. the Prime Minister now has our attitude quite clear. Clause by clause, we shall continue to move amendments where we think such amendments are material and important.

I also want to make the point that, with great respect, I am really quite surprised that he should quote only section 2 of the Commissions Act and not section 4 of that Act as well, seeing that that is what we are dealing with.

But I quoted section 4; at least, I referred you to that section.

With great respect, the hon. the Prime Minister has not dealt with the question of whether, if he is in fact relying on the Commissions Act, there is anything which he cannot do in terms of the Commissions Act and for which he now needs this legislation. If there is anything extra he needs, I believe he should tell us what it is.

Order! The hon. member is out of order now. He cannot discuss that point. The Committee is not dealing with that point at the moment.

Sir, if I may, I should like to deal very briefly with the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. I am pleased that he has reacted and has entered this debate. I think he has now appreciated that one cannot simply adopt the attitude that “because you have not agreed to our amendments to clause 4, we are going to wash our hands of the whole thing”,but that one still has a duty to the public. I do not hold it against him that he has entered the debate. On the contrary, I am very pleased that he has followed our good example. Let me go one point further—I think the argument of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana that it may be necessary in certain circumstances to exclude people where it is in the interest of national security, is an argument that has considerable merit in it. I want to make it clear that we will not vote against this further amendment and that we are very pleased that we have at least provoked the United Party into taking some action in regard to this particular matter.

Amendment moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Dr. A. L. Boraine put and the Committee divided:

AYES—36: Aronson. T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

NOES—92: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé’ G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—92: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.;Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—36: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and T. G. Hughes.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the following amendment—

1. (9) Any person who attends any sitting of the Commission or a committee as a witness in terms of a summons or at the request of the chairman, shall be entitled to be represented by counsel or an attorney, who shall be entitled to reexamine such person, and to make objections and submissions on his behalf, and to cross-examine any witness who gives evidence relating to such person in respect of such evidence.

I have already indicated, in the debate on clause 7, that while we object to the Bill, we believe we have a duty to those people who will be summonsed to appear before the commission, to ensure for them the protection to which we believe they are entitled. Sir, I regard this provision as one of the main issues in this Bill. What are the main issues? I want to say that the question of the name of the commission, the history of this matter since 1972, the question of whether this body is to investigate legislation or organizations or individuals, and other matters that have been raised in that connection are not, to my mind, as important as the issues with which I want to deal right now. Let me also make it quite clear that the issue of whether subversion should be fought is not an issue between us and the Government. We agree that in fact subversion should be fought, but we also say that subversion must be fought with the right weapons and we believe that adequate protection under the rule of law must be given.

The issues, as I see them, are firstly, how the alleged subversion is to be investigated; secondly, how the alleged subversion is to be fought; thirdly, how those alleged to be guilty of subversion are to be tried; fourthly, how the guilty are to be punished; fifthly, whether the judgment is to be made by politicians; and sixthly, whether the guilt to be alleged will be by publicity in a commission’s report, admittedly not tested by the rules which are laid down for justice in a criminal court. In this regard I want to say that there is little doubt that despite the fact that the evidence is not tested in such a report, there is no question that a considerable number of people attach weight to the findings of a report of this nature. That has been demonstrated by the report of the Schlebusch Commission. A seventh issue relates to the punitive action to be taken by administrative action as the result of a report. Quite clearly, Sir, we do not approve of this. It has been established beyond all reasonable doubt, as a result of the words of the hon. the Prime Minister himself in the debate yesterday, that administrative restrictions have resulted from this type of report. They resulted, for instance, from the second interim report of the Schlebusch Commission. It is clear, therefore, that all these investigations may also result in administrative action being taken against individuals.

This clause gives the commission in some respects the power, and in other respects also the status, of a court of law. That is sought to be done by subsection (1) of clause 8, which we are now discussing. Secondly, this clause creates an offence which continues, and it allows for repetitive punishment for failure to answer fully and satisfactorily.

Or to appear.

Yes, or even to appear. Thirdly, witnesses can be subpoenaed and can be kept there for a considerable period of time. Now I anticipate that the hon. the Prime Minister may well say that we must look at the Commissions Act. I have looked at the Commissions Act, and although some of the provisions of the Commissions Act are contained in this clause, there are far more provisions in this clause, and they are far more extensive than the provisions which are contained in the Commissions Act of 1947.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to put the case for my amendment, the case for representation. Firstly, if counsel can appear and can actively participate, there is the opportunity to object to inadmissible evidence, because in the case of a commission you are not bound by the rules of evidence. Yet, without having regard to the rules of evidence, there can be a finding in a report which can receive publicity and which can have an effect upon the lives of individuals. Secondly, when a witness gives evidence, there must be the right to reexamine, the right to bring out things which may not have been brought out in the questioning by the commission. That right is an important one. Thirdly, there is the question of drawing attention to privilege when points of privilege do arise. This particular clause, in terms of subsection (8), applies the law relating to privilege to a witness, and here again the services of counsel can be extremely important. The fourth point is that it is sometimes very important that counsel should have the right to address a commission, the right to be able to address argument in order to focus attention on matters which, for his client’s sake, he must focus attention upon. Such arguments could well cause the commission to see the matter in a different light, because they may have had the wrong impression.

The last and fifth point, which is perhaps the most important, is that there must be an opportunity to test evidence by way of cross-examination. This can involve two things. One is that it is necessary that there must be put to a witness whatever there is against him, so that he can explain himself. The other is, where evidence is given and the witness does not know of the evidence. It has been shown again and again that as a result of cross-examination one can show that it is not credible evidence and that it should not have regard to any finding. Without these opportunities to test the situation, any report which is prepared must necessarily be subject to the reservation that it has not had the benefit of having these tests applied to it. Our basic standpoint is that justice has to be done. We believe that the security of the State can be safeguarded and that justice can still be done in these circumstances. We know of history, not only in South Africa, but also in other parts of the world—perhaps one can refer to the famous Dreyfus case which no one in this House need be raw about—where it has been shown how a miscarriage of justice can occur. With great respect, there is no doubt that the findings of a commission are regarded as important in two respects. One is that the public knows about them, because there is a trial where the man is found guilty and it is published that he is alleged to have done something, that he is alleged to have participated in something or that an organization is alleged in some way to have contravened the law or, if it has not contravened the law, has at least indulged in conduct which is reprehensible. The second factor which we cannot ignore, is that there is no doubt that as a result of the findings of these Commissions administrative action of a restrictive nature is taken and, in those circumstances, there should be every opportunity to make quite sure that there is no miscarriage of justice. In these circumstances we moved this amendment which we urge upon the hon. the Prime Minister to accept for the sake of justice.

Mr. Chairman, the position is very clear that when a witness is summoned he, first of all, has the elementary right to refuse to reply to any question which may be incriminatory. This is generally accepted, and it is so prescribed. What I find strange is that the apologists for the subverters proceed from the standpoint that these are accused persons before the commission. Surely there are no accused persons before a commission. No individual is being called because he is being accused of anything. Not even an organization is being called to come and explain something because it is an accused. No accused persons or defendants appear before this commission. This commission simply collects facts. In the process of collecting facts it summons people to appeal before it to furnish information. If any individual appearing before the commission believes that he will or has to give evidence which will incriminate him, he may invoke this right, and that commission cannot force him to testify. Secondly: In the Commissions Act itself it was not found necessary to make provision for the kind of thing to which the hon. member is now referring. What is more: If the hon. member would look at the report of the Select Committee which was presented at the time, he would find that the very first resolution adopted by the committee on 2 March 1972, reads as follows—

I think that that was a sensible resolution which the committee adopted there. I am convinced that no injustice was inflicted by the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission upon any person who appeared before the commission. I am not referring now to the witness of the hon. member for Sandton who contracted a certain type of fever because he had to go and give evidence. This happens in ordinary traffic cases as well. In any case it was an inane story which he came and told here. We find that when the members of Nusas appeared before the committee, they were represented throughout by counsel and attorneys, except for one individual—if I remember correctly what was said here in this House—who did not want representation. I believe that it is necessary for this to be done, and that it will most certainly be done in the case of this commission as well. Under those circumstances I have no intention now of accepting the amendment moved by the hon. member. The hon. member, like myself, is an attorney and he will recall—and this is the same role which he is now playing in this context—how frequently we drew up wills into which we had to write restrictions concerning the surviving spouse and the next day, or the day after, do the opposite when that party thought that he or she might die first. The hon. member wants to impose restrictions on me. He wants to impose restrictions on the commission. This could perhaps be tolerated, but he also wants to impose restrictions on the security of the State, and that, unfortunately, I cannot allow him to do.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Prime Minister has just said that the law of privilege relating to a witness who need not answer a question which is incriminating, in any event applies. I think that is correct, but the situation is that ordinary witnesses, people who are not necessarily legally trained, people who are laymen, may not necessarily know what it is which is incriminating at all. The hon. the Prime Minister has also said that we are not dealing with an accused, but that we are dealing with a witness. However, the situation is very different, because very often the witness becomes the convicted, judging by previous commissions that we have had. Very often the witness, who does not know that he is an accused, is the suspected. Very often it is the witness having given evidence who finds that he or his organization is at the end of the lash. I think that we must realize that this is not an ordinary commission which would run in the normal course of events, but that this is a commission which is aimed at certain people, people as yet unspecified, at certain organizations, also as yet unspecified, and at individuals. We are seeking, not as some people say and as the hon. the Prime Minister has alleged, to protect subverters or communists. We are seeking to protect the rights of an individual in what we are supposed to have in South Africa, namely a free society. The hon. the Prime Minister says that attorneys are allowed into the commission. I find this bald allegation somewhat surprising coming from the hon. the Prime Minister. Surely the hon. the Prime Minister knows that the conduct and the ability of the attorney to act on behalf of his client, within the confines of that commission, is prescribed by the chairman and by the commission itself. He does not have any inherent right of protection of his client. His role, as has been demonstrated in this debate already, is in fact minimal. It is important that the attorney be entitled to protect clients against questions which he considers improper and that he has the right to do this. When I look at this amendment, one of the most vital aspects of it relates to the question of re-examination.

As I have already said, we are not dealing with legally trained people who will appear before the commission, but with ordinary people. These people have no knowledge of the law, and in particular they have no knowledge of the weight of the evidence they give. I am now dealing particularly with the right of re-examination. It is the task of the legal representative to see to it that the commission hearing the case or matter or taking the evidence, has proper evidence before it and that the weight of that evidence is carefully placed before the commission. Obviously an attorney or an advocate cannot change in re-examination the import of totally unfavourable evidence perhaps already given, but through his consultations with his client, through him knowing his client and knowing his client’s case, he will know precisely what it is his client has to say to any commission. He can help the client, who may be nervous and who may not know the value of the evidence. He can help the client to place that evidence in proper perspective.

This Government and the hon. the Prime Minister have been at pains to say that this is not a witch-hunt, that this clause does not mean that it is a witch-hunt. It is being said that the Government is not looking for victims, but for subversion and wants to open up the affairs of certain organizations. If that is the case, why does the Government not allow the proper legal procedure to be applied within this commission? Everyone, regardless of his status, has the right to have his case put as strongly as he can put it and as competently as it can be put through proper representation. I therefore support the amendment. In terms of subsection (4) of the clause it is quite clear, from the Press outside, from the comment in this debate from both the official Opposition and these benches, from the statements made by many organizations throughout the country and leading figures, that this commission which it is proposed to set up, has not the full confidence of this House, has not the full confidence of the electorate, has not the confidence of the non-White and Black population of South Africa and has not the full confidence of the world at large. If the hon. the Prime Minister wants this commission to enjoy at least a semblance of confidence with at least some elements in South Africa, then this subsection should be radically amended. It is one of the reasons for the distaste experienced by all of us for this Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with a subsection of the clause which my hon. colleague has just spoken about, and that is the subsection which refers to people who are summoned to attend and give evidence for the commission. The wording of subsection (4) is if they fail to do so “without sufficient cause” they “shall be guilty of an offence”. I would like to suggest to this Committee that the use of a phrase “sufficient cause” is significant. Section 212 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955, makes it an offence for a witness in a court of law to refuse to testify without, and the words are “just excuse”. I mention the phrase “just excuse” because the phrase, to my way of thinking, preserves a notion of justice and of equity. At least one organization in South Africa, one which is entitled to be taken seriously, is on record as saying that the choice of the phrase that we have here, “sufficient cause” instead of “just cause” is, in fact, designed to avoid notions of equity and to make it absolutely clear that considerations of conscience will not relieve a person from testifying before a commission. I believe that these fears are in fact justified. They have been expressed, and the fact that they have been expressed cannot be argued away. It is a very sad fact. I hope that we are going to get some kind of explanation, because just as there were cases, genuine cases, before the Schlebusch Commission where people for very genuine and sincere reasons of conscience felt that they could not testify, there must be some kind of provision for that as far as the proposed new commission is concerned.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the hon. member for Parktown can imagine where we in South Africa will end up if people who object to testifying before a commission on grounds of conscience, are allowed to do so. The position is that each of the people who refused to testify before the commission, did so because he or she had some conscientious objection, an objection in principle, against it. Not one of them had sufficient and legitimate reason, a reason which has been determined over the years, and centuries to be sufficient reason, in other words, according to due merit. All the people who refused to testify, did so because they had a political objection to the commission. That was all: They had a political objection to the commission. I do not have the particulars before me, but I have a huge file on the whole matter about which the hon. member is now speaking. From the first witness who refused to give evidence to the last, they did so because they had a political objection to the commission, not because they had had objections of merit. In the judgments which were subsequently passed, the courts, too, said that this was insufficient reason. As we know, those people’s appeals were refused. I therefore have no difficulty in understanding why the hon. the Prime Minister says that he cannot even pay any more attention to this son of suggestion. The hon. member should just bear this in mind.

I want to deal with the standpoint adopted by the hon. member for Yeoville, namely that witnesses must be allowed to have legal representation, that witnesses must be subjected to full cross-examination and that the testimony of other witnesses must be available. The hon. member for Sandton took the same attitude, although the hon. member ought to know from personal experience what degree of legal representation witnesses enjoyed before the commission. The hon. member for Pinelands also knows very well, and all the other hon. members of that party know too, that from the first witness who appeared before the Select Committee or commission, every witness who requested it, was entitled to legal representation.

But what did that mean?

In the first instance, every witness was entitled to legal representation.

Could I ask; if it was asked that a document had been presented to the commission, be identified as to its origin, who had written it, what it was all about, etc., was that done?

Mr. Chairman, I am not sure exactly what the hon. member has asked me now. Can he please repeat his question?

Was the attorney before the commission allowed to ask that documents placed before or used in the commission be placed before the witness, read and be identified properly?

Mr. Chairman, I have an idea of what the hon. member is referring to, but naturally after three years one does not remember facts so clearly. In general, however, I want to tell the hon. member that the specific attorney to whom he is now referring had no reason at all to object. Every single witness who wanted a document to be elucidated, was afforded ample opportunity to have it elucidated, whether with the aid of his legal representative, members of the commission or officials assisting the commission.

Was cross-examination permitted?

Mr. Chairman, I should like to set the hon. member’s mind at rest and tell him that there was not a single witness who was not afforded the fullest opportunity …

But what does that mean?

If only the hon. member for Yeoville would be quiet. I am speaking to the hon. member for Sandton. Does the hon. member for Yeoville have no manners? [Interjections.] I want to assure the hon. House—because hon. members are asking about it—that in all these years not a single witness has had any reason to complain that he was not afforded ample opportunity to present his evidence to the best of his ability, in so far as it concerned the identification of documents and the particulars therein.

Mr. Chairman, did the commission allow the right of re-examination of a witness by that witness’ attorney?

No, that was not allowed. This has already been said before. It was not allowed, and for this, too, there were very good reasons. It was also done on very good authority. The hon. member need only read the case of Bell v. Van Rensburg. There he will find all the authority in the world as to why this is not applicable to a commission and why it is not done. The hon. member for Yeoville, too, asked me something. Will he please repeat it?

I wanted to know about cross-examination.

I replied that cross-questioning was not allowed. However, every witness had the fullest right to ask his legal representative …

May I ask you another question?

Just allow me to answer you first as to whether a question which was put, was incriminating or not. Every witness was repeatedly afforded the opportunity to ask his counsel—many of the witnesses were even represented by senior counsel—to ask his attorney if he was obliged to answer a certain question. There were many occasions on which the chairman—the previous chairman or myself—afforded a witness the opportunity of consulting at length with his representative before answering a question. On certain occasions it happened that a witness’ legal representative himself addressed the commission to advance reasons why his client would answer certain questions and not others. I should therefore like to give the assurance that the witness was fully protected in that respect as well.

Would the hon. the Deputy Minister tell us precisely what he means by legal representation? In other words, precisely what does it cover? Does it cover the right to object to evidence? Does it cover the right to address the commission? The hon. the Deputy Minister said it did not cover the right of re-examination and cross-examination. What did it cover other than the right to consult during the proceedings?

Mr. Chairman, the regulations which concern the commission—they are also the regulations to which the hon. the Prime Minister referred in general terms just now—provide inter alia, that a witness who appears before a commission may be assisted by counsel or an attorney, only to the extent to which the chairman allows it. In that degree we, as chairmen of the commission, decided that we were not involved in a court case, neither were we involved in a court case which would continue for years and drag on merely for the sake of the legal representatives who were involved in it. We were there to gather information and submit a report to the State President. After the final report which we would issue, the State President and his representatives could take further action at their own discretion. This is what a commission is all about. I do not think that I have had enough time during my speech to reply to this fully, but if I have an opportunity to speak later on, I shall furnish a comprehensive reply on the authority of the Supreme Court itself. The hon. member is now trying to make out that I am adopting a standpoint which is a personal one. But this standpoint is based on a verdict of the Supreme Court itself, and the hon. member probably knows about the case of Bell v. Van Rensburg, N.O.C.P.A.(1971)(3). He knows all about it, but now he sits there very piously and would like to start a fight here today which may receive outside publicity, concerning his standpoint in this connection. But surely he knows what the Supreme Court said, and not only the Supreme Court, but the Appeal Court too, and even higher courts in England— everything agrees with what has been done here—and if he likes, I can quote it. I should like to refer hon. members to the verdict in the case of Bell v. Van Rensuburg, which was decided in 1971 in the Cape Division of the Supreme Court. I think Mr. Justice Baker was the judge. Mr. Justice Baker was an acting judge at that stage. I refer to page 706. There the hon. judge said the following, inter alia, referring to royal commissions in the United Kingdom—

[Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville. The basic motivation behind this amendment has already been made clear by the hon. member who moved it, but the participation now by the hon. the Deputy Minister of the Interior, I think, gives far better motivation, frankly, than any that we could give as to why this amendment ought to be accepted by the hon. the Prime Minister. We were told by the hon. the Prime Minister, when we moved these amendments and this one in particular, that he was amazed, that it seemed very strange, that we should try to tie the hands of those who work to preserve the security of the country. Sir, we want to stress again that never before was this our intention and it is certainly not our intention now. I would have thought that if the hon. the Prime Minister wants to have this commission and wants to prove to the people of South Africa and, indeed, further afield, that this is a genuine attempt to try to meet the forces of subversion which are operating in South Africa, then he would accept the amendment, for what does this amendment do? It seeks to do only four things. That is what I want to stress: Firstly, that people be represented by counsel or by an attorney. That, we have already heard, is part and parcel of that.

Order! I have heard that argument quite a number of times now.

I accept your ruling, of course, Sir, but unfortunately the hon. members of the Government do not seem to be hearing it. The last thing I want to say, if you will not allow me to make these four points …

I know the hon. member is not a lawyer. Perhaps he should quote some of the Commandments.

I shall, Sir. The commission shall not hear a witness without the right of re-examination of such person. Furthermore, the commission shall not refuse to allow the attorney to make objections and submissions on behalf of his client. The last point is that the commission shall not forbid any cross-examination of the witness who gives evidence relating to such person in respect of such evidence. I am very grateful for your advice, Sir. The other point I want to make in response to the hon. the Deputy Minister, concerns his question about why people should be fearful of appearing before a commission. The fact of the matter is that in the light of the experience we have had since 1972 in this country, and with the commission in the form envisaged, there are people who will be afraid to appear before such a commission because of the very nature and political character of the commission, if for no other.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry the hon. member did not give me a chance to finish what I was saying. However, I intentionally want to have this on record in Hansard. What I said, I merely sketched by way of background. I now want to place the other two relevant portions on record for the benefit of the hon. member for Yeoville. The judge went on to say—

But the judgment of an hon. judge of the Cape Provincial Division is apparently not enough, and I shall therefore refer to what Judge of Appeal Van den Heever said in 1949, also with reference to an investigation by a commission of which he had been the chairman. In that connection the judge said, inter alia—

He then went further, and had this to say—

Then the judge referred again to the legal position in England which is equally applicable in South Africa, as confirmed by our courts. The judge had this to say—

This is the existing practice in the highest authority in the British Empire.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Deputy Minister whether any of the commissions to which those papers refer are likely to give the sort of recommendations that would lead to administrative action being taken against the witnesses concerned? Surely that is the important consideration?

The hon. member knows that we have progressed far beyond that point. We are no longer obsessed by administrative action. We decided the issue a long time ago, i.e. that under this Government the executive in this country will not be bound. This has been made very clear by the hon. the Prime Minister, and I do not want to go into it again. The hon. judge went on to say the following—

And then the judge said—

There is no doubt, therefore, that a commission is not a court of law. A commission is not there to try offenders. A commission is not there to summon offenders to appear before it. A commission is there to collect evidence, or assemble facts and to report to the authority which instructed it to do so. To rule under those circumstances—this has been proved over and over again to be good practice—that the free rules governing the law of evidence and the giving of evidence should not be allowed in cases such as these, appears to my mind to be the correct ruling. I know of other commissions in which this was in fact allowed and then the commissions sat for a period of 18 months, and even for two years. There were accounts totalling as much as R53 000 which had to be paid in respect of attorneys’ fees alone. In whose interests was this? It was a money-making business, and nothing else. We were not prepared to allow money-making by means of this commission. What is more, we were assembling facts in accordance with our terms of reference. This is one of the reasons why the clause is phrased in this way. The assurance which I want to give to this House and hon. members opposite—the hon. member for Sandton and other hon. members are very well aware of this—is that no single witness ever alleged that he did not receive the fairest treatment possible from the chairman and/or the members of the commission and the officials in charge of the leading of evidence. There was not a single one who raised such a complaint.

I had several complaints.

It is very strange that the hon. member who attended sessions of Parliament during the four years over which the commission sat, and who had the public media at her disposal, never, as far as I know, brought a single case to our attention. On the contrary. The hon. member did not even take the trouble to read the reports. Yesterday she said that she had read them, but when did she read them? When reports were being debated she had not read them. The hon. member professes to be the champion for the oppressed in South Africa, but she did not make the accusation she is now making in a single debate in which the reports of the commission were discussed in this House. I challenge the hon. member to furnish the particulars now. What about the public media at her disposal? She has the world Press at her disposal, but she never mentioned her allegation. [Interjections.] This Committee Stage is now being used by the hon. members sitting in that little group there, the PRP, in an attempt to create a public platform for themselves so that the impression can gain ground that they are in fact interested in the security of the State. They want to demonstrate this by opposing one clause after another, despite the fact that they said from the outset that they were not interested in the Bill because of its contents. I cannot give any more assurance than those I have already given.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the arguments advanced by the hon. the Deputy Minister are absolutely ridiculous. In the first place he realizes as much as anybody in this House that witnesses who appear before the commission could find themselves smeared and their characters assassinated in reports or through executive action. This is a fundamental issue which is at stake here. I want to speak to the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville and answer a point which was also put by the hon. the Deputy Minister. He said that the people who had objections on the basis of conscience to appearing as witnesses before the commission, really raised that objection on political grounds. Such a statement is also absolute nonsense. I should like to give one fundamental reason why I believe it is very difficult for anybody of honour and conscience to appear before this commission. A person who appears as a witness before this commission is aware of the fact that, after he has appeared, people will try to smear him and that there will also be attempts at character assassination in the reports. He also knows that executive action is going to be taken. Any person who gives evidence before the commission will realize that the persons against whom he might be giving evidence in the eyes of the commissioners, will have no opportunity whatsoever to test the evidence he has given. He might give his impressions, he might think that he remembers certain incidents and therefore he might give all sorts of things which he believes are facts, but which really are not facts. He may therefore incriminate the people against whom he gives evidence and this may result in those people being reported about in the commission’s report in the way in which those students were reported about in the second interim report. Those persons may then be banned as were those students. The people against whom evidence is given, have no chance at all to challenge any of the evidence which has been put forward. Therefore, if a man appears before the commission as a witness and is questioned about people or about his recollection of the actions of people, he knows that what he says about those people, may be condemning them and they will never have a chance of putting their side of the story, a chance to question any of the evidence or to exonerate themselves from the impression which the commission has formed. I think this is a fundamental reason why anybody in South Africa, if he is a man of conscience, a man of decency, a man who believes in the rule of law, will think very carefully before he gives evidence before the commission.

Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to react to the hon. the Deputy Minister of the Interior because I put a question to him which unfortunately he did not answer. I want to put it very simply to him across the floor of the House that the situation in the Schlebusch Commission, and in what became the Le Grange Commission, was that representation was allowed to the extent that the chairman permitted. I want to ask him to what extent it was permitted …

Order! We are not discussing the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission at this stage. The hon. member must come back to the clause.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Deputy Minister said something and I want to deal with it.

He said that in passing and I am not going to allow the hon. member to debate that.

Then, if the contention is that in respect of this piece of legislation, representation may be allowed to the extent permitted by the chairman of the commission—I want to deal with that, because that is what my amendment deals with—I ask the hon. the Deputy Minister to answer the following questions: Does he think that there should be the right to a legal representative who is there to object to inadmissible evidence? In other words, if a matter is put to the witness, the legal representative must see to it that the witness is faced with admissible evidence and not with inadmissible evidence. I now come to the second question. I have already dealt with it, but will there be the right to allow re-examination so that when a matter has not been clearly put … [Interjections.] No, he said that in the Schlebusch Commission, to which I am not allowed to refer, it was not allowed. I want to know whether it is going to be allowed in this commission. I want to know whether, if a matter is obscure …

Order! The hon. member should put his question to the hon. the Prime Minister and not to the hon. the Deputy Minister.

Mr. Chairman, I shall address my questions to the hon. the Prime Minister and I shall have a secondary request to the hon. the Deputy Minister, if I may, in that sense. If matters are not clear from the evidence and a legal representative is sitting there and realizes that the witness may not have put across the point correctly, will the legal representative then be allowed to reexamine? I now come to the next question. The hon. the Deputy Minister spoke about the witness being allowed to consult his legal adviser as to whether he should or should not answer, but will the legal adviser be allowed to take points of privilege? Will he be allowed to take the point on behalf of his client and not wait for the client to consult him? The client does not know whether he is or is not obliged to answer the question because he does not walk with a book on evidence in his pocket. The next question is whether it will be allowed that argument be addressed to the commissioner on the value to be attached either to the evidence of the witness, or to the matters which arise from it, or to the facts which were put to him. That again is very important.

Lastly, how does the witness know what the evidence against him is …

It is not a question of evidence against him.

Mr. Chairman, with due respect to the hon. the Prime Minister, a finding is made and the commission regards that as a finding of fact. I can quote from the commission’s report to substantiate that. That finding of fact can implicate a person or an organization. It is a finding of fact presented to the public. How does such a person or organization know whether in fact there is evidence against him, evidence which, if he knew of it, he could then rebut? How does he know that, if it is not put to him? How does he know it, if he cannot cross-examine? What value can one attach to a finding of fact when the organization concerned does not get an opportunity of dealing with it?

Why do you not ask for the Appellate Division’s decision?

No, I am dealing with this piece of legislation now. I shall deal with the Appellate Division in a moment. I want to know how, in fact, one can attach value to a finding of fact if these elementary rules, which since time immemorial have been part of the basis on which people are found guilty, whether for punishment purposes or public purposes, are not followed?

I now want to deal with the argument of the hon. the Deputy Minister concerning the Appellate Division and Bell’s case. That was not a laying down of the common law at all, and the hon. the Deputy Minister knows it was a decision which was based on the interpretation of a statute.

Have you not read what the decision was?

Of course I read it, but it does not concern the common law. There is nothing in our common law which relates tc this. As the hon. the Deputy Minister knows—he has the facts in his possession—in Bell’s case the decision rested on the interpretation of the particular statute.

I am saying that the Commissions Act can be used for two purposes. Firstly, it can be used to investigate an issue in respect of which it can determine what is to be done in a particular set of circumstances. An example of this is the commission of inquiry into the position of Coloured people. Secondly, it can be used to appoint a commission which is designed to investigate people and organizations.

The hon. the Prime Minister has repeatedly in this debate and also in his reply to the Second Reading debate made it very clear that the intention behind this piece of legislation is to investigate organizations. That means a finding of fact which relates to people. It is no use coming with that particular decision to which the hon. the Deputy Minister referred or with decisions taken in England; in England they do not take administrative action in times of peace in order to impose restrictions. In wartime, certainly, they had commissions investigating internment, but they do not take such action in times such as these, they do not come to a finding of fact which can result in an organization or people being dealt with in this manner.

Finally, I want to take up the point made by the hon. the Prime Minister in regard to security. Through you, Sir, I want to say to the hon. the Prime Minister that I do not take second place to him or anybody else as regards opposition to subversion. I do not put him ahead of me and I do not take second place to him. [Interjections.] I am sick and tired of the fact that, whenever one has an argument about the merits of a case, he piously concludes his argument by saying: “You are doing something to security.” It is a lot of nonsense! The truth is that we are as much against subversion as he is. [Interjections.] Perhaps we are in many respects more so. Make no mistake about it! However, we believe that, if one is to fight subversion, one must realize that the first thing that the communists want one to do is to ignore the rule of law, because then they have their first weapon against one. We do not want to sacrifice that weapon, which is the strongest weapon democracy has. I think the hon. the Prime Minister is doing a disservice to the country by continually adopting the attitude that he is the only one who is for security, and that everybody else is against it. It is a lot of nonsense, and the sooner the public knows that, the better. The hon. the Prime Minister is sacrificing one of our major weapons against communism and subversion by ignoring the rule of law.

Mr. Chairman, before the hon. member bursts a blood vessel, I think it is time for us to adjourn for lunch.

Business suspended at 12h45 and resumed at 14hl5.

Afternoon Sitting

Mr. Chairman, before business was suspended we had a fit of angry chagrin on the part of the hon. member for Yeoville. I listened to it with amusement because it struck me that that kind of thing sometimes made quite an impression in the provincial council. [Interjections.] May I ask the hon. member for Yeoville to cast his mind back a little way into the past. In the days when he and I were members of the Johannesburg Bar, can he recall who held forth the most eloquently in the common-room on the “rule of law”, on the rights of individuals and of people? Was it not Joe Slovo and Bram Fischer?

Yes, but … [Interjections.]

I am not making any insinuations now. As a matter of fact, I am going to praise the hon. member.

Who is giving the guarantee now, you or I?

I want to praise the hon. member now and tell him that I do not question his patriotism. This has never been on my part. As I sit here and observe the opposite side objectively, I see that the hon. member is meeting with adversity in his party. I am prepared to venture to predict now that the hon. member is going to meet with adversity inter alia because—there are other factors involved—he is too patriotic for people in his party as they see it. It is true. Therefore I am praising the hon. member. [Interjections.] If the effective leader of the Progressive Party has finished gesticulating, I shall proceed with my speech. I want to put a question to the hon. member in all humility. He heard from the hon. the Deputy Minister what was said in regard to this matter in Britain and what was said in South Africa’s inferior courts and in the Appeal Court. He knows that no provision is made for these matters in the Commissions Act. It is established practice that these rules which he now wants written into this Commission, do not exist in any Commissions Act and have never been applicable to any commission. Why does he now want to do this in respect of this commission? Why does he now want to deviate from established practice as far as this commission is concerned? Apart from what the hon. the Deputy Minister said, let me now quote a citation to him from the Bell case. Reference is being made here to the problems which Mr. Justice Diemont experienced in regard to the Langa Commission. You then find the following on page 709 of the 1971 edition of the South African Law Reports, the third volume, and I quote—

This is what Mr. Justice Diemont had already said in regard to the Langa matter. Subsequently a concurring reference was made to what Judge of Appeal Van den Heever had said, and I quote—

A dark room without a candle! Unfortunately this appears to be the position in that party. I now want to put the following question: Why do you want to throw established practice overboard, and why do you now, although you do not do this in regard to any other commission—and there are extremely important matters which are being investigated by commissions—want to afford protection to people who may perhaps,—and I am not putting it any stronger than that—organizations that may perhaps be involved in subversive activities, protection which you do not want to afford the ordinary law-abiding citizen.

May I ask a question?

Yes, with pleasure.

Have there ever been commissions in South Africa before which, as the result of the recommendations of those commissions, banned people or placed them under any kind of restriction? Has there ever been anything of the kind?

This is precisely the confusion in which the hon. member finds himself. People are not restricted because commissions restrict them.

You said so yesterday.

People are restricted because not only does the executive have the power, but also the duty, in terms of a law of Parliament, to do so under given circumstances. That is how simple it is.

You said yesterday, as a result of the accusation …

I have made it very clear now. At that time, when the Nusas leaders were restricted, they were not restricted because the commission restricted them. They were not restricted because the commission recommended that they should be restricted. They were restricted because the Minister of Justice restricted them in terms of his powers.

They were restricted because of the commission’s recommendations.

I am not speaking to the hon. member for Houghton now. ] am speaking to the chicken behind her. [Interjections.] That is how simple it is. It is because of this ambivalence in the hon. member’s mind that the hon. member now adopts the standpoint that if a person appears before the commission, he is guilty. Perhaps he knows more about these people than I do. I do not regard them as being guilty persons simply because they appear there. Nor do I regard an organization which is being investigated as an organization which is before a court of law, for the commission is not a court of law and I see no reason at all for tried practices which have always applied in South Africa, which apply in the Western world, to be thrown overboard now simply in order to write these things into the Commissions Act.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to reply to the hon. the Prime Minister’s statements. I am not a legally trained person, but it does not need a legally trained mind to see the fallacy in the arguments which the hon. the Deputy Minister introduced earlier today when he quoted from cases referring to Royal Commissions and other commissions, which are completely different from the commission which we are setting up today. They are completely different. The other commissions are commissions of inquiry into ad hoc subjects, inquiries such as the Theron Commission and other commissions of that kind. This commission is an inquiry with a view to exposing subversive activities in South Africa and nothing else.

What is wrong with that?

As a result of the investigations of a commission of this kind, recommendations are made. We have before us, as the hon. member for Yeoville has pointed out, the example of the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission which made recommendations, and as a result of those recommendations executive action was taken. The hon. the Prime Minister today tried to get away from that altogether. He says that people are banned, restricted, as a result of the authority held by the hon. the Minister of Justice in terms of the laws of this House. That is his argument. In other words, he tries to divorce entirely the action that was taken by the hon. the Minister of Justice in regard to the students who were named in the Schlebusch Commission’s second interim report. Unless my memory fails me, I seem to recollect that the hon. the Prime Minister stood up in this House—and I shall rapidly do a little research to see whether I am right or not—and announced that such action had been taken following the recommendations of the commission.

That is not so and my Hansard is there for you to see. As a matter of fact, I think the hon. member for Green Point has it with him now. Ask him for it.

I shall have a good look at your Hansard, because it is possible that my memory may be faulty in this regard. [Interjections.] But if it is faulty in that regard, it is certainly not faulty regarding what the hon. the Prime Minister said yesterday in this House. Yesterday in this House he admitted that without any equivocation, and I do not know why now, in order to score a cheap debating point …

That is not so and you know it.

Is it also not so that you admitted it yesterday?

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman: Is the hon. the Prime Minister allowed to say, “That is not so and you know it”?

Order! The hon. the Prime Minister must withdraw those words.

But I did not say she was lying, Sir. I never said that.

What did the hon. Prime Minister say exactly?

He said: “It is not so and you know it”.

Then the hon. member may proceed.

Then I say that it is so and the hon. the Prime Minister knows that it is so. He said it yesterday in this House, and I will prove it to him. The point is that all of us in this House know that this is no ordinary commission. For the hon. the Prime Minister to try to score cheap debating points about this is certainly lowering his status in this House. Let him argue on the merits of the case and let him not try to pretend that the commission which is being set up under this Bill, is anything like the Royal Commissions or any of the other commissions to which the hon. the Deputy Minister referred earlier today.

Amendment put and the Committee divided:

AYES—36: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

NOES—92: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling. J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.;Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—92: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—36: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and T. G. Hughes.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 9:

Mr. Chairman, just before I come to my amendment, I first want to say something about the United Party. It is very clear that in this Committee Stage the United Party simply …

Order! The hon. member must return to a discussion of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I shall return to the clause in a moment. First I just want to say that … [Interjections.]

First move the amendment!

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper.

It is not necessary for the hon. member to withdraw it. He need only refrain from moving the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to advance reasons to explain why I believed in the first place that I should in fact move the amendment. In the second place, I want to say why I now believe that it has become necessary for me to withdraw the amendment.

The amendment is not under discussion at all until it has been moved. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I shall move the amendment and then withdraw it. Would that be in order?

The hon. member may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that this amendment was necessary because, in the first place, there is a similarly worded provision in the Commissions Act of 1947. In the Commissions Act however, it was something which could be regulated by the Governor-General or the State President by way of regulation. The Commissions Act served as the model on which the Bill which is before us today was based. Apart from that it was also contained in this way in the regulations which were promulgated with regard to the Schlebusch Commissions as we know it. I believe that the commission which is now to be established should in fact enjoy the same protection which other commissions of the same nature enjoyed in the past. I believe, however, that time will tell whether this measure with regard to this specific commission as such is necessary. Therefore I am not moving the amendment at this stage.

The reason for that is that, as was originally foreseen, this commission would be a commission which would consist of members of both the governing party as well as the official Opposition Party. But now the official Opposition has, however, allowed the Progressive Party to make a lackey of it. Yesterday we in this House expected no one to be sitting in the Official Opposition benches today, because the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said in his speech yesterday—as it was reported in the unrevised copy of Hansard—that—

Order! It is my task to apply the rules of this hon. Committee and I am not going to allow the hon. member to elaborate on that. If I did so I would also have to allow other hon. members to reply to it. That would lead to a discussion ad infinitum.

Mr. Chairman, I am not proceeding with my amendment because the official Opposition is not prepared to do its duty with regard to legislation …

Order! The clause has no bearing whatsoever on that.

Mr. Chairman, it is very clear to me that if this amendment were accepted the opportunity would be created in future to draw poison from such a provision. I believe that this process has already begun in this party directly in front of me. They will draw poison from this provision. They will say that it is a measure to protect a one party commission. Therefore I am not proceeding with my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, needless to say, I had a good argument against the hon. member’s amendment, but since he has seen fit not to move it, it is unnecessary for me to argue against it. I have no doubt, however, that the same thing will happen in the case of this commission that happened in the case of the Schlebusch Commission. At some stage or another the commissioners will go running along to the hon. the Prime Minister, not laughing sycophantically as they have done every five minutes this afternoon, but begging for his protection.

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the word “psychopath”. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I used the word “sycophantically,” which means “lavishing praise on somebody”.

Order! I find it very difficult to follow the hon. member, because her voice is of a tone which I just cannot follow from this Chair. I find it rather difficult.

I shall try and lower it, Sir. [Interjections.] Sir, I have to pitch my voice high on account of the fact that there is so much disturbance around me. If everybody was quiet, I would talk at this level and you would hear me very easily. “Sycophantically” simply means “lavishing praise on somebody”.

Now I can follow the hon. member.

Thank you, Sir. As I was saying, I have no doubt that at some future time the hon. members who are going to be appointed to the commission—and I do not think the hon. the Prime Minister is going to have any difficulties in finding members for that commission … [Interjections.]

Where does that stand in the clause?

I am coming to it. Just be patient. The hon. the Prime Minister must just be patient and I shall also give him the reference to what he said about the banning of the students in 1973. That is not relevant to this clause, but it is to another one. Sooner or later, I have no doubt whatsoever, the members to be appointed will ask for the hon. the Prime Minister’s protection because, as the hon. member for Waterkloof has rightly anticipated, we are going to say some very unpleasant things about the commission and about the commissioners.

You have done so for four years.

Yes, and we did so for very good reason. And so, I realize that we are going to have this amendment which the hon. member does not see fit to introduce now; we shall have it introduced by way of a regulation by the State President. Anyway, as we have done in respect of the other clauses, we shall oppose this clause, since it is part and parcel of a Bill which we reject in its entirety.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—92: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—36: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Clause agreed to.

Clause 10:

Mr. Chairman, there are two reasons why we shall vote against this clause. The first is of course because we are completely opposed to the Bill in its entirety. The second reason is because it has now become very clear that the proposed commission will be nothing but a one-party political commission, and because we do not want the Public Service to be involved in it—because it is a political matter—we are going to vote against this clause.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—93: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: N. F. Treurnicht, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—37: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, G W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Clause agreed to.

Clause 11:

Mr. Chairman, our repugnance to this Bill extends to each and every one of its clauses, and it is therefore our intention to vote against this clause as well.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—92: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—37: Aronson, T.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Clause agreed to.

Clause 12:

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the following amendment—

Order! I shall consider the hon. member’s amendment. In the meantime he may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, the situation is—and I do not want any wrong impression created—that at present in terms of the Bill there is no power to convict, to impose a penalty, to restrict a person or to prevent any publication. I think it was the hon. member for Bezuidenhout who suggested that there was in fact the creation of an offence and the ability to punish in terms of this Bill. That is not so. It is quite clear that the Bill itself does not contain an express power to do this. However, we know, and I have indicated …

Order! At this stage I must interrupt the hon. member. That amendment is in conflict with clause 4, which has already been accepted by this Committee. I accordingly rule it out of order.

Sir, will you not allow me to address you on this subject before you rule it out of order?

No; the hon. member may address me on a point of order, but not on that amendment.

Sir, on a point of order, in terms of clause 4, which has been accepted, the commission shall investigate matters which, in the opinion of the State President, affect internal security and which are referred to it by the State President. In other words, all that is given in terms of clause 4(1) is a power to investigate …

And report.

Yes, and report. Nobody is arguing about reporting. Then, subsection (2) states—

In other words, nowhere in clause 4 is there the slightest reference to a power to convict, a power to impose a penalty, a power to restrict or a power to prevent a publication. All that is given is a power to investigate and report …

Order! The amendment is not in order.

With respect, Sir, may I ask why?

I have given my ruling. It is not necessary for me to give the hon. member reasons.

Mr. Chairman, as far as this clause is concerned, you will allow me to make it very clear that the elucidation which the hon. member gave before you ruled him out of order—I do not want to say that the hon. member did it deliberately—is going to create a false impression outside, for in law the position is, and the hon. member ought to know it, that this commission has no power to pass judgment on anyone. This commission has no power to restrict anyone. The State President cannot give a commission such a right, even if he wanted to. He cannot exceed the provisions of this legislation to give it such terms of reference. If it were otherwise it would surely have resulted in the most absurd position imaginable, for this same provision to which the hon. member is now objecting and which, according to him, should now be eliminated, is contained in the Commissions Act. If the hon. the Minister of Agriculture were to appoint a commission to investigate Newcastle disease among poultry, the hon. member should come forward with the same amendment to the effect that it cannot hang people while it is investigating Newcastle disease. Surely this is too absurd for words. The hon. member is a jurist … [Interjections.] No, he really is; hon. members should not doubt it. The hon. member is a jurist and he is trying to imply that what is not authorized in an Act may be authorized by way of regulations in terms of that Act. Surely that is not the case, and consequently I am simply rising to point out that the hon. member is now engaged in suspicion-mongering, and in throwing up a smoke-screen. If he wants to hit out at the commission, he can do so in other ways. There are many ways: but he should not avail himself of this method of doing so, i.e. of implying in respect of something which cannot be done, that he will save the situation.

Mr. Chairman, I was in the middle of my address when the hon. the Prime Minister … [Interjections.] I simply want to read the clause, because I am going to suggest that the hon. the Prime Minister, in the same way as he used the words earlier, knows that what he is saying is incorrect. He knows it because all one has to do is to read the clause which says—

The Commissions Act has got absolutely nothing to do with it and he knows it full well, otherwise he would have incorporated the terms of the Commissions Act. The hon. the Prime Minister knows that in terms of this clause one can give any additional power one likes which relates to internal security in South Africa. Sir, since you have ruled this amendment out of order, I move the following amendment which stands on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and which he has not moved—

There is no question that this clause has to be read as restrictive, because there is a power to investigate and report somewhere else. Therefore, with great respect, the argument which the hon. the Prime Minister has advanced, is of no substance whatsoever. Any reasonable person—he talks about my being legally trained, but he is legally trained and he has legal draftsmen supporting him—will interpret this to mean that one can assign any additional power in connection with internal security.

I spoke with the law adviser and he said it is not so.

Let him test it in the courts; then he will see. These are the ordinary, normal words and words have their ordinary meaning. The truth is that if the hon. the Prime Minister wants to pass a clause like this, he is giving to the State President, who will act on the advice of the hon. the Prime Minister, the power to deal with any matter concerning internal security.

That is nonsense.

Then your Bill is nonsense; and there I agree with you. One simply cannot escape the actual words that are contained here in exactly the same way as the reasonable consequences of men’s acts cannot be escaped from. I now want to quote what the hon. the Prime Minister himself said yesterday—

The hon. the Prime Minister went on to say …

Order! I am not prepared to allow a repetition of the Second Reading debate on this clause.

No, Sir; this is not the Second Reading, these are the remarks the hon. the Prime Minister made, which relate to this clause, and which he used when he accused the hon. member for Houghton of being incorrect. He used these words yesterday. The hon. the Prime Minister continued and said—

He attacked the hon. member for Green Point, but now he says it is different. He now says that the words contained in his legislation do not mean what they say here. How can the hon. the Prime Minister say that? With respect to the hon. the Prime Minister, this is a test of whether he intends doing any of these things or not. If he does not intend doing any of these things, if these powers should not be assigned to this commission, there should be no difficulty in deleting clause 12(1)(a), as I have suggested, or stating specifically that no power shall be assigned which allows a person to be convicted of any offence, imposes the penalty, restricts any person or prevents any publication.

Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief. I just want to say that a tremendous amount of noise is coming from a number of members around us, particularly from those in close proximity to us. Those hon. members do not get up and speak because they have nothing to say. They have only noises to make. [Interjections.]

Order!

The question that is before us is the deletion of clause 12(1)(a). The question I want to ask requires, I submit, an answer, and not an entirely negative statement to the effect that we are talking nonsense or are incorrect. If this provision is retained in the Bill, could the hon. the Prime Minister tell us precisely what he has in mind in wishing to assign, at some stage, by means of regulation, additional duties and powers to this commission? In terms of the legislation before us, the commission already has all the investigatory powers it requires. Nothing more than what is provided for in this Bill is required to give the commission powers of investigation. Already enshrined in the Bill is the power to be granted to the commission, in terms of assignment given to it by the State President, to investigate any person or any organization and to report upon such organization or person. Since we know that the commission already has all the investigatory powers and all the inquisitorial powers to investigate whatever person or matter the State President may desire, I think it is fair to ask what the Government actually has in mind in purporting to assign additional duties and powers to the commission, duties and powers which are not already covered by this Bill. If the hon. the Prime Minister cannot give us examples which are sensible and logical, we can only come to the conclusion that the hon. member for Yeoville is quite right in saying that in years to come such powers will be offensive to the very concept of this Bill.

Mr.Chairman, the hon. member asked a question which in my opinion was a very clever one. However, I have already told the hon. member that he will find the same general covering provision in section l(1)(b) of the Commissions Act of 1947. This general and covering provision applies in respect of all commissions in case something—which is not covered by regulations or, in this case, by the Act—should in future be entrusted to the commission. I am not going to exclude that general covering provision of the Commissions Act of 1947 now simply because hon. members on the opposite side are seeing spectres where there are none. The hon. member for Yeoville should know that I cleared up this matter personally with the Chief Law Adviser. His advice to me—advice with which I wholeheartedly agree—was:The State President cannot, even if he wanted to, confer on that commission the kind of powers which are being proposed in his amendment, which has been ruled out of order. I do not think there is a single jurist in this House who will not agree with the view. In fact, the courts have repeatedly ruled that a regulation does not have the force of an Act, and that what one cannot do in an Act one cannot rectify by means of a regulation. Such a ruling has been given on innumerable occasions. The hon. member is simply chasing up hares for nothing now.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Prime Minister precisely what additional duties and powers the Government is contemplating with this clause? [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I told the hon. member that it was a general covering provision which is contained in the Commissions Act of 1947, and which has been included just as it stands in this legislation. Just as it is impossible for a person to predict what additional terms of reference may be given to a commission investigating Newcastle disease among poultry, so one cannot predict it in this case. One merely makes provision for cases in which this might be necessary. This applies to every Commissions Act in the world, and therefore applies to our Commissions Act of 1947 as well.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, the hon. the Prime Minister is confusing the concept of being ultra vires a regulation with being ultra vires the enabling powers of the statute as opposed to the rights of Parliament to legislate in any manner possible. If there were here a provision stating that further regulations could be made for the purposes of this Bill, the hon. the Prime Minister would be absolutely right. However, the provision we are concerned with here states the following, and I want to quote it again because the wording is terribly important.

The State President may make regulations …

That is the enabling power, which means that if anything is done which is within the ambit of what is prescribed here, that will be valid and enforceable and cannot be declared ultra vires.

There is nothing about punishment in this whole Bill.

Of course there is not. However, I am now going to quote further—

1. (a) Assigning additional duties and powers …

Additional duties, however, are functions which the commission has to exercise. Additional powers are powers which the commission may additionally exercise. It is expressly stated that these powers are “in connection with internal security”. There are no limits to the powers which the State President may assign, not the way this provision is drafted. That is absolutely clear. The simple test is that as long as the regulations are within the ambit of the authority granted by the statute, the regulations will be valid. The powers can then be exercised. I want to repeat once more that if these regulations were merely in connection with investigatory powers, I would have no quarrel with the hon. the Prime Minister. However, there is no limitation …

He cannot go beyond the investigating powers assigned in this Bill.

That is the whole problem. If that is what it said, it would be fine. The difficulty is that it does not say so.

It does say so.

Well, Sir, if it does say so, one of us cannot read. [Interjections.] Subsection (1)(a) says—

That means any additional powers and any additional duties. I regret that, whatever the hon. the Prime Minister may have been advised, on an ordinary reading of this I have no doubt that any court in South Africa will find that if, for example, there were a power given …

That is being plain stupid.

Well, you may think it is stupid, but that may reflect on you, you know; therefore I do not think you should be so quick with those words.

Address the Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether there is another chairman sitting behind me …

Order! The hon. member must address the Chair.

Sir, I have been addressing you all along. I do not need the hon. member for Brakpan making a noise behind me all the time.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of explanation: The hon. member was addressing the hon. the Prime Minister and not the Chair.

Order! The hon. member may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is very unlikely that he will get your job. I want to make the position very clear and therefore I want to repeat …

Order! I do not want the hon. member to repeat it for a third time.

Sir, I am going to sit down in a moment. If there was the limitation that this related to investigating and reporting, my argument would be of no substance. However, it is an unlimited power and therefore we cannot accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to take a slightly different line to that taken by the hon. member for Yeoville in supporting his amendment. I want to respond to a certain statement the hon. the Prime Minister made. It seems to me that, when the hon. the Prime Minister compares this commission with a commission on agricultural affairs, we begin to realize the whole dilemma of the difference between this side and that side of the House. Clause after clause and argument after argument we have tried to make it abundantly clear, as in fact the whole of this side of the House has tried to do, that this is a very different kind of commission from any other commission we have had heretofore. Therefore, when he begins by saying that if we on this side object to para. (a) of clause 12(1), we are in fact disagreeing with the investigation of Newcastle disease among fowls, it really means that the hon. the Prime Minister is having to deal with chickens that have come home to roost, because it is the very nature of this whole Bill which is at stake. When we say we have a problem with the words “additional powers”, it is because we are very concerned about the Bill itself. The fact that there is the possibility of additional powers being assigned to the commission is why we object to this clause and support the amendment.

Question put: That the paragraph stand part of the clause.

Upon which the Committee divided:

AYES—91: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J.C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: S. F. Kotzé, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

Question affirmed and amendment dropped.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—89: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Clase, P. J.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marias, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niémann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H.

Tellers: S. F. Kotzé, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 13:

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to sound facetious, but I want to say that I think this commission is singularly inaptly named. After all, when you talk about a parliamentary commission, you would think it would comprise members of Parliament from all sides of the House. Secondly, this commission, whether we like it or not, in modern days has remarkable resemblances to the inquisitions which we read of which took place 600 years ago. For instance, the inquisitors 600 years ago, after having a hearing, made recommendations …

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to be frivolous.

I am not being frivolous at all, Mr. Chairman.

If the hon. member continues along those lines, I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I shall then merely say that I believe that this commission is inaptly named and that the word “inquisition” should be included in the title.

Order!

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—90: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma, M. G; Brandt, J. W.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villers. D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. C. Roux, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, L F. A.; De Villiers, J. L; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills,F. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 1 (standing over):

Mr. Chairman, a lot has been said on this Bill in the Committee Stage and therefore it is at this stage not necessary for us to discuss clause 1. I rise merely to express our opposition to the clause and in terms of our earlier statement we will vote against it.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—90: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. R; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. R; Ligthelm N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simpkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, C. V.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt H. D. J.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux and A. van Breda.

NOES—38 Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 2 (standing over):

Mr. Chairman, I am interested to read in clause 2 that “There is hereby established a body to be known as the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission”. The word “hereby:” interests me very much indeed because it took the hon. the Prime Minister almost exactly three long years before he came to Parliament to introduce this Bill into this House. I would like the hon. the Prime Minister to explain to us why it was that he waited three years before carrying out what was a recommendation, an urgent recommendation in fact, of the second interim report of the Schlebusch Commission. He indulged in a bit of by-play during an earlier stage of this Bill …

Order! That has nothing to do with this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the word “hereby” means now …

Order! This clause deals only with the establishment of the commission.

The “hereby” refers to the Bill …

I beg your pardon? I did not hear what the hon. the Prime Minister said, but I see that he is exchanging friendly smiles with the leader of the Opposition.

The “hereby” refers to the Bill, not to the time factor.

Never mind, Sir, “hereby” means now and “hereby” is this moment of time. The hon. the Prime Minister is establishing a parliamentary commission.

I think the hon. member is being frivolous now.

On the contrary, Sir, I am being deadly serious …

Order!

I want to tell the hon. the Prime Minister that he could not have done this at a worse time. It would have been better if he had postponed this measure altogether and did not establish this parliamentary commission now. I know why he is coming along with this measure now: He has no option; it is being forced upon him. Unfortunately, he who is usually so good at diagnosing when to strike and when not to strike as far as the Official Opposition is concerned, failed to diagnose correctly this time.

Order! The hon. member must abide by my ruling or else must resume her seat.

I must tell the Committee that we are, as we have mentioned, against the establishment of this commission. We would also have been against it had the hon. the Prime Minister established it three years ago, as he should have if he was so concerned about the security of this country, and we would also be against it if he established it at a later time. I want to tell the hon. the Prime Minister that we do not believe that this parliamentary internal security commission is going to accomplish any of the aims and objectives that he thinks or that it is going to ensure security for this country. I want him to know that it is in fact sowing a lack of confidence in South Africa overseas. The very fact that he is establishing this commission is sowing further lack of confidence at a time when this country can ill-afford it. I want to illustrate my point by saying that when the hon. the Prime Minister introduced this Bill into Parliament I was ‘phoned by the BBC in London and asked whether I would give a telephonic interview on this Bill because people in London were wondering whether there was any crisis concerning security in South Africa.

Order! The hon. member is evading my ruling. The hon. member must discuss the details of the clause. The principle has already been accepted at the Second Reading and I am not going to allow the debate on the Second Reading all over again.

I am not going to debate that again. I am simply saying that we are against the establishment of this commission and that it is a pity that the hon. the Prime Minister has seen fit to establish it now. We shall vote against this clause, and I want to tell the hon. the Prime Minister—I admit that it is not exactly relevant—that, if he will look at Hansard of 27 February 1973, he will see that I was right and he was wrong.

I want to be very brief and make only one remark. That is that we on these benches believe that we must have law and order and that we must have internal peace. However, it will not be achieved only by this, because in South Africa we also need a strong army, we need law and order and hope for the people, hope from which security will flow.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—90: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.;Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, C. V.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux and A. van Breda.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. L; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Clause agreed to.

Clause 3 (standing over):

Mr. Chairman, we are dealing here with the clause relating to the constitution of the commission and to the period of office of the members of the commission. Because of the procedure adopted yesterday by this Committee, clause 3 is in fact the last clause to be debated today in the Committee Stage of this Bill. So, by debating this clause we have come to the end of a debate which, for many members, may have been tiresome, but which, I think, has demonstrated the National Party’s continued adherence to authoritarianism. The contents of this clause, Mr. Chairman …

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the clause.

The contents of this clause, Mr. Chairman …

I shall not allow a general discussion on this clause. The hon. member must confine himself only to the details.

I shall abide by your ruling, Mr. Chairman. The contents of this clause are no less obnoxious to us than the contents of any other clause of this Bill. It is for us and for South Africa of no consequence that the commission consists of five, 10 members or of 250 members, as the whole principle relating to the matter is bad. Similarly, it is also of no consequence that the term of office of members of the commission is five years. We feel that the term of office should not even be five minutes. We have no interest—and I am dealing specifically with this clause—in the method of appointment. But having said that, we do look, in a clause of this nature, for some mitigating features. In this particular case, I must say, there are none.

I particularly look at subsection 5 of the clause, which reads—

I would say that this type of subsection should not be in a Bill such as this. It should not be there because it creates a situation where a member of a commission dealing with sensitive matters relating to people and to organizations in fact does not have security of tenure, is not totally independent of the opinion of the State President as advised by the hon. the Prime Minister. So, all in all, I believe that, like the rest of this Bill, this clause runs contrary to fair law, creates judges out of politicians, politicians who are subjective and who are, finally, dependent upon the executive for their tenure of office. We shall therefore vote against the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I want to elaborate just for a minute on the last point my hon. colleague has made. I simply want to say that in spite of what we have been told about who and what this commission is going to investigate, it is inevitable, so I argue, that by its very nature, the very nature of the work this commission will have to do, it will be concerned very largely with politics and with political parties. My argument as it relates to this clause is that we are here creating a body of ten politicians from one single party who are in fact and in effect going to be asked to sit in judgment on other politicians policies. This is my submission. If the Government feels so strongly that it wants an internal security commission, why does it then not create a body which will have a little more sheen of impartiality when it comes to judging these things?

Order! There is nothing in this clause which says that the members should belong to one party only.

But we know what the effect will be of 10 Parliamentarians sitting on the commission. It has been made abundantly clear.

*Sir, with regard to these 10 Parliamentarians who are going to be appointed in this commission, I should like to quote from a letter I received from one of my constituents. He wrote as follows—

We shall vote against this clause.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—90: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, C. V.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Walt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux and A. van Breda.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause agreed to.

Title put and the Committee divided:

AYES—88: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetsee, H.J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. V.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, W. D.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, C. V.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, W. L.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux and A. van Breda.

NOES—38: Aronson, T.; Barlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Title agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported with amendments.

Mr. Chairman, when the Committee suspended its proceedings, I was replying to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Johannesburg North. I think that for the sake of clarity I should just repeat that this proposed new clause to be inserted after clause 17, in fact imposes certain obligations on the Minister of Economic Affairs. Basically, what it amounts to is that it must be possible for the Minister to be compelled to furnish reasons for any notice published under clauses 12, 14, 15 or 17, which have already been agreed to by the Committee. It is very clear that I cannot accept this new clause because a notice published under clause 17 is not a notice published by the Minister of Economic Affairs. Such a notice is published by the Secretary. In the second place, in the nature of the matter, this is a provisional notice. When, we look at this we see that a notice which can published in terms of clause 15, for example, is subject to clause 16, and clause 16, which we have agreed to, states very clearly that before a notice can be published in terms of clauses 12, 14 or 15, notice must first be given in the Gazette of the intention to publish a notice with a specific content. This is intended to afford people with objections to the proposed notice, an opportunity to have the matter considered. Therefore I do not want to delay the Committee for very long in this connection. In my opinion it cannot be expected, for any practical reasons, that the Minister of Economic Affairs should furnish reasons for a notice which is not even published by him, but is published by the Secretary for Commerce. I think hon. members will understand the validity of this argument in this particular connection.

In conclusion, I want to say in this connection that the purpose of clause 17 is, in the first place, to impose a temporary prohibition, and in the second place, to do so in circumstances of urgency. That is why the prohibition will in any event fall way, unless further steps are taken. In these circumstances I want to ask hon. members not to insist on this new clause. In the first place I am of the opinion that it is not practical and in the second place I think it frustrates the aims of clause 17, because by its nature it is only intended for urgent situations, to afford the Trade Practices Advisory Committee the opportunity to investigate the true position in the meantime. I want to say at once that I do not believe, in any event, that a court of law will be capable of expressing an opinion on the justification a Minister of Economic Affairs may have in publishing such a notice. I think that owing to practical considerations, the second part of the amendment, viz. to create the right of appeal, lapses for the same reasons. I understand that there is a natural sentiment among hon. members that one must afford people who have been affected by Government action, whether administrative or otherwise, the opportunity to defend themselves. I believe that in view of the fact that this notice to which reference is made in clause 17 is temporary and the fact that notices under clauses 12, 14, 15 and 16 must afford people the opportunity to make representations before such a notice is placed, hon. members will be able to understand why I cannot accept this amendment.

New clause 17 negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause 22:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 19, in line 50, to omit “unless” and to substitute “provided”;
2. (2) on page 19, in lines 53 and 54, to omit “without the connivance or” and to substitute:

1. (3) on page 19, in line 55, to omit “all” and to substitute “no”;
2. (4) on page 21, in line 2, to omit “not”;
3. (5) on page 21, to omit all the words after “thereof” in line 7 up to the end of subsection (1).

I want to say straight away that I find clause 22, as at present framed, completely repugnant. This clause contains a presumption that a person is responsible for the acts of his manager, his agent or his employee, unless he can prove that that person was acting without connivance with himself or without his permission and he can prove—not “or”, but “and”—that all reasonable steps were taken by him to prevent his employee, agent or manager acting in that way and—”and” not “or”—unless he can prove that that person has not acted within the scope of his authority. This presumption becomes all the more repugnant because this clause goes on to say that the forbidding of such an act or omission to act, will not in itself constitute proof that reasonable steps were taken to prevent that omission or that act. In other words, this clause places the onus of proving innocence on the accused. To me as an ordinary member of the public, it is not elementary justice to place the onus on the accused to prove his innocence. To me elementary justice places that onus on the State. For that reason, I have moved the first four amendments.

As regards the circumscription of these presumptions, namely the fact that the specific instructions given by the person involved to his manager, agent or employee, that such an act should not be committed, do not reasonably constitute evidence that reasonable steps have been taken to prevent that act being committed. I find that circumscription completely unacceptable. The normal way in which one gives an instruction to get something carried out, is to give it either verbally or in writing. What else can one do to ensure that something that should not be done, is not done? How else can one do it? One cannot stand over one’s employee, agent or manager all day to ensure he is doing that thing or is not doing it. One has to issue an instruction. If such an instruction is not going to be recognized as a reasonable step having been taken to see that something is done or that something is not done, whichever the case may be, I regard it as completely repugnant and unfair.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I should like to deal with this clause in two sections. The first is that the clause creates an onus which is placed upon the accused. That onus, in order to be discharged, requires three things to be done. The first is that the accused must show that it was done without his permission or connivance. The second is that he took reasonable steps to prevent the commission of that act, and the third is that it was within the scope of the authority. The problem that exists is that even if he proves these three issues, it may still not be enough if it is proved, that he merely gave instructions that the offence should not be committed. In the common law relating to crime there is no vicarious liability. [Interjections.] I said “common law”. Liquor law is not common law. The authority for this, for the benefit of that hon. member, is the case of Rex v. Lullaby, decided in 1939, Appellate Division 427. It was laid down very clearly there that there was no vicarious liability for crime in our common law. The second aspect of this is that the normal rule pertaining to a contravention of a statute does not require a particular mens rea, that is a particular intent. A master is liable for his servant’s acts within the general scope of employment, even if it is contrary to orders, unless the master has acted in good faith and has done all that is reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of an offence. That proposition, if the hon. member for Ermelo wants authority for it, is Rex v. Bear and Another in 1912 T.P.D. 246. That in itself would be adequate in these particular circumstances where there is not a particular mens rea. Where there is a particular mens rea, there is a degree of difference among the authorities as far as the liability is concerned but the balance appears to be in favour of a proposition that where the discretion has been given to the employee—in other words, where the employee has a discretion in the exercise of the business, the employer can be convicted on the intent of the employee. The authority for that is Rex v. Van Schalkwyk (1921 C.P.D. 79). In the present circumstances, if one has a situation where the discretion was given to an employee, for example in regard to the making of representations, then the employer could still be convicted on the intent of an employee.

In so far as the liability of corporate bodies is concerned for the crimes of servants, section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Act applies. It states that where the expressed or implied consent of the corporate body exists for the furtherance of an act which will further its interests, shall be deemed to be sufficient to impose a criminal liability upon the corporate body. There is ample coverage in our law in order to cover a situation in respect of an employee here and the liability of a master without going this far. I want to concede immediately to the hon. the Minister that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions. It is not the Liquor Act to which the hon. member referred, but section 32 of the Wage Act which contains a provision almost similar to this one. Also section 72 of the Industrial Conciliation Act contains an almost similar provision. Therefore, if one does not approve of this provision, I want to concede immediately, disclose what the facts are, that this is not a unique position. In other words, it is not the first time this has been enacted. The fact that it is not the first time it is being enacted, does not make it right. In my view it is not necessary to go as far as we go here. I think there are circumstances where the employer cannot do more than give instructions for this or that act not to be committed. In our view, once his bona fides has been discharged, once he has gone as far as to make it clear that these are instructions, I think that should be satisfactory, I think this fact should be accepted by the hon. the Minister. That is why I moved the amendment, and I hope the hon. the Minister will see his way clear to accepting this amendment. It is for that reason that I have put all my cards on the table. I have conceded that there are similar statutes and I have tried to set out the relevant elements of the common law and the principles that are applied. I hope that on the strength of that reasoned argument, the hon. the Minister will find it possible to have this provision deleted.

Mr. Chairman, I have already indicated that I cannot accept the amendments, and I think that after I have stated my standpoint, hon. members will be able to understand that my standpoint in this particular connection is reasonable. Looking at clause 22 and the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville, I get the impression that his only objection to this clause is in connection with the proviso in subsection (1) and that he has no argument in connection with paras, (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1). I hope I have understood him correctly. In contrast to the hon. member or Yeoville, the hon. member for Constantia has a basic objection to the clause and it is his argument that a mere prohibition ought to be sufficient to exempt an employer against any immediate responsibility for any of his managers, employees, or whatever the case may be. The hon. member for Yeoville is quite correct about the general legal position. Clause 22 of the Bill contains a provision in terms of which an employer or a principal is held responsible for an offence committed by a manager, agent or employee. At the moment, however, there is a lack of clarity in regard to the circumstances in which an employer or principal can be held responsible for an offence committed by a manager, agent or employee in terms of the common law or otherwise, and because this is so, clause 22 seeks in the first instance to eliminate that lack of clarity. In the second place, it is indicated that an employer or a principal will be able to free himself from the immediate responsibility imposed on him by this clause if he is able to prove certain things. In the first instance he must be able to prove that he has not connived at the offence, and it is definitely not difficult to prove that. In the second place, he has to prove that he has taken all reasonable steps to prevent the offence being committed. In the third place he has to prove that the offence was not committed by his manager or the agent within the scope of their duties. Then there is the further provision that the mere issuing of a prohibition is insufficient to relieve him of this onus of proof. I want to concede that. We argued this particular point ad nauseam in the Committee Stage of another piece of legislation. There are circumstances in which a prohibition is the only step which he could have taken. But then, after all, he has not connived at the offence and has surely taken all reasonable steps because the prohibition constitutes the reasonable steps he has taken and consequently prevention of the offence was beyond his power. That is why I have no fault to find with the argument, but I maintain with respect that it is unnecessary to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville in order to achieve what he wants to achieve.

Now I come to the four amendments of the hon. member for Constantia. He does not want to accept the shifting of the onus of proof in this clause. The argument as to the shifting of the onus in this specific case is valid because the facts which may be advanced in connection with evidence relating to the onus, have regard to aspects which often fall exclusively within the sphere of knowledge of the employer. The employer knows whether he has prohibited something; the employer knows, too, whether the infringement took place in front of him; and the employer is aware of the steps he has taken to prevent or avoid the committing of an offence. There is a second important point, too, which I want to mention to the hon. member for Constantia. Whereas the onus is being shifted here, it is unnecessary for the employer to prove beyond all doubt that he has complied with this provision. All he has to do is to prove on a balance of probabilities that he has taken reasonable steps. I want to ask, therefore, that this amendment not be insisted on. Hon. members will know that I have given the assurance in similar circumstances that we do not want to—nor shall we—use this legislation to institute a prosecution with reference to anything that might possibly occur. It is as a deterrent that this measure will be most effective. Even in the most favourable circumstances it is extremely difficult to protect consumers against exploitation. Since I belong to the same profession as the hon. member for Yeoville, I know that resourceful attorneys can deal very effectively with the provisions relating to this specific subject. I have done so myself, and if I had not had that experience, I should not have been able to argue about this so vigorously. I want to conclude by giving the assurance that the measures in the legislation which are calculated to prevent abuses, form the positive part of it, the part about which we all agreed. That is why powers must not be granted which will only be included in the Statute Book theoretically. The machinery capable of giving effect to these matters about which we are largely in agreement, must be created. I request the co-operation of hon. members in this connection.

On amendment (1) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter,

Question put: That the word stands part of the clause,

Upon which the Committee divided:

AYES—88: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J.W.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J. Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—34: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Question affirmed and amendments (1) to (4) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter dropped.

Amendment (5) moved by Mr. D. D. Baxter negatived and amendment moved by Mr. H. F. Schwarz dropped (Official Opposition and Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Clause put and the Committee divided:

AYES—88: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, L. J.; Botha, S. P.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetsee, H. J.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cronje, P.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Beer, S. J.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S.F.; Kotzé, W. D.; Krijnauw, P. H. J.; Langley, T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Lloyd, J. J.; Louw, E.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, P. S.; Maree, G. de K.; McLachlan, R.; Muller, S. L.; Niemann, J. J.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Uys, C.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, A. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, A. van Breda, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

NOES—34: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; McIntosh, G. B. D.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Streicher, D. M.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Clause agreed to.

Clause 1 (standing over):

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in the name of the hon. member for Wonderboom on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 3, in line 30, after “sale” to insert “or leasing”;
2. (2) on page 5, in line 8, after “assembles” to insert “leases”;
3. (3) on page 5, in line 18, after “packager” to insert “assembler, lessor”;
4. (4) on page 5, in line 41, to omit “together” and to substitute “in connection”.

Those hon. members opposite who have done their homework will know what is implied by the amendments and therefore I shall say nothing about them. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. member? [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member is not prepared to answer questions.

Mr. Chairman, merely to facilitate the procedure, I want to indicate that I am prepared to accept the amendments moved by the hon. the Chief Whip. I am prepared, too, to accept the second amendment appearing on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Wynberg. Unfortunately I am unable to accept his first and third amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 5, to insert the following definition to follow definition (ix):

1. (x) ‘purchaser’ includes a prospective purchaser; (xii)

1. (2) on page 5, in line 50, to omit paragraph (b).
2. (3) on page 5, to add the following as a subsection (2) at the end of the Clause:

1. (2) In determining whether or not any trade practice is justified in the public interest, regard shall be had only to the ultimate interest of consumers.

The hon. the Minister has indicated that he is prepared to accept my second amendment. I therefore do not propose to debate it any further. In regard to my first amendment, I would like to draw the Minister’s attention to a statement made by him in the debate on clause 11. He said that he wanted to retain the word “purchaser” in clause 11, and the reason he gave was the following—

From that it appears that the hon. the Minister does not believe that any advertising which takes place should contain the inducement of any discount at all. If the hon. the Minister, who is now shaking his head, says that I have misinterpreted him, I would like him to tell me what in fact he means when he says “dit is omdat ons juis uitgelokte verkope wil verbied”. In this connection he went on to say—

I think it is quite clear what the hon. the Minister wants. He is only prepared to allow a discount by way of a coupon if that discount is offered simultaneously with the sale. That means that in the event of an advertisement inducing a sale, the hon. the Minister will say: “As this is an advertisement which precedes a sale and it is not ‘gelyktydig met die kooptransaksie’, I am not prepared to allow it.” I should like to point out to the hon. the Minister that this is a custom which has grown up over many years in the market place. You attract custom by offering discount. There are various ways of offering discount. A number of the ways in which you offer discount are set out in clause 11. Now the hon. the Minister says he is not prepared to omit the word “purchaser” and to substitute the word “person”. I must accept, for that reason, that he believes that a purchaser is a person who has purchased. He is only going to allow a coupon for a discount …

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I do not believe that argument has any bearing on this provision. That clause has been dealt with, and the word “purchaser” is contained in that clause.

Mr. Chairman, I do not quite follow what the hon. the Minister is doing. Is he taking a point of order?

Yes.

What is the point of order? Can we hear it? I would like to hear his point of order.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, clauses 10 and 11 have been disposed of, with regard to trade coupons. The hon. member may argue about the definition of the word “purchaser” until tomorrow; it is quite in order, but he may not discuss trade coupons and advertisements now with reference to clause 11.

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that the hon. the Minister is quite incorrect. When we commenced the Committee Stage of this Bill, we asked that clause 1 stand over because we would have to deal with clause 11 before clause 1. That is the reason why it stood over. I readily agree that that clause has been disposed of, but the arguments used by the hon. the Minister in that connection do have a bearing on my amendment. I am moving that the word “purchaser” should include a prospective purchaser. Clause 11 is the only clause in the Bill in which the word “purchaser” is used. The hon. the Minister will remember my argument under clause 11, when I said that clause 10 of the Bill was introduced in order to bring into operation certain sections of the Trade Coupon Act and to try to graft it onto this Bill. I said it was a very poor grafting and that it would wither and die. I believe that I am quite in order to deal with the matter because the word “purchaser” has specific reference to clause 11. Anything which the hon. the Minister has said about the word “purchaser” in argument on clause 11,I am quite at liberty to refute. The hon. the Minister shakes his head, but I do not quite see why he keeps on shaking his head.

I think he is agreeing with you.

He should be agreeing with me, but I think he agrees in the wrong way, by shaking his head. It is quite clear to me that if the definition of the word “purchaser” is to be retained in its present form, and does not include a prospective purchaser, then no discounts can be given by way of advertisement. If one follows the rest of clause 1, one will see that the word “sell” “includes agree to sell, or mark with a selling price, or offer, advertise, keep, expose, transmit, send, convey or deliver for sale …” That is all selling; so it is quite clear that an advertisement is also selling, and if no one is allowed to advertise a discount it will then mean that nobody will be able to induce a prospective purchaser to purchase a particular item, because a discount is being advertised and advertising is part of the selling transaction. I do not know whether the hon. the Minister wants to argue in reverse and say that because advertise is also selling, therefore you can advertise a discount. If that is what the hon. the Minister is shaking his head about and he wants to show that this is not going to affect any inducement and that is added in an advertisement before the time, then I would like to know what he means by saying that he does not want “uitgelokte verkope”, because that is exactly what is going to happen. He cannot have his cake and eat it. Either he must allow a prospective purchaser to be induced to become a purchaser or he must say that he is going to allow inducements to be offered to purchasers generally. I want it to be quite clear as to what the hon. the Minister’s attitude is, because it seems to me that he does not have the same idea about the matter as he had when he replied to the debate on clause 11.

You are talking nonsense.

The hon. the Minister says I am talking nonsense.

Yes, you are talking nonsense.

What is the hon. the Minister getting at? What does he mean by “uitgelokte verkope”? If the hon. the Minister means that “uitgelokte verkope” is an inducement that is offered in respect of a sale, then I would like to know why he is not prepared to accept my amendment in which I allow a purchaser also to be a prospective purchaser.

Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member does not know that under clause 10 of the Bill a general prohibition has been imposed on the use of trade coupons, then he ought to know. Only the provisos in clause 11 provide under which circumstances a trade coupon may be issued. In the debate which he quotes in connection with his definition of “purchaser”, he maintains that I said that one may not advertise a discount. Surely he has no grounds whatsoever for making an inference of that nature. Let us take a look at the amendment under discussion. The hon. member’s amendment which is now being discussed, is to the effect that the definition of “purchaser” should also include a “prospective purchaser”. I challenge the hon. member to tell me what a “prospective purchaser” is. It is everyone who reads an advertisement? Are they all “prospective purchasers”? Is everyone who reads an advertisement— because he is arguing with me about an advertisement now—a prospective purchaser?

Yes, of course.

Why do you not say so then? He says that he wants to extend the definition to include prospective purchasers as well. In other words, there need be no transaction on the part of a person who reads an advertisement, not even one which attracts his interest. Merely through reading an advertisement he is a prospective purchaser. With respect, Mr. Chairman, surely that is a … I almost used a word I shouldn’t have.

Why does he read the advertisement, then?

With all respect, the definition of “purchaser” which the hon. member wants to provide is a meaningless definition. It has no meaning whatsoever. He can argue about Clause 11, in which the word “seller” appears, and which includes the proviso to clause 10, but still this does not lend substance to the definition he wants to give the word “purchaser”. If one gives the term “prospective purchaser” its ordinary meaning, then it cannot be what he says it is. According to him, anyone who reads an advertisement is automatically a prospective purchaser, whereas the word “prospective” means that a person will have had to do a specific act without qualifying what that act is. Although I want to accommodate the hon. member, I cannot do so by accepting his definition, because it is not susceptible to interpretation. If the hon. member wants a purchaser to be any specific person, then he must say so, and he must effect his amendment at another place, because he cannot do it here.

Mr. Chairman, that is exactly the point. That is why I suggested to the hon. the Minister, when we dealt with clause 11, that he should change the word into “persoon”. However, he was not prepared to accept it, and the reason he gave is the reason I read out. The hon. the Minister must explain to me what he means by saying: “Dit is omdat ons juis uitgelokte verkope wil verbied.”

Mr. Chairman, let me take the hon. member back …

I am only asking for an explanation. That is all I want.

… to the context in which my speech was made, the speech which he is now quoting.

It was in reply to my speech.

Mr. Chairman, with all respect I want to say that I was not under the impression that there was any substance in the speech which the hon. member made at that time of the evening. However, I said that the basic objective—and the hon. member can go and read it again; he must not read it in isolation—of the trade coupon legislation being repealed by this legislation, certain provisions of which are being included in the Bill again, was to discourage injudicious purchases by the public resulting from the offering of coupons. Now the hon. member may argue about the merits or demerits of this, but this was the aim of the Trade Coupon Act.

The specific practice against which that Act was aimed, and against which the clauses in this Bill, too, are aimed, clauses which have already been accepted by the Committee—was a practice in accordance with which certain offers were made to the public to collect coupons with a view to the purchase of goods other than those in respect of which the coupons were purchased, and the purchase price of which was covered by the value of the coupons. That was the first aspect.

I went on to say—and now I come to my words which the hon. member—with respect—quoted entirely out of context—that the Trade Coupon Act had a further purpose, viz. the prevention of a situation in which the prices of goods were unreasonably loaded with the aim of stimulating the public, by means of the issue of coupons, to purchase goods for which they would then pay more than would have been the case in the absence of the coupons. I went on to react to what the hon. member for Yeoville said, and stated that what this amounted to was that we wanted to discourage elicited sales in this way. This has nothing to do with the point made by the hon. member for Yeoville. I repeat with respect that it is the definition of “seller” which is now under consideration. If this causes the hon. member difficulties, if he has difficulties with the word “advertisement”, which now includes “purchase”, and vice versa, then he must effect his amendment at another place. However, he cannot now, after the Committee has already accepted section 11, attempt to undo the Committee’s acceptance of the clause by means of a definition.

Quite apart from that, the hon. member has not yet replied to my question as to the ordinary meaning he wants to attach to the word “prospective”. Someone has to interpret that word. My reason for being unable to accept it, is the fact that his definition of “purchaser” is not susceptible to interpretation.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the hon. the Minister and I believe he has forgotten what he said on clause 11. In clause 11 I dealt with this matter in full. I shall read what the hon. the Minister said in reply to my speech on clause 11. This is what he said—

That is quite correct.

That is correct, and I stand by it.

The hon. the Minister continued as follows—

That is what the hon. the Minister said. By that reply to the debate on clause 11, the hon. the Minister brought every normal person under the impression that he does not want anything which is meant to induce a purchaser. I should like the hon. the Minister to tell us now what he means by “uitlok”. Does he mean advertising? Does he mean trade coupons which are issued by a business enterprise? Does he mean trade coupons which are distributed by means of a newspaper? What exactly does he mean? We should like to know, and the public would like to know; so would the traders. So far we have received no reply from the hon. the Minister.

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the hon. member for Wynberg. I have three trade coupons here, and shall send one over to the hon. the Minister so that he can have a look at it while I am talking. These coupons are handed out by the manufacturers of the products to which they refer. These are trade coupons in terms of the definition and particularly in terms of clause 10, where it is specified that … The hon. the Minister apparently does not like my coupons. I do not know why he does not like them. [Interjections.] That is a coupon I have tendered to the hon. the Minister which will allow him …

Must I tell you what you can do with it?

Please, in all seriousness, I want to make my point. That is a coupon which allows the Hon. the Minister to get a benefit on the purchase of a particular product. I have handed it to him as a potential purchaser. He can take that coupon, go to the nearest supermarket and get a discount by using that coupon. As I say, these are usually distributed by the manufacturers of those products. They distribute them to potential customers as I have given it to the hon. the Minister as a potential customer. The question now is: Did that person commit an offence when he handed that coupon to the hon. the Minister.

What does that have to do with the definition of “purchaser”?

The whole point is the question of whether or not the hon. the Minister is in fact a purchaser or whether he is a potential purchaser. Let me put it this way: As the hon. the Minister sits in his bench, having received that coupon, he is not a purchaser. I can distribute these things by the million throughout the country, but the moment I give one to a person who picks up a packet of Lifebuoy soap or Wholesum in my store, then I am handing it to a purchaser and that is the whole point made by my hon. friend from Wynberg. He is trying to help the hon. the Minister. I do not know why I am, because I do not believe the hon. the Minister is right in doing this anyway. I believe the hon. the Minister was totally wrong on Wednesday night when he said that this was his intention. If that is his intention, he is going to handcuff the trade in this country to such an extent that he might as well forget about the advertising business. Here we have another advertisement …

I did not understand it that way.

That is the way I understood it. Here is another advertisement: “Bespaar nou met hierdie bewys, kry afslag van R80 as jy ’n klavier koop.” What is the object of the advertiser here? The object of the advertiser, when he spends hundreds of rand on an advertisement of this size, is to induce somebody to come and buy his pianos. That was his intention. The hon. the Minister says he wants to stop it, but every single advertisement is done that way. Here is another one I received in the post two days ago from a firm that wants to paint my house. It says that if I enter into a contract with them to paint my house, I can participate in a competition for a free television set, not one made by that firm, but by a different firm. That is what the hon. the Minister wants to outlaw, in terms of the statement he made.

That is not a competition. It is only to have your house painted.

This is a competition for a free television set …

You have to have your house painted.

That is the whole point—if I have my house painted. Now that the hon. Whip has got the point I hope the hon. the Minister has got it as well. This is the point. Does the hon. the Minister really intend to outlaw this sort of thing? Because this is what we are getting at. If I may further tie my argument to clause 1, I want to say that we have a change in the definition of “sell”. It is a change from the existing Trade Coupons Act, which now for the first time includes “advertise” in the definition of “sell”. Before it was an offence when I, as a supermarket owner, sold a packet of lifebuoy soap and put on the packet a voucher like that saying that he could get a discount of 4 cents. That is how the law stands today. In terms of the new definition of “sell”, which now includes “advertise”, it now becomes an offence for me to give that out as an advertisement.

I want to come back to the question of whether or not it is a purchaser or a potential or intended purchaser. Let me refer to the vouchers, a specimen of which I have sent across to the hon. the Minister. In all seriousness, in terms of the Bill as it stands now, if I as a supermarket manager were to hand such a voucher to a purchaser in my supermarket, granting him a discount, I would be guilty of an offence. However, very large firms are distributing these by the thousands. They are being handed out as handbills to people in the street urging them to go to the nearest supermarket. Those persons, however, are not guilty of an offence. I wonder if the hon. the Minister is here trying to defend or protect those large manufacturers who are doing this in order to allow them to continue giving this benefit to the public while at the same time preventing the supermarket owners and storekeepers themselves from granting such benefits. I do not know whether that is the hon. the Minister’s intention. Is that perhaps the reason why he will not accept the amendment of my friend, the hon. member for Wynberg? I wonder whether the hon. the Minister could reassure us on that point?

Mr. Chairman, the motion which the hon. member for Wynberg has moved here in connection with the definition is not susceptible of interpretation. We must have a definition which must be interpreted by someone. What on earth does it mean when we say that a person is ultimately a purchasher? Is a person who picks this trade coupon up in the street, a prospective purchaser? With all respect, I cannot make this concession if I know in advance that it is not susceptible to interpretation. Whether the managers of supermarkets and chain stores can distribute these trade coupons or not is beside the point. I cannot accept this definition because it is meaningless.

Amendments (1), (2) and (3) moved by Mr. S. F. Kotzé agreed to.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. J. I. de Villiers negatived.

Amendment (4) moved by Mr. S. F. Kotzé agreed to.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. J. I. de Villiers agreed to.

Amendment (3) moved by Mr. J. I. de Villiers negatived.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported with amendments.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Agreed to.