Mr. Speaker, next week we shall deal with the following legislation appearing on today’s Order Paper: Orders of the Day Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 23.

I should also like to indicate that we shall probably continue the discussion of the Votes after the long weekend only.

Order! I have given consideration to the notice of an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House standing in the name of the hon. member for Yeoville. The instruction seeks to empower the Committee of the Whole House to consider the advisability of providing that additional powers of review be given to the review committee for which provision is made in the new section 10sex which clause 5 of the Bill proposes to insert in the principal Act. I appreciate that it can be argued that the instruction, if adopted, will extend the scope of the Bill and that the instruction is accordingly admissible, and I have given full weight to this aspect in considering the instruction. However, after a detailed examination of the provisions of the new section 10sex, I have come to the conclusion that the House in agreeing to the Second Reading of the Bill clearly intended that the review committee should be confined to the investigation of the Minister’s actions in terms of section 10(1)(a)bis and that any amendments giving the committee additional powers of review would be inconsistent with the decision of the House taken at Second Reading (see May’s Parliamentary Practice, 18th edition, page 500).

I accordingly regret that I cannot accept the instruction of which the hon. member for Yeoville has given notice.

The Chairman will now take the Chair.

Order! Before putting clause 1, I want to point out that certain principles contained in the Bill have already been agreed to by the House at Second Reading. In terms of Standing Order No. 63, those principles may not be discussed by this Committee. It is established practice, however, that one member of each party is allowed to state his party’s attitude to such principles. Thus clauses 1, 2, 3, 4(b), 7 and 8 of the Bill embody the principle that action can be taken against organizations or persons promoting activities endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. I shall allow one member of each party to state his party’s attitude to this principle when the Committee discusses clause 1. Thereafter, debate on the other clauses embodying the same principle will be strictly confined to the details of those clauses. There are also other principles which have been agreed to and I shall apply the same approach in respect of these. I refer hon. members especially to the following groups of clauses, viz. clauses 4(c) to (f) and clause 5; clauses 12 to 14; and clauses 6, 9, 11 and 15.

Clause 1:

Mr. Chairman, if I may summarize the attitude of the Official Opposition in regard to the clauses of the Bill which contain the phraseology “engages in activities which endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order”—as you have indicated, Sir, this phraseology appears in a variety of clauses of the Bill—I want to point out that we appreciate that South Africa, and indeed Africa, but South Africa in particular, finds itself in times of unusual difficulties in the field of security and any Government would have to meet these difficulties. It is for that reason that we believe that the best way to handle this situation is for a Select Committee to meet where the dangers which face us could be fully substantiated by evidence from the appropriate authorities in order that the manner of combating those difficulties could be appreciated and the action required properly defined. It is impossible for any draftsman to put into words the sort of action, the sort of offence, the sort of penalty which ought to be applied to combat danger of that kind, unless the draftsman appreciates the precise nature of what is taking place and the precise nature of the activity which the Government is required to combat. As I have indicated, that is the reason why we have asked for a Select Committee. Well, the House has decided otherwise and one has now to face the legislation as it is without the benefit of a Select Committee. That means that it is not possible for those of us who take the view I have indicated, to draft amendments to the various clauses which would meet the case to our satisfaction, because we do not know precisely what dangers are involved.

The objection to the clause as it stands can, however, be stated simply. Instead of widening the scope of the offences for which subversive persons can be brought before the courts, convicted and put in gaol—the manner in which we believe the situation should be handled—the hon. the Minister has left section 11 of the Act entirely alone and has merely introduced clauses such as clause 1, which we are dealing with now, which widens the sphere within which he can take executive action— what one might call civil action—against the persons and organizations concerned. To us that is putting the thing the wrong way round. To us the field within which executive action can be taken by the hon. the Minister should be narrowed and the field within which the Police can operate, bringing charges and bringing offenders before the courts, should be widened. This is our principal objection to this clause and various others of this kind.

It is nevertheless the function of the Opposition to try, in the Committee Stage, to narrow the scope of anything it objects to, and for that reason I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Whilst the clause, even with the amendment, is still objectionable to us, the amendment does nevertheless limit the scope of the clause. As the clause stands at present, the hon. the Minister can take a purely subjective view— indeed, he is required to do so—of any file that is placed before him containing information in regard to activities which endanger the security of the State. Whether or not it was the intention of the person concerned so to endanger the security of the State, the hon. the Minister is entitled to act. The object of my amendment is to require the hon. the Minister to have regard to the intention, the guilty mind, of the person concerned, and I believe that the inclusion of these words would empower him to act only when he is satisfied that it was the intention of the person engaged in those activities in fact to endanger the State. Only then could he embark upon action in terms of the powers inherent in this clause. For the reasons I have given earlier, we would not, even if this amendment were to be accepted, be in agreement with this clause because we prefer criminal action in the courts to executive action by the hon. the Minister. Nevertheless, I believe the amendment would give a better dimension to the field within which the hon. the Minister would be required to operate and it would require a further exercising of his mind about the intention of those engaged in certain activities before he could legitimately take action.

Mr. Chairman, I want briefly to state the attitude of those of us who sit in these benches to the aspects raised under clause 1. I think the first point which needs to be made so that there can be no misunderstanding, is that persons and organizations which endanger the security of the State in fact need to be dealt with. We accept that. We believe, however, that those persons should be dealt with within the ambit of what the rule of law prescribes and they should be dealt with in the ordinary way. The normal, traditional process should be applied. We believe that only in times of war or in an emergency, which should be proclaimed, should the normal rules be suspended. Even in those circumstances there should be safeguards which, while not exposing the security of the State to danger, safeguard the individual. That is the principle upon which we approach these provisions.

The problem which arises is that the definitions of the functions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are becoming increasingly blurred in the South African scene. What is happening here, and what is appropriate to these clauses in particular, is that the executive is becoming predominant in this matter, because the executive does not only act in order to investigate whether an offence has been committed—in other words, through its police—and does not merely act as the entity which decides whether there should be a prosecution—that is the function of the Attorney-General and therefore an executive function—but it also acts as the judge in the matter and makes the decision as to whether a person should be restricted or should be affected in some form or another. In other words, the executive acts as prosecutor and as judge. Finally, the executive itself enforces the provision which, again, is an executive function in the ordinary course. Here we have a situation—that is why these provisions are unacceptable to us—that the executive is, in fact, all-powerful.

If we look at what the specific provisions are with which we deal here—I refer especially to the provisions of clause 1—we find that the importance of clause 1 is that it introduces another factor, a discretionary power for the hon. the Minister to exercise. What is more, he exercises these discretionary powers without notice and without hearing or, where he does not exercise them, the State President exercises them but also without notice and without hearing. We cannot look merely at clause 1 and the amendments which it seeks to bring about in section 2 of the principal Act, but must also look at the principal Act in order to see it in its context. There it is very clear that if the executive, i.e. the State President, is satisfied in regard to certain things, including the provisions of the proposed paragraph (cA), then he may without notice to the organization concerned, by proclamation in the Gazette do a variety of things. That makes it clear that there is no opportunity even for someone to put up a case or to be told that there is going to be action against him. It is done without notice and without a hearing. This we find entirely repugnant to the principles for which we stand.

While we support the amendment which the hon. member for Umhlatuzana has moved, the difficulty which we have with it—I am sure that he will concede that that difficulty exists—is that while the action is discretionary, while it cannot be tested in a court of law and while there is no appeal against it, to limit it in the way the hon. member’s amendment seeks to do, does not provide a solution, because it remains a discretion which is exercised and whether it is exercised in the manner in which it is now described in the subsection or whether it will be exercised in the manner in which the hon. member for Umhlatuzana intends it to be exercised, nobody will ever know.

If it is honest …

But the bona fides of the hon. the Minister cannot be tested and therefore we will never know. We are not talking about whether he is or is not honest. We are talking about the fact that nobody will ever know on what basis he has exercised his discretion. There is no way of testing this and there is no way of asking him for reasons. Indeed, there is no way of doing anything at all. Therefore, while we support the hon. member’s amendment, we really do not believe that it solves the problem. The problem cannot be solved while, in this particular case, the State President has absolute discretion to do as he likes in the circumstances. That is why, as far as we are concerned, we shall vote against clause 1 because it is completely contrary to a principle for which we stand.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

To begin with I want to say that there is a fairly big difference between myself and the hon. member for Umhlatuzana as far as the amendments to this clause are concerned. For the rest I think that the hon. member for Umhlatuzana has formulated his amendment rather clumsily. The first reason I want to advance for amending this clause, as well as clauses 2 and 3 of this Bill, so as to bring in the word “calculated” is that this will bring the Bill into line with the definitions in the Suppression of Communism Act, Act No. 44 of 1950. In the definition of “communist” in that Act, we read, inter alia—

Therefore my amendment is after the analogy of the existing definition in that Act. Section 2(2)(c) of the same Act provides that the State President may declare an organization to be an unlawful organization if he is satisfied that that organization—

of certain objects. My amendment seeks to adapt this Bill to the existing legislation. The same thing is found in section 9 of the principal Act, which is being amended by clause 3 of this Pill. Therefore, the intention is to bring in the word “calculated” so as to bring this measure into line with the principal Act.

As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana is concerned, it seems to me at this stage as though we are going to experience a problem with the amendment in that the clause, as it reads at present and as my amendment seeks to supplement it, gives us an objective test, whereas the amendment of the hon. member, in my opinion, embodies a subjective one. Therefore we cannot accept it. The very thing we want in this regard is an objective test, and not a subjective one, as that proposed by the hon. member. We can quote adequate authority to show that the courts have already taken up a standpoint with regard to words like “calculated” and “likely”. However, I do not want to take up the House’s time by dealing with this. Personally I believe that my amendment is better than that of the hon. member since I avoid a subjective test in my amendment and try to retain an objective one.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal with the amendment moved by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke. We are opposed to his amendment because, quite simply, it enlarges the scope of the clause further. As I read it, we are dealing with activities which “endanger the security of the State”. The amendment proposes to insert the words “or are calculated to endanger”. This introduces a new concept. Whilst one may not be able to say that certain activities do in fact endanger the security of the State, one can say that they could create a situation which would endanger the security of the State. In other words, it is clearly a wider concept than is contained in the clause as it stands. As I have indicated, we are already opposed to the present scope of the clause. We believe it is too wide and that the issue ought to be more clearly defined and limited. That is why I moved the amendment which I did. It goes without saying that we are opposed to the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke because, as I read it, it extends the concept even further.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that we are going to support the hon. member for Umhlatuzana, as the hon. member for Yeoville has pointed out, although we do not believe that his amendment by any means covers our objections to this clause. We shall certainly vote against the clause, even if the hon. member’s amendment is accepted. We are going to vote against the amendment moved by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke because we believe that, if anything, this widens the discretion which is given to the hon. the Minister. “Is calculated” means that it does away with intention, and, so far as we are concerned, this in fact widens the scope of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I have to decide between the wording as moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana and that moved by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke. The wording proposed by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana reads as follows—

The hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke moved the following wording—

During the Second Reading debate the criticism was expressed that I would possibly have to make use of a subjective test for the purpose of determining whether the security of the State was endangered. In the light of court decisions I am of the opinion that the proposed amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke puts it quite clearly that the test is, in fact, objective. I should like to refer hon. members to the case of the State v. Nokwe and Others (S.A. Law Reports, 1962 (3) p. 71). This was a case in the Transvaal Division of the Supreme Court, in which Mr. Justice Trollip expressed himself as follows—

“Calculated” is the word which the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke proposed—

This is precisely what is in fact envisaged with the present wording. It is an objective test. There must be something which can have effects, and in the light of that I declare that I am prepared to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke, but not that of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the hon. the Minister has now made the situation slightly worse, because what he has indicated by saying that he will accept the amendment by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke, is that, not only need there be no hostile intent, but the Act may not even have the effect of having a hostile effect on the situation.

Oh no, nonsense!

The result of this is that, by saying that he is prepared to accept the amendment, any act, even though it may be innocently intended—and even though it might not have the effect—if it is likely to have that effect, that would be sufficient for the hon. the Minister to exercise his discretion. That, of course, extends the clause substantially. It extends it substantially beyond what the present ambit is. It makes it clear that the objective test which the hon. member for Umhlatuzana wanted to have applied, will in fact never be applied. That strengthens the argument which we have put forward, i.e. that the whole matter is discretionary. Once it is discretionary, it does not even matter what the words are, because it can be exercised without ever being tested. Therefore it is a completely discretionary matter. We can only record our strongest protest, not only against this clause, but also against making the clause even worse by accepting the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke.

Amendment moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—81: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C; Du Plessis, G. C; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. G; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, C. J.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Heerden, R. F.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, S. F. Kotzé, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—81: Albertyn, J. T.; Badenhorst, P. J.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Hoon, J. H.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, C. J.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. R; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van den Berg, J. C.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Heerden, R. F.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux, C. V. van der Merwe and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—38: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Basson, J. D. du R; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 2:

Mr. Chairman, in terms of your ruling a little earlier, I do not propose to speak at length on this clause other than to state in a nutshell the objection of the official Opposition. The clause contains the same principle which we have already discussed, the question of publications, and gives to the hon. the Minister the power to prohibit publications which fall within the wide definition which we have already dealt with—that is to say, a matter which he believes is calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. Once again, without elaborating on it, we believe that this matter should be dealt with as with the offences mentioned in section 11 of the principal Act so that the matter can be dealt with as an offence before a criminal court rather than through the Minister’s discretion. We on this side of the House are, consequently, opposed to this clause.

Mr. Chairman, if ever there was a superfluous and dangerous clause in any Bill, it is the one we are dealing with now. The clause is superfluous for several reasons. The first reason—and I say this without fear of contradiction—is that there is no one in the South African Press who would wantonly or purposely make himself guilty of an offence which would endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order. [Interjections.] The Press operates in the open and not in the dark. Everyone knows and sees what the Press does, and I challenge anyone on that side of the House to mention the name of a single newspaper which would purposely make itself guilty of subversive activities. [Interjections.] However, let us leave the matter at that and take it that there is a newspaper or magazine here and there that would act in this way. I want to maintain that for cases like these, a whole battery of laws exists which, as far as the action …

Order! I informed the Committee earlier on that as far as clauses 1, 2, 3, 4(b), 7 and 8 were concerned, hon. members would be discussing a certain principle and that on clause 11 would allow one hon. member to state his party’s standpoint. As far as clauses 2, 3, 4(b), 7 and 8 are concerned, I shall therefore allow discussion of the details of those clauses only and not of the principle. Therefore the hon. member must not discuss the principle of the clause again now.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of procedure: We accept the ruling that you have given, but what we wish to do during the debate on this clause, is to debate why this particular clause, which relates to publications as such, should be retained in the Bill.

[Inaudible.]

Mr. Chairman, would you ask the hon. member for Pretoria Central to control himself? He is not the Chairman.

The hon. member may proceed.

What we want to advance is reasons why we will vote against this specific clause which deals solely with publications. That is a specific item. We do not want to deal with the principle of the clause, but only with the question of publications.

Order! The hon. member for Yeoville is a relatively new member in this House, and I must therefore direct his attention to Standing Order No. 63, which I referred to at the commencement of proceedings and which reads as follows—

I have given my ruling in this connection, and hon. members must abide by that ruling.

Mr. Chairman, may I take a point of order? As one who has been in this House for a long time, I want to say that it has always been the practice in this House that the details of the clauses could be discussed at the Committee Stage.

Yes, and I have said so.

Sir, that is exactly what the hon. member for Parktown wishes to do. May I point out that on clause 1 we discussed the general principle of extending the existing legislation to cover persons or organizations who are outside of the actual ambit of the Suppression of Communism Act. Now we are discussing the application, in detail, of certain of the provisions of this Bill to publications and newspapers, and I should like to put it to you, Sir, with respect, that you have not allowed the hon. member for Parktown to develop his argument.

Order! In terms of my ruling, only the details of this clause can be discussed, and not the principle involved. I want to be quite fair to the hon. member for Parktown. If he wishes to state his objections very briefly in this connection, I shall allow him to do so, but will not allow a repetition of the Second Reading debate. The hon. member may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to discuss anything other than the particulars of this clause, and I shall be pleased if you will assist me in this connection. If you do not allow me to say why we are of the opinion that the Minister already has enough legislation in terms of which he can take action against the Press, then I should like to put my argument differently. We are here dealing with the provision in terms of which the Minister only has the right to prohibit any publication if he is of the opinion that it is calculated to effect certain things. He can do so, and there is no appeal against such a decision. My objection is that in a case like this the Minister is not only the prosecutor, but also the judge. I want to try and prove that an extremely dangerous situation is being created in this Bill as far as the Press is concerned and after all, Mr. Chairman, this clause is solely concerned with the Press. How wide is this provision going to be? How are newspapers going to know when they infringe this provision? In this connection I should like to put a direct question to the hon. the Minister. Yesterday, in this House, he quoted a leader from The Daily News of Durban. May I now ask him whether, should this provision be accepted, he could take action against that newspaper with respect to that article? Could he, on the basis of that introductory article, take steps against that newspaper in terms of this provision? I hope the hon. the Minister will tell me, because with the application of this particular provision we are dealing with a very difficult practical problem. We must bear in mind that the hon. the Minister is going to take his own decision in this connection. How is a newspaperman going to know what norms are going to be applied? For instance, he may give his interpretation of an event quite sincerely.

In this connection I want to mention a specific example. Say for example there is a bus boycott in which Blacks are involved. A newspaper feels that it wants to give both sides of the matter and after an inquiry it decides to defend the standpoint of the boycotters. It thinks it is doing so in the public interest, and it does in fact do so in the interests of public opinion. But what happens if the Minister takes action and says that the newspaper’s action is a threat to law and order? What is the position of the newspaper then? This is my difficulty. This clause creates a situation of utter uncertainty as far as the newspapers and magazines are concerned. We hear so much from hon. members opposite and from the Government about freedom of the Press, but what becomes of freedom of the Press if it depends upon the interpretation of one individual? I do not know where we stand, Sir. The Minister and his advisers have one point of view and perhaps the newspaperman has another. What kind of norm must he recognise? Who is going to know under which circumstances the Minister can take action? The Minister can take action under any circumstances. I argue that as a result of this clause, we are going to create an untenable situation for the whole newspaper industry, not only as far as commentary is concerned, but also as far as interpretation and reporting is concerned. No newspaper, not even those who are usually well-disposed to the Government, will know precisely where it stands. I say this with respect, Sir, but they will have to live and work in a sort of atmosphere of a reign of terror as a result of this clause. I want to suggest that this is anything but the kind of atmosphere in which freedom of the Press can be exercised. I should like to warn the hon. the Minister, in all seriousness, that if this clause is accepted, it will create a situation in which that side will no longer be able to go around in the outside world saying that we have a totally free Press in this country. They are very fond of hawking the freedom of the Press, but their credibility will have been annihilated.

Order! The hon. member must not go too far.

I accept your guidance, Sir, but I think it is true that as a result of this clause, we are going to create a situation which will result in hon. members opposite no longer being able to defend themselves abroad, because we have here a limitation and a curtailment of the freedom of the Press, and also together with this, of the freedom of the right of the individual to know what is going on.

Sir, in reply to the argument of the hon. member for Parktown, I should like to point out to him that the wording in the proposed amendment consists of the same words which are already in the section relating to the furthering of the aims of communism. If we look at section 6(d) of the Act, we see that it provides that—

In other words, the uncertainty to which the hon. member is now referring, the uncertainty which suddenly arises when this particular clause is accepted, has already existed for 25 years.

No. There are other factors involved.

Sir, the hon. member said there were other factors which were now being dragged in. But this is not the case. The proposed amendment reads that should the State President be convinced that a publication “serves inter alia as a means for expressing views or conveying information, the publication of which is calculated to endanger the State …” The provision already contained in the Act reads “calculated to further the achievement of any of the objects of communism”.

Order! I think that the hon. member for Pretoria Central is going too far. He is now discussing the principle of the matter and this has already been decided at the Second Reading. If he discusses the details of this clause, I shall allow him to continue; if not, I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

I am in fact referring to the details of the clause and indicating that the words in the proposed amendment are precisely the same as those already in the Act. From this I conclude that since there is no uncertainty or atmosphere of a reign of terror in the Press of the country under the present Act, such an atmosphere will not prevail if this clause becomes part of the Act, either.

Mr. Chairman, I really cannot believe that the hon. member for Pretoria Central can be so ignorant as to argue as he has now argued. He said there was no uncertainty about communism, but there was indeed a degree of uncertainty about communism. The whole thing is now being extended here in that the following wording is envisaged—

However, it is a question of interpretation. Who can tell a newspaperman exactly what this means? To argue that the situation with regard to communism has not given rise to this type of uncertainty, is avoiding the whole argument. I simply cannot see the point of the argument.

Order! For the same reason that I called the hon. member for Pretoria Central to order, I must now also call the hon. member for Parktown to order. The principle is not the issue here.

Mr. Chairman, I want to speak specifically about two words which are contained in this amendment: Firstly, the word “information” in line 11 and, secondly, the word “calculated” in line 12.

Out of order!

Would you like to take over as chairman? We seem to have a lot of chairmen in this House. Mr. Chairman, would you mind making it clear that these hon. members are not chairmen of this House.

Order! Henceforth I am going to take very strict action against hon. members who interrupt a speaker. We cannot conduct a debate if we do not have order in the Committee. The hon. member may proceed.

Thank you. The first point I want to make is that this particular clause relates to the conveying of information. However, no reference is made to the conveying of false information. In other words, even though the information conveyed may be absolutely correct, the hon. the Minister may still act in terms of this clause. The clause therefore needs to be read with due attention to the word “calculated” because the word “calculated”—as the hon. the Minister has just indicated, quoting Justice Trollip—makes it clear that there need be no intent or intention at all to do any harm. In other words, a true fact, which is published without any hostile intent and which does not cause any harm to the security of the State, but which in the view of the hon. the Minister is only likely to cause harm to the security of the State, could result in action being taken if the hon. the Minister or the State President acted objectively. In my view that demonstrates that the word “calculated” is a harmful word to use in these circumstances. Let me now place this clause in the context of the principal Act. The principal Act makes it very clear that action is taken entirely without notice to the person concerned. In other words, a true fact, which is honestly published and in which there is no hostile intent, but which somebody merely thinks is likely to cause harm to the State, can result in a newspaper or some other publication simply being closed down. That is, in my opinion, the dramatic effect of this clause. What is interesting in relating this clause to section 6 of the principal Act, is that section 6 of the Act refers firstly to the profession by a publication that it is a publication advocating the spread of communism. In other words, the newspaper must indicate this in so many words. The second point at issue is publication or dissemination under the direction of an organization which has been declared to be unlawful. From this it is quite clear that a different context is involved here. Thirdly, a periodical or publication must serve as a means for expressing the views of such an unlawful organization.

The fourth point is that it serves as a means of expressing the views or conveying information which is calculated to further the achievement of the objects of communism.

The last one is that it is a continuation or substitution of another periodical. The effect is that we are now introducing into the section a new concept in its entirety so that the dissemination of true information which is only likely, perhaps, to cause harm, is in fact something which can allow the State President to act, and without notice. I want to stress that the tragedy of this is that by acting without notice you do not give a person an opportunity of explaining and you do not give him the opportunity to put his case to the Minister. In fact, having done it, there is not even a legal remedy to put it right. In these circumstances we submit that this clause is one which can only make direct inroads on what we regard as the freedom of the Press in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, although I accept your ruling that we may not discuss the principle involved, I do feel that we have to look at the application of the clause. We should know in exactly what way the hon. the Minister is going to apply it. If I am allowed just one brief word in regard to the Press, I should like to say to the hon. the Minister that the freedom of the Press is something which we jealously guard in this country.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. the Minister must not get angry.

You are chasing up hares.

No. The hon. the Minister must not get angry. I am not going to speak about the Press. I have given that undertaking.

You are just damaging the country.

No, I am not damaging the country at all. What I am trying to say to the hon. the Minister is that by the application of this provision he can damage the country. If he acts in terms of this provision in a manner which is not going to be understood, firstly, by the people of South Africa and, secondly, by the people outside South Africa, he will damage South Africa; he will damage the image of South Africa. He knows what I am saying, particularly in regard to the Press. However, this does not only apply to the Press.

I am not wholly satisfied that the hon. the Minister has asked for this provision simply so that he can deal with the Press. I do not believe that that is the only reason why the hon. the Minister has asked for this provision. I wonder whether the hon. the Minister will tell us what exactly he is looking for. Why does he need this provision? Why is it necessary to expand the provisions of section 6 of the principal Act? That Act enables him to deal with all facets of the furthering of the aims of communism.

If we come to what he is asking for now, we find that he is asking for power to take action against publications which are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. The warning which I must issue to the hon. the Minister is that “calculated” refers to the State President or, in effect, to the Minister himself because we must take note of the fact that the provision reads that “if the State President is satisfied that any periodical or other publication is calculated to endanger the security of the State …” There is no requirement for mens rea on the part of the publisher himself or of the writer. That is why the onus is very heavily on the Minister to see that he acts responsibly when he acts in terms of this.

He is asking that we extend this so that he can act against those publications which in his view are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. The hon. the Minister and I served on a Select Committee which was converted into a commission of inquiry and we went into the whole question of the publication of matter which are damaging to the State. The hon. the Minister knows the list of Acts and provisions which already exist and which we investigated in that commission, Acts and provisions enabling the State to act against publishers of publications which in any way affect the security of the State. He knows of the provisions, for instance, which are contained in the Industrial Conciliation Act and which empower him to act immediately when a publication appears which endangers the maintenance of public order or endangers the security of the State. He knows that in terms of the Publications Act he can immediately prohibit the dissemination of any publication which does those things. He knows that it can happen immediately; that was the whole intention of the majority of that commission and it is provided for in the Act which was eventually placed on the Statute Book. He can act immediately—it is not a long drawn out process as it was in the past, one of the reasons advanced by the hon. the Minister and members on his side of the House for the passing of the Act.

He knows, also, of the provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act. If he does have to act against a newspaper and the other provisions do not apply, he knows he can use the Riotous Assemblies Act because that does apply to newspapers and to people affiliated with the Newspaper Press Union. He should also know that in terms of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927 he has power to act immediately against any publication or any person who publishes any article which is designed to exacerbate racial feelings. He knows of all these provisions. Why, then, does he now take this power? Is this power necessary? That is the question this Committee must ask itself. The principle that the Minister may act against a publication is accepted, but we must ask ourselves now whether he requires this specific power …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May I inquire whether the hon. member is abiding by your ruling by dealing with the principle of the matter and asking whether the Minister requires these powers?

Order! The Chair will decide when the hon. member is out of order. The hon. member may proceed.

Thank you, Sir. I was busy making my final point, which is that, although the principle that the Minister may act against a publication is accepted, the Committee must now ask itself whether the Minister requires this specific power to act against a publication. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, it virtually breaks my heart to see what emotion the hon. member for Parktown is showing all of a sudden.

This is an important matter.

Yes, it is an important matter, but the hon. member does not understand it correctly. He has not read the Acts concerned. It makes me feel rather unhappy, since this is such an important matter, that the hon. member deals with it without his having read the Acts concerned. This is what disturbs me. The hon. member said the Minister could do this and the Minister could do that, but section 6, of the principal Act provides: “If the State President is satisfied …” Surely that is not I alone.

Oh, please!

Oh, yes. The hon. member is dealing with a very serious matter. If the State President “has to be satisfied”, it is not only the Minister who is involved. That is the point I wish to make. If the hon. member cannot understand that, he has no notion whatsoever of how laws and the executive work. That is his difficulty. If reference is made to the “State President”, it means that the Minister is not the only one who is involved. It means: The State President acting on the recommendation of the executive. Therefore, it includes the whole Cabinet. That is the first point in respect of which the hon. member was totally wrong.

It is totally irrelevant.

In a moment the hon. member will have another opportunity to lay an egg. She need not cackle in advance.

Do not be so rude!

Let us look at the present wording of the Act as it has been applicable to the Press since 1950.

†I quote section 6—

In terms of the Bill the following paragraph is to be added after paragraph (d)—

So far the wording is exactly the same. However, where paragraph (d) continues ”… to further the achievement of any of the objects of communism”, paragraph (dA) states ”… to endanger the security of the State”. The point I wish to make is that “to further the achievement of any of the objects of Communism” must also envelope or include “to endanger the security of the State”. One of the objects of communism, a well-known object, is to endanger the security of the State and the maintenance of public order. In other words, clause 2 contains no extension whatsoever.

Why then do you need the new provision?

Wait a second; let me just complete my argument. The only reason why this provision is included, is because this specifies the norm, and the newspapers must go by that norm. Before, the newspapers had before them “the objects of communism” with the stress on the word “communism”. Now it will be the responsibility of the Press to consider especially the security of the State. It is the same responsibility as before. It is exactly the same responsibility, though an editor has to decide for himself as to whether his newspaper, his periodical, or whatever his publication may be, is endangering the security of the State. That is the responsibility to which I tried to draw the attention of the Press during the Second Reading. The Press should have adhered to that since 1950, and I hope they will adhere to it until 2050.

Have they not adhered to it up to now?

That is not what I am talking about. I am talking on this clause in the Committee Stage.

Why do you say then that they should have adhered to it?

I say that they should have adhered to it, of course. That is the law.

But have they not?

I do not know whether they have adhered to it or not. How can you ask me that? [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, now some hon. members contend that newspapers may be prohibited simply in the street. I want to refer them, however, to section 17 of the present Act.

†The Suppression of Communism Act, section 17, says the following:

That hon. member should not continue accusing me of doing this or that, or and of being able to do this or that, when my hands are fettered by the fact that it is the State President who acts, and also by the fact that section 17 of the Act is applicable. In any case, the accent has been shifted to the security of the State and away from the objects of communism. However, it remains exactly the same thing.

Then why did you ask the question?

It is exactly the same thing. It involves no extension whatsoever.

Mr. Chairman, I want to mention two points that need to be dealt with in so far as the hon. the Minister’s reply is concerned. Firstly, I do not believe that anybody is arguing about the question of whether it is the hon. the Minister or the executive. We have made it very clear, we have repeatedly stated that what we are talking about, is executive action. With great respect to the hon. the Minister, for him to say now that he does not have the responsibility …

Sophistry.

With respect, the hon. the Minister knows what the position is. He knows that he recommends to the executive. He knows that the executive recommends to the State President. He also knows that we are talking about executive action. There is no question of doubt on that issue. With great respect to the hon. the Minister, it is irrelevant.

The second point: The hon. the Minister referred us to section 17 of the Act. We are quite aware of section 17, but what the hon. the Minister had not dealt with, and what he cannot deal with, unless he is prepared to amend the legislation, is that there is no notice to the affected person, no question of a hearing, and, what is more, he receives a report without there being any obligation upon anybody going to a newspaper in the first place to inform the editor that it is the intention to take action. That is what the complaint is. It makes it very clear that it is a prohibition without notice to the person concerned. With great respect to the hon. the Minister, in section 17 there is no provision for notice to the person concerned. If one accepts that there should be notice to the person concerned, or if one wants to argue that, he should get up and state that he accepts that there should be notice. We shall then move an amendment immediately. With great respect, we cannot have the situation where the hon. the Minister gets up and says: “You are blaming me for everything”. Of course, we are blaming him. He is the Minister representing the executive in this issue. Yesterday he waxed all lyrical about his responsibilities. He was not prepared to abdicate. But today he is pushing them off. [Interjections.]

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Venter, A. A.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (‘t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 3:

I should like to suggest that since this provision is contained in clause 1as well, hon. members need not state their cases in full again.

Mr. Chairman, I rise only to move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

For the record I should just like to say that our argument here is exactly the same as that on clause 1.

Mr. Chairman, we are here dealing with the application of the same principle, i.e. activities “which endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.” We are here dealing with the application of that principle in relation to the power of the hon. the Minister to prohibit the attendance of persons at gatherings or the holding of certain gatherings—in other words the application of that principle to section 9 of the principal Act. The section of the principal Act which is here sought to be amended empowers the Minister to issue, when he is satisfied that certain activities are taking place, a notice which can prohibit a person from attending gatherings or any particular gathering at a particular place or of a particular nature. It is necessary to understand the import of this section to appreciate what a gathering is in terms of the principal Act. I shall not state it in detail other than to say that “gatherings” is widely defined so as to include almost any type of gathering of persons, whether for sporting, business or social reasons. Consequently, a power such as we are dealing with, which prohibits a person from attending a gathering, is a power of very wide import indeed. It is wide as it presently stands, tied as it is to the concept of communism or furthering the aims of communism.

Order! I hope the hon. member will not take that point too far, because we are not discussing the principal Act now.

Indeed, Sir, I am not taking it any further. I merely wish to say that to include the phrase which we have discussed throughout the Bill so far makes it even wider. The inclusion of the amendment which was moved by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke widens it still further, for the reasons which we discussed when he moved the same amendment under a previous clause. Therefore, it remains merely for me to say that our opposition in principle to this clause is the same as our opposition in principle to the previous two clauses, namely that it constitutes a widening of executive discretion and power rather than the combating of evils of this kind through the courts. Therefore we are opposed to this clause.

Mr. Chairman, it goes almost without saying, as indeed it will have to be in terms of your ruling, that we are going to oppose this clause. We also oppose the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke which, as the hon. member for Umhlatuzana has correctly said, and we agree, widens the whole ambit of this clause. We shall be opposing it on those grounds. I want to point out that the hon. the Minister cannot coyly tell this Committee that this is not his responsibility, that it is the responsibility of the State President. This clause states very definitely—

Now the responsibility is firmly on the hon. the Minister’s shoulders and he cannot raise any technical objection, as he did with the hon. member for Parktown in respect of the previous clause. This puts us at the mercy of ministerial decision. It is the tyranny of ministerial discretion to which we are subjected by the widening of the powers which the hon. the Minister already has in terms of the principal Act. I would like the hon. the Minister to give hon. members some example, if he can, of the sort of case that he had in mind when he found it necessary to increase his authority by this clause. I would also like to know whether the hon. the Minister will tell hon. members whether he intends to issue any warning to the persons concerned before he takes the pretty drastic action of forbidding them to attend any gathering, bearing in mind that the term “gathering” can be very widely interpreted in terms of the law. As we know from previous cases, “gathering” is defined as anything more than two persons. The difficulty of persons who fall under ministerial discretion or tyranny—as I prefer to call it—in terms of this clause is that their personal lives can be limited to the utmost. They can be made to live lives of utmost loneliness. I want to know what the hon. the Minister contemplates and the sort of people he has in mind, because it now goes very much further than communism, as we have argued earlier. I know of many people who are engaged in what normal countries would consider to be perfectly normal activities, e.g. trying to improve the conditions of people who are disfranchised and have no other way of organizing themselves, helping those people to improve their standards of living by teaching the benefits of collective bargaining, and so on. I would very much like to know what the hon. the Minister has in mind with this clause.

Mr. Chairman, all I have in mind is gatherings which endanger the security of the State.

A trade union meeting, for example?

I do not know; it will depend on the gathering and the reason why it was called. It will depend on a number of factors which will be taken into account to assess whether the meeting will endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. That is the final test. Anybody who gathers to dance, will be able to dance. If they go there to do something which will endanger the security of the State, the gathering will be stopped. The hon. member must make no mistake about that. The time has come to clean South Africa of people who are endangering the State.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the time has come to chuck the Government out. That is more to the point. I would like to ask the hon. the Minister whether he considers that a gathering of workers, for instance, who consider that they should have collective bargaining rights and are addressed by people who wish to show them how they can put their case to the Wage Board, is likely to come within the ambit of this clause?

It is not possible for me to answer the theoretical suppositions which the hon. member puts to me. I will have to assess the position when it comes before me.

Amendment put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—80: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Wyk, A. C; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—41: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—80: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, M. C.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Van Wyk, A. C.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—41: Aronson, T.; Bartlett, G. S.;Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 4:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The argument in this case is the same as the one applicable to the previous clause.

Mr. Chairman, our objection to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke has already been stated three times and I therefore do not propose to state it again. Suffice it to say that we are opposed to his amendment for the reasons stated.

This is the clause that deals with internment, i.e. the hon. the Minister’s ability to detain people. Our objection to the phraseology of the amendment is the same as the objection already stated. Let me simply say that it widens the hon. the Minister’s discretion and we are opposed to that. Accordingly I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

In other words, the State President may not issue a proclamation bringing the hon. the Minister’s powers of detention into effect in respect of any area in the Republic unless he has regard to certain criteria set out in the amendment, the said criteria being that he must be satisfied that there is action threatening the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order, that circumstances have arisen seriously threatening the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order and that the ordinary law of the land is inadequate to enable the Government to deal with that situation. What I have tried to introduce here, therefore, is an amendment to the effect that before the hon. the Minister’s discretionary powers come into effect, the State President has to decide that there are circumstances prevailing in the area concerned which, in terms of the Public Safety Act, would enable him to declare a state of emergency in that area. The wording I have introduced in the amendment is almost verbatim the wording taken from the Public Safety Act relating to the power of the State President to declare a state of emergency.

I can understand the hon. the Minister’s reluctance to declare a state of emergency, firstly because of the ensuing administrative difficulties. One can also visualize circumstances which could have economic effects one would wish to avoid. However, that is overcome by the amendment I have proposed because the acceptance by the hon. the Minister of my amendment would not require him to declare a state of emergency. It would merely require him to come to the conclusion that those circumstances do exist before the hon. the Minister can exercise the powers of detention set out in section 10 of the principal Act, the scope of which we are widening here as a result of the amendments proposed in this clause. I can see no reason why the hon. the Minister should not accept this amendment. It would have the effect of limiting, to a certain extent, the ambit of the clause in question—the wideness of which we object to—but it would do so in a manner which, it is my belief, the hon. the Minister should find acceptable. The Public Safety Act is an Act which was accepted by both sides of the House when it was passed. Neither have I heard any suggestion, during this debate, that its powers are either too wide or unnecessary. Therefore, for the reasons I have mentioned I hope the hon. the Minister will find it possible to accept this amendment. I have already indicated that we are opposed to the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke and that we are also opposed to the principle of detention without trial which is contained in this clause.

Mr. Chairman, we shall support the amendment of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana, but I must say, in all honesty, that I do not think it really meets the case at all. He is attempting to narrow the manner in which this is going to be introduced, but in the end, as we all know, the responsibility rests with the hon. the Minister. The introduction of the State President does not really mean very much in practice.

Why do you not vote against it then?

Because it does not do any harm, but it certainly does not do much good. Even if it were to be accepted, let me tell the hon. member for Umhlatuzana, we are still going to oppose the clause. As far as we are concerned it therefore makes no difference to the actual effects of the clause. For the reasons mentioned in connection with previous clauses we are, of course, going to oppose the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke since it widens the whole ambit of this clause. I want to talk about the major part of this clause in order to express my party’s point of view. Sir, I want to obey your ruling and shall not discuss that part of the clause which has nothing to do with the widening of the definition. I refer to the whole principle of ministerial discretion or, as I have put it before, the tyranny of ministerial discretion. The Minister has to decide whether or not he is going to intern people in this country, whether on a large scale or a small scale, or whatever he wants to call it. In fact, it boils down to the tyranny of ministerial discretion, because the Minister will be able to keep people either in prison, or in a place which is designated as a prison, for periods up to one year, but since it can be proclaimed anew, it means that the internment can go on indefinitely.

As I have pointed out before, the necessity for reproclamation by the State President is no deterrent whatsoever. The hon. the Minister has to advise the Cabinet, the Cabinet then advises the State President, and that is that. This section will be reproclaimed year after year. First of all we want to reiterate our implacable opposition to any law which allows the hon. the Minister the discretion of locking people up, be it in prison, in an internment camp, or anywhere else for that matter, without such a person having been found guilty under the laws of South Africa by due process in the courts of law. That is the simple definition of the rule of law. One hon. member here said that he did not know of any definition of the rule of law, but I can refer him to Dicey, to other legal authorities, to an article by Prof. Beinardt and even to the article from which the hon. the Minister quoted yesterday in support, believe it or not, of the measure that he was introducing. I refer to the article on the rule of law by Adv. Arthur Suzman. For the hon. the Minister to use that article, or any sentence of it, to justify what he is doing, is sophistry in the extreme, because the hon. the Minister knows perfectly well, since he presumably read the entire article …

It was just stating the law …

The entire article was against the abrogation of the rule of law in South Africa. The hon. the Minister quoted only one sentence out of the article.

It was a statement of our legal position.

But the hon. the Minister, without any doubt, quoted it in support of this Bill. It is true that in that article Adv. Suzman says that it is accepted that every State is entitled, in exceptional circumstances, to take exceptional measures to preserve its own security. The whole article was written in order to expose the untruths in a pamphlet of the Department of Foreign Affairs published on South Africa and the rule of law. I shall come back to the matter of exceptional circumstances.

I want to come now to what the hon. member for Umhlatuzana has said. He said he could understand the hon. the Minister’s reluctance to proclaim a state of emergency before taking these powers.

I did not say that.

Yes, the hon. member did. Those were his exact words. He will see them in his Hansard tomorrow. I listened very carefully to the hon. member. He said he could understand. That does not mean that he approves. However, he can understand.

I did not say “these powers”. I simply said the proclaiming of a state of emergency for economic reasons.

But then surely one must go on to say “before assuming emergency powers”.

Do not attribute words to me which I did not use.

But that is what all this is about. What are we discussing today but the hon. the Minister’s taking emergency powers without declaring a state of emergency? That is what all this is about. The hon. the Minister had the impertinence yesterday to infer that certain members on these benches wanted him to declare a state of emergency because they made money out of it. Well, the hon. the Minister may know something about justice, although I must say that this hope is fading by the minute as I sit in this House. I do not think he knows anything about justice. I believe his whole philosophy is that of a man who is steeped in totalitarian philosophy. And he knows absolutely nothing about economics. If anybody stood to lose by the declaration of a state of emergency, it was the people who had some possessions in this country. After the declaration of a state of emergency, property values dropped to nothing and share values dropped approximately £631 million within six months. What does he think one stands to gain by that?

Who made the money?

Nobody did.

The “bears” did; and the hon. member knows who the “bears” are.

South Africa lost the confidence it desperately needed. The hon. the Minister must not think he is fooling anybody by coming to this House and having emergency powers given to him which he can apply without a state of emergency being declared. If anything is calculated to erode the confidence of overseas investors in South Africa’s stability, it is that the Government should come along and declare that it needs these emergency powers whether it declares a state of emergency or not.

And you like it.

What did the hon. the Deputy Minister say?

I said you like it.

Sir, would you please stop these ludicrous remarks from hon. members.

Order!

Sir, we are dead against this hon. Minister, or any other hon. Minister for that matter, taking arbitrary powers unto himself to deprive persons of their liberty without due process of the law. Let hon. members not tell me that the hon. the Minister is acting in terms of the law because Parliament has passed such a law. There is a vast difference between “the rule of law” and “rule by law”. What the hon. the Minister is doing today, is to pass an enabling law. He is enabling himself to take powers which go right outside the normal rule of law as it is understood in any democratic country in the world.

I want to quote from a statement made by a judge of the Supreme Court in India—the hon. the Minister referred to India as one of the countries that had taken certain powers. Incidentally, those powers were taken only after a state of emergency had been declared. At least to that extent India respects democratic practices. The hon. judge stated the following—

This is an enabling law which allows the hon. the Minister to abrogate the basic principle of the rule of law, which is the writ of habeas corpus, the only thing that protects the individual against the might of the State which can call to its command a Police Force and an Army if necessary. That is what the hon. the Minister is doing.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, he cannot. I have only five minutes left.

Why do you not quote what Judge Broome said as well?

You can quote him; I am quoting the judge of the Supreme Court of India to which the hon. the Minister referred yesterday in his argument. There is no question about it: We are now going to have internment in South Africa, call it by any pretty name you like. The hon. the Minister took umbrage at the fact that I called this “the SS Bill”. In fact, I did not originate the phrase. The Bill had already been called that by the Press in many parts of South Africa. However, I do not withdraw my support of that title, because it is an SS Bill.

That is a disgrace!

Also, it is a communist Bill because it is only in such countries that one found the introduction of laws that gave the Ministers such powers without charging anyone in a court of law or presenting any evidence against him.

You have already made the headlines.

Never mind about headlines; just answer my arguments, and do so without being personal. Answer my arguments, and never mind about the personalities involved. I would oppose this Bill, and so would my colleagues on these benches, irrespective of whether this Minister or any other Minister introduced it. Let the hon. the Minister reply to our arguments and not try to introduce the question of personalities and other completely irrelevant matters such as the lists I submitted to him in order to find out what had happened to people who had disappeared because anxious relatives want to know where they had gone.

Not relatives.

Is the hon. the Minister going to tell me where people disappear to in his internment camps? [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Houghton is quite carried away.

Yes, I am! And so should you be.

The fact that the hon. member for Houghton is well known to be soft both on communism and on security, should…

That did not work in Durban North.

She should not allow that …

Will you never learn?

Order!

She should not… [Interjections.]

Order! I am not going to allow a dialogue between the hon. member for Umhlatuzana and the hon. member for Houghton.

That is the last thing I have in mind, Sir. [Interjections.]

It will be a monologue anyway. [Interjections.]

If it is to be a monologue, it will not be me, but the hon. member for Houghton, who will conduct it. What I want to do is to put the record straight and to restore the debate to the facts, as opposed to the distortions I have heard from the hon. member who has just spoken.

[Inaudible.]

And what are the facts, Sir?

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the word “distortions”.

I withdraw the word “distortions”, Sir. It was misinterpretation by the hon. member for Houghton…. Now, what was the hon. the Minister’s case yesterday? The hon. the Minister’s case yesterday was made in reply to the standpoint of this side, which was that we are opposed to detention without trial, and that it could be justified only in the circumstances of a state of emergency or war, and then under safeguards. That was the standpoint of this side of the House. It was clearly stated and the hon. member for Houghton heard it. It was also clearly stated in the fourth interim report, which we discussed. Now, it was in reply to that statement—that we are opposed to detention without trial except at a time of national emergency or war, and under safeguards—that the hon. the Minister has said there are disadvantages in declaring a state of emergency. He sought to take these powers because he could do it without declaring a state of emergency. It was in reply to that—which the hon. member for Houghton heard—that I said in my speech, in favour of this amendment, that, if my amendment would be accepted the State President nevertheless has to have regard to the requirements of a state of emergency, without actually declaring it. The powers of the application of this clause would be limited to that extent.

I went on to say—and the hon. member for Houghton heard it—that we were nevertheless opposed to the clause, because we are opposed, as I said earlier, to detention without trial, even if my amendment is accepted, because it does not conform with the requirements which were so clearly stated during the Second Reading. I have found it necessary to restate the position because of the misrepresentation we have had from the hon. member for Houghton.

[Inaudible.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member allowed to accuse another hon. member of misrepresentations?

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I have given attention to what the hon. member for Umhlatuzana had to say about his proposed amendment. The problem with regard to the proposed amendment, and the mistake the hon. member for Umhlatuzana is making, is that he thinks that I have only proposed this Bill because I do not want to declare the state of emergency as such. That is quite correct; that is one of the factors which I did mention. It is a factor which could have harmful consequences for the economy of South Africa. This has already been proved in the past. If, however, I may refer the hon. member to my Second Reading speech, I want to bring to his attention once again that in it I also referred to the situation as a situation which was less serious than the state of emergency and which was covered by the Public Safety Act of 1953. In my Second Reading speech I said that when it came to situations of this kind, I was covered. Then I could declare the state of emergency. There are a number of regulations and there would be a vast number of internments. Then there is a movement away from prisons and things of that kind. This Bill provides for a less serious situation than that covered by the Public Safety Act. Now the hon. member is furnishing me with the very three conditions contained in the Act mentioned. In other words, he is shifting the situation I want in the Bill back to the 1953 Act. With respect, the hon. member is taking it too far. Then I do not need this Bill. I should quite simply have to carry on under that Act, because then the situation would be far worse. Quite apart from this, I looked at the hon. member’s amendment. The third amendment in particular I find very difficult, even under the 1953 Act. I do not know at exactly what stage it may be said that “the ordinary law of the land is inadequate to enable the Government to ensure the safety…

That is the essence of the amendment.

Surely we are now dealing with administrative action. It depends on the situation, not on the laws, the courts or whatever. The courts are factors which will be taken into account. If all the courts were to become congested with a lot of court cases, if the Police were caught up in the investigation of court cases, this is the factor which must be taken into account. Last night in my Second Reading reply I said that I was after the spiders, the people who sit tight and make a small move or do planning, those people whom it is most difficult to prove guilty and for whom the longest investigations are necessary, but whom one knows are guilty because once one has apprehended and removed him, all the planning suddenly comes to a halt. One then knows, surely, that one has taken the right man. It is these people whom I am really trying to deal with here. That is why it is impossible for me to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I must take the hon. the Minister to task for the explanation which he has just given with regard to the amendment which has been moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. I do not want to repeat the viewpoint of this side of the House, that we reject this type of apprehension, this form of detention without trial, but I wonder if the hon. the Minister is well aware of it. However, I would like to say for his edification that the intention is to provide as adequate safeguards as is perhaps possible to provide in regard to the principle which apparently has been accepted by the House as the amendment to the Act and represented by the clause which we are discussing. The position is that in the Public Safety Act the State President takes these matters into account before he declares a state of emergency. Here the hon. the Minister wishes powers to intern to be granted to the State President by proclamation. He said in his Second Reading speech, and I think even in his reply to the Second Reading, that there are certain offences or crimes which cannot be pinned down within the concept of some legal definition. That is why we say that he must at least be in a position where he is satisfied that the ordinary law of the land is inadequate. If there is nothing in the Statutes at all, nothing in the common law or otherwise, to enable the Minister to take the normal procedure in apprehending people, the normal procedure in avoiding crime, the normal procedure in arresting people on a charge and bringing them before the courts, then we say that these are the safeguards that are being provided, not necessarily because we like the provisions of the clause or the powers which the hon. the Minister wants, but to some extent to alleviate the harshness of the steps, which we decry because they are extremely harsh steps to take. It is a power which most democracies feel should not be in the hands of an individual, irrespective of person. We are not dealing with the hon. the Minister personally. We are not dealing with a person; we are dealing with the power which is now going to be established in our legal system.

Order! The hon. member is going too wide now. He must not deal with the principle.

No, Sir. I have already said that the ruling is that there is a principle here and it is in respect of that principle that we are endeavouring to alleviate its harshness. The hon. the Minister will have the right to act, but at least let us be satisfied that before that proclamation is issued, without having recourse to the Public Safety Act and talking of a national emergency, that the executive is satisfied that there is nothing in the ordinary law or common law of the land which will enable him to take the steps which he should take, because this is a very harsh step and one which I think, even from the hon. the Minister’s point of view, is something which under normal conditions is, as I have said, an abhorrent step to take.

Mr. Chairman, I readily concede that the hon. member for Jeppe is correct when he states that no one would like to carry out the proclamation. I am the last person to want to do so. But why, then, bind me with three directions which already appear in another Act. I want to ask hon. members to give me the right to take all factors into account. Let me tell hon. members right away that I shall consider all factors very carefully before we resort to detaining people without trial.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether he will give an indication of some cause he would regard as sufficient other than the three provided for in the amendment?

Mr. Chairman, I shall reply to the question by the hon. member for Green Point in a moment My standpoint is that at any stage I shall have to take all factors into account. The hon. member asks me to give him examples. However, I cannot imagine all the different possibilities and facets of this kind of behaviour. What I am prepared to do, however—and this will necessarily have to occur—is to come to the House after the expiration of the period and the House can call me to account, whether in the no-confidence debate or under my Vote. Hon. members will be able to tell me that I had detained, say, 20 people for more than six months, and may ask what the state of emergency is to which I referred. They can demand that I state what exactly is going on. I am prepared to be fully accountable to the House for my actions under the Act. What I am stating now, is fact. I am accountable to the House and the nation for all my actions, and I am not going to run away from that. When the time for action comes and I fail in my responsibility, I shall resign.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether he appreciates the point that there is nothing personal as far as he is concerned. He might be the most wonderful person in the world. He might be most impartial and have the most objective outlook. But what happens if another Minister comes in his place …

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the signs of lack of confidence in any of my successors is touching. When I review the situation, I come to the conclusion that all the Ministers of Justice before me were quite probably better than I. I cannot understand why the hon. member should foresee that there will be worse Ministers of Justice than I in the future. [Interjections.]

The standard is going down!

Hon. members must accept my bona fides because the issue here is my bona fides. If such a proclamation becomes necessary, then I shall declare myself to be prepared to come back to the House after the events have occurred and say what I did and why I did it. Hon. members will then be able to hang me for what I have done. However they should not hang me before the time.

Mr. Chairman, in terms of what he has said, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister whether he is going to supply the House with a list of the names of the people interned by him. If I were to put a question on the Order Paper, would he answer that question?

No, certainly not.

Ah! You see …

Obviously not in a crisis period.

But the hon. the Minister has told us that there is no crisis period.

Does the hon. member mean at this stage?

I am not speaking in terms of the Terrorism Act. I submitted the list to him to try to find out where people who have disappeared have got to, because anxious relatives want to know.

What is the question?

The question is whether the hon. the Minister will answer questions when he puts people away in his camps or his prisons, or whatever he wants to call them, and I ask him whether he has interned anybody or put somebody away under section so or so; if so, how many and who are they? Would the hon. the Minister tell us that? Not that I want to know it for any sinister motive. The country is entitled to know, and so are the relatives.

Mr. Chairman, it would depend entirely on whether it was in the public interest to furnish the names or not. The hon. member wants me simply to furnish names, but during my Second Reading reply I indicated to her why I could not always do this.

Business suspended at 12h45 and resumed at 14h15.

Afternoon Sitting

Mr. Chairman, the arguments the hon. the Minister advanced before the lunch adjournment justify the stand taken by this side of the House during the Second Reading of this Bill, namely that this measure should be referred to a Select Committee to thrash out those very points. It is all very well for the hon. the Minister to say that after he has proclaimed a state of emergency and after he has taken certain executive action, we would have the opportunity in this House to criticize his actions either during the debate on his Vote or in the no-confidence debate. But that can be six to nine months after the event. We shall not even know of all the action which has been taken and therefore be working in the dark. There is no provision in the Bill that the hon. the Minister must report everything he has done to Parliament. We shall be aware of the proclamation, but we shall not be aware of how many people have been detained or who have been detained. It could happen that the relatives of detained people would also not be aware of it. I raised this question with the hon. the Minister also during the Second Reading debate. I now want to give notice that I intend moving an amendment to clause 6 which will make it obligatory upon any officer of the State to advise the next of kin when action is taken in terms of the new section 10(a)bis. What has been the position up to now? A man, convicted of an offence and imprisoned, simply has his period of detention extended by executive action.

Order! The hon. member cannot discuss that at this stage.

Sir, I am merely stating the difference between the two situations, as it is now and as it will be in terms of this clause. With respect, that is the present position, namely that the next of kin of a detainee are aware of the fact that he is being detained in a prison. In terms of the present Act the hon. the Minister extends his detention in that particular prison. Now the hon. the Minister asks for the power, whether a person has been convicted or not, to pick him up at any time and under any circumstances covered by the Act. The hon. the Minister can then have him confined to any prison anywhere in the Republic. The hon. the Minister may, at any time, have him removed from that prison to any other prison and, in the words of the hon. the Minister …

Order! The hon. member is now discussing a principle and I cannot allow him to continue on those lines.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I am fully aware of your ruling and I am prepared to abide by it, but I am simply mentioning the circumstances which pertain in terms of this section, as the hon. the Minister wishes to amend it, in order that I may make a case.

The hon. member may refer to it very briefly, but I am not going to allow him to discuss it at any length.

I shall be as brief as possible. In the words of the hon. the Minister, in his reply to the Second Reading debate, it need not even be what is today acknowledged as being a prison. It can be some other place which may be declared a prison.

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to continue on those lines. If the hon. member does not abide by my ruling, I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

Having received all these powers from Parliament, the hon. the Minister can have this person removed without notifying the next of kin, so that it could happen that the next of kin would be unaware of the whereabouts of their relative who has been apprehended and locked up by the hon. the Minister. It is for that reason, Sir, that it is my intention, under clause 6, to move that a new clause be added, to read: …

Order! The hon. member can discuss that on clause 6.

Very well, Sir. In that case, I give notice now that it is my intention to move an amendment to rectify that position.

Mr. Chairman, just before the lunch adjournment I asked the hon. the Minister what information this House was going to be given in respect of the people he was going to intern, or put away, or gaol, or whatever term he cares to use—they are all much the same as far as I am concerned.

[Inaudible.]

Well, what would you prefer me to use?

Use whichever one you prefer.

I think “intern” is the correct term, so that is the word I shall use. I should like to know whether he is going to give this House and the country any information about the people that he is going to intern. Sir, he used the old escape hatch of Ministers, which has been used over all these years, and said that he would only do so if it was in the public interest to disclose that information. I want to point out to the hon. the Minister that under the 90-day provision we at least had that amount of information forthcoming from hon. Ministers. A list was tabled, or we were informed in this House, of which persons had been detained under that provision. Under the Terrorism Act, of course, there was no such provision. In fact, the Terrorism Act expressly forbade any information to be made available. The Bill remains silent on this point, and that is why I am asking whether we are going to have any details about this. I want to give the hon. the Minister one reason why I ask this. There has been a tendency for the Government, and the Minister in particular, to object to the use of the term “political prisoner” in respect of people who are in gaol in South Africa. Always, when one uses that term either in the House or by way of a question, one is told that one must talk about people who are in gaol for crimes against the State. That is the official terminology. If we are not going to have any information given to us about people who have not been convicted for crimes against the State …

You will be able to use that term in respect of this provision.

Well, then one will have to use the term “political prisoner”. The hon. the Minister says that he does not mind that and that he has no objection to that.

I cannot have an objection, because they will not have come before a court, but I have an objection now, because all these prisoners have been before a court.

All right, but from now on the Minister is prepared to accept that we have political prisoners in South Africa.

We have not.

But we will have, the minute you intern the first person.

Yes.

The hon. the Minister says “yes”.

Order! That is not under discussion now.

But, Sir, we are dealing with clause 4. I am sorry, Sir, but, with respect, I must question your ruling. I am not discussing the principle of the clause.

Order! We are not dealing with political prisoners at this moment.

Mr. Chairman, under this clause the hon. the Minister is going to intern people, and I want to know the consequences of that internment. I am not discussing the principle of interning them. I did so in an earlier speech. I am now following the consequences of this through in its details.

The answer is that you can call them whatever you like.

Yes, but what are you going to call them?

I am going to call them whatever I like. [Interjections.]

Well, that is very interesting. What I have established, Sir, is that the hon. the Minister admits that from the moment he interns the first person under clause 4 of this Bill, South Africa will officially have political prisoners.

He did not say that. He said you could call them that.

Oh yes, he did. I shall watch this Hansard very carefully, believe me. I believe this has also been observed by other members of the House. This Hansard will remain unchanged. Sir, I want to point out to the hon. the Minister that yesterday he gave us a long list, and said that he needed this clause because, if I followed him correctly, there were so many cases presently before the courts that if he had to leave it to the courts to examine these cases, the courts would be cluttered up.

I never said that.

Well, you inferred that the courts …

I never inferred that.

… were too busy to handle some cases …

I never inferred that.

Well, then I drew an inference which the hon. the Minister says he did not in fact…

You always do.

Oh, no, I do not always do that, and you are very quick to pull me up on a few instances when I do.

Order!

Very well, I shall leave that matter, but the hon. the Minister did say yesterday—and I have his speech here; with regard to the matter I have just referred to, I thought the Minister had made that statement this morning, but I do not have that speech— that he was right in all the actions which he took under his existing powers, and that that had been proved by the numbers of people that he had restricted who had subsequently been convicted by the courts of law. He quoted about seven cases of people whom he had restricted and who had finally ended up in the courts and been sentenced to terms of imprisonment. That is what he said—right? Well, Sir, I want him to tell us about the hundreds of people who never landed in court at all.

You are drawing an inference.

The interesting thing is that what he boasted about did not stop these people from committing the crimes which landed them in gaol, some of them under terms of life imprisonment. So what makes the hon. the Minister think that by putting people under restraint he necessarily is going to stop them from committing these acts? Every argument the hon. the Minister has used as an explanation either contains an insinuation or personal references which have absolutely nothing to do with the principle that is now being discussed.

Sir, I wish to address you on the amendment which has been moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. The principle of this clause, as approved in the Second Reading, provides for two basic and essential steps which must be taken before it can be implemented. The first is that the State President must declare the necessity for applying this provision to a particular area for a particular time, the new paragraph (bA). When that is done, the hon. the Minister may take action, if he is satisfied that certain persons fall within the scope of those provisions. What the hon. member for Umhlatuzana is asking is that we should not have a wide open provision for the State President to make this declaration, but that it should, for the sake of the public and for the sake of the world at large, be indicated that there is in fact a state of affairs existing which justifies the State President in making that declaration. If the hon. the Minister looks at (bA) on page 7 of the Bill, he will find that it provides that the State President may from time to time determine by proclamation in the Gazette that this provision shall be enforced during such periods not exceeding 12 months at a time and in such part of the Republic as the State President determines. Now, there is nothing in the clause to indicate what must motivate the State President in making such a declaration—not one word. The hon. member for Umhlatuzana has suggested, and I believe fairly so, that one should indicate the circumstances which should motivate the State President in making this declaration. Sir, we realize that we are all in a hostile world as far as South Africa is concerned at present, but the way this clause reads, it gives a purely authoritarian power to make a declaration without any indication whatsoever as to what has motivated the State President in making that declaration. The hon. member for Umhlatuzana has said, basically, what is in the Public Safety Act of 1953. I accept what the hon. the Minister has said, that one does not want to declare a state of national emergency when there may be difficulties in a particular area for a limited space of time in dealing with subversion. I agree with the Minister on that score, that it is undesirable to declare a state of emergency unless there is a real state of emergency affecting the country as a whole. What is being suggested by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana is that the motivation under the Public Safety Act for a declaration of a general state of emergency should also—those considerations—be paramount in the mind of the State President in determining the limited field—I do not want to use the words “state of emergency”—in which executive action is necessary to cope with subversion and a threat to the security of the State. I do not believe that this is a hindering process which has been suggested by the hon. member. On the contrary, I believe it gives clarity, it gives credence and motivation to action being taken by the State President.

I want to appeal to the hon. the Minister to look at the matter from that point of view. No limitation is being placed on the State President, because I cannot believe that he would exercise the rights contained in this clause unless one or other of these conditions did, in fact, exist. He would not act arbitrarily or capriciously by simply declaring this operative in a certain area. Neither do I think that the hon. the Minister intends that there should be arbitrary or capricious use of this particular clause. That being so, why does the hon. the Minister not accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana? This would give to the world at large and to our people in this country the basic approach, motives or reasons for such action being taken by the State President for which authority is given to him in this clause.

I think the words that have been used are words that were introduced by that side of the House. These particular criteria were introduced by this Government for a national emergency. Why should they therefore not be the criteria for a limited power of executive action within a limited area of the Republic for a limited period of time? I can see no reason why the hon. the Minister should not accept the precedent given to this House and this country—and accepted by us on this side of the House in 1953—as a motivation, a reason or justification for the type of action proposed in terms of this clause. I therefore ask the hon. the Minister to seriously reconsider his refusal, because I think his approach is somewhat wrong. He has gone too wide in suggesting that because this forms the basis for a national emergency, he cannot accept it as a basis for a partial state of emergency. I use the word “partial” in relation to the Republic as a whole and in relation to time. The country would be behind a declaration of this sort if they can accept that it is motivated by the conditions or circumstances set out in the amendment of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. I do believe the hon. the Minister would be doing a service to South Africa and would be acting in the interests of maintenance of law and order and the containment of subversion if he were to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to raise a number of points. The first of these arises from the detention of individuals and the consequences which flow from such detention. In particular I should like the hon. the Minister to deal with the effect of this kind of detention on the individual’s financial situation, his means of support and business commitments. What does he intend to do if he does detain people who have not been found guilty? Is it his intention that there shall be compensation? In fact, does he intend to do anything at all in respect of this matter?

I think it is important that we distinguish between people who have been found guilty of conduct which is designed to undermine or endanger the safety or security of the State, or of other offences, and people who are being detained by reason of a belief, merely on the part of the hon. the Minister, that they will be guilty of such offences. The hon. the Minister said, during the Second Reading debate yesterday, that he believed that he might not be able to secure a conviction because he might not be able to prove matters beyond any reasonable doubt, even though he did have certain information. If that is so, and the man cannot be convicted, I think he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Therefore I think one is entitled to ask what will actually be done in respect of the financial and economic plight of people who will be detained.

The second question I want to raise is this. What will be the attitude of the hon. the Minister in respect of the family life of the people being detained? I think that is a matter of some importance. The hon. the Minister indicated that he does not necessarily have to detain people in existing prisons. He went as far as saying that he could even take a holiday resort and declare it to be a prison. What does he have in mind? Has he in mind that he will neutralize the activities of people and yet not interfere with their family existence, or has he in mind that he will isolate the people from their normal existence as such? I should like the hon. the Minister to deal with this, because I think he will be as aware as I am of some of the hardships that can be caused by this kind of internment, where you intern people who have not been convicted.

The second point I wish to deal with relates to an interpretation which I should like him to explain in regard to the proposed paragraph (bA) which reads—

Then there follows a proviso in terms of which any person who has by notice in terms of paragraph (a)bis been prohibited from absenting himself from a place or area therein referred to, shall, if the Minister so directs, be removed in custody from such place or area and be detained in custody, for such period as the notice may be in force, in any other place or area referred to in that paragraph, in any other part of the Republic.

The question I should like the hon. the Minister to deal with specifically is as follows: Has he in mind here that if the State President proclaims these powers to be of operation in respect of a specific area in the Republic that only persons who are then physically present within that area may, in fact, be detained or has he in mind that people who are outside that area can be brought into the area and also be detained? As I read the proviso it means that only people who are physically present within the area to which the proclamation is applied can be detained and nobody who is physically present outside.

Yes.

If that is how the hon. the Minister interprets it, I hope he will confirm it in his reply.

The third point which I should like to make concerns the amendment moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. With respect, I think the hon. the Minister is in a dilemma because if he rejects the amendment, I have little doubt that it can then be argued and construed that the executive intends to exercise the powers outside the ambit of the amendment of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. By rejecting the amendment he is virtually saying that the State President may in fact issue such proclamation even if he is not satisfied in respect of these three matters. With respect, I think the hon. the Minister is in a dilemma. I do not think he can reject this amendment. As far as we are concerned we made it clear that we do not think that even this amendment will satisfy us and we will still vote against the clause. However, the tragedy which I think exists and which is also the dilemma of the hon. the Minister is that if the NP rejects the amendment, the executive will in fact exercise these powers even if it is not satisfied, for example, that the ordinary law of the land is inadequate to deal with the situation. This is the dilemma of the hon. the Minister. With respect, I do not think that he is now able to reject this amendment, because if he rejects it, then he is virtually admitting that what really is required is completely arbitrary powers for the executive. This is the dilemma in which the hon. the Minister is.

I should like the hon. the Minister to tell me one other thing. He has tackled the hon. member for Houghton as to the nomenclature which should be applied to a person to whom the provisions of this clause are applied. May I ask the hon. the Minister to tell me what he thinks should be the term used? I have a book which is called Agter tralies en doringdraad. The book was issued by the “Bond van Oud-geïntemeerdes en politieke gevangenes”.

Order! The hon. member is now going too far. He is not discussing the details of the clause.

Sir, I shall come back to that because I want to quote from this book in order to ask him how certain persons should be referred to. [Interjections.] I want to draw a comparison between the provision which is contained in the Bill and a provision which was previously in force in South Africa. I want to compare the two pieces of legislation. In terms of emergency proclamation No. 201 of 1939—

That was the provision as it was in proclamation 201 of 1939. I quoted from page 177 of the book to which I have referred. Subsequently, in 1940, Act No. 13 of 1940 was passed, in respect of which the following comment was me made—

Order! The hon. member is now discussing a principle of the Bill.

No, Sir, I am making a comparison between the legislation then and the legislation now. I have one final sentence to read, as follows—

That was the comment made there. When a similar matter was debated in Parliament, the following was said—

Order! If the hon. member does not come back to the details of the clause, I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

Sir, with respect, all I want to do … [Interjections.] Sir, may I address you, or are these gentlemen addressing you? [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I first want to refer to the hon. member for Green Point. He said that he accepted my bona fides. I want to thank him for that. The hon. member asked me to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. I thought I had put it quite clearly that in matters relating to security one could not allow oneself to be bound by hard and fast rules of this nature. I think the hon. member for Houghton was right in this connection when she said that even these rules or directions were in the hands of the State President. It therefore depends on how he sees it, does it not? What, then, is the sense in this? I cannot at this stage foresee all the circumstances which may have to be taken into account before a proclamation is issued. However, I can tell hon. members that our aim in this regard is to promote state security and to counteract subversion of state security. That is why we shall have to take into account all the factors necessary to safeguard the State. If it is necessary for us to issue a proclamation and detain certain people for a certain period at a certain place …

You are dealing with the less serious situations …

That is exactly the point. Why try and bind me to things that are absolutely impossible to anticipate? I do not know all the circumstances which may arise and which may cause us to issue this proclamation. As I have said over and over again, the whole idea with this proclamation is to get hold of people whom, normally, one cannot reach. One can then take them out of circulation for a while and see what happens. Some of them one would not be able to take to court. However, if they are not the people one is after, they would soon be set free. The point is that we have to take all the circumstances into account. From the point of view of security, we have to take a particular situation and a particular point in time into account. Such factors or circumstances may be covered by the three guide-lines which the hon. member wants me to add to the Bill, but they may also fall outside of these. The whole point is that the test really is whether it is necessary to issue a proclamation to bring these two measures into operation for the security of one’s country.

If the answer is “yes”, a proclamation will be issued. If the answer is “no”, we shall delay it because it is not yet necessary. We can still deal with it in another way. The whole crux of this matter is to keep South Africa secure, and I know the hon. members agree with me on that point. Why then bind me to one or two guide-lines which, as the hon. member for Houghton rightly said, are in any case a subjective point of view at that particular stage? I still have to take all the other factors into account. Why not then accept my bona fides, as the hon. member for Green Point has done, and accept what the hon. the Minister has said in Parliament as being what he meant, that he is not arbitrarily going to start arresting people …

You cannot debate on the basis of bona fides.

Of course you can. I am not trying to run away from that. This is executive action.

Why do you not give yourself complete authority?

But you are giving me complete authority. I am only asking you to trust me. I am not asking the hon. member for Houghton to trust me.

That would be a waste of time!

However, I am certainly asking the hon. member for Umhlatuzana and the hon. member for Green Point to trust me. That is all I am seeking.

Mr. Chairman, I do not quite follow the reply which the hon. the Minister has given. After all, there are two aspects of this clause. The one is that the hon. the Minister can take certain action. The second is that that action can only be taken in certain circumstances, in an area and for a time approved by the State President.

Let us deal with the first point. The hon. the Minister, in terms of the Bill itself, can only act within the circumscribed provisions of this particular clause. In other words, the hon. the Minister can only act if he is satisfied that a person engages in activities which endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. That is stated quite explicitly. The public will know the reason for the hon. the Minister’s actions. In trying to refute the argument which I put to him, the hon. the Minister says that it is possible that he could deal with the situation in another manner rather than having the State President make a declaration. That is exactly what the amendment of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana says, when the ordinary law of the land is adequate to enable the Government to ensure the safety of the State or to maintain public order. In other words, we have said to the State President that, if he is satisfied from the reports of the hon. the Minister and others who will advise him, that the ordinary laws of the land can no longer deal with the situation, he may act. We are surely not restricting the hon. the Minister’s approach in this matter. At the moment there is no indication in the Bill—not one word, let alone a sentence—of the circumstances about which the State President must be satisfied before he operates. The hon. member for Umhlatuzana has said that the State President must be satisfied that certain circumstances exist.

The hon. the Minister quite rightly takes the strongest exception to talk of political prisoners.

He does not! He agreed to it a moment ago!

I agree with his reaction a moment ago. If there is no specification of the circumstances in this Bill as the circumstances in which the State President can enable this hon. Minister to take action, within the limits which are prescribed by this clause, he is quite correct in saying that persons detained can be regarded as, and will be regarded as, political prisoners. I am sure the hon. the Minister …

Order! I hope the hon. member is not going to take that point too far.

No, Sir. I am dealing with the question in what circumstances the Minister may exercise these powers, and I want him to have this protection and the country to have this protection, that when the Government acts to detain somebody the world at large will know that the mind of the State President has been applied to the three criteria which have been stated by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. Then I can defend it. Then I can defend it outside this country on the grounds that those steps have been taken on the two criteria: firstly, that there is a need for action to be taken and, secondly, that the Minister has had to apply his mind to circumstances justifying him taking action under circumstances which have been approved by the State President. I think the hon. the Minister is being obstinate and is rendering a disservice to the country by not accepting the amendment which has been moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana.

Mr. Chairman, at the start I wish to point out that the last of the quotations when my time expired was from a predecessor of the hon. the Minister who was then a member of Parliament, viz. Mr. Swart, so that there should be no misunderstanding that there appears to be a difference of approach between this hon. Minister and his predecessor at that particular moment of time.

I now wish to deal with a couple of further points. The first is that I think the hon. the Minister owes us a reply in respect of what he intends to do about the disruption of business, commercial employment and family life. If he does not give us a reply I think that it can be taken to mean that he does not intend to do anything about it at all. I hope that that is not the case. I want to give him a further opportunity of doing that.

The second point, one which I think is still more important, is that the hon. the Minister indicated when he spoke a few moments ago that as far as he was concerned, the whole Bill was an issue of bona fides, the exercise of the powers by the executive and by himself in a bona fide manner. What is important in respect of that admission is that it is quite clear that if there should ever be a Minister who does not exercise the powers in a bona fide manner, he will have the power in order to do so when Parliament no longer has control. This is the weapon that is being created. It is all very well for the hon. the Minister to say that he will act bona fide, that he will exercise the powers bona fide. The truth is that powers are being created here which are capable of being abused. That point, with respect, has not been answered at all.

There is one further point, and that arises again from the amendment of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. In so far as paragraphs (1) and (2) are concerned, they do not actually take the situation much further. They merely stress the fact that it is a question of the safety of the public that is at issue, that the security of the State or the maintenance of the public order must be effected before the State President can act, etc. But the sting is in the last paragraph and that is that the State President must be satisfied that the ordinary law of the land is inadequate. I understood that the whole reason for this legislation is because the hon. the Minister in his mind considers that the law of the land is inadequate. He said so.

I said it was one of the factors.

If the law was adequate there would be no need to enact a new law. This is an admission therefore that the law is inadequate and that this additional power should be taken. But what is remarkable is that the hon. the Minister is not prepared to have included in this legislation a statement that the powers should only be exercised if it is considered that the ordinary law of the land is inadequate. If that is so, I do not think that the hon. the Minister can blame anybody for suggesting that what he is wanting is a power, not only because the law may be inadequate, but because he wants additional powers which he may Use at his discretion whether or not the law is adequate or otherwise.

Mr. Chairman, either the hon. member for Yeoville is totally misinterpreting what I said, or he does not want to understand it. In my Second Reading Speech I mentioned this as being one of the factors. I indicated how many cases were before the courts at the moment, and how many would come before the courts shortly. I said that if we were to multiply this by ten or 15 and take into account the number of detectives who would be engaged in carrying out investigations at a given stage in order to bring facts before the courts, and the situation were to occur in which I needed those people, then that would be one of the factors to be considered in issuing such a proclamation. It is obvious that this is the case, because otherwise we should require the services of those men. I intimated that this was one of the factors, but now the hon. member for Yeoville wants to suggest that that is all I said. However, I said that there were many factors which would have to be taken into account. I shall let that suffice.

The hon. member for Yeoville asked me what I was going to do about the people if they were to suffer a financial loss. The people who are going to be detained are not simply people I take off the streets. I am not simply going to take a group of people and tell them that I am putting them in gaol. The legislation provides very clearly that the people who may be detained are people who are endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. It is people of this kind who are going to be detained. I also put it very clearly that I was mindful of the fact that many of them would not be summoned before a court. I added that many of the prisons were in far better places than the one at Koffiefontein. I also intimated that if large numbers of people had to be detained, one could even proclaim another place as a prison so that the people could be detained in comfortable circumstances. I am not unsympathetic towards the detainees; in fact I have intimated that I am sympathetic in this regard. If any of the families suffer hardships, they can apply to the Department of Social Welfare for aid. Of course they cannot expect to receive what the detainees earned, at a large firm, for example, but they will get enough from the Department of Social Welfare to get by until the detainee is released. That is my reply to that point.

The hon. member quoted from a book. I am happy with what has occurred before, and that also goes for what happened during the Second World War. I referred to the Second World War last night merely in order to lay down a norm. The hon. member asked what these people should be called. I can give hon. members the assurance that whatever I may suggest, the enemies of South Africa will think up a different name. That is why I put it clearly, and I want to repeat it—particularly for the benefit of the hon. member for Yeoville, because he is obsessed with it—that one can call them what one likes. The issue is the security of South Africa. If we are to safeguard South Africa, they can be given any kind of name—as long as I know that South Africa is safe.

Mr. Chairman, I listened with interest to the debate on my amendment. I purposely refrained from coming in until now, for the reasons that will emerge while I speak. I am grateful to the hon. member for Yeoville for the attitude he has taken in regard to the amendment and for the support he has given.

I should like to say a word to the hon. the Minister. As I see it, the hon. the Minister is in great difficulties.

I am in no difficulty whatsoever.

The hon. the Minister, to have these provisions brought into operation by a proclamation, must have two things in mind. He must either have in mind that there is a danger to public order, to the maintenance thereof, or he must have in mind that there is danger to the safety of the State. Those must be present in his mind before this power comes into operation at all, because thereafter those are the criteria he has to apply if he is going to act. In the first two paragraphs of my amendment is included specifically the maintenance of public order. The hon. the Minister cannot say that he is considering circumstances outside the field of public order, because I have used exactly the words the hon. the Minister has to consider in this Bill.

If the hon. member will formulate his amendment requiring me to take into account the things I have to take into account, then I will accept it.

No, I have not finished yet. The hon. the Minister cannot say that it is a question of the maintenance of public order in my amendment which he finds an obstacle, because it is already in the wording of his own Bill.

The only other criterion I have brought in in the first two paragraphs of my amendment, is the criterion that the action or threatened action by any persons or bodies in the area concerned is of such a nature and extent that the safety of the public is endangered. I should like the hon. the Minister to give me one instance—I do not think he can—where he can come to the conclusion that the safety of the State is endangered while the safety of the public is not endangered. I can conceive of no circumstance where the safety of the State is endangered—that is what the hon. the Minister has to decide in terms of his clause—where the safety of the public itself is not endangered. There is none at all. I challenge the hon. the Minister to give me an example of such a situation, because if he cannot, and if my contention is correct, namely that the one cannot exist without the other, then there is nothing whatsoever to stop him accepting my amendment. If he does not accept it, then we are entitled to draw the inference that the hon. gentleman is going to use these powers or contemplates using these powers of detention without trial in times of normality. That is the inference that can be drawn. If that is a correct deduction from the situation that we are in, and I believe it is, then it casts doubt on the entire case the hon. the Minister made in his Second Reading speech and in his reply to the Second Reading debate. I believe the situation has now crystallized, and I invite the hon. the Minister to give us an example.

Mr. Chairman, I am not prepared to accept the amendment moved by the hon. member in its present form. If the hon. member wants to reformulate his amendment now or later, I may allow it for consideration in the Other Place …

I am keeping it this way.

If you want it this way, then I am not accepting it.

*What I will do, is to consider whether I can draft an amendment which would perhaps satisfy the hon. member. However, I shall formulate it in such a way as to be the same as that relating to detention. If the hon. member is not satisfied with that, then I fear that I can do nothing about it.

Mr. Chairman, I move…

Order! The hon. member for Houghton has already spoken three times.

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendments—

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept these amendments as they seek to introduce a new and important principle not contemplated by the Bill as read a Second Time. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order …

Order! I have given my ruling, and I am not prepared to allow the hon. member for Houghton to argue that point.

But, Mr. Chairman, there is no principle involved in informing the next of kin.

Order! I have given my ruling.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is it not permissible for me to address you on the question of whether or not the amendments are in order before you give your ruling? There is an audi alteram partem rule, a rule which, I think, is normally applied.

Order! I have given very careful consideration to these amendments before giving my ruling.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would make it clear, for the benefit of hon. members, what the actual principle is which is involved in this situation.

Order! I have given my ruling. I shall now proceed to put the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that it is a matter of personal regret to me that you have ruled these amendments out of order. I do believe that I should place on record my support for the sentiments that are expressed in the amendments that have been moved by the hon. member for Yeoville.

Order! The amendments are not before the Committee at this stage and the hon. member may therefore not discuss them.

Very well, Sir. I shall then not discuss his amendments.

Mr. Chairman, may I raise a point of order? Is it or is it not permissible to address you and to address this Committee on whether or not people should or should not be allowed to have access to people who are being detained, and should not know where they are? I ask you to rule whether the Second Reading means, as you have apparently ruled it to mean, that the House has agreed that people may be detained without anybody having access to them or knowing where they are, because that is what you have ruled. I ask you, Sir, whether you are giving that ruling.

Order! I have given my ruling, and I am not prepared to reconsider that ruling. I gave my ruling after very careful consideration.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask for your guidance in this matter? As I understand it, you have allowed a discussion on this issue to take place under this particular clause. Is it not possible, then, to move an amendment which pertains to subject matter on which you have allowed discussions?

Order! The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South may proceed. I must point out, of course, that the hon. member may not continue on the same lines. I hope he will raise another issue.

Mr. Chairman … [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, why are hon. members opposite so sensitive? Why must I sit down? Why must I resume my seat?

Order! The hon. member must come back to the details of the clause.

Yes, Sir, I shall. I was trying to say to you—and I promise not to refer to any amendment—that I can agree entirely with the sentiments expressed by the hon. member for Yeoville. [Interjections.] I believe that it is a matter of importance to this Committee.

Order! The hon. member for Yeoville, in his amendments, introduced a new principle and I am not prepared to allow the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South to discuss that principle. He may do so at Third Reading, but I am not prepared to allow him to discuss it at this stage.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I am not discussing any amendment. I am merely discussing the sentiments expressed …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Would you please tell us, because it affects the debate in this House, whether the principle has now been accepted that there is no access to internees and that one is not entitled to know where they are? If that has not been accepted, then, with respect, the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South is allowed to address you on the issue of access and on the question of people being informed.

Order! I would have thought that the hon. member for Yeoville had been in this House long enough to know that those amendments have nothing to do with the principles of the Bill before this Committee.

You should have allowed them, Mr. Chairman.

I am therefore not going to reconsider the ruling I have given. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I find myself in considerable difficulty in regard to this matter. I want to say in conclusion, if I may …

Order! I am not going to allow the hon. member to discuss these amendments or the principle involved.

I am not going to discuss them at all, Sir. I simply want to … [Interjections.] I find myself, for the first time in 11 years in this House, completely at a loss to understand the attitude of hon. members who will just not give an hon. member the opportunity to have his say. [Interjections.]

Order! Hon. members must please keep quiet so that I can follow the hon. member.

The point I wish to make is that the sentiments expressed by the hon. member for Yeoville are contained in the copy of an amendment which I handed to the Whip of his party, an amendment which, I told you, Sir, I would move later on. The position is simply that the sentiments expressed by the hon. member are, I believe, based upon that amendment.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T; Ballot, G. C; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plesses, G. C; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D,; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C; Du Plessis, G. C; Englebrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Bailing, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (‘t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Amendment agreed to.

On amendment (1) moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman,

Question put: That the word stand part of the clause,

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Craywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk. F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Balling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Question affirmed and amendment, with amendment (2), dropped.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, H.; Muller, S. L.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw. W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 5:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

This is the last amendment I shall move today and I hope that the Opposition parties will follow my example and also put no further amendments.

It is necessary for me to say a few words about my amendment. Under this legislation the State President may issue proclamations in terms of which certain areas are proclaimed for the purposes of this legislation. I think it is only fair that we should have an arrangement in accordance with which the State President may issue a proclamation for a certain part of South Africa and that it should then be possible for a review committee to be appointed for that part so that it is unnecessary for a review committee to be appointed for the whole country. It should also be possible for the State President to dissolve the review committee appointed, after the committee has served its purpose. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is essential that we do not insist on the entire committee consisting specifically of judges or former judges or magistrates. As long as the chairman complies with that requirement, we can compare it with a situation in the Supreme Court where we have a judge of the Supreme Court assisted by two assessors. In this case the assessors will be people who have a specific knowledge of that particular area. It will therefore serve the purposes of this legislation far better if it is dealt with in this way.

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept this amendment.

What a surprise!

Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with this clause in general, as well as the various aspects of it, and also with what has been introduced by the principles which have been passed at the Second Reading. I shall deal with the machinery which is provided for review of decisions and actions of the executive by persons outside the executive. On behalf of the official Opposition I want to utilize the occasion of dealing specifically with the limitation of this particular clause to section 10(1)(a)bis of the Act, the internments only. I am utilizing the privilege which you, Sir, have given the parties to indicate what their attitudes are.

We accept and welcome this step towards having a review procedure to supervise and comment upon and to advise in regard to executive action which affects the liberty or the movement of an individual. The position at the present moment, in terms of the Bill before us, is that this review committee will only concern itself with executive action which is taken under, what we have termed, the internment clause. It has no regard to the other provisions of the Suppression of Communism Act, when it affects individuals, organizations and publications. I believe it is a good thing that we should remind ourselves—when we criticize the fact that there is this limitation of review to only internment proceedings—of what the effect of a banning order is, and of the respect in which it differs from the internment orders, which are now to be subject to review. I have before me a banning order issued recently in terms of section 10 of the Act. It is the type of order which is not to be reviewed by the review committee. It runs into seven pages. It is an interesting document. I want to direct the attention of fixe Committee to the question of the difference between the restrictions contained in this order and the actual effect of an internment. This document is in two parts, the first part relating to attending gatherings of various sorts. It then proceeds to deal with the other restrictions which are imposed upon the individual concerned. I read—

This takes some eight or nine lines to define—

It goes further and states that he shall not be able to take part in any activity which deals with any principle or policy of the Government which is propagated, defended, attacked, criticized, discussed or referred to. He must be completely neutral in regard to political activities. If the Government accepts the principle that there should be review of internment, why is there no acceptance of extending this clause to the other subsections of section 10 of the Act? The only difference between a banning order or a restriction order which is issued at the present moment and an internment is that the physical detention is supervised in a prison in the one case while the individual is left to remain in his home in the other case. I have said that we believe that all executive action should be subject to safeguards. We say so because we believe that no matter how objectively the hon. the Minister charged with executive action applies his mind, there is room for error and there is room for possible miscarriage of justice.

That part of the Act has never been amended.

The hon. the Minister must be a little patient. I want to give him an example. On his right-hand side sit two Ministers of the Government, the Minister of Community Development and the Minister of Public Works and of Immigration. Both applied their minds to the circumstances of eight students, after the first report, and I want to say that the hon. the Minister of Community Development honestly expressed his opinion and said that the commission could not find them guilty in any way of furthering the ends of communism or that they were communists in any way, except that by way of coincidence it was found that they were publishing matters which were also published by the Communist Party. His colleague, equally honest, equally straightforward, equally objective, said the following—

We have two colleagues of the hon. the Minister sitting side by side in this House, both applying their independent and objective minds and coming to a totally different interpretation as to what action should be taken in certain circumstances. Is there any more cogent reason that I can offer to the hon. the Minister that all executive action, not only internment, should be subject to this kind of review? The type of review will be dealt with in amendments as to how the court of review shall be established. I cannot move it and I cannot extend the Act to cover these other clauses, but I want to state quite categorically that we on this side of the House believe that all executive action which affects the liberty of an individual, should be reviewed by a judicial tribunal. I have quoted this example of the honest opinions of two of the hon. the Minister’s own colleagues sitting in the benches next to him to indicate how necessary it is for this type of review to take place. I want to say in conclusion that I welcome the acceptance of the principle which is contained in this clause, viz. the principle of review, although it does not go the whole way to meet the necessity of review and proper review for actions of an executive nature. A further point which I want to make quite clear to the hon. the Minister is that when we approve of the principle of review procedure, it does not mean for one moment that we condone executive action being taken except in conditions of emergency …

Mr. Chairman, I support the sentiments of the hon. member for Green Point in so far as his view is that procedure for review of executive action should be extended to all forms of restrictions, bannings, detention and even the holding of witnesses. However, I want to make it clear that while the provisions of clause 5 are an innovation in South African law and, I think, a principle to be welcomed, it is absolutely useless to have a procedure for review which is of no value to the person whose case is being reviewed. This is the problem we have with this particular clause.

I welcome the fact that the Government recognizes or acknowledges that unchecked executive power is indeed bad for South Africa. I also welcome its acceptance of the fact that it is bad for public confidence in the administration of justice. As has emerged very clearly in the Second Reading debate, public confidence is vital to the success of security legislation of any sort in any country. Therefore the legal device we have in the form of clause 5, the safety valve being placed on the Statute Book by the Government and which is to be incorporated in law, is in some small way an acceptance of that principle. However, in a certain way it reflects the dilemma of the Government, of the hon. the Minister in particular. The dilemma is how to create a review structure which would give protection to the individual without weakening the powers which the Minister himself believes he has to have. While the hon. the Minister would like to have the support of the House, of the legal profession and of public opinion, he cannot contemplate the dissipation of his powers. This is the problem. And so we find a new provision, a provision which outwardly seems to be a leavening of the stringency of the Bill, but which, in reality, leaves the Minister unhampered in what he may wish to do. The imperfections are all there for everyone to see.

In the very appointment of the committee there are three major defects in the very first subsection of the proposed section 10sex, reading—

We believe that the chairman of the review committee, if it is to enjoy the confidence of the public, should in fact be a judge and nobody else. We also believe that the persons who are appointed to the committee should in fact be seen to be independent of the executive. They should be people of broad experience, of training and status. A judge would give this to the committee. I believe that the other members should also have received legal training. They should be persons who should be seen to be at arm’s length from the executive in the exercise of their functions and not dependent on the Government in any way for their future appointments. In particular, subjectivity must be avoided. I do not believe that in the setting up of the committee subjectivity is totally excluded as it should be.

Finally, this very subsection is made worse by the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke, who tells us that the only purpose for moving in the amendment that “… the State President may for good reason from time to time withdraw the appointment …” is that this is a way to disband the committee when it has done its job. That may well be one of the functions of the amendment. However, the problem is that if a situation is created in terms of which it is wished to have an independent review undertaken of a detention, one should not have the power for one’s own reasons to withdraw the appointment of the people who are undertaking the review. Those persons should be independent of the executive and should not have to worry about their appointment at all. In the very composition and setting up of this committee, confidence in the committee is, in my view, not necessarily safeguarded as it should be. If one looks at subsection (2), one notices that provision for investigation and reinvestigation is made at intervals of not more than six months. This is far too irregular, because much can happen in six months and great stress can be placed on people who are incarcerated in prisons or in a place of safety. It is particularly so in the case where a person has been detained, has not been convicted, does not know how long he will be there and is, consequently under even more stress than the person who knows precisely what his position is. Generally, in regard to the procedure of detention and the review of the detainee’s case in terms of this provision, I believe the provisions are inadequate. But subsection (6) takes the cake. It reads—

This is perhaps the key to our dissatisfaction about this provision. Surely this subsection, giving the hon. the Minister the power to override and disregard the advice of the review committee, renders the whole procedure of review of minimal value.

Of no value whatsoever.

What is the purpose of review if the committee’s motivated decisions are not binding on the hon. the Minister or the executive? The situation is worsened by subsection (7), which disallows reasoned pressure being brought upon the Minister or being brought to bear on the executive and where the Minister does not even have to state the reasons for not accepting the recommendation. Recommendations are not made public and also not the report of the committee. I accept that it is not always necessary to publish the deliberations, or to make them public. However, I feel that at least the report and the recommendation made by this responsible committee should be the subject of public debate in this House. By allowing the hon. the Minister to get away without even having to place these before the House, we are faced with the situation that his viewpoint cannot be tested at all. On top of all this, no detained person has the right to legal counsel or representation. He has to present his own case before the review committee as best he can in secrecy and in private. There is an old legal adage, namely that a man who is his own advocate, has a fool for a client. This is very true, because we cannot deny that a person who is detained in difficult circumstances cannot deal objectively and, very often, not even competently with his own case. He should in fact be entitled to expert assistance and advice. His very freedom may, in fact, depend on it. Finally subsection (11) says the following—

That means that even in the cases of the grossest injustice—which is not impossible— the courts are totally excluded from pronouncing or adjudicating upon it. I suspect—I ask the hon. the Minister to react to this particular point—that by including this provision in this Bill, even the power of review—not of appeal—of the decisions of the review committee is excluded. I should like an answer on that point. If that is so, even the limited grounds of review, where male fides can be questioned, where a proper hearing is perhaps not given, where it is alleged that the committee did not bring its mind to bear upon the case, it would seem to me that, in terms of this subsection, all these are excluded from the purview of the courts. This complete exclusion of the courts—not necessarily sitting in public, because I do not think there would be an objection if the courts had to sit in camera to hear certain matters—not only in respect of a right of appeal, but also in respect of a right of review, is in fact fundamental to our opposition to the provisions of this clause. I understand …

Order! Does the hon. member wish to move his amendments before his time expires?

Yes, Mr. Chairman. I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept amendments (2) and (6) moved by the hon. member for Sandton as they are inconsistent with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the first and second amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I shall deal with the third amendment at a later stage, as I understand that there may be some difficulty in regard to it. The two amendments I have moved have to do with the composition of the review committee which is the subject of this clause. As it stands, the review committee will have a chairman who is to be either a judge or a magistrate or a retired judge or a retired magistrate. The review committee also includes two other unspecified categories of persons, to be appointed by the hon. the Minister. Because of the very important function which the review committee will perform, in the light of this Bill—and I do not have to go into the background of it again—I take the view that one ought to be more specific with regard to the class of persons appointed to that committee. In view of the nature of the powers that we are discussing and which will be subject to scrutiny by this committee, it is important, in my view, that the committee should enjoy the maximum possible confidence in so far as the public is concerned. I accordingly believe that the chairman ought not to be a magistrate or a judge or a retired magistrate or a retired judge, but that that position should be filled by an active judge of the Supreme Court and nobody else. There is nothing against the magistracy, Sir; not for any task, but we are dealing here not with a judicial function, primarily, but with a function in the administrative field, and it is well-known that magistrates, in the course of their working lives, when it comes to administrative matters as opposed to judicial matters, act in terms of instructions of their seniors in the department. Consequently, it could be said by those outside, looking in on a review committee of this kind, that if you have a preponderance of magistrates, or a magistrate as the presiding officer, there would not be that independence in what is a quasi-administrative function which would be the case if the presiding officer were a judge. Therefore I do not go along with the amendment which is apparently to be moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, for the reasons that I have given. Nevertheless, I believe that the point of view of the department is one legitimately to be heard in a committee of this kind. Consequently, in terms of my amendment, I have proposed that one of the members be a senior magistrate, the reason being, as I have said, that the view of the department is entitled to be heard, and that the advocate concerned should be an advocate of not less than 10 years’ standing. The reason for that is that the advocates have a tradition of looking at matters independently and unfettered by any governmental agency. Such persons, apart from their legal training and traditional standpoint of an independent view, would in a sense be the laymen in the triumvirate. Consequently it will be seen from my amendment that we suggest a judge—not a retired judge but an active judge—as chairman, a senior magistrate as another of the members and an advocate of not less than 10 years’ standing as the third. Such a review committee, in our view, would better serve the purpose for which it is designed.

There were questions raised by the hon. member for Sandton, many of which I would agree with. Had this review committee been operating in the circumstances we have earlier advocated, i.e. in properly defined circumstances, in times of an emergency or in times or war, there would be something to be said for the point of view that it should be merely advisory to the Minister, its views not being binding on the Minister. However, in the light of this Bill, as it stands, and in the light of the review committee as set out in the Bill, the only safeguard one can have is to support the suggestion of the hon. member for Sandton that its decision be binding on the Minister.

Then there is the third amendment which I had intended moving, but which I am given to understand, Sir, you will rule out of order for the reasons you have already furnished in connection with another matter.

I think that is very wise.

I wish merely to say that it was designed to make the review committee and its powers applicable to all the discretionary aspects which the hon. the Minister has in the Bill, but since I believe that when I sit down you will rule it out of order, I will take it no further.

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of amendments, and I would like to deal with them in turn. Firstly, I move amendments Nos. 1 and 2 printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

These amendments are in substance substantially the same as those moved by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana, except for the fact that we believe that the matter is so serious, and that the incarceration—if one may use that term—of individuals is so important that there should be only judges concerned with this matter. If I understood the hon. member for Umhlatuzana correctly, he said that he thought that the department should be heard. The department will be heard in representations which are made before the committee.

It is not a party to the committee and should not be a party to the committee. The committee should, in fact, be as close as possible to a judicial tribunal. [Interjections.] I think the difference between myself and the hon. member relates to representations that are made and the right to hear evidence, this being the occasion for the department to be heard. My first and second amendments relate solely to the proposed new section 10 sec (1) and the constitution of the appeal committee itself. We take the view that the appeal committee should only consist of people who are judges. That is the difference between the hon. member for Umhlatuzana and myself.

Amendment No. 3 is equated with the same issue and makes it clear that not only should the chairman be a judge, but that all the members should be judicial officers and possibly could be in the case of other members who shall be judges of the Supreme Court who have held office as judges or as magistrates. In other words, for the other members we are prepared to allow that possibility. I move the third amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

When it comes to amendment No. 4 on the Order Paper, I am of course in a dilemma because of the instruction that was ruled out of order earlier. This was intended to be the amendment which was to be moved pursuant to that instruction. The only point I want to make in respect of this issue is that in the same way that the hon. member for Umhlatuzana said he believed that all the executive action should be subject to review and to appeal to a body of this nature, the findings of which we believe should be binding, we also very strongly take this view. Let me say that the hon. the Minister of Community Development, as he now is, is on record as having addressed the University of the Witwaters-rand. In that address he said that no person had been deprived of access to the courts in terms of any legislation. That is what he said. However, we now find ourselves in a situation such that it is not only a fact that there is a deprivation of access to the courts, but also that this is now expressly being stated in legislation. Although we cannot move this amendment, it is quite clear that this is another step to exclude the courts. This point is quite apparent in this clause.

I now come to amendment (5) on the Order Paper, and in this connection I refer the House to subsection (3) which states—

We regard it as important that there must be given to the person who is held in custody a summary of the allegations against him, and he must also be given an opportunity—it should not be a discretion, it should be a right that he should be able to exercise—to give the evidence and to make representations. So although in respect of other persons there can be a discretion, for a person who is detained it should be a right. He should be given a summary of the allegations against him.

In support of the argument for this amendment I again want to refer to the book Agter tralies en doringdraad.

That is where you are still going to find yourself.

When there was internment during the war, there was provision for a statement of the allegations to be given to the internee so that he could answer them and they could be presented to a review committee. The complaint in this book is simply that in most cases the statement was not adequate, but the fact remains that internees were given a statement. I shall not burden the Committee by reading the example given on page 180 of this book, but the statement does, in fact, give details of the alleged organizations the detainee was a member of, whether he was alleged to have participated in drilling or was allegedly a member of a semi-military organization and was therefore to be regarded as a threat to the security of the State. The detainee was therefore given some facts to reply to. In this legislation, however, he is given nothing to reply to. There is nothing to say that he must be told what the allegations are. I now move my fifth amendment on the Order Paper, as follows—

I now come to amendment (6) on the Order Paper. In subsection (4) of the Bill it is stated—

In the same way the request to give evidence must be submitted to the Secretary for Justice, but there is nothing that compels the Secretary for Justice to submit this to a review committee. I think, however, that there should be a compulsion to do so, and accordingly I move the 6th amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

There is no provision here—as was contained in an amendment we tried to move earlier—to indicate how a person should know that someone is being interned so that he can make representations. We suggested earlier—and the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South expressed the same sentiments—that one must at least tell the next of kin where a man is. This becomes very relevant here because one is saying that anyone has the right to make representations, but how does one know that a fellow has been locked up? Therefore one must at least tell the next of kin, and for that reason, in addition to my amendments on the Order Paper, I move the following amendment—

Now I come to amendment (7) on the Order Paper. The purpose of this amendment is that there should be a report to Parliament immediately, not just in ordinary session of Parliament, but during any session of Parliament.

I accept amendment (7) as printed on the Order Paper.

You say you accept that? Thank you, then I shall not go any further. I think that everything else I shall leave over to the next speech in case I should persuade the hon. the Minister to change his mind on this further amendment.

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the last amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville as it seeks to introduce a new and important principle not contemplated by the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, may I address you on this point? The difficulty which I have is that I cannot see how a person can make representations on behalf of another person if he does not know that person is being detained. I should also like to indicate, with respect, that I cannot see that in the Second Reading a principle was accepted that it should not be known that persons are being detained. I do not remember that being debated and I do not remember it being in the Bill. All that is happening here is that we are asking that the person’s next-of-kin should be advised that he is detained and where he is detained. Mr. Chairman, if you, for example, should disappear your next-of-kin would not know. You might have done anything, you might have jumped into the sea, but your next-of-kin would not know that you were being detained. This is no new principle and no principle has been accepted that people should not know that there are people being detained. I therefore ask you to reconsider your ruling.

Order! There is no principle in the Bill to cover this and therefore I am not prepared to reconsider my ruling.

Mr. Chairman, the first point I wish to make is that as I understood the hon. member for Yeoville—I would appreciate his attention for a moment—I think he has misread his amendment. As I understood him, he said that his amendment has the effect of changing the composition of the review committee so that it will consist only of judges.

No, the other members can be magistrates.

Is the effect of the amendment that he seeks the chairman to be a judge while the other two members can be magistrates?

Yes.

Well, that is as it reads, but in my view it has the defect, as I tried to indicate earlier, that there is a preponderance, if one can put it that way, of the view of the department. To obviate that I suggested that one should be a member of the Bar and the other a senior magistrate.

I am sorry that the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South is not here at the moment; he was called out momentarily. However, as I understood it, he was intending to move an amendment to clause 6 of the Bill. Copies of his amendment have been circulated to the various parties. It appears—I do not wish to put it any higher than that because I am not steeped in this matter and the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South is not here—that the amendments which the hon. member for Yeoville tried to move to both clauses 4 and 5 are virtually a carbon copy of the amendment of which the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South gave that party a copy.

No, that amendment applies to witnesses, whereas ours applies to detainees.

If that is the way in which we are to conduct our proceedings here in the future, it makes life for the ordinary, simple member very difficult.

Mr. Chairman, I am surprised at the incisive legal brain of the hon. member for Umhlatuzana

Flattery will not help you.

Well, it might help sometimes. Abuse does not get me anywhere with the hon. member, so now I am trying flattery. The amendment which the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South wanted to move applies to witnesses detained and not to detainees interned, who are quite a different class of people.

But the same principle applies.

No.

Order! I must point out to the hon. member for Houghton that I have ruled that amendment out of order. Consequently, she cannot talk on it.

Very well, Sir. The hon. member for Umhlatuzana was allowed to put his point of view and I am just correcting the impression he seems to have. Our amendments applies to a different class of people altogether.

Sir, I want, of course, to support the amendments moved by the hon. members for Yeoville and Sandton. I think they have adequately expressed our reasons for wanting to amend this clause. I am sorry, Sir, that you find it impossible to allow any discussion on the Minister’s need to give effect to recommendations of the review committee.

Order! I cannot quite follow the hon. member’s argument now. Does she desire to amend the amendment of the hon. member for Sandton?

No, Sir, I desire to try to get the hon. the Minister to heed the recommendations of the review committee. I do not see any purpose of having a review committee if, after it has sat and deliberated on cases and made recommendations, the hon. the Minister can simply throw those recommendations into the wastepaper basket without heeding them in the slightest.

Order! I must point out that the hon. member is now discussing the very amendment that I have ruled out of order. She cannot continue along those lines.

Well, Sir, can I move to delete subsection (6) of the proposed new section 10sex?

The hon. member cannot do so, because it has the same effect and involves the same principle.

That is what I was trying to achieve, Sir.

The hon. member can vote against it.

Do not worry, Sir, I will. There is no danger of my not doing that.

Sir, I want to crave your indulgence by moving another amendment, as follows—

I am sorry that I have not handed it in before, but it just occurred to me now. What I am trying to do is to get the hon. the Minister to lay on the Table of this House a list containing the names of all persons who have in fact been interned. I might say that this introduces no new principle to the existing law, since the hon. the Minister does inform the House of the persons who have been banned in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act or who have otherwise been restricted in terms of different sections of the Act. In addition, we were provided with the names of the persons who were detained in terms of the 90-day law.

Could I have a copy of that?

Yes, but I have just written it out now. I am not trying to bemuse the hon. member. Just listen carefully, because it is very simple. For the hon. member for Umhlatuzana’s information, it simply adds a list of names. I do not think there is anything further I wish to add to the very cogent arguments that have been put forward by the hon. members for Sandton and Yeoville.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the following amendment—

Sir, this is a very simple amendment. It is merely asking that, when the review committee has considered representations, the recommendations should be made known to the detainee. I believe that the detainee should be aware of what is taking place. The detainee would obviously be aware by, perhaps, a continued period of incarceration. That is possible. Just by way of a courtesy to which a detainee should be entitled, I believe, he should be made aware of the recommendations. I do not believe that that is asking too much.

If it will make the hon. member for Jeppe happy, I shall accept his amendment. [Interjections.]

*Mr. Chairman, I should just like to give an indication of which amendments I am prepared to accept. The first amendment moved by the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke, is, as I have already indicated, acceptable to me. I am not prepared to accept the first two amendments by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. Nor am I prepared to accept the first two amendments of the hon. member for Yeoville. Indeed, I am not accepting any of his amendments, except the seventh. Nor am I prepared to accept the amendments moved by the hon. member for Sandton. My standpoint concerning the composition of the review committee, is that I am satisfied as long as I know that a judge or a former judge or a magistrate or former magistrate is the chairman of the review committee. I want to assure hon. members that the other two members of the review committee will of course be people of consequence. There is, of course, the problem that the review committee might be appointed in an isolated rural area. It may also be necessary for that review committee to recommend a local Black or Brown person of consequence as one of its members. I am not sure how many members of the review committee must have legal qualifications, or have them, or whether such people are available. The fact is that I am satisfied that, should a judge or an ex-magistrate be chairman, the review will be guided. What is the review committee? The review committee is, in fact, only there to check my report. My report consists of the facts which I have compiled up for them. They are the facts which are available to me and which I, in turn, convey to the review committee. The review committee then peruses them. If it receives a sort of appeal from the person concerned, who will, of course, know that he has been taken in custody, the review committee may ask that person or witnesses to appear before the committee to furnish them with further information in connection with the facts which the Minister has presented to the committee. The person who has been taken into custody may elucidate some of those facts and after that the review committee may tell the Minister that as far as they are concerned, their recommendation is that they do in fact share the view of the Minister as far as the detainment of the person is concerned.

Another possibility is that the review committee may tell the Minister that after considering everything which the Minister has conveyed to them, the evidence they have heard and the representations they have received from the person who was taken prisoner, they are of the opinion that the person should be released. I can think of very, very few cases in which I would not accept the recommendation of such a review committee; however, it is the Minister’s final responsibility. This detention is an administrative detention and the matter cannot be shifted onto a review committee, no matter how good the review committee may be, even if it were to consist of three judges. The Minister must retain the final say to indicate that he accepts the responsibility for the detainment of the person. Even though, for example, the review committee were to confirm the Minister’s findings, it must still be provided in the Act, so that everyone may know, that the Minister carries the responsibility and not the review committee. The review committee is only there to check the order and to assist me by saying, for example, that due to other factors which must be taken into consideration, the person should be released. The review committee is there to ensure that the Minister does not make mistakes—factual or otherwise—concerning his conclusions about a person who is being detained. If the Minister were to allow himself to be bound by the review committee, the committee would actually be a sort of appeal court. Then all the amendments which the hon. member for Yeoville has moved, viz. that there should be legal representation, that there should be the right to call witnesses, and that witnesses may be tested, would be found to be logical. This is no longer so much a question of administrative detention as a court case. Why, then, should I make use of a review committee? After all, I could then much rather carry on with a court case and have done, rather than waste time by making use of a review committee like this. The review committee is only there to correlate the Minister’s facts and conclusions and to make recommendations to the Minister after which the Minister accepts full responsibility. I must point out that the Minister is not obliged to present all the facts to the review committee and that it is only necessary for the Minister to inform the review committee of the essential facts in order to enable it to confirm the detention. It may happen that additional facts may come available to the Minister, facts which would cause the Minister not to accept the recommendation of the committee. The Minister must consult the House of Assembly in this regard.

Once again I do not believe that all the facts relating to the recommendation should be laid on the Table here. However, the fact remains that the Minister must appear before the House of Assembly and that the matter may also be debated under his Vote. I want to assure the House that I shall be prepared to release as many facts as possible. I, as the Minister, am here to report on this and therefore certain information is laid on the Table. This may be discussed in due course, whether in the no-confidence debate or under the Vote of the Minister of Justice. Under these circumstances I am not prepared to accept the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with a number of matters. Firstly, I have grave difficulty with one argument of the hon. the Minister. I moved an amendment in terms of which two things are essential: The one is that, at least, the man who is detained should have the right to be heard before the review committee. I cannot understand how anybody can remotely claim to accept the fundamental principles of justice and not accept that. Surely the one thing that a man is entitled to when he is locked up …

He has the right to ask for a lawyer.

No, he has not. I am sorry, but the hon. the Minister must read subsection (3) of the new section 10sex under clause 5 of the Bill which reads as follows—

Yes, “consider all facts and representations”.

It means that they have a discretion whether or not to hear oral evidence from the detained person.

But they can make it in writing.

They can take it from him in writing, but he has no right to appear in his own defence before this committee. This is a fundamental thing. As emasculated as the committee is, surely the one thing to allow a detained person to do is to appear before the committee to put your own case. That the hon. the Minister is not accepting and I find this unbelievable.

The second point is that the hon. the Minister will not accept that a man must be told what the complaint is against him. As much as it was shouted about and as much as this book mentions how people felt aggrieved during the last war, the one tiling that was not done was that they were not told what the charges were against them. Now, a time when there is not a war, when it is not alleged that there is an emergency, the hon. the Minister is not even prepared to say to a detained person: “This is what I want you to answer.” With great respect, I have very great difficulty in understanding how he can reject that.

I also want to deal with subsection (6) of the new section 10sex and to move the following amendment—

I would again like to quote from this book and quote the following—

That is the point. Do hon. members know what he is talking about? He is talking about a review committee—not a committee in that case, but a commissioner, one person whose job it was to sit in order to review these matters—and he says specifically that it was not binding upon the Minister or upon anybody else. It was a recommendation, and this was his comment on it at that time. This comment is 100% more applicable here now. By saying it is not binding on him renders this in fact a sham. The whole thing is not a meaningful situation at all.

If I may touch upon a point which the hon. member for Umhlatuzana raised, I should like to deal with the question of the constitution of the review committee. I have no objection to having a member of the Bar on the review committee as well, instead of an additional magistrate. I think it is not a matter of such moment. I think that either an advocate of 10 years’ standing or a magistrate, would be suitable as the extra members of that committee. I do not believe that this is a fundamental issue between us on these benches and the official Opposition.

Now I should like to deal with the somewhat caustic comment that we are supposed to have moved an amendment which belongs to the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South. If the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South will feel happy about it, I am prepared to give him the credit for having thought of this. Mr. Chairman, I moved the amendment a few moments ago which you ruled out of order. I believe, however, that to introduce a new clause 6 would in fact result in its being declared out of order. I believed the same point was more easily accessible and I moved the amendment accordingly. I am prepared to say that the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South can have the credit for the idea. I do not have to steal ideas from him. I shall graciously and happily give the credit to him.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to refer the hon. the Minister to the proposed new subsections (3) and (4) which make provision for the manner in which the review committee will work and the manner in which the subject-matter of their inquiries shall be placed before them. As I understood the hon. the Minister, the review committee would consider a report, reports, papers and matters placed before it by him or on his behalf. If my understanding of the hon. the Minister’s speech was correct, I do not really understand why we are enacting subsections (3) and (4). Subsection (3) reads—

If by those words the hon. the Minister intends merely that a report, as it were, of his view of things should to be placed before the review committee, it is going to make the review committee’s work very difficult indeed. As I understand it, the object of a review committee is not merely to review the facts which have impressed themselves upon the mind of the hon. the Minister, but all surrounding facts relating to the detention and all the surrounding facts in terms of which the hon. the Minister came to his conclusion and issued his order.

But all that will be put before the review committee.

The question is whether it will be.

Of course.

Why, then, not make it possible for others, such as the detained person, also to submit the facts, circumstances and representations?

The detainee can make representations.

But I do not see this included in subsections (3) and (4).

In subsection (3) it is stated—

Yes, but by whom?

By the detainee.

It does not say so, nor does it designate any other person. It says: “submitted to it in writing”. A detained person, who is presumably in a room with bars and locked doors …

We will give him a pen and tell him that he can write…

I believe that this should be written into the law so that those who have to administer it know what they are doing.

Everybody knows that the representations can be made by the detainee personally or by his family.

I should now like to quote subsection (4)—

I hope the hon. the Minister makes it very clear, either in the legislation or in his reply to the debate, precisely what the rights are, either for the detained person to make his view known, or for his views to be made known on his behalf. That is the first point I would like to make.

Secondly, in regard to amendments 1 and 2, as printed in my name, which I have already moved and which I have spoken about, it occurs to me that after the amendment of the hon. member or Schweizer-Reneke has been put, it will then be moved that my two amendments fall away with the acceptance of the amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke. There will then not be an opportunity for the House to divide on my amendment. That being so, I should like to move the following amendments to the first amendment of the hon. member for Schweizer-Reneke—

I may say that the effect is precisely the same as the amendment which I had on the Order Paper, but it will enable the House to divide on my amendment, whereas in the other case it would simply fall away.

On amendment (1) moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman to the amendment moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt,

Question put: That the words stand part of the amendment moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt,

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—75: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton.

Question affirmed and amendment moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman dropped.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman to amendment moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. H. J. D. van der Walt agreed to and amendments (1) and (2) moved by Mr. R. M. Cadman and (1), (2) and (3) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz dropped.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. D. J. Bailing negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

On amendment (4) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz,

Question put: That the words stand part of the Clause,

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—75: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. G; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. G; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Balling and R. J. Lorimer.

Question affirmed and amendment dropped.

Amendment (5) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Official Opposition and Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. H. Miller agreed to.

Amendment (6) moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz agreed to.

Amendment (3) moved by Mr. D. J. Balling put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. L; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. I. Lorimer.

Noes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Amendment negatived.

Amendment moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

Amendment (4) moved by Mr. D. J. Dalling negatived (Progressive Reform Party dissenting).

On amendment (5) moved by Mr. D. J. Dalling,

Question put: That the subsection stand part of the clause,

Upon which the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kotzé, S. F.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L.; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: J. M. Henning, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers, I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W; B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, G J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: D. J. Dalling and R. J. Lorimer.

Question affirmed and amendment dropped.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—76: Albertyn, J. T.; Ballot, G. C.; Barnard, S. P.; Bodenstein, G. F.; Botha, G. F.; Botha, J. C. G.; Botha, P. W.; Botma, M. C.; Brandt, J. W.; Coetzee, S. F.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, A. M. van A.; De Klerk, F. W.; De Villiers, D. J.; De Villiers, J. D.; De Wet, M. W.; Du Plessis, B. J.; Du Plessis, G. F. C.; Du Plessis, G. C.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Greeff, J. W.; Grobler, M. S. F.; Grobler, W. S. J.; Hayward, S. A. S.; Hefer, W. J.; Henning, J. M.; Herman, F.; Heunis, J. C.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, J.; Janson, T. N. H.; Kotzé, G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Le Roux, F. J. (Brakpan); Le Roux, F. J. (Hercules); Le Roux, Z. P.; Ligthelm, N. W.; Louw, E.; Malan, J. J.; Marais, P. S.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Nel, D. J. L.; Palm, P. D.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Scott, D. B.; Simkin, C. H. W.; Smit, H. H.; Snyman, W. J.; Steyn, D. W.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Swanepoel, K. D.; Terblanche, G. P. D.; Treurnicht, A. P.; Ungerer, J. H. B.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, S. J. H.; Van der Walt, A. T.; Van der Walt, H. J. D.; Van der Watt, L; Van Rensburg, H. M. J.; Venter, A. A.; Viljoen, P. J. van B.; Vlok, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vosloo, W. L.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: S. F. Kotzé, P. C. Roux, N. F. Treurnicht and W. L. van der Merwe.

Noes—40: Basson, J. D. du P.; Baxter, D. D.; Bell, H. G. H.; Boraine, A. L.; Cadman, R. M.; Dalling, D. J.; Deacon, W. H. D.; De Villiers I. F. A.; De Villiers, J. I.; De Villiers, R. M.; Eglin, C. W.; Enthoven (’t Hooft), R. E.; Graaff, De V.; Hickman, T.; Hughes, T. G.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lorimer, R. J.; Miller, H.; Mills, G. W.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Olivier, N. J. J.; Page, B. W. B.; Pyper, P. A.; Raw, W. V.; Schwarz, H. H.; Slabbert, F. van Z.; Streicher, D. M.; Suzman, H.; Van Coller, C. A.; Van den Heever, S. A.; Van Eck, H. J.; Van Hoogstraten, H. A.; Von Keyserlingk, C. C.; Waddell, G. H.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Webber, W. T.; Wood, L. F.

Tellers: E. L. Fisher and W. M. Sutton. Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 6:

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the following amendments, as printed in my name on the Order Paper—

I should like, very briefly, to state our attitude to the provisions of this clause. Firstly, in so far as the powers of the Attorney-General to prohibit release on bail or otherwise are concerned, we accept that in certain circumstances it may be necessary to refuse bail, but, as we have indicated, we are opposed to and cannot support the provisions as set out in the proposed section 12A. The Attorney-General may, in terms of subsection (1), in fact virtually prohibit bail indefinitely while a trial is pending. The State can take its own time in choosing when to bring a matter to court, and a trial may take a tremendously long time. We believe, therefore, that at the very least there should be a limitation on the period for which a person may be refused bail in terms of this provision. The reason for my first amendment, then, is to limit that period to a maximum of three months.

Although the proposed new sections 12B and 12C, which are inserted by this clause, are not new provisions in our law, our attitude in this regard is that we are utterly opposed to section 12B in its entirety. This whole provision, relating to the detention of witnesses, is something which is utterly wrong and, as I have said, we are utterly opposed to it. However, because this is likely to be passed despite our objections, I have moved my second amendment, which will have the effect that the spouse, children and the legal adviser of the person detained will have access to that person. Let me remind you, Sir, that this person who is detained is not someone who it is alleged is guilty of any offence. He is not a person who is being detained because it is in the national interest or because there is a threat to the security of the State, or anything like that. He is merely a person whom it is desired to have give evidence in a trial.

There seems to be no reason why a person who is a witness should not have access to his spouse, his children and his legal adviser. I have also raised previously, in the Second Reading, the point that in terms of this legislation witnesses are being detained, and this could disrupt their family and business life, lose them their jobs, cause them to suffer mental trauma and economic losses as the result of separation from their families and businesses. Except for the provision to pay witness fees, there is no question of compensation to people who are, by admission, only witnesses and not persons who have committed offences.

I now come to the third amendment. In the proposed new section 12B(5) it is stated—

However, there is no provision for anything to be done once the magistrate visits the detainee. There is no obligation on the magistrate to do anything at all. We want to suggest that the magistrate should prepare a report and submit that report to the hon. the Minister, and that that report should be tabled in Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, as the hon. member for Yeoville has pointed out, this clause has three parts, two of which he dealt with. The first part relates to the powers of the Attorney-General to prohibit the release of accused persons on bail, the second part relates to the power of the Attorney-General to detain witnesses under warrant pending the conclusion of a criminal trial and the third part relates to the power of the State President, from time to time by proclamation, to augment the list of offences in a schedule to which the powers of detention under warrant of the Attorney-General apply in respect of both witnesses and accused persons. This means to say that the field of operation of warrants issued by the Attorney-General can be extended in terms of the proposed new section 12C by proclamation by the State President in the Gazette. As is apparent from the amendments on the Order Paper, we in the official Opposition are opposed to the proposed new section 12C which enables the extension of the offences listed in a schedule which will be discussed in clause 9.

As far as the other sections of the clause are concerned, the power to detain an accused person in the cases mentioned, which is simply a re-enactment, in a different piece of legislation, of the laws enacted by this House in 1965, has our support in principle. I shall not repeat the reasons, furnished to this House during Second Reading, as to why such powers are necessary. The reason devolves largely upon the propensity of accused persons, in offences of this kind, to estreat their bail, because the money is not put up by them, and so not to stand trial. I must say that the amendments moved by the hon. member for Yeoville, in regard to this aspect of the matter, seem reasonable and will be supported by us.

I now come to the second section of the clause, i.e. the detention of witnesses. We are opposed to that today, as we were when this identical section was enacted in the General Law Amendment Act of 1965. Once again I am not going to repeat the arguments which were stated during the Second Reading debate other than to say that there ought and, having regard to the statements of the hon. the Minister in that debate, must be better ways of protecting a witness from ill-treatment from outside than by putting him in gaol, particularly if he does not seek that protection himself.

So far as the proposed amendments by the hon. member for Yeoville are concerned, those in regard to the detention of witnesses, I want to say that they are reasonable and have our support. I would suggest that one could go even further than the hon. gentleman has gone in so far as his second amendment is concerned. He suggests that access should be made available to the spouse, children and legal adviser of the person detained, but there are persons who have neither spouse nor children and I would suggest that next-of-kin might also be included to satisfy that category.

Will you move that?

I think it is to be moved by somebody else on this side, but if not, I shall move it.

It is to be moved.

Summarizing what I have already said, it follows that we are opposed to clause 6.

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the amendments moved by the hon. member for Yeoville. You will see that there is also an amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper. The amendment seeks the omission of the entire proposed section 12B which is the 180-day provision. I opposed this law when it was introduced in 1965 and I oppose it even though I realize fully it is simply being transferred from one Act to another in order to simplify procedure.

I do not want to cover all the ground which I went over when I opposed the 180-day provision at Second Reading and in the Committee Stage in 1965. I am glad to say that this provision was one which the official Opposition opposed at Second Reading as well as in the Committee Stage, unlike the preventive detention clause, the 90-day provision and others.

Meeow!

Order!

Well, the hon. members can make all the animal noises they like, but I know that it is unpleasant to be reminded of the history of the UP in connection with laws of this kind. However, the point I want to make to the hon. the Minister is that if my memory is correct—I should have done research on this, but unfortunately it only just occurred to me—this provision has hardly been used at all over the past few years. Am I right in saying that most of the questions which I put to the hon. the Minister on the number of persons detained under section 215 bis of the Criminal Procedure Act the answer has been a very small number if any at all? Will the hon. the Minister tell me if I am right in that recollection?

Yes, that is correct.

They have therefore hardly used this provision and the reason is clear. They do not use the 1965 Act which allows for the detention of witnesses because they have the Terrorism Act. It is much easier just to pop people in in terms of the Terrorism Act because you do not have to answer any questions about them and nobody has any access and so on. It is true that under the 180-day law no access was given in terms of the law and therefore it is necessary for the hon. member for Yeoville to move this amendment. However, I did get an undertaking from the then Minister of Justice during the debate on that clause that obviously witnesses would be allowed to see their relatives and so on, because, he said to me, since these are witnesses to be used for the State, they will obviously be treated as kindly as possible. I remember very clearly that undertaking being given during those debates.

Did I say that?

No, it was one of your predecessors. You were not the Minister of Justice in 1965; the hon. the Prime Minister was then the Minister of Justice.

What a good one!

Well, let us not go into that. All I can say is that if he was such a good one, I did get the undertaking from him at the time that because the State wanted to use these people it would obviously not want to antagonize them and therefore these witnesses would be very kindly treated indeed by the State. If he was such a good Minister of Justice, then I am sure that this Minister of Justice would like to follow his example and not only give an assurance to the House, but translate it into actual law. In any case the Government has hardly used this at all, because the Terrorism Act is so much handier and so much easier since it does not require any account to be given of ministerial or police actions under the Terrorism Act.

Mr. Chairman, I therefore move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, we have now come to that stage of the Bill where the hon. the Minister is asking us to include three new provisions. The first one is to provide that the Attorney-General may prohibit or disallow the granting of bail. The second one, as has been indicated by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana, is abhorrent to us. Thereby the hon. the Minister asks that the Attorney-General may, by warrant, detain a witness, whether he has asked for protection or whether he has not. The third one, of course, is the provision that the State President may from time to time, by proclamation, remove or add to the schedule of the offences mentioned in clause 9 of the Bill.

This question of detention of any person without trial is something which is absolutely foreign to us, but the aspect—I cannot discuss the principle now and I do not intend to do so—which worries me particularly is the fact that people simply disappear. I believe that the hon. the Minister, in asking for this power, must give a quid pro quo.

The quid pro quo which, I believe, is required is that there should be an onus on the State—somebody involved in the administration of this particular Act, when it becomes one—to make it known that somebody has been detained. Whether such person is in custody in terms of the new section 10(1)(a)bis, which is embodied in clause 4—that means someone who is being detained—or whether it is somebody who is detained as a witness for his own protection, or for whatever reason, we believe there should be an onus on the State to make known the fact that such person has been taken into custody. I believe that onus should be placed directly on the State, the onus of notifying the next of kin.

For this reason I framed an amendment which, in the light of conventions which exist in this House, I have distributed among the hon. the Minister, the Clerk, the Chairman and the Chief Whip of the PRP. It has been accepted in the past that, when somebody has the courtesy of handing out copies of amendments intended to be moved, that confidence is respected and plagiarism does not result therefrom.

This was not done.

Sir, as a result of what has happened this afternoon …

I asked for next of kin to be informed way back in 1963.

… I am afraid I must say now in all seriousness that, at last, I know what the letters “PRP” stand for. I have come to the conclusion that they stand for “Political Robbers and Plagiarists”! [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member must withdraw those words.

I withdraw the words, Sir.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member must please return to the clause under discussion.

You are just being petty! [Interjections.]

No, Sir, it is not a question of being petty. It is a question of placing on record the principles which have been adhered to in this House. Mr. Chairman, you are aware of this yourself. You have done your best to maintain the dignity of this House.

I must inform the hon. member that I am not going to allow discussion on those lines. We are not dealing with that.

Well, Sir, because of this, and for the reasons I have stated— together with those stated by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana—I now wish to move the following amendment—

From the amendment you will see, Sir, that I have incorporated all three provisions which are contained in the Bill relating to detention. I believe that, in all three of those cases, it is only humanitarian. If I can appeal to the hon. the Minister on the grounds of humanitarianism, on the grounds of compassion, rather than on the grounds of legality…

Order! I have had time to consider the amendment I am afraid that I am unable to accept it as it seeks to introduce a new and important principle not contemplated by the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, I accept your ruling, and in doing so, would like to appeal to the hon. the Minister to consider this idea we have now given him from this side of the House. I wonder whether he would not consider introducing an amendment of that nature when he takes the Bill to the Other Place.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Subsection (7) of the proposed section 12B states—

In that way it excludes the courts completely from dealing with a witness who has been detained in terms of these provisions.

Order! In order to avoid unnecessary debate, I would like to point out that I have carefully considered these amendments and regret that I am unable to accept them as they are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, may I query your ruling not as regards the first amendment, but in regard to the second amendment and just put it to you …

Order! The hon. member must abide by my ruling.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The amendment affects the proposed section 12C, in clause 6 of the Bill. It provides—

In other words, the schedule to the Bill could be added to. I am actually more concerned about the fact that offences may be added to the schedule. The point I want to put to the hon. the Minister is the fact that the Bill deals specifically with a certain aspect of our criminal code. It deals with the question of communism, and it also deals with further activities, all of which have been illustrated by amendments to other sections of the principal Act in this particular Bill. We are now fully aware of what is involved. It is the usual procedure in all statutes which come before us, including the Criminal Code itself, that reservations of this nature are carefully set out in a schedule and that changes to that schedule take place, in terms of parliamentary practice, with the approval of Parliament itself. One need only look at page 15 of the Bill to see this very fact illustrated more graphically where certain amendments are made to part IIbis of the Criminal Procedure Act.

I appeal in all earnestness to the hon. the Minister to accept the amendment, because we know exactly what the Bill is dealing with. If the hon. the Minister wants to say: “The State President may from time to time by proclamation in the Gazette remove from … the schedule …”, then it is up to him, or he can only say that the proclamation shall be in respect of matters set out in the schedule. The schedule, clause 9, itself states—

And now comes the important part—

Every person who is detained, whether it be as a witness or whether as an accused, should know what he is faced with and the ambit of the crime. I do not think I am asking very much of the hon. the Minister if I ask him to give attention to the amendment I have moved.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Umhlatuzana suggested that the words “or other next-of-kin” be inserted in the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville, an amendment to the effect that the words “the spouse, children and legal adviser of the person detained and” should be inserted in line 51, page 11. I now move as an amendment to amendment (2) moved by the hon. member for Yeoville—

This simply follows the suggestion made by the hon. member for Umhlatuzana.

Mr. Chairman, I am just rising to say that I am not prepared to accept any of the amendments. The issue here, is two sections of the existing Criminal Procedure Act which have simply been transferred to the Bill. We have been living with these two sections for many years. They work perfectly well. There have never been any complaints about them. The hon. member for Houghton herself said that the one section is very seldom used, anyway. I always receive a report about it. Therefore, I am not prepared to tamper in any way with the existing legislation, which has simply been transferred.

I want to assure the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South that it is the practice of the S.A. Police—the hon. member is shaking his head, but I can assure him that this is the case—to inform, where possible, immediately, or as soon as possible, the next-of-kin when someone is arrested, except in cases where it is not in the interests of the security of the State to do so. Although I am not prepared to write what he is asking into the legislation, I am prepared to assure him that I shall ask the Commissioner of Police to request, by means of a circular, that the next-of-kin of the person who is arrested be informed as soon as possible, except in cases where the police feel that it is not in the interest of the security of the State. In most cases, I believe, this will not apply. At the moment, where possible, we give notice of any arrests.

What about the hon. member for Jeppe’s amendment?

I said that I am not accepting any amendments. [Interjections.] The hon. member can see clearly from the Bill that the State President may have a proclamation published in the Gazette. It therefore appears in the Gazette. The hon. member’s argument was that people may not know about it. However, it appears in the Gazette and can therefore be debated here.

Mr. Chairman, what I put to the hon. the Minister is what was the practice, usage and custom in regard to all criminal legislation in this country over the years. Schedules to legislation of this nature were always amended by Parliament by means of an amending Bill. I stated that a practical example of this was to be found on page 15 of the Bill. I also said in passing that every person should know the ambit of the alleged crime. However, the main requirement is that an amendment should be effected by Parliament and not by proclamation, because this opens the door to practices which are foreign to the practice of the House.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.